NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers' Meeting 30 Nov to 1 Dec Policy Brief

NATO FOREIGN
MINISTERS’ MEETING
30 Nov.–1 Dec. 2021
Policy Brief
175 SPE 21 E | Original: English | December 2021
This Policy Brief is presented for information only and does not
represent the official view of the Assembly.
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NATO's Parlamentariske Forsamling 2021-22
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I. RUSSIA: MILITARY BUILD-UP IN AND AROUND UKRAINE
• Ministers discussed Russia’s large and unusual concentration of combat-ready
forces and military materiel in and around Ukraine (incl. heavy equipment,
armoured vehicles, tanks, unmanned aerial vehicles and electronic warfare systems).
This is the second surge in 2021. In the spring, Moscow engaged in the largest
massing of forces since 2014, leaving most of them in place. NATO Secretary General
Jens Stoltenberg stressed that the situation raises tensions, risks miscalculations and
“remains fluid and unpredictable.” Russia’s intentions are unclear, but the surge in
forces and materiel is “unprovoked”, “unjustified and unexplained”, he said.
• Heightened aggressive rhetoric and disinformation from Moscow has accompanied
this build-up, which “approach[es] levels last seen in the leadup to Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine in 2014,” noted US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken during a press
conference with Mr Stoltenberg. Secretary Blinken expressed deep concern regarding
“evidence that Russia has made plans for significant aggressive moves against
Ukraine”, incl. destabilisation from within and large-scale military operations.
• NATO’s main goal is to deter further Russian aggression against Ukraine, while
also remaining prepared to deal with the use of military force by Russia if need
be.
• Ministers called on Russia to be transparent, de-escalate and reduce tensions.
Mr Stoltenberg made clear that “Any future Russian aggression against Ukraine
would come at a high price. And have serious political and economic consequences
for Russia.” Asked about the type of measures Allies would envisage, Mr Stoltenberg
listed “economic sanctions, financial sanctions, political reactions, but also as you have
seen the readiness of NATO to protect and defend all Allies, as we have done with
increased presence in eastern part of the Alliance.”
• Ministers made clear that Russia must not misunderstand or miscalculate when it
comes to NATO’s resolve to defend and protect all Allies. “Allies agree that we
need to have the plans in place to be sure that we are always able to protect all Allies
against any potential threat”, Mr Stoltenberg noted, adding “We can of course hope for
the best, but we need to be prepared for the worst.” To highlight this resolve, the
NATO Secretary General visited the NATO Multinational Battlegroup – Latvia in
Adazi, Latvia, together with Mélanie Joly, Foreign Minister of Canada, which serves as
the framework nation for this battlegroup. The battlegroup is the largest of four,
NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, 30 NOV–1 DEC 2021:
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Agenda
• Russia: military build-up in and around Ukraine
• Ukraine and Georgia
• Belarus: use of migrants to pressure Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania
• NATO’s role in support of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
• Strategic Concept 2022
• Afghanistan: lessons learned and supporting the fight against terrorism
• Western Balkans: focus on Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina
Additional notes
• Joint NATO-EU visit to Lithuania and Latvia on Sunday 28 November
• A session was held with Georgia and Ukraine’s Foreign Ministers.
• NATO Partners Sweden and Finland, as well as EU High Representative attended
the discussion on the Western Balkans.
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established in 2016 under NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence to strengthen the
defence and deterrence posture in the eastern part of the Alliance.
• Mr Stoltenberg made clear that even if Ukraine is not covered by the Alliance’s
Article 5 collective defence clause, NATO and individual Allies have means to support
Ukraine, incl. through political and practical support, e.g. capacity building, training,
provision of equipment and advice as well as information sharing. Ministers
commended Ukraine for the measured response to Russia’s continued
provocations.
• Allies reaffirmed their commitment to a dual-track approach to Russia, i.e.
maintaining strong defence and deterrence and remaining open for dialogue. Over the
last 18 months, Allies have repeatedly invited Russia to a NATO-Russia Council,
but Moscow has yet to answer. Mr Stoltenberg noted that “dialogue is vital.
Unfortunately, Russia has recently decided to cut diplomatic ties with NATO. We call
on Russia to reverse this decision. And to re-engage in the NATO-Russia Council.”
• See President Connolly’s statement on the issue here.
II. UKRAINE AND GEORGIA
• On 1 December, ministers discussed Black Sea security and Russian regional
aggression in a meeting with Foreign Ministers David Zalkaliani of Georgia and
Dmytro Kuleba of Ukraine. Both are long-standing and close NATO partners aspiring
for membership.
• Ministers stressed their unwavering support for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Georgia and Ukraine and the need to remain vigilant to Russia’s
continued aggressive and destabilising actions against its neighbours. Again,
ministers made clear that Russian aggression would come at a high price, with serious
political and economic consequences.
• Ministers also expressed their continued commitment to enhance their political
and practical support to these NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partners. Allies are,
inter alia, strengthening their capabilities to defend themselves, increasing training and
exercising with NATO, providing maritime support, and sharing information.
• NATO ministers made clear they stand by their decisions on future membership,
made at the 2008 Summit in Bucharest.
• Ministers also voiced the importance of further reforms in both countries to
strengthen the rule of law and democracy, fight corruption and transform the defence
and security sector.
III. BELARUS: USE OF MIGRANTS TO PRESSURE POLAND, LATVIA, AND
LITHUANIA
• Ministers addressed the Lukashenko regime’s hybrid campaign of exploiting
vulnerable people to put pressure on Poland, Latvia and Lithuania through
forced migration. Mr Stoltenberg called Lukashenko’s actions “cynical” and
“inhumane”.
• Ministers made clear that they stand in full solidarity with the Allies affected. “No
Ally stands alone,” Mr Stoltenberg underlined. Notably, NATO recently deployed a
counter-hybrid team of experts to Lithuania to share information, analysis and
experience.
• On this issue, NATO cooperates closely with the European Union (EU), as the
crisis affects both organisations and its members. Ahead of the ministerial meeting,
Mr Stoltenberg visited Vilnius and Riga, together with Ursula von der Leyen, President
of the European Commission. Mr Stoltenberg noted they discussed “how we could
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step up our joint work, incl. through a joint NATO-EU declaration, because we are
stronger and safer when we work together.”
• Ahead of the ministerial meeting, Mr Stoltenberg discussed the issue with Poland’s
President Andrzej Duda.
• In November 2021, Allies suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation with
Belarus, but NATO maintains dialogue as necessary.
• See President Connolly’s statement on the issue here.
IV. NATO’S ROLE IN SUPPORT OF ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND
NON-PROLIFERATION
• Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation remain a NATO priority. Allies
support the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. However, Allies maintain their
position that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear
alliance”.
• The ministers noted their concern about worrying trends, such as Russia and China’s
efforts to expand their nuclear arsenals, efforts to undermine or abrogate long-standing
treaties as well as emerging and disruptive technologies changing the nature of
conflict.
• Ministers voiced their determination to lead a renewed effort to strengthen arms
control, incl. on disruptive technologies and in dialogue with China, because “in a
more dangerous world, we need more predictability and more transparency”,
Mr Stoltenberg stated.
• Asked by the press about the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
and Germany and Norway’s consideration of attending as observers, Mr Stoltenberg
reiterated that all NATO Allies agree not to become parties to the TPNW, because they
believe in “balanced, verifiable arms control, not unilateral arms control”. He welcomed
the incoming German government’s intention to continue to consult with other Allies on
the TPNW.
V. STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022
• For the first time, Mr Stoltenberg shared his ideas for NATO’s next Strategic Concept.
He outlined five essential elements at the Riga Public Diplomacy Conference just
prior to the ministerial meetings.
1. Protecting our values: Mr Stoltenberg listed the defence of democratic values as the
first priority. His statements on this issue were the strongest so far and very much
echoed the NATO PA’s own analysis: “NATO was created to defend democracy,
freedom, and the rule of law. These values define who we are. They are not optional
[…]. These values are under pressure. Both from outside our Alliance and from within
our own nations […]. So more than ever, we need to demonstrate the strength of our
democratic model. And protect our values. Abroad and at home.”
2. Reinforcing our military power: “we must continue to strengthen and modernise
our deterrence and defence. We need to ensure our militaries are ready and prepared
for any threat. With the right equipment. The right training. And the right skills.”
3. Strengthening our societies (societal resilience): “our people and our institutions
must be able to better resist and bounce back from attacks. Our infrastructure must be
more resilient. And our supply chains more diverse and secure. […] this must be a
collective effort […] Because we are only as strong as our weakest link.”
4. Taking a global outlook: “NATO is, and will remain, an alliance of Europe and North
America. But our region faces global security challenges. They require global
awareness and global reach.” To address them, Mr Stoltenberg advocated intensifying
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cooperation with NATO’s Asia-Pacific partners (Australia, Japan, South Korea and
New Zealand); engaging more with other countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America;
and further strengthening cooperation with the EU and NATO’s partners in Europe.
5. Building NATO as the institutional link between Europe and North America: Allies
must continue to invest in NATO politically, militarily and financially. “NATO is a
powerful idea. […] But NATO is more than an idea. It is an idea nested in a strong
institution.”
• Ministers held a working dinner on 30 November to discuss NATO’s key challenges.
• A first working draft of the new Strategic Concept is expected in the spring of
2022. NATO Heads of State and Government will endorse the new document at
the Madrid Summit in June 2022.
VI. AFGHANISTAN: LESSONS LEARNED REPORT AND SUPPORTING THE FIGHT
AGAINST TERROR
• Following the rapid collapse of the Afghan government and forces in August, a
comprehensive political and military assessment was conducted, with the active
involvement of Allies and outside experts.
• The assessment’s key recommendations and conclusions should inform NATO’s
political and military leaders if and when they consider and direct future crisis
management operations:
1. In an increasingly complex security environment, crisis management should remain
a core task for NATO. Mr Stoltenberg noted the Alliance cannot rule out that similar
large military operations will be needed in the future again and should be prepared.
2. The international community’s level of ambition in Afghanistan ultimately extended far
beyond degrading terrorist safe havens. In the future, Allies should continuously
assess strategic interests, set achievable goals and remain aware of the dangers of
mission creep.
3. NATO should ensure training efforts create more self-sustaining local forces.
4. On consultation, Mr Stoltenberg welcomed the consultations this year and the joint
decision to end the NATO mission, but noted “we would have benefitted from more
meaningful discussions on the negotiations of the US-Taliban agreement concluded in
February last year.”
5. Based on the experience of the Kabul airlift, NATO should explore how to strengthen
its ability to conduct short-notice, large scale non-combatant evacuation efforts,
either through the NATO Response Force or as a stand-alone force.
6. Additional recommendations include maintaining interoperability with partners and
greater consideration of political and cultural norms of host nations, in addition
to their ability to absorb capacity-building and training.
• NATO achieved its main goal – to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe
haven for international terrorist organisations – aims to preserve this gain, by holding
the Taliban accountable and being ready to strike from distance, over the horizon.
• NATO ministers agreed to maintain efforts to fight terrorism, incl. through increased
efforts on partner training and capacity building, e.g. in Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia.
VII. WESTERN BALKANS: FOCUS ON KOSOVO AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
• Ministers discussed security and stability in the Western Balkans, with a focus on the
recent rise in tensions in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has been
exacerbated by the increase in aggressive rhetoric, stalled reforms and external
interference.
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• Ministers noted their resolve to continue to promote regional stability, security,
and cooperation. Further, ministers agreed on the importance of maintaining a strong
presence, incl. through NATO’s KFOR mission in Kosovo and its offices in Belgrade
and Sarajevo.
• Mr Stoltenberg stressed Allies’ strong support for the integrity of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and concern about Milorad Dodik’s “inflammatory rhetoric”, which “is just
undermining the Dayton Agreement and the efforts to build a stable, multi-ethnic
Bosnia and Herzegovina”.
• NATO’s cooperation in the region with the EU remains essential. Both organisations
will continue to hone their abilities to work together to preserve stability and support
necessary reforms.
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