COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Subsidiarity Grid Accompanying the document DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and Regulation (EU) 2015/757

Tilhører sager:

Aktører:


    2_EN_autre_document_travail_service_part1_v4.pdf

    https://www.ft.dk/samling/20211/kommissionsforslag/kom(2021)0551/forslag/1800080/2429477.pdf

    EN EN
    EUROPEAN
    COMMISSION
    Brussels, 14.7.2021
    SWD(2021) 557 final
    COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
    Subsidiarity Grid
    Accompanying the document
    DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
    amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission
    allowance trading within the Union, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the
    establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas
    emission trading scheme and Regulation (EU) 2015/757
    {COM(2021) 551 final} - {SEC(2021) 551 final} - {SWD(2021) 601 final} -
    {SWD(2021) 602 final}
    Europaudvalget 2021
    KOM (2021) 0551 - SWD-dokument
    Offentligt
    1
    Subsidiarity Grid
    1. Ca the U io a t? What is the legal asis a d o pete e of the U io s’ i te ded a tio ?
    1.1 Which article(s) of the Treaty are used to support the legislative proposal or policy initiative?
    The legal basis for this proposal amending Directive is Article 192 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
    the European Union (TFEU). In accordance with Article 191 and 192(1) TFEU, the European Union
    shall contribute to the pursuit, inter alia, of the following objectives: preserving, protecting and
    improving the quality of the environment; promoting measures at international level to deal with
    regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change.
    1.2 Is the Union competence represented by this Treaty article exclusive, shared or supporting in
    nature?
    I the ase of e iro e t, the U io s o pete e is shared.
    Subsidiarity does not apply for policy areas where the Union has exclusive competence as defined in
    Article 3 TFEU1
    . It is the specific legal basis which determines whether the proposal falls under the
    subsidiarity control mechanism. Article 4 TFEU2
    sets out the areas where competence is shared
    between the Union and the Member States. Article 6 TFEU3
    sets out the areas for which the Unions
    has competence only to support the actions of the Member States.
    2. Subsidiarity Principle: Why should the EU act?
    2.1 Does the proposal fulfil the procedural requirements of Protocol No. 24
    :
    - Has there been a wide consultation before proposing the act?
    - Is there a detailed statement with qualitative and, where possible, quantitative indicators
    allowing an appraisal of whether the action can best be achieved at Union level?
    In order to collect evidence and ensure greater transparency, the Commission first invited feedback
    on an inception impact assessment, outlining the initial considerations and policy options of the
    revision5
    . The Commission then organised an online public consultation, receiving almost 500
    replies6
    . To support the initiative concerning carbon pricing for maritime transport, a targeted
    stakeholder survey was carried out accompanied by a targeted interview programme7
    .
    1
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E003&from=EN
    2
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E004&from=EN
    3
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E006:EN:HTML
    4
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016E/PRO/02&from=EN
    5
    The inception impact assessment was open for feedback from 29 October 2020 to 26 November 2020 and
    received about 250 contributions. The outcome can be found on the following website:
    https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12660-Updating-the-EU-Emissions-
    Trading-System.
    6
    This was open for 12 weeks from 13 November 2020 to 5 February 2021. The outcome can be found on the
    following website: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12660-Updating-
    the-EU-Emissions-Trading-System/public-consultation.
    2
    In addition, the Commission held (virtual) bilateral and multilateral stakeholder meetings, including
    with industry representatives across different sectors, trade unions, non-governmental organisations
    and Member States and participated in virtual conferences. Finally, the Commission instructed a
    contractor to organise two expert workshops8
    on the review of the Market Stability Reserve (MSR).
    The results of the consultation activities are reported in the impact assessment accompanying this
    proposal.
    Articles 191 to 193 of the TFEU confirm and specify EU competencies in the area of climate change.
    Climate change is a trans-boundary problem, which cannot be solved by national or local action
    alone. Coordination of climate action must be taken at European level and, where possible, at global
    level. EU action is justified on grounds of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European
    Union. Since 1992, the European Union has worked to develop joint solutions and drive forward
    global action to tackle climate change. More specifically, action at EU level will provide for cost
    effective delivery of the 2030 and long-term emission reduction objectives while ensuring fairness
    and environmental integrity.
    In light of the emission reduction target for 2030, and in the perspective of the climate neutrality
    objective to be achieved by 2050, stronger EU action is needed.
    The explanatory memorandum of the proposal, and the impact assessment under chapter 3, contain
    sections on the principle of subsidiarity.
    2.2 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying the
    Co issio ’s p oposal o tai a ade uate justifi atio ega di g the o fo ity with the
    principle of subsidiarity?
    Yes, they do. The explanatory memorandum (as well as the accompanying impact assessment)
    explain that climate change is by its very nature a trans-boundary challenge that cannot be solved by
    national or local action alone. Coordinated EU action can effectively supplement and reinforce
    national and local action and enhances climate action.
    Although initiatives at the national, regional and local level can create synergies, alone they will not
    e suffi ie t. O their o , i di idual Me er States ar o arkets would represent too small a
    market to achieve the same level of results. Therefore, an EU wide approach is needed to drive
    industry level changes and to create economies of scale.
    2.3 Based on the answers to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed action be
    achieved sufficiently by the Member States acting alone (necessity for EU action)?
    This proposal aims increase the contribution of emissions trading in a manner commensurate with
    the overall EU emissions reduction target of at least 55% for 2030. This objective cannot be achieved
    by the Member States alone as it requires cost-efficient emissions reductions across the Union and
    increased resources that can only be achieved through the EU-level carbon market.
    (a) Are there significant/appreciable transnational/cross-border aspects to the problems being
    tackled? Have these been quantified?
    7
    The stakeholder survey run from December 2020 and February 2021, and the targeted interview programme
    from January 2021 to February 2021.
    8
    https://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/expert-workshop-market-stability-reserve_en,
    https://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/2nd-expert-workshop-market-stability-reserve_en.
    3
    Climate change is a trans-boundary problem and both international and EU action can effectively
    complement and reinforce regional, national and local action. The European Climate Law9
    , as agreed
    by the co-legislators, akes the EU s li ate eutralit target legall i di g, a d raises the
    ambition by setting a target of at least 55% net emission reductions by 2030 compared to 1990. The
    EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) covers 41% of the EU's greenhouse gas emissions. The
    environmental contribution of the ETS needs to be increased in a manner commensurate with the
    overall EU target for 2030. If the legislation remains unchanged, sectors currently covered by the ETS
    would together achieve a 2030 emission reduction of 51% compared to 2005 (see Section 5.1 of the
    impact assessment). This would be an insufficient contribution to an overall target of -55% compared
    to 1990. The policy scenarios that achieve around 55% reductions project a cost-effective
    contribution of the sectors currently covered by the ETS in the range of -62-63% compared to 2005.
    (b) Would national action or the absence of the EU level action conflict with core objectives of
    the Treaty10
    or significantly damage the interests of other Member States?
    Urgent economy-wide emission reductions to combat climate change are necessary to fulfil the
    objectives of Article 192 TFUE, of preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the
    environment, protecting human health, as well as to promote measures at international level to deal
    li ate ha ge. The a se e of EU le el a tio ould lead to e iro e tal du pi g et ee the
    Member States, where Member States compete for the least stringent climate change measures to
    benefit their own economies, damaging the internal market and weakening climate action. An urgent
    climate transition requires a high degree of investments. As a result, foregoing the benefits of
    economies of scale and the possibility of reducing emissions where they are more cost-effective,
    would result in a slower climate transition due to increased costs and less available funds.
    (c) To what extent do Member States have the ability or possibility to enact appropriate
    measures?
    Member States are able to act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that are under the scope of the
    EU ETS through other policies than emission limits adopted pursuant to Directive 2010/75/EU.
    However, they are not able to establish an EU-level carbon market. In particular, national action
    remains important in the areas of buildings and road transport, for which a separate EU level
    emissions trading system is proposed as additional economic incentive to achieve cost-effective
    emission reductions.
    (d) How does the problem and its causes (e.g. negative externalities, spill-over effects) vary
    across the national, regional and local levels of the EU?
    The effects of raising the contribution of emissions trading towards a higher emissions reduction
    target will not be felt equally across the EU, as their starting point in terms of the emissions in the
    sectors covered by the Directive are not the same. Some Member States will be more affected than
    others. Increasing the contribution of the ETS to achieve the revised target will require investments
    in the energy systems and the greening of industrial processes in Member States where
    modernisation needs are already the highest. Regions and local communities in which employment is
    linked to fossil fuel production are impacted more significantly than others. Furthermore, there are
    distributional concerns within Member States, as low-income households across the EU will bear a
    9
    Regulation (EU) 2021/... of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... establishing the framework for
    achieving climate neutrality a d a e di g Regulatio s EC No / a d EU / Europea
    Cli ate La OJ L ... .
    10
    https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en
    4
    relatively higher burden notably in terms of heating fuel expenses compared to wealthier
    households. Hence, there are likely to be different distributional issues that emerge if the EU
    emissions trading is expanded to new sectors. At the same time, there will be also positive social
    impacts, like an improvement concerning health issues linked with air pollution. In addition,
    emissions trading generates auction revenues which can be used by Member States to address these
    problems, including if there were specific problems at regional or local level.
    (e) Is the problem widespread across the EU or limited to a few Member States?
    The need to address climate change is widespread across the EU.
    (f) Are Member States overstretched in achieving the objectives of the planned measure?
    The ETS Directive establishes a carbon market in the EU, without specific targets per Member State.
    Emission reductions take place where they are most cost-efficient. Nevertheless, the ETS Directive
    includes measures to mitigate the distributional and social effects of the ETS explained in point 2.3(d)
    above, reinforced by the proposal. Notably, the ETS Directive includes:
    - A solidarity redistribution provision consisting of the redistribution of 10% of the auctioned
    allowances to 16 low income MS (around 5% of the current overall cap or around 700 million
    allowances over the 2021-30 period)
    - The Modernisation Fund (up to 2025, 2% of the overall cap or around 275 million allowances
    over the 2021-30 period, from 2026 onwards 4% of the cap).
    - 150 million allowances issued under the new emissions trading system for road transport
    and buildings will be made available to increase the current Innovation Fund of 450 million
    allowances to stimulate the green transition.
    - Article 10c derogation applying to 10 low income Member States that can opt to give free
    allocation (of up to 40% of their regular auction volume) to investments in power generation
    for the modernisation of the energy sector (totalling about 630 million allowances over the
    2021-30 period).
    - [CBAM]
    In addition, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 establishes a market stability reserve for the ETS with an intake
    until 2025 that is only based on the 90% regular auctioning shares, exempting the 10% solidarity
    shares. The proposed new Regulation on a social facility for climate action addresses the social
    impacts of carbon pricing in the new emissions trading system for buildings and road transport.
    (g) How do the views/preferred courses of action of national, regional and local authorities
    differ across the EU?
    The ETS is widely supported across the Union. The different views or preferred courses of action do
    not relate to the use of the ETS in itself, but to aspects of its design.
    2.4 Based on the answer to the questions below, can the objectives of the proposed action be
    better achieved at Union level by reason of scale or effects of that action (EU added value)?
    The objectives of the proposed action be better achieved at Union level by reason of the cost-
    efficiency of emissions reductions, coherence of EU action, preserved functioning of the internal
    market and strengthened EU position to foster global action on climate change.
    (a) Are there clear benefits from EU level action?
    Yes. The benefits from EU level actions relate to the economies of scale and improvement of the EU
    internal market explained below. In addition, EU action can also inspire and pave the way for the
    5
    development of market based measures at global level, e.g. as regards the maritime transport within
    International Maritime Organisation. EU action also allows the EU to have a stronger position
    internationally to apply a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, which will be based on the ETS to
    ensure compliance with the World Trade Organisation rules.
    (b) Are there economies of scale? Can the objectives be met more efficiently at EU level (larger
    benefits per unit cost)? Will the functioning of the internal market be improved?
    Yes. As a carbon market, the ETS incentivises emission reductions to be made by the most cost-
    efficient solutions first across the activities it covers, achieving greater efficiency by virtue of its scale.
    Implementing a similar measure nationally would result in smaller, fragmented carbon markets,
    risking distortions of competition and likely lead to higher overall abatement costs. The same logic
    holds for the extension of carbon pricing to new sectors.
    Many of the policy elements of the proposal have an important internal market dimension, in
    particular the options related to the carbon leakage protection and the low-carbon funding
    mechanisms.
    (c) What are the benefits in replacing different national policies and rules with a more
    homogenous policy approach?
    The benefits of a more homogenous approach are highlighted in point 2.4(b) above. Emission
    reductions take place where they are most cost-effective, thus reducing the overall cost of the
    climate transition for the EU. Emissions reductions also take place without distorting the internal
    market, and preventing environmental dumping. As highlighted in point 2.3(c) above, for the new
    ETS for buildings and road transport, the aim is not to replace but to complement national policies.
    (d) Do the benefits of EU-level action outweigh the loss of competence of the Member States
    and the local and regional authorities (beyond the costs and benefits of acting at national,
    regional and local levels)?
    The benefits of EU-level action outweigh the loss of competence of the Member States and the local
    and regional authorities, because reducing greenhouse gas emissions is fundamentally a trans-
    boundary issue that requires urgent effective action at the largest possible scale. The EU, as a
    supranational organisation is well-placed to establish effective climate policy in the EU. Concretely,
    the benefits are the cost-efficiency of emissions reductions, coherent EU action, preserved
    functioning of the internal market and strengthened EU position to foster global action on climate
    change.
    (e) Will there be improved legal clarity for those having to implement the legislation?
    Yes. The wording of several provisions is improved (e.g. Article 10a(8) of the ETS Directive on the
    Innovation Fund).
    3. Proportionality: How the EU should act
    3.1 Does the explanatory memorandum (and any impact assessment) accompanying the
    Co issio ’s p oposal o tai a ade uate justifi atio ega di g the p opo tio ality of the
    proposal and a statement allowing appraisal of the compliance of the proposal with the
    principle of proportionality?
    Yes. The explanatory memorandum (as well as the accompanying impact assessment) explain that
    this proposal complies with the proportionality principle because it does not go beyond what is
    6
    necessary in order to achieve the U io s o je ti es of redu i g gree house gas e issio s i a ost-
    effective manner, while ensuring fairness and environmental integrity.
    The European Climate Law has endorsed an overall economy-wide and domestic reduction in
    greenhouse gas emissions of at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050.
    All options analysed for the strengthening of the existing ETS are based on the already existing
    instrument, the ETS Directive. The initiative is limited to ETS adjustment needs that are triggered by
    this increased emissions reduction target of at least 55%.
    The instrument of emissions trading ensures that additional costs for industry due to the increased
    le el of a itio of the EU s li ate poli ies are e pe ted to e kept to a minimum, given that the
    ETS incentivises emissions reduction by operators with the lowest abatement costs. Moreover, the
    use of the existing instruments minimises any additional administrative costs.
    3.2 Based on the answers to the questions below and information available from any impact
    assessment, the explanatory memorandum or other sources, is the proposed action an
    appropriate way to achieve the intended objectives?
    The proposal is the appropriate way forward to ensure that the sectors currently under the ETS, and
    those to which the system is extended, contribute to the reduction of emissions in line with the
    increased EU emissions reduction target for 2030. It reinforces a carbon pricing mechanism that has
    proved to be effective for those sectors already covered by the ETS, and extends it to sectors that
    currently are not reducing their emissions sufficiently, building on the lessons from the successfully
    established existing ETS.
    (a) Is the initiative limited to those aspects that Member States cannot achieve satisfactorily on
    their own, and where the Union can do better?
    Yes, the proposal is limited to a carbon pricing system in those sectors previously under the EU ETS,
    and those sectors that in the absence of additional measures would not decrease as much as
    required to be on a path to achieve an economy-wide 55% reduction in emissions (buildings, road
    transport, and the maritime sectors). These sectors are subject to regulatory measures but generally
    not subject to a carbon price and may therefore not be sufficiently incentivised to reduce their
    emissions. Carbon pricing is only one of the policies that will be necessary to achieve the level of
    emissions reductions required; Member States should make use of additional measures to trigger the
    reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
    (b) Is the form of Union action (choice of instrument) justified, as simple as possible, and
    coherent with the satisfactory achievement of, and ensuring compliance with the objectives
    pursued (e.g. choice between regulation, (framework) directive, recommendation, or
    alternative regulatory methods such as co-legislation, etc.)?
    The objectives of this proposal can be best pursued through a Directive. This is the most appropriate
    legal instrument to make amendments to the existing ETS Directive.
    A Directive requires Member States to achieve the objectives and implement the measures into their
    national substantive and procedural law systems. This approach gives the Member States more
    freedom when implementing an EU measure than does a Regulation, in that Member States are left
    the choice of the most appropriate means of implementing the measures in the Directive. This allows
    Member States to ensure that the amended rules are consistent with their existing substantive and
    procedural legal framework implementing the EU ETS, in particular regulating permits for
    installations as well as enforcement measures and penalties.
    (c) Does the Union action leave as much scope for national decision as possible while achieving
    satisfactorily the objectives set? (e.g. is it possible to limit the European action to minimum
    7
    standards or use a less stringent policy instrument or approach?)
    Yes, as a Directive is used, leaving to Member States the decision on how to achieve the objectives
    set out in Directive, where uniform conditions of implementation are not needed. For example, the
    ETS Directive leaves to the Member States the choice of excluding smaller installations under certain
    conditions, or of unilaterally including additional activities and gases. A less stringent policy
    instrument would not be adequate to establish an EU carbon market, that requires a common
    framework applying to all the Union to ensure equivalent application in all Member States. Else, the
    benefits of cost-efficient emissions reductions and prevention of environmental dumping would not
    be achieved.
    (d) Does the initiative create financial or administrative cost for the Union, national
    governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators or citizens? Are these costs
    commensurate with the objective to be achieved?
    The EU ETS generates significant revenues. At present most of those auction revenues accrue to
    Member States. The proposal affects national budgets and administrations primarily because it
    provides for the transfer of a share of ETS auction revenues to the EU budget. This is in line with the
    inter-institutional agreement of 16 December 202011
    , which requires the Commission to propose a
    limited own resource based on the EU ETS by mid-202112
    .
    Nevertheless, national budgets of Member States will benefit from the extension of the EU ETS scope
    to maritime transport and from the new emissions trading for road transport and buildings.
    The secure operation of the Union registry is funded from the Union budget. Extending the ETS scope
    to maritime transport and the new ETS for road transport and buildings will require additional
    resources for the secure operation of the Union registry, as specified in the financial statement
    accompanying this proposal. These resources will be made available through redeployment in the
    light of the budgetary and staffing constraints for European Public Administration under the current
    Multiannual Financial Framework while related operational expenditure will be funded with the LIFE
    programme envelope. IT development and procurement choices will be subject to pre-approval by
    the European Commission Information Technology and Cybersecurity Board.
    Financial and administrative costs are limited for those sectors already covered by the ETS. The
    covered e tities, ha e e o e er fa iliar ith the ETS s a ual o plia e le ased o
    obligations related monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions. Compliance with these rules
    is almost 100%. This also holds for the national authorities responsible for various implementing
    tasks, such as the issuing of emission permits, the assessment of monitoring plans and emission data,
    as well as the allocation of free allowances.
    A strengthening of the ETS does not affect these regular activities. However, as ambition increases
    and free allocation starts to decrease, industrial players may choose to become more active
    participants on the carbon market, increasing their hedging behaviour to better manage their
    compliance costs.
    The situation is different for the new sectors to which emissions trading may be extended.
    With regard to the maritime sector, the regulated entities, i.e. the ship-owners will already be
    familiar with the dedicated rules on monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions for their
    sector. These activities will have to be complemented by allowance management to ensure a
    sufficient number of allowances is acquired and surrendered in time.
    The regulated entities in the road transport and buildings sector have no experience with emissions
    trading or its practical implications. Putting the obligation upstream on the tax warehouses and on
    11
    OJ L 433I , 22.12.2020, p. 28–46
    12
    Proposal for a Council Decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own
    resources of the European Union (COM(2021) xxxx).
    8
    fuel suppliers implies however that those entities usually have experience in dealing with fuel
    taxation and related administrative procedures. Additional administrative tasks will be related to the
    particularities of an emissions trading system, such as obtaining a GHG emissions permit; opening
    and maintaining registry account(s), complying with monitoring, reporting and verification rules; and
    the timely purchasing and surrendering of allowances. No free allocation is envisaged for these
    sectors, hence the implementation for national authorities is simplified. Member States could decide
    to establish as the competent authority for the new sectors the same as the one actually responsible
    for the current EU ETS, reducing the administrative burden and benefitting from synergies.
    (e) While respecting the Union law, have special circumstances applying in individual Member
    States been taken into account?
    Yes, see point 2.2.(f).