COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT ANALYTICAL DOCUMENT Accompanying the document Consultation document Second phase consultation of social partners under Article 154 TFEU on a possible action addressing the challenges related to working conditions in platform work

EN EN
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 15.6.2021
SWD(2021) 143 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
ANALYTICAL DOCUMENT
Accompanying the document
Consultation document
Second phase consultation of social partners under Article 154 TFEU on a possible
action addressing the challenges related to working conditions in platform work
{C(2021) 4230 final}
Europaudvalget 2021
C (2021) 4230 - SWD-dokument
Offentligt
1
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................4
2. WHAT IS PLATFORM WORK AND WHY DOES IT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED .........7
2.1 What is platform work? .............................................................................................................7
2.2 The ‘triangular relationship’ underpinning platform work...................................................8
2.3 Who are the people working through platforms?....................................................................9
2.4 What types of digital labour platforms operate in the EU?..................................................15
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION .........................................................................................................19
3.1 External drivers of the problem ..............................................................................................21
3.1.1 Megatrends: globalisation, digitalisation and societal changes .....................................21
3.1.2 Growth in platform work..................................................................................................27
3.1.3. Increased use of workforce analytics, surveillance and algorithmic management.....30
3.2 Internal drivers related to the employment status.................................................................35
3.3 Internal drivers related to platforms’ algorithm-based business model..............................43
3.3.1 Lack of information, consultation and redress and unclear responsibilities in the use
of algorithmic tools .....................................................................................................................44
3.3.2 Information asymmetries and insufficient dialogue in platform work.........................46
3.4 Internal drivers related to the cross-border nature of platform work.................................50
3.5 Internal drivers related to the gaps of existing and forthcoming legislation.......................54
3.5.1 EU labour and social acquis..............................................................................................54
3.5.2 EU internal market acquis ................................................................................................57
3.5.3 National responses to the challenges of platform work..................................................60
3.6 Consequences of the problem...................................................................................................66
3.6.1 For people working through platforms............................................................................66
3.6.2 For digital labour platforms..............................................................................................72
3.6.3 For markets and consumers..............................................................................................73
3.6.4 For Member States.............................................................................................................74
4. EU COMPETENCE AND ADDED VALUE................................................................................75
4.1 Possible legal bases....................................................................................................................75
4.2 Necessity and EU added value .................................................................................................76
5. POLICY OBJECTIVES.................................................................................................................78
6. POLICY OPTIONS........................................................................................................................79
6.1 Baseline scenario against which the options are assessed......................................................79
2
6.2 Avenues for EU action..............................................................................................................80
6.2.1 Addressing misclassification in the employment status..................................................81
6.2.2 Introducing new rights related to algorithmic management .........................................83
6.2.3 Addressing the cross-border dimension...........................................................................84
6.2.4 Strengthening enforcement, collective representation and social dialogue ..................84
6.3 EU instruments..........................................................................................................................87
7. POLICY IMPACTS........................................................................................................................88
7.1 Social impacts............................................................................................................................88
7.2 Economic impacts .....................................................................................................................89
7.3 Impacts on public authorities...................................................................................................90
7.4 Other impacts............................................................................................................................91
Annex I: Examples of platform companies operating in different Member States ..................96
Annex II: Overview of the employment status of platform workers in the EU Member States
........................................................................................................................................................100
Annex III: Examples of policy developments in Member States regarding platform work ..105
Annex IV: Overview of relevant decisions by national courts or administrative bodies in EU
Member States on the employment status of people working through platforms ..................120
3
Glossary
For the purpose of this document, the terms below have the following meaning:
 “people working through platforms” refers to individuals providing services
intermediated with a greater or lesser extent of supervision via a digital labour platform,
regardless of these people’s legal employment status (worker, self-employed or any
third-category status). The term ‘platform worker’ is only used as an equivalent when
quoting official documents which contain such term;
 “digital labour platform”1
refers to a private internet-based company which
intermediates with a greater or lesser extent of supervision on-demand services,
requested by individual or corporate customers and provided directly or indirectly by
individuals, regardless of whether such services are performed on-location or online;
 “on-location labour platform” refers to a digital labour platform which only or mostly
intermediates services performed in the physical world, e.g. ride-hailing, food-delivery,
household tasks (cleaning, plumbing, caring…)
 “online labour platform” refers to a digital labour platform which only or mostly
intermediates services performed in the online world, e.g. AI-training, image tagging,
design projects, translations and editing work, software development;
 “platform work” refers to the services provided on demand and for remuneration by
people working through platforms, regardless of the type of digital labour platforms
(on-location vs online) or the level of skills required;
 “algorithmic management” means the greater or lesser extent of supervision exerted
by digital labour platforms through automated means over the assignment,
performance, evaluation, ranking, review of, and other actions concerning, the services
provided by people working through platforms;
 “false self-employment” occurs when a person is declared as self-employed while
fulfilling the conditions characteristic of an employment relationship. False self-
employed people are de facto employees of their contracting entity.
1
This document uses the term ‘platform’ interchangeably with ‘digital labour platform’.
4
1. INTRODUCTION
EU labour markets have been hit hard by the economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Unemployment and inactivity have increased, bringing a higher risk of precariousness to
several socio-demographic segments. Short-time work schemes introduced by Member
States, with support through EU instruments such as SURE, have helped mitigate the
negative consequences, but the crisis has exposed the poor working conditions of many
non-standard workers2, including people working through platforms, who are unable to
rely on a stable source of income, clear rights and adequate access to social protection, and
are likely to have less access to public support cushioning the negative employment impact of
the crisis.3
The pandemic has also cast light on the paramount importance of new technologies in
our daily lives. When workers left their factories and offices in the Spring of 2020, due to the
containment measures, many were able to simply switch on their computer at home and
telework with little or no substantial change to their working conditions, health and safety
risks and employment protection. Solid IT infrastructures and the digital preparedness of
companies kept thousands of businesses afloat and saved millions of jobs.
In order to reap their benefits, however, new technologies affecting the world of work
ought to be framed within clear legal frameworks, lest they challenge established rights
and norms. The European social model, based on a competitive social market economy and
strong social dialogue, requires companies to fully comply with labour and internal market
regulations, providing them in turn with legal certainty and the world’s largest single market
allowing for economies of scale and scope.
In the world of work, the digital transition is offering as many opportunities as
challenges. Platform work is a clear example: as a new, non-standard form of work
underpinned by rapidly evolving digital developments, such as widespread use of
smartphones and the ever ampler range of Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications, platform
work is and has been at the centre of legal disputes and policy debates in the EU, and beyond.
Some people working through platforms are unclear about their employment status,
their social and labour rights, as well as who is responsible for the surveillance, management
and supervision of their work. Digital labour platforms are spearheading the
phenomenon of algorithmic management (i.e. the digitally-driven automation of
managerial functions), which academics reckon is already spreading to more traditional forms
of work too.4
2
Eurofound (2021), COVID-19: Implications for employment and working life, Publications Office of the
European Union, Luxembourg. Aailable online.
3
Eurofound (2020), Platform economy: Developments in the COVID-19 crisis; available here.
4
Wood, A., Algorithmic Management: Consequences for Work Organisation and Working Conditions, Seville:
European Commission (2021), JRC124874. Available online.
5
Algorithmic management arguably conceals the real extent to which digital labour
platforms supervise and control the work of people working through them.5
Against the
background of the innovation, job opportunities and consumer welfare brought by digital
labour platforms to the EU, the aforementioned risks and legal conundrums raise questions on
the accountability, transparency and sustainability of platform work, and arguably of the
platform economy at large.
As the EU recovers from the Covid-19 crisis, the objectives of promoting socially fair
transitions towards climate-neutral and digital economies are more important than
ever. Ensuring that all workers in the EU have decent working conditions, as well as
adequate access to social protection, is essential for recovery as well as for building fair and
resilient economies. Increased legal clarity and predictability should enhance sustainable
growth of digital labour platforms in Europe, allowing them to make most of the
opportunities of the single market.
An initiative tackling the risks for work emerging from the platform economy builds
precisely on these objectives, in the knowledge that, though still a comparatively limited
phenomenon, platform work is growing fast and is shaping Europe’s labour markets. The
increasing importance of platform work as a policy topic is reflected in the priorities
and engagements of many institutional actors.
In November 2020, the European Parliament released a report on “A Strong Social Europe
for just transitions”6
, calling on the Commission to propose a directive on decent working
conditions and rights in the digital economy, also covering non-standard workers, workers on
digital labour platforms and the self-employed. In November 2020, the European
Parliament’s Employment Committee held an exchange of views with the Commission and
different stakeholders on platform work and in February 2021 the Committee on Employment
and Social Affairs of the European Parliament released a draft report on working conditions
in platform work.7
The Council has called on Member States and the Commission to strengthen efforts and take
appropriate action as regards platform work8
, in line with the ILO’s Centenary Declaration
for the Future of Work.9
In December 2020, EU employment and social affairs ministers
held a debate on platform work. They acknowledged that platform work is an international
phenomenon with a strong cross-border dimension, and that therefore there is a role for the
EU to address the related challenges.
5
Jeremias Adams-Prassl (2019). What if Your Boss Was an Algorithm? The Rise of Artificial Intelligence at
Work. [2019] 41(1) Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 123. Available online.
6
Available online.
7
Draft report on fair working conditions, rights and social protection for platform workers - new forms of
employment linked to digital development (2019/2186(INI). Available online.
8
Council Conclusions “The Future of Work: the European Union promoting the ILO Centenary Declaration”,
October 2019; Available online.
9
Available online.
6
The European Economic and Social Committee10
and the Committee of the Regions11
have put forward opinions on platform work.
The ILO in its Centenary Declaration called upon its members to “promote sustained,
inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work
for all through (…) policies and measures that (…) respond to challenges and opportunities in
the world of work relating to the digital transformation of work, including platform work”. In
February 2021 the ILO launched a flagship report12
exploring how the platform economy is
transforming the way work is organized and analysing the impact of digital labour platforms
on enterprises, workers and society as a whole.
In her Political Guidelines13, President von der Leyen pledged to address the changes
brought by the digital transformation to labour markets, by looking into ways to improve
the working conditions of people working through platforms and supporting the
implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. The Commission Work Programme
for 202114
announces a legislative initiative based on Article 153 TFEU in the fourth quarter
of the year, subject to consultation of social partners.
Prior to the launch of the formal consultation of the social partners, the Commission
discussed platform work challenges and opportunities with a variety of stakeholders in
different formats and at different levels, to make sure that everyone’s voice is taken into
account for the purpose of this initiative. Grassroot associations representing people working
through platforms, digital labour platform companies, trade unions, experts from academia,
international organisations, and representatives from civil society were among the
stakeholders that the Commission reached out to, and continues to engage with. In addition,
the open public consultation for the Digital Services Act, which ran from 2 June to 8
September 2020, contained a section on challenges of self-employed individuals offering
services through platforms.
In line with Article 154 TFEU, the Commission is now carrying out a two-stage
consultation of social partners. During the first stage of the consultation, which ran from 24
February to 7 April, social partners were consulted on the need and possible direction of EU
action. In the course of this first stage of the consultation, the Commission also received a
number of position papers from other stakeholders. These are also taken into account in the
Commission’s further analysis of the challenges and policy solutions relevant to platform
work.
In the second stage, social partners are consulted on the possible instrument and
content of the envisaged proposal. This analytical document, prepared by the Commission
10
EESC opinion: Fair work in the platform economy (Exploratory opinion at the request of the German
presidency). Available online.
11
CoR opinion: Platform work – local and regional regulatory challenges. Available online.
12
World Employment and Social Outlook 2021: The role of digital labour platforms in transforming the world
of work’. Available online.
13
Available online.
14
Available online.
7
services, accompanies the consultation document of the second stage, which contains a
summary of the fourteen replies of social partners to the first stage consultation.
After this introduction, the document gives an overview of what is platform work, who are
the people working through digital labour platforms, what are digital labour platforms and
how work is accessed, organised and performed through them (Section 2). Then, it identifies
the problems that need to be addressed to ensure people working through platforms have
access to decent and transparent working conditions and adequate social protection (Section
3). It then explains where the EU’s competence and action added value to tackle these
problems lies (Section 4), presents the objectives of such action (Section 5), the possible
policy options (Section 6) and their impacts (Section 7).
2. WHAT IS PLATFORM WORK AND WHY DOES IT NEED TO BE
ADDRESSED
2.1 What is platform work?
The term platform work refers to “the matching of supply and demand for paid work through
an online platform”.15
According to Eurofound, the key characteristics of platform work are that:
• Paid work is organised through an online platform.
• Three parties are involved: the online platform, the client and the worker.
• The aim is to carry out specific tasks or solve specific problems.
• The work is outsourced or contracted out.
• Jobs are broken down into tasks.
• Services are provided on demand.
Despite the attention that platform work has generated over the last years, uncertainty over its
exact meaning persists. This is partly due to the various inter-related concepts that are used to
describe platform work, such as “collaborative economy” and “collaborative platforms”, or
“gig economy” and “gig work”16
. In addition, the rapid pace at which technology is
developing, as well as the variety of business models with which platform work is associated,
further complicate efforts to adopt a systematic definition of platform work.
Yet the language used when talking about platform work is of utmost importance, as it can
influence the way regulators and society at large think about it. In particular, the lack of
uniform terminologies and definitions creates obstacles to the effective documentation and
15
Eurofound (2018), Employment and Working Conditions of Selected Types of Platform Work, Eurofound,
Luxembourg. Available online.
16
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (2017), Protecting Workers in the Online Platform
Economy: An overview of regulatory and policy developments in the EU, Luxembourg. Available here. And,
European Parliament (2017), The Social Protection of Workers in the Platform Economy, IP/ A/ EMPL/ 2016-
11, Brussels. Available online.
8
analysis of platform work as a phenomenon. This, in turn, can impede constructive policy
debate and action in this area.
The concept of platform work as understood in this document is distinct from other income-
generating, online activities like renting out one’s property through an accommodation
platform or selling items on online marketplaces. The reason for this is that platform work
involves the provision of labour, which is then mediated and/or transmitted through internet-
driven technologies. In other words, the main difference with other activities in the platform
economy is that in platform work, the “main traded good is labour rather than capital”17
.
2.2 The ‘triangular relationship’ underpinning platform work
Platform work is characterised by a so-called “triangular relationship”, a complex set of
dynamics involving at least three distinct parties: the digital labour platform, the person
working through it and the client (whether private individuals or business entities).
Temporary agency work has a similar triangular structure in the employment relationships it
entails. The actors involved are the agency, the worker and the user undertaking. In contrast
to temporary agency work, however, platform work can involve more than three parties. That
is the case, for instance, with food delivery platforms, which are characterised by multilateral
contractual relationships between four parties: the platform, the person delivering the food,
the individual customer and the restaurant business.
There are also other important differences. Temporary agency work is already regulated at
EU level through the Temporary Agency Work Directive, granting specific rights to the
workers concerned.18
Whereas in temporary agency work the contractual relationship
between the worker and the agency is clearly defined as an employment relationship, there is
for the moment no such clarity in platform work, where platforms predominantly set out in
their terms and conditions that people working through them are independent contractors.
Furthermore, unlike temporary agency work, platform work is not only concerned with
business-to-business situations (between the agency and the user undertaking), but rather
often involves natural persons as customers. This, together with the central role of technology
in platform work, the fragmentation of work into individual tasks and the potential
international character of the employment relationship, sets it apart from other forms of
employment and makes its analysis challenging in terms of traditional labour market concepts
and frameworks19
.
Nevertheless, there have been situations in which people working through platforms have
been employed through an intermediary, akin to agency work models. For example, from
2016 to 2018, Deliveroo in Belgium had an agreement with the SMart cooperative, according
to which people working through the platform had the option of working as employees of the
cooperative, which guaranteed them a minimum wage, among other benefits.20
In 2018,
Portugal introduced a legal framework for ride-hailing platforms whereby only legal persons
17
Eurofound (2018), Employment and Working Conditions of Selected Types of Platform Work, Eurofound,
Luxembourg. Available online.
18
Directive 2008/104/EC. Available online.
19 19
Eurofound (2019), Mapping the contours of the platform economy, Dublin. Available online.
20
Z. Kilhoffer, K. Lenaerts (2017), What is happening with platform workers’ rights? Lessons from Belgium,
CEPS. Available online.
9
could enter a contractual relationship with the platform.21
As a result, in order for individual
drivers to work through ride-hailing platforms, they had to be employed by a company.
Defining the nature of the contractual relationship between the (at least three) parties
involved in platform work is not always straightforward. The classification of the relationship
usually requires an assessment of the individual circumstances in each case, as the factual
nature of the relationship will determine whether labour law applies. An analysis of platform
work in traditional labour law terms forces us to split the triangular relationship that exists
between the parties into a series of bilateral contractual relationships, and to attempt
determining whether any of them can be classified as one of employment. However,
according to certain scholars, in order to comprehend the economic effects of platform work,
the contractual relationships between the parties should instead be analysed as an
“interdependent net of contracts”.22
The classification and regulation of the contractual relationship between the parties involved
in platform work is further complicated by the platforms’ business models. Digital labour
platforms usually define themselves as intermediaries providing an ICT-based matching
service and characterise the relationship between the parties as one of self-employment. At
the same time, through their contractual terms and conditions and the algorithmic
management tools, they exercise varying levels of supervision and control over the work
process. For example, they frequently match the people providing services to clients, set
prices, determine the contractual conditions, and reserve the power to deactivate users. This,
in turn, makes many types of platform work distinct from traditional situations of self-
employment, where there is usually a direct relationship between the self-employed person
and the client, and wherein the parties determine the aspects of the work between themselves.
2.3 Who are the people working through platforms?
A study by CEPS notes that 92% of platforms active in the EU (representing 93% of the
earnings of people) classify people working through them as self-employed. In the remaining
cases various types of work agreements are used, including full-time or part-time
employment, temporary agency work agreements and zero-hour contracts. Furthermore, the
employment status is only clearly stated by a minority of the digital labour platforms in their
contractual terms and conditions.23
The same study finds that, for a selection of platforms,24
the large majority of people working
through them are free to choose and change their working time. This means that people can
log onto the platform when they would like or choose their hours of availability. The study
21
Law 45/ 2018. Available online.
22
J. Prassl, M. Risak (2016), Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms as Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis
of Crowdwork, Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 37, no.3. Available online.
23
W. de Groen, Z. Kilhoffer, L. Westhoff, D. Postica and F. Shamsfakhr (2021). Digital Labour Platforms in the
EU: Mapping and Business Models. Study prepared by CEPS for DG EMPL under service contact
VC/2020/0360. Available online.
24
The CEPS study notes that information on the working conditions was the most complex to retrieve. The
working conditions information has therefore been collected for a more limited sample of 38 active digital
labour platforms, including 8 platforms for which two or more countries were covered. The total number of
country-platforms observations is therefore 52. The digital labour platforms and countries have been selected
based on the size of the platforms considering the earnings of the people working through platforms. Indeed, all
the digital labour platforms with significant activities were selected (potentially 5% or more of the earnings).
10
notes that, in practice, flexibility over working time may however be more limited. Platforms
closely monitor working patterns of people working through platforms and this information
feeds into the algorithm that determines work allocation, with more frequent participation
often rewarded. None of the platforms surveyed included an exclusivity of services provision
in their contractual terms and conditions.25
The Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) points out, based on the results of the
COLLEEM survey that assessing the socio-demographic characteristics of people working
through platforms is very important because different demographics may potentially call for
different policy responses. Furthermore, the demographic characteristics of the workforce
may reveal something about the structure of the platform labour market itself.26
The JRC’s survey suggests that people working through platforms are younger than
‘traditional’ workers. The average age in 2018 was 33.9 years in platform work and 42.6
years in ‘traditional’ businesses. Figure 1 shows how the age distribution changes according
to the different categories of people working through platforms.27
Figure 1: Age distribution of the offline and digital labour platform workforce (14 and
16 EU Member States for 2017 and 2018 respectively)
25
Ibidem.
26
Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and Fernandez Macias, E., New evidence on platform workers in Europe,
EUR 29958 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020. (Available online)..
27
“Main platform workers”, according to the JRC, are those who claim to work more than 20 hours a week
providing services via digital labour platforms or earn at least 50% of their income doing so. “Secondary
platform workers are those respondents who provide services via digital labour platforms more than ten hours a
week and earn between 25% and 50% of their income from platform work. “Marginal platform workers” work
less than 10 hours a week and earn less than 25% of their income providing services via digital labour platforms.
“Offline workers” are those respondents to the survey who do not perform work on digital labour platforms.
Offline workers Marginal platform workers
Secondary platform workers Main platform workers
11
2017
Source: JRC (2020). Note: data are from a self-administered online panel survey (COLLEEM). Averages for
2017 concern 32 389 respondents from 14 EU Member States whereas 2018 averages concern 38 022
respondents from 16 EU Member States.
Although people working through platforms are still mostly young men, the second
COLLEEM survey finds that the platform work gender profile is becoming less male-
dominated. This has also been observed by a recent report of the ILO, which estimates that
four out of ten people working through online platforms globally are women.28
Figure 2: Composition of the offline and digital labour platform workforce by age and
gender combined, (14 and 16 EU Member States for 2017 and 2018 respectively)
Source: JRC (2020). Note: data are from a self-administered online panel survey (COLLEEM). Averages for
2017 concern 32 389 respondents from 14 EU Member States whereas 2018 averages concern 38 022
respondents from 16 EU Member States.
The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) found through its ‘Online Panel Survey
of Platform Workers’29
that among people working through platforms, women worked
through platforms slightly more often than men, even though there are fewer women than
men among “regular platform workers”30
(43% compared to 57 %). Also EIGE’s survey
found that the gender difference in the take-up of platform work appears to have been
decreasing over the last years. Among regular platform workers who started working on
platforms in 2020, half are women.
28
International Labour Office (2021), World Employment and Social Outlook 2021: The role of digital labour
platforms in transforming the world of work, Geneva: Switzerland. Available online.
29
EIGE (2021, forthcoming), Gender equality prospects in labour markets transformed by artificial intelligence
and platform work. The survey draws on an online panel survey on working conditions, work patterns and
work-life balance of close to 5,000 women and men engaged in platform work conducted in ten Member States.
30
“Regular platform workers” were defined in EIGE’s ‘Online Panel Survey of Platform Workers’ as people
working through platforms who did so at least occasionally via online platforms in the previous 6 months.
12.8%
28.6%
39.5% 38.3%
39.7%
30.8%
28.3%
35.4%
13.3%
23.1%
18.0%
15.7%
34.2%
17.5% 14.3% 10.7%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Offline
workers
Marginal
platform
workers
Secondary
platform
workers
Main
platform
workers
Male<35 Male>=35 Female <35 Female>=35
14.4%
34.6% 37.5% 37.1%
37.3%
29.7% 27.2% 27.8%
16.4%
24.1% 24.3% 22.8%
32.0%
11.6% 11.0% 12.4%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Offline
workers
Marginal
platform
workers
Secondary
platform
workers
Main
platform
workers
Male<35 Male>=35 Female <35 Female>=35
2018
12
Nevertheless, despite the noticeable presence of women in digital labour platforms, platform
work often reproduces, rather than challenges, gender inequalities from the broader labour
market. In fact, some studies have pointed towards a gender pay gap, particularly in online
platform work. For example, research on the online labour platform Amazon Mechanical
Turk highlighted that women earn less per hour on average.31
However, this wage gap did not
stem from differences in task selection or experience, but instead from more fragmented
working patterns amongst women owing to domestic responsibilities. Though a recent study
by the ILO does not find a significant difference between the hourly earnings (paid and
unpaid) of male and female respondents on online freelance platforms, it nevertheless
observed significant gender pay gaps in some countries such as Ukraine and China.32
EIGE’s survey also found that people working through platforms perform a broad range of
services, although their type is in general split along well-known gendered lines. In some
sectors, the gender differences are smaller than in the general labour market (e.g., among
those who provide childcare and elderly care services, 61 % are women and 39 % are men;
among those who provide housekeeping and other home services, 54 % are women and 46 %
are men). Some traditionally female-dominated sectors show gender balance (e.g., among
those who provide teaching and counselling services, 44 % are women and 56 % are men).
Men more often than women work in software development, ride-hailing services and
construction and repair works, similarly to the developments of the overall labour market.
A 2021 study notes that most of the services require low and (to a lesser extent) medium
skills (Figure 3). These combined account for almost 90% of the intermediated work, when
measured in terms of the earnings of people working through platforms. High-skilled
platform work, in turn, is responsible for about 6% of the intermediated work.33
Figure 3 - Skill level required to perform service
(2020, earnings of people working through digital labour platforms)
Source: CEPS (2021).
31
Adams A. (2020). The Gender Wage Gap on an Online Labour Market: The Cost of Interruptions. CEPR
Discussion Paper DP14294. Available online.
32
International Labour Office (2021).
33
W. de Groen, Z. Kilhoffer, L. Westhoff, D. Postica and F. Shamsfakhr (2021). Available online.
Low (EUR 4bn - 70%)
Low-medium (EUR
1bn - 18%)
Medium (EUR 0,1bn -
2%)
Medium-high (EUR 0,03bn -
0%)
High (EUR 0,4bn - 6%) All (EUR 0,3bn - 4%)
13
Both rounds of the COLLEEM survey show that people working through platforms are more
educated than the average population.34
Similarly, the ILO report finds that those working on
online labour platforms are highly educated, particularly those from developing countries. In
addition, in some countries across the globe, the proportion of people providing ride-hailing
or delivery services through on-location platforms who are highly educated is greater than
that of those providing the same services in traditional sectors35
.
Figure 4: Composition of the offline and digital labour platform workforce by level of
education attainment (14 and 16 EU Member States for 2017 and 2018 respectively)
Source: JRC (2020). Note: data are from a self-administered online panel survey (COLLEEM). Averages for
2017 concern 32 389 respondents from 14 EU Member States whereas 2018 averages concern 38 022
respondents from 16 EU Member States. Low education corresponds to ISCED 0-2; medium education to
ISCED 3-4; high education to ISCED 5-8.
Furthermore, both the COLLEEM and ILO surveys have discerned a skills-mismatch and a
trend towards over-qualification in low-skilled types of platform work, such as microtasking
in online labour platforms or ride-hailing and delivery on on-location platforms. For example,
the abovementioned ILO report has found a big skills-mismatch among people doing
microtasks on online labor platforms, 57% of whom hold a university degree yet undertake
tasks that require little to no skills.36
In addition, the high educational levels observed among
those working on on-location ride-hailing and delivery platforms may also be indicative of a
skills-mismatch, as the tasks performed through such platforms are generally considered to be
low-skilled.
34
Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and Fernandez Macias, E. (2017), Platform Workers in Europe Evidence from
the COLLEEM Survey. Available online. And, Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and Fernandez Macias, E.
(2020).
35
International Labour Office (2021).
36
International Labour Office (2021).
18% 15% 12% 12%
46%
34% 40%
33%
36%
51% 48%
55%
Offline
workers
Marginal
platform
workers
Secondary
platform
workers
Main platform
workers
Low Medium High
19% 17% 16%
7%
46%
34% 36%
35%
36%
49% 47%
58%
Offline
workers
Marginal
platform
workers
Secondary
platform
workers
Main platform
workers
Low Medium High
2017 2018
14
People working through platforms are also more likely to live in households with dependent
children, in some cases also being responsible for those children, than the general population.
This suggests that their income and employment conditions may have implications that go
beyond their own. The COLLEEM II survey also finds evidence of significant “multi-
apping” (i.e. being active on different platforms simultaneously). More than half of people
working through platforms carry out more than one type of task.37
Around 7.7% of the total COLLEEM sample was estimated to consist of people born abroad
(either in a different Member State or outside the European Union). The proportion of foreign
born respondents is however twice as high among people working through platforms, with
the percentage equal to 16.3% for ‘marginal platform work’, 14.4% for ‘secondary platform
work’, and 13.3% for ‘main platform work’.38
The ILO has also observed that migrant
workers account for 17% of those providing freelance services through online platforms
globally.39
People working through online platforms are generally more spread out throughout the
national territory, even though they tend to be clustered in and around big cities. By contrast,
people performing on-location tasks appear to be located only in bigger cities, with the
exception of some Eastern European countries.40
In terms of motivation, flexibility and the desire to complement existing income seem to be
the main reasons why people engage in platform work. These motivations, however, can vary
depending upon the type of platform work and the demographics of the people working
through platforms. For instance, the ILO reports that the possibility to work from home is a
very important factor for women engaging in platform work, while the lack of alternative
employment opportunities seems to be the main motivator for those working through on-
location ride-hailing and delivery platforms.41
Also Eurofound42
reports that motivations can
differ across different types of platform work, whereby low entry barriers, additional income,
and flexible working time are important in on-location platform-determined work, while in
online contest work use of creativity and new ideas, means to build client and flexibility in
work organization are the most important factors.
That being said, however, a major concern among those engaging in platform work seems to
be the inability to access a sufficient amount of work. For instance, 86% of people working
through online platforms globally and 69% of those engaged through on-location delivery
platforms expressed a desire to undertake more work.43
The problem of a lack of sufficient
37
Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and Fernandez Macias, E. (2020).
38
As per COLLEEM terminology, main platform workers are those who claim to work more than 20 hours a
week providing services via digital labour platforms or earn at least 50% of their income doing so. Secondary
Platform workers are those respondents who provide services via digital labour platforms more than ten hours a
week and earn between 25% and 50% of their income from platform work. Survey respondents who work less
than 10 hours a week and earn less than 25% of their income providing services via digital labour platform are
called marginal platform workers.
39
International Labour Office (2021).
40
Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and Fernandez Macias, E. (2020).
41
International Labour Office (2021).
42
Eurofound (2018), Employment and working conditions of selected types of platform work, Publications
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Available online.
43
Ibidem.
15
work has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, notably for some types of platform
work most affected by the pandemic (such as ride-hailing for example).44
Another major concern for people working through platforms, is the lack of access to
adequate social protection. On a global level, the ILO has observed large gaps to the social
security coverage of people working through platforms. In particular, less than 10 per cent of
those working through on-location delivery or ride-hailing platforms are covered by
unemployment protection or disability insurance, and less than 20 per cent are covered by
old-age pensions or retirement45
. Therefore, despite platform work’s potential to encourage
participation of marginalised groups in the labour market, the lack of sufficient social security
might further contribute to the vulnerability of these groups.
The ILO has also observed that platform work is the main source of income for 84% and 90%
of those working through on-location ride-hailing and delivery platforms respectively, the
majority of whom earn less than the average in these sectors.46
Findings from several studies
and country reports in Europe suggest that platform work is primarily performed as a
secondary activity.47
For more information on developments, see also section 3.1.2 on growth
in platform work.
2.4 What types of digital labour platforms operate in the EU?
Platform work involves a variety of tasks and can be found in various sectors of the economy.
Tasks performed on digital labour platforms can vary from high-skilled work or complex
tasks such as computer programming and graphic design, to low-skilled work or simple tasks
such as driving or image tagging. As a result, the classification of digital labour platforms can
be challenging.
The main types of activities performed through digital labour platforms are
professional tasks, ride-hailing, household tasks, and micro tasks.48
As the activities may
be delivered either online or on-location (i.e. in person), the format of these service
provisions is distinguished in on-location and online digital platform work. It is important to
note these two categories do not take into account the scale of tasks, the existing
heterogeneity in skills levels, forms of matching client to workers, and the degree of work
precariousness. This means one can find high- and low- skilled tasks being performed in
both on-location and online work, as well as people with different skills, platforms exerting
varying degrees of supervision on the performance of work and varying degrees of in-work
poverty, unpredictability and different qualities of the working conditions. The on-location /
online dichotomy thus merely refers to the place and modalities through which platform work
is performed.
44
Eurofound (2020), Platform economy: Developments in the COVID-19 crisis. Available online.
45
International Labour Office (2021).
46
Ibidem.
47
European Centre of Expertise (ECE) in the field of labour law, employment and labour market policies,
(forthcoming), Thematic Review 2021 on Platform Work.
48
Eurofound (2018).
16
On-location labour platforms only or mostly intermediate services performed in the
physical world, i.e. in a specific geographical area. These are typically local, service-oriented
tasks such as ride-hailing, deliveries (including food delivery), and domestic work (cleaning,
plumbing, and care services).
Online labour platforms only or mostly intermediate services delivered in the online world.
The tasks are typically not location-dependent, and can be outsourced through an open call to
a geographically dispersed crowd (for this reason, it is also sometimes referred to as
“crowdwork”). These could be professional tasks such as software development, graphic
design, AI training, translation and editing work, or image tagging. In its 2021 report, the ILO
further subcategorises online labour platforms between freelance, contest-based, microtask,
and competitive programming, and on-location labour platforms between taxi and delivery.49
Eurofound distinguishes 10 categories of platform work based on criteria such as skills
levels, on-location or online service provision, scale of tasks (larger or micro), form of
matching (offer or contest) and the selector (platform, client or worker). It indicates that most
common type of platform work in the EU is the on-location platform-determined routine
work (such as ride-hailing or deliveries) with over 31% share both in terms of number of
platforms and estimated share of people working through them. On-location client-
determined moderately skilled work represents around 11% share of number of platform and
number of workers, and online client-determined specialist work is offered by over 5% of
platforms, with around 30% share of people working through them.50
Providing an alternative categorisation, the COLLEEM I and II surveys identify 11 types of
labour services on digital labour platforms on the basis of three criteria: the place of
provision, the skill-level required and the scale of the task in question. They further group
these services into three categories:
 professional tasks, which typically require high skills and include services such as
software development, and writing and translation;
 non-professional tasks, which usually involve repetitive and simple tasks such as
micro tasks and clerical and data entry tasks; and
 on-location tasks, which are physically provided and often require little to no skills.
Both rounds of the COLLEEM survey conclude that the most common type of tasks are
clerical and data entry tasks (accounting for 43% of the total services in 2017), followed by
professional and creative tasks (30%).51
While the proportion of the people who provide
professional tasks has remained stable since 2017, the COLLEEM II survey reports an
increase in the number of people providing translation tasks through platforms (40% in 2018
compared to 26% in 2017).52
Furthermore, the number of people providing on-location
services has also increased between 2017 and 2018.53
49
International Labour Office (2021).
50
Eurofound (2018), Employment and working conditions of selected types of platform work, Publications
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Available here.
51
Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and Fernandez Macias, E. (2017). It should be noted that because COLLEEM
is an online survey, people carrying out online tasks may be over-represented compared to on-location services.
52
Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and Fernandez Macias, E. (2020).
53
Ibidem.
17
A 2021 report suggests that on-location platform work represents over 90% of intermediated
services in the EU digital labour platform economy. Most of these come from taxi and
delivery services (63% of the earnings of people working through platforms), followed by
home services, professional services and domestic work (29% in terms of earnings). The
online services such as micro tasks, freelance, contest-based and medical consultations
account for the remaining less than one-tenth of the work.54
The five biggest digital labour platforms are estimated to be responsible for about half of the
total earnings of people working through platforms in the EU, whereas the top 25 platforms
account for about four-fifths of the earnings. Most of the largest platforms55
are either ride-
hailing or delivery services - two such platforms56
account for an estimated 17% of the digital
labour platform economy (EUR 2.4 billion out of a total of EUR 14 billion in 2020).57
The European platform economy is dominated by digital labour platforms originating in the
EU (77% of all active digital labour platforms) (Figure 5). This share drops when weighted
for comparison purposes in terms of earnings generated through platforms, as platforms
originating in the EU account for about half of the earnings of people working through
platforms. Most big platforms, therefore, seem to originate from outside the EU. Platforms
originating from the US and the UK account for about 95% of the earnings of people working
through platforms founded outside the EU.58
At the same time, there is a variety of smaller-
scale platforms operating in one or a few Member States,59
while specific regulations in some
Member States prevent the major players from entering their markets. Looking at the most
prevalent Member State origin of European platforms, German platforms are largest with
about EUR 1 billion in earnings for people working through platforms in the EU, followed by
France (EUR 0.7 billion), the Netherlands (EUR 0.4 billion), Spain (EUR 0.4 billion) and
Estonia (EUR 0.2 billion).60
54
W. de Groen, Z. Kilhoffer, L. Westhoff, D. Postica and F. Shamsfakhr (2021). Available online.
55
Measured by earnings of people working through platforms
56
Uber and Uber Eats.
57
W. de Groen, Z. Kilhoffer, L. Westhoff, D. Postica and F. Shamsfakhr (2021). Available online.
58
Ibidem.
59
See Annex I for a non-exhaustive list of examples of platform companies active in different Member States.
60
W. de Groen, Z. Kilhoffer, L. Westhoff, D. Postica and F. Shamsfakhr (2021). Available online.
18
Figure 5 Origin of digital labour platforms active in EU27 (2020)
a) Share in number of platforms b) Share of earnings of people working
through platforms
Source: CEPS (2021).
Most of the non-EU platforms providing on-location services have an established office in
the EU, whereas online labour platforms tend not to. In total, 84% of non-EU platforms do
not have an office in the EU. This, however, represents less than a tenth of platform work in
the EU.61
This is likely to be affected by recent (proposed) instruments, such as the revised
Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC7)62
and the proposal for a Digital Services
Act.63
Both instruments require platforms operating in the EU to have a legal representative
in one Member State.
Most of the digital labour platforms active in the EU are for-profit companies, with non-for
profit companies representing 6% of active digital labour platforms (and less than 1% in
terms of earnings).64
The primary source of revenue for three-quarters of digital labour
platforms active in the EU is commissions.65
Out of the identified landscape of active digital
labour platforms in the EU, most intermediate on-location services, such as delivery services,
domestic work or other services provided on-location. For each of these services, there are
well over 100 active platforms, out of a non-exhaustive but representative landscape of 516
active platforms examined in the 2021 study. Only on-location ride-hailing services are
intermediated by fewer platforms (55 or 11% of active digital labour platforms).66
61
Ibidem.
62
Available online.
63
Available online.
64
W. de Groen, Z. Kilhoffer, L. Westhoff, D. Postica and F. Shamsfakhr (2021). Available online.
65
Ibidem.
66
Ibidem.
EU27 (396 -
77%)
Other Europe
(41 - 8%)
North
America (61 -
12%)
Asia (9 - 2%)
Oceania (7 - 1%)
Other (2 -
0%)
EU27 (EUR 3bn
- 51%)
Other
Europe (EUR
0bn - 5%)
North
America
(EUR 3bn -
42%)
Asia (EUR
0bn - 1%)
Oceania (EUR 0bn - 1%)
Other (EUR
0bn - 0%)
19
When it comes to online platform work, the most frequently intermediated services are online
writing and translation (97 or 19% of active digital labour platforms) and creative and
multimedia work (92 or 18% of active digital labour platforms).67
It is important to note that while the majority of platforms focus on a single type of service
(328 or 64% of active digital labour platforms), about one-third of them offer multiple types
of services. 68
An alternative classification of services intermediated by digital labour platforms according
to economic activity (according to NACE sectors) shows that most digital labour platforms
are active in intermediating services in the transportation and storage (200 or 39% of active
platforms) and administration and support (167 or 32% of active platforms).69
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Given the specific features of platform work, people working through platforms often
face challenges they face in terms of working conditions and social protection, which are
difficult to address within existing legal frameworks. The following sections describe the
problem in more detail, delving into its underlying causes and consequences in the context of
a perspective EU initiative on platform work.
Partially, the problem is influenced by global megatrends affecting labour markets in
general, such as globalisation, digitalisation and ongoing societal shifts and changes. These
drivers, while having an impact on the problem the EU initiative aims at tackling, are
‘external’ to its scope and reach. They are described in section 3.1, together with other
phenomena that are intrinsic to platform work itself and beyond direct reach of policy action
(the sustained growth and expansion of it, and the generalised increase in the use of IT tools
and new technologies in the world of work).
Most importantly, the poor working conditions in some types of platform work and the
inadequate access to social protection linked to it are driven by multifaceted and complex
‘internal drivers’ which, for analytical purposes, are clustered into four macro-drivers. First,
these are the drivers related to the employment status (described in section 3.2). Secondly,
those stemming from the algorithm-based business models of platforms, such as insufficient
access to information and consultation, to redress and to collective dialogue (described in
section 3.3). Thirdly, the internal drivers related to the cross-border nature of platform
work (section 3.4). Finally, those related to gaps in the coverage of existing and
forthcoming legislation (at both EU and national level, as explained in section 3.5) with
regards to platform work challenges.
These ‘internal drivers’ are the aspects of the problem that the EU initiative would aim at
addressing to prevent negative consequences (described in section 3.6). These concern
primarily the people working through platforms, who face, among other things, work and
67
W. de Groen, Z. Kilhoffer, L. Westhoff, D. Postica and F. Shamsfakhr (2021). Available online.
68
Ibidem.
69
Ibidem.
20
income precariousness, limited career opportunities, weak bargaining power and are often
unaware of rights they are entitled to. However, the problem also has consequences for
digital labour platforms, especially SMEs and startups who seek to scale-up their business
from a local to a European level, only to find substantial legal uncertainty, administrative
burdens and unfair competition vis-à-vis bigger players. The same section also describes the
more general consequences for markets and consumers and Member States, who lose out
on the fiscal revenues that would derive from a correct employment status classification, face
enforcement difficulties, do not have enough data for evidence-driven policymaking and risk
to experience a race-to-the-bottom in social standards.
The intervention logic is diagrammatically summarised below (‘problem tree’).
21
3.1 External drivers of the problem
3.1.1 Megatrends: globalisation, digitalisation and societal changes
Platform work is a new, technology-enabled, non-standard form of work. Its rise and main
characteristics can be indirectly traced back to three megatrends that are affecting the world
and having repercussions on a wide array of social and economic phenomena.
The first one is globalisation. In the last century, the acceleration in the opening up of
borders and lowering of cross-country barriers has resulted in an exponential growth in the
global, cross-country flow of goods, capital, ideas and people. This has brought as many
opportunities as challenges to the governance of labour markets and its institutions. The
globally increased competition between companies has led them to seek ways of reducing
costs to make up for decreasing revenues. Amongst other practices, the widespread use of
non-standard contracts, coupled with an increasing outsourcing of the workforce, has led to a
decrease in overall standard employment, with detrimental effects for the working conditions
and social protection of the workers concerned.70
Long-term corporate cost-cutting and
streamlining has also been affecting the wages of workers. As of 2018, low-wage earners71
in
the EU stood at 15.3% of the workforce (cfr. Figure 6). Low-wage earners were strongly
represented among workers younger than 30 (25%) and among workers in the
accommodation and food services (39%) and in the support services that include temporary
work agencies (33.3%).72
Figure 6: Share of low-wage earners in the EU, 2018
Source: Eurostat (online data code earn_ses_pub1s). Note: data exclude apprentices.
70
Non-standard employment around the world: Understanding challenges, shaping prospects, International
Labour Office – Geneva: ILO. 2016. Available online.
71
Low-wage earners are defined by Eurostat as those employees earning two thirds or less of the national
median gross hourly earnings. Hence, the threshold that determines low-wage earners is relative and specific to
each Member State. More information available online.
72
Eurostat data, available online.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
22
A high incidence of low-wage earners is often a reflection of low bargaining power,
especially in the context of a generalised decrease in trade union density and collective
bargaining coverage.
Although there have been attempts on the side of unions in various EU countries to reach out
to people working through platforms73
, collective bargaining in the platform economy
remains very limited74
and data on trade union density on platforms is scarce or non-existent.
Globalisation affects working conditions in platform work by putting the pressure of
competition on companies to reduce social standards in order to cut costs and increase
revenues. Furthermore, with work on online platforms becoming increasingly available, the
incentive is high for companies in high-income countries to purchase labour provided by
workers in low-income countries. As of 2020, nearly 40% of online platform work demand
came from the United States, whereas over 50% of online platform work came from India,
Pakistan and Bangladesh.75
Figure 7: Distribution of global labour supply and demand on major online platforms,
by country and occupational category, 2018-2020
Source: Graphical elaboration of data of the Online Labour Observatory
(iLabour Project, Oxford Internet Institute and ILO)
This is made possible by the second megatrend affecting working conditions in platform
work: digitalisation. Digitalisation has been facilitating communications and international
73
Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales (2019). Don't Gig Up ! State of the Art Report. Document de
travail, n° 02.2019. Available online.
74
Eurofound Platform economy online repository – Collective Bargaining. Available online.
75
International Labour Office (2021).
23
cooperation, allows for streamlined management and organisational processes, increased
transparency and cross-border exchanges of ideas, work and practices. The ongoing, internet-
driven ‘information revolution’ is facilitating the emergence of business models based on the
collection, processing, management and monetisation of large amounts of information (‘Big
Data’).
Digital labour platforms’ business models are amongst these. They collect and process
information on the existing demand and available supply of a given service. They match the
demand and supply efficiently and monetise the whole procedure by charging customers, and
in some instances the people working through platforms themselves, for the matching service.
Digital tools allow them to break jobs down into micro-tasks and thus facilitate outsourcing
to a “crowd”. As section 3.3.1 illustrates, digital labour platforms do not always limit
themselves to matching demand and supply, but exert a lesser or greater supervision on how
the work is performed. Hence, the challenges their business model poses to the world of
work.
Digitalisation mainly affects labour markets quantitatively in two ways: it has a positive
effect on employment growth and a negative one on wage distribution. Regarding the first,
numerous studies have found a correlation between digitalisation and a net employment
growth, meaning that overall new technologies create more jobs than they replace. This is
explained by the fact that digitally-induced automation mostly concerns single tasks rather
than whole jobs, and in some instances this complements and boosts the productivity of
certain jobs leading to further job-creation.76
Such findings should nonetheless be interpreted
with the caveat that employment growth is higher for jobs at low-risk of automation, i.e.
high-skilled jobs.77
Digitalisation also affects labour markets qualitatively, for instance by changing the way
people interact with one another on the workplace and with their employer/contracting entity.
By shifting parts or all of these interactions to the digital sphere, new opportunities but also
new challenges arise and the working conditions of the people involved are affected.78
For
instance, digitalisation has led to a proliferation of digital technology start-ups providing
automated services, such as virtual assistant services or automated legal services. Though
these companies advertise their services as AI-enabled, in practice, they are often performed
by people working through digital labour platforms to varying degrees79
. In fact, given the
costs involved in automation, AI companies often prefer to outsource tasks to human workers
76
C. Frey and M. Osborne (2013), The Future of Employment: How susceptible are jobs to computerization?
Working Paper, Oxford Martin School – University of Oxford. Available online.
P. Brandes and R. Wattenhofer (2016), Opening the Frey/Osborne Black Box: Which Tasks
of a Job are Susceptible to Computerization?, ETHU Zurich, Switzerland. Available online.
Arntz, M., T. Gregory and U. Zierahn (2016), The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries: A
Comparative Analysis, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 189, OECD Publishing,
Paris. Available online.
77
A. Georgieff and A. Milanez (2021), What happened to jobs at high risk of automation?, OECD Social,
Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 255, OECD Publishing, Paris. Available online.
78
International Labour Office (2021), World Employment and Social Outlook 2021: The role of digital labour
platforms in transforming the world of work, Geneva: Switzerland. Available online.
79
Idem, p. 123.
24
through platforms.80
Digitalisation can therefore lead to the creation of an invisible
workforce, which increases the risk of ‘dehumanisation’ and ‘commodification of labour’,
and raises concerns over the quality of jobs that survive automation81
.
The growth of digitalisation exacerbates platforms’ benefits of so-called “indirect (or cross-
side) network effects”.82
By making centralised service-providers like platforms efficient and
convenient for consumers: the more consumers a platform is able to reach, the more services
it is able to offer to such consumers, which in turn makes the platform more attractive to
other consumers, and so forth. Hence, a successful platform business model is based on
quickly establishing, maintaining and further growing network effects, including a self-
reinforcing circle of market-share growth, with long-term detrimental effects on the
bargaining power of people working through that same company, but also for consumers
themselves. As section 3.6.3 explains, consumers in highly concentrated digital labour
platform markets face higher prices and fewer alternatives. Finally, digitalisation also has
qualitative effects on the accessibility and performability of work. When the assignment and
the performance of jobs become available online, the kinds of people being assigned and
performing such jobs change. This has demographic repercussions.
In fact, the third megatrend affecting working conditions in platform work comprises an array
of ongoing societal changes. The number of international migrants has grown robustly over
the past two decades. It is estimated that the number of persons living outside of their country
of origin reached 281 million in 2020. Between 2000 and 2010, the number of international
migrants increased by 48 million globally, with another 60 million added between 2010 and
2020. Much of this increase was due to labour or family migration. In terms of the regional
distribution of where migrants live, Europe was home to the largest number of international
migrants in the world in 2020: 87 million. Europe also had the largest share of intra-regional
migration, with 70 per cent of all migrants born in Europe residing in another European
country.83
In 2007, the number of people living in cities worldwide surpassed that of rural areas for the
first time in history. By 2050, the world population is projected to be 68% urban. In Europe,
it will be 74.9 %, compared to 51.4% in 1950.84
Migration and urbanisation go hand in hand
with ongoing changes in workforce participation patterns. Today, people working or actively
seeking a job in the European Union are increasingly more likely to have a migrant
background and/or to be women than in the past.
80
P. Tubaro, A.A. Casilli, and M. Coville (2020), The trainer, the verifier, the imitator: Three ways in which
human platform workers support artificial intelligence, 7(1) Big Data & Society. Available online.
81
V. De Stefano (2018), “Negotiating the algorithm”: Automation, artificial intelligence and labour protection,
Employment Working Paper No.246, International Labour Office, Geneva: Switzerland, p. 4.
82
F. Zhu and M. Iansiti (2019), Why Some Platforms Thrive and Others Don’t, Harvard Business Review –
January-February 2019 issue (pp.118-125). Available online.
83
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2020). International
Migration 2020 Highlights (ST/ESA/SER.A/452). Available online.
84
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). World Urbanization
Prospects: The 2018 Revision (ST/ESA/SER.A/420). New York: United Nations. Available online.
25
Urban population growth and the spread of related urban life-styles drive the growing
consumption of on-demand services such as food-delivery, ride-hailing and
household/cleaning services. Platform work in Europe (and most notably on-location
platform work) is concentrated in urban areas and big cities.85
In this context, the
opportunities offered by platforms’ easy-to-access jobs with low entry-barriers (especially in
terms of formal qualifications, language requirements and legal checks) are becoming
increasingly known and attractive for migrants and people who have more difficulty
accessing more traditional jobs. 13.3% of people working through platforms have a migrant
background.86
The compound effect of these societal changes, with Europe’s population
becoming increasingly more concentrated in cities on the one hand, and migrants and women
being increasingly more represented in the workforce, impact both the demand and supply of
digital labour platforms’ services.
The combined effects of globalisation, digitalisation and societal changes, including the
ageing of the EU’s population, also have budgetary repercussions for countries. The pressure
of global competition on cutting corporate costs, digitally-enabled outsourcing processes, a
wider section of the population entitled to pension benefits and a much slimmer one supposed
to pay for it may end up limiting countries’ social policy options when dealing with in-work
poverty and precariousness. Member States may have less fiscal leverage to extend labour
regulations (because of their intrinsic costs) and existing social security regimes to non-
standard workers, including people working through platforms. This has detrimental effects
on these people’s working conditions, ability to smooth consumption and face unforeseen
fluctuations in their income, ultimately affecting the future sustainability of welfare
systems.87
85
Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and Fernandez Macias, E. (2020).
86
Ibidem.
87
H. Glennerster (2010), The Sustainability of Western Welfare States in The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare
State, Edited by F. G. Castles et al., Oxford University Press
26
The COVID-19 pandemic and its effects on platform work
In the first nine months of the Covid-19 pandemic, demand for some types of platform work
services plummeted as a result of the lockdown-induced restrictions (cfr. Figure 9, which reflects
developments in online platform work only), although it subsequently picked up again.1
Figure 9: Online labour demand on major digital labour platforms, February to mid-October 2020
However, some types of digital labour platforms have seen the demand for their services balloon,
particularly in the food-delivery sector. This has meant increased job opportunities for people
working on platforms in this sector, but also additional challenges.
Vulnerabilities regarding, for example, access to social protection, precarious working conditions
and income stability have become more visible in this and other types of platform work. The
pandemic has also resulted in increased health and safety risks for some people working through
platforms, notably the on-location labour platforms.
Some platform companies have provided people working through them with personal protective
equipment (PPE) and, in some cases, forms of income-support and insurance. Additionally, some
Member States’ governments have included people working through platforms in their short-time
work and income-support schemes2
. Nevertheless, evidence on the effects of the pandemic-led
crisis on platform work employment and working conditions ought to be assessed further in the
future, when data allows for more comprehensive analyses.
1
: Cfr: The Online Labour Index. Available online.
2
: International Labour Office (2021). The data are taken from 5 online platforms: freelancer.com,
guru.com, mturk.com, peopleperhour.com, and upwork.com.
27
3.1.2 Growth in platform work
Estimating the number of people working through platforms is challenging. As the ILO
points out, platforms often do not disclose such data. Where such data is available, it can
overestimate the number of people working through the platform, as it often reflects all
registered people, which are not necessarily all active on the platform. In addition, people
might also be registered on multiple platforms and possibly counted twice.88
Most available data is therefore survey-based. This brings about certain challenges, as
methodological and definitional differences in different surveys result in large variations in
the estimated number of people working through platforms. Definitional differences include
for example broad or narrow definitions of the types of platform covered and the reference
period in question. Methodological differences, in turn, are reflected in the use of different
approaches (i.e. income-based or job-based) in surveys.89
Such methodological and
definitional differences hamper comparison of results across surveys and, more broadly,
efforts to understand and address platform work challenges.
An online panel survey by the Commission’s Joint Research Centre90
in two waves estimated
the number of people working through platforms in 2017 and 2018. It combined frequency,
hours and income generated from platform work to generate different categories of people
working through platforms.
Overall, the survey finds that the prevalence of platform work increased between 2017 and
2018, which for the EU as a whole goes from 9.5% to around 11% (or 24 million people) of
the EU’s workforce. The increase is observed in all included Member States but two.
COLLEEM also looks into how the different categories of people working through platforms
evolve.
Main platform workers are those who claim to work more than 20 hours a week or earn at
least 50% of their income doing so. This group is estimated to represent on average 1.4% (3
million of the EU’s workforce) of the respondents in the surveyed countries in 2018, and has
decreased by 0.9 percentage points compared to 2017. JRC notes, however, that this seeming
decline in the number of platform workers could be influenced by methodological differences
between the first and second COLLEEM wave.91
Secondary platform workers provide services via digital labour platforms more than ten hours
a week and earn between 25% and 50% of their income from platform work. They are
estimated to represent on average 4.1% (9 million of the EU’s workforce) in 2018, and have
increased by 0.5 percentage points from 2017.92
People who work less than 10 hours a week and earn less than 25% of their income providing
services via digital labour platforms (marginal platform workers) represent 3.1% (6.8 million
88
International Labour Office (2021).
89
Ibidem.
90
Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and Fernandez Macias, E. (2017). And Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and
Fernandez Macias, E. (2020).
91
Ibidem.
92
Ibidem.
28
of the EU’s workforce) of respondents in 2018, increasing by 1.5 percentage points from
2017.93
When also considering national data, and acknowledging the above-mentioned non-
comparability of the different data sources due to the variety of definitions, methodologies
and timing, it is interesting to note that most available information hints to a dimension of 1–
2% of the workforce being engaged in platform work as a main job, and around 10% doing it
occasionally94
. That said, substantial differences regarding the spread of platform work across
countries are observable, pointing into the direction that the labour market and employment
situation is among the decisive factors for the uptake and growth of platform work.
The size of the digital labour platform economy in the EU in terms of revenue has
grown almost five-fold from an estimated EUR 3 billion in 2016 to about EUR 14 billion
in 2020 (Figure 10). This reflects consolidated revenues of involved parties (platforms,
people working through platforms and fourth parties). Around three-quarters of these
revenues originates from ride-hailing and delivery platforms. COVID-19 has played a role in
recent developments in the platform landscape in the EU, with ride-hailing services (which
until 2019 dominated the platform economy) decreasing 35% in 2020, while food delivery
growing by 125% in the same year.95
Figure 10: Size of the European digital labour platforms economy, in EUR billion
Source: CEPS (2021).
Globally, the total revenue of digital labour platforms was estimated to be around USD
52 billion in 2019, the biggest share of which was generated by on-location ride-hailing
platforms (and one platform in particular),96
which in 2019 generated a revenue of USD 10.7
93
Ibidem.
94
Eurofound (2020).
95
Willem Pieter de Groen, Zachary Kilhoffer, Leonie Westhoff, Doina Postica and Farzaneh Shamsfakhr
(2021). Available online.
96
Uber
0 0 0 0 1
0 1
2
3
8
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
3
3
6
8
11
14
0
3
5
8
10
13
15
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Freelance Delivery Home services
Domestic work Microtask Taxi
Contest-based Professional services Medical consultation
29
billion.97
A reason for this may be because on-location ride-hailing platforms have received a
much larger share of venture capital funds, which in turn has significantly contributed to their
diffusion and has allowed them to operate even at a loss.98
A forthcoming study, based on a non-exhaustive but representative sample, notes that
the number of digital labour platforms active in the EU has increased from around 463
in 2016 to around 516 in early 2021.99
Most of these platforms provide freelance, delivery
or home services tasks. This growth trend has also been observed globally, with the total
number of active platforms having increased fivefold between 2010 and 2020. The majority
of these were delivery platforms, followed by those intermediating freelance services and
those providing ride-hailing services.100
The biggest share of these platforms globally is
concentrated in the United States, followed by India and the United Kingdom.101
It should be
noted that the total landscape of digital labour platforms examined in the study is non-
exhaustive but representative of the platform work ecosystem in the EU.
In recent years, the net growth in digital labour platforms’ numbers in Europe seems to have
slowed down significantly. Identified trends show that the number of newly launched
platforms decreased, while the number of those taken offline due to limited longer-term
viability, as well as merger and acquisition activity, increased.102
The earnings of people working through platforms active in the EU have grown two and
a half times in the same period from an estimated EUR 2.6 billion in 2016 to EUR 6.3
billion in 2020 (Figure 11). Five digital labour platforms, involving predominantly food
delivery and ride-haling services, accounted for about half of these earnings. The pandemic
has also played a role in these dynamics, as the total earnings of people working through
platforms is estimated to have decreased somewhat due to COVID-19.103
97
International Labour Office (2021).
98
Ibidem..
99
Willem Pieter de Groen, Zachary Kilhoffer, Leonie Westhoff, Doina Postica and Farzaneh Shamsfakhr
(2021). Available online.
100
International Labour Office (2021).
101
Ibidem..
102
Willem Pieter de Groen, Zachary Kilhoffer, Leonie Westhoff, Doina Postica and Farzaneh Shamsfakhr
(2021). Available online.
103
Ibidem.
30
Figure 11 – Estimated earnings of people working through platforms in the EU27 by
type
Source: CEPS (2021).
Globally, the ILO has also observed a drop in the earnings of people working through
platforms following the outbreak of COVID-19. In a rapid assessment survey carried out in
2020 in Chile, India, Mexico and Kenya, nine out of ten people providing ride-hailing
services through on-location platforms and seven out of ten people providing delivery
services reported a decline in their earnings.104
3.1.3. Increased use of workforce analytics, surveillance and algorithmic management
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is being applied extensively in our everyday lives, for example in
online shopping and advertising, web search, digital personal assistants, machine translations,
or autonomous driving.105
. The EU Fundamental Rights Agency (EU FRA) notes that 42% of
companies report using AI-related technologies, while further 18% plan to do so in the
future.106
In the world of work, while the use of automated systems first gained prominence through its
applications in the platform economy, algorithmic management tools are spreading to
“traditional” workplaces as well. According to the European Survey of Enterprises on New
and Emerging Risks, in 2019 machines were used for employee management or surveillance
in 12 % of EU companies. 3.7% of enterprises reported using robots that interact with
workers, 11.8% of enterprises used machines determining the content or pace of work, 8.2%
used machines monitoring workers’ performance, while 4.8% used wearable devices. Only
24.5% of enterprises that reported using digital technologies for work, discussed the possible
impacts of the use of such technologies on the health and safety of employees. Increased
104
International Labour Office (2021).
105
See also this report by the European Parliament. Available online.
106
EU Fundamental Rights Agency (EU FRA) (2020). Getting the Future Right. Artificial Intelligence and
Fundamental Rights. December 2020. Available online.
0 0 0 0 0
0 0
0 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
3
4
2
0
0
0
1
0
3
4
6
7
6
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Freelance Delivery Home services
Domestic work Microtask Taxi
Contest-based Professional services Medical consultation
31
work intensity or time pressure was highlighted by respondents reporting the use of workers’
performance monitoring technologies.107
Beyond the discussion of how to quantify the impact of AI on labour markets and what to do
about the ensuing labour market transitions at a macro-level,108
some authors109
have started
to look into the qualitative aspects connected to the digitisation of work. These are mostly
focused on platform work and include the quality of the transformed jobs or the implications
from the growing interactions between humans and automated digital tools used to manage
businesses or production processes.
Algorithms can create efficiencies, by effectively managing a vast pool of data and by
proposing user-friendly solutions. In the world of work, AI is used for the following broad
purposes: recruitment, surveillance, management, supervision and control, termination of
work-related contractual relationships. These notions are to be interpreted exclusively in the
framework of labour law. The analysis presented hereunder leaves unaffected the rights and
classification of digital platforms under other pieces of EU law.
AI can be used for surveillance – to monitor work performance and behaviour. This includes
for example screening emails or internal communications for the purposes of worker
productivity measurement or informing/influencing management decisions on worker career
progression. If combined with personal data (such as from activity trackers regarding sleep
and exercise patterns, food and drink intake), algorithms could help build profiles that reflect
a worker’s propensity to take extended periods of sick leave, the impact of personal life on
productivity levels, or the likelihood of getting pregnant (and hence taking maternity leave
and be potentially less available due to care responsibilities), to name a few.
Algorithms can also be used for management and control - to make decisions on promotion
and termination of work-related contractual relationships, or manage work performance and
behaviour. For example, automated systems in the platform economy are applied for
algorithmic management. This includes situations in which algorithms take decisions for task
allocation (which can affect for example pay levels) or give work instructions (which route
should drivers or riders take, etc.) based on internal metrics and/or worker ratings.
A study by CEPS finds out that, for a selection of digital labour platforms,110
many of these
seek to supervise the behaviour of people working via them through detailed monitoring of
their activities. Surveillance is especially common on location-based ride-hailing and delivery
107
EU-OSHA (2020). European Survey of Enterprises on New and Emerging Risks (ESENER) 2019. Available
online.
108
For an overview of such discussions and the implications from an EU perspective, see for example Michel
Servoz (2019). The future of work? Work of the future! On how artificial intelligence, robotics and automation
are transforming jobs and the economy in Europe. Available online.
109
See for example Valerio De Stefano (2019) or Jeremias Adams-Prassl (2019).
110
It is important to note that, while for the CEPS study platform landscape, a non-exhaustive but representative
list of 516 digital labour platforms were examined, the analytical framework connecting business models and
their impact on working conditions is based on 52 country-platform observations.
32
services, as well as freelance services. In contrast, customers tend to monitor people working
through platforms in home services, professional services and domestic work.111
Surveillance in the platform economy plays an important part in guiding the algorithmic
management of people working through platforms through its impact on internal metrics and
ratings. Examples of types of surveillance include the use of GPS data to monitor worker
location on on-location platforms, or using monitoring systems that automatically take
screenshots of people’s screens when work is carried out online.112
Such ‘performance’
information can potentially be gathered even while off-duty and be incorporated in internal
metrics used by the platform company to judge the actual or potential performance of people
working through it (e.g. how safe one is driving or likely to drive, etc.). When combined with
customer ratings, therefore, surveillance can impact the access to work opportunities.
The abovementioned CEPS study notes that, for a selection of digital labour platforms,
algorithms often take the decisions regarding account suspension and termination. The
majority of reviewed platforms seem not to offer any dispute resolution for people working
through platforms. Of platforms that offer such a mechanism, half provide a human contact
point to review and reconsider decisions, while the other half provide a dispute resolution
process arbitrated by a third party. Human review tends to be available on platforms
intermediating location-based taxi services.113
Algorithms can also be used to determine a person’s eligibility for a potential task (e.g.
vehicle age as one of the criteria for ride-hailing platforms), track their movements (via their
phone’s GPS), make conclusions about work performance (tapping into smartphones’
gyroscope to note a vehicle’s sudden acceleration or braking), or assign work. Algorithms are
also used to influence the supply of labour by ‘nudging’ and enticing workers to areas of high
demand by using for example ‘surge pricing’.114
The breadth of AI use-cases in the world of work suggests that algorithms are increasingly
used to execute decisions that were previously part of the responsibilities of managers
and human resources personnel.
On digital labour platforms, algorithms match clients with workers, evaluate work
performance, and even manage and organise the delivery process of each task. Such
practices are very relevant for worker classification discussions in the platform economy, as
platforms usually classify people working through platforms as self-employed while at the
same time exerting supervision and control over them through algorithms.
Employers have been found to often use three related supervision and control mechanisms:
direction, evaluation, and discipline in order to achieve a desired behaviour from workers.
Direction entails for example specifying what needs to be performed, in what order and time
111
Willem Pieter de Groen, Zachary Kilhoffer, Leonie Westhoff, Doina Postica and Farzaneh Shamsfakhr
(2021). Available online.
112
International Labour Office (2021).
113
Willem Pieter de Groen, Zachary Kilhoffer, Leonie Westhoff, Doina Postica and Farzaneh Shamsfakhr
(2021). Available online.
114
Available online.
33
period, and how accurately. Evaluation entails reviewing workers to address mistakes, assess
performance, and identify inadequate performance. Discipline entails punishing and
rewarding workers to prompt cooperation and enforce compliance with the employer’s
direction.115
A central aspect of algorithmic management in the platform economy is the use of automated
systems for task allocation. It has important implications for access to work opportunities and
hence the income of people working through platforms. Related to task allocation is the issue
of algorithmic ratings in the platform economy. Many platforms apply user-generated
rating systems. Algorithmic ratings have been found116
to raise important concerns about
discriminatory outcomes, as it can be subject to gender and racial stereotyping.
Research117
further suggests that platform companies have used algorithms to restrict access
to jobs for people working through platforms with low ratings. In addition, algorithmic
ratings can be volatile because they often dynamically draw from multiple data sources,
update frequently, and automatically deny access even based on small variations in ratings.
Court rulings and algorithmic management
The implications of using algorithms to manage people working through platforms were the
subject of a court ruling from January 2021118
in Italy, in which the court ruled that an
algorithm used by a food delivery platform to rank and offer shifts to riders was
discriminatory. According to the court, the algorithm’s failure to take into account the
reasons behind a cancellation amounts to discrimination and unjustly penalizes riders with
legally legitimate reasons for not working (for instance due to family emergencies or ill
health).
The particular algorithm examined by the court was used to determine the “reliability” of a
rider. According to the ordinance, if a rider failed to cancel a shift pre-booked through the
app at least 24 hours before its start, their “reliability index” would be negatively affected.
Since riders deemed more reliable by the algorithm were the first ones to be offered shifts in
busier time blocks, this effectively meant that riders who could not make their shifts—even if
due to a serious emergency or illness—would have had fewer job opportunities in the future.
In March 2021 a Dutch court ruled that the use of an algorithmically-assisted process by a
ride-hailing platform to support decisions on account termination did not breach provisions in
the General Data Protection Regulation – namely Article 22, which provides the right to have
a ‘human in the loop’, i.e. not to be subject to fully automated decisions. The decision was
taken after Uber provided proof of its internal Risk Operations team assessing fraud risks
initially signalled by automatic means.119
The proof was not disputed by the applicants.
Hence, the court concluded that there was significant human intervention in the account
deactivation assessment and decision procedure.
115
Katherine C. Kellog et al. (2020). Algorithms at work: the new contested terrain of control. Academic of
Management Annals 2020, Vol. 14, No. 1, 366–410. Available online.
116
Ibidem.
117
Ibidem.
118
Available online.
119
Available online (in Dutch).
34
In a different ruling from April 2021, a Dutch court ordered120
Uber to compensate and re-
hire drivers, who were judged to have been unlawfully dismissed by algorithmic means.
Having outlined the different ways in which AI is applied in the world of work and notably in
platform work, it should be noted that AI is not a static concept and there are different
approaches to its development.121
For the purpose of this analytical document, it is important
to mention two particular types of algorithmic systems which have different impacts on
capabilities and related challenges (notably regarding machine learning algorithms as ‘black
boxes’).
Rules-based AI produces pre-defined outcomes that are based on a set of certain rules coded
by humans (if A happens then do B). In practice, this means that AI programmers need to
make up a large number of rules ahead of time to try to handle all possible scenarios. Rules-
based AI systems have been the basis of earlier periods of AI advances, such as during the
1980s. These systems’ limitations contributed to other factors that led to reduced funding and
interest in AI systems (it was the so-called ‘AI winter’) in the 1990s.122
Nevertheless, rules
based AI systems continue to be heavily used across all industries, for instance for simulation
and planning tasks, which might also be relevant for workers.
More recently, machine learning techniques have contributed to the extensive application of
AI in numerous sectors of economy. Machine learning techniques use artificial neural
networks,123
which mimic how the human brain operates. A human programmer sets the
objective of machine learning systems, which then define their own set of rules that are
largely based on data used to train the system. For example, an image recognition algorithm
could be told its objective is to recognise cats in images. The system is then fed pre-labelled
data with cat images, upon which it is trained to recognise cats. Once it sets its own rules, the
machine learning system can start recognising cats in unlabelled images as well.
It is important to note that machine learning brings distinctive challenges due to the lack of
clarity as to how the system develops its rules (or what they really are). Such information is
often times unknown even to the developers of the system, hence the depiction of AI as ‘a
black box.’ This also brings challenges from the perspective of responsibility. With machine
learning, responsibility becomes diffuse – it becomes increasingly hard to answer who is
responsible when something goes wrong, whether it is the programmer, the provider of the
software, or the user.
120
Available online (in Dutch).
121
For example i). Machine learning approaches, including supervised, unsupervised and reinforcement
learning, using a wide variety of methods including deep learning; ii). Logic- and knowledge-based approaches,
including knowledge representation, inductive (logic) programming, knowledge bases, inference/deductive
engines, (symbolic) reasoning and expert systems; and iii). Statistical approaches, Bayesian estimation, search
and optimization methods.
122
Joint Research Centre (2020). Historical Evolution of Artificial Intelligence. Available online.
123
A computational learning system that uses a network of functions to understand and translate a data input of
one form into a desired output, usually in another form. The concept of the artificial neural network was inspired
by human biology and the way neurons of the human brain function together to understand inputs from human
senses. Source available online.
35
The use of algorithms in platform work and the general labour market therefore has important
implications for the working conditions of an increasing number of people. It also brings
distinct challenges, which are examined in depth in section 3.3.1.
3.2 Internal drivers related to the employment status
The key challenge in platform work is the risk of misclassification of the employment
status. Such misclassification negatively affects the access of people working through
platforms to existing labour rights and protection.
With most people working through platforms combining features of subordination and
autonomy, it is not always clear whether they should be considered as workers or self-
employed, and what obligations would fall on the platforms as employers or as contracting
entities. Only people who are considered as workers have access to the full set of labour
rights, such as on working time, paid annual leave, maternity, paternity and parental leave,
and in general occupational health and safety. Workers also have easier access to social
protection (although gaps remain for workers in non-standard employment) and are better
protected in cross-border situations, in case of disputes on jurisdiction or applicable law (see
also Section 3.4).
A common feature of digital labour platforms’ business models is the characterisation of the
work relationship as other than one of employment. Platforms often rely on “independent
contractors”, “third-party service providers” and “freelancers” to offer services. Platforms
define themselves as intermediaries connecting service providers to clients and therefore
describe the service providers’ status as independent contractors in their standard contracts.
Contractual terms and conditions for service providers often explicitly exclude any status of
employment and deny any responsibility of the platform as an employer.124
The risk of false self-employment
Various aspects of how services are provided through these platforms may often resemble
working conditions in an employment relationship. Hence, there is a high risk of
misclassification, by which people working through platforms are classified as self-
employed despite not necessarily enjoying the full autonomy that comes with such status.
Although in most cases people working through platforms have the freedom to decide
whether to log in and thus when to work, as illustrated in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the actual
organisation of work may be determined by the platforms themselves. For example, through
their terms of service agreements, platforms may unilaterally regulate conditions pertaining to
pay, working time, dispute resolution, customer service etiquette, and more, while
simultaneously using technological means to monitor and evaluate the work.125
This can lead
to what is commonly referred to as false self-employment, depriving the people concerned of
basic workers’ protection and often also limiting their access to social security schemes.
124
Z. Kilhoffer et al. (2020), Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers. Final
report prepared for the European Commission, Brussels. Available online. ILO (2021).
125
International Labour Office (2021), particularly section 5.1.1.
36
In platform work, the contractual relationship between the person providing work and the
platform will in most cases come into being when the person in question accepts the
platform’s terms and conditions online. Such contractual terms and conditions, though, are
often expressed in opaque and unintelligible ways, thereby compromising the person’s ability
to fully understand what they are signing up for, in particular where the Platform-to-Business
Regulation126
does not apply.127
The role of algorithms in concealing the employment status
The contractual terms and conditions presented to people on platforms may not correctly
reflect the actual treatment and relationship that will follow. This is due to the fact that many
of the management operations on platforms are automated through the use of AI, particularly
in instances where existing regulations, such as the Platforms-to-Business Regulation, do not
apply.
Available evidence of this is often based on anecdotal accounts, mostly due to a lack of
transparency of ‘black box’ decisions. For example, in 2020, some of the couriers and
drivers of one of the biggest food delivery platforms128
blamed unexplained changes to the
algorithm for affecting their jobs and incomes. When they asked for reasons about their
plummeting income, the company told them it had no human supervision over how many
deliveries they received.129
One should note that forthcoming internal market acquis may
address issues related to transparency and responsibility in the development, deployment and
use of AI systems used in the world of work.130
The impossibility to explain certain algorithmically-driven decisions and the lack of
responsibility resulting from the use of certain algorithms may also contribute to the potential
misclassification of people on platforms, since their factual relationship with the platforms
may not be that described in the contractual terms and conditions they signed up for.
Therefore, the lack of transparency inherent in the technology further allows for concealment
of factual evidence needed to establish a correct employment status classification.
Flexibility and bargaining power
Most digital labour platforms’ business models rely on contracting self-employed people
rather than employing them under labour law conditions. The reliance on contractors
provides platforms with more flexibility than traditional service providers that rely on
dependent employees, as it possibly allows them to adjust the supply of service providers to
fluctuations in demand.131
The administrative steps involved in recruitment and workforce
management, as well as the resulting costs in terms of social security contributions and
taxation, possibly to be provided across borders, can be seen by platforms as a burden on
their competitiveness and agility on the market.
126
Regulation (EU) 2019/1150. Available online.
127
J. Venturini et al. (2016), Terms of Service and Human Rights: An Analysis of Online Platform Contracts.
Council of Europe and FGV Direito, Rio de Janeiro. Available online. ILO (2021).
128
Uber Eats
129
Available online.
130
AI Act proposal.
131
OECD (2019), Gig economy platforms: boon or bane? Economics department working papers No. 1550.
Available online.
37
The persons working through platforms, on the other hand, may not have a choice but to
accept the standard contracts on offer, also in reason of the fact that they lack any significant
bargaining power in the pre-contractual stage. In practice, the employment status and the
resulting rights of people working through platforms will therefore often be determined
unilaterally by the platforms’ terms and conditions rather than by the outcome of a genuine
contractual negotiation, which would be typical for genuine self-employed activity.
There are a few examples of platforms offering all or some of its workers an employment
contract. In many of these cases, however, platforms use subcontracting business models with
work providers in a position similar to temporary agency workers.132
Also, in some countries,
workers can be classified under a third employment status – this is a hybrid classification
sitting somewhere between that of employee and self-employed in terms of rights and
obligations. Nevertheless, the predominant employment model remains the self-employed
status.133
Uncertainty concerning the employment status
Existing regulation on platform work at national level remains patchy and often limited to
specific sectors. This means that many people working through platforms often fall between
the cracks of labour and social protection, which also leads to a lack of equal treatment
between them and traditional workers. A blurred distinction between employers and clients,
as well as grey zones between workers and self-employed people, lead to regulatory
uncertainty over applicable rules, thereby affecting the working conditions of people on
platforms and their access to social protection.
Platform work is usually not legally recognised as a stand-alone form of work. Member
States’ labour regulations typically do not specify the employment status of people working
on platforms.134
Whether a person engaged in platform work is deemed to be an employee
and thus falls under the remit and protection of labour law depends on the general rules on
employment status in each Member State.
These rules are not harmonised and, despite there being CJEU case-law on the concept of
“worker”, there is no EU-wide definition used throughout the EU’s social and labour acquis.
The CJEU’s approach to deciding who is a worker is to a large extent determined by whether
an EU legal instrument refers to national definitions or not.135
CJEU case-law on the platform economy
132
Eurofound (2018).
133
Eurofound (2018). Kilhoffer et al. (2020). International Labour Office (2021).
134
Eurofound (2018), p. 43.
135
Risak/Dullinger (2018), The concept of worker in EU law: Status quo and potential for change, ETUI,
Brussels. Available online; Kontouris (2018), The concept of ‘worker’ in European Labour Law –
Fragmentation, Autonomy, and Scope, 47(2) Industrial Law Journal 192. Available online; see, for instance,
CJEU, C-658/18, UX, 16.7.2020. Available online.
38
The Court of Justice of the European Union has had several occasions to pronounce itself on
the legal qualification of digital labour platforms. In a first series of rulings which do not
directly touch on the labour law dimension of the platform economy but might have indirect
consequences on the responsibilities of platforms under labour law, the Court took a position
on the classification of services provided by platform operators and its regulatory
implications.136
In relation to the ride-hailing platform Uber, the Court ruled that, in view of
the high degree of control which the company exercises over the driver, the service delivered
and its remuneration, the platform’s business model does not merely constitute an online
intermediation service, but must be classified as a service in the field of transport and
therefore must comply with sectoral rules in that area. By contrast, a platform such as Star
Taxi App which is limited to licensed taxi drivers for whom this intermediary service is only
one of several means of acquiring customers, which they are by no means obliged to use, and
which does not organise the general functioning of the ride-hailing service by selecting the
drivers, setting or collecting the fares or controlling vehicles or the behaviour of drivers,
remains a company offering an information society service and is not classified as a ride-
hailing service. It remains to be seen whether the Court will extend this reasoning to the
obligations that digital labour platforms carry for the people working for them.
While the Court did not yet deal with the employment status in platform work directly, it was
seized in a similar case of a neighbourhood courier providing services exclusively for a parcel
delivery company as a “self-employed independent contractor”. The case concerned the
application of the Working Time Directive.137
In that instance, the Court did not exclude the
classification of such a person as self-employed and indicated that the person’s independence
is based on a number of indicators, including: the possibility to use subcontractors or
substitutes; the discretion to accept or not to accept the tasks offered by the company; the
freedom to provide services to any third party, including direct competitors of the company;
and the discretion to fix his hours of work to suit their personal convenience.
The Court also made clear that such classification can only hold provided that the referring
court ascertains that the person’s independence from the company is not fictitious and that it
is not possible to establish a relationship of subordination, which the referring court must do,
taking into account all the relevant factors relating to that person and to the economic activity
they perform.
While in most Member States, and at EU level, labour law is based on a binary distinction
between worker and self-employed, some Member States (e.g. Germany, France, Italy, Spain
and Portugal) have created a third/intermediate category of employment, usually for self-
employed individuals depicting a degree of economic dependency towards a quasi-
employer.138
This, as well as other contractual statuses used in platform work in Member
States, may add to the enforcement complexity of laws and jurisprudence.139
136
CJEU, cases C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi (Uber Spain), C-320/16, Uber France, and C-
62/19, Star Taxi App. Available online, respectively, here, here and here.
137
CJEU, case C-692/19, Yodel Delivery Network. Available online.
138
Eurofound (2018).
139
A detailed overview can be found in annex IV.
39
In situations of legal ambiguity, Member States either approach these with statutory
definitions of the employment relationship (e.g. Germany) or rely on criteria developed by
case-law (e.g. Ireland, Sweden). Some Member States have laid down legal presumptions in
their labour regulations to make it easier for individuals considering themselves as false self-
employed to claim their rights, either in specific sectors (e.g. Belgium), for certain
professions (e.g. France) or where a number of criteria are met (e.g. Spain, Netherlands,
Malta).
Some Member States (e.g. Belgium, Italy, Malta) provide for an administrative procedure
involving an administrative or other independent body which allows a party to a contract to
ascertain the employment status involved. However, such instruments are far from
universally available in all Member States. Labour inspectorates in some Member States
(e.g. Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland) can play a role in reviewing and assessing contractual
relationships and reclassifying them, but their resources are often limited and, in the absence
of physical work premises, as is often the case in platform work, they are not always fully
aware of platforms’ activities.
Challenging misclassification in court
In many cases, a person who considers herself to be false self-employed does not have a
choice but to challenge the alleged misclassification through legal action in court. People
working on platforms can seize a judge to challenge their employment status as determined
by the platforms’ terms and conditions to demand re-classification as a worker or, typically
after the contractual relationship has been terminated, to claim rights resulting from the
employee status.
Trade unions can support workers in their legal actions. However, due to the nature of
platform work, which does not entail fixed job premises and is often being performed on
wheels, from home or in other people’s homes, trade unions can face difficulties in
identifying and getting in touch with people working through platforms.
According to the general rules in Member States’ procedural law on the burden of proof, it
is for the person claiming the violation of a right to establish and prove the necessary facts
before the court. This means that the onus lies with the worker claiming rights from the
employee status. However, one of the crucial elements of an employee status – legal
subordination – often cannot be inferred from the terms of the contract, but derives from the
actual organisation of work. It is often difficult for people working on platforms to establish
such facts, as they have only limited insights into the organisation of work, its allocation
and control and the underlying mechanisms140
, in particular where they are determined by
algorithms (see section 3.3.1).
Despite such practical and procedural obstacles to redress, litigation on the classification of
platform work relationships has been increasing in recent years in the absence of a specific
legal framework. A significant number of court and administrative cases dealing with the
employment status of people working through platforms has been observed in nine Member
140
M. Risak (2017), Fair working conditions for platform workers: Possible regulatory approaches at the EU
level, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung. Available online.
40
States.141
The majority of those cases dealt with on-location platform work in the passenger
transport and food delivery sectors. However, several cases also concerned other forms of on-
location platform work, such as digital labour platforms for on-location micro-tasks142
and
platforms intermediating cleaning or similar services. No cases for online platform work were
identified. The fact that no case-law on alleged misclassification in platform work was found
in other Member States might be explained by the introduction of specific regulation on the
matter143
. Alternatively, this may be explained by structural factors in those countries such as
less litigation on the employment status and on labour law matters in general, and the absence
or weakness of workers’ organisations which typically support workers in bringing legal
action to courts.
Existing jurisprudence on the employment status
This case-law has an important impact, as courts have decided in favour of reclassification
in a significant number of the cases observed. Where cases have reached the highest court in
a Member State, the courts have generally ruled in favour of employment status (France,
Germany, and Spain).144
The only exception is Italy, where the Supreme Court applied the
legal regime of the third category status (lavoro eteroorganizzato) to food delivery
couriers.145
In other countries, such as Belgium or the Netherlands, litigation on
misclassification in platform work have not reached the highest courts yet, but might do so in
the near future.
There where highest courts have decided on landmark cases, this case-law has often not
settled the issue, as lower-instance courts have not always followed that jurisprudence in
subsequent rulings. For instance, the Lyon Appeals Court found drivers working for a ride-
hailing platform to be self-employed despite an earlier French Supreme Court ruling to the
contrary. In Italy, the Palermo Civil Court went beyond the Supreme Court ruling by
reclassifying food delivery riders as workers, while the Florence Civil Court rejected that
classification. Spain is the only Member State where case-law seems to have consolidated in
favour of reclassification as workers as a result of a high number of lawsuits.
Drawing general conclusions from the national case law can be challenging given the
diversity of approaches taken. Nevertheless, some common patterns can be observed. In
general, courts have not been constrained by contractual stipulations, focusing instead on the
individual circumstances of work organisation in each case.146
Also, legal presumptions for
141
These are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. This
section draws heavily on an analysis of more than 100 court decisions and 15 administrative decisions on cases
of alleged misclassification of platform workers in these Member States, as well as Switzerland and the United
Kingdom, carried out by the European Centre of Expertise in the field of labour law, employment and labour
market policies (ECE). “Case Law on the Classification of Platform Workers: Cross-European Comparative
Analysis and Tentative Conclusions”, May 2021. Available online. For all other Member States, the absence of
relevant case law has been confirmed by the respective national experts in the ECE network.
142
An example of this is the Click and Walk platform in France which assigns on-location micro tasks such as
mystery shopping to its users.
143
For instance, Law 45/2018 in Portugal requires ride-hailing platforms to conclude commercial contracts with
a transport company that employs the drivers.
144
A detailed overview of all the cases considered in this section can be found in annex IV.
145
It is to be noted, however, that as the Supreme Court was seized by the platform which sought a qualification
of its workers as self-employed, it did not scrutinize the part of the appeal court’s assessment which denied a
qualification as regular employees.
146
Commonly referred to as the “primacy of facts” principle – see article 9 of the ILO Employment Relationship
Recommendation, 2006 (No. 198). Available online.
41
an employment status in case some criteria are fulfilled have played a crucial role in national
case-law determining the status of people working through platforms, such as in Spain or in
Belgium. On the contrary, the French presumption of self-employed activity in case of entry
in a business register appears to have significantly contributed to the initial reluctance of
lower courts to reclassify people engaged in platform work as workers.
The existence of third statuses between employment and self-employed activity has had
different effects in Member States, owing also to the variation in rights attached to these
statuses. As mentioned above, in Italy the existence of a third status has facilitated the
reclassification of people working through platforms, without however closing the debate on
a full worker status. In Spain, courts are now regularly “upgrading” people working through
platforms from the intermediate status (“TRADE”) to regular worker status, whereas the
French Supreme Court has ruled in favour of the worker status even after the introduction of
special rights for self-employed people working through platforms.
Criteria for judicial assessment of the employment status
The criteria for assessing the employment status and the importance attributed to specific
features of the contractual relationship are gradually shifting. Although the freedom of
people working through platforms to decide if and when to work has frequently been
relied upon as a reason to deny worker status by earlier judgments in particular, courts are
increasingly discarding such reasoning by focusing instead on those people’s lack of genuine
independence. In the majority of judgments ruling in favour of reclassification, the unilateral
imposition of terms and conditions by platforms, especially with regards to assignment and
payment, has been relied upon as an indicator of the platforms’ control over the organisation
of work. In the view of judges, sanctions (or less favourable conditions for future
assignments) in case of non-acceptance of tasks or incentives to work longer hours
compensate for the lack of a contractual obligation to work.
The traditional labour law criterion of subordination, in the sense of direction and control of
the workers’ activity by the employer, has gradually taken on a different meaning due to the
peculiarities of the role of algorithms in managing platform work. In the absence of a superior
on the place of work, the judicial assessment focuses instead on the presence of concrete
instructions given by platforms’ algorithms through a smartphone app on how to perform
services, and their degree of detail. Even if no specific instructions are given for individual
tasks, the courts give more weight to the fact that the platforms frequently determine and
dominate all aspects of the service performed. In particular, rulings issued by courts of last
instance refer to the constant localisation of people working on platforms through GPS
technology, as well as to the platforms’ rating systems and measures of performance and
(mis)conduct, which can lead to sanctions and eventually to deregistration, as tools of
control that indicate subordination.
Similarly, courts have increasingly come to consider elements of organisational integration
into the platform’s business model and the absence of genuine entrepreneurial
independence of the people working through platforms as key factors in assessing the
employment status (in addition to the more traditional elements of direction and control).
This includes considerations on whether the people working through platforms appear, in the
customers’ view, as independent entrepreneurs, whether they bear the economic risk of the
enterprise in question and have opportunities to further develop their business, or if, on the
other hand, they may be structurally and organisationally dependent on the platform. It also
includes the issue of ownership of equipment and infrastructure necessary for the service
42
provision. In Spain especially, the courts have acknowledged that the platform app and thus
the digital infrastructure are the main means of production, rather than the smartphone or the
means of transport. The courts’ focus on the organisational dependence of the people working
through platforms – rather than on the lack of an explicit obligation to work – is also in line
with established jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
according to which a person cannot be self-employed if they cannot independently determine
their own conduct on the market.147
Overall, a clear trend can be observed that many courts have developed a better
understanding of the organisation of platform work, of the role of algorithms to manage
and control delivery of services and the functioning of the market, and have shifted their
attention to these factors in order to reclassify the contractual relationship as one of
employment. However, this trend is not followed by all courts, as the jurisprudence is far
from being settled. It is yet unclear whether courts in other Member States which have not yet
had any cases will follow.
Most of the rulings reclassifying service providers as employees concerned ride-hailing and
food delivery platforms, but the two decisions by higher courts in Germany and France
which examined digital labour platforms intermediating on-location micro-tasks have
also followed this direction. So far, courts have been reluctant to reclassify people offering
their services as cleaners through platforms, taking into account that the remuneration and
the service delivery were agreed upon mutually between the person working through
platforms and the client, with limited intervention by the platform. However, the low number
of cases and the fact that they were decided by first-instance courts (in Denmark and the
Netherlands) does not allow for a general conclusion.
The ambiguity of platforms’ business practices
The diversity of approaches taken by national courts, both within and between Member
States, and the absence of case-law in many others, create legal uncertainty for platforms
and people working through them. However, legal uncertainty does not always stem from a
lack of regulation or diverging court rulings. It is often the result of platforms’ business
practices. By defining their business model as the provision of intermediation services with
service providers as independent contractors, platforms determine various conditions related
to remuneration, working time, dispute resolution, and more.148
Strategies used by some
platforms to avoid obligations as employers and reclassification claims include complex legal
set-ups between subsidiary and parent companies, mandatory arbitration clauses and making
disputes subject to foreign law.149
In some cases, following newly introduced legislation or
court decisions, platforms have made changes to their business model or their contractual
terms and conditions. However the extent of these changes are difficult to verify, also due to
the lack of information, consultation and redress mechanisms vis-à-vis the organisational
changes in question.150
147
Case C‑413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media. Available online.
148
Courts, however, have been challenging platforms’ classifications. For example, in Case C-434/15
Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL. [2017], the Court of Justice of the European Union
held that Uber is not a mere technological intermediary, rather it provides services in the field of transport.
Available online.
149
International Lawyers Assisting Workers Network (ILAW), “Taken for a ride: Litigating the digital platform
model”, Issue Brief, March 2021. Available online.
150
For example, in France and Spain some platform companies did not change the employment status of their
contractors even after rulings by the highest-instance courts.
43
Changes to platforms’ business models following regulatory changes or court rulings in
non-EU countries
Following the passage of the AB5 law in the State of California in 2019, which extended the
worker status to some people working in non-standard arrangements, including platforms,
some digital labour platforms first argued that it did not apply to them. Following this, Uber
made changes to its business model, allowing for drivers in California to see the “pickup, trip
time, distance, destination and fare upfront”.151
Finally, several ride-hailing companies
funded a ballot initiative, Proposition 22, to exempt both ride-hailing and delivery platforms
from the AB5 requirements, while also granting drivers some new protections. Proposition 22
passed in November 2020 with 59% of the vote.152
Similarly, Uber implemented the UK Supreme Court ruling of 19 February 2021 by re-
classifying its drivers as “workers” under UK law (a status more akin to the third category
introduced by some EU Member States), but did not apply the ruling’s passage according to
which the time spent by drivers logged into the Uber app waiting for assignments was to be
counted as working time. Uber argued that the ruling based its decision on key features in the
app from 2016 that are now defunct and that its definition of working time was consistent
with the court ruling. Furthermore, the company argued it stopped penalising drivers for
refusing trips in 2017, removing their obligation to work.153
Digital labour platforms can, and often have, updated their terms of use in order to comply
with the law. For example, in 2018, when the General Data Protection Regulation became
applicable, many platforms updated their privacy policies to signal their commitment to it.154
The variety of judicial responses to platform work, as well as the constant changes to
platforms’ business practices, create legal uncertainty at all levels, including for digital
labour platforms, but in particular for the people working through them. The uncertainty over
their employment status has a direct impact on the labour and social rights they can access,
since the existence of an employment relationship is a key factor in cross-border situations
and for benefiting from the EU labour and social acquis.
3.3 Internal drivers related to platforms’ algorithm-based business model
Platform work is by definition IT-driven, and some types of platform work can be easily
delivered cross-border. This brings about certain challenges that have an impact on the
working conditions of people working through platforms. Existing EU labour law does not
tackle algorithmic management challenges. Currently, the internal market acquis is
developing in this area, but without focusing specifically on the perspective of people
providing services via platforms. Such challenges are driven by the lack of transparency and
151
The change in Uber’s policy was signaled in a blog post on the website of the company. Available online.
152
Proposition 22 vote results available online.
153
Article in the Financial Times, Uber agrees to classify UK drivers as workers entitled to benefits, 16 March
2021. Available online.
154
See for example, Uber’s Privacy Policy dated 25 May 2018: Available online. See also the privacy policy for
Upwork which has introduced a separate Data Processing Agreement in order to streamline its compliance with
the GDPR. Available online.
44
clear responsibility associated with the use of algorithms, the information asymmetries and
insufficient dialogue prevalent in platform work, as well as unclear and complicated
relationships between platforms and authorities.
3.3.1 Lack of information, consultation and redress and unclear responsibilities in the
use of algorithmic tools
Lack of sufficient information, consultation and redress underpins algorithmic management
in platform work. Some academics note that algorithmic management may enable forms of
oversight and control that alter the traditional role of managers in workplaces (and human
supervision in general) or remove them further from the scene of work.155
The particularities of how automated systems are designed and (“trained” to) operate result in
three main challenges when applied in the world of work. At the same time, the extent to
which these challenges translate into specific regulatory failures should be assessed both from
the perspective of EU labour law as well as in the context of the overall internal market
acquis. Some issues may be addressed by existing and proposed horizontal legislation.
 Bias that could lead to discrimination. There are two ways, in which bias towards
certain groups of people could ‘creep’ in algorithms. Data bias could result when an
algorithm finds a certain pattern in the data on which it is trained. This could for
example be a correlation between certain personal characteristic (gender, age, ethnic
origin etc.) and expected work performance. This could then introduce or reinforce
discriminatory practices vis-à-vis the affected people, for example by not allocating
tasks to certain individuals based on some personal traits, or excluding certain
individuals from using the platforms services all together.
The EU Fundamental Rights Agency notes that discrimination a crucial topic when it
comes to the use of AI, because the very purpose of machine learning algorithms is to
categorise, classify and separate. Even if information about protected attributes
(gender, age, ethnic origin) is removed from the data, it can still be inferred via
proxies (postal code, educational institution, etc.).156
This makes addressing potential
discrimination more difficult.
A Eurobarometer survey157
found that only around 40% of EU citizens are concerned
that using AI could lead to discrimination in terms of age, gender, race or nationality
– for example, in taking decisions on recruitment or credit worthiness.158
The
possibility that this reflects a lack of general awareness on how automated systems
could affect one’s rights (rather than a widespread trust in the technology) should not
be discounted.
Algorithms can also be discriminatory due to a bias in their programming. This could be the
result of conscious or unconscious bias held by the human developing the algorithm and
155
Katherine C. Kellog et al. (2020).
156
EU Fundamental Rights Agency (EU FRA) (2020).
157
Eurobarometer 92.3 (2019). Available online.
158
EU Fundamental Rights Agency (EU FRA) (2020).
45
could lead to prejudiced decisions based on programming rules. This potential for bias is best
exemplified by the fact that about 85% of AI developers are men.159
Despite most of the focus being on negative outcomes of algorithmic bias, it should be noted
that the use of algorithms can also lead to socially important outcomes, such as serving as a
behavioural diagnostic and helping society understand the nature of human error. If
implemented well, algorithms might also have the potential to reduce bias.160
 Lack of transparency. Machine-learning-based algorithms have been labelled as
‘black boxes’ due to a lack of clarity on how the system has been programmed to
develop the rules, based upon which it fulfils its primary objective.
This lack of transparency affects the understanding of how algorithms work, what the
implications for workers are, or even how their working conditions are affected. Most
workers currently do not fully grasp what kind of data is being collected about them,
how it is being used, or how to contest it.161
In the platform economy, such lack of
transparency can also reinforce power imbalances, leaving the people working
through platforms unable to challenge unfavourable decisions, while at the same time
not having access to certain rights and protections granted under labour law.162
The EU Fundamental Rights Agency has noted the necessity to ensure that people can
seek remedies when something goes wrong. To do so, they need to know that AI is
being used. It also means that organisations using AI need to be able to explain AI
systems in use and how they deliver decisions based on them.163
The lack of information about essential aspects of the working relationship is further
negatively affected by a limited knowledge about relevant rights under existing EU
instruments, such as the GDPR. For example, For example, a Eurobarometer survey
carried out in 2019 shows that only 40% of Europeans are aware that they have the
right to have a say when decisions are automated. .164
It is also worth noting that developers often make the claim that there is a trade-off
between the transparency and the effectiveness of algorithms – the more
understandable the system is, the worse it performs.
 A responsibility gap. Algorithmic systems allow the tracking, disciplining and
setting of expectations for workers without any human supervision and control. This
159
Michel Servoz (2019).
160
Kleinberg et al. (2018) Human decisions and machine predictions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133(1):
237-293. Available online.
161
Katherine C. Kellog et al. (2020).
162
To give a practical example, people working through platforms have blamed unexplained changes to the
algorithm for having an impact on their access to tasks (and hence income). When the couriers asked for reasons
about their plummeting income, responses from the platform company advised them “we have no manual
control over how many deliveries you receive.” Available online.
163
EU Fundamental Rights Agency (EU FRA) (2020).
164
Ibidem.
46
could undermine existing fundamental rights and allow companies to distance
themselves from decisions taken via algorithms by making it more difficult to identify
the responsible entity, thereby preventing the attribution of (potential) obligations.
This can create a responsibility gap due to the lack of a human ‘in the loop’ of an
algorithmic decision. It might also prevent the effective exercise of the right of
workers and their representatives to be informed about working conditions and
procedures. The proposed AI Act and the General Data Protection Regulation
introduce provisions for the human oversight of automated-decisions. Still,
specificities of employment relations might necessitate further action best tackled
through the Treaty social chapter.
The EU Fundamental Rights Agency points out that without improved transparency
of algorithmic decisions, individuals may not be able to defend themselves, assign
responsibility for the decisions affecting them, or appeal any decision negatively
affecting them. In this regard, opportunities to successfully complain against the use
of AI and challenge decisions based on it are essential. This challenge is exacerbated
by the complexity of algorithmic decision-making systems. Furthermore, a particular
challenge to filing successful complaints against automated decisions or the use of AI
in general relates to the need to explain decisions based on complex systems.165
Algorithms can bring added value in managing efficiently the plethora of data and the
matching of supply and demand, thereby creating new business models. However,
speeds of data processing can ramp up the pressure to rubber-stamp what automated
systems output, due for instance to information asymmetries between the human
validator and the system itself.166
Humans responsible for overseeing and controlling
algorithms used for work monitoring and supervision and control might lack
protection against undue repercussions in case they ignore automated decisions
affecting workers.
The general challenges described in this section and inherent in the nature of the technology
enabling algorithmic management will not be subject to a possible initiative improving the
working conditions in platform work, as they are dealt with through separate
instruments167. When applied in the world of work, however, the use of algorithms results in
specific labour-related challenges, such as lack of information, consultation and redress and
unclear responsibilities in the use of algorithmic tools, which the potential initiative may aim
to tackle. Section 3.2.1 of the consultation document presents in further detail these specific
challenges. Possible avenues for EU action to address them are described in Section 6.2.2 of
the analytical document.
3.3.2 Information asymmetries and insufficient dialogue in platform work
While work or services provided via digital labour platforms have opened up new
opportunities, there is growing uncertainty on a number of issues relating to earnings,
165
EU Fundamental Rights Agency (EU FRA) (2020).
166
The risk of automation bias is reflected in the proposed AI Act.
167
Most notably the proposed AI Act.
47
working conditions and social protection. To a significant extent, these challenges appear to
link to information asymmetries and insufficient dialogue between platforms and the
people working through platforms. These challenges exist in other non-standard forms of
work outside of the digital labour platform economy, yet the opaqueness allowed for by new
digital technologies seem to be exacerbating them.
Despite the limited research on this aspect of the digital labour platform economy, scholars
have pointed to the need for attention to the disruptive role of digital labour platforms in
shaping power relations and communications.168
In this context, the information and
power asymmetries produced by platforms are arguably fundamental to the platforms’ ability
to exert supervision and control over the people working through them, even if these are
classified as self-employed.
Indeed, unclear information and consultation rights can affect the working conditions of
people working through platforms. From their perspective, it can be difficult to maintain an
overview of existing rights and regulations, given their complexity, scarce publicity and
difficult intelligibility in the platforms’ terms and conditions. People working through
platforms often accept terms and conditions without a clear overview of the corresponding
advantages and disadvantages, despite provisions in existing instruments, such as the
GDPR169
and the Platforms to Business Regulation170
.
To some extent, the unbalanced power relationship due to the information asymmetries
between platforms and the people working through them is a defining feature of many digital
labour platforms. Scholars argue that the work being performed on digital labour
platforms in some cases is shaped by the algorithmic deployment of a variety of business
model decisions that generate information asymmetries. Hence, platforms exert “soft
supervision” over the behaviour of people working through them.171
In this way, the information asymmetries arise, as the rules made by the platforms may have
the effect of weakening the position in the negotiation process of people working through
them. Thus, due to the existence of information asymmetries, people voluntarily bind
themselves to the protocol of the platform without having the ability to question the
advantages and disadvantages associated with the protocol. At the same time, the lack of
social dialogue and collective representation amplifies the drawbacks, as these would
otherwise be a tool to intervene and reduce the information asymmetries by bringing together
the interests of people working through platforms vis-à-vis digital labour platforms
themselves.
Even if the collective representation and bargaining power of people working through
platforms were to be improved, this would not necessarily guarantee an improvement of the
168
A. Rosenblat and L. Stark (2016) Algorithmic Labour and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of
Uber’s Drivers in International Journal of Communication 10(2016), 3758-3784. Available online.
169
GDPR aims to address information asymmetries by providing in Article 12 that the “controller shall take
appropriate measures to provide any information referred to in Articles 13 and 14 and any communication
under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 relating to processing to the data subject in a concise, transparent, intelligible and
easily accessible form, using clear and plain language”.
In addition, the controller is obliged to facilitate the
exercise of data subject rights under Articles 15 to 22.
170
The P2B Regulation only covers self-employed ‘business users’ engaged in direct transactions with
customers.
171
A. Rosenblat and L. Stark (2016).
48
conditions, especially in case of people performing low-skilled, repetitive and easily
replaceable tasks. While collective bargaining can be an effective tool to reducing existing
information asymmetries, it is important to stress that the issue of information asymmetries
and insufficient dialogue goes beyond strictly looking at the legal employment status of
the people working through platforms. Indeed, information and consultations rights, social
dialogue, and collective organisation are also challenging due to the specificities of platform
work.
For example, platform work often involves no physical shared workplace, even for on-
location platforms, which means that people working through platforms rarely interact
with each other, and that they may often not know who their peers on a given platform are
or even how to contact them. Consequently, collective organisation and representation
become difficult and fragmented, regardless of the employment relationship. For instance,
although strikes have been organised through social media platforms, the success of these is
dependent on whether the people are active on the social media platform in question and/or
whether they become aware of the forthcoming strike in due time.
Platforms’ business models, for instance those relying on a ranking system, may
generate competition between people working through platforms rather than
cooperation with the aim of better social protection and working conditions. This
appears to be the case for several platforms, where couriers are ranked according to a number
of factors, including for example their ability to work during high-demand hours, the amount
of completed orders, their average number of deliveries per hour as compared to the fastest
courier, customer ratings and order history.172
The issue of information asymmetries dovetails with the opaqueness in algorithmic
management, and thus the challenges are to some extent rooted in a general lack of
transparency. People working through platforms have been seeking various unionised
responses to the challenges of platform work, including strike actions over poor wages
and working conditions. For example, the city-based ‘Riders Union Bologna’ was
established with the aim of setting a minimum level of job security, full accident insurance
and proper and free equipment, guaranteed working hours, decent payment and compensation
in case of smog, rain and holiday work.173
Similarly, the ‘Wolt Workers Group’ is a
Copenhagen-based worker organisation that consists of a group of riders doing deliveries
through Finnish platform ‘Wolt’ who are campaigning for better pay and working conditions,
offering general advice to the riders.174
This is done through petitions and protests, the latest
having taken place in February 2021, where riders protested against changes to the payment
model. In 2018, one group of couriers in Spain launched its own delivery platform, ‘La
Pajara’175
, with the aim to establish a more autonomous business model, giving the small
team of bicycle couriers a fixed salary, health benefits and parental leave.
Various initiatives by social partners across EU Member States are also arising. One
example is the Framework Agreement on Digitalisation adopted by the European Social
Partners on 23 June 2020, which aims at laying out an inclusive approach to the digital
172
Pierre Bérastégui (2021) Available online
173
Marco Marrone (2019) Rights against the machines! Food delivery, piattaforme digitali e sindacalismo
informale in Labour&Law Issues, volume 5. No. 1. Available online.
174
Eurofound (2021).
175
La Pàjara. Available online.
49
transformation. The framework agreement analyses the impact of digitalisation on the
workplace and covers all workers and employers in the public and private sectors and in all
economic activities, including digital labour platforms.176
While this only covers the
instances where an employment relationship exists, the challenges identified, such as the
impact of Artificial Intelligence and ICTs on skills, work-life balance, work environment, and
health and safety may indeed still be relevant for all people working through digital labour
platforms.
Additionally, new models of collective negotiations have been developed, for instance in the
case of Deliveroo in Belgium who employed workers through the intermediary ‘SMart’ (see
section 2.2). A survey suggests that the arrangement was primarily motivated by the specifics
of the Belgian tax system, but that it nevertheless provided workers with protections,
including income security.177
‘SMart coops’ operate in some EU Member States178
. In return
for a fee, SMart helps the self-employed with administration, accounting and financial
management tasks.
Finally, it is important to note that some collective agreements have already been achieved
within traditional trade union frameworks. For instance, ‘3F’ (the United Federation of
Danish Workers) was able to conclude a temporary collective agreement with the cleaning
platform ‘Hilfr’ in 2018.179
In 2019, the ‘Fellesforbundet’ union and ‘Foodora’ reached a
collective bargaining agreement that includes an annual pay hike for full-time riders in
Norway.180
In addition, in January 2021, 3F and the employers’ organisation ‘Dansk Erhverv’
reached a national sectoral agreement for delivery riders, which covers riders working
through the food delivery platform ‘Just Eat’ in Denmark.181
Similarly, in Austria social
partners have concluded a sectoral collective agreements for bicycle couriers working under
an employment relationship, who from January 1st
, 2020 could benefit from a minimum wage
and paid leave.182
Although these collective agreements may be limited in either sectoral
scope or timeframe, they are important in that they display social dialogue and collective
representation as viable means to improve the working conditions in platform work.
Digital labour platforms are also starting to establish standalone business associations.
For instance, ‘AssoDelivery’ is an Italian association in the food delivery industry to which
Deliveroo, Glovo, SocialFood and Uber Eats adhere183
, and which aims to ensure that food
176
The European Social Partners Framework Agreement on Digitalisation was signed by BusinessEurope,
ETUC, CEEP and SMEunited to support the successful digital transformation of Europe’s economy and to
manage its large implications for labour markets, the world of work and society at large. The agreement
supports the successful integration of digital technologies at the workplace, investment in digital skills, skills
updating and the continuous employability of the workforce. The agreement enables employers and unions to
introduce digital transformation strategies in partnership in a human oriented approach at national, sectoral,
company and workplace levels, including on the modalities of connecting and disconnecting and respect of
working time rules and appropriate measures to ensure compliance. Available online
177
Jan Drahokopil and Agnieska Piasna (2019) Work in the platform economy. Deliveroo riders in Belgium and
the SMart arrangement. Working paper 2019.01. Available online.
178
Smart (2021) Available online.
179
Kristin Jesnes, Anna Ilsoe, and Marianne J. Hotvedt (2019) Collective agreements for platform workers?
Examples from the Nordic countries. Fafo. Available online.
180
Eurofound (2021).
181
Asger Havstein Eriksen (2021) Groundbreaking agreement: Danes can now order takeaways with a clean
conscience in Fagbladet 3F. Available online.
182
Eurofound (2021), Collective agreement for bicycle couriers in Austria. Available online.
183
Associazione Italiana de categoria. Available online.
50
delivery platforms have a unitary representative organisation. The platforms are also
increasingly publishing collective statement of principles, charters, and codes of conduct,
which can be a first step in the direction of more transparency to close the gap in information
imbalances between platforms and their associated workers. The fact that platforms are
entering into collective associations may also create renewed pressure for people working
through platforms to not only enter collective representation within the framework of a single
platform, but also to seek broader unionisation. This would help addressing the question of
workers working through different platforms simultaneously and thus having to prioritise
their loyalties, although it would perhaps add to the challenge of identifying fellow people
working through platforms.
Platforms’ initiatives to improve working conditions and access to social protection
Aside from initiatives directly linked to the COVID pandemic (see the box on the impact of
COVID in section 3.1.1), some platform companies have proposed measures to improve
working conditions of self-employed people that provide services through them.
These include for example:
 Different types of private insurance schemes, such as Uber’s partnership with AXA or
cooperation of Wolt, Deliveroo or Glovo with Qover;
 Provision of training: either directly relevant for platform work (e.g. Frizbiz and
Heetch in cooperation with a home improvement and gardening retailer, Leroy
Merlin) or for further career development (Uber’s cooperation with the Open
University in the UK);
 Tools for more control and transparency over earnings (e.g. Uber’s earnings estimator
in France);
 Tools for recording rankings (Glovo Pro to download a certificate containing
information on the metrics and evaluations).
Some platforms have also committed to greater transparency and improvement in working
conditions through codes of conducts such as the Crowdsourcing Code of Conduct184
in
Germany or declarations such as the Charter of Principles for Good Platform Work185
or
Statement of Principles of EU technology platforms.186
3.4 Internal drivers related to the cross-border nature of platform work
Platform work across borders can create difficulties for determining the law applicable to
the contractual obligations between the platform and the person working through it, as well
184
Available online.
185
Available online.
186
Available online.
51
as for determining which courts have jurisdiction over disputes relating to such
obligations, in particular in situations where the employment status is not clear.
The Brussels Ia187
and Rome I188
regulations set out, respectively, rules on determining the
responsible jurisdiction and the applicable law in cross-border disputes. In such disputes
between the employer and the worker these provisions derogate from the general rules
concerning contracts, and providing certain safeguards, with the aim of protecting workers as
the weaker party to a contract. Brussels Ia, in particular, stipulates that a worker may
only be sued in the Member State of his/her domicile and that s/he may choose between
several jurisdictions when bringing a claim against the employer. Rome I stipulates that
while the parties to the employment contract can determine the law applicable to it,
they cannot contractually opt out from the mandatory legal provisions of the country
whose law would be applicable in the absence of the choice, which in principle is the law
of the country “where or from where the employee habitually carries out his work”. As
a result, a worker is entitled to protections under the more favourable mandatory employment
law of these Member States. These provisions protecting workers do not apply to self-
employed whose transactions are governed by the general rules. Hence, legal uncertainty on
the employment status generates further doubts on whether contractual clauses of digital
labour platforms regarding the choice of law and jurisdiction are valid or not.
The unclear status of people working through platforms can also give rise to questions about
their social security coverage in cross-border situations. The classification of these people
in national law bears consequences for social security coordination law.189
For instance, if a
person working through a platform is classified as a worker in Member State A (where s/he
performs a significant activity of more than 25% and also resides) and as a worker in Member
State B, Member State A will be competent for social security. However, if, under the same
conditions, Member State A classifies such person as self-employed, Member State B may be
competent due to the priority of the Member State of employment over the Member State of
self-employment. False self-employment or unclear employment status in platform work
therefore further complicates the social security coverage of people moving to another
Member State or working across borders.
A 2021 study by CEPS notes that, based on a selection of digital labour platforms, only a
minority of terms and conditions (19% of selected digital labour platforms) clearly spell out
the contractual relations between the platform and the person working through it. 190
National authorities do not have easy access to data on platform work and people
working through them, which is especially relevant where platforms operate in several
187
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351,
20.12.2012, p. 1. Available online.
188
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6. Available online.
189
Strban et al (2020), Social security coordination and non-standard forms of employment and self-
employment: Interrelation, challenges and prospects, July 2020. Available online.
190
Willem Pieter de Groen, Zachary Kilhoffer, Leonie Westhoff, Doina Postica and Farzaneh Shamsfakhr
(2021). Available online.
52
Member States. Data gaps regarding the latest terms and conditions of platforms, and the
number and employment status classification of people working through them, affect the
ability of relevant national authorities and stakeholders to bring about positive change, for
instance through accurate and evidence-driven policymaking. It is not always clear where
platform work is performed, which can lead to difficulties tracing and addressing cross-
border challenges.
The high-level expert group on the impact of the digital transformation on EU labour
markets,191
which was set up to provide analysis and advice to the Commission, noted in its
final report and recommendations the need to create a Digital Single Window for
employment contributions and taxes for self-employed people working on platforms. The
high-level group further suggested that through a digital interface, automated reports from
platform companies could allow collecting earnings data in a standardized digital format to
reduce the cost of compliance.192
A subsequent study193
assesses the viability and feasibility of the concept of an EU-level
“Digital Single Window.” It underlines that income reporting for social contribution
purposes presents unique challenges due to the complex national social contribution rules.
Some Member States have social contribution rules that are designed in accordance with
assumptions about regular employment. Such design could therefore make it exceedingly
difficult to square with the current reality of platform work. A focus on income reporting
for tax purposes could be considered as an alternative
The study notes that, in principle, an EU Digital Single Window could serve two functions: a
disclosure function and an enforcement function. Disclosure function refers to a system that
facilitates income data reporting at EU level, in order to facilitate collection at Member
State level. Enforcement function refers to a system that would facilitate actual tax collection
and distribution to Member States. The study notes limitations to ensuring an enforcement
function at EU level and looks only into the disclosure function instead.
The Digital Single Window study examines a centralized (‘hub and spoke’) approach, in
which member states would nominate an (EU level) central agency (the “hub”) to receive
income data from all the platforms with users in the Member States and forward it to national
tax and social security agencies (the “spokes”), in whatever form they require (Figure 12
below). There is currently no precedent at EU level for such a model.
Figure 12: Hub-and-spoke model of cross-EU platform income data reporting
191
Available online.
192
Ibidem.
193
Vili Lehdonvirta and Daisy Ogembo (2019). A Digital Single Window for Income Data from Platform Work.
Available online.
53
There are numerous challenges with such a centralized approach, in addition to the issue of
having to first identify all the platforms that operate within the European Union. As income
taxation is a national competence, there are legal constraints to establishing such a data
collection effort at EU level. Data protection rules stemming from the GDPR should also be
complied with. More generally, such a centralized model also raises concerns over data
protection and cybersecurity, with the concentration of taxpayers’ data in a single hub
particularly problematic in this regard. National tax agencies would also not be collecting
data directly from their local platforms, whereas the actual tax and social security rules
applicable to platforms and people working through platforms would be national.194
Beyond
these considerations, there are also the significant administrative costs to be taken into
account.
The study also looks into a decentralized model of income reporting, with tax agencies in the
Member States collecting data from the platforms registered in their jurisdiction and reporting
the data regarding tax residents of other member states to the tax agencies in those Member
States.195
It should be noted here that the Council has recently adopted a revision of the
Directive on Administrative Cooperation in Tax Matters (DAC7 revision), which in
essence represents such an approach. The DAC7 revision is further described in section 3.5.2
Beyond putting forward models for the operationalizing of a “Digital Single Window,” the
study notes also that insufficient data has repercussions for taxing and extending the social
security coverage to people working through platforms. This is further complicated by their
194
Ibidem.
195
Ibidem.
54
involvement in multiple, simultaneous engagements, possibly on different terms and under
different employment statuses even within the same country.196
The DAC7 revision addresses the need for income-related data collection in the digital labour
platform economy, when it comes to the self-employed people working through platforms.
As section 3.5.3 b on existing national measures in this area shows, however, there are still
considerable gaps when it comes to collecting data on the working conditions in platform
work. Further efforts might therefore be necessary in this regard.
3.5 Internal drivers related to the gaps of existing and forthcoming legislation
3.5.1 EU labour and social acquis
In order to prevent unfair competition to the detriment of workers and a race to the bottom in
employment practices and social standards, the EU has created a minimum floor of labour
rights that apply to workers across all Member States. The EU labour and social acquis has
grown throughout the years and sets minimum standards through a number of key
instruments. These include:
 The Directive on transparent and predictable working conditions197
provides for
measures to protect working conditions of people who work in non-standard and new
working relationships. This includes rules on transparency, the right to information,
probationary periods, parallel employment, minimum predictability of work and
measures for on-demand contracts. These minimum standards are particularly relevant
for people working through platforms, given their atypical work organisation and
patterns. It is important to note that the Directive permits Member States to exclude
from its scope workers with a very low number of monthly working hours. Zero-hour
work contracts, however, cannot be excluded.
 The Directive on work-life balance for parents and carers198
lays down minimum
requirements related to parental, paternity and carers’ leave and flexible work
arrangements for parents or carers. It complements the Directive on safety and
health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth
or are breastfeeding199
, which provides for a minimum period of maternity leave,
alongside other measures.
 The Working Time Directive lays down minimum requirements for the organisation
of working time and defines concepts such as ‘working time’ and ‘rest periods’.
While the CJEU has traditionally interpreted the concept of ‘working time’ as
requiring the worker to be physically present at a place determined by the employer,
in recent cases the Court has extended this concept in particular when a ‘stand-by’
time system is in place (i.e. where a worker is not required to remain at his or her
196
Ibidem.
197
Directive (EU) 2019/1152. Available online. Member States have until 1 August 2022 to transpose it.
198
Ibidem.
199
Directive 92/85/EEC. Available online.
55
workplace but shall remain available to work if called by the employer). In the 2018
Matzak case, the Court made clear that ‘stand-by’ time, during which the worker's
opportunities to carry out other activities are significantly restricted, shall be regarded
as working time.200
This interpretation may be relevant to people working through
platforms.201
 The Directive on temporary agency work202
defines a general framework applicable
to the working conditions of temporary agency workers. It lays down the principle of
non-discrimination, regarding the essential conditions of work and of employment,
between temporary agency workers and workers who are recruited by the user
company. Due to the typically triangular contractual relationship of platform work,
this Directive can be of relevance. Depending on the business model of the platform
and on whether its customers are private consumers or businesses, it might qualify as
a temporary-work agency assigning its workers to user companies. In some cases, the
platform might be the user company making use of the services of workers assigned
by temporary-work agencies.203
 The Directives on part-time work204
and on fixed-term work205
stipulate equal
treatment in working conditions between workers employed under a part-time or
fixed-term contract and comparable workers engaged under a ‘standard’ employment
contract.
 The Occupational Health and Safety (OSH) Framework Directive206
lays down the
main principles for encouraging improvements in the health and safety of workers at
work. It guarantees minimum health and safety requirements throughout the European
Union, with Member States allowed to maintain or establish more stringent measures.
 The three directives on anti-discrimination and equal treatment lay down a general
framework for combating discrimination in the area of employment and occupation
on the grounds of sex207
, racial or ethnic origin208
, religion or belief, disability, age or
sexual orientation,209
with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the
principle of equal treatment.
200
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 21 February 2018 in Ville de Nivelles v Rudy Matzak, C-518/15,
ECLI: EU:C:2018:82. This line of reasoning was confirmed and elaborated in two 2021 judgments (Judgment of
the Court (Grand Chamber) of 9 March 2021 in RJ v Stadt Offenbach am Main, C-580/19,
ECLI:EU:C:2021:183; Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 9 March 2021 in -D.J. v Radiotelevizija
Slovenija, C-344/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:182).
201
The UK Supreme Court in its judgment in case Uber BV v Aslam ([2021] UKSC 5) of 19 February 2021
makes reference to this CJEU case-law. Available online.
202
Directive 2008/104/EC. Available online.
203
See for instance the case of JustEat: Article in The Guardian (April 2021), Just Eat to offer 1,500 Liverpool
couriers minimum hourly rate and sick pay. Available online.
204
Directive 97/81/EC. Available online.
205
Directive 1999/70/EC. Available online.
206
Directive 89/391/EEC. Available online.
207
Directive 2006/54/EC. Available online.
208
Directive 2000/43/EC. Available online.
209
Directive 2000/78/EC. Available online.
56
However, only workers who fall under the personal scope of these legal instruments will
benefit from the protection they afford.210
Self-employed people, including those working
through platforms, fall outside the scope and typically do not enjoy these rights, making the
employment status a gateway to the EU labour and social acquis. (The only exception are the
equal treatment directives which also cover access to self-employment, due to broader legal
bases.211
)
Other, non-legally binding instruments are broader in scope and also cover self-
employed people, but they do not confer any rights directly.
The Council Recommendation on improving the protection of the health and safety at
work of the self-employed212
promotes the prevention of occupational accidents and
diseases among the self-employed, measures for promoting health and safety and
surveillance, including access to training in the area of health and safety. The Council
Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed213
encourages Member States to ensure that both workers irrespective of the type of
employment contract and the self-employed have access to effective and adequate social
protection. Both instruments provide guidance to Member States on measures that are
particularly relevant for people working through platforms that do not have an employment
relationship (or have a non-standard employment relationship, in the case of the latter
Recommendation), but do not confer any rights on those people directly. However, as
countries implement these Recommendations, provisions at national level may give rights to
those concerned.
While the EU labour and social acquis thus provides a minimum floor of labour rights
and protection to workers, it usually only contains general provisions on enforcing those
rights, the latter being primarily the role and prerogative of national authorities.
Furthermore, the question of whether people working through platforms whose employment
status is uncertain or who might have been falsely classified as self-employed can benefit
from this acquis remains to be decided by courts in individual cases.
Genuine self-employed people are only covered to a limited extent by EU measures in the
social realm. However, in their capacity as business actors, they may benefit from other EU
instruments (outlined in the next chapter) that have been adopted with the objective of
ensuring the correct functioning of the EU’s internal market.
210
Some instruments define the personal scope by reference to national definitions of ‘worker’ or ‘employee’
while others do not include such reference. The CJEU has developed a comprehensive case-law to defining the
personal scope of these instruments.
211
Articles 19 and 157 TFEU respectively. The latter covers “equal treatment of men and women in matters of
employment and occupation”.
212
Council Recommendation of 18 February 2003 (2003/134/EC). Available online.
213
Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 (2019/C 387/01). Available online. The Recommendation
covers unemployment, sickness and health care, maternity and paternity, invalidity, old-age and survivors’
benefits and benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases.
57
3.5.2 EU internal market acquis
Companies operating in the EU have access to the world’s largest internal market, of
approximately 450 million consumers. To ensure equal business opportunities and fair
treatment to all consumers, the EU has developed an extensive regulatory acquis for the
governance of its internal market, ranging from product liability to anti-merger rules.
Elements of this internal market acquis are particularly relevant for digital labour platforms:
 The Regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online
intermediation services (the so-called ‘Platform-to-Business’ or ‘P2B’ regulation)214
aims to ensure that self-employed ‘business users’ of an online platform’s intermediation
services are treated in a transparent and fair way and that they have access to effective
redress in the event of disputes. It has a review clause concerning the potential
misclassification of ‘business users’ as self-employed. The P2B Regulation’s relevant
provisions include, among others:
 Subject to certain conditions, the right to prior notice before termination of
a business users’ account at least 30 days in advance;
 The right to terms and conditions written in clear and intelligible
language, including enhanced transparency, including on the main parameters
determining the ranking;
 Transparency on differentiated treatment between business users
affiliated to the platform and those unaffiliated;
 A prohibition of retroactive changes to a platform’s terms and conditions
except where they are required to respect a legal or regulatory obligation or
when the changes are beneficial for the business users;
 The right for representative organisations and associations to have legal
standing to stop or prohibit non-compliance with the Regulation before courts
at the national level.
 The General Data Protection Regulation215
lays down rules for the protection of
natural persons with regards to the processing of their personal data. It grants people
working through platforms a range of rights regarding their personal data, regardless
of their employment status. Such rights include, among others:
 the right of access to personal data, including the right to obtain a copy of
one’s personal data undergoing processing;
 the right to rectification, including the right to have one’s data corrected
if it is inaccurate;
 the right to obtain from a data controller a restriction of the processing of
one’s data under certain conditions;
 the right to data portability, including right to receive and transmit one’s
personal data from a controller to another without hindrance, where
technically feasible.
214
Regulation (EU) 2019/1150. Available online.
215
Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Available online.
58
 The Late Payment Directive216 regulates payment terms in commercial transactions,
lays down penalties in case of delayed or non-payment and addresses unfair payment
provisions and practices. The Directive applies to any commercial transaction,
intended as the supply of goods and/or provision of services in exchange of payment,
either between public authorities and businesses (G2B) or between businesses (B2B),
including self-employed people working through platforms.
In addition to these existing laws, the European Commission has recently put forward
legislative proposals that may be of relevance to people working through platforms:
 The Digital Services Act package, which includes the Digital Services Act (DSA)
and the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The proposals were adopted by the European
Commission in December 2020 and are now undergoing the ordinary legislative
procedure.
 The DSA primarily concerns providers of intermediary services, and many of
its provisions focus on digital platforms. For example, online marketplaces,
social networks, content-sharing platforms, app stores as well as online travel
and accommodation platforms could fall within the scope of the DSA. It sets
out due diligence obligations for digital services as regards the fight of illegal
content online, including potentially illegal listings on digital labour platforms,
while preserving the fundamental rights of their users and ensuring the
competitiveness and innovation of digital services. The proposed regulation
sets out information obligations for online intermediaries related to their terms
and conditions as regards the use of information provided by the recipients of
the service, including algorithmic decision-making and human review,
transparency reporting obligations, risk assessment obligations and risk
mitigation measures for very large online platforms as regards the
dissemination of illegal content and the negative effects for the prohibition of
discrimination, as enshrined in the Charter. The DSA also provides that
national authorities can order, on the basis of national or EU laws,
intermediaries to provide them information about the recipients of their
services so that authorities can assess compliance by such recipients of
services with national or EU laws.
 The DMA includes rules that govern so-called ‘gatekeeper online platforms’.
According to the proposal, gatekeepers are providers of core platform services
(e.g. online intermediation services) with an important impact in the internal
market that act as gateways between businesses and consumers. It can-not be
excluded that the Digital Markets Act may also be relevant for digital labour
platforms should such platforms constitute core platform services within the
meaning of the Digital Markets Act and providers of these platforms would be
designated as gatekeepers.
216
Directive (EU) 2011/7. Available online.
59
 When adopted, the proposed AI Act217 will address risks linked to the use of
certain AI systems. The proposed regulation tackles issues related to development,
deployment and use of AI systems. It lists certain AI systems used in employment,
worker management and access to self-employment that are to be considered as high
risk. It puts forward mandatory requirements that AI systems must comply with, as
well as obligations for providers and users of such systems. Among other things, the
proposal for an AI Act imposes requirements to enable human oversight and extensive
documentation on high-risk AI systems and requires improved transparency of
information to users (e.g. platform companies) of high-risk AI systems. The proposed
AI Act foresees specific requirements on documentation, logging and transparency,
and will ensure that platforms as users of high-risk AI systems will have access to the
necessary information. In addition, the proposed AI Act addresses inherent challenges
in the development of AI, such as bias, notably by setting requirements for high-
quality datasets, helping to tackle the risk of bias and discrimination.218
Nonetheless, specificities of employment relations might necessitate further
action beyond what is achievable with an internal market instrument. For
example, provisions and procedures for improved information could also benefit
people in the labour market affected by automated decisions when they are not the
users of the system, or be useful to their representatives. Such people could also
benefit from the possibility to ask for substantiated grounds for significant decisions
or challenge them once they have been taken, and also from the promotion of social
dialogue and reinforced collective information and consultation rights. Addressing
specificities of employment relations when it comes to algorithmic management might
therefore be best tackled through the Treaty social chapter. Any potential actions in
the area of algorithmic management should be without prejudice to the proposed
AI Act.
 The proposal for a Machinery Regulation, which was adopted219
by the European
Commission in April 2021, has implications for machinery with embedded AI
systems. It is currently undergoing the ordinary legislative procedure.
 The amended Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC7)220 was formally
adopted on 22 March 2021. It sets out new tax transparency rules for digital platforms
ensuring that Member States automatically exchange information on the revenues
generated by sellers on digital platforms, whether the platform is located in the EU or
217
COM(2021). Available online.
218
The recently proposed Digital Services Act (COM/2020/825 final) also sets out information obligations for
online intermediaries related to their terms and conditions as regards the use of information provided by the
recipients of the service, including algorithmic decision-making and human review, transparency reporting
obligations, risk assessment obligations and risk mitigation measures for very large online platforms as regards
the dissemination of illegal content and the negative effects for the prohibition of discrimination, as enshrined in
the Charter and secondary EU law. Available online.
219
COM (2021). Available online.
220
Council Directive (EU) 2021/514 of 22 March 2021 amending Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative
cooperation in the field of taxation ST/12908/2020/INIT, OJ L 104, 25.3.2021, p. 1–26. Available online.
60
not. It could have an indirect effect on (self-employed) people working through
platforms by giving more legal clarity to digital labour platforms, and thus scope for
growth with the additional job opportunities this would bring. Importantly, the
Directive only concerns reporting and consequent exchange of information regarding
self-employed business users.
The existing and forthcoming elements of the EU’s internal market acquis have important
implications for digital labour platforms, most notably by establishing certain obligations
they have to comply with vis-à-vis people working through them.
However, from the point of view of platform work, a number of challenges remain. Under
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)221
, people working through platforms are
entitled to specific rights as data subjects irrespective of their employment status. Such rights
include the right of access to personal data, the right to rectification, the right to data
portability and the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing.
Many people remain unaware of such rights. Some rights are available under the EU internal
market acquis222
, with the overall goal of ensuring the correct functioning of the EU’s
internal market. The Platform-to-business regulation provides, among others, the right to
terms and conditions written and clear and intelligible language. Importantly, the Regulation
only covers genuinely self-employed ‘business users’ engaged in direct transactions with
customers. When it comes to algorithmic management, the proposed AI Act, foresees specific
requirements on documentation, logging, transparency and the possibility of human
oversight, and will ensure that platforms as users of high-risk AI systems will have access to
the necessary information. It might be necessary to establish internal procedures to ensure
that this information is shared as appropriate with people working through platforms who are
subject to algorithmic management, or with their representatives.
Finally, it should be noted that the existing jurisprudence on the applicability of the EU’s
internal market acquis to digital labour platforms is not conclusive, mostly due to their
constantly evolving business models that make laws and rulings difficult to future-proof. For
instance, the CJEU ruled in 2017 that UberPop, one of the services offered by Uber
connecting non-professional drivers to customers, was only partially an information society
service, as an integral part of an overall transport service which was thus subject to national
transport regulations and did not benefit from certain protections under the EU internal
market laws.223
Uber subsequently ceased to offer its UberPop service, defining itseld since
then as falling under the scope of information society services’ regulations, such as the P2B
Regulation and the forthcoming DSA, rather than national transport regulations.
3.5.3 National responses to the challenges of platform work
a) National initiatives related to employment status and working conditions
221
Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Available online.
222
See a detailed overview of internal market acquis and its application to platform work in Section 3.5.2 of the
accompanying analytical document.
223
CJEU, cases C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi (Uber Spain). Available online.
61
National responses to platform work are diverse and are developing unevenly across Europe.
Very few EU Member States adopted national legislation specifically targeting improvement
of working conditions and/or access to social protection in platform work. In other
Member States people working through platforms may be impacted by legislative initiatives
not specifically targeting platform work. In some Member States platform work and a
possibility to introduce legislative changes is currently debated.
Recent national legislation which has directly or indirectly impacted working conditions and
social protection of people working through platforms vary in terms of adopted approaches:
 defining their employment status; and/or
 extending the personal scope of application of national labour and social protection
law traditionally applicable to workers; and/or
 regulating the working conditions and social protection for persons in non-standard
employment; and/or
 strengthening the rights and protection of the self-employed and/or
 introducing a third category status with ad hoc rights and provisions.224
In addition, national legislation has been mostly adopted in specific sectors, notably in the
sectors of ride-hailing services and/or in food delivery services. In total, national experts
catalogued 177 responses across the EU27, the UK, Norway and Iceland, excluding tools
considered very general, for example general labour law (cfr. Figure 13).225
These include
civil-society actions, such as collective bargaining agreements and platform-driven responses,
that are discussed in more detail in section 3.3.2.
Figure 13: National initiatives related to platform work, including civil society actions
224
Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers (CEPS, 2020), p. 102-103.
Available online.
225
This number should be understood very cautiously, as it is not always easy to decide when a tool is relevant
enough to include, Moreover, it often proved difficult to find and verify responses that were initiated but
abandoned, or simply pending.
62
France is the only EU Member State which has adopted specific legislation providing some
labour and social rights to people working through platforms irrespective of the sector of
economic activity, through a revision of the Labour Code in 2016.226
The law specifically
targets technologically and economically dependent self-employed by granting them access
to a voluntary insurance against work accidents. Platforms have to pay the premiums unless
they are providing a collective insurance for people working for them. People working
through platforms are also granted the right to form a trade union, to take collective actions
and to continuing education and validation of the acquired experience.
France has also recently adopted a transportation law (2019)227
which, amongst other things,
addresses platform work. It introduces voluntary charters in which platforms can offer
rights and obligations to riders while classifying them as independent contractors.
While the above mentioned Labour Code provisions apply to platform work as self-employed
activity, following two Court de cassation rulings recognising employee status of people
working through platforms228
as employees there are ongoing discussions in France on the
employment status of people working through platforms. Different possibilities are being
considered, including a recourse to a third operator to provide platform self-employed
workers with the status of employee (‘portage salarial’ or the use of existing legal status of
‘employed partner of a cooperative society’).229
In Italy, regional legislation in Piedmont and Lazio (2019)230
directly addresses the working
conditions and social protection of people working through platforms by improving the
labour and social rights of all platform workers irrespective of their employment status. This
includes minimum protection for all ‘digital workers’ including protection in the event of
accidents at work, safety training, liability and accident insurance, and certain social
protections. The law also reiterates regional prohibition of compensation per task.
In 2019, Italy also adopted national, specific legislation231
with a view to increase the
protection of the working conditions of self-employed food delivery riders.
The law provides:
 the right to have written and transparent working conditions;
 the right to information;
 prohibition of piece-rate payments while hourly pay-rates have to be determined in
accordance with the minimum wages that are paid on the basis of collective
agreements applied to employees in a similar sector;
226
LOI n° 2016-1088 du 8 août 2016 relative au travail, à la modernisation du dialogue social et à la
sécurisation des parcours professionnels (1), also known as Loi El Khomri. Available online.
227
Loi d’orientation de mobilite, LOM, 24.12.2019. Available online.
228
Take Eat Easy (18 November 2018, case 17-20.079) and Uber (4 March 2020, case 19-13.316)
229
J-Y Frouin (2020) Available online
230
Regione Lazio, Legge Regionale 12 aprile 2019, n.4.Available online.
231
L. 2 novembre 2019, n. 128, Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 3 settembre 2019, n.
101. Available online.
63
 the right to supplementary payments for night work, work on public holidays and
work performed in other exceptional circumstances.
In Lithuania, changes to the Road Transport Code introduced in January 2020 apply stricter
rules to ride-hailing services and stipulate that ride-haling services are to be provided by
self-employed and on the basis of a contract between the latter and the -ride-hailing operator
or the platform.
In Portugal, legislation was adopted in 2018232
on digital labour platforms in the passenger
transport sector. The law aims at regulating the activity of individual paid transport of
passengers by ordinary vehicles (TVDE). By stipulating that only legal persons can be
contracted by ride-hailing digital labour platforms, the law is addressing some of the
challenges faced by drivers when they are directly engaged by a (most often local) company.
The law also ensures working time limitations of drivers by clarifying which existing
provisions apply depending on whether the driver is a worker or a self-employed. In addition,
it forbids the driver from working longer than 10 hours in a period of 24 hours. This rule
applies regardless of the number of TVDE platforms with which the drivers have a contract.
In Spain, a new law was adopted on 11 May 2021, which introduces a legal presumption
that delivery platform riders and drivers in the food and parcel delivery sector are workers,
placing the burden on the platform to show that they are not233
. The law gives delivery
platforms a mid-August deadline to hire the workers currently freelancing for them, granting
the workers with rights as well as access to social security contributions234
. The new law also
requires the companies to provide trade unions with details on how, amongst other things,
their algorithms and AI systems assign jobs and judge workers’ performance. In addition to
the aforementioned laws, several legislative proposals aiming at increasing protections of
people working through platforms are currently being discussed by national administrations.
In Germany, the Federal Ministry of Labour has published a Green and White Paper on the
future of work, in which platform work has a prominent place. Among the proposed plans are
the inclusion of self-employed people working through platforms into the statutory pension
insurance scheme and the improvement of their work accidents insurance. The Ministry
furthermore proposes to establish transparency and reporting obligations for all platform
operators and the right to portability of work reviews for people working through platforms.
In November 2020, the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs issued a paper on ‘Fair
Work in the Platform Economy”235
, laying out key issues it intends to look into to improve
the working conditions of people working through platforms. Among the proposals it will be
considering is a reversal of the burden of proof to facilitate court proceedings regarding the
potential misclassification of the employment status of people working through platforms.
232
Lei n°45/2018 Regime jurídico da atividade de trasporte individual e remunderado de passageiros em
veículos descaracterizadosa partir de plataforma electrónica. Available online.
233
Available online.
234
Available online.
235
Available online.
64
In Lithuania, a draft proposal for amendment to the Commercial Code is currently being
debated, introducing the obligation that the contracts between digital labour platforms and
self-employed people working through platforms should be in writing and contain provisions
on the price, methods of payment, the procedures to change the contract terms and change of
the prices.
In the Netherlands, the debate on the employment status of people working through
platforms is part of a wider debate on the growing diversification of non-standard forms of
work and flexible work arrangements and the lack of coherence between labour, taxation and
social security legislation between the different employment statuses.236
The Netherlands
already uses a legal rebuttable presumption of employment status which states that when a
person performs work for more than twenty hours per month against remuneration for three
consecutive months they are presumed to perform this work under a contract of employment.
The burden of proof about the opposite is shifted to the party that is engaging the worker.237
However, people working through platforms less than 20 hours per week in practice cannot
rely on this legal presumption. In October 2020, the Dutch government announced it will
further examine whether a legal presumption of employment status as a worker could be
installed specifically for platform work.238
In Portugal, the Green Book on the future of work was presented in November 2020 to the
social partners. It addresses several challenges related to platform work and includes
proposals such as:
 the creation of a legal presumption on the status of employee for people working
through platforms;
 improved social protection for the self-employed;
 the collective representation of people working through platforms.
Several countries have taken legislative action related to platform work in other dimensions
than working conditions or social protection of people working through platforms. For
example, Estonia239
, Denmark, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Greece240
and others enacted
legislation aiming at creating a level playing field in the sector of ride-hailing services
between the digital platforms and the traditional taxi businesses. These measures have
indirectly impacted on the position of platform workers who are engaged as drivers.
236
Commissie Regularing van Werk, (2020), In wat voor land willen wij werken?: naar een nieuw ontwerp voor
regularing van werk
237
an Voss, H (2017), “The Concept of ‘ Employee’: The Position in the Netherlands”. Available online.
238
Letter of the Minister and the Secretary of State of Social Affairs and Employment. Available online.
239
Estonia was the first country to amend its Public Transport Act. In 2011 it created a common licensing and
quality vetting for ride-sharing platform businesses and traditional taxi companies. (CEPS, 2020)
240
In the course of 2019, a law was adopted which banned ride-hailing platforms from competing with
traditional taxis by setting their own fare policy, or by contracting with non-taxi drivers, or by setting higher
quality standards than those sanctioned by law. (ECE, forthcoming)
65
b) National initiatives related to registration and reporting obligations
In most Member States, digital labour platforms fall under the main national regulations
applicable to businesses. No specific registration or licensing regime is applied, unless it
concerns temporary work agencies, which are usually subject to specific local registration or
licensing legislation.
Generally, platforms do not currently report on the payments that they have made to
individual people working through platforms. This may lead to various situations of
un(der)declared work and un(der)reported income, especially given the transnational settings
in which platform work is organised. However, several Member States have already adopted
legislation on revenues or income generated by platforms or by people working through
platforms.
In France, since 2019, digital labour platforms are obliged to report to the tax authorities
when payments to people working through them exceed EUR 3 000 per year.
In Belgium, licensed digital labour platforms have to report annually to the Belgian tax
authorities on the income that was paid to people working through them.
In Estonia, in 2015, the government and ride-hailing platforms Taxify and Uber started to
collaborate on the creation of an information system to simplify the income and tax
declarations of the drivers. These have the option to declare their income through a pre-filled
form provided by the Tax and Customs Board.
In Lithuania, since 2020, ride-hailing digital labour platforms are obliged to report to the tax
authorities the data of the drivers that have made use of the app, as well as the income they
have generated. Based on the data received, the tax authorities prepare preliminary tax returns
for people working through ride-hailing digital labour platforms.
c) National initiatives related to the use of algorithms in the workplace
Without prejudice to the internal market acquis (see Section 3.5.2), existing measures address
more generally algorithmic management at the workplace. A number of EU Member States
have policies building on personal data protection laws or anti-discrimination legislation.
This is the case in Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands. Reference to privacy policies is made in Czechia and Luxembourg, while
antidiscrimination legislation is built upon for the use of algorithmic management and AI in
Germany and Italy. In Estonia, legislation on responsibility has been highlighted as a
relevant one for application also in the domain of AI and algorithmic management. In Italy,
relevant AI policies build on information rights and are based on the Charter of Bologna, as
well as on regulation concerning remote monitoring.
Most Members States have also adopted or are in the process of adopting o national
strategies on Artificial Intelligence, in line with the EU Coordinated Plan on Artificial
Intelligence, which also refer to the impact of AI on the workplace.
Belgium has adopted a guidebook on AI, which also stipulates recruitment processes via
algorithmic management.
66
In January 2021, Poland saw the establishment of the Policy for the Development of
Artificial Intelligence, based on a Resolution of the Council of Ministers. This document
seeks to regulate the use of AI in various aspects of public life, including work and education,
while acknowledging the risks connected with the use of digital technologies.
Portugal adopted a Green Book on the future of work, which also includes provisions for
stipulating AI at workplaces. In addition, Portugal has also adopted the Charter for
Fundamental Rights in the Digital Era, which calls for transparency in using AI.
No EU Member State has adopted legislation specifically addressing algorithmic
management in platform work with the exception of Spain where the law passed in May
2021 (see section 3.5.3/a) includes a provision regarding transparency of algorithms and the
use of AI to manage workforces. According to this, the worker needs to be informed of the
parameters and rules on which algorithmic management is based, affecting decision-making
and impacting working conditions and access to work.
3.6 Consequences of the problem
3.6.1 For people working through platforms
Platform work offers many opportunities for flexible work arrangements and
additional income. It can help people complement their revenue from other jobs, expand
their entrepreneurial activity and acquire new clients. The flexibility in working hours that
platform work often brings enables many people to combine work with family or other care
responsibilities or studies. New skills can be acquired and applied in practice. Platform work
also often represents an entry point for groups who otherwise have difficulties accessing the
labour market, such as migrants or people with disabilities.241
People engaged in online
platform work can develop new business ideas and thus contribute to job creation in other
areas.
Nevertheless, platform work often presents certain challenges which relate to
precarious working conditions. Depending upon the type of digital labour platform in
question, platform work can affect working conditions to varying degrees. Despite a
classification as self-employed, people often lack the autonomy and ability to shape their own
working conditions traditionally associated with a self-employed status. Rights and
protections normally available under labour law in cases of subordination are also unavailable
to them as self-employed.
Lack of awareness of entitlements and inability to claim existing rights
The existence of an employment relationship remains a gateway to labour and social
protection, both at Member State and EU level. The uncertainty over the employment
status of people working through platforms often means they are unable to claim key labour
and social rights, which significantly adds to their precariousness. (see also Section 3.5.1).
In practice, the only available option for people working through platforms who wish to
clarify their employment status, is to bring a legal action in courts or to rely on the
jurisdiction of the labour inspectorates in their respective Member States. Given that
241
International Labour Office (2021), particularly section 4.1.4.
67
courts decide on a person’s employment status on a case-by-case basis and in light of labour
inspectorates’ often limited resources and powers242
, these courses of action may not always
bring about legal clarity and often require long time before they reach a conclusion. What is
more, people working through platforms may be discouraged from bringing a claim in the
first place, either because of financial difficulties or because of practical challenges, such as
when platforms require claims to be brought in a particular jurisdiction.
Furthermore, people working through platforms may often be unaware of their rights
under EU and national law. For instance, though people working through platforms are
entitled to rights over their personal data under the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) irrespective of their employment status, the extent of such protection is not always
well-understood.243
Weak bargaining power and inability to enter collective bargaining agreements
Digital labour platforms defining their business model as intermediaries, may at the same
time be exercising tight organisational control over the work process. Platforms may
unilaterally set contractual terms and conditions related to pay, working time, dispute
resolution, customer service, and more, usually in the absence of negotiation with the
people working through them. This, coupled with the power of certain platforms to
deactivate users with little to no justification, gives people working through them weak
bargaining power. In addition, the fact that various aspects of these contractual terms and
conditions often resemble those in a subordinate employment relationship can lead to a lack
of equal treatment between people working through platforms and workers in similar
industries. These challenges are particularly relevant for people who are “false self-
employed”.
Moreover, the complex language in which terms of service agreements are often framed,
together with the fact that many of the contractual terms and conditions are in practice
algorithmically implemented, limits access to information regarding work organisation.
This, in turn, can lead to imbalances of power and create obstacles to the reclassification of
false self-employed people, who may struggle to prove subordination.
Through their terms of service agreements and privacy policies, digital labour platforms
also reserve the right to collect and process extensive data on the people working
through them. Such data is then transformed by platforms into data intelligence244
which is used, among other things, to determine and supervise various aspects of the work
process. Though the GDPR grants individuals the right to access their personal data,
242
ECE (forthcoming).
243
In a 2020 case from the Netherlands against Uber (a transcript of the case is available here), a group of
drivers brought a case against the platform alleging that their deactivations contravened article 22 of the GDPR,
which establishes the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing. The court in
that particular case did not find a violation, namely because the deactivation decisions in question were taken by
a dedicated team of Uber and hence were not deemed to be solely based on automated processing. However, this
does not rule out the possibility that a case against another platform might produce a different outcome, seeing
as case law has not yet clarified when an automated decision will count as being based solely on automated
processing for the purposes of article 22.
244
P.J. Singh (2020), Economic Rights in a Data-Based Society - Collective Data Ownership, Workers’ Rights,
and the Role of the Public Sector, Fiedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Available online.
68
people working through platforms do not always possess the legal awareness and
knowledge necessary to effectively manage their data
At the same time, people working through platforms have limited access to collective
bargaining. For genuinely self-employed people this is linked with existing obstacles related
to competition law. For false self-employed and those people working through platforms who
are classified as workers there are no such formal obstacles. However, the physical
dispersion of people working through platforms as well as the absence of a fixed physical
workplace complicates efforts to organise.245
Lack of career development, upskilling, training and mobility opportunities
Tasks on digital labour platforms can vary from high-skilled to low-skilled ones. However,
the nature of many low-skilled tasks such as food delivery or data cleaning, often means that
platform work does not offer many on-the-job learning opportunities. Even on high-skilled
tasks on online labour platforms, such as computer programming, upskilling might also be
limited as people prefer to undertake tasks they are familiar with to maximise their
performance on the platform.246
The preference for platform-specific reputation systems as opposed to traditional skills
metrics such as work portfolios or education histories, can also affect the mobility of people
working through platforms. In particular, the different metrics and indicators that digital
labour platforms use to rate users can have the effect of locking people in the platforms,
as the costs of switching to another platform and building one’s reputation from scratch
are high. Lack of transparency, on the other hand, might also shut off access to work or
professional mobility opportunities for people working through platforms, often without a
clear reason. This is reinforced by the fact that people working through platforms often do not
have any opportunities to contest unfair rating outcomes.247
That being said, however, platform-specific reputation systems like client reviews or ratings,
can also have positive effects. They can act as equalizers of opportunity for people who have
not pursued higher education and they can increase anonymity, both of which can potentially
reduce risks of discrimination. Nevertheless, rating systems do not completely eliminate the
potential for discrimination. In fact, either as a matter of platform design or because of
clients’ own biases, discrimination can still occur. For instance, there are online labour
platforms that permit clients to restrict tasks to people from specific geographical areas.248
Therefore, unless designed to be accessible to all, digital labour platforms may reproduce
rather than combat discrimination.
Although people working through platforms are in theory free to work for multiple platforms
at once, in practice they are discouraged from doing so. A recent study by CEDEFOP
revealed that the majority of people working through platforms, do not feel they can
245
H.Johston and C.Land-Kazlauskas (2019), Organizing on-demand: Representation, voice, and collective
bargaining in the gig economy, International Labour Office, Geneva: Switzerland. Available online.
246
Eurofound (2020), Platform work: Skills use and skills development. Available here.
247
Katherine C. Kellog et al. (2020)..
248
V. De Stefano (2016), “The rise of the «just-in-time workforce»: On-demand work, crowdwork and labour
protection in the «gig-economy»”, Conditions of Work and Employment Series No.71, International Labour
Office, Geneva: Switzerland.
69
switch platforms without this affecting their income.249 This dependence on one platform
jeopardises the mobility of those working on digital labour platforms and can have a freezing
effect on their career development. This is a challenge for all people working through
platforms, regardless of whether they are genuinely self-employed or misclassified as such.
Precariousness and discrimination
 Earnings
Earnings on digital labour platforms are often unpredictable, particularly in online
platform work and when low skilled tasks are concerned, given the potentially large
competition for this type of tasks. Payments are usually made on a per-task basis and
platforms retain a percentage of the earnings made through them as commission. Being an
“on-demand” economy, workers engaging in platform work are confronted with insecurity
about future work assignments as there is no obligation of clients or platforms to
continuously provide them with work which is a general characteristic of a traditional
employer-employee relationship.
Earning vary depending upon the business model in question. For instance, on certain
online digital labour platforms, freelancers can negotiate the rate of their services directly
with their respective clients. This is particularly important for self-employed persons working
through platforms, since it allows them to test and expand their entrepreneurial skills.
Nevertheless, platforms may also reserve the right to refuse payment where the work in
question does not meet the standards of the platform or those of the client, or may prohibit
payments or communication outside of the platform, thereby de facto limiting the freedom of
self-employed persons to organise their work.250
Meanwhile, other platforms such as those in the passenger transport sector or those mediating
micro-tasks, often determine prices algorithmically, with no input from or without the
knowledge of the parties involved. In addition, in certain online contest-based platforms,
people working through platforms are required to provide the work requested by the client,
who then decides which of the workers to reward. This results in a situation of only one or
few of the workers being paid, while a larger number provided labour services, and it is
difficult, if not impossible, for the worker to assess their likelihood of being paid in
advance.251
This unpredictability of earnings can create considerable income insecurity for false self-
employed persons who are unable to benefit from minimum wage or to bargain collectively
to improve their financial circumstances. Furthermore, an ILO report has observed that on
certain online digital labour platforms, labour supply exceeds labour demand, which, in turn,
can have the effect of putting downward pressure on earnings252
.
 Working time
249
CEDEFOP (2020), Developing and matching skills in the online platform economy - Findings on new forms
of digital work and learning from Cedefop’s CrowdLearn study, Luxembourg. Available online.
250
International Labour Office (2021).
251
Eurofound (2018).
70
Issues related to earnings are also closely connected to the question of working time. For
example, the same ILO report253
notes that people working through online digital labour
platforms spend about one third of their time doing unpaid work, a problem that is also
observed on certain on-location platforms. This issue is of particular importance for false
self-employed, who because of the misclassification are not protected through the working
time legislation.
In theory, people working through platforms are free to determine when to log in to platforms
and thus when to work. However, a closer look into the actual working conditions in
platform work reveals that the business model of digital labour platforms affects
working time in various ways. For instance, the use of algorithms to allocate tasks could
also lead to increased pressure to perform tasks as quickly as possible, and/or force people
working through certain types of platforms (particularly online ones) to be hyper vigilant,
spending many hours sifting through tasks and being on call day and night, as most micro-
task platforms only allow people to pick up jobs on a first-come, first-served basis.254
This
can be particularly problematic for women, who still carry a disproportionate burden of care
responsibilities, and who therefore may not be able to pursue tasks with the same intensity as
their male counterparts.
Another issue related to working time – particularly in some forms of on-location platform
work - refers to the potential of having to work unsocial hours (e.g. at night, weekends, public
holidays) or on short notice (particularly as regards low skilled platform work), which tends
to negatively influence work-life balance.255
 Occupational safety and health
The unpredictability of earnings mentioned above can also add to the pressure of working at a
rapid pace, which can compromise the occupational safety and health (OSH) of those
engaged in platform work. For example, it can increase the risk of road traffic accidents
among those working on food delivery platforms, or it may induce visual fatigue and
musculoskeletal problems for those working on online digital labour platforms.256
Work-
related stress is also frequently reported as one of the main challenges facing people
working through platforms, which can be traced back to other challenges such as
income insecurity and the pressure to work at a rapid pace.257
In addition, the demographic characteristics of people working through platforms can
potentially aggravate their OSH risks. Being generally young and at least partly belonging to
groups in a disadvantaged situation such as migrants, platform workers might not be well
familiar with OSH standards and practices, and/or not in a position to follow them.258
 Social security and social protection
255
Eurofound (2018).
256
P. Berastegui (2021), Exposure to psychosocial risk factors in the gig economy: a systematic review. ETUI
Publications, Report 01.2021. Available online.
257
Ibidem.
258
Eurofound (2018).
71
Self-employed persons and non-standard employees working through platforms generally
have lower access and coverage under the national social protection schemes than traditional
employees.259
For example, though in some Member States, certain social security benefits
are universal260
, other benefits such as unemployment schemes are limited to workers261
while effective access to benefits such as pensions can be restricted in practice262
. Moreover,
inadequate access to social protection can also be an issue for workers who engage in
platform work as a secondary activity, who do not often meet the necessary eligibility
thresholds. As a result, people working through platforms, irrespective of their employment
status classification, are often unable to access adequate social protection. This can have
implications for access to family leaves which can particularly affect women who, as already
mentioned, carry a disproportionate burden of care responsibilities. In the longer term,
limited access to old-age pensions for an increasingly important share of the work force can
jeopardise future adequacy of pensions and puts an additional burden on the welfare
state/society.
Limited social protection coverage becomes even more problematic in light of the OSH-
related risks to people working through platforms, which have only intensified since the
outbreak of the COVID 19 pandemic. On a global level, a recent ILO study observes that
people working through platforms often face violence and harassment.263
In particular, the
report notes that women are more likely to report concerns about physical safety than men,
which in some cases concerning on-location platforms, can affect their willingness to work
during night hours. This, in turn, can have implications on women’s’ ability to access work.
 Access to justice
In case of a platform based in one Member State and operating in another questions may arise
about the applicable law to the working arrangement. Where people working through
platforms are workers, EU legislation is clear about the applicable law being that of the place
where the “employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract”.264
However, for people working through platforms who are classified as self-employed,
platforms’ terms of service can deter them from having recourse to the local system of
justice. This is particularly problematic as courts are usually the only venue through which
people working through platforms can challenge their classification.
 Algorithmic management
The use of algorithms to give direction and exert supervision and control could lead
people working through platforms, as well as others subject to algorithmic
management, to experience frustration, discrimination and/or thwarted participation.
Algorithmic and data bias can lead to instructions that are not intelligible, reinforce
259
ECE (forthcoming). See also European Social Policy Network (ESPN) thematic report (2017), Access to
social protection for people working on non-standard contracts and as self-employed in Europe - A study of
national policies. Available online.
260
For example, Austria has a mandatory social security system that covers all forms of employment when it
comes to health insurance, old age and invalidity pension insurance, and workplace accident insurance.
However, gaps exist for self-employed workers with regards to sick leave and unemployment insurance.
261
ECE (forthcoming).
262
ESPN (2017)
263
International Labour Office (2021).
264
Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation.
72
inequalities, or negatively affect the welfare of those being nudged.265
The central role that
ratings play in platforms’ business models could reinforce the potential for
discrimination, given that algorithms and ratings can be subject to gender and race
stereotyping.
While these challenges inherent to algorithms may be addressed in a general manner through
forthcoming EU internal market acquis, specific issues related to labour law rights and
obligations in the world of platform work arise irrespective of a person’s employment status.
People working through platforms often have limited opportunities for redress against
unfavourable algorithmic decisions, and in most cases the only available option is to bring a
case before a court. In addition, the lack of information for and involvement in (changes
to) the way algorithms are used could reinforce power asymmetries and negatively
affect working conditions.
3.6.2 For digital labour platforms
As illustrated in Section 3.1.2, many digital labour platforms are growing fast, constantly
developing and updating their business models and expanding across borders. As they enter
different national markets, they need to comply with different regulatory regimes or lack
thereof, facing mounting legal uncertainty and economic unpredictability.
Section 3.5 sheds light on the existing patchwork of laws regulating the digital labour
platform economy. Digital labour platforms have to comply with the EU’s social and labour
acquis in Member States where a national law classifies the people working through them as
workers. In other Member States, digital labour platforms have to comply with existing rules
for contracting self-employed people, unless they voluntarily decide to hire the people
working through them.
At the same time, digital labour platforms have to comply with the EU’s internal market
acquis in all Member States where they operate. The heterogeneity of both the personal and
material scope of the platform-relevant internal market acquis means companies still face
regulatory uncertainty and compliance costs and that, de facto, there are different incentives
and disincentives when choosing which Member States to operate in. This contributes to a
regulatory uneven playing field with negative spill over effects, including a race-to-the-
bottom competition between platforms.
Furthermore, a growing number of court rulings at various administrative levels within
Member States is contributing to the legal and jurisprudential fragmentation faced by digital
labour platforms in Europe. As illustrated in Section 3.2, most of the court cases which have
reached a final verdict concern the employment status of people working through platforms
and/or their working conditions. A smaller number of court cases and rulings concern the
business classification of digital labour platforms.
These judicial outcomes and the lack of an even regulatory response to the challenges they
highlight contribute to a generalised, negative perception of the digital labour platform
economy from a social viewpoint, with negative effects on the public’s trust vis-à-vis these
platforms and investors’ willingness to support them financially, also in view of their
265
Katherine C. Kellog et al. (2020).
73
uncertain growth perspectives.266
The legal uncertainty surrounding platforms’ liability vis-à-
vis people working through them may have substantial long-term costs, which risk
advantaging the big players who have the financial capacity to plan for unforeseen
adversities267
or pay penalties.268
These elements play into the fragmentation of the EU’s single market which, coupled with
the compliance costs of having to operate in different national markets according to different
rules, prevent platform SMEs and startups from fully benefitting from the single market’s
economies of scale and scope. This makes it challenging for them to scale-up from a local or
national to a European level, where they would be able to bolster the EU’s competitiveness
on the global stage.
3.6.3 For markets and consumers
The lack of EU regulation addressing the working conditions in platform work has
repercussions on the functioning of markets and on consumers who purchase services through
digital labour platforms. The regulatory fragmentation across the EU, while posing
administrative hurdles and costs to all market players, is a serious challenge to the scaling-up
of platform SMEs and start-ups. This weakening of challengers’ growth opportunities
entrenches the market position of incumbents, who are able to acquire a dominant or semi-
dominant role in their sector of activity.
Market concentration is particularly strong in the digital economy, thanks to the economies of
scale and scope, data-driven ‘network effects’ and platforms’ control over data.269
These
create high barriers to entry for new and growing platforms in comparison to well established
ones.270
Incumbent digital labour platforms also gain market power by entering ‘adjacent markets’
(i.e. markets that share some but not all features of a company’s market of origin) and
leveraging their initial pool of data to acquire even more data, leading to growth and market
entrenchment.271
For example, a ride-hailing platform may decide to leverage the data on
road traffic collected through its drivers to enter the more profitable market of self-driving
vehicles, which in turn may give it the revenues necessary to boost its position in the
passenger transport sector.272
The loop of growth and market concentration observable, amongst others, in digital labour
platforms active in various sectors, has detrimental effects for the competitiveness of the
266
See for example the negative outcomes of Deliveroo and Uber’s IPOs.
267
Article in The Guardian (2021), Deliveroo sets aside £112m to cover legal costs of delivery rider cases.
Availalble online.
268
Article in Politico EUROPE (2021), Italy demands €733M in fines from food delivery platforms. Available
online.
269
Song, P. et al. (2018), The Ecosystem of Software Platform: A Study of Asymmetric Cross-Side Network
Effects and Platform Governance, MIS Quarterly (42:1), pp. 121–142. Available online.
270
Parker, G. et al. (2017), Platform Ecosystems: How Developers Invert the Firm, MIS Quarterly (41:1), pp.
255–266. Available online.
271
R. Picker (2018), Platforms and Adjacent Market Competition: a Look at Recent History, in Digital
Platforms and Concentration, in University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Available online.
272
S. Davies (2019), Power On: Accelerating Uber’s Self-Driving Vehicle Development with Data, in Uber
Engineering blog, Available online.
74
economic sectors concerned, the companies operating with ‘traditional’ business models in
those sectors, as well as for consumers, who face reduced choice and increased prices.
Consumers may also face problems arising from the informal production of services and the
insufficient transparency of liability rules and resolution or redress mechanisms. Given the
uncertainty surrounding the employment status of people working through platforms, it is
also difficult for consumers to establish who is responsible if the quality of a service is not up
to standard or if a good is not delivered in the shape or form promised by the seller.273
Furthermore, the business model underpinning online labour platforms may increase the risk
of off-shoring to low-income countries. As illustrated in Section 3.1.1, the bulk of online
labour supply comes from low-income countries, whereas the majority of online labour
demand comes from high-income countries.
This off-shoring of online platform work has negative spill-over effects for consumers, who
may purchase lower-quality services than paid for, since the consumer protection and product
quality rules of such countries may be less stringent than the EU’s. The off-shoring may also
have negative effects for the people offering those same services in high-income countries,
since they may not be able to compete with the low fees paid to their low-income countries’
counterparts.
3.6.4 For Member States
Member States face similar challenges with regards to defining the status of workers and
companies in the digital labour platform economy, enabling social dialogue, responding to
different protection needs for the diverse types of platforms and for a variety of work
arrangements (part-time, hybrid income, etc.), mitigating the risks of undeclared work, social
dumping and gatekeeping by platform companies.274
Member States’ public finances are negatively affected by the legal uncertainty surrounding
the employment status of people working through platforms. Self-employed people and non-
standard workers often do not pay or only pay low income taxes or social contributions.
Misclassifying those working on platforms exacerbates this challenge, thereby leading to
higher net fiscal costs for governments275
, unequal social protection coverage for the people
concerned and unfair competition vis-à-vis ‘traditional’ companies, which may only
outsource non-core tasks of their business.276
As explained in Section 3.2, the legal uncertainty surrounding the employment status of
people working through platforms, as well as the constantly evolving business model of
digital labour platforms, complicates the enforcement of existing laws and court rulings.
273
Eurofound’s repository on the platform economy: consumer protection. Available online.
274
Key messages of the Mutual Learning Programme (MLP) organised by the German Presidency with Member
States’ experts in October 2020.
275
A. Thörnquist (2015), False Self-Employment and Other Precarious Forms of Employment in the ‘Grey
Area’ of the Labour Market, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 31(4),
411-429. Available online. Sectoral evidence is also available, see for example: M. Faioli and E. Ales (2010),
Self-Employment and Bogus Self-Employment in the European Construction Industry. Available online.
276
International Labour Office (2017), Dependent self-employment: Trends, challenges and policy responses in
the EU, Employment Policy Department – Working Paper No. 228. Available online.
75
These legal and jurisprudential challenges add to the already complex dynamics of cross-
border cooperation between authorities described in Section 3.4.
Inspection in platform work poses challenges to national labour inspectorates by making
them increasingly more difficult, primarily due to the opaqueness of platforms’ complex
business models. Furthermore, platforms’ workforce is dispersed and rarely engaged in a
traditional, onsite, employer-worker relationship, with the cross border character of some
types of platform work further adding to the complexity.277
Enforcement difficulties by Member States’ governments and courts are also exacerbated by
the lack of clear rules on digital labour platforms’ data reporting, which also has negative
implications for future policy-making endeavours. This results in an overall
underperformance of Member States’ administrations and economies.
4. EU COMPETENCE AND ADDED VALUE
4.1 Possible legal bases
In accordance with Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Union aims at
promoting the well-being of its people and shall work in particular for the sustainable
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly
competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress.
Title X of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contains the legal
bases at the disposal of the Union for pursuing these objectives in the area of ‘Social Policy’.
In this title, Article 153(1) TFEU provides the legal basis for the Union to support and
complement the activities of the Member States with the objective to improve working
conditions, social security and social protection, workers’ health and safety, and the
information and consultation of workers, among others. In those areas, Article 153(2)(b)
TFEU empowers the European Parliament and the Council to adopt – in accordance with the
ordinary legislative procedure – directives setting minimum requirements for gradual
implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of the
Member States.
This legal basis would enable the Union to set minimum standards regarding the working
conditions of people working through platforms, where they are an employment
relationship and thus considered as workers. The Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) has ruled that “the classification of a ‘self-employed person’ under national law does
not prevent that person being classified as a worker within the meaning of EU law if his
independence is merely notional, thereby disguising an employment relationship”.278
False
self-employed people would thus also be covered by EU labour legislation.
Should possible Union action address the situation of genuine self-employed people working
through platforms as business actors, it could possibly be based on an internal market legal
basis. Possible provisions in the TFEU include Article 53(1) – which empowers the Union to
277
Senior Labour Inspectors Committee (2020), Opinion on future EU OSH Enforcement priorities contributing
to a renewed EU OSH Strategy, adopted on 21 October 2020, available online
278
CJEU, cases C-256/01, Allonby, and C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media. Available online,
respectively, here and here.
76
issue directives coordinating national provisions concerning the taking-up and pursuit of
activities as self-employed persons in cross-border situations – or Article 114 allowing for the
approximation of laws with regard to the establishment and functioning of the internal
market, which requires demonstrating that the aim and content of the intended initiative
directly affects the establishment or functioning of the internal market within the Union279
.
Finally, if an internal market legal basis is not available, possible Union action on the
working conditions of self-employed people engaged in platform work could also be based
on Article 352 TFEU, which allows the Union to act in order to attain one of its Treaty
objectives in the absence of a more specific legal basis. The adoption of such a proposal
would require unanimity in the Council, after obtaining the consent of the European
Parliament.
4.2 Necessity and EU added value
Member States’ labour markets are confronted with common challenges, linked to the
structural trends triggered by globalisation, digitalisation and societal changes. These include
an increasing share of non-standard and precarious work driven by the growing weight of the
service sector in the economy, as well as the emergence of new forms of work organisation
and business models, such as platform work. While these new forms of work bring
opportunities for businesses and individuals, in many cases the workers concerned may
earn lower hourly wages than full-time permanent employees and face difficulty
accessing social protection. This results in an increased risk of in-work poverty. Traditional
collective bargaining structures, which contributed to a more equal wage distribution in the
past, are also eroding, in part due to the economic shift from manufacturing industries
towards services and non-standard workers’ lack of trade union coverage.
As shown in the sections above, these problems are particularly acute in the case of
people working through platforms. Their unclear employment status fragilises their access
to labour rights and social security coverage. While an employment relationship guarantees a
basic set of rights and social protection standards, only few people working through platforms
have undisputed access to this safety net; often litigation is necessary to attain it. The lack of
transparency and responsibility inherent in work organisation managed by algorithms and the
risk of algorithmic bias compounds these people’s weak standing in the labour market.
As pointed out above, Member States take different approaches on whether or not to
regulate platform work, and in what direction. National courts have repeatedly
reclassified falsely self-employed people working through platforms as workers, but this
trend is built on individual cases and is not developing consistently throughout the entire EU.
As the legal protection and rights that these people enjoy often hinges on their employment
status classification, their position in the labour market differs from one Member State to the
other, even where labour law minimum standards set by Directives would apply to all
workers in the EU. Rights of vulnerable self-employed people working through platforms are
equally fragmented.
279
CJEU, case C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising). Available online.
77
Moreover, action by Member States alone would not address the above described challenges.
One third of EU-based platform work is estimated to be performed across borders280
,
for instance with the platform operation or the client or both being established in another
country than the person offering work through it. This adds complexity to contractual
relationships, in particular where platforms’ terms and conditions make legal disputes subject
to the law and/or jurisdiction of the country where the platform is established or of yet
another country.281
Choice-of-law and choice-of-jurisdiction clauses as well as mandatory
arbitration clauses are common in platforms’ terms of contract.282
The social security
coverage of people performing cross-border platform work is equally uncertain and
depends strongly on their employment status. Risks of non-compliance and obstacles to
tackling undeclared work are higher in cross-border situations, in particular when it concerns
online platform work.283
In the absence of EU minimum standards on platform work, platforms operate in different
Member States under different jurisdictions – with case law developing in potentially
different directions. While working through a platform established in a Member State under
different national law compared to where the work is performed, people may encounter
difficulties to ascertain their employment status and to enjoy the protection afforded to
workers under the Brussels Ia and Rome I Regulations. Due to the flexibility and the
enhanced mobility of the digital labour platform economy whose primary means of
production are algorithms, data and clouds and which is not tied to any fixed premises,
Member States on their own will face difficulty in maintatining a level playing field
among themselves as well as between platforms and traditional businesses.
Consequently, EU action is needed to ensure that the highly mobile and fast-moving
nature of the digital labour platform economy develops together with sufficient labour
standards and for people working through platforms. Such action would not unduly
increase the possible administrative burden for platforms, and would take into particular
account the impact on SMEs and start-ups. By acting at EU level there is a possibility to take
advantage of and build on Member States' recognised good practices and to create a
momentum for Member States to advance together towards better outcomes. Consequently,
the EU could further encourage Member States to focus on the long-term bigger picture and
the major socio-economic challenges related to platform work.
Only an EU initiative can set common minimum standards that apply to all platforms
operating in the EU. Joint action can work as a catalyst for a wider scale improvement of the
working conditions in platform work: for EU labour markets and platform operators, creating
a level playing field; for people working through platforms, reducing the uncertainty by
providing more clarity on their employment status or the means to ascertain it and certain
minimum rights addressing algorithmic management challenges for example. This in turn
would contribute to less precariousness and better working conditions.
280
Urzi Brancati, M.C., Pesole, A. and Fernandez Macias, E. (2017).
281
Kilhoffer et al. (2020).
282
ILAW (2021).
283
Kilhoffer et al. (2020).
78
Economies and labour markets of Member States are increasingly interlinked: minimum
harmonisation in the social field, in other words upward social convergence, is required,
if the ambition for the EU is to go beyond free movement of workers. The specific EU
added value lies and results in the establishment of minimum standards, below which
Member States cannot compete, and the fostering of upwards convergence in
employment and social outcomes between Member States. This is clearly reflected in the
wording of the Treaty itself, which provides that only "minimum requirements" can be
enacted at EU level in social policy (Article 153 (2) (b) TFEU).
5. POLICY OBJECTIVES
In November 2017, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission proclaimed
the European Pillar of Social Rights284
, comprising twenty rights and principles. The Pillar
is aimed at guiding social developments in the EU and to support convergence of living and
working conditions. On 4 March 2021, the Commission put forward the European Pillar of
Social Rights Action Plan285 to turn the principles into concrete actions, which was endorsed
during the Porto Social Summit of 7 May 2021 as the guidance for the implementation of the
Pillar286
.
The initiative "Improving the working conditions in platform work" is intended to address
challenges, through EU-level action, directly related to several principles set out in the
European Pillar of the Social Rights, most importantly:
Principle 5 on ‘Secure and adaptable employment’, which foresees that ‘regardless of the
type and duration of the employment relationship, workers have the right to fair and equal
treatment regarding working conditions, access to social protection and training…Innovative
forms of work that ensure quality working conditions shall be fostered. Entrepreneurship and
self-employment shall be encouraged. Occupational mobility shall be
facilitated…Employment relationships that lead to precarious working conditions shall be
prevented, including by prohibiting abuse of atypical contracts…’
Principle 7 on ‘Information about employment conditions and protection in case of
dismissals’, which proclaims that ‘Workers have the right to be informed in writing at the
start of employment about their rights and obligations resulting from the employment
relationship, including on probation period’, that they have ‘the right to be informed of the
reasons and be granted a reasonable period of notice’ as well as ‘the right to access to
effective and impartial dispute resolution and, in case of unjustified dismissal, a right to
redress, including adequate compensation’.
Principle 10 on ‘Healthy, safe and well-adapted work environment and data protection’,
which provides that ‘workers have the right to a high level of protection of their health and
safety at work [and]…a working environment adapted to their professional needs and which
284
COM(2017). Available online.
285
COM(2021). Available online.
286
Action Plan available online here and Porto Declaration here.
79
enables them to prolong their participation in the labour market. Workers have the right to
have their personal data protected in the employment context.’
Principle 12 on ‘Social Protection’, which states that ’regardless of the type and duration of
their employment relationship, workers, and, under comparable conditions, the self-
employed, have the right to adequate social protection.’
On 9 March 2021, the Commission presented a vision and avenues for Europe’s digital
transformation by 2030: the Europe’s Digital Decade287
. Building on the Commission's
Communication on Shaping Europe’s Digital Future288
of February 2020, the
Communication sets a framework of digital rights and principles that will help promote and
uphold EU values in the digital space.
The EU's ambition is to be digitally sovereign in an open and interconnected world, and
to pursue digital policies that empower people and businesses to seize a human centred,
sustainable and more prosperous digital future. The initiative "Improving the working
conditions in platform work" aims at being one of the answers to this call.
The general objectives of the initiative are to:
(1) Ensure that people working through platforms have decent working conditions and
social rights.
(2) Ensure conditions for sustainable growth of digital labour platforms in the EU.
The specific objectives through which the general objectives will be addressed are to:
(1) Ensure that people working through platforms have – or can obtain – the correct
legal employment status in light of their relationship with the platform and gain access
to labour and social protection rights thereof.
(2) Ensure fairness, transparency and responsibility in algorithmic management.
(3) Enhance knowledge of developments in platform work and provide clarity on the
applicable rules for all people working through platforms operating across borders.
6. POLICY OPTIONS
6.1 Baseline scenario against which the options are assessed
The assessment of relevant and feasible options for intervention at the EU level in ensuring
proper working conditions for people working through digital labour platforms highly
depends on the overall potential development pathways of the digital labour platform
economy. Based on the rapid increase in technological progress and prevalence of digital
labour platforms in recent years, it seems likely that either – at least in the shorter run – this
trend would continue in moderate levels of progress or more expansively. The latter may
especially be the case depending on the extent to which labour market actors, including
national governments, view and use work through digital labour platforms actively as an
287
COM(2021). Available online.
288
COM (2020). Available online.
80
opportunity for young or low-skilled people affected by the crisis following the Covid-19
pandemic to (re)enter the labour market.
In a baseline scenario, policies surrounding the working conditions of people working
through platforms would therefore evolve nationally without a common policy
framework at the EU level. This is particularly the case considering the pace of
development of the digital labour platform economy, and the increasing number of people
who are (partly) relying on income from work performed through digital labour platforms. In
some Member States, an increasing number of strikes and calls for action has already resulted
in regulations at national level, including attempts to reach agreements through collective
bargaining. The varying court judgements add to divergent approaches across the EU.
In the baseline scenario, the absence of EU action entails a high risk of regulatory
fragmentation across Member States.
Divergent approaches across the EU may also make it more difficult for digital labour
platforms to work across borders using the same business model, making their expansion
challenging. This could lead to markets dominated by large non-EU digital labour platforms,
with detrimental effects for competitiveness and innovation.289
Such a situation would also
challenge national regulations and enforcement practices.
At the same time, and if the digital labour platform economy continues to expand, national
governments may also feel inclined to establish their own regulations of the digital labour
platform economy. This would be aimed at preventing the ‘traditional’ economy from
becoming ‘platformised’ and facing a deterioration of working conditions, services’ quality
and consumer protection standards.
This may be a particular concern in urban areas, where the supply of services provided
through digital labour platforms is higher. In a worst-case scenario290
, labour supply may
begin to exceed labour demand in these areas, thus leading to a severe worsening of the
general working conditions for people working through digital labour platforms who would
have very little bargaining power vis-à-vis platforms.
Against the baseline scenario, the next sections consider different policy options that may be
put forward to positively impact the working conditions in platform work.
6.2 Avenues for EU action
A possible EU initiative would be designed in full respect of national competencies, the
diversity of Member States’ labour market traditions and social partners’ autonomy.
This section presents possible options for an EU initiative on platform work, providing an
overview of the measures under consideration for addressing the problem and meeting the
objectives outlined above. All options should be complementary to existing (or proposed) EU
legislation, which is not focused per se on platform work but partly covers the challenges set
out above vis-à-vis digital labour platforms.
289
Eurofound (2020).
290
Ibidem.
81
Several options could be envisaged for the personal scope of the EU initiative.
Depending on their design and objective, the measures could target all people working
through digital labour platforms, regardless of employment status, or be limited to workers
(including those people with a misclassified employment status). An EU initiative could
cover all digital labour platforms active in the EU, or focus on certain types of platform
work or certain types of platform business models.
These measures can form part of a package of binding and non-binding instruments.
They address different challenges in platform work and can be combined in various ways as
they are not mutually exclusive.
Any initiative on platform should respect national concepts of employment status. Social
partners agree in their responses to the first phase consultation that they do not wish to open a
discussion on an EU concept of “worker”. Member States have different approaches to the
delimitation between the worker and the self-employed status, and some have introduced an
intermediate category for dependent or “employee-like” self-employed who enjoy better
access to social protection. Any EU-level initiative on platform work should thus rely on
definitions of the employment relationship as laid down by national law, collective
agreements or practice, while taking into account the case law of the Court of Justice of the
EU. For this reason also there is no intention to create a ‘third’ employment status at EU
level, while respecting the choice made by some Member States to introduce it in their
national legislation.
6.2.1 Addressing misclassification in the employment status
Facilitating the correct classification would address many of the identified challenges related
to access to decent working conditions and to social protection.
The establishment of an employment relationship remains a gateway to many existing rights
and protections, both at Member State and EU level. Only people who are classified as
workers have access to the full set of labour rights, such as on working time, paid annual
leave, maternity, paternity and parental leave, and occupational health and safety. Workers
have easier access to social protection, although gaps remain for non-standard workers. For
example, when it comes to coverage by insurance for accidents at work and occupational
diseases in 10 Member States there is no accidents at work scheme for the self-employed, and
in further six self-employed have only access to voluntary or partial schemes.291
Workers are
also better protected in cross-border situations than the self-employed, in case of disputes on
jurisdiction or applicable law (see Section 3.3).
The initiative could include tools helping people working through platforms to clarify the
classification of their employment status in line with national definitions, taking into account
the imbalance of power between the platforms and the people working through them.
One option would be a rebuttable presumption of an employment relationship to the
effect that the underlying contract between the platform and the person working through it is
deemed to be an employment relationship. To counter that presumption, platforms would
have to establish in a legal procedure before a court that the person is in fact self-employed.
291
Avlijas (2020): Social Situation Monitor - Comparing Social Protection Schemes for the Self-employed
across EU-27. Available online.
82
Such legal presumption could have the advantage of providing a clear rule and strengthen the
work of labour authorities or social security institutions to reclassify them as workers. In
order to ensure that genuine self-employed remain so, the scope of application of such
rebuttable presumption could be narrowed by accompanying it by a number of criteria that
would need to be met in order to trigger the presumption, or be limited to situations where the
work relationship has certain stability.
Another option would be a shift in the burden of proof or lowering the standard of proof for
people engaged in platform work or their representatives in legal proceedings. The person
working through the platform would not automatically be considered to be in an employment
relationship, but would have to establish very few basic facts from which it can be presumed
that an employment relationship exists (prima facie evidence), in which case it would be for
the platform operator to prove that the person is in fact self-employed. The prima facie
evidence could, for instance, consist in the fact that the level of remuneration is determined
by the platform, the fact that the platform controls or restricts the communication between the
person and the customer or that it requires the worker to respect specific rules with regard to
appearance, conduct towards the customer or performance of the work. Since people working
through platforms often do not have full access to information on how the work is organised
and therefore might be in a difficult position to prove all elements of an employment
relationship, this option would help them challenge more easily their contractual status if they
would so wish. It would, however, still require individuals to start court proceedings, with the
associated costs and risks.
An administrative procedure to examine the employment status could spare people working
through platforms the cost and risk involved in legal proceedings and thus lower the burden
of reclassification action. It could be open to both parties of the contractual relationship, and
possibly other actors such as worker representatives, and would result in an administrative
ruling. 292
Decisions would have precedent value for similar cases, without being legally
binding (except for the administration itself). Such administrative procedures would have the
advantage of being less costly and lengthy than court proceedings, and thereby more easily
accessible for individuals. They are, however, still open to a challenge in court. If one of the
parties refuses to comply with the administrative ruling, subsequent litigation might still be
necessary.
Another “out-of-court” option would be the certification of work-related contracts carried
out at the request of either party by labour authorities or by independent bodies. This means
that persons engaged in platform work could, on their own or represented by worker
representatives, have their employment status ascertained by an impartial institution. The
same possibility would be open to platforms. The certification would produce the
presumption of a correct classification of the employment relationship (as either worker, self-
employed or a third status, in line with national law) for labour, social protection and tax
authorities, which only a court could reverse. 293
While the certification has a signalling effect
and does not entail high costs or risks, it cannot be directly enforced. In case of non-
compliance by the platform, a misclassification claim would need to be introduced before a
court.
292
This possibility exists in Belgium since 2006 through the Administrative Commission for the regulation of
the employment relationship established by the federal government as part of the social security service.
293
Such a certification procedure of work-related contracts was introduced in Italy in 2003.
83
These different tools would pursue the same objective, but would produce different effects
and different degrees of efficacy not only in terms of legal certainty and speed of procedures,
in balancing the asymmetry of bargaining power between the worker and the platform, but
also in terms of level playing field within the internal market. Different options could also be
combined in different ways. Depending on the level of ambition and the stringency of the
tool envisaged, they could apply either to all digital labour platforms or only to specific
categories. For instance, an administrative or certification procedure for all digital labour
platforms could be combined with a rule on the burden of proof for legal procedures and/or a
rebuttable presumption of employment status. It would also be possible to combine a
rebuttable presumption for those sectors where misclassification is more prevalent, such as
platforms intermediating certain forms of on-location platform work, with a rule on the
burden of proof for all other digital labour platforms.
Criteria or indicators to clarify the employment status and assist in the correct classification
could further reinforce these procedural tools. They could narrow down the scope of a legal
presumption or define what kind of evidence could be sufficient to shift the burden of proof.
Such criteria or indicators should be specific to platform work and not interfere with national
definitions of general labour law. They could be either binding or indicative, exhaustive or
non-exhaustive. They can also promote a level playing field across the single market not only
between platforms but also between platforms and other businesses.
6.2.2 Introducing new rights related to algorithmic management
Algorithmic management brings about distinct challenges in platform work, and is also
becoming more prevalent beyond the platform economy. It is a new phenomenon not yet
fully tackled in labour law at EU and national level. The initiative could therefore propose
new rights in this area, building upon and in full consistency with existing instruments
(labour law, GDPR, P2B) and proposed ones (AI Act, DSA). These could include:
 improved information for the people affected by algorithmic management and their
representatives on the way algorithms manage work;
 establishing internal procedures to guarantee timely and justified human oversight,
control and responsibility of decisions with significant implications for affected
people;
 ensuring appropriate channels for redress (e.g. by setting up internal procedures or
mediation structures within companies);
 reinforcing information and consultation rights on algorithmic management systems,
ensuring full involvement of social partners;
 ensuring the right to privacy while off duty294
, as well as the effective application of
other relevant GDPR principles and requirements in the workplace;
 promoting ratings portability, in particular by increasing the effective use of the right
to data portability; and
 excluding automatic termination of work-related contractual relationships or practices
with equivalent effect.
294
Platforms often tap into the service provider’s smartphone gyroscope to detect driving patterns – sudden
braking, acceleration, etc.
84
An EU initiative introducing new rights and reinforcing the implementation of the existing
rights could be specific to platform work and apply to workers only or also the self-
employed, to the extent that such rights are not already attributed to them through other
existing, or proposed, EU laws. It could also look at the world of work in general. If tailored
to algorithmic management challenges in platform work, the initiative could pave the way for
a broader approach to the use of artificial intelligence in the labour market in the near future.
6.2.3 Addressing the cross-border dimension
National authorities face challenges when it comes to cross-border platform work. With
platform companies often operating in several Member States and offering services across
borders, verification of compliance with existing laws and their enforcement may be
challenging for national administrations, in particular those responsible for labour inspection,
social security and taxation.
The initiative could consider either a register of, or transparency obligations for,
platforms, which could provide key information such as the active contractual terms and
conditions, the number of people working through them and their employment status.
To facilitate authorities’ tasks, platforms could be required to report certain data
regarding transactions they facilitate (i.e. task duration, pay per task, assignment of the task to
the workers, contacts between the workers and the platform, etc.). Member States could
ensure access to the reported information for relevant national authorities for the purposes of
enforcing the rights and obligations and to build statistical information on the digital labour
market, needed for informed policies. Information could also be exchanged between Member
States when the provision of services has taken place in a different Member State than the
(potential) place of registration of the platform company.
To support the portability of social security rights and address challenges in the
identification of people working through platforms across borders or in two or more
Member States for social security coordination purposes, the specificities of platform work
could be taken into account in the design of use cases piloted of the European Social
Security Pass announced in the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan which was
endorsed at the Porto Summit.
The initiative should keep any new reporting obligations to a minimum in order not to create
excessive administrative burdens on platform companies, in particular small and medium-
sized businesses, or national administrations, also in view of the fact that there are several
reporting and data sharing obligations for online platforms scattered in the internal market
acquis and taxation legislation.
People working through platforms in a cross-border context are also in need of accurate
information on rules and obligations. The initiative could provide interpretation or
guidance regarding the application of existing EU legislation to people working through
platforms, including for instance rules on applicable law and jurisdiction or social security
coordination.
6.2.4 Strengthening enforcement, collective representation and social dialogue
Enforcement of rules and collective action are key given the imbalance of power between
platforms and people working through them. This is particularly true for workers who often
face obstacles or risks to claim their rights without any support from trade unions or other
85
organisations. It is also true for certain self-employed who are sometimes in a weak position
to defend their rights and interests.
The initiative could introduce measures to ensure compliance with the new material and
procedural rights and obligations in platform work that the initiative will confer. Such rules
should be in line with national traditions and could take inspiration from other instruments in
labour and equal treatment law. They could encompass access to effective and impartial
dispute resolution, procedures on behalf of or in support of workers (e.g. by trade unions), the
right to compensation, protection against adverse treatment or consequences for claiming
rights, access to evidence and penalties. Another avenue to be considered is the promotion of
ombudspersons at national level for resolving disputes between platforms and people
working through them.
Social partners have an important role to play in the management of platform work. To
support the representation of people working through platforms and the platforms themselves
in Member States’ existing social dialogue practices, the EU could also encourage Member
States and social partners to stimulate social dialogue in platform work and to support
capacity building in this context. Trade unions face difficulties in identifying and contacting
people working through platforms due to the absence of a common place of work.
Communication channels embedded in the digital infrastructure of platforms allowing worker
representatives to provide people working through the platforms with information could
strengthen their ability to effectively defend their rights.
Removing obstacles for collective bargaining might be necessary. Under competition law,
self-employed people are considered “undertakings” and any agreement between them risks
being prohibited as anticompetitive under Article 101 TFEU. A forthcoming separate
initiative aims to ensure that EU competition law does not stand in the way of collective
bargaining for self-employed who need it (while other aspects of competition law would
remain applicable to self-employed and platforms).295
Finally, clarity on rules and a broader data basis can contribute to better enforcement and
compliance. The initiative could encourage Member States to provide advice and guidance to
people on rights and obligations resulting from their platform activity in relation to tax and
social security matters. Data collection and exchange of best practices on platform work and
algorithmic management could also be a way forward.
Overview of policy options
Policy field Policy options
Employment status;
working conditions and
access to social
protection for workers
 ensure correct employment classification in platform work, based
on national definitions of worker, taking into consideration the
jurisprudence of the CJEU and in full respect of national
competence and the diversity of Member States’ labour market
traditions;
 introduce a rebuttable presumption of the existence of an
employment relationship, possibly only for certain types of
platform work or based on quantitative and/or qualitative
thresholds;
295
See more details here.
86
 introduce a rule on shifting of the burden of proof, to the effect that
the person would only have to establish basic facts from which it
can be presumed that an employment relationship exists (prima
facie evidence), in which case it would be for the platform operator
to prove that the person is in fact self-employed;
 introduce an administrative procedure to examine the employment
status;
 introduce certification of work-related contracts carried out at the
request of either party by labour authorities or by independent
bodies;
 provide guidance on indicators that could be used to assess and
establish the employment status and/or the self-employment status
in platform work;
 ensure that people recognised as workers have access to rights
established in EU and national labour law and in social protection
frameworks.
Algorithmic
management rights
 improved information for the people affected by algorithmic
management and their representatives on the way algorithms
manage work;
 establish internal procedures to guarantee timely and justified
human oversight, control and responsibility of decisions with
significant implications for affected people;
 ensure appropriate channels for redress, e.g. through the setting
up of internal procedures or mediation structures within companies
to look into complaints;
 reinforce information and consultation rights on algorithmic
management systems, e.g. by requiring involvement of workers
and their representatives in decisions leading to application of
algorithmic management systems in the company;
 ensure the right to privacy while off duty, as well as the effective
application of other relevant GDPR principles and requirements in
the workplace;
 promote portability of ratings, in particular by increasing the
effective use of the right to data portability;
 exclude automatic termination of work-related contractual
relationships or practices with equivalent result (e.g. permanent
exclusion from task allocation).
Cross-border
dimension
 ensure that platforms registered on their territory are required to
publish for EU Member States where they operate their active
contractual terms and conditions, information on how many people
are working through them (and possibly under what status);
 introduce a (voluntary or mandatory) register of all platforms
active in the respective Member State which could include the
active contractual terms and conditions and the number of people
working through them (and possibly under what status);
 require platforms to report certain data regarding transactions
they facilitate (i.e. task duration, pay per task, etc.) to national
social security and tax authorities;
 take into account the relevance of platform work in the pilot under
the European Social Security Pass announced in the European
Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan;
87
 provide interpretation and guidance regarding existing EU
legislation (labour law, social security coordination, rules
regarding jurisdiction and applicable law) and its implications for
cross-border platform work.
Enforcement,
collective
representation and
social dialogue
 establish enforcement provisions such as the right to redress,
procedures on behalf or in support of workers (e.g. by trade
unions), the right to compensation, protection from dismissal for
claiming rights, access to evidence and penalties;
 promote ombudspersons at national level for resolving disputes
between platforms and people working through them;
 stimulate social dialogue in platform work;
 capacity building for social partners in the area of platform work;
 encure communication channels allowing worker representatives to
provide people working through the platforms with information.
 provide advice and guidance to people providing services through
platforms on the tax, social security and/or labour law obligations
of their platform activity via information websites and hotlines;
 improve data collection on platform work and algorithmic
management.
6.3 EU instruments
The initiative on working conditions in platform work could take the form of a Directive, a
Council Recommendation, or a combination of the two. A policy Communication could also
possibly introduce any non-legislative elements of the initiative.
Directive
A Directive would provide certainty about the mandatory requirements to be applied by
Member States. To this end, it could contain a set of minimum standards and procedural
obligations to be necessarily complied with.
Article 153 (2) TFEU provides the possibility of adopting a Directive in the area of ‘working
conditions’ involving minimum requirements for implementation by Member States.296
This
legal basis would enable the Union to set minimum standards regarding the working
conditions of people working through platforms, where they are in an employment
relationship and thus considered as workers (including false self-employed people), in line
with national traditions and practices.
A Directive addressing the situation of genuine self-employed people working through
platforms as business actors could be based on an internal market legal basis. Possible
provisions in the TFEU include Article 53(1) – which empowers the Union to issue directives
coordinating national provisions concerning the uptake and pursuit of activities as self-
296
Art 153(2) (b) also states that “Such directives shall avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal
constraints in a way which would hold back the creation and development of small and medium-sized
undertakings”.
88
employed persons – or Article 114 allowing for the approximation of laws with regard to the
establishment and functioning of the internal market.
Article 352 TFEU allows the EU to act in order to attain one of its Treaty objectives in the
absence of a more specific legal basis. This legal basis could be used for a directive on the
working conditions of self-employed people engaged in platform work. This legal basis
would require unanimity in the Council.
Council recommendation
A recommendation could provide for policy guidance and a common policy framework at EU
level, while not setting specific mandatory requirements. Envisaged tools for monitoring
implementation of such a non-binding instrument might include the use of benchmarking
integrated in the European Semester, the exchange of good practices, and joint work with
Member States and social partners on the development of appropriate monitoring tools.
Non-legislative measures
The initiative could also entail non-legislative measures at EU level that would contribute to
the objectives formulated above. The Commission could, for instance, facilitate a dialogue
with platform operators aiming at developing principles for good quality platform work by
way of a code of conduct or a charter possibly accompanied by a voluntary label. Such a self-
regulatory tool could cover social benefits and training on digital labour platforms as well as
complementary aspects in relation to working conditions and algorithmic management.
As possible EU legislative action can only set minimum standards in the labour and social
affairs field and cannot ensure full harmonisation in the internal market, further action could
be taken to improve coordination and avoid fragmentation, such as organising exchanges of
experience and mutual learning among Member States on the issue of clarifying the
employment status of people working through platforms.
Other possible measures include: guidance regarding the application of existing legislation in
cross-border platform work, including for labour inspectorates; promoting social dialogue
and other social partner initiatives; and/or further monitoring and data collection by setting up
an EU-level observatory on platform work and algorithmic management. Such actions could
be promoted by means of funding, organisation of meetings and other forms of support.
7. POLICY IMPACTS
The following sections illustrate the impacts that the policy options outlined in Section 6
would have on the social and economic spheres, as well as on other domains such as
fundamental rights, the environment and technological sovereignty.
A table at the end of the section summarises these impacts in terms of costs and benefits.
7.1 Social impacts
Policy options tackling the main problems faced by people working through platforms
would improve their working conditions and access to social protection. Measures aimed
at clarifying their employment status would bring legal clarity to both them and the platforms
through which they work, with positive spill over effects in the social sphere. Such measures
89
would facilitate their access to courts and legal disputes to challenge their potential
misclassification as self-employed.
Those who are correctly classified as workers as a result of such measures would benefit
from the EU and national labour and social acquis, thereby falling under the scope of
employment protection legislation, better access to social security schemes, protection against
health and safety risks, collective bargaining rights, mobility and skills opportunities, and
minimum wages frameworks. On the other hand, the newly classified workers may then face
lower remuneration if social contributions are partially or entirely passed on to them by
platforms, whereas those people who are confirmed to be self-employed may have reduced
access to self-employed job opportunities in platform work, despite expected sustained
growth in demand for platform work services. Clarification on what constitutes an
employment relationship in platform work could however have a spill-over effect on the way
that platforms facilitate and organise their working relationship with self-employed service
providers and thus impact positively their level of autonomy and control at work. They could
also contribute to legal security for platforms that want to provide additional benefits to the
self-employed who work through them.
Workers on digital labour platforms would not have to lose the flexibility in organising
their own schedule and work they currently access. Both the EU and most Member States’
labour acquis a plethora of flexible employment contracts for workers (including temporary
agency work, fixed-term contracts, part-time contracts) that would allow both platforms and
the workers to maintain existing flexible arrangements, while adding benefits and social
protection on a pro rata basis. Flexible employment contracts for workers (including
temporary agency work, fixed-term contracts, part-time contracts) would allow both
platforms and the workers to maintain existing flexible arrangements, while adding benefits
and social protection on a pro rata basis.
Measures tackling the challenges posed by algorithmic management would make the
platform work environment more transparent, predictable and decent. Such measures
may also have positive effects on working conditions and social dialogue, by enhancing the
responsibility of platforms and opening their algorithms up to external scrutiny. The positive
spill over effects would also be on earnings, as increased transparency on pay, performance
evaluation and client-ratings would grant workers firmer control over their own work
schedule and organisation.
Measures on reporting and enforcement would improve working conditions by
strengthening the role of labour inspectorates and allowing better public policymaking
through better access to data and information on digital labour platforms and people working
through them. Clarity on rights and obligations would diminish the risk of non-compliance
(e.g. with taxation obligations).
7.2 Economic impacts
Policy options clarifying the employment status of people working through platforms
would have substantial impacts on the digital labour platform economy and the
economy at large. Digital labour platforms which misclassify workers would face potentially
substantial costs to reclassify their contractors as workers. Furthermore, those who do not
90
correct the employment status classification following introduction of such policy options
would face further litigation costs, stemming from the legal disputes brought before courts by
people wanting to challenge their employment status classification or proceedings launched
by relevant national administrations. In the case where misclassification is confirmed,
platforms would then have to factor in operating costs of the social protection and
contributions they would have to pay for their employees.
If on the one hand this may lead some platforms to change their business model to adapt
to the new costs of having to hire service providers, they would also find themselves
operating within a much clearer legal framework, with greater possibilities of long-term
adaptation, planning and scale-up investments. This would have positive spill over effects on
investors’ and users’ trust, fostering a new, positive outlook for the digital labour platform
economy. Such benefits would arguably be especially important for platforms SMEs and
startups, which would benefit from a newly levelled playing-field, fairer competition and
more incentives to expand their business across the EU.
‘Traditional’ companies would see their competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis platforms
reduced, although some may also have their opportunity to outsource tasks to platforms or to
use platforms to reach a broader client base curtailed, due to higher costs and reduced labour
supply. This could be the case for example for restaurants using delivery platforms.
Consumers would access services which are of better quality and with clearer liability
attached to them. Such benefits may, however, come with higher prices and reduced product
supply, due to more costly quality controls and increased legal accountability.
Measures improving the information, consultation and redress in the use of algorithmic
management would face digital labour platforms with administrative costs to ensure full
compliance with requirements and embedding responsibility mechanisms within their IT
tools and automated procedures. Such costs, however, would arguably be more than offset
by the benefits that would derive from a renewed platform ecosystem based on trust.
This would lead to greater consumer and investor confidence, increased worker involvement
and participation and ultimately greater incentives to innovation thanks to a clearer, future-
proof legal framework.
Measures on reporting and enforcement would have limited costs for platforms,
demanding they make public some (already available) information concerning their business
activities. The benefits of such measures would come in the form of heightened public trust in
the digital labour platform economy, thanks to greater transparency and better, data-driven
public policymaking. These measures would also make services more reliable vis-à-vis
consumers and would contribute to ensuring a level playing field in the digital labour
platform economy, fostering competition and allowing new, smaller players to challenge
incumbents.
7.3 Impacts on public authorities
Policy options tackling the challenges of platform work may also have direct or indirect
effects on Member States’ public authorities. Measures aimed at clarifying the
91
employment status of people working through platforms could impose administrative
costs on Member States’ courts, although, given the current trend of increasing legal
challenges against platforms’ employment contracts they would have to deal with such
procedures in any case. Furthermore, these measures would facilitate legal proceedings,
leading to shorter times and clearer legal outcomes.
The courts’ administrative costs would arguably be outweighed by substantial financial
benefits for Member States’ governments, deriving from the increased tax and social
security contributions paid by digital labour platforms on behalf of their employees.
Furthermore, the proceedings thus imposed on courts could be greatly facilitated by the
measures improving information, consultation and redress on algorithmic management.
Bringing more transparency to the internal workings of the platforms, the work of courts
would be facilitated in cases of potential employment status misclassification.
Similarly, measures on reporting and enforcement would generate a one-in, one-out
virtuous cycle, by which the operating costs demanded to authorities to change, shift and
strengthen their inspection procedures would be offset by the benefits deriving from more
thorough controls on platforms, fewer cases of employment status misclassification and
greater legal clarity for workers and businesses alike.
Bringing people working through platforms effectively into the scope of social protection
would significantly broaden the tax and contribution base of the social protection systems and
help adjust social protection systems to the changing economy and the world of work,
improving their adequacy, sustainability and resilience in the long term.
7.4 Other impacts
An EU initiative on platform work may have impacts on other societal domains, directly or
indirectly related to the issues tackled by the policy options described in Section 6.
Technological sovereignty
By clarifying the obligations of digital labour platforms in the EU, these policy options
contribute to fostering a transparent, rules-based digital single market, underpinned by a
level playing field for all businesses and strong social rights for the people working in it. This
has implications for the EU’s international partners, as it strengthens the Union’s values-
based approach to the digital transition.
These policy options would demand that all digital labour platforms active in the EU,
regardless of where they are based or originate from, comply with European principles.
Hence, the EU would be pursuing its technological sovereignty by setting global digital
standards on algorithmic management and the digitalisation of the world of work.
Fundamental rights
This initiative aims at strengthening the right to fair and just working conditions recognised
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (the Charter). Under the Article 31 (1) every
worker has the right to fair and just working conditions, which respect his or her health,
safety and dignity.
Furthermore, the initiative will support the freedom to choose an occupation, and right to
engage in work, recognised in Article 15. Different avenues for policy actions presented
92
above provide different impact on these rights, with a positive impact on the right to fair and
just working conditions expected to be ranging from medium to high.
In order to ensure that the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16) is fully upheld, possible
avenues for action will be tested to ensure the proportionality principle is respected, and that
the final proposal will aim at maximising the fundamental rights impact.
In addition to Article 31 and Article 15, other rights protected in the Charter could potentially
be positively impacted by action aimed at an improvement of working conditions in platform
work. It can support dignity in the workplace (Art 1), the fight against coerced work (Art 5),
respect for family life (Art. 7), equality before the law of workers (Article 20), non-
discrimination (Article 21), as well as workers' right to information and consultation (Article
27).
IMPACTS
Social
- Employment (mobility, transitions, skills,
labour market segmentation)
- Working conditions
- Social protection (income insecurity, poverty,
precariousness, inequality)
- Health
- Fundamental rights
Economic
- Impact on business (SME
included)
-Operating (labour costs) and
conduct of business, including
administrative burdens
- Competitiveness and unfair
competition
Public authorities
- Budgetary consequences
- Public authorities
organisation
Costs Benefits Costs Benefits Costs Benefits
Baseline
scenario
For people working
through platforms:
*lack of access to
labour law
protections (including
e.g. paid holidays,
health and safety
protections; minimum
wage protections)
* time pressure and
inter-worker
competition in some
platforms may impact
safety
*costs of social
protection which
should be shared with
the employer
* high barriers to
claim rights through
courts
For people working
through
platforms:*access to a
variety of job
opportunities through
platforms
*flexibility of self-
employed status
For platforms
*Increasing
legal costs
related to
litigation and
following
compliance
costs
*Decrease in
investors’
confidence
*Costs of
coping with
legal
fragmentation
and legal
unpredictability
For other
companies:
*unfair
competitive
advantage
based on lower
labour costs,
relying on more
flexible
regulations as
well as network
effects
For consumers
*platforms’
lack of liability
For platforms
*Competitive
advantage for
platforms,
resulting in a
possible
growth of
platform
companies
For other
companies:
*Increasing
opportunities
to outsource
parts of
operations to
platforms
*Platform
intermediation
allows for
broadening
markets
For
consumers
*access to
variety of
services at
low cost and
with some
quality
controls set up
by platforms
*False self-
employment or
undeclared
self-
employment
results in
potential lower
tax incomes
and increased
net public
spending to
cover for
missed social
security
contributions
* Costs of
inspections by
tax authorities
and/or labour
inspections to
detect and
pursue cases of
false self-
employment
*Potential
legalisation
of work that
could
otherwise
remain in
grey economy
93
for services
provided by
self-employed
service
providers may
impact
availability and
quality of
service
Tackling
employment
status,
working
conditions
and access to
social
protection for
workers
Labour markets
*Decrease in the
number of self-
employed job
opportunities,
including those with
low barriers
For people working
through
platforms:*potentially
higher taxes and costs
of social
contributions
* potentially losing
some of the flexibility
related to self-
employment
Labour markets
*Creation of better
quality jobs (with
access to labour
rights and social
protection)
For people working
through
platforms:*facilitation
of access to courts to
correct employment
status qualification
*improved working
conditions (including
e.g. paid holidays,
health and safety
protections, access to
minimum wage
protections), *fuller
access to social
protection
For platforms
*Increase in
operating costs
(labour and
social
protection
costs)
*Increased
administrative
costs
*Potential need
to change
business
models that
rely on the
availability of
high numbers
of service
providers
For other
companies:
*Potential loss
of opportunities
to outsource or
seek new
customers via
platforms
For consumers
*potential
increase of
prices and/or
lower
availability of
services
For platforms
*increased
legal
predictability,
resulting in
the longer
term in lower
legal costs
*increased
investors’
confidence
*increased
user trust
For other
companies:
*more equal
level playing
field in
competition
between
platforms and
other
companies
For
consumers
*more
reliable
service thanks
to fuller
accountability
of platforms
*Potentially
administrative
costs to
introduce new
administrative
procedures or
to adapt the
procedures
related to court
proceedings
*Correct
employment
classification
(as worker
and as self-
employed)
would result
in increased
tax and
social
security
contributions
*Facilitation
for tax
authorities
and/or labour
inspections to
detect and
pursue cases
of false self-
employment
Tackling
algorithmic
management
For people affected
by algorithmic
management
*no direct or indirect
costs
For people affected by
algorithmic
management
*more predictable
working environment
*positive effects on
earnings
* positive effects on
work satisfaction
*possibility to request
a review of an
unfavourable decision
For companies
*one-off and
running
administrative
costs to ensure
improved
information,
consultation
and redress
regarding the
use of
algorithmic
management
tools
For
companies
*improved
trust and
retention of
workers
*involvement
of workers in
setting up
algorithmic
management
system can
help to make
the tools more
*No direct or
indirect costs
*Improved
information,
consultation
and redress
onin the use
of
algorithmic
management
will facilitate
correct
employment
classification.
94
For consumers
No direct or
indirect
impacts
effective
*positive
impact on
innovation
through
adaptation of
algorithmic
management
systems
For
consumers:
No direct or
indirect
impacts
Cross-border
dimension
For people working
through
platforms:*No direct
or indirect costs
For people working
through
platforms:*Improved
working conditions
thanks to enhanced
inspection of platform
work
*Greater
transparency in
working conditions.
For platforms:
*Limited
administrative
costs to publish
information
(anyhow
available) on
their website or
in a register
*Possible
higher
administrative
costs for
reporting of
transactions
For other
companies:
*No direct or
indirect
impacts
For consumers
*No direct or
indirect
impacts
For
platforms:
*increased
public trust
thanks to the
transparency
For other
companies:
*No direct or
indirect
benefits
For
consumers
*improved
reliability of
services
available
through
platforms
*One-off and
running
administrative
costs of
creating a
register of
platforms or a
system for
reporting
transactions
*Availability
of
information
reported by
platforms
would
facilitate
inspection
and
enforcement
of
obligations,
including as
regards
payment of
social
security
contributions
and taxes
Enforcement,
collective
representation
and social
dialogue
For people working
through
platforms:*No direct
or indirect costs
For people working
through platforms:
*Improved working
conditions thanks to
better enforcement of
rights and stimulated
collective action and
social dialogue
For platforms:
*possible costs
in case of non-
compliance
related to
penalties and
sanctions
For other
companies:
*No direct or
indirect
impacts
For consumers
For
platforms:
*increased
public trust
thanks to
better
compliance
and collective
representation
For other
companies:
*improved
compliance of
platforms with
*Administrative
costs of
adjusting
national
enforcement
provisions and
building
capacity for
social dialogue
*Operating
costs or shift in
resources to
enhance
inspection and
*Improved
enforcement
of obligations
would result
in increased
tax revenues
and social
security
contributions
95
*No direct or
indirect
impacts
existing
obligations
would have a
positive
impact on
level playing
field
For
consumers
*improved
reliability of
services
available
through
platforms
enforcement
96
Annex I: Examples of platform companies operating in different Member States
Count
ry
On-location platforms Online platforms
Transport,
ride-hailing
Food and goods
delivery
Personal and
household
services (e.g.
care,
gardening,
cooking,
cleaning,
shopping)
Microwork (e.g. transcriptions,
translations, web search, IT tasks, etc.)
AT Uber, Bolt, Free
Now
Mjam (part of
Delivery Hero
Berlin),
Lieferservice (part
of Just Eat
Takeaway.com
Amsterdam)
Extrasauber.at,
Haushaltshilfe24.at
(part of Lemonfrog
AG Switzerland,
Betreut.at (part of
care.com Europe
Berlin)
Clickworker
BE Uber, HEETCH,
BEEP
Deliveroo, Uber
Eats,
Takeaway.com,
IzI, Shopopop
Helpper, Bringer
Nanny Nina, B-
homecare.be,
Handyfriend, Harry
Butler
Jellow, ListMinut, Teacheronline,
Bijleshoek
BG Foodpanda.bg,
takeaway.com,
ebag.bg
Housecare.bg,
phcare.bg,
bavachki.bg,
maistorplus.com
, domestina.bg
Upwork, fiverr, freelancer.com, gigsbg.com,
freelance.bg, dibla.com,
CY Uber, Beat,
Taxiplon
Wolt, efood, Foody
Cyprus, Bolt Food,
Food Cyprus,
BOX, deliveryman
Douleftaras.com
.cy
CZ Uber, Bolt Damejidlo.cz,
zavezu.cz,
robeeto.com,
grason.cz,
nejremeslnici.cz
,
supersoused.cz,
hlidacky.cz
Navolnenoze.cz, jaudelam.cz,
DE Uber,
CleverShuttle
(subsidiary of
Deutsche Bahn),
Moia (backed by
Volkswagen),
Berlkönig
(active in Berlin,
provided by the
Berlin Public
Transportation
Company, Via
Deliveroo, efood,
Wolt, Delivery
Hero, Lieferando
(subsidiary of the
Dutch Eat
Takeaway), serving
as an umbrella for
pizza.de,
foodora.de,
lieferservice.de,
and lieferheld.de;
flaschenpost and
betreut.de, or
haushelden.de,
Gewerbeschein,
Helpling,
Expat.com
Clickworkers, MyLittleJob, Streetspotr
97
Transportation
and Daimler
AG).
Durstexpress
(subsidiary of Dr.
Oetker KG);
DK 3F Transport,
Uber
Wolt, Just Eat,
Hungry.dk, Too
Good to Go
Happy Helper,
Chabber
Upwork, Consultant, Worksome
EE Bolt (previously
Taxify), Uber,
Yandex,
Wisemile
Wolt, Uber Eats,
Zomato,
foodpanda,
Deliveroo
Shipitwise, Bolt,
Barbora, in
addition each large
supermarket (about
5-6 larger
companies) have
their own delivery
platform created by
now
UpSteam, Care
Mate
GoWorkAbit, H2H, Upwork, Handy, Toitla
EL Beat
The only space
left to platforms
is as
intermediaries
between
passengers and
licenced taxis
Wolt, efood, BOX,
Bolt Food,
UberEats
Douleftaras.gr,
Paramana.eu
Freelancer.gr
ES Uber, BlaBla
Car, Cabify,
MyTaxi,
Blackcabs.es,
Enmercedes.com
,
Limousinecc.co
m (also Free
Now, Ecologic,
Pidetaxi as taxi
apps)
Deliveroo, Glovo,
Uber Eats, Just
East, Stuart
Specialised
platforms: Cuideo,
Aiudo, Wayalia,
Cuorecare, Joyners,
Cuidum,
Familiados,
Depencare,
Nannyfy, Sitly,
Topnanny . Multi-
service platforms:
Yocuido,
Cronoshare, Clintu,
Care.com,
Topayuda, Yoopies
Trabeja.com, Neuvoo, Prontopro,
Freelancer.com, Soy Freelancer, Trabajo
Freelance, Twago, Fiverr, People per Hour,
Upwork, Workana, Malt, Guru,
Speedlancer, People per Hour, Greatcontent,
Textbroker, Gengo, Jooble
FI Uber Foodora, Wolt
(both Finnish start-
ups in food
delivery), Budbee
in goods delivery
Seure.fi Amazon Mechanical Turk, Upwork
FR BlaBla Car,
Chauffeur Privé,
Resto-in,
Vizeat/Eatwith,
Uber Eats, Stuart
AlloVoisins eYeka,
98
HR Uber, BlaBlaCar Glovo, Wolt,
Pauza, Bolt,
Welovelocal.hr
Clintu, Cuvalica.hr,
Trebam.hr
ClickWorker, Fiverr, Microworker,
Upwork, Toptal, BigTranslation
HU Bolt, Uber Wolt, Bolt Food,
Netpincér
Expat.com,
Rendi.hu
Freelancer
IE FreeNow, Lynk,
Uber
Deliveroo, Just Eat
Ireland
Home Care Direct,
Mindme, Laundr,
Pristine,
Helpling.ie,
babysits.ie
Fiver, Upwork
IT Uber Just eat, Foodinho
(Glovo), Uber Eats
Italy, Deliveroo,
MyMenu, Sgnam,
Foodora
Sitly.it
LT Bolt, Uber,
eTransport,
eTaksi, Trans for
Forwarders,
eTransport
Bolt Food,
ZITICITY,
LastMile, Wolt,
Lėkštė.lt, Bazzarr
GETFIX,
PortalPRO, Domio,
myHelper,
Discontract
Teisės partneris, Cloud marketplace, FDP.lt
LU Uber Foostix,
FoodLunch.lu,
Goosty,
Webfood/Livrando
Crowdwork
LV Uber, Bolt,
Yandex
Bolt Food, Wolt Expat.com,
Greataupair.com,
baltichousehold.lv
MT Bonju, Cool,
eCabs, iGo,
Ryde
Bolt, Wolt, Bonju
Eats
Genie
NL Uber,
L1NDA.com,
Temper
Thuisbezorgd.nl,
Deliveroo, Uber
Eats, Eat
Takeaway, ishipit
Brenger, Helpling,
YouBahn, My
Flexwork,
Flexbook,
Inhuren.com,
Wurcly, care.com,
petbnb
Temper Works, handiwork (Werkspot),
Upwork, 99designs, AMT, Clickworker,
Freelance.nl, Jellow, YoungOnes
PL Uber, Bolt, Free
Now (formerly
myTaxi), iTaxi
Glovo, Wolt, Uber
Eats, Finebite, Bolt
Food, Pyszne.pl,
otostolik.pl, Stava,
Delgoo, knajp.pl,
Delidelivery
hojoclean.pl,
oferia.pl, niania.pl,
favore.pl
uslugi-artystyczne.pl, Designer.pl,
useme.com, freelancer.pl, oferia.pl
PT Uber, BOLT,
Freenow
Uber Eats, Glovo,
Takeaway, Bolt
Food
Dona Rosa,
Simplicasa
Zaask, fixando.pt
RO Uber, Bolt,
Clever,
Glovo, Foodpanda,
Takeaway
LiberProfi, Fiverr, upWork, Freelancer,
PeoplePerHour, Workaway, Taskrunner
99
Blackcab,
Yangoo,
Freenow
SE Bolt, Uber,
Bzzzt, Clever,
Foodora, Uber
Eats, Bolt food,
Wolt,
Yepstr, Tidy App,
Taskrunner,
Techhbuddy,
nanny.nu, Tipptapp
Fiver, Wordapp, Gigger,
SI Uber, Flixbus,
GoOpti, Taxi
Cammeo
Wolt, E-hrana beeping
SK Bolt (previously
Taxify), Uber,
Hopin, Bla Bla
Car, Liftago
Wolt, Bolt Food,
Bistro
Jaspravim, Domelia Taskit, Mikropraca.eu, Microjob.sk, Wilio
Source: ECE Thematic Review (forthcoming).
100
Annex II: Overview of the employment status of platform workers in the EU Member
States
Member
State
Employment status used in platform work In-between or third category (apart
from employee and self-employed)?
On-location Online
Austria -Self-employed
-Employee-like
service provider
-Temporary
agency worker
-Home-worker297
-Employee
(minority)
-Self-employed Yes: employee-like persons and employee-
like service provider (freelancer)
Special status of a ‘home worker’
(craftsmen)
Belgium -Occasional
worker in the
collaborative
economy298
-Self-employed
(as main or as
secondary
professional
activity)
-Temporary
agency worker
-Employee
(minority)
-Self-employed No
Bulgaria -Self-employed
-Civil law
contracts
(contract of
mandate and
contracts of
manufacture)
-Employee
(minority)
-Self-employed No
Cyprus -Self-employed
-Employees
-Self-employed No
Czechia -Self-employed
-Workers under
an Agreement to
complete a job or
Agreement to
perform work
-Self-employed No (but existence of two special
‘employment’ contracts)
Germany -Self-employed
-Temporary
agency work
-Employee
-Self-employed Yes: employee-like persons (they are self-
employed)
297 Home worker is a special status referring to those persons who perform manual labour from their home or a place of their
choosing and who have no trade license (usually it concerns craftsmen). They have some labour rights similar to the labour
rights of employees, such as a special minimum wage, sick pay, annual leave etc.
298 Under the Belgian income taxation legislation individuals can carry out occasional platform work for other natural
persons in a number of sectors the income of which is taxed at lower rates when below an annual threshold of EUR 6 340
(fiscal year 2020).
101
Denmark -Self-employed
-Employee
-Self-employed No
Estonia -Self-employed
(self-employed
non-traders, self-
employed sole
proprietors and
companies)
-Entrepreneur
account
-Employee
-Self-employed (self-
employed non-traders, self-
employed sole proprietors and
companies)
-Entrepreneur account
No
Greece -Self-employed
-Occasional
workers
-Dependent self-
employed
-Employee
-Self-employed
-Occasional workers
-Dependent self-employed
No
Spain -Economically
dependent self-
employed
(TRADE)299
-Self-employed
-Special
employment
status for
workers in
domestic
services
(cleaning and
care)
-Employee
-Economically dependent self-
employed (TRADE)
-Self-employed
Yes: the economically dependent self-
employed (TRADE)
Finland -Self-employed
(business or sole
traders)
-Employee
(minority)
-Self-employed No
France -Self-employed
(standard self-
employed and
micro-
entrepreneur
self-
employed300
)
-Employee
(minority)
-self-employed (standard self-
employed and micro-
entrepreneur self-employed)
No
Croatia -Freelancer
under contract
for services
-Self-employed
-Freelancer under contract for
services
-Self-employed
No
299 Self-employed are considered as economically dependent if they carry out a professional or economic activity personally,
directly and predominantly for a single client from who they receive at least 75% of their income.
300 A special subcategory of self-employed, which was originally created in 2008 to facilitate workers to exercise secondary
professional activities next to the main professional occupation and/or to earn small additional income for other groups such
as students, pensioners or jobseekers. A lower social contribution rate of 22% applies and income and an annual maximum
threshold applies of EUR 72 000. Above that level, the income becomes subject to VAT and a 45% social contribution rate
applies under the standard regime for self-employed.
102
-Employee
-‘Digital
nomads’301
Hungary -Self-employed
-Employee
-Self-employed No
Ireland -Self-employed
-Employee
-Self-employed No
Italy -Self-employed
(self-employed
platform workers
in food delivery
have special
protection under
Labour Code)
-‘Employer-
coordinated
workers’
(‘cococo’)
-‘Employer-
organised
workers’
(‘cocoorg’)
-Employees
(minority)
-(Temporary
agency worker)
-Self-employed Yes: quasi-subordinated work
-‘employer-organised workers’ (‘cocoorg’)
-‘employer-coordinated workers’
(‘cococo’)
Lithuania -Self-employed
(with an
individual
activity
certificate)
-Temporary
agency worker
-Employee
(minority)
-Self-employed No
Luxembourg -Self-employed
-Employee
-Self-employed No
Latvia -Self-employed
(individual
entrepreneurs or
microenterprises)
-Employee
-Self-employed (individual
entrepreneurs or
microenterprises)
No
Malta -Self-employed
(including self-
occupied
persons302
)
-Employee
(minority)
-Self-employed (including
self-occupied persons)
No
The
Netherlands
-Self-employed
(self-employed
without
personnel and
self-employed
-Self-employed (self-
employed without personnel
and self-employed with
employees)
No
301 Since 2021 the Croatian Immigration legislation was changed and allowed ‘digital nomads’ who are working through
digital platforms for businesses not established in Croatia to pay income tax in their country of residence.
302 Self-occupied workers is a concept enshrined in social security law and referring to those who perform services as
opposed to other self-employed who gain income through other means such as renting of accommodation or through
investments.
103
with employees
-Special regime
for domestic
services303
-Non-
professional
income
-Employees
(including
temporary
agency work)
Poland -Civil law
contracts
(contract of
mandate or
contract for
specific task)
-Self-employed
-Self-employed No
Portugal -Self-employed
-Employee
(minority)
-Self-employed No
Romania -Self-employed
(including
certified
authorized
private persons,
individual
undertakings and
family
undertakings)
-Liberal
professions
-Employee
Self-employed No
Sweden -Self-employed
with a Business
Tax Certificate
(a sole trader or a
company)
-Private persons
performing
occasional work
-Private persons
‘employed’ by
umbrella
organisations304
-Employee
-Self-employed with a
Business Tax Certificate (a
sole trader or a company)
-Private persons performing
occasional work
-Private persons ‘employed’
by umbrella organisations
No (but system of occasional work and
practice of umbrella organisations)
Slovia -Self-employed
-Civil contract
-Self-employed
-Work from home (which
Yes: economically dependent persons are
self-employed who earn at least 80% of
303 Under the regime ‘concerning personal services provided at home’ individuals can be employed by the client for a
maximum number of three days per week while the income is exempted from some income taxation and from employer’s
social contributions and the worker is not falling under the scope of the social insurance schemes for employees.
304 Umbrella organizations act as a sort of intermediary and pay the taxes and social contributions for the individual workers
who are receiving a wage, while the umbrella organization charges a commission and issues invoices to the clients.
104
for services
-Student
-Employee
includes telework) agreements their annual income from one single
contracting partners305
Slovakia -Self-employed
-Civil law
contracts
-Work
performance
agreements,
agreement of
work activity or
student
agreements306
-Employee
(minority)
-Undeclared
work common
(for personal and
household
services, e.g.
care services and
cleaning)
-Self-employed No
305 Economically dependent persons enjoy protection against unfair dismissal, minimum notification periods for dismissals,
protection of their income in return of their services, which should be comparable to the wages that are paid to employees on
the basis of the collective agreements, and limited liability for damages.
306 Work performed outside of regular employment
105
Annex III: Examples of policy developments in Member States regarding platform
work
Type of policy
development
Year,
month
Description
AUSTRIA
Collective
agreements and other
forms of worker
organization
2018
October
The Transnational Federation of Couriers was founded, representing
people working through platforms across Europe. Its aim is to
improve the working conditions of workers in the platform economy.
Collective
agreements and other
forms of worker
organization
2020
January
Social partners agreed on the first collective agreement for bicycle
couriers who have an employment contract with a traditional
company and those who have an employment contract with a
platform. With the agreement now they must receive a monthly gross
wage of EUR 1,506, additional holiday and Christmas remunerations,
the customary additional 13th and 14th months’ pay, the option to
work only four days a week, and an additional compensation of EUR
0.14 per kilometer when couriers use their own bicycle.307
Those who
work as independent contractors, are not eligible for the conditions
under this collective agreement.
Collective
agreements and other
forms of worker
organization
2021
January
Social partners agreed on the collective agreement for all drivers in
passenger transport who have an employment contract with any
traditional company and those who have an employment contract
with a platform. With the agreement now they must receive a
monthly gross wage between EUR 1.604,10 and EUR 2.756,70,
depending on working experience and occupation group. In addition,
employed drivers are entitled to holiday and Christmas allowances,
each amounting to one gross monthly salary. The agreement regulates
employed drivers’ working time, including the weekly maximum of
40 hours, resting periods and additionally regulates overtime and
work on weekends and holidays.308
Those who work as independent
contractors, are not eligible for the conditions under this collective
agreement.
BELGIUM
Legislation 2018-2020 Legislated the Act of a tax threshold of EUR 6,130 per year, under
which employees can have an additional income from digital
platforms, from work for non-commercial associations, and from
small non-professional jobs for other citizens. For this additional
income, there are no income taxes or social security contributions
required. The Constitutional Court overturned this tax scheme and it
was abolished in the end of 2020 and since 2021 the services
provided through recognized electronic platforms will be taxed at a
tax rate of 20%.309
BULGARIA
Legislation In Bulgaria, a third category of workers exists under the concept of
307 Digital Platform Observatory (2020). Austrian collective agreement for couriers. Retrieved from:
https://digitalplatformobservatory.org/initiative/austrian-collective-agreement-for-couriers/
308 Austria. Collective Agreement Passenger Transportation. Available at:
https://www.kollektivvertrag.at/kv/personenbefoerderungsgewerbe-mit-pkw-taxi-arb
309 Maertens, P. (2020). Circular letter on the taxation regime of the collaborative economy: Impact of the decision of the
Constitutional Court. Retrieved from: https://news.pwc.be/circular-letter-on-the-taxation-regime-of-the-collaborative-
economy-impact-of-the-decision-of-the-constitutional-court/
106
‘contractors’ and they fall under the scope of general social insurance
legislation, as employees and self-employed. Bulgarian labour law
also stipulates that if a contract with an independent service provider
conceals an actual employment relationship, the contract will be
classified as an employment relationship with all legal consequences
for the parties in this regard.310
No court cases have yet been raised to
reclassify people working through platforms.
Labour Inspectorate
and other
administrators
2015 The Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) in Bulgaria
after investigations into Uber, prompted by protest led by trade
unions and local taxi services, declared that the platform has been
engaging in unfair competition. CPC fined Uber for such activity for
EUR 25,532 and an additional EUR 25,532 for failing to provide
information requested during the investigation.311
The fines came
together with a ban on Uber’s operations in Bulgaria and the ban was
confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court.312
CROATIA
Legislation Croatia is one of the countries with a subcategory for employment
status, which applies to people working through platforms who can
work under a ‘contract for services’. In this case, they are not
considered self-employed and pay pension contributions at half the
rate set for self-employed workers.313
CZECH REPUBLIC
Legislation 2017 May After considering the challenges brought by digital platforms the
government developed a National Action Plan (Work 4.0). It has 4
priorities: Regulation of impact of technological changes on demand
on labour force and employment; Support of further specialised
education; Adjustment of labour market within the context of
technological changes; Regulation of impact of technological
changes on selected social aspects.314
The last priority includes
revising the Labour Code to improve OSH and working conditions
for those working from home and also to address the mental and
physical health elements in platform work. The action plan has been
approved by the Government.315
Labour Inspectorate
and other
administrators
2018 A memorandum between government and Uber was signed,
representing the key initiative related to digital labour platforms. It
commits the company to apply the rules governing the taxi sector and
includes a data sharing provisions for the tax collection purposes. The
authorities, including those in charge of labour inspection, apparently
accept that the company operates on the basis of self-employment.316
310 Kabatliyska, V. & Todorova, M. (2020). Employment and employee benefits in Bulgaria: Overview. Practicallaw.
Thomsonreuters. Retrieved from: https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/8-503-
3652?__lrTS=20171205150500174&amp;transitionType=Default&amp;contextData=%28sc.Default%29&amp;firstPage=tr
ue
311 Markova, E. (2016). Bulgaria: Supreme Court shuts down smartphone car service Uber. Eurofound. Retrieved from:
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2016/bulgaria-supreme-court-shuts-down-smartphone-car-service-uber
312 Markova, E. (2016).
313 Eurofound (2018). Platform work: Employment status, employment rights and social protection. Retrieved from:
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/mk/data/platform-economy/dossiers/employment-status
314 Garben, S. (2017). Protecting Workers in the Online Platform Economy: An overview of regulatory and policy
developments in the EU. Publications Office of the European Union. Retrieved from:
https://osha.europa.eu/en/publications/protecting-workers-online-platform-economy-overview-regulatory-and-policy-
developments, 70
315 Ibid.
316 Drahokoupil, Jan (2021). European Centre of Expertise (ECE) in the field of labour law, employment and labour market
policies: Czechia. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021.
107
DENMARK
Legislation 2017
October
The Danish government set out 22 proposals concerning taxation in
the sharing economy, working conditions, and rules and
responsibilities for workers, clients, and platforms.317
The
government aims to set up an online portal for specific information
provided by the authorities regarding platforms. It is planned to have
online reporting of revenue in order to lower taxes on income
generated through providing accommodation or transportation via
platforms. Proposals also include taking measures against grey areas
existing in legislation and focus on expanding the knowledge base for
people working through platforms regarding unemployment
insurance funds and job centres on the rules for unemployment
benefits.318
Legislation 2018 May The strategy set out in 2017 translated into a political agreement
between the government and social democrats on better conditions
for growth in the platform economy. The agreement led to the
establishment of the Council for Sharing Economy dedicated for
social dialogue with the social partners and the industry, which will
advise the Minister of Business on developments in the sharing and
platform economy.319
Legislation 2018 July A new unemployment insurance scheme came into force, whereby
rights are accrued depending on activities rather than on contractual
arrangement. This makes Denmark one of the countries in which the
government tried to decouple welfare protection from the
employment relationship after the rise of atypical forms of
employment.
Collective
agreements and other
forms of worker
organization
2018 The Voocali accession agreement negotiated in 2018.320
Voocali.com
is an interpretation platform company which offers interpretation
services to public and private entities.321
The agreement entails that
interpreters, who are employees, are provided with all the rights of
the Sectoral Collective Agreement for White Collar Workers in
Trade, Knowledge and Service.
The parties also agreed to conclude a special collective agreement for
freelance interpreters at Voocali. The agreement entails that freelance
interpreters receive a guaranteed fee agreed to in the collective
agreement with HK Privat, transportation compensation, a no-show
fee in event of cancellation, a requirement of objective reasons for
being excluded from the platform, registration of taxes for freelancers
without a Business Registration Number, no restrictions with regards
to carrying out assignments outside of Voocali.com, and data
portability to take their user ratings with them.
Collective 2018 Collective agreement between the trade union 3F and platform for
317 See summary at: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/danish-governments-sharing-economy-strategy-english-michael-bugaj/
318 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
319 OECD. (2019). Policy Responses to New Forms of Work. Retrieved from: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-
migration-health/policy-responses-to-new-forms-of-work_0763f1b7-en
320 The accession agreement is available in Danish at: https://www.hk.dk/-/media/dokumenter/raad-og-stoette-v2/freel
ancer/erklringvoocalihkprivatendelig.pdf?la=da&hash=F220F50F58285F3F4681F9
AE6A81E2E716EF953C. Accessed 28 July 2020.
321 Munkholm (2021), Collective Agreements and Social Security Protection for Non-Standard Workers and Particularly for
Platform Workers: The Danish Experience, Chapter 7, Ulrich Becker, Olga Chesalina (Ed.) Social Law 4.0, New
Approaches for Ensuring and Financing Social Security in the Digital Age, 1. Edition, p. 194. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748912002-171
108
agreements and other
forms of worker
organization
signed in
April,
entered into
force in
August.
cleaning services Hilfr.dk. The agreement ensured employee status
for the workers, the minimum hourly rate (EUR 19) and set a welfare
supplement (EUR 3) which the worker uses for sickness, retirement,
holidays etc.322
The company committed to making these workers
employees and bearing their financial risk for their work. The
agreement also stipulates the need for the platform to report income
to the tax authorities.323
In 2019, the parties began evaluating the
agreement and renegotiations are still in place.
Legislation 2020
September
The Danish government put forward a legislative proposal wishing
inter alia to reaffirm the incentive to become self-employed and to
improve the pay compensation – beyond maternity and parental
benefits – during maternity and parental leave. The proposal is
thought to ensure that self-employed (including people working
through platforms) would have equal access to social protection
related to childbirth and care (as workers who are classified as
employed do). Moreover, it guarantees that self-employed would also
be entitled to compensation from the equalisation scheme. Therefore,
people working through platforms would have greater financial
security to, for example, cover the fixed expenses of their business
while on maternity and parental leave. The proposal is not yet
adopted.
Legislation 2020 May Statutory consolidated act no. 674 of 25 May 2020 on the working
environment. The responsibility of monitoring daily and weekly rest
periods of people working through platforms in Denmark lies with
the employer, and the Danish Working Environment Authority
supervises their compliance. The authority can fine employers for not
fulfilling their obligations according to the Working Environment
Act.324
However, if the platform worker is self-employed, the
requirements concerning daily and weekly rest periods must be
fulfilled by the platform worker, if the platform worker is employed
by the platform, the platform has the obligation to ensure that the
platform worker is granted the required rest periods.
Labour inspectorate
and other
administrators
2020
August
In August 2020, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority
(‘DCCA’) argued that, from a competition law point of view, fixed
prices among the self-employed on the Hilfr platform were perceived
to create a ‘price floor’ harming the open price competition. The
review concerning Hilfr was critical, since the platform utilised the
unprecedented approach of leaving the choice of employment status
to the worker. Hilfr had stipulated a minimum hourly fee for the
services of both types of providers and had advertised the minimum
fee for the self-employed workers on the platform, whilst the
minimum fee for the employed was stated in the collective agreement
with the trade union 3F. The DCCA assessed that both types of
providers were in fact undertakings, which meant that those classified
as employed, most likely, did not have the status of employees of
Hilfr from a competition law point of view.325
322 Lsøe, A. & Jesnes, K. (2020). Platform work in the Nordic models. Chapter 5. Collective agreements for platforms and
workers – two cases from the Nordic countries. Retrieved from: https://pub.norden.org/temanord2020-513/#25169
323 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
324 Statutory consolidated act no. 674 of 25 May 2020 on the working environment.
325 A resume of the decision is available in English here: https://www.en.kfst.dk/nyheder/kfst/english/decisions/20200826-
commitment-decision-on-the-use-of-a-minimum-hourly-fee-hilfr/
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The assessment of the DCCA has nevertheless been criticised as a
misguided ruling.326
The case was subsequently settled by Hilfr
committing to ensure that those classified as employed by the
platform would be entitled to the same rights as employees in relation
to competition law, which originally was the intention behind the
conclusion of the collective agreement with 3F.327
The DCCA has
accepted those commitments as satisfactory.328
Collective
agreements and other
forms of worker
organization
2021
February
In the beginning of 2021, the Danish trade union ‘3F’ and the
employers’ organization ‘Dansk Erhverv’ reached a national sectoral
agreement for food delivery services. The agreement is valid from
2021 to 2023 and gives couriers who deliver takeaway meals a
regulated wage, pension, maternity pay, holiday pay and sick pay.
The food delivery platform Just Eat is the first to sign the agreement,
which will take effect for all its couriers later on in the year329
.
ESTONIA
Legislation 2015 The Estonian Tax and Customs Board asked Uber to establish an
automatic earnings declaration system for drivers with people
working through platforms can opt-in to share their earnings made on
Uber directly with the tax office, automatically adding this to their
tax return, simplifying the burden for the worker.330
Legislation 2017
November
The Estonian Parliament amended the Public Transportation Act to
regulate platform-based transportation services. The amendment
requires no professional training from the platform worker, but the
rideshare platforms are responsible for arranging the necessary
instruction. Also as the price for a ride is calculated online, thus taxi
workers on platforms are not required to have a taximeter. A
taximeter is required only of taxis who provide services at a taxi
stand or from the curb and must follow local price limits.331
Legislation 2018 Simplified Business Income Taxation Act reduced the tax burden for
part-time and self-employed. Not explicitly but the category included
people working through platforms in transport, accommodation, and
food delivery sectors. Annual income up to EUR 25,000 is taxed at a
20% rate compared to the regular rate of approximately 50%.332
FINLAND
Legislation 2017-2019 The Act on Transport Services has been updated with new provisions
since 2017. The new additions have included preconditions for
digitalisation and new business concepts in transport, and promoting
competition. Its key aim is provision of customer-oriented transport
services, as it removed taxi permit caps, introduce fare restrictions.
Legislation 2019 The Finnish government has initiated a family leave reform, to
326 Stefano, Valerio and Nicola Countouris, ‘Collective-bargaining rights for platform workers’, Social Europe, 6 October
2020. Available at: https://www.socialeurope.eu/collective-bargaining-rights-for-platform-workers
327 As part of its commitment, Hilfr sought to ensure that there is legal subordination between Freelance Hilfrs and the Super
Hilfrs, and that Hilfr will bear the financial risk for Super Hilfr’s cleaning work through the platform.
328 Ilsøe, Anna et al., ‘Hilfr-aftalen – et nybrud i det danske aftalesystem’, FAOS/WELMA Analysis, 2020, p. 11. Available
at: https://faos.ku.dk/pdf/Hilfr-aftalen___et_nybrud_i_det_danske_overenskomstsystem.pdf
329 Fagbladet 3F (2021) Groundbreaking agreement: Danes can now order takeaways with a clean conscience. Available
online.
330 Senat.fr. (n.d.). Taxation and the collaborative economy: The need for a fair, simple and unified regime. Retrieved from:
http://www2.senat.fr/rap/r16-481-2/r16-481-225.html
331 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
332 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
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increase the duration of paid family leave in a way that gives mothers
and fathers an equal quota of months.333
The Federation of Finnish
Entrepreneurs in the tripartite working group334
is negotiating the
reform has highlighted how the rigidities of the existing family leave
system are challenging for people working as entrepreneurs and self-
employed people working through platforms who might not be able
to take the long leaves from paid work.335
Labour Inspectorate
and other
administrators
2020 Platform work is explicitly included in the Government Strategy for
Tackling the Grey Economy and Economic Crime (2020-2023). In
line with the Government Programme, the strategy aims at reviewing
and clarifying the employment contracts act as well as the application
practices of different authorities concerning light entrepreneurship
and new forms of work The strategy aims to improve the access of
Tax authorities to financial information of companies, especially
expanding the obligation of digital platform economy actors to
provide information. The purpose of the efforts to combat undeclared
work is to improve working conditions, promote labour market
integration and facilitate social inclusion.
Actions taken by
labour inspectorates
and other
administrators
2020
October336
A decision by the Labour Council337
shed some light on the status of
people working through platforms, it concluded that food couriers
may be regarded as employees. The Labour Council came to a
conclusion, which disclosed that algorithmic distribution of gigs
(which is based on worker ratings and execution of delivery)
corresponds to work performed under the employer's direction and
supervision. In other words, the Labour Council perceived that the
Finnish company and the app information on couriers’ execution of
tasks make it possible for the company to supervise couriers in a
rather detailed manner. Although the Council’s statements are not
legally binding, they are considered as having societal importance
because the Council consists of legal experts.338
Further, it was the
first time an authority evaluated the employment status of people
working through platforms.
Collective
agreements and other
forms of worker
organization
2018 Establishment of Justice4Couriers - a campaign by the Finish
working on delivery platforms to improve the working conditions of
couriers and drivers. The campaign demands repeal to pay cuts,
transparent shift allocations, and break spaces for couriers and
drivers, equipment compensations and insurances against illness and
333 Finnish Government ‘Inclusive and competent Finland – a socially, economically and ecologically sustainable society
(2019). The government programme of Prime Minister Sanna Marin’s Government’. Retrieved from:
https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/marin/government-programme ; as well as discussions in the Finnish Parliament
https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/naineduskuntatoimii/kirjasto/aineistot/kotimainen_oikeus/LATI/Sivut/perhevapaauudistus.aspx
334 Ministry of health and social affairs (2020). Family leave reform aims at encouraging both parents to take family leave.
Retrieved from: https://stm.fi/en/reform-aims-to-encourage-both-parents-to-take-family-leave
335 Interview with the Lawyer of the The Finnish Confederation of Professionals (STTK) 16 November 2020.
336 Labour Council (2020). Statement on the application of the Working Hours Act on food couriers working through
Company X. Helsinki: Labour Council. Retrieved from: https://tem.fi/documents/1410877/2191939/TN+1482-
20.pdf/5334691d-7ebc-3a5c-443de79ba7578ccc/TN+1482-20.pdf?t=1602756083049
337 The Labour Council is a tripartite body that operates under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment.
338 There is no immediate government response to this as the government’s programme made in 2019 already states the aim
of revising the Employment Contract Act. It was the regional work inspection authority that made the appeal to the Labour
council to evaluate the labour market status pf platform workers. The Labour council statement is based on the interpretation
of the current law.
111
accidents, and the possibility of an employment contract. The main
targets of the campaign are Foodora and Wolt.339
FRANCE
Legislation 2016
August and
2018
January
Law 2016-1088 legally defined ‘electronic platforms’ by extending
rights to platforms workers, such as the right to create and join a
union, organize and join a strike. It granted rights to people working
through platforms on labour, modernisation of social dialogue and
guarantees for securing of professional careers.340
In January 2018 it was updated that if the worker earns more than
13% of the annual social security ceiling (EUR 5 100) per year
through the platform, the platform must cover worker’s insurance
against occupational accident or illness and cover professional
training or ‘validation of academic credit’ (also recognizing prior
learning) of those workers, and provide a training indemnity.341
Legislation 2018
October
2019
French Law no. 2018-898 introduced a tax code for platforms.
Platforms must provide their tax obligations to users and a link to the
tax office’s website to their users.
2016 amendment to the Finance Act stipulates that from 2019 all
online platforms (whether based in France or abroad and regardless
of area of business) would be obliged to send directly the earnings of
their workers to the tax authorities.342
Legislation 2019 The Bill on Transport Mobility (Loi LOM) was aimed to improve
social rights and working conditions of people working through
platforms in the transportation sector. Platforms can voluntarily
establish a social responsibility charter with guarantees to people
working through platforms such as: freedom of activity, decent
income for each task, improved working conditions, transparency,
prohibition of exclusivity clause and unilateral breaking of contract
without compensation, and provide opportunities for career
development and training. The charter must be approved by the
French administration for it to have a biding legal character.343
Legislation 2018-2020 A major reform to social protection is being implemented between
2018 and 2020. It brings coverage of the self-employed under the
general social protection scheme, limiting the administrative changes
required if a person moves between employment and self-
employment. One of the main aims is to ensure continued social
security coverage throughout peoples’ careers. Other efforts to
simplify payment and filing procedures were also announced, such as
unifying social and tax declarations for the self-employed from 2020.
Actions taken by
platforms
2017-2018 Law in 2016 which introduced the principle of social responsibility
for platforms encouraged many platforms to partner with insurance
companies to offer insurance policies for accident and liability
protection. Uber announced a partnership with AXA in July 2017,
and in May 2018 it declared that it was expanding the partnership on
339 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
340 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
341 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
342 OECD. (2019). Policy Responses to New Forms of Work.
343 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
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a European scale. Deliveroo also entered into a partnership with
AXA in March 2017.344
Actions taken by
platforms
2019-2020 Deliveroo France proposed to bear the expense of medical
teleconsultation and to compensate a 25-euro fee for the purchase of
protective equipment for its riders. However, this means the company
passes on the responsibility to purchase such protective equipment to
the worker.
Deliveroo promised to pay a lump sum of EUR 230 for 14 days of
sick leave for these riders who contracted COVID-19.345
However,
only workers who have made EUR 130/weekly during the last 4
weeks are eligible for this compensation.
Such platform-led initiatives were motivated by the pressure put by
CGT Uber Eats/Deliveroo Lyon trade union on the companies
through strikes and campaigns throughout 2019 and 2020.
GERMANY
Collective
Agreement
2017 German Crowsdsourcing Association, several platforms and
metalworkers’ union (IG Metall) established a join Ombuds Office
dedicated to resolving disputes and issues between people working
through platforms, customers, and platforms (those who have signed
the Crowdsourcing Code of Conduct).346
Collective
Agreement
April 2018 An agreement establishing an SE Works Council in Delivery Hero
(which owns Foodora) was signed in Berlin with the German Food,
Beverages and Catering Union, the Italian Federation of Workers of
Commerce, Hotels, Canteens and Services, and the European
EFFAT, (European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism).
The agreement specifies that each country in which the company is
active must have at least one employee representative in the
'European Company' (SE) works council and the council must be
provided with detailed information about the company’s strategies
which might impact the work organization and employee’s interests.
The agreement specifies that employee representatives can participate
in the supervisory board, where they should be represented in equal
numbers to the stakeholders and will hold the same voting rights.
This agreement applies in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.
Actions taken by
platforms
March
2017
Eight Germany-based platforms signed a Code of Conduct in which
they agree to include local wage standards as a factor in setting prices
on their platforms. First initiated by the Munich-based software
testing platform Testbirds, it was officially supported by the German
Crowdsourcing Association.347
GREECE
Legislation 2017 There are no specific legal provisions aimed at preventing bogus self-
employment (prevalent among people working through platforms) in
Greece. However, the Greek government has implemented reforms
aimed at improving the regulation of dependent self-employment.
Reforms for Laws No. 3144/2003, 3846/2010, and 4387/2016 have
344 Don;t Gig Up! (2020). Final Report. Retrieved from: http://www.dontgigup.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Final-Report-
3.pdf, 14
345 The European Trade Union Confederation. (2020). Red card for platform abuses in the Covid-19 crisis. etuc.org.
Retrieved from: https://www.etuc.org/en/document/red-card-platform-abuses-covid-19-crisis
346 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
347 Garben, S. (2017), 69.
113
clarified employment status and with the 2017 legislation employees
and the self-employed will be covered by common rules for
contribution requirements (a single rate of 20%) and benefits.348
If a
dependent self-employed worker has no more than two clients per
year, social insurance contributions will be paid as if they were an
employee.349
Legislation 2018 Adopted legislation aiming to prevent the presence of ride-sharing
apps and obliging to conclude three-year contracts with taxi owners.
The legislation introduces heavy fines for licensed taxi drivers, as
well as for private vehicle owners, who fail to abide by the rules.350
Legislation
(proposal)
2021 Currently a new law is under preparation regarding labour relations
that will introduce measures for people working through platforms.
With this law, two ways of collaboration for those providing their
services through platforms will be recognized: dependent
employment contracts or independent services/work contracts. Legal
criteria will be provided for the correct classification of the workers.
Most importantly, the providers of independent services would
acquire similar rights to those of employees; it provides for natural
persons associated with these platforms with trade union rights, rights
to establish a trade union organization, negotiate and draft collective
agreements and go on strike. In that way, the rights of workers on
platforms would be protected, regardless of the type of contract that
they are connected with the platform.
HUNGARY
Legislation 2017 In response to development of the digital economy and its effect on
the labour market skills, the Hungarian Government removed some
restrictions towards short courses (under 30 hours) in order to have a
more flexible approach towards such learning.
ITALY
Legislation 2017 Italy’s ‘collaboratori’ category was created with the purpose of
improving access to social protection for those in between
independent contractor and employee status. Unemployment benefit
for ‘collaboratori’ was established in 2017, along with new
protections (for both ‘collaboratori’ and freelance professionals) in
case of ‘maternity, illness or accident, including the possibility to
postpone/suspend or find a suitable replacement for an activity for a
client, subject to agreement with them’.351
Legislation 2018 July The first office in Italy for understanding the issues and providing
information for workers of food delivery platforms was inaugurated
in Milan. The office also provides free training courses on road
safety, safety at work, and basic sanitary rules for food transport.
Legislation 2019 April Following two court cases, Region Lazio promoted the first
348 Heyes, J., & Hastings, T. (2017). The Practices of Enforcement Bodies in Detecting and Preventing Bogus Self-
Employment. ec.europa.eu. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=17971&langId=en, 18
349 Social insurance contributions would be paid in a matter where one-third is paid by the ‘self-employed’ person and two-
thirds by the employer.
350 De Groen, W., Kilhoffer, Z., Lenaerts, K., Smits, I., Hauben, H., Waeyaert, W., Robin-Olivier, S. (2019). Study to gather
evidence on the working conditions of platform workers. Retrieved from:
https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=8280, 103
351 OECD (2019). Policy Responses to New Forms of Work. OECD Publishing, Paris. Retrieved from:
https://www.oecd.org/g20/summits/osaka/g20-policy-responses-to-new-forms-of-work-OECD-2ndEWG%20meeting.pdf, 7
114
(regional) legislative provisions in Italy concerning ‘protection and safety of
digital workers’.352
The Regional Law does not define the specific
contractual status applicable to ‘riders’, but aimed at introducing
rules for protection and safety of people working through
platforms.353
The law established obligations to platforms concerning
safe working conditions and maternity and paternity leave.354
Legislation 2019
November
The Italian Parliament converted a decree into a law which
introduced a special regime for gig workers with provisions for social
protection of self-employed people working on delivery platforms.
The reform aimed to ensure equality of working conditions for self-
employed and in permanent employment. With the new law,
according to Eurofound:355
 The platform must provide to the worker a written
employment contract containing all relevant information for
working conditions and safety and health;
 Social partners can define wages via collective bargaining,
taking into account the platform model of delivery activities
and working conditions;
 In absence of collective bargaining in place for a platform,
the wage cannot solely consist of a remuneration per
delivery. It must have a fixed minimum wage, based on
minimum wage levels established in comparable sectors by
collective bargaining at national level;
 The collective bargaining agreement must also contain
clauses to remunerate night work, weekend and holiday
work, and work during unfavourable weather conditions,
which must be at least 10% higher than the standard pay;
 Workers are protected by anti-discrimination legislation;
 The platform cannot exclude workers or reduce their work
opportunities as consequence of non-acceptance of delivery
proposals sent by the platform;
 Personal data must be protected;
 Self-employed workers have guaranteed access to a social
protection package, including a daily indemnity for illness,
hospital stay, and a guarantee of maternity and parental leave.
The Law came into force November 2020.
Collective Action 2018 May In Bologna a ‘Charter of fundamental digital workers’ rights within
an urban setting’ was signed by the city’s mayor, 4 labour unions and
by two food delivery platforms (Sgnam and MyMenu). The Charter
sets out to ensure a minimal wage for people working through
352 L&E Global. (2019). Italy: First legislative provisions regarding "riders" of the "gig economy" arrive from Region Lazio.
Retrieved from: https://knowledge.leglobal.org/italy-first-legislative-provisions-regarding-riders-of-the-gig-economy-arrive-
from-region-lazio/
353 Ibid.
354 Obligations are specified as follows: ‘a specific obligation to train the ‘digital worker’ in matters of health and safety at
work, in particular, on ‘risks and damages deriving from the exercise of service activities and on prevention and protection
procedures’; the duty to guarantee adequate ‘protection devices’ in compliance with the regulations on health and safety at
work, as well as to provide for the ‘maintenance costs’ of the equipment and tools used for the service activity by ‘digital
workers’; the duty to implement an insurance in favor of the ‘digital worker’ against accidents at work and occupational
diseases, for damages caused to third parties during the performance of the service activity, as well as for the protection of
maternity and paternity and guarantees for remuneration, mandatory ‘preventive and exhaustive information’ to be provided
to the ‘digital worker’. Available at: https://knowledge.leglobal.org/italy-first-legislative-provisions-regarding-riders-of-the-
gig-economy-arrive-from-region-lazio/
355 Eurofound. (2020)
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platforms which is at least equal to workers in a similar sector,
ensures compensation for holidays, bad weather, overtime, bicycle
maintenance, and gives insurance for accidents during work time.
The Charter also guarantees the freedom of association and the right
to strike.356
Collective Action 2020
September
A collective agreement between Assodelivery, the employer
organisation representing the majority of the platforms in the delivery
sector, and UGL, a small Italian trade union, aimed at providing a
regulation of ‘employer-organised work’, in compliance with the
specific regulation of delivery and avoiding the application of
statutory provisions set in the 2015-2019 reforms (for those self-
employed in the delivery sector). The agreement, which specifies that
riders are self-employed workers, has been contested by both the
three major Italian trade union confederations (CGIL, CISL and UIL)
and the Minister of Labour (Circolare no. 17 of 19 November 2020).
The agreement introduced piece-rate remuneration for workers
(which was contested) and had provisions on working time, access to
training, tools and equipment, on predictability and transparency and
health and safety of workers.
Labour Inspectorate
or other
administrators
2021
March
Assodelivery and the three main Italian confederations CGIL, CISL,
UIL and UGL have stipulated at a national level a new experimental
protocol promoted by the Ministry of Labour. This agreement is
aimed at detecting and sanctioning illegal labour intermediation and
labour exploitation in the food delivery sector (Article 603-bis of the
Criminal Code). In an earlier protocol the platforms took the duty to
implement an organizational and management model pursuant to
Legislative Decree no. 231/2001 and to avoid the use of external
companies to supply the requests of delivery to persons that are not
directly engaged by the platform. Moreover, the protocol establishes
an Observatory (‘Organismo di garanzia’) to monitor the conditions
of the sector.
Actions by platforms 2021
February
Uber Eats introduced a protocol to protect the health and safety of its
food delivery riders in Italy, with the provision of free helmets and
other safety devices, the supply of anti-Covid-19 protective
equipment and free training courses.
LATVIA
Legislation 2018 The Latvian government approved regulations for providing
passenger transport services, including via platforms. The rules
require providers of these services to register for a special permit.
LITHUANIA
Legislation 2017 Changes since 2017 have provided additional social protection to the
self-employed, extending unemployment insurance, maternity
benefits and sickness insurance to owners of sole proprietorships and
members of business partnerships.
Legislation 2017-2018 Created a new framework for ridesharing type services. This was
accomplished through amendments to the Road Transport Code.357
The reform came into force in March 2018, regulating platforms such
as Uber and Taxify and set an example of ridesharing law in Europe.
LUXEMBOURG
Legislation 2016 Luxembourg’s Third Industrial Revolution Strategy deals broadly
356 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
357 De Groen et al. (2019), 103
116
with changes in the ‘world of work’ in the digital age, which includes
the possibility of new platform work regulation. Including strategies
to clarify employment status for people working through platforms,
ensure social protection, and expand educational re-skilling and up-
skilling for workers in a digitalized and automated work
environment.358
MALTA
Legislation Maltese law protects self-employed workers who are in practice
equivalent to employees, as the ‘Employment Status National
Standard Order’, stipulates that if an employment relationship fulfils
five of the eight criteria listed in the order359
(e.g. depending on one
person for 75% of the income in one year or using tools provided by
the employer), then such an 'employment relationship' shall be
deemed to be an 'employment' at law.360
NETHERLANDS
Legislation 2020
January
The Committee on the Regulation of Work (Borstlap Committee) in
the Netherlands has advised the government that ‘everything must
focus on reducing the difference between employees, self-employed
and flex workers’361
this indicated some development in legal
provisions concerning platform work. For now no clear steps have
been taken as the government applies existing regulations to online
platform work, which entails a case-by-case determination.
Collective agreement 2018 The platform Temper (matches supply and demand in the hospitality
sector) and a Dutch trade union (FNV) signed a cooperation pact
which provides self-employed Temper workers with training,
pensions, and insurance for one year. Later in the year the pact was
extended including the removal of a fee workers paid for the platform
and more training opportunities.362
Actions taken by
platforms
The platform Happy Helper which matches demand and supply for
cleaning services started providing its workers with trainings to
improve skills in services provided, interpersonal communication and
digital skills necessary for using their platform.363
Case Law 2020 July The ADCU, a trade union for people working through platforms in
the gig economy (backing three UK drivers) and the IAATW
(supporting a fourth driver in Lisbon) launched a legal action in the
358 Rifkin J. et al (2016). The 3rd Industrial Revolution Strategy Study for the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. IMS,
Luxembourg. Retrieved from: https://www.troisiemerevolutionindustrielle.lu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/TIR-Strategy-
Study_Short.pdf, 130
359 A courier could be eligible for a formal employment contract if they: 1) depend on the employer for at least 75% of their
income over a one-year period 2) depend on the employer to determine what work needs to be done and where 3) perform
the work using equipment, tools or equipment provided by employer 4) are subject to a minimum work period established by
the employer 5) cannot sub-contract his work to others as a substitute for himself 6) are integrated in the structure of the
production process, the work organisation or the company’s hierarchy 7) provide a core element in the organisation and
pursuit of company objectives 8) carry out similar tasks to existing employees.
360 Bugeja, T. (2018). Uber And The Platform Economy – A New Hybrid Form Of Employment? - Employment and HR -
Malta. Mondaq. Retrieved from: https://www.mondaq.com/employment-litigation-tribunals/685100/uber-and-the-platform-
economy-a-new-hybrid-form-of-employment
361 Commissie Regulering van Werk (2020). In wat voor land willen wij werken? Naar een nieuw ontwerp voor de
regulering van werk. Retrieved from: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2020/01/23/rapport-in-wat-voor-
land-willen-wij-werken, 23.
362 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
363 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
117
district court in Amsterdam over Uber's failure to respect the digital
rights of drivers and couriers under the GDPR.364
Uber has illegally
blocked workers from accessing all of their personal data at work and
failed to provide workers transparency to algorithmic management
and control of drivers when requested to do so. This arose after Uber
drivers were dismissed allegedly for fraudulent activity on Uber. The
drivers denied the claims, however were not provided access to the
evidence against them, nor allowed to challenge or appeal the
decision to terminate. The unions claim they have evidence that Uber
maintains secret driver and courier profiles which it uses to rate
worker their performance with categories such as 'late arrival/missed
ETA', 'negative attitude' or 'inappropriate behaviour'.365
POLAND
Legislation 2016 In a report by the Commission for the Codification of Labour Law
established the need to elaborate the new individual and collective
Labour code in order to adapt the labour law system to the current
labour and economic conditions in the country – there is a reference
to the legal status of platform work. However, there has been no
legislative action regarding platform work since.
PORTUGAL
Legislation 2017 Changes to Law n.º 63/2013 and Law n.º 55/2017 provide workers
with a speedier court decision recognising the existence of an
employment relationship. In addition, employers may receive a pre-
notification from the labour inspection authority to regularise a bogus
self-employment relationship where one has been detected.
Legislation 2018-2019 The government passed a law which only applies to the transport
sector, obliges platforms to use ‘operators’ as intermediaries between
the platform and the drivers. According to this law, individual drivers
must be contracted by these intermediate operators instead of having
a contract directly with the platforms. Thus introducing an
employment contract between the driver and the operator, even if the
contract constitutes a different relationship. The law introduces
additional material provisions on working conditions (e.g. limited
working hours). Furthermore, Uber drivers, as employees, are
covered by general labour and social protection legislation.
The law entered in to force in 2019.
Other 2020
January
The Institute of Public Affairs has lobbied the Parliament to regulate
the status of people working through platforms366
who, at present, are
classified as self-employed or employed under a civil law contract.367
SLOVAKIA
Legislation 2018 Adopted new tax legislation obliging platforms to provide data on
earned income through personal transport services and
accommodation services.368
The regulation has entered into force.
Legislation 2019 April Adopted legislation which introduced a wider definition for
‘dispatching services’ (Platforms are not considered taxi companies
but dispatchers). The new legislation abolished several requirements
364 ADCU.org. (2020). Uber Drivers Take Unprecedented International Legal Action to Demand Their Data. Retrieved from:
https://www.adcu.org.uk/news-posts/uber-drivers-take-unprecedented-international-legal-action-to-demand-their-data
365 App Drivers and Couriers Union. (2020). Help protect Uber drivers from unfair &amp; hidden algorithmic management.
CrowdJustice. Retrieved from: https://www.crowdjustice.com/case/help-protect-uber-drivers-from/
366 Interview with the Director of the Programme of Social Policy in the Institute of Public Affairs, 28 October 2020.
367 Don't Gig Up! (2020), 12.
368 De Groen, W. et al. (2019), 110.
118
that were previously applied to the taxi business, such as the
requirements to prove financial reliability, to have a proficiency test
or to have a taximeter at all times.369
This new definition removed
most of the requirements for platform drivers that previously were
applied and forced Uber to stop its operations in the country.
In force since April 2019.
SLOVENIA
Legislation 2020
December
Slovenian government adopted a proposal to amend the Road
Transport Act370
in December 2020. This Act establishes a new type
of work, occasional ‘chauffeur service’ (for which a state license is
now obligatory), the abolition of taximeters for taxi drivers, and that
the regulation of taxi services which will be the responsibility of local
communities. The government has legitimated this policy measure as
an opportunity for new transport services, enabling business through
advanced platforms, and more choice and lower prices for users.371
Labour Inspectorate 2014-2017 The labour inspectorate, motivated by campaigns by ZSSS trade
union, sanctioned GoOpti (transportation platform) for
misclassification of the employment status (classified as self-
employed rather than employees). Since 2015, following the
sanctions, the platform subcontracts tasks to transport companies and
still does not employ the drivers. The labour inspectorate’s check in
2017 confirmed that some transport companies hire self-employed
workers contrary to law.
Collective action 2019 Cooperating with other Slovenian trade unions Mladi Plus (union
representing students, pupils, unemployed youth and young
precarious workers since 2011) prevented Uber from entering into the
country through legal action. Platforms such as Wolt, which recently
started operating in Slovenia, are employing people with special
student work agreements or as self-employed workers, because of
that Mladi Plus took initiatives against these platforms and fights for
the recognition of couriers as employees.372
SPAIN
Legislation 2018 July The Spanish government put in place a ‘Strategic Plan for Decent
Work 2018-2020’373
to tackle bogus self-employment and abuses in
temporary and part-time work among other issues. Two immediate
action plans were launched to fight against fraud in temporary and
part-time contracts.
Legislation 2018
December
Through a reform extended social protection and social security
contributions to almost all self-employed, aligning their social
security scheme more closely to that of employees. It increased the
social contributions for the self-employed which allows better access
and conditions for unemployment, also ‘coverage for occupational
risks (benefits relating to accidents at work or occupational diseases),
enhanced benefits for temporary disability due to sickness, improved
work-life balance and maternity protection’.374
369 De Groen, W. et al. (2019), 103
370 Road Transport Act. Available at: http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO4236 (Accessed 14 December 2020).
371 Gole, Nejc, (2020). Na mizi je zakon, ki bi v Slovenijo pripeljal Uber'. Delo, 9.
372 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
373 See more at:
http://www.mites.gob.es/ficheros/ministerio/plandirector/National_Plan_for_decent_work._Executive_Summary_and_first_
outcomes.pdf
374 OECD (2019), 56
119
Legislation 2019
December
The Parliament of the Basque Country Region passed a non-binding
resolution against the precarious work derived from the platform
economy which promotes the regular work and the fight against the
false independent contractors.375
Legislation 2021
May
The Spanish government put in place the first legislation in Europe
that explicitly regulates the status of delivery workers. The ‘Riders
law’ requires digital labour platforms in delivery sector to classify
their couriers as employees, rather than independent contractors. The
law is also introducing the right of information on algorithms.
According to the new provisions, companies must provide (i)
algorithm parameters, and (ii) mathematical formula that have an
impact on the employment relationship with workers.376
Labour Inspectorate
or other
administrators
2017 The labour inspectorate of the autonomous community of Valencia
concluded in December 2017 that Deliveroo riders are employees and
not self-employed as the platform claims. As a result, the platform
was obliged to pay around EUR 161,000 in unpaid social security
contributions.377
Labour Inspectorate
or other
administrators
2018-2020 Developed campaigns targeted at false self-employment in platform
work as part of the Labour and Social Security Inspection Strategic
Plan 2018- 2020, including developing a dedicated operative
procedure, providing specialised training to inspectors and
implementing regional pilot programmes.
Labour Inspectorate
or other
administrators
2019 The Labour inspectorates of Valencia and Madrid held that workers
of Deliveroo and Glovo work in conditions of subordination to the
platform, something that is not compatible with the purported self-
employed status of riders.378
Labour Inspectorate
or other
administrators
2020
October
The Spanish labour inspectorate officially registered 4,066 Amazon
Flex delivery workers who worked as self-employed (which is
considered fraud due to pushing workers into bogus self-
employment). The ruling requires Amazon to pay over EUR 6
million to cover Social Security contributions as the workers have
been illegally classified as freelancers.379
Collective
agreements
September
2018
The Workers General Union (UGT) signed a manifesto of intentions
with the employer organisation of car rental companies with drivers
(VTC), including Cabify (a platform operating in Spain and in 10
other countries). The agreement aimed at ensuring safe working
conditions for all drivers and pushing all platforms, including Uber,
to join. The agreement was proof of shared intentions, but it did not
set any concrete actions, besides starting a social dialogue and setting
up a collective agreement negotiation table for the future.380
Collective action 2020
October
A dialogue between the Spanish Ministry of Employment,
representatives of the employers (Confederation of Employers and
Industries of Spain (CEOE) and Spanish Confederation of Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises (CEPYME)), trade unions (Confederation
375 Beltran, I. & Ruiz, H. (2018).
376 Disposición 7840 del BOE núm. 113 de 2021 (mites.gob.es).
377 Stefano, V. (2018). Platform work and labour protection. Flexibility is not enough. Regulating For Globalization.
Retrieved from: http://regulatingforglobalization.com/2018/05/23/platform-work-labour-protection-flexibility-not-enough/
378 Ibid.
379 Gómez, M. (2020). Spain's Labor Inspectorate forces Amazon to give 4,000 false freelancers work contracts. El Pais.
Retrieved from: https://english.elpais.com/economy_and_business/2020-10-15/spains-labor-inspectorate-forces-amazon-to-
give-4000-false-freelancers-work-contracts.html
380 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
120
of Workers’ Commissions and General Union of Workers (UGT))
took place in October 2020381
to elaborate an act that will regulate
platform work. This initiative started after Supreme Court’s decision
against Glovo which ruled that the platform was not a mere
intermediary, but that there is an employment relationship between
Glovo and its riders. Before this ruling, the Ministry of Employment
had already announced in early 2020 the importance of regulating
people working through platforms. After several claims from workers
and trade unions, the new act should cover all types of platforms.382
SWEDEN
Collective
Agreement
2018 The transportation platform Bzzt and the Swedish Transport
Workers’ Union made a collective agreements which allowed Bzzt
drivers to be covered by the Taxi Agreement. This coverage meant
people working through platforms were given access to the same
standards as traditional taxi drivers (Bzzt drivers are now offered
marginal part-time contracts).383
Collective
Agreement
2021
April
The delivery platform Foodora and Trafikforbundet, the Swedish
Transport Workes’Union signed a collective agreement. According to
the union, the agreement covers all the riders directly employed at
Foodora but not the riders in the Foodora market, so called terminal
workers that are employed by other companies. The coverage means
increased salaries and compensation for bids during certain times;
annual salary increases; compensation for maintenance of bicycles
and work; clothes; pensions and insurances that are in line with
Transport's other collective agreements.384
Actions taken by
labour inspectorates
and other
administrators
The Swedish Public Employment Services started an initiative called
Joblink, intended to be ‘an open, neutral and common platform for all
actors offering digital services such as matching, recruitment and
education’. As there are so many different platforms, the PES says,
Joblink aims to make it easier for jobseekers to find jobs and for
platforms to find workers. It is also an effort to contribute to the
‘digital ecosystem’ by offering a common platform that encourages
all actors (including the Public Employment Service) to share data,
maximising the efficiency of matching and stimulating the creation of
more digital services.
Annex IV: Overview of relevant decisions by national courts or administrative bodies in
EU Member States on the employment status of people working through platforms
Date Court/administ
rative body
Platfor
m
Classificati
on
Conseque
nces
Insta
nce
Appeal Case No./link
Belgium
381 CCOO (2020). Las plataformas digitales deben adaptarse a la legislación laboral’, CCOO, Retrieved from:.
https://www.ccoo.es/noticia:522145--
Las_plataformas_digitales_deben_adaptarse_a_la_legislacion_laboral&opc_id=8c53f4de8f8f09d2e54f19daf8d8ed95
382 UGT, (2020). UGT y CCOO valoramos la reunión de la mesa de diálogo social sobre plataformas digitales’, UGT,
Retrieved from: https://www.ugt.es/ugt-y-ccoo-valoramos-la-reunion-de-la-mesa-de-dialogo-social-sobre-plataformas-
digitales
383 Eurofound. (2020). Platform economy initiatives. Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-
economy/initiatives#industrialaction
384 Foodora och Transport tecknar kollektivavtal | Lag & Avtal (lag-avtal.se) Foodora [EN] – Transport
121
12/9/20
15
Office national
de la sécurité
sociale (ONSS)
[National Social
Security Office]
Uber self-
employed
drivers
responsibl
e for
paying
social
security
contributio
ns
- - Legal expertise
commissioned by
the Secretary of
State for Social
Fraud
23/2/20
18
Commission
Administrative
de règlement de
la relation de
travail (CRT)
[Administrative
Commission for
the Regulation
of Labour
Relations]
Delivero
o
employee reclassific
ation for
social
security
purposes
required
1st overruled
for
procedural
reasons by
the the
Labour
Court on
3/7/2019
116 – FR –
20180209
9/3/201
8
Commission
Administrative
de règlement de
la relation de
travail (CRT)
[Administrative
Commission for
the Regulation
of Labour
Relations]
Delivero
o
employee reclassific
ation for
social
security
purposes
required
1st - 113 – FR –
20180123
16/1/20
19
Tribunal de
l’entreprise
francophone de
Bruxelles
[Brussels
Business Court]
Uber self-
employed
- 1st decision on
appeal by
the Cour
d'appel de
Bruxelles
of
15/1/2021
does not
focus on
questions
of worker
status
R.G. no
A/18/02920
3/7/201
9
Tribunal du
travail
francophone de
Bruxelles
[Brussels
Labour Court]
Delivero
o
- invalidatio
n of the
CRT's
decision
of
9/3/2018
2nd final
decision
pending
R.G.
no 18/2076/A
26/10/2
020
Commission
Administrative
de règlement de
la relation de
travail (CRT)
[Administrative
Commission for
the Regulation
of Labour
Relations]
Uber employee Uber and
the
Belgian
Platform
rider
associatio
n (BPRA)
must both
be seen as
employers
1st appeal
brought by
Uber
before the
Brussels
Labour
Court,
pending
187 – FR –
20200707
Germany
19/9/20
18
Arbeitsgericht
Fulda [Fulda
Labour Court]
[platfor
m
linking
self-
employed
competenc
e of the
Civil
1st upheld by
the Labour
Appeals
4 Ca 278/18
122
bus
driver
and
compan
y]
Court
instead of
the Labour
Court
Court on
14/2/2019
14/02/2
019
Landesarbeitsge
richt Hessen
[Hesse Labour
Appeals Court]
[platfor
m
linking
bus
driver
and
compan
y]
self-
employed
competenc
e of the
Civil
Court
instead of
the Labour
Court
2nd - 10 Ta 350/18
20/2/20
19
Arbeitsgericht
München
[Munich
Labour Court]
Roamler self-
employed
- 1st upheld by
the Labour
Appeals
Court on
4/12/2019
19 Ca 6915/18
4/12/20
19
Landesarbeitsge
richt München
[Munich
Labour Appeals
Court]
Roamler self-
employed
- 2nd overruled
by the
Federal
Labour
Court on
1/12/2020
8 Sa 146/19
1/12/20
20
Bundesarbeitsg
ericht [Federal
Labour Court]
Roamler employee referred
back to
2nd
instance
3rd - 9 AZR 102/20
Denmark
26/8/20
20
Konkurrenceråd
et (Competition
Council)
Hilfr self-
employed
violation
of
competitio
n law by
minimum
pay rates
1st - Konkurrencerådsaf
gørelse den 26.
august 2020
Spain
2/2/201
7
Juzgado
Mercantil de
Madrid [Madrid
Commercial
Court]
Blablaca
r
self-
employed
- 1st SJM M 6/2017
1/2018 Inspección de
trabajo [Labour
Inspection]
Delivero
o
employee retroactive
imposition
of social
security
contributio
ns
1st non-published
decision
2/2018 Inspección de
trabajo [Labour
Inspection]
Glovo employee retroactive
imposition
of social
security
contributio
ns
1st non-published
decision
29/5/20
18
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Barcelona
[Barcelona
Social Court]
Take
Eat Easy
employee reinstatem
ent and
retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
1st 213/2018
123
for
indetermin
ate
duration
1/6/201
8
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Valencia
[Valencia
Social Court]
Delivero
o
employee retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
for
indetermin
ate
duration
1st 244/2018
3/9/201
8
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Madrid [Madrid
Social Court]
Glovo third
category
(TRADE)
- 1st 284/2018
11/1/20
19
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Madrid [Madrid
Social Court]
Glovo third
category
(TRADE)
- 1st overruled
by the
Madrid
Appeals
Court on
27/11/2019
12/2019
11/2/20
19
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Madrid [Madrid
Social Court]
Glovo employee reinstatem
ent and
retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
for
indetermin
ate
duration
1st upheld by
the
Asturias
Appeals
Court on
25/7/2019
53/2019
20/2/20
19
Juzgado de lo
Social de Gijón
[Gijón Social
Court]
Glovo employee reinstatem
ent and
retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
for
indetermin
ate
duration
1st upheld by
the Madrid
Appeals
Court on
3/2/2021
61/2019
25/2/20
19
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Oviedo [Oviedo
Social Court]
Glovo third
category
(TRADE)
- 1st 106/2019
3/4/201
9
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Madrid [Madrid
Social Court]
Glovo employee - 1st 128/2019
4/4/201
9
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Madrid [Madrid
Social Court]
Glovo employee reinstatem
ent and
retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
1st 134/2019
124
for
indetermin
ate
duration
4/4/201
9
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Madrid [Madrid
Social Court]
Glovo employee reinstatem
ent and
retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
for
indetermin
ate
duration
1st upheld by
the Madrid
Appeals
Court on
18/12/2019
130/2019
29/5/20
19
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Barcelona
[Barcelona
Social Court]
Glovo third
category
(TRADE)
- 1st overruled
by the
Cataluña
Appeals
Court on
12/5/2020
202/2019
21/5/20
19
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Barcelona
[Barcelona
Social Court]
Glovo third
category
(TRADE)
- 1st overruled
by the
Cataluña
Appeals
Court on
7/5/2021
205/2019
10/6/20
19
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Valencia
[Valencia
Social Court]
Delivero
o
employee retroactive
imposition
of social
security
contributio
ns
1st 197/2019
11/6/20
19
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Barcelona
[Barcelona
Social Court]
Delivero
o
employee - 1st 193/2019
14/6/20
19
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Salamanca
[Salamanca
Social Court]
Glovo third
category
(TRADE)
- 1st overruled
by the
Castilla
Appeals
Court on
7/5/2020
215/2019
22/7/20
19
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Madrid [Madrid
Social Court]
Delivero
o
employee retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
for
indetermin
ate
duration
1st 188/2019
10/6/20
19
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Asturias
[Asturias
Appeals Court]
Glovo employee - 2nd 1818/2019
30/7/20 Juzgado de lo Delivero employee - 1st 213/2019
125
19 Social de
Barcelona
[Barcelona
Social Court]
o
19/9/20
19
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Madrid [Madrid
Appeals Court]
Glovo third
category
(TRADE)
- 2nd overruled
by the
Supreme
Court on
25/9/2020
715/2019
27/11/2
019
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Madrid [Madrid
Appeals Court]
Glovo employee reinstatem
ent and
retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
for
indetermin
ate
duration
2nd 1155/2019
12/11/2
019
Juzgado de lo
Social de Vigo
[Vigo Social
Court]
Glovo third
category
(TRADE)
- 1st 642/2019
18/11/2
019
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Barcelona
[Barcelona
Social Court]
Glovo employee reinstatem
ent and
retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
for
indetermin
ate
duration
1st 325/2019
27/11/2
019
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Madrid [Madrid
Appeals Court]
Glovo employee - 2nd 1155/2019
18/12/2
019
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Madrid [Madrid
Appeals Court]
Glovo employee - 2nd 714/2019
1/2020 Inspección de
trabajo [Labour
Inspection]
UberEat
s
employee retroactive
imposition
of social
security
contributio
ns
1st non-published
decision
17/1/20
20
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Madrid [Madrid
Appeals Court]
Delivero
o
employee - 2nd pending
appeal
brought by
Deliveroo
before the
Supreme
Court
40/2020
3/2/202
0
Tribunal
Superior de
Glovo employee - 2nd 85/2020
126
Justicia de
Madrid [Madrid
Appeals Court]
17/2/20
20
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Castilla y León
[Castilla
Appeals Court]
Glovo employee retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
for
indetermin
ate
duration
2nd 992/2020
21/2/20
20
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Cataluña
[Catalonia
Appeals Court]
Glovo employee reinstatem
ent and
retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
for
indetermin
ate
duration
2nd 1034/2020
27/4/20
20
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Zaragoza
[Zaragoza
Social Court]
Delivero
o
employee retroactive
imposition
of social
security
contributio
ns
1st 123/2020
7/5/202
0
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Cataluña
[Catalonia
Appeals Court]
Glovo employee reinstatem
ent and
retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
for
indetermin
ate
duration
2nd 1432/2020
12/5/20
20
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Cataluña
[Catalonia
Appeals Court]
Glovo employee - 2nd 1449/2020
11/6/20
20
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Cataluña
[Catalonia
Appeals Court]
Glovo employee - 2nd 2405/2020
16/6/20
20
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Cataluña
[Catalonia
Appeals Court]
Delivero
o
employee - 2nd 2557/2020
7/9/202
0
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Delivero
o
employee reinstatem
ent and
1st 723/2020
127
Barcelona
[Barcelona
Social Court]
retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
for
indetermin
ate
duration
22/9/20
20
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Cataluña
[Catalonia
Appeals Court]
Glovo employee - 2nd 4021/2020
23/9/20
20
Tribunal
Supremo
[Supreme
Court]
Glovo employee retroactive
entitlemen
ts in line
with
contract
for
indetermin
ate
duration
3rd 4746/2019
10/2020 Inspección de
trabajo [Labour
Inspection]
Amazon
Flex
employee retroactive
imposition
of social
security
contributio
ns
1st non-published
decision
18/11/2
020
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Barcelona
[Barcelona
Social Court]
Delivero
o
employee retroactive
imposition
of social
security
contributio
ns
1st 259/2020
20/11/2
020
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Santander
[Santander
Social Court]
Glovo employee retroactive
imposition
of social
security
contributio
ns
1st 289/2020
30/11/2
020
Tribunal
Superior de
Justicia de
Madrid [Madrid
Appeals Court]
Glovo employee - 2nd 1052/2020
12/1/20
21
Juzgado de lo
Social de
Barcelona
[Barcelona
Social Court]
Delivero
o
employee retroactive
imposition
of social
security
contributio
ns
1st not yet published
France
1/6/201
5
Conseil de
Prud’hommes
de Paris [Paris
Labour Court]
LeCab self-
employed
competenc
e of the
Business
Court
instead of
Labour
1st upheld by
the Paris
Appeals
Court on
7/1/2016
RG n° F14/7887
128
Court
7/1/201
6
Cour d’appel de
Paris [Paris
Appeals Court]
LeCab self-
employed
competenc
e of the
Business
Court
instead of
Labour
Court
2nd - RG n° 15/06489
5/9/201
6
Conseil de
Prud’hommes
de Paris [Paris
Labour Court]
Delivero
o
self-
employed
- 1st upheld by
the Paris
Appeals
Court on
9/11/2017
RG n° F15/0164
17/11/2
016
Conseil de
Prud’hommes
de Paris [Paris
Labour Court]
Take
Eat Easy
self-
employed
- 1st upheld by
the Paris
Appeals
Court on
20/4/2017
RG n° F16-04592
14/12/2
016
Tribunal des
affaires de
sécurité sociale
(TASS) de Paris
[Paris Social
Security Court]
Uber - (Social
Security
Administrat
ion's claim
for
reclassificat
ion rejected
for
procedural
reasons)
- 1st pending
appeal
brought by
the
URSSAF
(Social
Security
Administra
tion)
RG n° 16-03915
20/12/2
016
Conseil de
Prud’hommes
de Paris [Paris
Labour Court]
LeCab employee retroactive
obligation
to grant
wages,
reimburse
ment of
profession
al
expenses,
overtime
supplemen
ts,
compensat
ion for
disguised
employme
nt
1st upheld by
the Paris
Appeals
Court on
13/12/2017
RG n° 14/16389
20/12/2
016
Conseil de
Prud’hommes
de Paris [Paris
Labour Court]
LeCab employee retroactive
obligation
to grant
wages,
reimburse
ment of
profession
al
expenses,
overtime
supplemen
ts,
compensat
ion for
disguised
1st upheld by
the Paris
Appeals
Court on
13/12/2017
RG n° 14/11044
129
employme
nt and
unlawful
dismissal
24/1/20
17
Conseil de
Prud’hommes
de Paris [Paris
Labour Court]
Take
Eat Easy
self-
employed
- 1st upheld by
the Paris
Appeals
Court on
12/10/2017
RG n° F16/00407
30/1/20
17
Tribunal de
commerce de
Paris [Paris
Business Court]
Uber self-
employed
no
condemnat
ion of
Uber for
unfair
competitio
n by
circumven
ting social
law
1st decision on
appeal by
the Cour
d'appel de
Paris of
12/12/2019
(n°
17/03541)
does not
focus on
questions
of worker
status
RG n°
2014054740
20/4/20
17
Cour d’appel de
Paris [Paris
Appeals Court]
Take
Eat Easy
self-
employed
- 2nd overturned
by the
Supreme
Court on
28/11/2018
RG n° 17/00511
12/10/2
017
Cour d’appel de
Paris [Paris
Appeals Court]
Take
Eat Easy
self-
employed
- 2nd - RG n° 17/03088
9/11/20
17
Cour d’appel de
Paris [Paris
Appeals Court]
Delivero
o
self-
employed
- 2nd - RG n° 16/12875
13/12/2
017
Cour d’appel de
Lyon [Lyon
Appeals Court]
LeCab employee retroactive
obligation
to grant
wages,
reimburse
ment of
profession
al
expenses,
overtime
supplemen
ts,
compensat
ion for
disguised
employme
nt
2nd - RG n° 17/00351
13/12/2
017
Cour d’appel de
Lyon [Lyon
Appeals Court]
LeCab employee retroactive
obligation
to grant
wages,
reimburse
ment of
profession
al
expenses,
overtime
2nd - RG n° 17/00349
130
supplemen
ts,
compensat
ion for
disguised
employme
nt and
unlawful
dismissal
29/1/20
18
Conseil de
Prud’hommes
de Paris [Paris
Labour Court]
Uber self-
employed
- 1st - RG n° F16/11460
24/5/20
18
Tribunal
correctionnel de
Lille [Lille
Criminal Court
]
Clic and
Walk
self-
employed
- 1st overturned
by the
Douai
Appeals
Court on
4/2/2020
RG n°
16040000134
28/6/20
18
Conseil de
Prud’hommes
de Paris [Paris
Labour Court]
Uber self-
employed
- 1st overturned
by the
Paris
Appeals
Court on
10/1/2019
RG n° 17/04674
28/11/2
018
Cour de
cassation
[Supreme
Court]
Take
Eat Easy
employee referred
back to
2nd
instance
3rd - Arrêt n°1737 (17-
20.079)
10/1/20
19
Cour d’appel de
Paris [Paris
Appeals Court]
Uber employee referred
back to 1st
instance
2nd upheld by
the
Supreme
Court on
28/11/2018
RG n° 18/08357
8/3/201
9
Conseil de
Prud’hommes
de Lyon [Lyon
Labour Court]
Uber self-
employed
- 1st upheld by
the Lyon
Appeals
Court on
16/1/2021
RG n° 19/08056
4/2/202
0
Conseil de
Prud’hommes
de Paris [Paris
Labour Court]
Delivero
o
employee entitlemen
ts in line
with
employme
nt contract
of
indetermin
ate
duration;
indemnity
for
wrongful
dismissal
1st pending
appeal
brought by
Deliveroo
RG nº 19/07738
10/2/20
20
Cour d’appel de
Douai [Douai
Appeals Court]
Clic and
Walk
employee criminal
responsibil
ity of the
company
and its
manager
for
disguised
2nd pending
appeal
brought by
Clic and
Walk
RG nº 19/00137
131
employme
nt,
imposition
of fines
4/3/202
0
Cour de
cassation
[Supremen
Court]
Uber employee referred
back to
2nd
instance
3rd - Arrêt n° 374 (19-
13.316)
16/1/20
21
Cour d’appel de
Lyon [Lyon
Appeals Court]
Uber self-
employed
- 2nd RG n° 19/08056
Ireland
8/10/20
18
Tax Appeals
Commissioner
Domino
s Pizza
employee upheld by
the High
Court on
20/12/2019
23TACD2018
20/12/2
019
High Court Domino
s Pizza
employee pending
appeal
brought by
Dominos,
hearing set
for
20/7/2021
IEHC 894 [2019
No. 31 R]
Italy
7/5/201
8
Tribunale di
Torino [Turin
Civil Court]
Foodora self-
employed
- 1st overturned
by the
Appeals
Court on
11/1/2019
RG n. 4764/2017
10/9/20
18
Tribunale di
Milano [Milan
Civil Court]
Glovo self-
employed
- 1st - RG n. 6719/2017
11/1/20
19
Corte di
Appello di
Torino [Turin
Appeals Court]
Foodora third
category
(lavoro
etero-
organizzato
)
retroactive
obligation
to pay
wages in
line with
the
collective
agreement
for the
logistics
and freight
transport
sector, but
no
protection
against
unlawful
dismissal
2nd upheld (in
essence) by
the
Supreme
Court on
24/1/2020
RG n. 468/2018
24/1/20
20
Corte di
Cassazione
[Supreme
Court]
Foodora third
category
(lavoro
etero-
organizzato
)
retroactive
obligation
to pay
wages in
line with
the
collective
agreement
for the
logistics
3rd - RG n. 11629/2019
132
and freight
transport
sector, but
no
protection
against
unlawful
dismissal
20/11/2
020
Tribunale di
Palermo
[Palermo Civil
Court]
Glovo employee retroactive
rights in
accordanc
e with
employme
nt contract
concluded
for
indetermin
ate
duration
(consideri
ng
applicable
collective
agreement
);
reinstatem
ent and
compensat
ion for
unlawful
dismissal
1st pending
appeal
brought by
Glovo
RG n. 7283/2020
24/11/2
020
Tribunale di
Palermo
[Palermo Civil
Court]
Glovo employee retroactive
rights in
accordanc
e with
employme
nt contract
concluded
for
indetermin
ate
duration
(consideri
ng
applicable
collective
agreement
);
reinstatem
ent and
compensat
ion for
unlawful
dismissal
1st RG n. 7283/2020
31/12/2
020
Tribunale di
Bologna
[Bologna Civil
Court]
Delivero
o
employee
or third
category
(lavoro
etero-
organizzato
applicabili
ty of OSH
standards
1st RG n. 2949/2019
133
)
10/1/20
21
Tribunale di
Firenze
[Florence Civil
Court]
Delivero
o
self-
employed
or third
category
(lavoro
etero-
organizzato
)
non-
applicabili
ty of
prohibitio
n of anti-
union
behaviour
1st RG n. 2425/2020
24/2/20
21
Ispettorato
territoriale del
lavoro di
Milano [Milan
Labour
Inspectorate]
Just Eat,
Glovo,
Uber
Eats,
Delivero
o
third
category
(lavoro
etero-
organizzato
)
retroactive
obligation
to pay
wages and
social
security
contributio
ns; fines
for
violation
of health
and safety
standards
1st pending
appeal
brought by
Glovo and
Just Eat
before the
Administra
tive Court
Verbali di
accertamento
The Netherlands
23/7/20
18
Rechtbank
Amsterdam
[Amsterdam
Civil Court]
Delivero
o
self-
employed
- 1st - CV EXPL 18-
2673
15/1/20
19
Rechtbank
Amsterdam
[Amsterdam
Civil Court]
Delivero
o
employee applicabili
ty of the
collective
agreement
for the
road
transport
and
haulage
sector
(separate
judgment:
CV EXPL
18-14762)
1st upheld by
the
Appeals
Court on
16/2/2021
CV EXPL 18-
14763
1/7/201
9
Rechtbank
Amsterdam
[Amsterdam
Civil Court]
Helpling self-
employed
Helpling
to be
classified
as
placement
agency for
self-
employed
workers
and thus
prohibited
from
charging a
commissio
n from
workers
1st pending
appeal
brough by
the trade
union
before the
Appeals
Court
CV EXPL 18-
23708
23/6/20
20
Gerechtshof
Amsterdam
[Amsterdam
Helpling - plaintiff
permitted
to amend
2nd - 200.268.510/01
134
Appeals Court] and extend
appeal
against the
Amsterda
m Civil
Court's
decision
of
1/7/2019
16/2/20
21
Gerechtshof
Amsterdam
[Amsterdam
Appeals Court]
Delivero
o
employee - 2nd pending
appeal
brought by
Deliveroo
before the
Hoge Raad
[Supreme
Court]
200.261.051/01
2/2021 Inspectie
Sociale Zaken
en
Werkgelegenhei
d (SZW)
[Labour
Inspection]
Temper employee Report
classifying
the
platform
as
temporary
work
agency
1st - -
Sweden
18/6/20
18
Förvaltningsrätt
en i Stockholm
[Stockholm
Administrative
Court]
Cool
Compan
y
self-
employed
No
responsibil
ity of Cool
Company
for health
and safety
standards
1st upheld by
the
Administra
tive
Appeals
Court on
30/10/2019
Mål nr 3944-17
30/10/2
019
Kamarrätten i
Stockholm
[Stockholm
Administrative
Appeals Court]
Cool
Compan
y
self-
employed
No
responsibil
ity of Cool
Company
for health
and safety
standards
2nd Mål nr 5725-18
9/10/20
20
Arbetsmiljöverk
et [Work
Environment
Authority]
TaskRu
nner
employee TaskRunn
er obliged
to comply
with OSH
standards
1st - 2019/062973
13/10/2
020
Arbetsmiljöverk
et [Work
Environment
Authority]
Tiptapp
AB
employee Tiptapp
AB
obliged to
comply
with OSH
standards
1st - 2020/000125