Henvendelse af 18/5-21 vedr. overholdelse af IMO's maritime sikkerhedskrav, fra Lederne Søfart

Fra: Jens Marquard Sørensen [mailto:jms@lho.dk]
Sendt: 18. maj 2021 14:12
Emne: Lederne Søfart - til beslutningen om at sende et orlogsfartøj til Guineabugten.
Af uransagelige årsager har FM ikke fået os med i høring på dette forslag, som vi iøvrigt bakker op
om generelt, men med forslag til en forebyggende indsats til gavn for handelsflåden. Derfor
kommer dette forslag til forbedring, men med den klare opfattelse at forsvarsminister Trine
Bramsens forslag og udspil er godt.
Vi ved at man kan styrke det danske bidrag betydeligt hvis man også tager disse tre tiltag med.
Forslag
1 - Søværnet skal sikre at IMO’s maritime sikkerheds krav overholdes
Danske skibe og udenlandske skibe skal overholde IMO/FN’s eksisterende
sikkerhedskrav i højrisikozonen.
Lederne Søfart mener at en dansk tilstedeværelse har som sekundær mission at højne
handelsfartøjernes sikkerheds niveau, og indsamle viden om hvilke udfordringer dette skaber. Det
skal bruges til at tage nye relevante diplomatiske og sikkerheds initiativer i fremtiden, samt være
med til at danne danmarks næste antipirateri strategi.
Erfaringen fra Somalia og andre maritime sikkerheds problemer er, at en succesfull indsats også
skal have en effektiv civil anti-pirateri strategi. Som bekendt stoppede Somalisk pirateri uden at der
nogensinde var en indsats i land. I stedet stoppede pirateriet, fordi handelsfartøjerne ganske enkelt
ikke kunne tages længere - det blev forsvært. Den gængse opfattelse om at løsningen lå i land, viste
sig ikke at være rigtig. I stedet var en effektiv forebyggende indsats på havet for handelsfartøjer og
offshorefartøjer afgørende - det ødelagde forretningen for piraterne der derfor stoppede kort efter.
Hvor om dette er krævende og situations bestemt, er der minimums krav som stadig ikke er
overholdt i Guineabugten.
Ved Guineabugten er der desværre mange handelsfartøjer, som ikke overholder de sikkerheds krav
som IMO har sat - nærmere beskrevet i “BMP 5”, “BMP West africa” og ophøjet til dansk lov i
BEK nr 1084 af 23/11/2011 “Bekendtgørelse om teknisk forskrift om forholdsregler til
forebyggelse af pirateri og væbnede overfald på danske skibe” (alle tre er vedhæftede). Disse har til
hensigt at gøre det svært og måske umuligt at udføre succesfulde pirat angreb. Herunder bla. At
man skal vurdere om det er vigtigt at sejle ind i området, eller man blot ikke skal sejle ind.
Desværre vælger nogle skibe samt få rederier stadigt ikke at overholde disse krav. Hvilket er
pointeret af flere uafhængige analyser bureauer, som en af grundende til at piraterne har succes i
Guineabugten.
Skibe der flager Dannebrog
En succesfull indsats fra dansk side, bør derfor inkludere at inspicere danske handelsfartøjer inden
de sejler ind i højrisiko zonen. Her kan et dansk Orlogsfartøj rådgive Dansk flagende skibe, og i
særlige tilfælde agere myndig og stoppe skibene fra at sejle ind (ved tilfælde hvor man vurderer at
det er uforsvarligt at sejle ind i højrisiko zonen, og man ikke lever op til dansk lov). Erfaringerne er
Forsvarsudvalget 2020-21
B 295 - Bilag 2
Offentligt
også at Dannebrog gør sig bedre som attraktivt flag for rederier, når den danske stat tager initiativer
der slår sikkerheds niveauet for danske skibe fast.
Udenlandske skibe
Ved udenlandske skibe, kan et dansk Orlogsfartøj selvsagt ikke agere myndighed i internationalt
farvand, men overfor danske rederier der bruger udenlandske flag kan man evt. komme med
anbefalinger til rederiet.
Dernæst er det stadigt muligt at indsamle information om skibe der sejler ind i højrisiko zonen uden
at leve op til IMO’s krav. Et Dansk Orlogsfartøj bør derfor indsamle viden struktureret om dette.
Den viden kan f.eks. vise om der er er nogle rederier og flagstater, der er særligt dårlige til at
overholde IMO’skrav. Denne viden bør indgå i en diplomatisk mission, hvor Danmark som maritim
stormagt bruger sin indflydelse til at påpege overfor andre lande at de skal overholde IMO’s krav,
og den samme viden, kan også deles med kyststaterne, såfremt man er sikker på at den ikke vil blive
delt med organiserede pirat netværk - der som bekendt har kontakter til lokale korrupte
myndigheder.
2 - Vurderinger af angreb mod pirater
Væbnede aktioner skal vurderes lokalt ombord
Ved tidligere indsatser, har det vist sig at være en udfordring at afklare hvornår en indsats skulle
vurderes politisk, eller militærfagligt ombord. Det har været et problem, når Dannebrog flagende
skibe skulle have assistance fra et dansk Orlogsfartøj. Lederne søfart anbefaler derfor at
Forsvarsministeriet, laver en tydelig retningslinje for Søværnet - inden missionens påbegyndelse -
der afklarer hvilke angreb, indsatser osv. der er militærfagligt “sagsbehandling” ombord og
foretages af chefen på et dansk orlogsfartøj, og hvilke der skal have politisk godkendelse fra
embedsmænd i ministeriet, ministeren og evt. folketinget. Her bør man tage højde for at en
vurdering skal tages på ganske få minuter og til tider sekunder, hvis et dansk skib skal have
assistance, en embedsmands eller politisk vurdering af truslen kan i sagens natur, ikke foretages i
Danmark da muligheden for at assistere med en væbnet aktion kan forsvinde.
3 - IMO’s skibssikkerheds kode skal opdateres.
IMO’s sikkerheds kode skal genvurderes, for den er mest skabt til bekæmpelse
af terrorister.
ISPS koden der er IMO/FN’s sikkershedskode, stammer fra tiden efter 11/9. Den er derfor baseret
på et trusselsbillede, hvor terrorisme var den største maritime sikkerhedstrussel. Desværre er pirateri
ikke en stor del af koden. Lederne Søfart mener at Danmark som verdens 5 største søfartsnation,
skal tage initiativ til at koden opdateres og inkludere klare tiltag der skal forebygge fremtidige
pirateri problemer og skal genvurdere jævnligt ud fra et eksisterende trusselsbillede, frem for et
politisk perspektiv.
Bekymringer
Endeligt har det vagt opmærksomhed, at Frømandskorpsets ledelse, stadig møder kritik i offentlige
medier. Vi undre os over, om dette kan få negativ indflydelse på om Frømandskorpset bliver klar til
en indsats.
Jens Marquard Sørensen
Næstformand i bestyrelsen
Dir. +45 22489824 |
Mail jms@ledernesoefart.dk | Vermlandsgade 65, 2300 København S
Med venlig hilsen
Jens Marquard Sørensen
Næstformand for Lederne Søfart
Mail jms@lho.dk | Vermlandsgade 65, 2300 København S
Følg os på sociale medier:


1
Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime
Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea
Best
Management
Practices
–
BMP5
BMP5
Produced and supported by:
Forsvarsudvalget 2020-21
B 295 - Bilag 2
Offentligt
BMP5
Best Management Practices to Deter
Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in
the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean
and Arabian Sea
Published by
Witherby Publishing Group Ltd
4 Dunlop Square
Livingston, Edinburgh, EH54 8SB
Scotland, UK
Tel No: +44 (0) 1506 463 227
Fax No: +44 (0) 1506 468 999
Email: info@emailws.com
Web: www.witherbys.com
Legal Notice
BMP5 has been developed purely as guidance to be used at the user’s own risk. No responsibility is accepted by the
Authors, their Members or by any person, firm, corporation or organisation for the accuracy of any information in BMP5 or
any omission from BMP5 or for any consequence whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from applying or relying upon
guidance contained in BMP5 even if caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care.
Copyright notice
The Authors of BMP5 have provided BMP5 free of charge. All information, data and text contained in BMP5 whether in
whole or in part may be reproduced or copied without any payment, individual application or written license provided
that:
• It is used only for non-commercial purposes; and
• The content is not modified
Exceptions:
The permission granted above permits the photographs to be used within the whole or part of BMP5. The permission
does not extend to using the photographs separately outside of BMP5 as these photographs belong to a third party.
Authorisation to use the photographs separately from BMP5 must first be obtained from the copyright holders, details of
whom may be obtained from the Authors.
Logos and trademarks are excluded from the general permission above other than when they are used as an integral part
of BMP5.
Version 5 published June 2018
Authors: BIMCO, ICS, IGP&I Clubs, INTERTANKO and OCIMF
iii
Contents
The fundamental requirements of BMP iv
Section 1 Introduction 1
Section 2 The threat 4
Section 3 Threat and risk assessment 6
Section 4 Planning 8
Section 5 Ship Protection Measures 11
Section 6 Reporting 21
Section 7 Ships under attack 23
Annex A Contact details 33
Annex B Maritime security charts 35
Annex C Common understanding 36
Annex D UKMTO reporting forms 38
Annex E Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa reporting forms 40
Annex F Additional guidance for vessels engaged in fishing 47
Annex G Additional advice for leisure craft, including yachts 49
Annex H Definitions and abbreviations 50
Annex I Supporting organisations 53
Annex J Voyage reference card 69
iv
The fundamental requirements of
BMP
Understand the threat
• Maritime threats are dynamic.
• Obtaining current threat information is critical for risk assessment and decision making.
Conduct risk assessments
• Companies must conduct risk assessments.
• Identify ship protection measures.
Implement ship protection measures
• Harden the ship.
• Brief and train the crew.
• Enhanced lookout.
• Follow Flag State and military guidance.
Report
• Report to UKMTO and register with MSCHOA.
• Report incidents and suspicious activity.
• Send distress signal when attacked.
Cooperate
• Cooperate with other shipping and military forces.
• Cooperate with law enforcement to preserve evidence.
• Cooperate with welfare providers.
1
Section 1
Introduction
Seafarers have encountered different security threats when operating ships in the Red Sea,
the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.
The purpose of this publication is to help ships plan their voyage and to detect, avoid, deter,
delay and report attacks. Experience has shown application of the recommendations in this
publication makes a significant difference to the safety of seafarers.
Piracy-specific Best Management Practice (BMP), international navies and capacity building
ashore have helped to suppress piracy. However, Somali piracy has not been eradicated and
remains a threat.
The BMP contained in this publication mitigates the risk from piracy and other maritime
security threats.
Regional instability has introduced other maritime security threats, which include:
• Deliberate targeting of ships by extremist groups.
• Collateral damage arising from regional conflict.
BMP piracy measures are effective, but differences in attack methods from other threats may
require other forms of mitigation. For example, attacks carried out by extremists may be
more determined, as they may be willing to risk their lives.
The consequences of not adopting effective security measures can be severe. Some pirates
have subjected hostages to violence and other ill treatment and periods of captivity for
some hijacked seafarers have lasted for several years. Other attacks have demonstrated an
intent to damage ships and endanger life.
The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (www.ukmto.org) and Maritime Security
Centre – Horn of Africa (www.mschoa.org) websites should be consulted for advice.
See annex A for contact details.
This BMP complements piracy guidance in the latest International Maritime Organization
(IMO) MSC Circulars (see www.imo.org) and advice on the Maritime Security Transit
Corridor.
Nothing in this BMP detracts from the Master’s overriding authority
and responsibility to protect their crew, ship and cargo.
2
Geographical area
The geography of the region is diverse and ranges from narrow choke points such as the
Bab el Mandeb (BAM) Straits and the Strait of Hormuz to the wide-open ocean of the Somali
basin. Each area presents different challenges and threats will vary.
Attacks on ships and seafarers have taken place throughout the region. Threats are dynamic;
information should be sought from the organisations listed in annex A.
Voluntary Reporting Area
The UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is identified on maritime security charts such as
UKHO Q6099. Ships entering and operating within the VRA are encouraged to register with
the UKMTO. Registration establishes direct contact between the reporting ship and UKMTO.
MSCHOA vessel registration area
The MSCHOA vessel registration area is designed to inform military counter piracy forces of
the transit of merchant ships in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. The MSCHOA vessel
registration area is defined on maritime security chart Q6099.
High Risk Area
A High Risk Area (HRA) is an industry defined area within the VRA where it is considered that
a higher risk of attack exists, and additional security requirements may be necessary. The
HRA is outlined on maritime security chart Q6099. It is important the latest information on
current threats is used when planning routes through the HRA. Ships should be prepared to
deviate from their planned route at short notice to avoid threats highlighted by navigation
warnings or by military forces.
Maritime Security Transit Corridor
The Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) is a military established corridor upon which
naval forces focus their presence and surveillance efforts. The MSTC is shown on maritime
security chart Q6099 and the figure below and consists of:
• The Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).
- The IRTC is not a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) but an established transit corridor
in the Gulf of Aden where naval forces focus their counter piracy patrols. Within the
IRTC, group transits and national convoys may be offered.
• The BAM TSS and the TSS West of the Hanish Islands.
• A two-way route directly connecting the IRTC and the BAM TSS.
It is recommended that ships use the MSTC to benefit from the military presence and
surveillance.
3
Joint War Committee listed area
The insurance community may list an area of perceived enhanced risk in the region. Ships
entering the area would need to notify their insurers and additional insurance premiums
may apply. The Joint War Committee (JWC) comprises underwriting representatives from
both Lloyd’s and the International Underwriting Association representing the interests of
those who write marine hull war business in the London market. The geographic limits of the
JWC listed area can be found on their website: www.lmalloyds.com/lma/jointwar.
4
Section 2
The threat
As well as piracy, regional instability has introduced new security threats including the use
of:
• Anti-ship missiles.
• Sea mines.
• Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIED).
Piracy
Pirates operate in Pirate Action Groups (PAG) who operate several different boat
configurations, typically using small high speed (up to 25 knots) open boats or skiffs.
PAG boat configurations include:
• Skiffs only.
• Open whalers carrying significant quantities of fuel and often towing one or more attack
skiffs.
• Motherships, which include merchant ships and fishing vessels but, more commonly,
dhows.
Where motherships are used the crew are often held onboard as hostages. Motherships are
used to carry pirates, stores, fuel and attack skiffs to enable pirates to operate over a much
larger area and are significantly less affected by the weather. Attack skiffs are often towed
behind motherships. Where the size of the mothership allows, skiffs may be carried onboard
and camouflaged.
Pirates may use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) to intimidate Masters
of ships to reduce speed or stop to allow them to board. The bridge and accommodation
tend to be the main targets for these weapons.
Pirates use long lightweight ladders, knotted climbing ropes or long hooked poles to climb
up the side of the ship. Once onboard they will make their way to the bridge to try to take
control of the ship. When on the bridge they will demand the ship slows/stops to enable
other pirates to board.
Attacks can take place at any time – day or night – however experience shows attacks at
dawn and dusk are more likely.
5
The intent of Somali pirates is to hijack the ship and hold the crew for ransom. The usual
practice is to keep the crew onboard as negotiations progress, keeping both the crew and
the ship together. Seafarers have occasionally been separated by nationality and taken
ashore. It is in the interests of the pirates to keep their captives alive, although cases of
intimidation and torture have occurred.
Anti-ship missiles
Anti-ship missiles are long range, accurate and powerful weapons and have been used
against military ships in the region. Their use against merchant ships associated with
regional conflict cannot be discounted. Other ships may be hit if the missile controller
targets the wrong ship or the missile homes in on an unintended target.
Sea mines
Sea mines have been used to deter and deny access to key ports in Yemen. These mines
are usually tethered or anchored but may break free from moorings and drift into shipping
lanes. Transiting merchant ships are not a target and it is recommended ships use the MSTC
when passing through the area.
Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
WBIED attacks have been used against warships and merchant ships in the southern Red
Sea/BAM/western area of the Gulf of Aden.
Incidents have highlighted attacks by different groups operating in the region:
• WBIED used in the regional conflict have been aimed at harming those associated with
the conflict. These boats have been unmanned and operated remotely.
• WBIED used by extremists have been aimed at merchant ships. These boats have been
manned.
An attack involving a WBIED is likely to involve one or more speed boats operated by a
number of individuals approaching and firing both small arms and RPGs. Masters should
recognise the intent of these attacks is to cause damage and not necessarily to board the
ship. Mitigation measures to prevent the speed boat making contact with the ship’s hull are
limited.
6
Section 3
Threat and risk assessment
Threat assessment
The threat assessment must include all regional security threats.
As part of every ship risk assessment prior to transit through the HRA the latest military
threat advice must be obtained from UKMTO www.ukmto.org and threat assessments
from MSCHOA www.mschoa.org (see annex A).
A threat is formed of capability, intent and opportunity.
Capability means attackers have the physical means to conduct an attack. Intent is
demonstrated by continued attacks. Opportunity is what is mitigated by the company, ship
and crew through application of the measures described in this guidance. In addition to the
information provided in this guidance, supplementary information about the characteristics
of the threat, specific or new tactics, and regional background factors may be sought from
regional reporting centres and organisations as listed in annex A.
If one side of the triangle is removed, then risk is minimised. The company/Master cannot
influence either capability or intent, therefore BMP measures focus on minimising the
opportunity.
7
Risk assessment
Risk assessment is an integral part of voyage planning within a safety management system.
The risk assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery,
which will mean combining statutory regulations with supplementary measures. Companies
should also take account of these measures for ships transiting the VRA even if they do not
enter the HRA.
Further guidance on risk assessments can be found in the Global Counter Piracy Guidance
at www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org.
The risk assessment must consider but may not be limited to:
• Requirements of the Flag State, company, charterers and insurers.
• The threat assessment and geographical areas of increased risk.
• Background factors shaping the situation, e.g. traffic patterns and local patterns of life,
including fishing vessel activity.
• Cooperation with military. An understanding of presence should be obtained from
UKMTO.
• The embarkation of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP).
• The ship’s characteristics, vulnerabilities and inherent capabilities, including citadel and/
or safe muster points to withstand the threat (freeboard, speed, general arrangement,
etc.).
• The ship’s and company’s procedures (drills, watch rosters, chain of command, decision
making processes, etc.).
All voyages in this region require thorough advanced planning using all available
information. The maritime threats are dynamic, and it is therefore essential that a detailed
threat and risk assessment is completed for each voyage and activity within the region.
8
Section 4
Planning
Company planning
Together with the following, the output of the risk assessment will help develop the ship’s
voyage plan:
• Regular review of the threat and risk assessments. Plans should be updated as necessary.
• Review of the Ship Security Assessment (SSA), Ship Security Plan (SSP) and Vessel
Hardening Plan (VHP).
• Guidance to the Master about the recommended route, updated plans and requirements
for group transits and national convoys.
• Company mandated Ship Protection Measures (SPM).
• Due diligence of Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) for the possible use of
PCASP.
• Companies should consider the placement of hidden position transmitting devices as one
of the first actions of hijackers is to disable all visible communication and tracking devices
and aerials.
• Review of company manning requirements. Consider disembarking of non-essential crew.
• Crew training plans.
Information security
To avoid critical voyage information falling into the wrong hands the following is advised:
• Communications with external parties should be kept to a minimum, with close attention
paid to organising rendezvous points and waiting positions.
• Email correspondence to agents, charterers and chandlers should be controlled and
information within the email kept concise, containing the minimum that is contractually
required.
9
Ship Master’s Planning
Prior to entering the Voluntary Reporting Area
• Obtain the latest threat information.
• Check the latest NAVAREA warnings and alerts.
• Implement VRA/MSCHOA vessel registration and reporting requirements as highlighted in
section 6 and annexes D and E.
• If used, confirm PCASP embarkation plan.
• Confirm propulsion can operate at full speed.
Prior to entering the High Risk Area
• Implement security measures in accordance with the SSP.
Brief crew and conduct drills
The crew should be fully briefed on the preparations and drills should be conducted with
the SPM in place. The plan should be reviewed and all crew briefed on their duties, including
familiarity with the alarm that signals an attack, an all-clear situation and the appropriate
response to each. The drills should test:
• The SPM, including testing the security of all access points.
• Lock down conditions, including crew safety considerations.
• The bridge team’s security knowledge.
• The crew’s understanding of any different actions required in the event of a pirate attack
compared to other types of attack.
Other considerations
• Prepare and test an emergency communication plan. Masters are advised to prepare an
emergency communication plan, to include all essential emergency contact numbers
(see annex A) and prepared messages, which should be at hand or permanently displayed
near all external communications stations including safe muster point and/or the citadel.
Communication devices and the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) should be tested.
• Define the ship’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) policy. It is recommended that AIS
should remain switched on throughout passages through passages through the VRA and
HRA, to ensure militaries can track the ship, but restrict data to ship’s identity, position,
course, speed, navigational status and safety related information.
• Reschedule planned maintenance on voyage critical equipment for transit of an HRA.
Security is a key part of any voyage plan.
10
On entering the High Risk Area
• Submit ship reports as highlighted in section 6 and annexes D and E.
• Monitor latest threat information.
• Ensure all access points are limited and controlled.
• Avoid drifting, waiting, anchoring and slow steaming, particularly in the MSTC.
• Minimise use of VHF and use email or a secure satellite telephone instead. Where possible
only answer known or legitimate callers on the VHF, bearing in mind that imposters are
possible.
11
Section 5
Ship Protection Measures
This section highlights proven SPM that provide layered protection. The BMP is based on
regional experience of attacks and will continue to evolve as methods change.
The implementation of SPM will be identified during the voyage planning process.
Companies may wish to consider making further alterations to the ship beyond the scope
of this BMP, and/or providing additional equipment and/or personnel as a means of further
reducing the risk of attack.
Watch keeping and enhanced vigilance
The Master should implement the following actions to assist in raising vigilance on board.
• Provide additional, fully-briefed lookouts.
• Maintain an all-round lookout from an elevated position.
• Consider shorter rotation of the watch period to maximise alertness of the lookouts.
• Maintain sufficient binoculars for the enhanced bridge team, preferably anti-glare.
• Consider the use of thermal imagery optics and night vision aids as they provide a reliable
all-weather, day and night surveillance capability.
• Maintain a careful radar watch and monitor all navigational warnings and
communications, particularly VHF and GMDSS alerts.
• Consider placing well-constructed dummies at strategic locations around the ship to give
the impression of greater numbers of crew on watch.
Primary layer of defence
Good look out/vigilance.
Razor wire.
Manoeuvring.
Speed/freeboard.
PCASP.
Secondary layer of defence
Door hardening.
Gate/grate.
Motion sensor/CCTV.
Last layer of defence
Internal door hardening.
Citadel/safe muster point.
Communication.
12
• Consider using CCTV and fixed search lights for better monitoring. Fixed search lights can
deter approaches from the stern.
• Mount anti-piracy mirrors on the bridge wings to make looking aft easier.
Manoeuvring
The Master and officers should practice manoeuvring the ship to ensure familiarity with
the ship’s handling characteristics. The Master should also practice avoidance manoeuvres
while maintaining the best possible speed. Experience has shown that such action can
defeat even a lengthy and determined attack as creation of hydrostatic pressure can have a
better defensive impact than speed.
Alarms
The ship’s alarms inform the ship’s crew that an attack is underway and warn the attacker
that the ship is aware and is reacting. In addition, continuous sounding of the ship’s whistle
may distract the attackers.
It is important that:
• The alarms are distinctive to avoid confusion.
• Crew members are familiar with each alarm, especially
those warning of an attack and indicating ‘all clear’.
• All alarms are backed up by an announcement over the
accommodation and deck PA system, where fitted.
• Drills are carried out to ensure that the alarm is heard
throughout the ship. The drill will confirm the time
necessary for all crew to move to a position of safety.
An effective lookout is the most effective method of ship
protection. It can help identify a suspicious approach or attack
early on, which allows defences to be deployed.
Avoidance manoeuvres should only be practiced when it is
safe to do so.
13
Physical barriers
Physical barriers are intended to make it as difficult as possible for attackers to gain access
to ships by increasing the difficulty of the climb for those trying to illegally board. When
planning the placement of barriers special consideration should be given to ships with
sunken poop decks.
Razor wire
Also known as barbed tape. It creates an effective barrier if properly rigged and secured. The
quality of razor wire varies considerably and lower quality razor wire is less effective. The
following is recommended:
• Use a high tensile concertina razor wire with coil
diameters of 730mm or 980mm. This is difficult to
cut with hand tools.
• Use a double roll. If this is not possible, place
a single high-quality roll outboard of the ship’s
structure.
• Secure razor wire to the ship properly, to prevent
attackers pulling the wire off. For example, attach
at least every third wire ring to ship’s railings and
rig a steel cable through its core.
• Use personal protective equipment and wire
hooks to move and install razor wire.
• Obtain razor wire in short sections, e.g. 10m, so
that it is easier and safer to move.
• Keep razor wire clear of mooring fairleads when
at terminals so that it does not interfere with
mooring operations.
14
Other physical barriers
Other barriers have proven effective – from hanging
swinging obstacles over the gunnels to specifically
designed overhanging protection that prevents illegal
boarding by climbing over the ship’s rails.
Water spray and foam monitors
• The use of water spray and/or foam monitors is
effective in deterring or delaying any attempt to
illegally board a ship. The use of water can make
it difficult for an unauthorised boat to remain
alongside and makes it significantly more difficult
to climb aboard.
• It is recommended hoses and foam monitors
(delivering water) are fixed in position to cover likely
access routes and are remotely operated. Manual
activation is not recommended as this may place the operator in an exposed position.
• Improved water coverage may be achieved by using fire hoses in jet mode and using baffle
plates fixed a short distance in front of the nozzle.
• Water cannons deliver water in a vertical sweeping arc and protect a greater part of the
hull.
• Water spray rails with spray nozzles produce a water curtain covering larger areas.
• Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a ship’s standard fire fighting equipment
stock. Foam is disorientating and very slippery.
• The use of all available fire and general service pumps may be required to ensure all
defences operate efficiently.
• Additional power may be required when using pumps; the supporting systems should be
ready for immediate use.
• Practice, observation and drills are required to ensure the equipment provides effective
coverage of vulnerable areas.
15
Enhanced bridge protection
The bridge is usually the focal point of an attack. In some situations, attackers direct their
weapon fire at the bridge to intimidate the ship’s crew to slow or stop the ship. If pirates
board the ship, they usually make for the bridge to enable them to take control.
The following enhancements may be
considered:
• Bridge windows are laminated but further
protection against flying glass can be
provided by the application of blast
resistant film.
• Fabricated metal (steel/aluminium) plates
for the side and rear bridge windows and
the bridge wing door windows, which can
be quickly secured in place in the event of
an attack can greatly reduce the risk of injury from fragmentation.
• Chain link fencing can be used to reduce the effects of an RPG.
• Sandbags can provide additional protection on the bridge wings. They should be regularly
checked to ensure that they have not degraded.
Control of access to accommodation and machinery spaces
It is important to control access routes to the accommodation and machinery spaces to
deter or delay entry. Effort must be directed at denying access to these spaces.
• Escape routes must remain accessible to seafarers in the
event of an emergency.
• Where the door or hatch is located on an escape route
from a manned compartment, it is essential it can be
opened from the inside. Where the door or hatch is locked
it is essential a means of opening the door from the inside
is available.
16
• Doors and hatches providing access to the bridge, accommodation
and machinery spaces should be properly secured to prevent them
being opened from the outside.
• Once doors and hatches are secured, a designated and limited
number are used for security patrols and routine access. The use
of these doors or hatches should be controlled by the Officer of the
Watch.
• Block external stairs or remove ladders on the accommodation block to prevent use and
to restrict external access to the bridge.
• Doors and hatches that must be closed for watertight integrity should be fully dogged
down in addition to any locks. Where possible, additional securing mechanisms, such as
wire strops, may be used.
• Removable barriers should be used around pilot boarding points so that a ship does not
need to de-rig large areas prior to arrival at ports.
• Pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The fitting of
steel bars to portholes and windows will prevent this.
• Procedures for controlling access to accommodation, machinery spaces and store rooms
should be briefed to the crew.
• The attackers must be denied access to ship propulsion.
Safe muster points and/or citadels
The company risk assessment and planning process should identify the location of a safe
muster point and/or a citadel within a ship.
Safe muster points
A safe muster point is a designated area chosen to provide maximum physical protection to
the crew and will be identified during the planning process.
If the threat assessment identifies risks that may result in a breach of hull on or below the
waterline then a safe muster point above the waterline must be identified. In many ships, the
central stairway may provide a safe location as it is protected by the accommodation block
and is above the waterline.
17
To minimise the effect of an explosion, consideration should be given to the likely path of
the blast. The safe muster point should be selected with this in mind.
Citadels
A citadel is a designated area where, in the event of imminent boarding, all crew may seek
protection. A citadel is designed and constructed to resist forced entry. The use of a citadel
cannot guarantee a military or law enforcement response.
Well-constructed citadels with reliable communications (ideally satellite phone and VHF)
must be supplied with food, water and sanitation. Control of propulsion and steering can
offer effective protection during an attack. If citadels are used, they must complement, not
replace, all other SPM.
The use of the citadel must be drilled and the SSP should define the conditions and
supporting logistics for its use.
It is important to note that military forces are likely to apply the following criteria before
boarding a ship:
• All the crew must be accounted for and confirmed in the citadel.
• Two-way communication with the citadel.
The Master should decide when to use the citadel.
18
Other measures
Closed circuit television
Once an attack is underway it may be difficult to
assess whether the attackers have gained access
to the ship. The use of CCTV coverage allows a
degree of monitoring of the progress of the attack
from a less exposed position. Some companies
can monitor and record the CCTV from ashore,
which will be of value when provided to the military. The following should be considered:
• CCTV cameras for coverage of vulnerable areas, particularly the poop deck and bridge.
• CCTV monitors located on the bridge and at the safe muster point/citadel.
• CCTV footage may provide useful evidence after an attack and should be retained.
Lighting
Lighting is important and the following is recommended:
• Weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing lighting on the
poop deck to demonstrate awareness.
• If fitted, search lights ready for immediate use.
• Once attackers have been identified or an attack commences, over side lighting, if fitted,
should be switched on. This will dazzle the attackers and help the ship’s crew to see them.
• At night, only navigation lights should be exhibited.
• Navigation lights should not be switched off at night as this a contravention of
international regulations and the risk of collision is higher than that of being attacked.
• At anchor, deck lights should be left on as well-lit ships are less vulnerable to attack.
• The ability to turn off all internal accommodation lights to deter pirates from entering or
disorientate those who may already have entered.
Deny the use of ship’s tools and equipment
It is important to secure ship’s tools or equipment that may be used to gain entry to the ship.
Tools and equipment that may be of use to attackers should be stored in a secure location.
Protection of equipment stored on the upper deck
• Consideration should be given to providing ballistic protection to protect gas cylinders or
containers of flammable liquids.
• Excess gas cylinders should be stored in a secure location or, if possible, landed prior to
transit.
19
Private Maritime Security Companies
This section provides guidance on the employment of PMSCs. PMSCs may offer armed or
unarmed services. Further guidance on the use of armed services (PCASP) is given below.
BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of PMSCs onboard merchant ships;
this is a decision taken by individual ship operators where permitted by the ship’s Flag State
and any littoral states. However, the use of experienced and competent unarmed PMSCs
can be a valuable protective measure, particularly where there may be the requirement
to interface and coordinate with local law enforcement agencies, naval forces and coast
guards.
Any decision to engage the services of a PMSC should consider:
• The current threat and risk environment.
• The output of the company risk assessment.
• Voyage plan requirements.
• Ship speed.
• Freeboard.
• Type of operations, e.g. seismic survey or cable laying.
• Levels of protection provided by navies, coastguards and maritime police.
Some Flag States do not allow the deployment of PMSC.
It is recommended that shipping companies only employ PMSCs who are accredited to
the current ISO 28007-1:2015 Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC)
providing privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board ships.
A PMSC contract must:
• Be between the technical manager and the PMSC.
• Not prejudice the ship’s insurance cover arrangements.
• Ensure the PMSC has insurance policies that are current and compliant with the
requirements of the contract.
• Clearly identify the procedure for the use of force.
• Confirm the Master’s overriding authority.
Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
Any decision to engage the services of PCASP should consider the guidance above for PMSC as
well as the following.
BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of PCASP onboard merchant ships; this
is a decision taken by individual ship operators where permitted by the ship’s Flag State and
any littoral states.
20
Some Flag States do not allow the deployment of PCASP. Some Flag States provide military
Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) instead of PCASP. A VPD may be provided by another
State, subject to Flag State approval. In some cases, the deployment of either PCASP or VPDs
must be reported and acknowledged by the Flag State and reported when entering the VRA
(see section 6 and annexes D and E).
Master’s overriding authority
If private security contractors are embarked, there must be a clear understanding of the
overriding authority of the Master.
The Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) under which the PCASP operate must be acceptable to
the Flag State and the company.
The Master and PCASP should:
• Clearly understand and acknowledge the RUF as outlined in the contract.
• Have documentation authorising the carriage of weapons and ammunition.
• Ensure all incidents involving the use of weapons and armed force are reported at the
earliest instance to the Flag State and the Chief Security Officer (CSO).
The PCASP must:
• Act in accordance with the agreed RUF, which should provide for a graduated, reasonable,
proportionate and demonstrably necessary escalation in the application of force in
defence of crew on the ship.
PCASP should only be used as an additional layer of mitigation
and protections and not as an alternative to other measures.
The decision to carry PCASP is an output of the company risk
assessment and a ship that traverses the HRA without PCASP
on board can be considered in full compliance with the BMP. The
ship’s crew must not handle or use firearms.
Companies must check the credentials and licenses/permits of
the PMSC, and where appropriate the PCASP, to ensure they have
been issued by an appropriate authority and are operating legally
against identified threats.
21
Section 6
Reporting
All ships are strongly encouraged to inform military organisations of their movement as this
is essential to improve military situational awareness and their ability to respond. Once ships
have commenced their passage it is important this reporting continues and the guidelines in
this section and annexes C, D and E are adopted to ensure common understanding. The two
principal military organisations to contact are the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)
and Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA).
UKMTO
UKMTO acts as the primary point of contact for merchant ships and their CSOs, providing
liaison with military forces in the region. UKMTO administers the Voluntary Reporting
Scheme, under which merchant ships are encouraged to send regular reports. These
include:
1. Initial report (upon entering the VRA).
2. Daily reports (update on ship’s position, course and speed).
3. Final reports (upon departure from VRA or arrival in port).
4. Reports of suspicious/irregular activity (when necessary).
UKMTO is able to communicate with ships and CSOs directly, in order to disseminate
Warnings and Advisories of incidents within the region:
• Warnings: Simple messages describing that an incident has occurred in a Lat/Long and
with a time. This is normally accompanied by direct UKMTO-to-ship telephone calls to all
ships within a nominated radius of the incident to give ships the earliest possible alert.
• Advisories: This is the next tier of alerts to ships, normally of sightings/reports that are
relevant within the region.
UKMTO offers regular information to ships on its website www.ukmto.org and in a weekly
report summarising the previous week’s activity. UKMTO is also able to offer Masters and
CSOs the opportunity to conduct drills and exercises to support their passage planning
in the region. Companies that are interested can contact UKMTO +44(0)2392 222060 or
watchkeepers@ukmto.org.
Ships and their operators should complete both UKMTO vessel
position reporting forms and register with MSCHOA.
22
MSCHOA
The MSCHOA is the planning and coordination centre for the EU Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR).
MSCHOA encourages companies to register their ships’ movements before entering the HRA
and if participating in the group transit system via their website www.mschoa.org.
When departing the VRA, ships should be aware of adjacent regional reporting requirements,
e.g.: NATO Shipping Centre (Mediterranean – Chart Q6010) and ReCAAP Information Sharing
Center/Singapore Information Fusion Center (SE Asia – Chart Q6012).
EU NAVFOR and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) produce Industry Releasable Threat
Assessments (IRTAs) to aid risk management for companies. The threat assessments use
military knowledge and intelligence to present a common understanding of the threats and
trends in the region. The IRTAs are complimented by Industry Releasable Threat Bulletins
(IRTBs), which cover specific events. These documents are an important resource and
should be considered as part of the threat and risk assessment process.
The role of the seafarer in improving maritime safety and security in the
region
Although some of the maritime threats and crimes committed do not directly endanger
seafarers there is the opportunity for them to contribute to maritime security.
Experience has shown that maritime security cannot be improved by the actions of law
enforcement agencies and militaries alone; seafarers operating in the region can help. This
is more important in the seas off the coast of Somalia and Yemen where navies, coastguards
and law enforcement agencies have limited resources.
Masters are encouraged to report suspicious activity and provide as much detail as possible.
If it is possible to do so without compromising safety, photographs, video and radar plot
data of suspicious activity are of enormous value to the responsible authorities. If there is
any doubt as to whether the activity is suspicious, ships are encouraged to report.
Reporting suspicious activity to UKMTO
UKMTO can advise on the types of activity of interest to the regional maritime community.
A guide to help identify suspicious activity is in annex C and the suspicious/irregular
activity report is in annex D. Often, seafarers do not report suspicious activity as they may
be concerned observations could lead to further investigations by Port States and possible
delay to the ship. UKMTO will forward information received in an anonymised form to
the most appropriate agency empowered to act. While suspicious activity may appear
inconsequential, when added to other reports it may be extremely valuable.
23
Section 7
Ships under attack
General
A ship may come under attack with little or no warning. Effective lookouts, both visual and
radar, will help to ensure early detection.
Piracy attack
Pirates carrying weapons do not usually open fire until they are very close to the ship, e.g.
within two cables.
Use whatever time available, no matter how short, to activate any additional protective
measures and plans. This will make it clear to the attackers that they have been seen, the
ship is prepared and will resist attempts to board.
Approach stage
Effective lookouts may aid in identifying the nature of the attack, the threat profile of a piracy
or other attack may initially look similar and it will not be until the attackers are close that
the nature of the attack becomes apparent. In all cases, the following steps should be taken:
• If not already at full speed, increase to maximum to open the distance.
• Steer a straight course to maintain a maximum speed.
• Initiate the ship’s emergency procedures.
• Activate the emergency communication plan.
• Sound the emergency alarm and make an attack announcement, in accordance with the
ship’s emergency communication plan.
• Make a mayday call on VHF Ch. 16. Send a distress message via the Digital Selective
Calling (DSC) system and Inmarsat-C, as applicable.
• Activate the SSAS.
• Report the attack immediately to UKMTO (+44 2392 222060) by telephone.
• Ensure the AIS is switched on.
In the event of a suspicious approach, or if in any doubt, call
UKMTO without delay.
24
• Activate water spray.
• Ensure that all external doors and, where possible,
internal public rooms and cabins are fully secured.
• All crew not required on the bridge or in the engine
room should muster at the safe muster point or
citadel as instructed by the Master.
• When sea conditions allow, consider altering course
to increase an approaching skiff’s exposure to wind/
waves.
• Sound the ship’s whistle/foghorn continuously to
demonstrate to any potential attacker that the ship
is aware of the attack and is reacting to it.
• Check Vessel Data Recorder (VDR) is recording.
• PCASP, if present, will take agreed actions to warn off attackers.
Attack stage
As the attackers get close the following steps should be taken:
• Reconfirm all ship’s crew are in the safe muster point or citadel as instructed by the
Master.
• Ensure the SSAS has been activated.
• If not actioned, report the attack immediately to UKMTO (+44 2392 222060) by
telephone.
• As the attackers close in on the ship, Masters should commence small alterations of helm
whilst maintaining speed to deter skiffs from lying alongside the ship in preparation for a
boarding attempt. These manoeuvres will create additional wash to impede the operation
of the skiffs.
• Large amounts of helm are not recommended, as these are likely to significantly reduce a
ship’s speed.
• Check VDR data is being saved.
• PCASP, if present, will conduct themselves as governed by the RUF.
Actions on illegal boarding
If the ship is illegally boarded the following actions should be taken:
• Take all way off the ship and then stop the engines.
• All remaining crew members to proceed to the citadel or safe muster point locking all
internal doors on route.
• PCASP, if present, will follow procedures agreed with company and Master.
• Ensure all crew are present in the citadel or safe muster point. This includes the Master,
bridge team and PCASP.
25
• Establish communications from the citadel with UKMTO and your company and confirm
all crew are accounted for and in the citadel or safe muster point.
• Stay in the citadel until conditions force you to leave or advised by the military.
• If any member of the crew is captured it should be considered that the pirates have full
control of the ship.
If control of the ship is lost
• All movement should be calm, slow and very deliberate. Crew members should keep their
hands visible always and comply fully. This will greatly reduce the risk of violence.
Experience has shown that the pirates will be aggressive, highly agitated and possibly under
the influence of drugs or alcohol.
DO be patient.
DO keep mentally active/occupied.
DO keep track of time.
DO reduce stress where possible by remaining physically active.
DO remain calm and retain dignity.
DO be positive (remember, authorities are working tirelessly to release you).
DO remember to leave any CCTV or audio recording devices running.
DO exactly what the attackers ask and comply with their instruction.
DO NOT take photographs.
DO NOT attempt to engage attackers.
DO NOT make movements which could be misinterpreted as being aggressive.
DO NOT be confrontational.
DO NOT resist.
26
Hijack – hostage situation
The model of pirate action off Somalia is to hijack the ship and hold the crew for ransom. It
should be remembered it is in the interests of the pirates to keep the ship and crew safe.
Each company or organisation should have a policy in place to cover the eventualities of
kidnap and ransom. The following principles serve as guidelines to surviving a kidnapping.
DO remain calm and maintain self-control.
DO be humble and respectful to the pirates.
DO look out for your colleagues’ well-being.
DO stay together as a team, where possible.
DO accept the new pirate leadership.
DO maintain the hierarchy of rank.
DO try to establish normal communication with the pirates.
DO maintain personal hygiene.
DO save water and essentials.
DO be positive – many people are working to release you.
DO be patient and maintain routines (including your spiritual needs, as permitted by
pirates).
DO try to keep your breathing regular.
DO meditate and keep mentally active.
DO respect religion: yours, your colleagues’ and the pirates’.
DO NOT offer resistance.
DO NOT argue with pirates or your colleagues.
DO NOT take photographs.
DO NOT hide valuables.
DO NOT react emotionally.
DO NOT take drugs or alcohol.
DO NOT bargain with pirates for personal privileges.
27
In the event of military intervention
Brief and prepare the ship’s crew to cooperate fully during any military action onboard and
instruct crew as follows.
Attack from other threats
• Anti-ship missiles In the event or warning of a missile attack military advice should be
followed. If no warning is received there will be no time to take any mitigations beyond
a PA warning to the crew if a missile is spotted. It is unlikely merchant ships will be the
intended target; Masters should be aware of the ship plot in their immediate vicinity and, if
sea room allows, keep clear of naval and associated ships.
• Sea mines Ships should avoid all published or identified mine danger areas and maintain
close liaison with military authorities. If operating close to mine danger areas, Masters
should be aware tethered mines may break free and drift into shipping lanes. Ships should
manoeuvre clear of floating objects and the forward area of the ship should be kept clear
of crew. Effective lookouts are essential. Specific advice on self protective measures when
operating in mine danger areas can be obtained from UKMTO.
• WBIED attack In the early stages of the attack it may not be possible to differentiate
between a piracy or WBIED attack. Initial actions as highlighted in this guidance for the
approach stage of a piracy attack should be
followed. Military threat assessments may
indicate areas where one type of attack is more
likely than another. A speed boat with multiple
people onboard is unlikely to be a WBIED as
these are usually unmanned or have a solitary
occupant.
WBIED attacks may result in a breach of the
ship’s hull. The use of the safe muster point is
recommended before entering a citadel located
below the waterline.
DO keep low to the deck and cover head with both hands.
DO keep hands visible.
DO be prepared to be challenged on your identity.
DO cooperate fully with military forces.
DO NOT make movements that could be interpreted as aggressive.
DO NOT take photographs.
DO NOT get involved in activity with military forces unless specifically instructed to.
Courtesy of the US Naval Institute
28
If a WBIED is anticipated, the time to react is very short. The figure below gives an example
of possible reaction times.
The threat and risk assessment will identify areas where these threats occur which, if
successful, may result in an explosion (commonly referred to as a blast). The Master
should communicate to the crew prior to entering a threat area what position to take if a
blast threat is detected. The Master may consider telling the crew to:
• Lie flat on the deck, as this may minimise exposure and may reduce the impact on the
body from the blast.
• Adopt a brace position (arms/legs bent, hands holding onto something solid and feet
firmly planted on the deck) to protect personnel from shock waves.
• Move away from a particular area, such as the port side, starboard side, poop deck or
engine room.
Post a WBIED attack
• Ensure all crew and PCASP are accounted for.
• Send distress signal.
• Survey area where the blast occurred.
• Implement damage control.
• Call CSO and UKMTO.
29
Post incident actions and reporting
The period following an attack will be difficult as companies, Master and crew recover from
the ordeal. It is important that seafarers receive timely and proper medical assessments,
both physical and mental, and care following an attack or hostage situation. Companies
should have emergency management plans in place to manage the effects from an attack
from any of the identified threats on one of their ships. These plans should include the
management of a long, drawn-out hostage negotiation situation, including support for the
families of the kidnapped crew.
To give the investigating authorities the best chance of apprehending the perpetrators, it is
important that evidence is preserved in the correct manner. Companies, Masters and crew
should refer to IMO Guidelines on Preservation and Collection of Evidence A28/ Res. 1091
and other industry guidance.
Following any attack or suspicious activity, and after initial reporting of the event, it is vital
that a detailed report is completed. A copy of the report should be sent to the company,
the Flag State and appropriate authorities. It is important that any report is detailed and
comprehensive. This will assist with full analysis and trends in threat activity.
Without supporting evidence, including witness statements from those affected by the
incident, suspects are unlikely to be prosecuted.
Protection of evidence
The Master and crew can protect a crime scene until the nominated law enforcement agency
arrives by following these basic principles:
• Preserve the crime scene and all evidence if possible.
• Avoid contaminating or interfering with all possible evidence – if in doubt, do not touch
and leave items in place.
• Do not clean up the area, including hosing it down. Do not throw anything away, no
matter how unimportant it may seem.
• Take initial statements from the crew.
• Take photographs of the crime scene from multiple viewpoints.
• Protect VDR for future evidence.
• Make a list of items taken (e.g. mobile phones with numbers).
• Facilitate access to the crime scene and relevant documentation for law enforcement
authorities.
• Make crew available for interview by law enforcement authorities.
The collection and protection of evidence is critical.
30
Investigation
The quality of the evidence provided and the availability of the crew to testify will
significantly help any investigation or prosecution that follows.
Following any attack or incident the investigating authority will be determined by external
factors including:
• Flag State.
• Ownership.
• Crew nationality.
The lead law enforcement agency will talk to the Master and crew to understand the
sequence and circumstances of the event.
In a post hostage situation, law enforcement authorities may ask to conduct post-release
crew debriefs and to collect evidence for investigations and prosecutions following captivity.
Advice
INTERPOL has a secure website to provide support to ship operators who have had their
ships hijacked. INTERPOL’s Maritime Task Force can assist in taking the appropriate steps
to preserve the integrity of the evidence left behind at the crime scene. INTERPOL has a
Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC) that supports any of the 188-member countries
faced with a crisis or requiring urgent operational assistance. The CCC operates in all four of
INTERPOL’s official languages (English, French, Spanish and Arabic) and is staffed 24 hours a
day, 365 days a year. It is recommended that ship operators contact INTERPOL within three
days of a hijacking of their ship.
INTERPOL may also be consulted to discuss the recommended practices for the
preservation of evidence that could be useful to law enforcement agents pursuing an
investigation. Contact details are: email os-ccc@interpol.int; telephone +33 472 44 7676.
Thorough investigation using all available evidence is critical.
Seafarers should always be treated with respect and as victims of
crime.
31
Seafarer welfare
Seafarers and their families often have difficulty in expressing the need for assistance or
even recognising that they need assistance following exposure to a security threat. The
company should monitor the health, both physical and mental, of those exposed to piracy
and other maritime security threats and if necessary provide independent support and other
assistance, as may be appropriate. There is a range of humanitarian programmes aimed
at assisting seafarers and their families effected by piracy or maritime crime, including the
International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network and The Mission to Seafarers. See
www.seafarerswelfare.org and www.missiontoseafarers.org.
32
33
Annex A
Contact details
Emergency contacts
United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations
Email watchkeepers@ukmto.org
Telephone (24hrs) +44 2392 222060
Website www.ukmto.org
Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa
Email postmaster@mschoa.org
Telephone +44 1923 958545
+44 1923 958700
Fax +44 1923 958520
Website www.mschoa.org
US Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping
Email cusnc.ncags_bw@me.navy.mil
Telephone (24hrs) +973 3904 9583
Telephone (office) +973 1785 1023
Useful contacts
International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
Email piracy@icc-ccs.org
Telephone +60 3 2031 0014
Fax +60 3 2078 5769
Telex MA34199 IMBPC1
Website www.icc-ccs.org
INTERPOL
Email os-ccc@interpol.int
Telephone (24hrs) +33 472 44 76 76
Website www.interpol.int
34
Adjacent regional reporting centres
Mediterranean
NATO Shipping Centre
Email info@shipping.nato.int
Telephone (24hrs) +44 1923 956574
Fax +44 1923 956575
Website www.shipping.nato.int
South East Asia
ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre
Email info@recaap.org
Telephone +65 6376 3063
Fax No +65 6376 3066
Singapore Information Fusion Centre
Email ifc_do@defence.gov.sg
Telephone +65 9626 8965 (24/7)
+65 6594 5728
Fax No +65 6594 5734
35
Annex B
Maritime security charts
Maritime security charts contain safety-critical information to assist bridge crews in the
planning of safe passages through high risk areas. All information has been gathered by the
UKHO through work with NATO and other government organisations, ensuring each chart has
the most accurate, up-to-date and verified information available.
Each maritime security chart includes:
• Information about dangers to the security of navigation including piracy, terrorism,
embargoes, mine warfare, exclusion zones, blockades and illegal fishing. This information,
when used alongside official navigational charts, can help to ensure the safety of ships,
crew and cargo.
• General security advice, self-protective measures, security procedures and regional
contacts, as well as routeing and reporting requirements implemented by military or
security forces.
36
Annex C
Common understanding
It is important to have a common understanding when reporting attacks and suspicious
activity.
The following are guidelines to assist in assessing what is an attack or what constitutes
suspicious activity.
Attacks
• The use of violence against the ship, its crew or cargo, or any attempt to use violence.
• Unauthorised attempts to board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are
pirates or other unauthorised persons.
• If weapons or RPGs are fired.
• Attempts to place a WBIED against the hull.
• Sighting of missile firing.
• An actual boarding, whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not.
• Attempts to overcome the SPM using:
- Ladders.
- Grappling hooks.
- Weapons deliberately used against or at the ship.
Suspicious activity
• The number of crew onboard relative to its size.
• The Closest Point of Approach.
• The existence of unusual and non-fishing equipment onboard, e.g. ladders, climbing
hooks or large amounts of fuel.
• One vessel towing multiple skiffs or has skiffs onboard.
• The type of vessel is unusual for the current location.
• Small boats operating at high speed.
• If a vessel appears unmanned.
• The vessel is not transmitting on AIS.
• The vessel is not flying a Flag.
• Vessel is flying two or more flags simultaneously.
• Skiffs operating far from the coast.
• Vessels fishing outside of normal fishing zones.
• Windows of vessel covered or blanked out.
37
• Dhows/skiffs rafted up.
• No lights during hours of darkness.
• Skiffs with two or more outboard motors.
• Dhows/skiffs stopped in the water, no evidence of fishing.
• Vessels loitering East of Socotra, South of the Makran Coast or in the vicinity of Zanzibar,
Dar es Salaam, Pemba, Salalah, Ras Fartek or the IRTC.
• Packages hanging outboard of a vessel.
• Excessive communications antennas.
This is not an exhaustive list. Other events, activity and vessels may be deemed suspicious
by the Master of a merchant ship having due regard to their own seagoing experiences
within the region and information shared amongst the maritime community.
If in doubt, report and contact UKMTO.
38
Annex D
UKMTO reporting forms
UKMTO vessel position reporting forms
Once a ship has transmitted an initial report on entering the VRA, UKMTO will request daily
reports be transmitted. Upon reaching port or upon exiting the VRA, UKMTO will request a
final report. The following forms are provided below and are available at www.ukmto.org:
• Initial report.
• Daily report.
• Final report.
• Suspicious/irregular activity report.
UKMTO vessel position reporting form - initial report
1 Ship Name
2 Flag
3 IMO Number
4 INMARSAT Telephone Number
5 Time and Position
6 Course
7 Passage Speed
8 Freeboard
9 Cargo
10 Destination and Estimated Time of Arrival
11 Name and contact details of Company Security Officer
12 Nationality of Master and Crew
13 Armed/unarmed security team embarked
39
UKMTO vessel position reporting form – daily/transit position report
1 Ship Name
2 Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
3 Time of Report in UTC
4 Ship’s Position
5 Ship’s Course and Speed
6 Any other important information*
7 ETA point A/B IRTC (if applicable)
*Other important information could be change of destination or ETA, number of UK crew on
board, etc.
UKMTO vessel position reporting form - final report
1 Ship’s name
2 Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
3 Time of Report in UTC
4 Port or position when leaving the voluntary reporting area
UKMTO suspicious/irregular activity report
1 Ship’s name
2 Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
3 Time of Report in UTC
4 Ship’s Position
5 Ship’s Course and Speed
6 Sighting of suspicious activity. Time, position, brief description of craft and
activity witnessed
Note: Where possible include any imagery to aid military appreciation.
Follow-up report to UKMTO and MSCHOA
Following any attack or suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed report of the event is
provided to UKMTO and MSCHOA. It is helpful to provide a copy of the report to the IMB.
40
Annex E
Maritime Security Centre – Horn of
Africa reporting forms
MSCHOA vessel registration and incident reporting
Registration with MSCHOA ensures a ship is monitored by military counter piracy forces
during its transit of the HRA. In addition, regular threat assessment updates, warnings and
the latest self-protection information are made available to shipping companies and Masters
who register.
Registration is required within the MSCHOA Vessel Registration Area as highlighted on UKHO
Chart Q6099.
The form to ‘Register a Vessel’s Movements’ is available on the MSCHOA website and UKHO
Chart Q6099. The following should be noted:
• There are two principal methods to register your ship’s movement with MSCHOA.
- Online at www.mschoa.org (note you will need to register with MSCHOA for access,
this can be done following the register tab on the website).
- Offline. A downloadable form is available from www.mschoa.org or it can be
requested from postmaster@mschoa.org. This form was updated in March 2018
to make offline registration simpler for ships with sporadic internet connectivity to
register.
If the above options are not possible a ship can be registered by sending an email with
the subject heading MSCHOA Vessel Registration to postmaster@mschoa.org with the
information in the table below. Items marked with an * are mandatory.
Vessel Details
Ship Name * Flag State *
IMO Number * MMSI Number *
Call Sign * Ship’s Master
Primary Email * Secondary Email
Ship contact number * Ship contact email *
Owner name Operator name
Operator address DPA name
DPA telephone DPA email
41
Movement Details
Entry Point to MSCHOA vessel registration
area * (78°E/10°S/23°N/Suez/Port)
Entry Date/Time to MSCHOA vessel
registration area *
(DD/MM/YYYY) (HH) (MM)
Exit Point from MSCHOA vessel registration
area * (78°E/10°S/23°N/Suez/Port)
Exit Date/Time to MSCHOA vessel
registration area *
(DD/MM/YYYY) (HH) (MM)
Do you intend to transit the IRTC?
ETA to IRTC (times are in UTC/ Zulu time) *
Direction * (East/West)
Do you intend to join a group transit? Do you intend to join a National Convoy?
Which National Convoy are you joining? *
Crew numbers and nationalities Draught
Freeboard of lowest accessible deck in
Metres(M) *
Planned Transit Speed *
Vessel’s Maximum Speed * Cargo (Crude Oil/Clean Oil/Arms/
Chemicals/ Gas/Passengers/Bulk Cargo/
Containers/Fishing/Ballast/ Others …
Please Specify)
Hazardous cargo
Next Port of Call Last Port of Call
Number of Armed Security personnel on
board?
Nationality of armed security team?
42
Follow-up report to MSCHOA and UKMTO
Following any attack or suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed report of the event is
provided to UKMTO and MSCHOA. It is also helpful to provide a copy of the report to the IMB.
Incident report; vessel particulars/details
It is recognised that during an incident time may be short and crew will be under a number
of pressures and stresses. Those lines marked with an * are those that, in extremis, are the
key requirements that must be reported. Without this data responses cannot be planned or
mounted and assessments will be incomplete and may be inaccurate.
INCIDENT REPORTING PART ONE – VESSEL DETAILS
Line Responses / Inclusions Format
(a) (b) (d)
IDENTITY 1.1
A* SHIP NAME PLAIN TEXT
B* IMO NUMBER PLAIN TEXT
C FLAG PLAIN TEXT
D CALL SIGN PLAIN TEXT
E OWNER NAME & CONTACT DETAILS PLAIN TEXT
F
Company Security Officer / Designated
Person Assure CONTACT DETAILS
PLAIN TEXT
CREW / CARGO 1.2
A CREW NUMBER PLAIN TEXT
B CREW NATIONALITIES PLAIN TEXT
C CAPTAIN / MASTER NATIONALITY PLAIN TEXT
D CARGO PLAIN TEXT
E CARGO SIZE / QUANTITY PLAIN TEXT
ROUTE /
SCHEDULE
1.3
A LAST PORT OF CALL (LPOC) PLAIN TEXT
B LAST PORT OF CALL DATE PLAIN TEXT
C NEXT PORT OF CALL (NPOC) PLAIN TEXT
D NEXT PORT OF CALL DATE PLAIN TEXT
E SEA DAYS SINCE LAST PORT PLAIN TEXT
43
INCIDENT REPORTING PART TWO – INCIDENT DETAILS
Line Responses / Inclusions Format
(a) (b) (d)
DETAILS
2.1* TIME OF REPORT DTG
2.2
A* INCIDENT LOCATION LAT / LONG
B*
SPEED AND HEADING AT TIME OF
INCIDENT
PLAIN TEXT
2.3
A* INCIDENT START TIME DTG
B* INCIDENT END TIME DTG
C WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING EVENT PLAIN TEXT
INCIDENT 2.4
A*
SIGHTING / APPROACH /
COMMUNICATION / ATTACK / BOARDING
SELECT
B AREA(S) OF VESSEL TARGETED PLAIN TEXT
SUSPECTS 2.5
A* NUMBER OF SUSPECT CRAFT NUMBER
B NUMBER OF SUSPECT INDIVIDUALS NUMBER
C
NOT KNOWN / CIVILIAN DRESS /
UNIFORMS / MIX
SELECT
D ETHNICITY / LANGUAGES PLAIN TEXT
WEAPONS 2.6
A* NONE SEEN / SIGHTED / SHOTS FIRED SELECT
B
PISTOLS / RIFLES / MACHINE GUNS /
GRENADE LAUNCHERS
SELECT
LADDERS 2.7
A
NONE SEEN / SUSPECTED / SIGHTED /
USED
SELECT
B ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PLAIN TEXT
CRAFT 2.8
A*
TYPE: WHALER / DHOW / FISHING VESSEL
/ MERCHANT VESSEL
SELECT
B
DESCRIPTION OF VESSEL (COLOUR,
NAME, FEATURES)
PLAIN TEXT
44
YOUR
VESSEL
2.9
A* CITADEL / SECURE AREA YES / NO
B*
NO SECURITY TEAM / UNARMED TEAM /
ARMED TEAM
SELECT
C
HEIGHT OF FREEBOARD AT THE TIME OF
INCIDENT
PLAIN TEXT
D
SELF PROTECTION MEASURES IN PLACE
BEFORE INCIDENT
PLAIN TEXT
E DEFENCE MEASURES EMPLOYED YES / NO
F OTHER PLAIN TEXT
YOUR
RESPONSE
2.10
A* ALARM SOUNDED YES / NO
B* CREW MUSTERED IN CITADEL YES / NO
C*
INCREASED SPEED / EVASIVE
MANOEUVRES
SELECT
D* DESCRIPTION SELECT
E
PAST SHOWED WEAPONS / WARNING
SHOTS / AIMED SHOTS / NO PAST
PLAIN TEXT
F
WAS INCIDENT REPORTED TO
AUTHORITIES? IF SO TO WHOM?
PLAIN TEXT
STATUS 2.11
A* INCIDENT FINISHED / ONGOING SELECT
B
INCIDENT ENDED BY SUSPECTS / OWN
VESSEL
YES / NO
C DETAIL YES / NO
45
INCIDENT REPORTING PART THREE – STATUS AND SUPPORT REQUESTS
Line Responses / Inclusions Format
(a) (b) (d)
STATUS 3.1
A*
VESSEL SAFE / UNSAFE / UNDER ATTACK
/ BOARDED
SELECT
B VESSEL UNDERWAY / VESSEL STATIC SELECT
C*
UNDER OWN POWER / SUPPORTED /
WITHOUT POWER
SELECT
D
NO DAMAGE / MINOR DAMAGE / MAJOR
DAMAGE
SELECT
DAMAGE /
MEDICAL
3.2
A* DAMAGE DETAILS PLAIN TEXT
B
CREW AT STATIONS / CREW IN CITADEL /
CREW OFF SHIP
SELECT
C CREW INJURIES NUMBER
D INJURY DETAILS PLAIN TEXT
E CREW FATALITIES NUMBER
F FATALITY DETAILS PLAIN TEXT
INTENTIONS 3.3
A* CONTINUE AS PLANNED / RE-ROUTING SELECT
B*
REPAIR DAMAGE / ABANDON SHIP /
SURRENDER CONTROL
PLAIN TEXT
C CURRENT SPEED PLAIN TEXT
D CURRENT HEADING PLAIN TEXT
E OTHER PLAIN TEXT
46
IMAGERY 3.4
A WAS THE INCIDENT RECORDED? YES / NO
B CCTV FOOTAGE / PHOTOGRAPHS SELECT
C
IMAGERY ATTACHED (IF AVAILABLE
PLEASE ATTACH)
YES / NO
ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION
3.5
A
ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH MAY
ASSIST?
PLAIN TEXT
B
PLEASE ATTACH WITH THIS REPORT – A
BRIEF DESCRIPTION / FULL REPORT /
MASTER – CREW STATEMENT OF THE
ATTACK
PLAIN TEXT
47
Annex F
Additional guidance for vessels
engaged in fishing
This guidance for vessels engaged in fishing has been provided by the following national
fishing industry associations:
• OPAGAC – Organizacion de Productores Asociados de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores.
• ANABAC – Asociacion Nacional de Armadores de Buques Atuneros Congeladores.
Recommendations to vessels in fishing zones
• Non-Somali fishing vessels should avoid operating or transiting within 200nm of the coast of
Somalia, irrespective of whether they have been issued with licenses to do so.
• Do not start fishing operations when the radar indicates the presence of unidentified
boats.
• If polyester skiffs of a type typically used by pirates are sighted, move away from them at full
speed, sailing into the wind and sea to make their navigation more difficult.
• Avoid stopping at night. Be alert and maintain bridge, deck and engine-room watch.
• During fishing operations, when the vessel is more vulnerable, be alert and maintain radar
watch to give maximum notice to your crew and the state authorities if an attack is in
progress.
• While navigating at night, use only the mandatory navigation and safety lights to prevent
the glow of lighting attracting pirates, who are sometimes in boats without radar and are
waiting.
• If the vessel is drifting while fishing at night, keep guard at the bridge on deck and in the
engine room. Use only mandatory navigation and safety lights.
• The engine must be ready for an immediate start-up.
• Keep away from unidentified ships.
• Use VHF as little as possible to avoid being heard by pirates and to make location more
difficult.
• Activate the AIS when maritime patrol aircraft are operating in the area to facilitate
identification and tracking.
48
Identification
• Managers are strongly recommended to register their fishing vessels with MSCHOA for the
whole period of activity off the coast of Somalia. This should include communicating a full
list of the crewmen on board and their vessels’ intentions, if possible.
• Carry out training prior to passage or fishing operations in the area.
• Whenever fishing vessels are equipped with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) devices, their
manager should provide MSCHOA with access to VMS data.
• Fishing vessels should always identify themselves upon request from aircraft or ships from
any international or national anti-piracy operation.
• Military, merchant and fishing vessels should respond without delay to any identification
request made by a fishing vessel being approached (to facilitate early action to make
escape possible, especially if the vessel is fishing).
In case of attack
• In case of an attack or sighting a suspicious craft, warn the authorities (UKMTO and
MSCHOA) and the rest of the fleet.
• Communicate the contact details of the second Master of the vessel (who is on land)
whose knowledge of the vessel could contribute to the success of a military intervention.
• Recommendations only for Purse Seiners:
- Evacuate all crew from the deck and the crow’s nest.
- If pirates have taken control of the vessel and the purse seine is spread out,
encourage the pirates to allow the nets to be recovered. If recovery of the purse seine
is allowed, follow the instructions for its stowage and explain the functioning of the
gear to avoid misunderstanding.
49
Annex G
Additional advice for leisure craft,
including yachts
Leisure craft should make early contact in advance with the naval/military authorities to
determine if the VRA area is safe to transit; regional activity has indicated attacks occur on
both large and small vessels. Transit close to areas of conflict should be avoided. Close
contact should be maintained with UKMTO throughout any voyage.
See the MSCHOA (www.mschoa.org) and the International Sailing Federation
(www.sailing.org) for the most up-to-date information.
50
Annex H
Definitions and abbreviations
Definitions
The following definitions to term and categorise attacks and suspicious incidents that are
reported from shipping inside the VRA may help. This ensures the consistent identification of
patterns and trends.
Armed robbery The Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships, highlights armed robbery against ships consists of:
• Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other
than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against
persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic
waters and territorial sea.
• Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.
Attack An attack, as opposed to an approach, is where a ship has been subjected to an
aggressive approach by an unidentified craft AND weapons have been discharged.
Hijack A hijack is where attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a ship against
the crew’s will. Hijackers will not always have the same objective (armed robbery, cargo theft
or kidnapping).
Illegal boarding An illegal boarding is where attackers have boarded a ship but HAVE NOT
taken control. Command remains with the Master. The most obvious example of this is the
citadel scenario.
Piracy Piracy is defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) (article 101). However, for the purposes of these BMP, it is important to provide
clear, practical, working guidance to the industry to enable accurate and consistent
assessment of suspicious activity and piracy attacks.
The following may assist in assessing what is a piracy attack. A piracy attack may include but
is not limited to:
• The use of violence against the ship or its personnel, or any attempt to use violence.
• Attempt(s) to illegally board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are pirates.
• An actual boarding whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not.
• Attempts to overcome the SPM by the use of:
- Ladders.
- Grappling hooks.
- Weapons deliberately used against or at the ship.
51
Suspicious or aggressive approach Action taken by another craft may be deemed
suspicious if any of the following occur (the list is not exhaustive):
• A definite course alteration towards a ship associated with a rapid increase in speed by
the suspected craft, which cannot be accounted for by the prevailing conditions.
• Small craft sailing on the same course and speed for an uncommon period and distance,
not in keeping with normal fishing or other circumstances prevailing in the area.
• Sudden changes in course towards the ship and aggressive behaviour.
Abbreviations
AIS Automatic Identification System
BAM Bab el Mandeb
CMF Combined Maritime Forces
CSO Chief Security Officer
DSC Digital Selective Calling
EU NAVFOR European Union Naval Force
HRA High Risk Area
IMB International Maritime Bureau
IMO International Maritime Organization
IRTA Industry Releasable Threat Assessment
IRTB Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin
IRTC Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
JWC Joint War Committee
MSC Maritime Safety Committee
MSCHOA Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa
MSTC Maritime Security Transit Corridor
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PAG Pirate Action Group
PCASP Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
PMSC Private Maritime Security Company
RECAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in Asia
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade
52
RUF Rules for the Use of Force
SPM Ship Protection Measures
SSA Ship Security Assessment
SSAS Ship Security Alert System
SSP Ship Security Plan
TSS Traffic Separation Scheme
UKMTO United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations
VDR Vessel Data Recorder
VHP Vessel Hardening Plan
VMS Vessel Monitoring System
VPD Vessel Protection Detachment
VRA Voluntary Reporting Area
WBIED Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
53
Annex I
Supporting organisations
I.1 BMP5 Signatories
CDI
The Chemical Distribution Institute (CDI) was established in 1994 as a not for profit
Foundation and provides ship and terminal inspection data in an electronic report format
to its members. The main objectives of CDI is to continuously improve the safety and
quality performance of chemical marine transportation and storage; Through cooperation
with industry and centres of education, drive the development of industry best practice
in marine transportation and storage of chemical products; To provide information and
advice on industy best practice and international legislation for marine transportation and
storage of chemical products; To provide chemical companies with cost effective systems
for risk assessment, thus assisting their commitment to Responsible Care and the Code of
Distribution Management Practice.
www.cdi.org.uk
BIMCO
BIMCO is the world’s largest international shipping association, with around 2,000
members in more than 120 countries, representing 56% of the world’s tonnage. Our global
membership includes shipowners, operators, managers, brokers and agents. A non-profit
organisation, BIMCO’s mission is to be at the forefront of global developments in shipping,
providing expert knowledge and practical advice to safeguard and add value to members’
businesses.
www.bimco.org
54
CLIA
Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) is the world’s largest cruise
industry trade association, providing a unified voice and leading authority of
the global cruise community. CLIA supports policies and practices that foster
a safe, secure, healthy and sustainable cruise ship environment for the more
than 25 million passengers who cruise annually and is dedicated to promote the
cruise travel experience. The organization’s mission is to be the unified global
organization that helps its members succeed by advocating, educating and
promoting for the common interests of the cruise community.
www.cruising.org
ICS International Chamber of Shipping
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) is the international trade association for
merchant ship operators. ICS represents the collective views of the international industry
from different nations, sectors and trades. ICS membership comprises national shipowners’
associations representing over 80% of the world’s merchant fleet. A major focus of ICS
activity is the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations agency with
responsibility for the safety of life at sea and the protection of the marine environment. ICS
is heavily involved in a wide variety of areas including any technical, legal and operational
matters affecting merchant ships. ICS is unique in that it represents the global interests of
all the different trades in the industry: bulk carrier, tanker, container, and passenger ship
operators
www.ics-shipping.org
55
IGP&I Clubs
Thirteen principal underwriting associations “the Clubs” comprise the International
Group of P&I Clubs (IGP&I). They provide liability cover (protection and indemnity) for
approximately 90% of the world’s ocean-going tonnage. The Clubs are mutual insurance
associations providing cover for their members against third party liabilities relating to the
use and operation of ships, including loss of life, pollution by oil and hazardous substances,
wreck removal, collision and damage to property. Clubs also provide services to their
members on claims handling, legal issues and loss prevention, and often play a leading role
in coordinating the response to, and management of, maritime casualties.
www.igpandi.org
IFSMA
The International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations (IFSMA) was formed in 1974
by Eight National Shipmasters’ Associations to unite the World’s serving Shipmasters into
a single professional co-ordinated body. It is a non-profit making apolitical organisation
dedicated solely to the interest of the serving Shipmaster. The Federation is formed of
around 11,000 Shipmasters from sixty Countries either through their National Associations
or as Individual Members. In 1975, IFSMA was granted Consultative Status as a non
governmental organisation at IMO which enables the Federation to represent the views and
protect the interests of the serving Shipmasters.
www.ifsma.org
56
INTERCARGO
The International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), established in
1980 in London and granted IMO NGO consultative status since 1993, is a voluntary non-
profit association representing the interests of dry cargo vessel owners.
INTERCARGO provides the forum where quality dry bulk shipowners, managers and
operators are informed about, discuss and share concerns on key topics and regulatory
challenges, especially in relation to safety, the environment and operational excellence.
INTERCARGO promotes best practices and represents dry cargo shipping interests at IMO,
other industry fora and the broader business context, basing its strategies on the principle of
free and fair competition.
www.intercargo.org
IMCA
The International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) is a leading trade association
representing the vast majority of contractors and the associated supply chain in the
offshore marine construction industry worldwide. We have a membership of 800 companies
including contractors, suppliers, oil & gas companies, marine renewable energy companies
and numerous non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
www.imca-int.com
57
InterManager
InterManager is the international trade association for the ship management industry
established in 1991. It is the voice of ship management and the only organisation dedicated
to representing the ship management and crew management industry. In today’s global
shipping industry InterManager works for the needs of like-minded companies in the
ship and crew management sector, who all have the welfare of seafarers at their heats.
InterManager acts as a forum to share best practices and bring about positive change.
An internationally-recognised organisation, InterManager represents its members at
international level, lobbying on their behalf to ensure their views are taken into account
within the worldwide maritime industry.
www.intermanager.org
International Maritime Employers’
Council Ltd (IMEC)
IMEC is the only international employers’ organisation dedicated to maritime industrial
relations. With offices in the UK and the Philippines, IMEC has a membership of over 235
shipowners and managers, covering some 8,000 ships with CBA’s, which IMEC negotiates on
behalf of its members within the International Bargaining Forum (IBF).
IMEC is also heavily involved in maritime training. The IMEC Enhanced cadet programme in
the Philippines currently has over 700 young people under training.
www.imec.org.uk
58
INTERTANKO
INTERTANKO is the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, a forum
where the industry meets, policies are discussed and best practices developed. INTERTANKO
has been the voice of independent tanker owners since 1970, ensuring that the liquid energy
that keeps the world turning is shipped safely, responsibly and competitively.
www.intertanko.com
International Transport Workers’
Federation
The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) is an international trade union
federation of transport workers’ unions. Any independent trade union with members in the
transport industry is eligible for membership of the ITF. The ITF has been helping seafarers
since 1896 and today represents the interests of seafarers worldwide, of whom over 880,000
are members of ITF affiliated unions. The ITF is working to improve conditions for seafarers
of all nationalities and to ensure adequate regulation of the shipping industry to protect the
interests and rights of the workers. The ITF helps crews regardless of their nationality or the
flag of their ship.
www.itfseafarers.org
www.itfglobal.org
59
ISWAN
The International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN) is an
international NGO and UK registered charity set up to promote the welfare of seafarers
worldwide. We are a membership organisation with ship owners, unions and welfare
organisation as members. We work with a range of bodies including PandI Clubs, shipping
companies, ports, and governments. Our focus is the wellbeing of the 1.5 million seafarers
around the world.
We support seafarers and their families who are affected by piracy and our 24 hour
multilingual helpline, SeafarerHelp, is free for seafarers to call from anywhere in the world.
www.seafarerswelfare.org
IPTA
The International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA) was formed in 1987 to represent
the interests of the specialised chemical/parcel tanker fleet and has since developed into an
established representative body for ship owners operating IMO classified chemical/parcel
tankers, being recognised as a focal point through which regulatory authorities and trade
organisations may liaise with such owners. IPTA was granted consultative status as a Non-
Governmental Organisation to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1997 and is
wholly supportive of the IMO as the only body to introduce and monitor compliance with
international maritime legislation.
www.ipta.org.uk
60
The Mission to Seafarers
The Mission to Seafarers is the largest provider of port-based welfare services, providing
200 port chaplains and 121 seafarers’ centres across 50 countries. In addition to our services
of free Wi-Fi, respite and transportation, all chaplains are trained in post-trauma counselling
and are able to provide immediate support post attack or release, as well as connect with
relevant professional services in a seafarer’s home country. We run family support networks
in the Philippines, Myanmar, Ukraine and India offering access to education, training and
medical and legal services. The Mission to Seafarers is pleased to support the creation of
BMP5 and the associated resources and commends their use to all maritime personnel.
www.missiontoseafarers.org
Joint Hull Committee and Joint War
Committee
The Joint Hull and Joint War Committees comprise elected underwriting representatives
from both the Lloyd’s and IUA company markets, representing the interests of those who
write marine hull and war business in the London market.
Both sets of underwriters are impacted by piracy issues and support the mitigation of the
exposures they face through the owners’ use of BMP. The actions of owners and charterers
will inform underwriters’ approach to risk and coverage.
61
Sailors’Society
Sailors’ Society is the world’s oldest maritime welfare organisation caring for seafarers and
their families across the globe.
The charity works in ports across 30 countries and has projects ranging from medical centres
to building boats to get children safely to school.
Our renowned Crisis Response Network helping victims of trauma at sea is run across Asia,
Europe and Africa with plans to extend further.
Trained chaplains offer 24-hour support to victims of piracy, kidnapping and natural
disasters and come alongside survivors and loved ones with psychological and financial
help for as long as needed.
www.sailors-society.org
OCIMF
The Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) is a voluntary association of oil
companies (the ‘members’) who have an interest in the shipment and terminalling of crude
oil, oil products, petrochemicals and gas. OCIMF’s mission is to be the foremost authority on
the safe and environmentally responsible operation of oil tankers, terminals and offshore
support vessels, promoting continuous improvement in standards of design and operation.
www.ocimf.org
62
World Shipping Council
The World Shipping Council (WSC) is the trade association that represents the
international liner shipping industry. WSC’s member lines operate containerships, roll-
on/roll-off vessels, and car carrier vessels that account for approximately 90 percent of
the global liner vessel capacity. Collectively, these services transport about 60 percent of
the value of global seaborne trade, or more than US$ 4 trillion worth of goods annually.
WSC’s goal is to provide a coordinated voice for the liner shipping industry in its work with
policymakers and other industry groups to develop actionable solutions for some of the
world’s most challenging transportation problems. WSC serves as a non-governmental
organization at the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
www.worldshipping.org
SIGTTO
The Society for International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO) is the
international body established for the exchange of technical information and experience,
between members of the industry, to enhance the safety and operational reliability of gas
tankers and terminals.
To this end the Society publishes studies, and produces information papers and works
of reference, for the guidance of industry members. It maintains working relationships
with other industry bodies, governmental and intergovernmental agencies, including
the International Maritime Organization, to better promote the safety and integrity of gas
transportation and storage schemes.
www.sigtto.org
63
I.1 Naval/military/governmental organisations
CGPCS
The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was established on
14 January 2009, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1851. This ad hoc
international forum brings together more than 60 countries, regional and international
organisations, all working together towards the prevention of piracy off the coast of Somalia.
The CGPCS coordinates political, military and non-governmental efforts to combat piracy,
ensures that pirates are brought to justice and support local governments to develop
sustainable maritime security capabilities. The group’s approach focuses on informality,
inclusion and multi-stakeholder representation and is an attempt to find innovative
solutions outside of formal international organisations.
Combined Maritime Forces
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) is an enduring global maritime partnership of 32 willing
nations aligned in common purpose to conduct Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in order
to provide security and stability in the maritime environment. CMF operates three Combined
Task Forces (CTF) across the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin, Northern Arabian Sea, Gulf
of Oman, Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf. CTF150 is responsible for maritime security and
counter-terrorism, CTF151 is responsible for deterring, disrupting and suppressing piracy
and CTF152 is responsible for maritime security and counter-terrorism specifically in the
Arabian Gulf. Visit www.combinedmaritimeforces.com or e-mail us at
cmf_info@me.navy.mil.
64
EU NAVFOR
Piracy and other maritime security issues have continued to be a threat to mariners who
transit the Southern Rea Sea, Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean. The mission of
the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) is (1) to PROTECT World Food Programme
and other vulnerable shipping and (2) to deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed
robbery at sea. This requires (3) the enhancement of cooperation and coordination with
an increasingly wide range of maritime actors to uphold freedom of navigation across a
broad maritime security architecture. EU NAVFOR is also tasked with (4) monitoring fishing
activities off the coast of Somalia. Thus, acting as a catalyst for action, EU NAVFOR continues
to promote solutions to regional maritime security issues, thereby contributing to the EU’s
much wider security, capacity-building and capability-building work in this strategically
important location.
The Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) is an integral part of EU
NAVFOR, sitting functionally within the Operational Headquarters and staffed by military
and civilian EU NAVFOR personnel. The MSCHOA provides a service to mariners in the Gulf
of Aden, the Somali Basin and off the Horn of Africa. It is a Coordination Centre dedicated to
safeguarding legitimate freedom of navigation in light of the risk of attack against merchant
shipping in the region, in support of the UN Security Council’s Resolutions (UNSCR) 1816 and
subsequent reviews. EU NAVFOR and CMF are committed to ensuring that mariners have
the most up to date regular threat assessments and incident specific bulletins, published by
the MSCHOA. Through close dialogue with shipping companies, ships’ masters and other
interested parties, MSCHOA builds up a picture of vulnerable shipping in these waters and
their approaches. The MSCHOA can then act as a focal point sharing information to provide
support and protection to maritime traffic. There is a clear need to protect ships and their
crews from illegitimate and dangerous attacks, safeguarding a key global trade route.
http://eunavfor.eu
www.mschoa.org
MSCHOA
65
IMB Piracy Reporting Centre
Established in 1992, IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) provides the shipping
industry with a free 24-hour service to report any piracy or armed robbery incidents
occurring anywhere in the world.
The IMB PRC is an independent and non-governmental agency aimed at raising awareness
of areas at risk of these attacks. As a trusted point of contact for shipmasters reporting
incidents to the IMB PRC from anywhere in the world, the IMB PRC immediately relays
all incidents to the local law enforcement requesting assistance. Information is also
immediately broadcast to all vessels via Inmarsat Safety Net to provide and increase
awareness.
www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre
Information Fusion Centre
The Information Fusion Centre (IFC), based in Singapore, serves as the regional Maritime
Security (MARSEC) information-sharing hub. It has linkages with more than 70 regional and
extra-regional Operational Centres (OPCENs) from navies and law enforcement agencies in
39 countries, as well as linkages with the shipping industry. It is also the only centre in the
Asia-Pacific with International Liaison Officers (ILOs) from 16 countries.
The IFC collates and analyses relevant information to produce accurate, timely and
actionable products, which enable its partners to respond to MARSEC incidents in good
time. It also provides practical and useful information on MARSEC trends, incidents and best
practices to the shipping industry. IFC also administers the Voluntary Community Reporting
(VCR) for merchant vessels to report anomalies and incidents, enabling community
contribution to Safe and Secure Seas for All.
66
INTERPOL
INTERPOL has a dedicated unit for maritime piracy that works with the police, navy
and private sector in member countries, and can provide support to ship operators who
have had their ships hijacked. INTERPOL’s Maritime Security sub-Directorate (MTS) can
be consulted on the recommended practices and action to be taken to help preserve the
integrity of any evidence left behind following a pirate attack that could be useful to law
enforcement agents pursuing an investigation.
MTS can be contacted on tel +33 472 44 72 33 or via email dlMTSOPSupport@interpol.int
during business hours (GMT 08H00 – 17H00).
Outside of normal business hours, contact can be made via INTERPOL’s Command
and Co-ordination Centre (CCC). The CCC is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and
supports INTERPOL’s 190 member countries faced with a crisis situation or requiring urgent
operational assistance. The CCC operates in all four of Interpol’s official languages (English,
French, Spanish and Arabic). Contact details are: tel +33 472 44 7676; email os-ccc@
interpol.int.
It is recommended that ship operators contact INTERPOL within 3 days of a hijacking of their
ship.
NCAGS
The Naval Cooperation & Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) mission is to facilitate the
exchange of information between the United States Navy, Combined Maritime Forces, and
the commercial maritime community in the United States Central Command’s (CENTCOM)
Area of Responsibility. NCAGS operates as a conduit for information focused on the safety
and security of shipping and is committed to assisting all members of the commercial
maritime community. To help combat piracy, NCAGS serves as a secondary emergency point
of contact for mariners in distress (after UKMTO) and also disseminates transit guidance to
the maritime industry. NCAGS disseminates guidance to merchant shippers via briefings,
website, email, and duty phone concerning Naval Exercises, Boardings, Aids to Navigation,
Environmental Issues, MEDEVAC Assistance, Security and Augments, Regional Search and
Rescue Centres.
67
UKMTO
UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKTMO) capability acts as the primary point of contact
for merchant vessels and liaison with military forces within the region. UKTMO also
administers the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, under which merchant vessels are encouraged
to send regular reports, providing their position/speed and ETA at the next port of call, in
accordance with the Maritime Security Chart Q6099.
Emerging and time relevant information impacting commercial traffic can then be passed
directly to vessels at sea, and responding assets accordingly, therefore improving the
collective responsiveness to an incident. For further information on UKMTO please contact:
Emergency Telephone Numbers: +44 (0)2392 222060 or +971 5055 23215
e-mail: watchkeepers@ukmto.org Web: www.ukmto.org
68
69
Annex J
Voyage reference card
Understand the threat
„ Get threat information.
„ Review guidance.
„ Review Rules for the Use of Force.
Assess the risk
„ Conduct risk assessment.
„ Identify ship protection measures.
Protect the ship and crew
„ Harden the ship.
„ Test critical equipment.
„ Brief/train the crew.
„ Extra lookout/radar watch.
„ Control access.
„ Follow military advice.
Do NOT be alone
„ Report to UKMTO.
„ Register with MSCHOA.
„ Report suspicious activity.
„ Report incidents.
„ Send DISTRESS if attacked.
UKMTO
+44 (0) 2392 222060
watchkeepers@ukmto.org
MSCHOA
+44 1923 958545
www.mschoa.org
Cooperate with:
„ Other shipping and military forces.
„ Local law enforcement.
„ Welfare providers.
70
Primary layer of defence
Good lookout/vigilance.
Razor wire.
Manoeuvring.
Speed/freeboard.
PCASP.
Secondary layer of defence
Door hardening.
Gate/grate.
Motion sensor/CCTV.
Last layer of defence
Internal door hardening.
Citadel/safe muster point.
Communication.
BMP5 Detect, Deter,
Delay
Do Not Be
BOARDED
Do Not Be
VULNERABLE
Do Not Be
SURPRISED
DRAFT


Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance
Maritime Security off the Coast of West Africa including the
Gulf of Guinea
BMP West Africa
Produced and supported by:
NIGERIA
GULF OF GUINEA
NIGER
CHAD
CAMEROON
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
GABON
CONGO
ANGOLA
BURUNDI
MALI
MAURITANIA
GUINEA
GHANA
BURKINA
FASO
COTE
D’IVOIRE
SENEGAL
LIBERIA
SIERRA
LEONE
BENIN
TOGO
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF CONGO
GUINEA
BISSAU
GAMBIA
CABO VERDE
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
IFSMA
ATSEA
UNITY FORSAFETY
International Parcel
Tankers Association
Forsvarsudvalget 2020-21
B 295 - Bilag 2
Offentligt
1
BMP West Africa
Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and
Enhance Maritime Security off the Coast of West
Africa including the Gulf of Guinea
2
Legal Notice
BMP WA has been developed purely as guidance to be used at the user’s own risk. No responsibility is accepted by the
Authors, their Members or by any person, firm, corporation or organisation for the accuracy of any information in BMP WA
or any omission from BMP WA or for any consequence whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from applying or relying
upon guidance contained in BMP WA even if caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care.
Copyright Notice
The Authors of BMP WA have provided BMP WA free of charge. All information, data and text contained in BMP WA
whether in whole or in part may be reproduced or copied without any payment, individual application or written license
provided that:
• It is used only for non-commercial purposes; and
• The content is not modified Exceptions:
The permission granted above permits the photographs to be used within the whole or part of BMP WA. The permission
does not extend to using the photographs separately outside of BMP WA as these photographs belong to a third party.
Authorisation to use the photographs separately from BMP WA must first be obtained from the copyright holders, details
of whom may be obtained from the Authors.
Logos and trademarks are excluded from the general permission above other than when they are used as an integral part
of BMP WA.
BMP WA replaces any existing regional guidance issued by the supporting signatories.
Version 1 published March 2020
Authors: ICS, BIMCO, IGP&I Clubs, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and OCIMF
3
Contents
The fundamental requirements of BMP 4
Section 1 Introduction 5
Section 2 The threat 7
Section 3 Threat and risk assessment 9
Section 4 Planning 11
Section 5 Ship Protection Measures 15
Section 6 Reporting 29
Section 7 Ships under attack 31
Annex A Contact details 39
Annex B Maritime security charts 42
Annex C Common understanding 44
Annex D MDAT-GoG reporting forms 46
Annex E Other maritime security threats 50
Annex F Additional guidance for vessels engaged in fishing 52
Annex G Additional advice for leisure craft, including yachts 54
Annex H Definitions and abbreviations 55
Annex I Supporting organisations 58
4
The fundamental requirements of
BMP
Understand the threat
• Maritime threats are dynamic.
• Obtaining current threat information is critical for risk assessment and decision making.
Conduct risk assessments
• Companies must conduct risk assessments.
• Identify ship protection measures.
Implement ship protection measures
• Harden the ship.
• Brief and train the crew.
• Enhanced lookout.
• Follow Flag State, insurance and military guidance.
Report
• Register and report to MDAT-GoG.
• Report incidents and suspicious activity.
• Send distress signal when attacked.
Cooperate
• Cooperate with other shipping and military forces.
• Cooperate with law enforcement to preserve evidence.
• Cooperate with welfare providers.
5
Section 1
Introduction
The maritime security situation off the West Coast of Africa is complex and dynamic. BMP –
West Africa (WA) has been produced to help ships and seafarers avoid becoming the victims
of maritime security incidents in these waters.
This publication aims to help ships plan their voyage and to detect, avoid, deter, delay
and report attacks. Experience has shown that application of the recommendations in this
publication makes a significant difference to the safety of seafarers.
The BMP contained in this publication mitigate the risk from piracy and armed robbery.
However, differences in attack methods from other threats may require other forms of
mitigation.
The consequences of not adopting effective security measures can be severe. Some pirates
have subjected crew to violence and other ill treatment and extended periods of captivity.
Other attacks have demonstrated an intent to damage ships, seize the cargo and endanger
life.
Other maritime crime in the region, such as the trafficking of firearms, humans and narcotics,
migrant smuggling and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, can contribute to
insecurity.
The Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade-Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG)
(https://gog-mdat.org/home) website should be consulted for advice. See annex A for
contact details.
This BMP complements piracy guidance in the latest International Maritime Organisation
(IMO) Resolutions and Circulars (www.imo.org).
Nothing in this BMP detracts from the Master’s overriding authority
and responsibility to protect their crew, ship and cargo.
6
Geographical area
This Guidance introduces recommended practices and procedures for vessels operating in
the Voluntary Reporting Area as depicted on UKHO Chart Q6114 and SHOM Chart 8801CSD.
Attacks on ships and seafarers have taken place throughout the region but most
predominantly in the eastern part of the Gulf of Guinea. Threats are dynamic; information
should be sought from the organisations listed in annex A.
Voluntary Reporting Area
The MDAT-GoG Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is identified on maritime security charts such
as UKHO Q6114 & SHOM Chart 8801CSD. Ships entering and operating within the VRA are
encouraged to register with the MDAT-GoG as registration establishes direct contact between
the reporting ship and MDAT-GoG.
Joint War Committee listed area
The insurance community lists an area of perceived enhanced risk in the region. Ships
entering the area would need to notify their insurers and additional insurance premiums
may apply. The Joint War Committee (JWC) comprises underwriting representatives from
both Lloyd’s and the International Underwriting Association representing the interests of
those who write marine hull war business in the London market. The geographic limits of the
JWC listed area can be found on their website: www.lmalloyds.com/lma/jointwar
7
Section 2
The threat
The complex range of maritime security issues off the coast of West Africa creates direct and
indirect threats to the safety of seafarers. For this reason, it is important that all maritime
crime is addressed. This Guidance focuses on maritime crime that causes a direct threat
to seafarers, armed (and unarmed) robbery, including cargo theft, hijacking of vessels and
kidnapping.
The likelihood of attack further offshore is higher during the inter-monsoon season
(September-March). Attacks can take place at any time – day or night. However, more
seafarers have been kidnapped during the hours of darkness.
Attacks on Vessels
Attacks occur close to shore, in rivers and in ports; however, attacks have been reported over
200Nm from the coast.
Attacks on vessels vary significantly in their form. Attacks for theft may involve just a
few individuals. However, an attack on a vessel where the intention is the kidnapping of
seafarers and/or offloading cargo from tankers may involve a large number of heavily armed
individuals. Different types of vessels are used during attacks, these include fast small
craft, fishing vessels and small merchant vessels. Whilst most attacks on ships at anchor
off ports occur at night, many of the attacks further out to sea occur during the day or
night. Ships at anchor, drifting or conducting ship-to-ship (STS) operations are particularly
vulnerable. Attacks against vessels underway may occur when proceeding at slow speed and
occasionally involve some form of deception to force the vessel to stop. If a mother ship is
used it will carry pirates, stores, fuel and attack skiffs to enable attackers to operate over a
much larger area.
Attackers may use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) during attacks; the
bridge and accommodation tend to be the main targets for these weapons. Attackers may
use long lightweight ladders, knotted climbing ropes or long hooked poles to climb up the
side of the ship. Once onboard they will make their way to the bridge to try to take control
of the ship. When on the bridge they will demand the ship slows/stops to enable others to
board.
The objective of an attack varies. Kidnap for ransom is widespread. These kidnappings
have ranged from one seafarer to the entire crew of a ship. Seafarers are held in distressful,
unsanitary conditions lacking adequate medical support, which has resulted in sickness and
sometimes death.
8
Cases of armed robbery at sea involve the theft of cargo, valuables and the destruction
of navigation and communication equipment; sometimes they are opportunistic but are
carefully planned. A hijack will typically last several days whilst the vessel is moved around
outside the jurisdiction of the coastal states. During this time the vessel may be moved to a
number of rendezvous points to enable STS transfers of cargo.
Experience has shown the crew of a vessel targeted for armed robbery at sea or cargo theft
are likely to be treated badly by perpetrators during an attack. Injuries are common and any
resistance shown to the attackers may lead to an escalation of violence.
The capability of military and law enforcement forces to respond to incidents of armed
robbery at sea, hijacking and kidnapping in the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is improving,
but remains limited. Only a few countries provide or allow Secure Anchorage Areas (SAA),
Security Escort Vessels (SEV) and or Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) for merchant
vessels within their EEZ and/or territorial waters.
Other maritime security concerns are outlined at annex E.
9
Section 3
Threat and risk assessment
Threat assessment
The threat assessment must include all regional maritime security threats.
As part of every ship risk assessment prior to transit through the VRA the latest regional
threat advice can be obtained from the Interregional Coordination Centre, MDAT-GoG, the
IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) and commercial providers.
A threat is formed of capability, intent and opportunity.
Capability means attackers have the physical means to conduct an attack. Intent is
demonstrated by continued attacks or by good intelligence. Opportunity is what is
mitigated by the company, ship and crew through application of the measures described
in this Guidance. In addition to the information provided in this Guidance, supplementary
information about the characteristics of the specific threat or new tactics, and regional
background factors may be sought from regional reporting centres and organisations as
listed in annex A.
If one side of the triangle is removed, then risk is minimised. The company/Master cannot
influence either capability or intent, therefore BMP measures focus on minimising the
opportunity.
10
Risk assessment
Risk assessment is an integral part of voyage planning within a safety management system.
The risk assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery, which
will mean combining statutory regulations with supplementary measures.
Further guidance on risk assessments can be found at www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org
The risk assessment must consider but may not be limited to:
• The threat assessment and geographical areas of increased risk.
• Requirements of the Flag State, company, charterers and insurers.
• Secure Anchorage Areas (SAA), Security Escort Vessels (SEV) and or Vessel Protection
Detachments (VPDs).
• The ship’s characteristics, vulnerabilities and inherent capabilities, including citadel and/
or safe muster points to withstand the threat (freeboard, speed, general arrangement, etc).
• The ship’s and company’s procedures (drills, watch rosters, chain of command, decision
making processes, etc).
• Background factors shaping the situation, e.g. traffic patterns and local patterns of life,
including fishing vessel activity.
• Cooperation with military.
All voyages in this region require thorough advanced planning using all available
information. The maritime threats are dynamic, and it is therefore essential that a detailed
threat and risk assessment is completed for each voyage and activity within the region.
11
Section 4
Planning
Company planning
Together with the following, the output of the risk assessment will help develop the ship’s
voyage plan:
• Regular review of the threat and risk assessments. Plans should be updated as necessary.
• Review of the Ship Security Assessment (SSA), Ship Security Plan (SSP) and Vessel
Hardening Plan (VHP).
• Guidance to the Master about the recommended route and any rendezvous requirements.
• Due diligence of companies providing security services.
• Guidance on using a SAA, SEV and any transfer to terminal security.
• Company mandated Ship Protection Measures (SPM).
• Companies should consider using hidden position transmitting devices as hijackers
will often attempt to disable all visible communication and tracking devices and aerials
straight away.
• Review of company manning requirements. Consider disembarking of non- essential crew
and families prior to sailing to areas of high security risk.
• Crew training plans.
Information security
To avoid critical voyage information falling into the wrong hands, the following is advised:
• Communications with external parties should be kept to a minimum, with close attention
paid to organising rendezvous points and waiting positions.
• Minimise the use of VHF and use email or a secure satellite telephone instead. Where
possible, only answer known or legitimate callers on the VHF and keep voyage critical
information to a minimum.
• Email correspondence to agents, charterers and chandlers should be controlled and
information within the email kept concise, containing the minimum that is contractually
required.
• Reminding crew of the dangers of posting voyage related information on social media.
STS Operations
• Review the threat assessment and security measures for the location of STS operations.
Offshore Terminals
• Review the threat assessment and security measures for the location of Offshore
Terminals.
12
Ship Master’s planning
Prior to entering the Voluntary Reporting Area
• Obtain the latest threat information.
• Check the latest NAVAREA warnings, alerts and the Inmarsat SafetyNet broadcasts.
• Implement VRA vessel registration and reporting requirements as highlighted in section 6
and annex D.
• If security services are used, confirm arrangements with the Private Maritime Security
Companies (PMSC).
• If used, rendezvous position and communication plan for Security Escort Vessels.
• Contingency plans if security services do not arrive or cannot meet operational
requirements.
• Confirm propulsion can operate at full speed.
• Implement security measures in accordance with the Ship Security Plan (SSP).
Brief crew and conduct drills
Crews should be made aware of the threat, risk and consequences along with available
resources to cope. Good practice guides can be found at https://www.seafarerswelfare.
org/resources
The crew should be fully briefed on the preparations and drills should be conducted with
the Ship Protection Measures (SPM) in place. The plan should be reviewed, and all crew
briefed on their duties, including familiarity with the alarm that signals an attack, an all-clear
situation and the appropriate response to each. The drills should test:
• The SPM, including testing the security of all access points.
• Lock down conditions, including crew safety considerations.
• The bridge team’s security knowledge and crew awareness.
• The crew’s understanding of required action in the event of an attack.
On entering the VRA
• Submit ship reports as highlighted in section 6 and annex D.
• Update and monitor latest threat information.
• Ensure all access points are limited and controlled.
• Minimise the use of VHF and use email or a secure satellite telephone instead. Where
possible, only answer known or legitimate callers on the VHF and keep ship, crew, cargo
and voyage-critical information to a minimum.
Security is a key part of any voyage plan.
13
Other considerations
• Prepare and test an emergency communication plan. Masters are advised to prepare an
emergency communication plan, to include all essential emergency contact numbers
(see annex A) and prepared messages, which should be at hand or permanently displayed
near all external communications stations including safe muster point and/or the citadel.
Communication devices and the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) should be tested.
• Define the ship’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) policy. It is recommended that AIS
should remain switched on throughout passages in the VRA to ensure reporting centres
and militaries can track the ship but restrict the data to ship’s identity, position, course,
speed, navigational status and safety related information.
• Reschedule planned maintenance on voyage critical equipment for transit through areas
identified in the risk assessment and have all equipment ready in the event of attack.
Location and Time at Anchor
• Keep time at anchor to a minimum.
• Anchor watch to be maintained.
• Avoid setting patterns.
• Consider use of “secure anchorage areas” operated by some countries in the region. More
information is contained in local Notice to Mariners or Admiralty Charts.
• Vessels are most vulnerable when stopped in the water, drifting, at anchor or carrying out
STS transfer, Single Buoy Mooring (SBM) operations or slowing down for pilot transfer.
Coordinated Arrival
Many vessels wait offshore and transit at high speed to arrive at any rendezvous point ‘Just
in Time’ including STS and/or Offshore Terminals. Some vessels tender a virtual Notice of
Readiness (NOR) whilst staying safely offshore, and both are accepted practice for many
vessels operating in the GoG.
Planning considerations for vessels permanently operating inside the VRA
Marine operations in the GoG region are diverse, covering many areas of activity including:
• Offshore supply.
• Diving & RoV Support.
• MODU/MOU.
• Pipe laying.
• Fishing vessels.
• Passenger vessels and ferries.
• Recreation craft.
14
In general, maritime security considerations for vessels permanently operating in the region
are not dissimilar to those for vessels visiting the region, its ports and harbours.
There is no set pattern to the location of attacks against vessels based and operating in the
region, but it should be assumed criminals are aware of the regular transit routes to offshore
installations, STS and ship waiting areas, fishing grounds and scheduled ferry routes.
15
Section 5
Ship Protection Measures
This section highlights proven SPM that provide layered protection. The BMP is based on
regional experience of attacks and will continue to evolve as methods change.
When considering SPM it is important to recognise that ships may be subject to attack whilst
underway or stationary. Ships are especially vulnerable when at anchor or when carrying
out STS or SBM operations.
A Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP) can ensure vessels are prepared for operations in areas of
increased threat and ought to be considered as part of voyage preparation. The requirement
for a VHP should be defined within the company management procedures for security. The
Company Security Officer (CSO) should be responsible for the plan, with the Master and
Ship Security Officer (SSO) reviewing the contents before transit or operation within known
security risk areas.
The implementation of SPM will be identified during the voyage planning process and
clearly marked on the VHP. Companies may wish to consider making further alterations
to the ship beyond the scope of this BMP, and/or providing additional equipment and/or
personnel as a means of further reducing the risk of attack.
Watch keeping and enhanced vigilance
Primary layer of defence
Good lookout/vigilance.
Razor wire.
Manoeuvring.
Speed/freeboard.
PCASP.
Secondary layer of defence
Door hardening.
Gate/grate.
Motion sensor/CCTV.
Last layer of defence
Internal door hardening.
Citadel/safe muster point.
Communication.
16
The Master should implement the following actions to assist in raising vigilance on board:
• Provide additional, fully briefed lookouts.
• Maintain an all-round lookout from an elevated position. During STS operations there is a
tendency for members of the crew to be looking “in” not “out”.
• Enhanced vigilance may be required for exposed fender and mooring stations where SPM
have been removed.
• Consider shorter rotation of the watch period to maximise alertness of the lookouts.
• Maintain sufficient binoculars for the enhanced bridge team, preferably anti-glare.
• Consider the use of thermal imagery optics and night vision aids as they provide a reliable
all-weather, day and night surveillance capability.
• Maintain a careful radar watch and monitor all navigational safety warnings and
communications, particularly VHF and GMDSS alerts.
• Consider placing well-constructed dummies at strategic locations around the ship to give
the impression of greater numbers of crew on watch.
• Consider using CCTV and fixed search lights for better monitoring. Fixed search lights can
deter approaches from the stern.
• Consider mounting anti-piracy mirrors on
the bridge wings to make looking aft easier.
• The accommodation and pilot ladders, if
rigged, should be kept at main deck level
and lowered when required only.
• When in port:
— Access to the vessel must be
controlled.
— Regular security rounds should be
conducted.
• Ensure the crew, especially those assigned to Security Duties are well rested.
Manoeuvring
The Master and Officers should practice manoeuvring the ship to ensure familiarity with
the ship’s handling characteristics. The Master should also practice avoidance manoeuvres
while maintaining the best possible speed. Experience has shown that such action can
defeat even a lengthy and determined attack as the effect of hydrostatic pressure between
vessels can have a better defensive impact than speed.
A proper lookout is the most effective method of ship protection.
It can help identify a suspicious approach or attack early on, which
allows defences to be deployed.
17
Alarms
The ship’s alarms inform the crew that an attack is underway and warn the attacker that
the ship is aware and is reacting. In addition, continuous sounding of the ship’s whistle may
distract the attackers.
It is important that:
• The alarms are distinctive to avoid confusion.
• Crew members are familiar with each alarm, especially those warning of an attack and
indicating ‘all clear’.
• All alarms are backed up by an announcement over the accommodation and deck PA
system, where fitted.
• Drills are carried out to ensure that the alarm is heard throughout the ship. The drill will
confirm the time necessary for all crew to move to a position of safety.
Physical barriers
Physical barriers are intended to make it as difficult as possible for attackers to gain access
to ships by increasing the difficulty of the climb. When planning the placement of barriers,
special consideration should be given to ships with sunken poop decks.
Razor wire
Razor wire creates an effective barrier only if properly rigged and secured. The quality of
razor wire varies considerably and lower quality razor wire is less effective. The following is
recommended:
• Use a high tensile concertina razor wire with coil diameters of 730mm or 980mm. This is
difficult to cut with hand tools.
• Use a double roll. If this is not possible,
place a single high-quality roll outboard of
the ship’s structure.
• Secure razor wire to the ship properly, to
prevent attackers pulling the wire off. For
example, attach at least every third wire
ring to ship’s railings and rig a steel cable
through its core.
• Use personal protective equipment and
wire hooks to move and install razor wire.
18
• Obtain razor wire in short sections, e.g.
10m, so that it is easier and safer to move.
• Keep razor wire clear of mooring fairleads
when at terminals so that it does not
interfere with mooring operations or chafe
mooring ropes.
Other physical barriers
Other barriers have proven effective –
from hanging swinging obstacles over
the gunwales to specifically designed
overhanging protection that prevents
boarding by climbing over the ship’s rails.
19
Water spray and foam monitors
• The use of water spray and/or foam
monitors is effective in deterring or
delaying any attempt to illegally board a
ship. The use of water can make it difficult
for an unauthorised boat to remain
alongside and makes it significantly more
difficult to climb aboard.
• It is recommended hoses and foam
monitors (delivering water) are fixed in
position to cover likely access routes and
are remotely operated. Manual activation is
not recommended as this may place the
operator in an exposed position.
• Improved water coverage may be
achieved by using fire hoses in jet mode
and using baffle plates fixed a short
distance in front of the nozzle.
• Water cannons deliver water in a vertical
sweeping arc and protect a greater part of
the hull.
• Water spray rails with spray nozzles
produce a water curtain covering larger
areas.
• Foam can be used, but it must be in
addition to a ship’s standard firefighting
equipment stock. Foam is disorientating
and very slippery.
• The use of all available fire and general
service pumps may be required to ensure all defences operate efficiently.
• Additional power may be required when using pumps; the supporting systems should be
ready for immediate use.
• Practice, observation and drills are required to ensure the equipment provides effective
coverage of vulnerable areas.
20
Enhanced bridge protection
The bridge is usually the focal point of an
attack. In some situations, attackers direct
their weapon fire at the bridge to intimidate
the ship’s crew to slow or stop the ship. If
pirates board the ship, they usually make for
the bridge to enable them to take control.
The following enhancements may be
considered:
• Bridge windows are laminated but further
protection against flying glass can be
provided by the application of blast
resistant film.
• Fabricated metal (steel/aluminium) plates
for the side and rear bridge windows and
the bridge wing door windows, which can
be quickly secured in place in the event
of an attack, can greatly reduce the risk of
injury from fragmentation.
• Chain link fencing can be used to reduce the effects of an RPG.
• Sandbags can provide additional protection on the bridge wings. They should be regularly
checkedtoensurethattheyhavenotdegraded.
• The vulnerability of bridge doors should be
considered. Any physical barrier should not
impede access to life saving appliances.
Control of access to accommodation
and machinery spaces
It is important to control access routes to the
accommodation and machinery spaces to
deter or delay entry. Effort must be directed
at denying access to these spaces.
• Escape routes must remain accessible to
seafarers in the event of an emergency.
• Where the door or hatch is located on an
escape route from a manned compartment,
it is essential that it can be opened from the
inside. Where the door or hatch is locked,
it is essential that a means of opening the
door from the inside is available.
21
• Doors and hatches providing access to the
bridge, accommodation and machinery
spaces should be properly secured to
prevent them being opened from the
outside.
• Once doors and hatches are secured, a
designated and limited number are used
for security patrols and routine access. The
use of these doors or hatches should be
controlled by the Officer of the Watch.
• Block external stairs or remove ladders on
the accommodation block to prevent use and to restrict external access to the bridge.
• Doors and hatches that must be closed for watertight integrity should be fully dogged
down in addition to any locks. Where possible, additional securing mechanisms, such as
wire strops, may be used.
• Removable barriers should be used around pilot boarding points so that a ship does not
need to de-rig large areas prior to arrival at ports.
• Pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The fitting of
steel bars to portholes and windows will prevent this.
• Procedures for controlling access to accommodation, machinery spaces and storerooms
should be briefed to the crew.
• The attackers must be denied access to
ship propulsion.
Safe muster points and/or citadels
The company risk assessment and planning
process should identify the location of a safe
muster point and/or a citadel within a ship.
Experience shows these safe areas are
effective.
Safe muster points
A safe muster point is:
• A designated area chosen to provide
maximum physical protection to the crew and will be identified during the planning
process.
• An area where crew not required on the bridge or the engine room control room will
muster if the ship is under threat.
• A short-term safe haven, which will provide protection should the attackers commence
firing weapons.
22
Citadels
A citadel is a designated area where, in the event of imminent boarding, all crew may seek
protection. A citadel is designed and constructed to resist forced entry. The use of a citadel
cannot guarantee a military or law enforcement response.
Well-constructed citadels with reliable communications (ideally satellite phone and VHF)
must be supplied with food, water and sanitation. Control of propulsion and steering can
offer effective protection during an attack. If citadels are used, they must complement, not
replace, all other SPM.
The use of the citadel must be drilled and include a lockdown plan and procedures should
define the conditions and supporting logistics for its use.
It is important to note that military forces are likely to apply the following criteria before
boarding a ship:
• All the crew must be accounted for and confirmed in the citadel.
• Two-way communication with the citadel.
Citadel Management
The decision to send the crew to the citadel rests with the Master of the vessel. When
considering the use of a citadel in the Gulf of Guinea it is important to consider how and
when the crew exit the citadel and regain control of the vessel once the perpetrators have
left. Experience has shown rescue forces are unlikely to arrive before the perpetrators have
left the vessel or may not arrive at all.
23
Planning Considerations
• If military or law enforcement do not respond to an incident, is a plan in place for exiting
the citadel?
• To aid situational awareness on the vessel:
— A CCTV feed in the citadel can provide awareness of activity on the vessel.
— Transmit the vessel’s CCTV feed to Company HQ who can monitor and advise when
safe to leave the citadel.
— Ensure contact details for company, Flag State and MDAT-GoG are available in the
citadel.
Other measures
Closed circuit television
Once an attack is underway it may be difficult to assess whether the attackers have gained
access to the ship. The use of closed circuit television (CCTV) coverage allows a degree of
monitoring of the progress of the attack from a less exposed position. Some companies
can monitor and record the CCTV from ashore, which will be of value when provided to the
military. The following should be considered:
• CCTV cameras for coverage of vulnerable areas, particularly the poop deck and bridge.
• CCTV monitors located on the bridge and at the safe muster point/citadel.
• CCTV footage may provide useful evidence after an attack and should be retained.
Lighting
• Lighting is important. The ability to turn off all internal accommodation lights to deter
pirates from entering or disorientate those who may already have entered. The following
is recommended:
Underway
• At night, only navigation lights should be exhibited and remain on at all times.
• If fitted, search lights should be ready for immediate use.
• Once attackers have been identified or an attack commences, over side lighting, if fitted,
should be switched on. This will dazzle the attackers and help the ship’s crew to see them.
At anchor
• At anchor, lights should be left on as well-lit ships are less vulnerable to attack.
• Over side lighting should be kept on at all times during hours of darkness.
The Master should decide when to use the citadel.
24
Deny the use of ship’s tools and equipment
It is important to secure ship’s tools or equipment that may be used to gain entry to the
ship. Tools and equipment that may be of use to attackers should be stored in a secure
location.
Protection of equipment stored on the upper deck
• Consideration should be given to providing ballistic protection to protect gas cylinders or
containers of flammable liquids.
• Excess gas cylinders should be stored in a secure location or, if possible, landed prior to
transit.
Ship-to-Ship operations
• For vessels involved in STS operations, attackers have boarded via the Yokohama
fenders. When rigging or tending fenders, razor wire may well interfere with operational
requirements.
• The use of a chain link fence, particularly if topped with razor wire, attached to the ship’s
side rails and supplemented by stanchions in the vicinity of the Yokohama fenders
provides an effective deterrent to potential boarders. Care must be taken at the interface
between the chain link fence and razor wire to ensure that the best possible protection is
assured.
• The use of gratings, (particularly Glass Reinforced Plastic gratings for ease of fitting) may
be secured in way of open panama or roller fairleads which will further deter any potential
boarding.
• An additional deterrent in the vicinity of Yokohama fenders, and ship’s fairleads could be
the use of water spray.
• The hawse pipe should be properly secured to prevent unauthorised access. Use of the
anchor wash may also provide a deterrent.
• The main engines should be kept at immediate notice so the Master has the option of
getting underway in the event of an incident.
• Crew engaged in security duties should not be given other responsibilities.
Floating (Production) Storage & Offloading (F(P)SO) – Security Measures
F(P)SOs and vessels supporting offshore facilities are vulnerable.
F(P)SO Maritime Safety Zone
Procedures for establishing a vessel safety zone surrounding the F(P)SO that is monitored
and continuously controlled for unauthorised vessel entry should be in place. These
procedures should include communication checkpoints, means for vessel identification/
validation prior approval for entry. UNCLOS article 60.5 should be referenced. Preferably, all
vessels approaching within 2NM are monitored and then communicated with/challenged/
validated prior to entering in 1NM of the Safety Zone.
25
There should be means to continuously
monitor and detect vessels approaching the
F(P)SO’s Safety Zone. These may include:
• A proper radar watch.
• 360 degree CCTV coverage of F(P)SO
surroundings with thermal imaging
target detection/alarming for night time
surveillance.
• Dedicated security vessel(s) for continuous
patrol and surveillance.
F(P)SO Security Plan
The Security Plan should include:
• Management roles, responsibilities and clearly defined actions taken for threat level and
escalation.
• Compliance with measures to enhance maritime security as detailed in the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 (as amended) and Parts A/B of the
ISPS Code.
F(P)SOs not required to comply with the SOLAS and ISPS Code requirements should still
consider them when developing security plans.
F(P)SO Access Control
Procedures for controlling access should be established and should consider:
• Induction/familiarisation briefing.
• Designation and marking of areas restricted to authorised personnel.
• System for monitoring physical control and access barriers.
• Identity verification of F(P)SO personnel, contractors, vessel staff and visitors.
• Personnel safety and security requirement briefings.
F(P)SO Perimeter Detection Systems
Perimeter and access points from the water such as boat landings and stair towers, as
well as vulnerable areas such as mooring chain fairleads, tanker hawser and marine hose
connections and riser porches should be equipped with threat detection and deterrent
equipment such as:
• 360 degree perimeter lighting.
• CCTV coverage with thermal imaging target detection/alarming.
• Electronic motion detection with visual and audible alarm.
26
• Depending on threat level – dedicated security person(s) posted to monitor and detect
threats by sight and or through threat detection equipment.
• Search lighting (spotlights) capable of scanning 365 degrees of F(P)SO’s surrounding
waters. Spot light control can be locally but preferably controlled remotely.
F(P)SO Barriers
Perimeter
Vulnerable access points should be equipped
with physical hard barriers such as:
• Security fencing and hard bars.
• Razor or concertina wire.
Accommodation, Control Room and
Machinery Spaces
Hard barriers for access points including
port holes/window glass may include:
• Doors without windows being internally
secured.
• Personnel access points being limited to
single point of entry and secured during
night time operations.
• All windows/port holes secured to prevent
access if glass can be broken.
• All cargo and machinery hatches locked internally and easy to unlock in an emergency.
F(P)SO Citadel
F(P)SOs should have a centralised, hardened safe haven (citadel). The citadel should be:
• A hardened room that prevents penetration by small firearms and forceful entry.
• Big enough to safely accommodate all personnel on board.
• Free of dangerous fire suppression systems (CO2).
• Equipped with internal and external communications.
• Supplied with water, medical and toilet facilities.
• Able to access security CCTV and F(P)SO Emergency Shut Down and emergency systems
controls.
27
Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC)
PMSCs may offer security services and the provision of Security Escort Vessels (SEVs).
BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of a PMSC or the use of SEVs. This is
a decision taken by individual ship operators after carrying out a thorough risk assessment
and in conjunction with permissions from the ship’s Flag State, the hull and cargo insurance,
P&I club and any littoral states.
Any decision to engage the services of a PMSC should consider:
• Coastal state legislation and law enforcement practices.
• The threat and risk environment.
• The output of the company risk assessment.
• Voyage plan requirements.
• Type of operations, e.g. seismic survey or cable laying.
• Levels of protection provided by navies, coastguards and maritime police.
Security Escort Vessels
BMP does not recommend or endorse the general use of SEVs to accompany merchant
ships; this is a decision taken by individual ship operators.
A contract for the provision of SEVs must:
• Not prejudice the ship’s insurance cover arrangements.
• Ensure the PMSC has insurance policies that are current and compliant with the
requirements of the contract.
• Ensure the PMSC can legally operate the SEV in accordance with coastal state law.
• Ensure the SEV is fit for purpose.
Experience has shown some providers operate substandard SEVs. Therefore, any decision to
engage the services of SEVs should consider the guidance above for PMSC as well ensuring
the vessel operator:
• Has a robust quality assurance programme;
• A robust maintenance programme and;
• A record of inspection.
Companies should check the credentials and licences/
permits of the PMSC.
28
Operating with Security EscortVessels
• The escort plan, RV position and
communication arrangements should be
agreed in advance.
• Planning should consider that SEVs may
have operating restrictions.
• Regular communication should be
maintained.
• The SEV will be positioned to defend
the vessel at all times and be reactive to
intercept any approaching suspicious
craft.
• Authorisation to use force rests with the
military detachment onboard the SEV.
• The Master/Bridge Crew can aid the SEV
with early detection and warning.
• SEV should not enter any designated oil
terminal exclusion zone.
29
Section 6
Reporting
All ships using the VRA are strongly encouraged to inform MDAT-GoG of their movement
as this is essential to improve military situational awareness and their ability to respond.
Once ships have commenced their passage it is important this reporting continues and the
guidelines in this section and annex D are adopted to ensure common understanding.
MDAT-GoG
MDAT-GoG acts as the primary point of contact for merchant ships and their CSOs, providing
liaison with military forces in the region. MDAT-GoG administers the Voluntary Reporting
Scheme, under which merchant ships are encouraged to send regular reports. These
include:
1. Initial report (upon entering the VRA).
2. Daily reports (update on ship’s position, course and speed).
3. Final reports (upon departure from VRA or arrival in port).
4. Reports of suspicious/irregular activity (when necessary).
MDAT-GoG is able to communicate with ships and CSOs directly, in order to disseminate
Warnings and Advisories of incidents within the region:
• Warnings: Simple messages describing that an incident has occurred in a Lat/Long and
with a time. This is normally accompanied by direct MDAT-GoG to-ship telephone calls to
all ships within a nominated radius of the incident to give ships the earliest possible alert.
• Advisories: This is the next tier of alerts to ships, normally of sightings/ reports that are
relevant within the region.
MDAT-GoG offers regular information to ships on its website https://gog-mdat.org/home
and in a weekly report summarising the previous week’s activity. MDAT-GoG can offer
Masters and CSOs the opportunity to conduct drills and exercises to support their passage
planning in the region. Companies interested in this can make contact on a dedicated
exercise line; +33 298 221302.
Ships and their operators should submit vessel position
reporting forms to MDAT-GoG.
30
The role of the seafarer in improving maritime safety and security in the
region
Although some of the maritime threats and crimes committed do not directly endanger
seafarers, there is the opportunity for them to contribute to maritime security.
Experience has shown that maritime security cannot be improved by the actions of law
enforcement agencies and militaries alone; seafarers operating in the region can help.
Masters are encouraged to report suspicious activity and provide as much detail as possible.
If it is possible to do so without compromising safety, photographs, video and radar plot
data of suspicious activity are of enormous value to the responsible authorities. If there is
any doubt as to whether the activity is suspicious, ships are encouraged to report.
Reporting suspicious activity to MDAT-GoG
MDAT-GoG and the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC) can advise on the types of
activity of interest to the regional maritime community. A guide to help identify suspicious
activity is in annex C and the suspicious/irregular activity report is in annex D. Often,
seafarers do not report suspicious activity as they may be concerned observations could
lead to further investigations by Port States and possible delay to the ship. Suspicious
activity/attack reports should be sent to MDAT-GoG at the earliest opportunity, to allow
assistance to be sought.
MDAT-GoG will forward information received in an anonymised form to the most appropriate
agency empowered to act. While suspicious activity may appear inconsequential, when
added to other reports it may be extremely valuable.
Reporting specific vessel sightings and/or activity as requested to
MDAT-GoG
MDAT-GoG may seek the assistance of vessels reporting to the centre to try to locate
specific ships. These are usually vessels that cannot be found on electronic systems
such as AIS. Sometimes the request for information will come directly from MDAT-GoG
when, for example, a vessel may have been hijacked and its whereabouts unknown. On
other occasions MDAT-GoG may be requested to assist in locating a vessel or seek further
information on a vessel by INTERPOL, when an INTERPOL “Purple Notice” has been issued.
When MDAT-GoG is seeking further information on a vessel it will contact vessels reporting to
it in the VRA for support.
31
Section 7
Ships under attack
General
A ship may come under attack with little or no warning. Effective lookouts, both visual and
radar, will help to ensure early detection.
Mother ships
Mother ships have been used in the GoG acting as a base to launch and resupply pirate skiff
operations. Mother ships can vary in vessel type and have included offshore supply vessels,
fishing vessels or other smaller merchant vessels. Caution must be taken when detecting
merchant ships drifting in the area.
Piracy or armed robbery attacks
Pirates carrying weapons do not usually open fire until they are very close to the ship, e.g.
within two cables.
Use whatever time is available, no matter how short, to activate any additional protective
measures and plans. This will make it clear to the attackers that they have been seen, the
ship is prepared and will resist attempts to board.
In the event of a suspicious approach, or if in any doubt,
call MDAT-GoG without delay.
32
Approach stage
Effective lookouts, using all available means,
will aid in the early identification of an
approaching threat. The nature and intention
of the suspicious vessel will only become
apparent as it approaches.
In all cases, the following steps should be
taken:
• Sound the emergency alarm and make an
attack announcement, in accordance with
the ship’s emergency communication plan.
• Make a mayday call on VHF Ch. 16. Send a
distress message via the Digital Selective
Calling (DSC) system and Inmarsat-C, as
applicable.
• Activate the SSAS.
• If not already at full speed, increase to
maximum to open the distance.
• Steer a straight course to achieve
maximum speed quickly.
• Initiate the ship’s emergency procedures.
• Activate the emergency communication
plan.
Report the attack immediately to MDAT-GoG
by telephone +33 298 228888 and email
watchkeepers@mdat-gog.org
• Ensure the AIS is switched on.
• Activate water spray.
• Ensure that all external doors and, where possible, internal public rooms and cabins are
fully secured.
• All crew not required on the bridge or in the engine room should muster at the safe muster
point or citadel as instructed by the Master.
• When sea and navigational conditions allow, consider altering course to increase an
approaching skiff’s exposure to wind/waves.
• Sound the ship’s whistle/foghorn continuously to demonstrate to any potential attacker
that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it.
• Check Vessel Data Recorder (VDR) is recording and the data saved.
33
Attack stage
As the attackers get close to the ship, the
following steps should be taken:
• Reconfirm all ship’s crew are in the safe
muster point or citadel as instructed by the
Master.
• Report the attack immediately to
MDAT-GoG +33 298 228888 by telephone.
• As the attackers close in on the ship,
Masters should commence small
alterations of helm whilst maintaining
speed to deter skiffs from lying alongside
the ship in preparation for a boarding
attempt. These manoeuvres will create
additional wash to impede the operation
of the skiffs.
• Large amounts of helm are not
recommended, as these are likely to
significantly reduce a ship’s speed.
• SEV if present, will conduct themselves as
governed by their rules of engagement.
Actions on illegal boarding
If the ship is boarded, the following actions
should be taken:
• Take all way off the ship and then stop the
engines.
• Muster the crew in the citadel or safe
muster point.
• Use all available means to establish
communications from the citadel with
MDAT-GoG and company to confirm all
crew are accounted for and in the citadel
or safe muster point.
• Stay in the citadel until conditions force
you to leave or as advised by the military
or company.
• If any member of the crew is captured it
should be considered that the attackers
have full control of the ship.
34
If control of the ship is lost
All movement should be calm, slow and very deliberate. Crew members should keep their
hands visible always and comply fully. This will greatly reduce the risk of violence.
Experience has shown that the pirates will be aggressive, highly agitated and possibly under
the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Kidnap and ransom
One reason for attacking a ship off West Africa is to remove the crew ashore for ransom.
Each company or organisation should have measures in place to cover the eventualities of
kidnap. The following principles serve as guidelines to surviving a kidnapping.
DO be patient.
DO keep mentally active/occupied.
DO keep track of time.
DO reduce stress where possible by remaining physically
active.
DO remain calm and retain dignity.
DO be positive (remember, authorities are working tirelessly
to release you).
DO remember to leave any CCTV or audio recording devices
running.
DO exactly what the attackers ask and comply with their
instruction.
DO eat and drink when offered.
DO take essential medical supplies if moved ashore.
DO NOT take photographs.
DO NOT attempt to engage attackers.
DO NOT make movements which could be misinterpreted as
being aggressive.
DO NOT be confrontational.
DO NOT resist.
35
If kidnapped
In the event of military intervention
On receipt of information involving an attack or attempted attack on a vessel or offshore
platform, the MDAT-GoG/Regional reporting Centres/IMB PRC will immediately inform all
relevant regional and national Maritime Operation Centres who may respond if the incident
is within their area of jurisdiction and authority.
Reporting Centres do not have inherent response capability or the ability or mandate
to coordinate any response activity, especially inside a nation’s territorial waters. This
is the responsibility of the national authority with jurisdiction in the area. On the high
seas, activities may be coordinated by national authorities. For this reason, reporting any
suspicious/attempted or actual approach/attacks immediately to MDAT-GoG/Regional
reporting Centres/IMB PRC, using all available means, is important.
Advance warning of military or law enforcement intervention may be difficult without
detection and may add pressure on the crew. If the onset of military or law enforcement
action is suspected, the following should be considered:
Brief and prepare the ship’s crew to cooperate fully during any military action onboard and
instruct the crew as follows:
DO NOT offer resistance.
DO NOT argue with pirates or your colleagues.
DO NOT take photographs.
DO NOT hide valuables.
DO NOT react emotionally.
DO NOT take drugs or alcohol.
DO NOT bargain with pirates for personal privileges.
DO keep low to the deck and cover head with both hands.
DO keep hands visible.
DO be prepared to be challenged on your identity.
DO cooperate fully with military forces.
36
Post incident actions and reporting
A difficult period may follow an attack, as companies, Master and crew recover from the
ordeal. It is important that seafarers receive timely and proper medical assessments and
care, both physical and mental, following an attack or hostage situation. Companies should
have emergency management plans in place to manage the effects of an attack from any
of the identified threats on one of their ships. These plans should include the management
of a long, drawn-out hostage negotiation situation, including support for the families of the
kidnapped crew.
To give the investigating authorities the best chance of apprehending the perpetrators, it is
important that evidence is preserved in the correct manner. Companies, Masters and crew
should refer to IMO Guidelines on Preservation and Collection of Evidence A28/Res. 1091 and
other industry guidance.
Following any attack or suspicious activity, and after initial reporting of the event, it is vital
that a detailed report is completed. A copy of the report should be sent to the company,
the Flag State and appropriate authorities. It is important that any report is detailed and
comprehensive. This will assist with full analysis and trends in threat activity.
Without supporting evidence, including witness statements from those affected by the
incident, suspects are unlikely to be prosecuted.
Protection of evidence
The Master and crew can protect a crime scene until the nominated law enforcement agency
arrives by following these basic principles:
• Preserve the crime scene and all evidence if possible.
• Avoid contaminating or interfering with all possible evidence – if in doubt, do not touch
and leave items in place.
DO NOT make movements that could be interpreted as
aggressive.
DO NOT take photographs.
DO NOT get involved in activity with military forces unless
specifically instructed to.
The collection and protection of evidence is critical.
37
• Do not clean up the area, including hosing it down. Do not throw anything away, no
matter how unimportant it may seem.
• Take initial statements from the crew.
• Take photographs of the crime scene from multiple viewpoints.
• Protect VDR for future evidence.
• Make a list of items taken (e.g. mobile phones with numbers).
• Facilitate access to the crime scene and relevant documentation for law enforcement
authorities.
• Make crew available for interview by law enforcement authorities.
Investigation
The quality of the evidence provided and the availability of the crew to testify will
significantly help any investigation or prosecution that follows.
Following any attack or incident, the investigating authority will be determined by external
factors including:
• Flag State.
• Ownership.
• Crew nationality.
The lead law enforcement agency will talk to the Master and crew to understand the
sequence and circumstances of the event.
In a post hostage situation, law enforcement authorities may ask to conduct post-release
crew debriefs and to collect evidence for investigations and prosecutions following captivity.
Advice
INTERPOL has a secure website to provide support to ship operators who have had their
ships hijacked. INTERPOL’s Maritime Task Force can assist in taking the appropriate steps
to preserve the integrity of the evidence left behind at the crime scene. INTERPOL has a
Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC) that supports any of the 188 member countries
faced with a crisis or requiring urgent operational assistance. The CCC operates in all four of
Thorough investigation using all available
evidence is critical.
Seafarers should always be treated with respect and as
victims of crime.
38
INTERPOL’s official languages (English, French, Spanish and Arabic) and is staffed 24 hours
a day, 365 days a year. It is recommended that ship operators contact INTERPOL as soon as
possible and certainly within three days of a hijacking of their ship.
INTERPOL may also be consulted to discuss recommended practices for the preservation of
evidence that could be useful to law enforcement agents pursuing an investigation. Contact
details are: os-ccc@interpol.int; +33 472 44 7676.
Seafarer welfare
Seafarers and their families often have difficulty in expressing the need for assistance or even
recognising that they need assistance following exposure to a security threat. The company
should monitor the health, both physical and mental, of those exposed to piracy and
other maritime security threats and, if necessary, provide independent support and other
assistance, as may be appropriate. There are a range of humanitarian programmes aimed
at assisting seafarers and their families affected by piracy or maritime crime, including the
International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network and The Mission to Seafarers. See
www.seafarerswelfare.org and www.missiontoseafarers.org
After care of seafarers suffering violent attack is important and
should not be neglected.
39
Annex A
Contact details
Emergency contacts
MDAT-GoG
Email watchkeepers@mdat-gog.org
Telephone (24hrs) +33 298 228888
Website https://gog-mdat.org/home
International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
Email piracy@icc-ccs.org
Telephone +60 3 2031 0014
Fax +60 3 2078 5769
Telex MA34199 IMBPC1
Website www.icc-ccs.org
Useful contacts
INTERPOL Command and Coordination Centre
Email os-ccc@interpol.int
Telephone (24hrs) +33 472 44 76 76
Website www.interpol.int
Yaoundé Principal Centres
ICC
Email info@icc-gog.org
Telephone +237 696281947
+237 222217529
(From Monday to Friday, 0830 hours to 1800 (local)
40
ANGOLA
Luanda Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC)
Email kangamiala@hotmail.com
Telephone +244 2 2239 1399
+ 244 2 2233 0430
LIBERIA
Monrovia Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination
Centre (RMRCC)
Email mrcc.monrovia@yahoo.com
IOR INMARSAT C Terminal One #463728971
AOR-E INMARSAT C Terminal Two #463728972
INMARSATSatellitePhone(EXPLORER710) #+870772700138
INMARSATSatellitePhone(EXPLORER700) #+870772700139
International Landline #(+231) 777 092229
International Cellular & SMS #(+231) 777 290158
Safety & Security Coordination VHF/DSC CH 16 (Distress)
CH 09 (Ship/Shore)
Maritime Security (RMRCC & Liberia CG) CH 14
Monrovia covers the territorial waters of Liberia and her neighbouring countries
– Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire
MOROCCO
Rabat Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
(MRCC)
Email mrcc.rabat@mpm.gov.mg
Telephone Emergency + 212 5 37 625877
Other + 212 5 37 625897
Rabat covers the territorial waters of Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea
Bissau, Gambia and Cape Verde
41
NIGERIA
Lagos Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
(RMRCC)/C4I Centre
Email rmrccnigeria@yahoo.com
Telephone (24hrs) +234 (1) 730 6618, +234 (1) 7053794383
The RMRCC Lagos covers nine countries (Benin, Cameroon, Republic of Congo,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, São
Tomé & Príncipe and Togo). The RMRCC is collocated with the Nigerian Deep
Blue Project C4I Centre.
SOUTH AFRICA
Cape Town Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
(MRCC)
Email mrcc.ct@samsa.org.za
Telephone + 27 21 938 3300 / + 27 21 938 3309
International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance
Network (ISWAN)
Email iswan@iswan.org.uk
Telephone +44(0) 300 012 4279
Website www.seafarerswelfare.org
42
Annex B
Maritime security charts
Maritime security charts contain safety-critical information to assist bridge crews in the
planning of safe passages through high risk areas. All information has been gathered by the
UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO) ensuring each chart has the most accurate, up-to-date and
verified information available.
The Security Chart for West Africa is the latest version of UKHO Chart Q6114 or SHOM Chart
8801CSD.
43
Each maritime security chart includes:
• Information about dangers to the security of navigation. This information, when used
alongside official navigational charts, can help to ensure the safety of ships, crew and
cargo.
• General security advice, self-protective measures, security procedures and regional
contacts, as well as routeing and reporting requirements implemented by military or
security forces.
Yaoundé Code of Conduct (CoC)
The Yaoundé CoC is an agreement between nations from West and Central Africa with
an intention to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of transnational
organised crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other illegal activities.
Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety & Security Space
The Economic Community, ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC agreed on a MoU to implement the
regional maritime strategy within the Central and African common maritime space. This
agreement created a number of Maritime Zones covering the overseen by an Interregional
Coordination Centre in Cameroon responsible for cooperation, coordination, pooling, and
interoperability of community assets.
Map courtesy of one earth FUTURE
44
Annex C
Common understanding
It is important to have a common understanding when reporting attacks and suspicious
activity.
The following are guidelines to assist in assessing what is an attack or what constitutes
suspicious activity:
Attacks
• The use of violence against the ship, its crew or cargo, or any attempt to use violence.
• Unauthorised attempts to board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are
pirates or other unauthorised persons.
• If weapons are fired.
• An actual boarding, whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not.
• Attempts to overcome the SPM using:
— Ladders
— Grappling hooks or other boarding equipment
Suspicious activity
• The number of crew onboard an approaching skiff relative to its size.
• The Closest Point of Approach.
• The existence of unusual and non-fishing equipment onboard, e.g. ladders, climbing
hooks or large amounts of fuel.
• One vessel towing multiple skiffs or has skiffs onboard.
• The type of vessel is unusual for the current location.
• Small boats operating at high speed.
• If a vessel appears unmanned.
• The vessel is not transmitting on AIS.
• Skiffs operating far from the coast.
• Vessels fishing outside of normal fishing zones.
• Windows of vessel covered or blanked out.
• Skiffs rafted up.
• No lights during hours of darkness.
• Skiffs with two or more outboard motors.
• Skiffs stopped in the water, no evidence of fishing.
45
• Packages hanging outboard of a vessel.
• Excessive communications antennas.
This is not an exhaustive list. Other events, activity and vessels may be deemed suspicious
by the Master of a merchant ship having due regard to their own seagoing experiences
within the region and information shared amongst the maritime community.
If in doubt, contact MDAT-GoG & REPORT!
46
Annex D
MDAT-GoG reporting forms
MDAT-GoG vessel position reporting forms
Once a ship has transmitted an initial report on entering the VRA, MDAT-GoG will request
daily reports be transmitted. Upon reaching port/anchorage or upon exiting the VRA,
MDAT-GoG will request a final report. The following forms are provided below and can be
requested by email to watchkeepers@mdat-gog.org
• Initial report.
• Daily report.
• Final report.
• Suspicious/irregular activity report.
• Follow Up Report.
MDAT-GoG vessel position reporting form – initial report
1 Ship Name
2 Flag
3 Call sign and IMO Number
4 INMARSAT Telephone Number
5 MMSI Number
6 Time
7 Position
8 Course
9 Speed
10 Maximum Speed
11 Freeboard
12 Cargo
13 Destination and estimated time of arrival
14 Name and contact details of the CSO
15 Nationality of Master and crew
16 Will Security Services be used?
47
MDAT-GoG vessel position reporting form – daily/transit position report
1 Ship Name
2 Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
3 Time of Report in UTC
4 Ship’s Position
5 Ship’s Course and Speed
6 Any other important information*
7 Date/time leaving VRA if applicable
*Preferred time for transmitting the daily report is 1200UTC.
*Other important information could be change of destination or ETA etc.
MDAT-GoG vessel position reporting form – final report
1 Ship’s name
2 Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
3 Time of Report in UTC
4 Port or anchorage position when leaving the voluntary reporting area
MDAT-GoG suspicious/irregular activity report
1 Own ship’s name
2 Own ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number
3 Time of Report in UTC
4 Own ship’s Position
5 Own ship’s Course and Speed
6 Sighting of suspicious activity. Time, position, brief description of craft and
activity witnessed
Note: Where possible include any imagery to aid military appreciation.
Threats to Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea are complex and often result in harm
to seafarers. Masters are encouraged to report any signs of suspicious activity.
Follow-up report to MDAT-GoG and IMB PRC
Following any attack or suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed report of the event is
provided to MDAT-GoG and the IMB. The appropriate and relevant information from an
incident will be used to support INTERPOL and regional law enforcement investigations.
48
General Details
1 Name of Ship:
2 IMO No:
3 Flag:
4 Call Sign:
5 Type of Ship:
6 Tonnages: GRT:
NRT: DWT:
7 Owner (Address & Contact Details):
8 Manager (Address & Contact Details):
9 Last Port/Next Port:
10 Cargo Details (Type/Quantity):
Details of Incident
1 Date & Time of Incident: LT UTC
2 Position: Lat:
(N/S) Long: (E/W)
3 Nearest Land Mark/Location:
4 Port/Town/Anchorage Area:
5 Country/Nearest Country:
6 Status (Berth/Anchored/Steaming):
7 Own Ship’s Speed:
8 Ship’s Freeboard During Attack:
9 Weather During Attack (Rain/Fog/Mist/Clear/etc, Wind (Speed and
Direction), Sea/Swell Height):
10 Types of Attack (Boarded/Attempted/Other):
11 Consequences for Crew, Ship and Cargo: Any Crew Injured/Killed:
Items/Cash Stolen:
12 Area of the Ship Attacked:
13 Last Observed Movements of Suspect Craft:
14 Type of Suspicious vessel (Fishing Vessel, Merchant Vessel):
15 Description of Suspicious vessel (Colour, Name, Distinguishing Features):
16 Course and Speed of Suspicious vessel when sighted:
49
Details of Attackers (if applicable)
17 Number of Attackers:
18 Dress/Physical Appearance:
19 Language Spoken:
20 Weapons Used:
21 Distinctive Details:
22 Craft Used:
23 Method of Approach:
24 Duration of Attack:
25 Aggressive/Violent:
Further Details
1 Action Taken by Master and Crew and its effectiveness:
2 Was Incident Reported to the Coastal Authority? If so to whom?
3 Preferred Communications with Reporting Ship: Appropriate Coast Radio
Station/HF/MF/VHF/INMARSAT IDS (Plus Ocean Region Code)/ MMSI
4 Action Taken by the Authorities:
5 Number of Crew/Nationality:
6
Please Attach with this Report – A Brief Description/Full Report/Master
– Crew Statement of the Attack/Photographs taken if any.
7 Details of Ship Protection Measures.
50
Annex E
Other maritime security threats
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing
IUU fishing is a significant problem in West Africa. Illegal catches have a detrimental effect on
economic development and fish stocks. IUU threatens to contaminate the supply chain and
potentially prevent the legitimate export of products to the international market.
IUU fishing in the VRA involves extensive use of fraudulently issued licenses, as well as
blatant unlicensed fishing and illegal trans-shipping between purse seiners and reefers at
sea.
It is important for the mariner to understand how the fishing vessels that have been involved
in criminal activity directly affect seafarers on other vessels. Fishing vessels have, on a
number of occasions, been used to facilitate attacks on other vessels. It is also recognised
that fishing vessels are occasionally used in smuggling activities and have been involved in
the receipt of stolen bunker fuel by at sea STS.
For mariners to understand what suspicious fishing vessel activity is, it is important to be
familiar with normal fishing activity. More information on normal fishing activity is available
on the MDAT-GoG website.
Trafficking in narcotics
Trafficking of narcotics refers to the global illicit trade of illegal drugs. Maritime routes
through the waters off Africa’s western seaboard are used as a staging post to traffic cocaine
and heroin between the sites of production to the main consumer markets. West Africa is
regarded as an important waypoint for traffickers because of inconsistent law enforcement
and the increasing production of illegal drugs within the region itself.
Narcotics transiting the VRA are often transported without the knowledge of the ship’s
owner, operator or Master on internationally trading vessels, in sealed containers that are
supposed to be carrying legitimate cargo. Container vessels may unknowingly transport
cocaine from producers in South America to Western and Southern Africa, from there it is
transported to consumers in Europe. Recent seizures of heroin at port and at sea in West
Africa are indicative of the growing use of maritime trafficking routes between production
sites in Central and South-East Asia and markets in North America. While transshipment of
some narcotics has been reduced by successful intervention and legal action, the movement
of large quantities of cocaine gives authorities cause for concern with an increase in
quantities seized from shipping containers in West Africa.
51
Illegal drugs are also moved by much smaller vessels for transshipment or cross decking to
other craft for onward conveyance.
The responsibility to disrupt drug trafficking operations in West Africa rests with law
enforcement in the region. The shipping industry can support interdiction efforts by
remaining alert to and reporting suspicious activity to the MDAT-GoG who are able to inform
the appropriate authorities.
Human smuggling, trafficking and Stowaways
The smuggling and trafficking of persons are distinct crimes, but closely linked. Human or
migrant smuggling involves the illegal movement of willing and thus complicit persons over
an international border. Trafficking of persons does not necessarily involve the crossing
of an international border and, unlike human smuggling, involves an element of force,
coercion or fraud; people being trafficked are the victims, rather than complicit in the crime.
Should a person be smuggled into a country they can become a victim of trafficking through
subsequent exploitation.
The trafficking or smuggling of illegal migrants along maritime routes often involves the
use of unsafe and crowded vessels, which drastically increases the risk of an incident at
sea. Guidance from the IMO is that the shipping industry should be ready to provide all
possible assistance to persons in distress at sea, so that they can be rescued and receive fair
treatment once safely ashore. This principle is enshrined in international law.
52
Annex F
Additional guidance for vessels
engaged in fishing
This guidance for vessels engaged in fishing has been provided by the following national
fishing industry associations:
• OPAGAC – Organizacion de Productores Asociados de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores.
• ANABAC – Asociacion Nacional de Armadores de Buques Atuneros Congeladores.
Recommendations to vessels in fishing zones
• Do not start fishing operations when the radar indicates the presence of unidentified
boats.
• If polyester skiffs of a type typically used by pirates are sighted, move away from them at
full speed, sailing into the wind and sea to make their navigation more difficult.
• Avoid stopping at night. Be alert and maintain bridge, deck and engine- room watch.
• During fishing operations, when the vessel is more vulnerable, be alert and maintain radar
watch to give maximum notice to your crew and the state authorities if an attack is in
progress.
• While navigating at night, use only the mandatory navigation and safety lights to prevent
the glow of lighting attracting pirates, who are sometimes in boats without radar and are
waiting.
• If the vessel is drifting while fishing at night, keep guard at the bridge on deck and in the
engine room. Use only mandatory navigation and safety lights.
• The engine must be ready for an immediate start-up.
• Keep away from unidentified ships.
• Use VHF as little as possible to avoid being heard by pirates and to make location more
difficult.
• Activate the AIS when maritime patrol aircraft are operating in the area to facilitate
identification and tracking.
Identification
• Managers are strongly recommended to register their fishing vessels with MDAT-
GoG for the whole period of activity off the West Coast of Africa. This should include
communicating a full list of the crewmen on board and their vessels’ intentions, if
possible.
• Carry out training prior to passage or fishing operations in the area.
53
• Whenever fishing vessels are equipped with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) devices, their
manager should provide MDAT-GoG with access to VMS data.
• Fishing vessels should always identify themselves upon request from aircraft or ships from
any international or national anti-piracy operation.
• Military, merchant and fishing vessels should respond without delay to any identification
request made by a fishing vessel being approached (to facilitate early action to make
escape possible, especially if the vessel is fishing).
In case of attack
• In case of an attack or sighting a suspicious craft, warn the authorities (MDAT-GoG,
CRESMAC and CRESMAO) and the rest of the fleet.
• Communicate the contact details of the second Master of the vessel (who is on land)
whose knowledge of the vessel could contribute to the success of a military intervention.
• Recommendations only for Purse Seiners:
— Evacuate all crew from the deck and the crow’s nest.
— If pirates have taken control of the vessel and the purse seine is spread out,
encourage the pirates to allow the nets to be recovered. If recovery of the purse seine
is allowed, follow the instructions for its stowage and explain the functioning of the
gear to avoid misunderstanding.
54
Annex G
Additional advice for leisure craft,
including yachts
Leisure craft should make early contact in advance with the naval/military authorities to
determine if the VRA area is safe to transit; regional activity has indicated attacks occur on
both large and small vessels. Transit close to areas of conflict should be avoided. Close
contact should be maintained with MDAT-GoG throughout any voyage.
See the International Sailing Federation (www.sailing.org) for the most up-to-date
information.
55
Annex H
Definitions and abbreviations
Definitions
The following terms/definitions to categorise attacks and suspicious incidents that
are reported from shipping inside the VRA may be useful and ensures the consistent
identification of patterns and trends.
Armed robbery The Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships, highlights armed robbery against ships consists of:
• Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other
than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against
persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic
waters and territorial sea.
• Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.
Hijack A hijack is where attackers have boarded and taken control of a ship against the
crew’s will. Hijackers will not always have the same motive (armed robbery, cargo theft or
kidnapping).
Illegal boarding An illegal boarding is where attackers have boarded a ship but HAVE NOT
taken control. Command remains with the Master. The most obvious example of this is the
citadel scenario.
Maritime Safety Zone A safety zone is an area extending out from any part of an offshore
oil and gas installation (typically 500m) and is established automatically around all
installations which project above the sea at any state of the tide. These safety zones are
500m radius from a central point.
Piracy This is defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) (article 101). However, for the purposes of these BMP, it is important to provide
clear, practical, working guidance to the industry to enable accurate and consistent
assessment of suspicious activity and piracy attacks.
The following may assist in assessing a piracy attack. A piracy attack may include but is not
limited to:
• The use of violence against the ship or its personnel, or any attempt to use violence.
• Attempt(s) to illegally board the ship where the Master suspects the persons are pirates.
• An actual boarding, whether successful in gaining control of the ship or not.
• Attempts to overcome the SPM by the use of:
— Ladders.
56
— Grappling hooks.
— Weapons deliberately used against or at the ship.
Suspicious or aggressive approach Action taken by another craft may be deemed
suspicious if any of the following occur (the list is not exhaustive):
• A definite course alteration towards a ship associated with a rapid increase in speed by
the suspected craft, which cannot be accounted for by the prevailing conditions.
• Small craft sailing on the same course and speed for an uncommon period and distance,
not in keeping with normal fishing or other circumstances prevailing in the area.
• Sudden changes in course towards the ship and aggressive behaviour.
UNCLOS 60.5
The breadth of the safety zones shall be determined by the coastal State, taking into account
applicable international standards. Such zones shall be designed to ensure that they
are reasonably related to the nature and function of the artificial islands, installations or
structures, and shall not exceed a distance of 500 metres around them, measured from each
point of their outer edge, except as authorized by generally accepted international standards
or as recommended by the competent international organization. Due notice shall be given
of the extent of safety zones.
UNCLOS 101
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i)
on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board
such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
Abbreviations
AIS Automatic Identification System
CRESMAC Maritime Security Regional Coordination Centre for Central Africa
(Pointe Noire)
CRESMAO Maritime Security Regional Coordination Centre for Western Africa (Abidjan)
CSO Company Security Officer
DSC Digital Selective Calling
DSV Diving Support Vessel
57
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
FPSO Floating Production Storage & Offloading
FSO Floating Storage & Offloading
GCC Gulf of Guinea Commission
GoG Gulf of Guinea
ICC Interregional Coordination Centre
IMB International Maritime Bureau
IMO International Maritime Organization
JWC Joint War Committee
MSC Maritime Safety Committee
MDAT-GoG Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea
MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
MOU Mobile Offshore Unit
PAG Pirate Action Group
PCASP Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
PMSC Private Maritime Security Company
ROV Remotely operated underwater vehicle
RUF Rules for the Use of Force
SPM Ship Protection Measures
SAA Secure Anchorage Area
SEV Security Escort Vessel
SSA Ship Security Assessment
SSAS Ship Security Alert System
SSO Ship Security Officer
SSP Ship Security Plan
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
VDR Vessel Data Recorder
VHP Vessel Hardening Plan
VMS Vessel Monitoring System
VPD Vessel Protection Detachment
VRA Voluntary Reporting Area
58
Annex I
Supporting organisations
BMP WA Signatories
BIMCO
BIMCO is the world’s largest international shipping association, with around 2,000
members in more than 120 countries, representing 56% of the world’s tonnage. Its global
membership includes shipowners, operators, managers, brokers and agents. A non-profit
organisation, BIMCO’s mission is to be at the forefront of global developments in shipping,
providing expert knowledge and practical advice to safeguard and add value to its members’
businesses.
www.bimco.org
CDI
The Chemical Distribution Institute (CDI) was established in 1994 as a not for profit
Foundation and provides ship and terminal inspection data in an electronic report format
to its members. The main objectives of CDI are to continuously improve the safety and
quality performance of chemical marine transportation and storage; Through cooperation
with industry and centres of education, drive the development of industry best practice
in marine transportation and storage of chemical products; To provide information and
advice on industry best practice and international legislation for marine transportation and
storage of chemical products; To provide chemical companies with cost effective systems
for risk assessment, thus assisting their commitment to Responsible Care and the Code of
Distribution Management Practice.
www.cdi.org.uk
59
CLIA
Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) is the world’s largest cruise industry trade
association, providing a unified voice and leading authority of the global cruise community.
CLIA supports policies and practices that foster a safe, secure, healthy and sustainable
cruise ship environment for the more than 25 million passengers who cruise annually and
is dedicated to promote the cruise travel experience. The organisation’s mission is to be the
unified global organisation that helps its members succeed by advocating, educating and
promoting for the common interests of the cruise community.
www.cruising.org
ICS
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) is the international trade association for
merchant ship operators. ICS represents the collective views of the international industry
from different nations, sectors and trades. ICS membership comprises national shipowners’
associations representing over 80% of the world’s merchant fleet. A major focus of ICS
activity is the IMO, the United Nations agency with responsibility for the safety of life at sea
and the protection of the marine environment. ICS is heavily involved in a wide variety of
areas including any technical, legal and operational matters affecting merchant ships. ICS is
unique in that it represents the global interests of all the different trades in the industry: bulk
carrier, tanker, container, and passenger ship operators
www.ics-shipping.org
60
IFSMA
The International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations (IFSMA) was formed in 1974
by Eight National Shipmasters’ Associations to unite the World’s serving Shipmasters into
a single professional co-ordinated body. It is a non-profit making apolitical organisation
dedicated solely to the interest of the serving Shipmaster. The Federation is formed of
around 11,000 Shipmasters from sixty Countries either through their National Associations
or as Individual Members. In 1975, IFSMA was granted Consultative Status as a non-
governmental organisation at IMO which enables the Federation to represent the views and
protect the interests of the serving Shipmasters.
www.ifsma.org
IGP&I Clubs
Thirteen principal underwriting associations “the Clubs” comprise the International
Group of P&I Clubs (IGP&I). They provide liability cover (protection and indemnity) for
approximately 90% of the world’s ocean-going tonnage. The Clubs are mutual insurance
associations providing cover for their members against third party liabilities relating to the
use and operation of ships, including loss of life, pollution by oil and hazardous substances,
wreck removal, collision and damage to property. Clubs also provide services to their
members on claims handling, legal issues and loss prevention, and often play a leading role
in coordinating the response to, and management of, maritime casualties.
www.igpandi.org
61
IMCA
The International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) is a leading trade association
representing the vast majority of contractors and the associated supply chain in the offshore
marine construction industry worldwide. It has a membership of 800 companies including
contractors, suppliers, oil & gas companies, marine renewable energy companies and
numerous non- governmental organisations (NGOs).
www.imca-int.com
INTERCARGO
The International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO) is representing
the interests of quality dry cargo shipowners. INTERCARGO convened for the first time in
1980 in London and has been participating with consultative status at the IMO since 1993.
INTERCARGO provides the forum where dry bulk shipowners, managers and operators
are informed about, discuss and share concerns on key topics and regulatory challenges,
especially in relation to safety, the environment and operational excellence. The Association
takes forward its Members’ positions to the IMO, as well as to other shipping and
international industry fora, having free and fair competition as a principle.
INTERCARGO is committed to safety and quality in ship operations, with a focus on
operational efficiency and the protection of the marine environment.
www.intercargo.org
62
InterManager
InterManager is the international trade association for the ship management industry
established in 1991. It is the voice of ship management and the only organisation dedicated
to representing the ship management and crew management industry. In today’s global
shipping industry InterManager works for the needs of like-minded companies in the
ship and crew management sector, who all have the welfare of seafarers at their heats.
InterManager acts as a forum to share best practices and bring about positive change.
An internationally-recognised organisation, InterManager represents its members at
international level, lobbying on their behalf to ensure their views are taken into account
within the worldwide maritime industry.
www.intermanager.org
IMEC
The International Maritime Employers’ Council Ltd (IMEC) is the only international
employers’ organisation dedicated to maritime industrial relations. With offices in the
UK and the Philippines, IMEC has a membership of over 235 shipowners and managers,
covering some 8,000 ships with CBAs, which IMEC negotiates on behalf of its members within
the International Bargaining Forum (IBF).
IMEC is also heavily involved in maritime training. The IMEC Enhanced cadet programme in
the Philippines currently has over 700 young people under training.
www.imec.org.uk
63
ITF
The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) is an international trade union
federation of transport workers’ unions. Any independent trade union with members in the
transport industry is eligible for membership of the ITF. The ITF has been helping seafarers
since 1896 and today represents the interests of seafarers worldwide, of whom over 880,000
are members of ITF affiliated unions. The ITF is working to improve conditions for seafarers
of all nationalities and to ensure adequate regulation of the shipping industry to protect the
interests and rights of the workers. The ITF helps crews regardless of their nationality or the
flag of their ship.
www.itfseafarers.org
www.itfglobal.org
INTERTANKO
INTERTANKO is the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, a forum
where the industry meets, policies are discussed and best practices developed. INTERTANKO
has been the voice of independent tanker owners since 1970, ensuring that the liquid energy
that keeps the world turning is shipped safely, responsibly and competitively.
www.intertanko.com
64
IPTA
The International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA) was formed in 1987 to represent
the interests of the specialised chemical/parcel tanker fleet and has since developed into an
established representative body for ship owners operating IMO classified chemical/parcel
tankers, being recognised
as a focal point through which regulatory authorities and trade organisations may liaise with
such owners. IPTA was granted consultative status as a Non- Governmental Organisation
to the IMO in 1997 and is wholly supportive of the IMO as the only body to introduce and
monitor compliance with international maritime legislation.
www.ipta.org.uk
ISWAN
The International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network (ISWAN) is an
international NGO and UK registered charity set up to promote the welfare of seafarers
worldwide. It is a membership organisation with ship owners, unions and welfare
organisation as members. ISWAN works with a range of bodies including PandI Clubs,
shipping companies, ports, and governments. Its focus is the wellbeing of the 1.5 million
seafarers around the world.
ISWAN supports seafarers and their families who are affected by piracy and its 24 hour
multilingual helpline, SeafarerHelp, is free for seafarers to call from anywhere in the world.
www.seafarerswelfare.org
65
Joint Hull Committee and Joint War
Committee
The Joint Hull and Joint War Committees comprise elected underwriting representatives
from both the Lloyd’s and IUA company markets, representing the interests of those who
write marine hull and war business in the London market.
Both sets of underwriters are impacted by piracy issues and support the mitigation of the
exposures they face through the owners’ use of BMP. The actions of owners and charterers
will inform underwriters’ approach to risk and coverage.
The Mission to Seafarers
The Mission to Seafarers is the largest provider of port-based welfare services, providing
200 port chaplains and 121 seafarers’ centres across 50 countries. In addition to its services
of free Wi-Fi, respite and transportation, all chaplains are trained in post-trauma counselling
and are able to provide immediate support post attack or release, as well as connect with
relevant professional services in a seafarer’s home country. The Mission to Seafarers runs
family support networks in the Philippines, Myanmar, Ukraine and India offering access to
education, training and medical and legal services. The Mission to Seafarers is pleased to
support the creation of BMP5 and the associated resources and commends their use to all
maritime personnel.
www.missiontoseafarers.org
66
OCIMF
The Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) is a voluntary association of
oil companies with an interest in the shipment and terminalling of crude oil, oil products,
petrochemicals and gas. OCIMF focuses exclusively on preventing harm to people and
the environment by promoting best practice in the design, construction and operation of
tankers, barges and offshore vessels and their interfaces with terminals.
www.ocimf.org
Sailors’Society
Sailors’ Society is the world’s oldest maritime welfare organisation caring for seafarers and
their families across the globe.
The charity works in ports across 30 countries and has projects ranging from medical centres
to building boats to get children safely to school.
Its renowned Crisis Response Network helping victims of trauma at sea is run across Asia,
Europe and Africa with plans to extend further.
Trained chaplains offer 24-hour support to victims of piracy, kidnapping and natural
disasters and come alongside survivors and loved ones with psychological and financial
help for as long as needed.
www.sailors-society.org
67
SIGTTO
The Society for International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO) is the
international body established for the exchange of technical information and experience,
between members of the industry, to enhance the safety and operational reliability of gas
tankers and terminals.
To this end the Society publishes studies, and produces information papers and works of
reference, for the guidance of industry members. It maintains working relationships with
other industry bodies, governmental and intergovernmental agencies, including the IMO, to
better promote the safety and integrity of gas transportation and storage schemes.
www.sigtto.org
WSC
The World Shipping Council (WSC) is the trade association that represents the
international liner shipping industry. WSC’s member lines operate containerships, roll-
on/roll-off vessels, and car carrier vessels that account for approximately 90 percent of
the global liner vessel capacity. Collectively, these services transport about 60 percent of
the value of global seaborne trade, or more than US$ 4 trillion worth of goods annually.
WSC’s goal is to provide a coordinated voice for the liner shipping industry in its work with
policymakers and other industry groups to develop actionable solutions for some of the
world’s most challenging transportation problems. WSC serves as a non- governmental
organisation at the IMO.
www.worldshipping.org
68
Naval/military/governmental organisations
CISMAR
CISMAR is the Integrated Maritime Security Center of Brazil. It aims to contribute to the
safety of maritime traffic of interest to Brazil, meet commitments related to Naval Control of
Maritime Traffic and the Naval Doctrine Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping assumed by
the country, in addition to increasing maritime situational awareness.
Contact:
Email: cismar-secom@marinha.mil.br
Telephone: +55 21 2104 6353/6337
Website: https://www.marinha.mil.br/cismar/
IFC
The Information Fusion Centre (IFC), based in Singapore, serves as the regional Maritime
Security (MARSEC) information-sharing hub covering most of the Indo-Pacific region. With
an integrated team comprising International Liaison Officers (ILOs) from more than 19
navies and coast guard; and personnel from the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), the
IFC facilitates MARSEC information sharing and collaboration between its partners to cue
operational responses. Its linkages with more than 90 Operational Centres (OPCENs) from
navies, enforcement and maritime agencies in more than 40 countries, as well as linkages
with the shipping industry, provide IFC with maritime situational awareness and enables
collaboration beyond its Area of Interest.
The IFC collates and analyses MARSEC information to produce accurate, timely and
actionable products, which enables its partners to respond to MARSEC incidents in good
time. It also provides practical and useful information on MARSEC trends, incidents and best
practices to the shipping industry.
Contacts
Email: ifc_do@defence.gov.sg
Telephone: +65 9626 8965 (hotline), +65 6594 5728 (office)
Website: https://www.ifc.org.sg
69
IMB PRC
Established in 1992, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) is an independent, non-
governmental and not-for-profit organisation which provides the shipping industry with a
free 24-hour service to report any piracy or armed robbery attack occurring anywhere in the
world.
As a trusted point of contact for shipmasters and ship owners, all reported attacks are
immediately relayed to the most relevant government response agency seeking their
support to render assistance to the ship in distress. Inmarsat Safetynet broadcasts to ships
and alerts to CSOs via email are also sent out which help alert other seafarers and save lives
at sea.
www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre
INTERPOL
INTERPOL has a dedicated unit for maritime piracy that works with the police, navy
and private sector in member countries, and can provide support to ship operators who
have had their ships hijacked. INTERPOL’s Maritime Security sub-Directorate (MTS) can
be consulted on the recommended practices and action to be taken to help preserve the
integrity of any evidence left behind following a pirate attack that could be useful to law
enforcement agents pursuing an investigation.
MTS can be contacted on tel +33 472 44 72 33 or via email dlMTSOPSupport@interpol.int
during business hours (GMT 08H00 – 17H00).
Outside of normal business hours, contact can be made via INTERPOL’s Command and
Co-ordination Centre (CCC). The CCC is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and supports
INTERPOL’s 190 member countries faced with a crisis situation or requiring urgent operational
assistance. The CCC operates in all four of Interpol’s official languages (English, French,
Spanish and Arabic). Contact details are: tel +33 472 44 7676; email os-ccc@interpol.int.
It is recommended that ship operators contact INTERPOL within three days of a hijacking of
their ship.
70
MDAT-GoG
Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG) is a cooperation
centre between the Royal Navy (UKMTO) and the French Navy (MICA-Center) in support of
the Yaoundé Process. This centre has been in operation since June 2016. The primary output
from the MDAT-GoG is to contribute by maintaining coherent maritime situational awareness
in the central and western African Maritime areas, with the ability to inform and support
industry. It contributes to the safety and security of the Mariner in the regional maritime
domain.
NIMASA
The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) is committed to
the enthronement of global best practices in the provision of maritime services in Nigeria.
Our areas of focus include effective Maritime Safety Administration, Maritime Labour
Regulation, Marine Pollution Prevention and Control, Search and Rescue, Cabotage
enforcement, Shipping Development and Ship Registration, Training and Certification
of Seafarers, and Maritime Capacity Development. Using modern tools that guarantee
efficiency and effectiveness, we are determined to develop indigenous capacity and
eliminate all hindrance.
ICC-Gulf of Guinea-Yaoundé
The Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) is the coordination and information-
sharing structure which connects the Regional Maritime Security Centre for Central Africa
(CRESMAC) and the Regional Maritime Security Centre for Western Africa (CRESMAO).
MDAT-GoG
+33 298 228888


Udskriftsdato: 4. marts 2021
BEK nr 1084 af 23/11/2011 (Gældende)
Bekendtgørelse om teknisk forskrift om forholdsregler til forebyggelse af
pirateri og væbnede overfald på danske skibe
Ministerium: Erhvervsministeriet Journalnummer: Erhvervs­ og Vækstmin.,
Søfartsstyrelsen, j.nr. 201111833
Forsvarsudvalget 2020-21
B 295 - Bilag 2
Offentligt
Bekendtgørelse om teknisk forskrift om forholdsregler til forebyggelse af
pirateri og væbnede overfald på danske skibe
I medfør af § 6, § 17, stk. 6, § 22 og § 32, i lov om sikker-
hed til søs, jf. lovbekendtgørelse nr. 654 af 15. juni 2010, og
efter bemyndigelse fastsættes:
Bekendtgørelsens anvendelse på danske og udenlandske
skibe
§ 1. Denne bekendtgørelse finder anvendelse på handels-
skibe, der fører dansk eller grønlandsk flag, jf. dog stk. 2.
Stk. 2. Bekendtgørelsen finder ikke anvendelse på skibe,
som udelukkende sejler på grønlandske, færøske, islandske
eller europæiske havne samt for rederier, som udelukkende
driver sådanne skibe.
Forebyggelse af pirateri og væbnede overfald på danske
skibe
§ 2. Handelsskibe skal have procedurer for sejlads eller
havneanløb i områder, hvor der er risiko for pirateri og væb-
nede overfald mod skibe.
§ 3. For handelsskibe, der er forpligtede til at have et sik-
kerhedsstyringssystem efter ISM-koden (Koden for sikker
skibsdrift) eller en sikringsplan efter ISPS-koden (Koden for
højnelse af den maritime sikkerhed), skal de i § 2 nævnte
procedurer enten være indeholdt i sikkerhedsstyringssyste-
met eller i sikringsplanen. Såfremt procedurerne er inde-
holdt i skibets sikringsplan, skal de gøres tilgængelige for
skibets besætning på samme måde som procedurerne i sik-
kerhedsstyringssystemet.
§ 4. Rederier, hvis skibe er omfattet af §§ 2-3, skal endvi-
dere i deres sikkerhedsstyringssystem have procedurer for
vurderingen af, om der i et område er risiko for pirateri eller
væbnede overfald mod skibe.
§ 5. Handelsskibe, der ikke er pligtige til at have et sik-
kerhedsstyringssystem efter ISM-koden eller en sikringsplan
efter ISPS-koden, samt rederier, som driver sådanne skibe,
skal have procedurer, der svarer til de i §§ 3-4 nævnte.
§ 6. De i §§ 2-5 nævnte procedurer skal indeholde be-
stemmelser om forebyggelse af overfald, herunder om
1) vurdering af, hvorvidt der i et område er risiko for pira-
teri eller væbnede overfald mod skibe,
2) opdatering om situationen på relevante websites fx
MSCHOA1), NATO Shipping Center, ReCAAP ISC2)
og gennem NAVWARNS,
3) relevante foranstaltninger til beskyttelse af skibet og
dets besætning,
4) radarovervågning hele horisonten rundt og vedvarende
udkig til assistance for den vagthavende navigatør døg-
net rundt ved sejlads i områder, hvor skibsføreren vur-
derer, at der er væsentlig risiko for, at skibet kan blive
udsat for pirateri eller væbnede overfald,
5) hvorledes besætningen skal forholde sig ved overfald,
kapring eller forsøg herpå, og om instruktion af besæt-
ningen, hver gang der skal sejles ind et område, hvor
der er væsentlig risiko for, at skibet kan blive udsat for
pirateri eller væbnede overfald,
6) rapportering til rederi, myndigheder og andre skibe i
området ved overfald, kapring eller forsøg herpå.
Stk. 2. Procedurerne skal udarbejdes under hensyntagen
til de af den Internationale Maritime Organisation (IMO)
udsendte anbefalinger og vejledninger for sejlads i områder
med risiko for sørøveri og væbnede overfald. Ved vurderin-
gen af, hvilke forholdsregler der skal tages på det enkelte
skib, skal der tages hensyn til trusselsbilledet i det pågæl-
dende område, skibets størrelse, sejladshastighed og udstyr
samt eventuelle andre foranstaltninger, som træffes uden for
skibet som fx vagthold på kajen.
Stk. 3. De i stk. 2 nævnte anbefalinger og vejledninger er
tilgængelige på Søfartsstyrelsens hjemmeside www.soe-
fartsstyrelsen.dk.
§ 7. Såfremt en skibsfører af hensyn til risikoen for pirate-
ri og væbnede overfald slukker for skibets AIS transmission,
skal det indføres i skibsdagbogen med klokkeslæt og positi-
on, ligesom rederiet skal underrettes. Rederiet skal herefter
regelmæssigt underrettes om skibets position, indtil AIS
transmissionen på ny genoptages, medmindre skibsføreren
skønner, at en sådan underretning vil kunne udsætte skibets
besætning for fare. Tilsvarende skal det indføres i skibsdag-
bogen, når AIS transmissionen på ny påbegyndes.
Særlige foranstaltninger i højrisikoområdet
§ 8. For skibe, der sejler i det område, der i ”Best Ma-
nagement Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Pi-
Lovtidende A
2011 Udgivet den 30. november 2011
23. november 2011. Nr. 1084.
Erhvervs- og Vækstmin.,
Søfartsstyrelsen, j.nr. 201111833
BP000041
racy” (BMP) er defineret som højrisikoområdet, skal de i §§
2-6 nævnte procedurer endvidere i relevant omfang udarbej-
des under hensyntagen til industriens anbefalinger i ”Best
Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based
Piracy” (BMP), der er tilgængelig på Søfartsstyrelsens
hjemmeside www.soefartsstyrelsen.dk.
§ 9. De i § 6, stk. 1, nr. 6, nævnte rapporteringer skal i
højrisikoområdet endvidere ske til UKMTO3) og MSCHOA.
§ 10. Rederier skal monitorere deres skibe, når de sejler i
højrisikområdet.
Stk. 2. Når et skib sejler ind i eller ud af højrisikoområdet,
skal skibsføreren underrette rederiet. Så længe skibet er i
højrisikoområdet, skal skibsføreren mindst hver fjerde time
underrette rederiet om skibets position, medmindre skibsfø-
reren skønner, at en sådan underretning vil bringe besætnin-
gen i fare.
Stk. 3. Rederiet skal udpege en kontaktperson til at mod-
tage de i stk. 2 nævnte underretninger.
Stk. 4. Den løbende underretning af rederiet i stk. 2 kan
erstattes af, at rederiet med minimum samme hyppighed
monitorerer skibet gennem et automatisk elektronisk trac-
king-system.
§ 11. Når et skib sejler i de områder, der i BMP er define-
ret som hhv. højrisikoområdet og ”UKMTO Voluntary Re-
porting Area”, skal anbefalingerne i BMP om registrering
hos MSCHOA og rapportering til UKMTO følges.
Verifikation
§ 12. De procedurer, der er krævet i henhold til denne tek-
niske forskrift, vil indgå i Søfartsstyrelsens eller i en af Sø-
fartsstyrelsen anerkendt organisations verifikation af ISM og
ISPS.
Straffebestemmelser
§ 13. Overtrædelse af denne forskrift straffes med bøde
eller fængsel i indtil 1 år.
Stk. 2. Straffen kan stige til fængsel i indtil 2 år, hvis der
1) ved overtrædelsen er sket skade på liv eller helbred el-
ler fremkaldt fare herfor,
2) tidligere er afgivet forbud eller påbud for samme eller
tilsvarende forhold eller
3) ved overtrædelsen er opnået eller tilsigtet en økono-
misk fordel for den pågældende selv eller andre.
Stk. 3. Det skal betragtes som en særlig skærpende om-
stændighed, at der for unge under 18 år er sket skade på liv
eller helbred eller fremkaldt fare herfor, jf. stk. 2, nr. 1.
Stk. 4. Sker der ikke konfiskation af udbytte, som er opnå-
et ved overtrædelsen, skal der ved udmåling af bøde, herun-
der tillægsbøde, tages særligt hensyn til størrelsen af en op-
nået eller tilsigtet økonomisk fordel.
Stk. 5. Der kan pålægges selskaber m.v. (juridiske perso-
ner) strafansvar efter reglerne i straffelovens 5. kapitel.
§ 14. Såfremt forholdet er omfattet af anordning om
ikrafttræden for Grønland af lov om sikkerhed til søs, kan
der fastsættes foranstaltninger i henhold til kriminalloven
for Grønland.
Stk. 2. De i § 9, stk. 2 og 3, nævnte forhold skal anses
som skærpende omstændigheder.
Stk. 3. Sker der ikke konfiskation af udbytte, jfr. kriminal-
lovens § 166, stk. 1, som er opnået ved overtrædelsen, skal
der ved udmåling af bøde, herunder tillægsbøde, tages sær-
ligt hensyn til størrelsen af en opnået eller tilsigtet økono-
misk fordel.
Stk. 4. Er en overtrædelse begået af selskaber m.v. (juridi-
ske personer), kan der pålægges den juridiske person som
sådan bødeansvar. Er overtrædelsen begået af staten, Grøn-
lands Selvstyre, en kommune, et kommunalt fællesskab, der
er omfattet af § 64 i Landstingslov om kommunalbestyrelser
og bygdebestyrelser m.v., eller en bygdebestyrelse, kan der
pålægges vedkommende offentlige myndighed som sådan
bødeansvar.
Stk. 5. Såfremt den pågældende ikke er bosat i Grønland,
eller hans tilknytning til det grønlandske samfund i øvrigt
har en sådan løsere karakter, at forudsætningerne for anven-
delse af foranstaltninger ikke er til stede, kan sagen anlæg-
ges eller henvises til forfølgning i Danmark.
Ikrafttræden m.v.
§ 15. Bekendtgørelsen træder i kraft den 1. januar 2012.
Stk. 2. Bekendtgørelse nr. 9721 af 20. februar 2008 om
teknisk forskrift om forholdsregler til forebyggelse af sørø-
veri og væbnede overfald på danske skibe ophæves.
Søfartsstyrelsen, den 23. november 2011
FRANK BJERG MORTENSEN
/ Ditte Helene Bang
23. november 2011. 2 Nr. 1084.
1) Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)
2) Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Information Sharing Center (ReCAAP ISC)
3) UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)
23. november 2011. 3 Nr. 1084.