Comments NATO Sec Gen on 2019 NATO PA Policy Recommendations

COMMENTS OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF
NATO, CHAIRMAN OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC
COUNCIL
ON THE
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
ADOPTED IN 2019 BY THE NATO
PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY
056 SESP 20 E | Original: English | February 2020
NATO''s Parlamentariske Forsamling 2019-20
NPA Alm.del - Bilag 14
Offentligt
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RESOLUTION 454
on
REAFFIRMING COMMITMENTS TO NATO’S FOUNDING PRINCIPLES AND VALUES*
The Assembly,
1. Celebrating the 70th
anniversary of the transatlantic Alliance – a unique political-military
community of like-minded nations and a bulwark of the free world;
2. Convinced that the enduring prominence of this Alliance as a major international actor not only
stems from the military, economic, and technological strength of its members, but also from the
commitment to the shared principles and values that underpin the transatlantic community;
3. Recalling that the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington, D.C., stipulates in its
preamble the determination of the Allies “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation
of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”, and that,
in Article 2, the Allies express their commitment to “strengthening their free institutions”;
4. Noting that, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO contributed significantly to the
spread of democratic principles across the Euro-Atlantic area, and beyond, through political
statements, the Open Door policy, and partnership mechanisms;
5. Recalling its own role as a forum to discuss the democratic credentials of NATO members during
the Cold War and its activities in the post-Cold War era, supporting new democracies and helping
them to develop mechanisms of parliamentary oversight of the defence and security sector;
6. Stressing that after the end of the Cold War, many nations broke free and were able to join NATO,
and lamenting that some of them are still fighting for their freedom and their right to freely choose
their foreign policy vector and to join the Alliance;
7. Mindful of the ongoing paradigm shifts in the global political and security landscape as a result of
significant technological, economic, and demographic developments, and aware that these
developments can empower autocrats and lead to a global erosion of democracy and human rights
standards;
8. Deeply concerned that the Euro-Atlantic nations are not immune to phenomena such as
decreasing popular confidence in political institutions, disenchantment with mainstream parties, and
media and general democratic backsliding, which can jeopardise the trust among the Allies;
9. Deploring external interference, particularly by the Russian Federation, in the democratic
processes in North America and Europe, the aggression against Ukraine and Georgia, and attempts to
undermine the Alliance’s unity and deepen internal cleavages through cyber intrusions, social media
manipulation, and other hybrid tactics;
10. Emphasising, nevertheless, that the founding principles and values of the Alliance remain
valid and continue to define the Alliance’s identity;
11. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance to take a more
proactive approach in promoting and protecting democratic values within the Euro-Atlantic community
and beyond, and in particular:
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a. to consider designating a structure within NATO institutions with a mandate and capacity to
monitor and report – in a respectful and constructive manner – on the democratic credentials of
member and candidate states, when there is reasonable ground for it, and to offer assistance to
member states on election integrity and security, judicial independence, press freedom, and other
aspects critical to maintaining a vibrant democracy;
b. to consider updating NATO’s Strategic Concept to include stronger commitment to democratic
values and to expand references to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in NATO’s external
communication, including NATO Summit Communiqués;
c. to ensure adequate support to relevant Centres of Excellence, particularly the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of
Excellence, and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, in order to support
democracy resilience programmes in member states;
d. to exchange best practices and innovative techniques and to develop further cooperation with
the EU in enhancing the cyber literacy of citizens and in tackling disinformation, hate speech, and
other hybrid threats;
e. to identify national electoral systems as strategic infrastructure and provide them with
adequate protection and to raise awareness among officials and participants of electoral campaigns
on how to detect and prevent hostile interference;
f. to support the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and relevant national actors, including
parliamentarians, in their efforts to reach out to new generations of Europeans and North
Americans and to spread awareness of NATO’s core missions and values;
g. to reaffirm commitment to NATO’s Open Door policy as a tool to spread the zone of stability
and democratic standards in Europe, to support the Euro-Atlantic integration of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine, and to help strengthen their resilience against foreign
interference;
h. to support multilateral efforts to sanction human rights abusers;
i. to foster the implementation of NATO’s Women, Peace, and Security agenda and to
mainstream gender through all NATO policies;
j. to redouble efforts on the national, regional, and international levels to tackle the root causes of
public discontent, including migration and income inequality;
k. to encourage authoritative figures in politics, culture, and science to help rebuild public support for
democratic values and the rules-based global order;
l. to continue using the NATO Parliamentary Assembly as a venue for Allies to exchange their
views on how to defend and promote NATO’s core principles within the Alliance and beyond.
12. URGES international social media corporations to allocate sufficient resources to work with
relevant international organisations, including NATO, its member states and partner nations as well
as their civil societies, to identify and counter disinformation and social media manipulation efforts
aimed at influencing the free electoral choices of member and partner nations.
* Presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on
Monday 14 October 2019, London, United Kingdom.
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COMMENTS ON RESOLUTION 454
I welcome the emphasis that the Assembly puts on shared democratic principles and values as the
underpinning of the transatlantic community. The principles outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty have
guided the Alliance throughout its 70-year history, and will continue to do so. This is underlined in our
Strategic Concept and successive statements agreed by Allied Heads of State and Government,
Foreign and Defence Ministers over the past few decades, including the London Declaration issued at
our Leaders’ meeting there on 3-4 December 2019.
In response to the Assembly’s suggestion in serial a. of Resolution 454, I believe that organizations
like the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council of
Europe, are well placed to continue to set norms, advocate, monitor and report on issues like election
integrity, judicial independence, and media freedom.
This being said, NATO must and will continue to play its part in reinforcing the resilience of our
democratic societies, including by strengthening our cyber defences, stepping up our response to
hybrid threats, and ensuring that our critical infrastructure, energy security, and communications are
resilient.
With due regard for different legal and constitutional arrangements in individual member states, and on
the basis of policies supported by all Allies, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division (NATO PDD) leads an
overall effort within the Alliance’s civilian and military structures to disseminate facts, data, statistics
and promote narratives explaining NATO’s goals, posture and policies, as well as to increase
awareness of activities aiming to undermine our unity, values, and institutions.
Over the past few years, supporting the efforts made by individual Allies, NATO PDD has refocused its
activities and programmes towards audiences showing consistently less support for NATO, including
through opinion formers such as parliamentarians. In order to achieve better synergies, NATO PDD
has consulted with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Working Group on Education and
Communication on the basis of the results of the survey conducted by the Assembly on how NATO is
taught at schools.
NATO and the EU have and will continue to work together in tackling the challenge of disinformation
and promoting common values. For example, our Press and Media Section amplifies through its social
media channels all relevant “myth-busting” corrections of disinformation or propaganda that originate
from the “EU vs Disinfo” taskforce. On a case-by-case basis, the NATO Spokesperson also discusses
and coordinates messaging on security threats with her EU counterparts.
NATO will continue to lead by example in upholding democratic principles and values, including by
promoting robust policies to advance the Women, Peace and Security agenda, good governance of
the defence sector, and transparent and accountable defence institutions under democratic control.
The NATO/EAPC Women, Peace and Security Policy and Action Plan are based on the principles of
integration, inclusiveness and integrity. NATO is currently undertaking a review of the implementation
of the WPS agenda across NATO since the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution
1325, the first resolution on WPS, in 2000.
In November 2019, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed the first NATO Policy on Preventing and
Responding to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. Sexual exploitation and abuse runs counter to NATO’s
principles and core values, and undermines the effectiveness and credibility of the Alliance. Therefore,
NATO has a zero tolerance approach to all acts of sexual exploitation and abuse.
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I welcome the Assembly’s support for NATO’s Open Door policy as a unique tool to extend the zone
of stability and democracy in Europe. At their meeting in London in December 2019, NATO Leaders
also restated their commitment to the Open Door policy, which strengthens the Alliance and has
brought security to millions of Europeans.
In February 2018, Allies signed the Accession Protocol for the accession of North Macedonia into the
Alliance and work is now under way to prepare for the full integration of the country into NATO
structures. We are looking forward to welcoming North Macedonia as the 30th
member of the Alliance
very soon.
We also remain committed to the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Euro-Atlantic
community and to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a stable and secure Bosnia and
Herzegovina. NATO is committed to supporting the country with its reforms across the full political,
economic, defence, and security spectrum for the benefit of all people of the country.
NATO also continues to stand by its decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will
become a member of the Alliance, with Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the
process. NATO Ambassadors and Georgia adopted a NATO-Georgia statement on the occasion of
their visit to Batumi, Georgia, in October 2019, in which they welcomed the significant progress made
by Georgia since 2008.
Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance contains all the practical tools to prepare for eventual
membership, in particular the NATO-Georgia Commission, the Annual National Programme, and the
Substantial NATO-Georgia Package. Allies recognize the significant progress on reforms which
Georgia has made and must continue, which are helping Georgia, an aspirant country, progress in its
preparations towards membership, and which strengthen Georgia’s defence and interoperability
capabilities with the Alliance.
Allies also stand by their decisions taken at the Bucharest Summit and subsequent Summits in light of
Ukraine’s restated aspirations for NATO membership. In my speech to the Ukrainian Parliament on 31
October 2019, I underscored that Ukraine has the right to choose its own security arrangements and
that, for those who seek it, the road to NATO membership requires dedication and substantial reform.
NATO is supporting Ukraine on this path through the Annual National Programme and the
Comprehensive Assistance Package. It is also supporting Ukraine’s efforts to strengthen its own
resilience against hybrid threats.
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RESOLUTION 455
on
SUPPORTING NATO’S POST-INF TREATY DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE POSTURE*
The Assembly,
1. Recognising that the Alliance’s populations and territories, particularly its eastern territories, as
well as neighbouring countries, already face significant and escalating conventional and hybrid threats;
2. Alert to efforts by states such as North Korea and Iran to develop new, powerful, and precise
ballistic and cruise missile systems and, given these countries’ disregard for international law and
potential willingness to arm these weapons with nuclear warheads, concerned about the threat that
this poses to international security;
3. Aware of China’s renewed focus on its nuclear capabilities to enhance the size, robustness,
precision, and mobility of its nuclear systems and recognising that China’s efforts to modernise and
expand its nuclear arsenal threaten to destabilise international peace and security;
4. Concerned about Russia’s concerted efforts to modernise its existing strategic and tactical
nuclear forces and troubled by its endeavours to develop new destabilising nuclear weapons with the
goal of overwhelming any defences against them;
1. Emphasising the dangers associated with Russia’s renewed focus on nuclear
weapons development, as illustrated by recent incidents involving Russia’s experimental
nuclear weapons systems;
2. Underscoring that Russia’s use of aggressive nuclear rhetoric, the combination
of conventional and nuclear elements in its military exercising, and the continued ambiguity of
its nuclear doctrine signal a potentially lower threshold for the use of nuclear weapons;
7. Regretting that these developments demonstrate Russia’s determination to use nuclear
weapons as a key means to assert its position as a global power;
8. Underlining that, despite the Budapest Memorandum, which guarantees the respect of
Ukraine’s existing borders, security and sovereignty, Russia’s attack on Ukraine, its subsequent
annexation of Crimea and occupation of certain territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions has
undermined global nuclear non-proliferation efforts;
9. Reprehending Russia’s preparations for deployment of nuclear arms in Crimea;
10. Condemning Russian violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,
which had been a pillar of stability in European security for over three decades, and strongly
supporting the United States’ decision to withdraw from the treaty after that country’s extensive efforts
to bring Russia back into compliance;
11. Blaming Russia’s actions for the failure of the INF Treaty and diminished trust and stability
within bilateral arms control frameworks, which may result in negative impacts on future efforts to limit
the development and deployment of nuclear armaments;
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12. Underscoring NATO’s decision to respond to the end of the INF Treaty in a "measured and
responsible way" with regard to the deployment of new land-based missiles in Europe;
13. Strongly endorsing the Alliance’s announcement that it will both ensure that its nuclear
deterrent remains safe, secure and effective and explore options to “work on issues” such as:
exercises, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air and missile defences, and conventional
capabilities;
14. Reiterating NATO’s longstanding commitment to arms control, as stated in the 2018
Brussels Summit Declaration, and its enduring support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
15. Noting the ongoing debate about the potential extension of the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New START), now the only remaining strategic nuclear arms control agreement
between the United States and Russia - which is due to expire in 2021, and encouraging its extension;
16. Affirming that, as long as they exist, nuclear weapons must remain a core component of the
Alliance’s defence and deterrence posture and that NATO’s nuclear declaratory language must signal
Allies’ preparedness to take the steps necessary to defend themselves;
17. Highlighting that nuclear modernisation efforts by the United States, France, and the
United Kingdom are necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of existing arsenals and to respond to
the evolving nuclear environment, and that they do not contravene these countries' international treaty
commitments and obligations;
18. Underscoring the necessity of maintaining the full complement of NATO’s nuclear
deterrence mission, including Allied support for US forward-deployed nuclear weapons and the
systems necessary for their maintenance and potential deployment;
19. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
a. to continue to support the Alliance’s maintenance of a safe, secure, strong, capable, and
survivable nuclear deterrent as a central pillar of its defence and deterrence policy in order to ensure
the peace and security of Allied populations and territories and to mitigate against the dangers of an
evolving international security environment characterised by the development and deployment of
modern and destabilising nuclear weapons;
b. to continue the investments necessary to modernise existing nuclear systems and their
supporting infrastructures across the full complement of NATO’s nuclear mission, including the
maintenance of US forward-deployed nuclear weapons;
c. to stand behind and adequately resource new defence and deterrence measures taken by the
Alliance in response to the evolving post-INF Treaty security environment, including increased
exercises, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air and missile defences, and conventional
capabilities;
d. to educate their populations about the indispensable nature of the Alliance’s nuclear
capabilities within its broader defence and deterrence posture and, therefore, about the necessity of
providing sufficient resources to maintain safe and reliable nuclear capabilities;
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e. to support NATO’s efforts to maintain the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear
non-proliferation regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to encourage other states to
join international arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation initiatives reflecting the nuclear
weapons environment that Allies seek to mitigate for the sake of broader international peace and
security.
* Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on
Monday 14 October 2019, London, United Kingdom.
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COMMENTS ON RESOLUTION 455
I recognise the importance the Assembly places on supporting NATO’s Post-INF Treaty adaptations of
its Deterrence and Defence Posture. Resolution 455 echoes the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration
as well as the 2019 London Declaration in which NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed
that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. NATO Leaders in London
also made clear that they remain open for dialogue, and to a constructive relationship with Russia when
Russia’s actions make that possible.
Resolution 455 also acknowledges the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
which was a crucial element of Euro-Atlantic Security for decades. All Allies are in agreement that
Russia bears sole responsibility for the demise of the INF Treaty based on its repeated violations of it,
and that the United States’ decision to withdraw from the Treaty in response to these violations is
justified and appropriate.
I note the Assembly’s wider concerns regarding nuclear deterrence and defence in the post-INF Treaty
environment in which Russia’s actions continue to undermine the global Arms Control, Disarmament
and Non-Proliferation system, Allies’ security, and the rules-based international order. Russia’s actions
are likely to have both military and political aims: to gain a military advantage over NATO forces, and
to sow division among Allies.
Resolution 455 alludes to a pattern of more assertive and aggressive Russian behaviour, including the
violation of the INF Treaty as well as Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. Russia is presented with
a clear choice: return to compliance and uphold its arms control commitments, or bear full responsibility
for its irresponsible and dangerous actions.
I therefore appreciate the Assembly’s strong endorsement of NATO’s decision to respond to the end
of the INF Treaty in a defensive, measured and responsible way. This includes NATO’s balanced
response package to Russia’s development and fielding of the SSC-8 cruise missile. The
implementation of this response package is underway, informing NATO’s work on issues such as
exercises, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air and missile defences, and conventional
capabilities.
Furthermore, I welcome the Assembly’s reiteration of NATO’s longstanding commitment to arms
control. Allies remain fully committed to the preservation of and strengthening of effective arms control,
disarmament, and non-proliferation taking into account the prevailing security environment. Allies are
strongly committed to the full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) in all its aspects, including nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy.
Regarding public support for, and the effective communication of, NATO’s response to the deployment
of SSC-8 and the demise of the INF Treaty, Allies recognise that these aspects depend on Allied and
partner audiences’ accurate awareness and understanding of the true circumstances around these
events. Allies should continue to identify potential opportunities to highlight that NATO is a credible
and united nuclear Alliance and that maintaining nuclear deterrence is part of a defensive, balanced
and comprehensive approach to the end of the INF Treaty.
I would like to offer some specific comments on a few further aspects of Resolution 455. The new
START Agreement is now on the table as renewal is being considered. Taking into account the
Alliance’s aforementioned commitment to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, it is
important to recognise how much has been achieved because of the START agreements. Before the
first START agreement, there were around 12,000 nuclear warheads on each side, now there are 1,550
each.
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I also note that Resolution 455 refers to state actors other than Russia in the context of potential nuclear
threats in the post-INF environment. Recalling the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration in which NATO
Heads of State and Government reaffirmed NATO’s 360-degree approach to collective defence, crisis
management and cooperative security, I would highlight NATO’s progress on Ballistic Missile Defence
(BMD) which is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic
area. The development of a NATO BMD capability is an important component of NATO’s core task of
collective defence. NATO BMD Initial Operational Capability was declared in 2016 and the next major
milestone is the completion of the core element of the NATO BMD Command and Control.
Specifically regarding China, Allies are aware of its growing nuclear capabilities. Allies welcome China’s
role in the P5 process and urge China to continue substantive engagement in the NPT process.
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RESOLUTION 456
on
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN*
The Assembly,
1. Recalling that Afghanistan remains a high priority for NATO Allies and their international
partners, whose principal mission is to actively support the stabilisation of Afghanistan and to
contribute to the establishment of sustainable peace in this country, so that it will never again become a
haven for international terrorism;
2. Honouring the more than 3,000 NATO and partner country forces who died as part of the effort
to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan, and recognising the tens of billions of dollars
contributed by those countries to rebuild and develop Afghanistan;
3. Welcoming the Alliance’s decision at the 2018 Brussels Summit to maintain the Resolute
Support Mission (RSM), which trains, advises, and assists the Afghanistan National Defense and
Security Forces (ANDSF) in their mission to protect the people and territory of Afghanistan;
4. Concerned by faltering progress in security sector reform in the country, which impedes
ANDSF capacity and readiness and prolongs ANDSF dependence on external assistance;
5. Worried about increasing instability and a precipitous rise of civilian casualties due to the
Taliban’s intensified military efforts to seize more territory and maximise leverage at the negotiating
table;
6. Troubled by the continued and escalating attacks by the international terrorist group, the ISIL-
KP, also known as Daesh, in its effort to sow instability and jeopardise peace negotiations;
3. Disappointed the narcotics trade continues to flourish in the country, providing a key
income source for the Taliban and other armed insurgent groups, fueling widespread
institutional corruption, particularly in the security and justice sectors, and sustaining a nexus
of destabilising criminal networks in the country, across the region, and globally;
4. Encouraged by the July 2019 Intra-Afghan Conference for Peace, which brought
together a wide range of key stakeholders in Afghanistan and agreed on a formula for future
inclusive negotiations;
9. Urging key parties to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan to strive for constructive and inclusive
Intra-Afghan peace negotiations, in order to facilitate a settlement reflecting a shared understanding of
Afghanistan’s future;
10. Concerned by the impact of factional disagreements inside the National Assembly of Afghanistan
on the execution of its duties, resulting in its increasing marginalisation by the executive branch in the
policy-making process;
11. Underlining that only an independent, effective, accountable, and transparent justice sector can
ensure the establishment of the rule of law, increase trust in the country’s institutions, and mitigate
corruption;
12. Recalling progress made in key areas to rebuild and strengthen Afghanistan since the fall of
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the Taliban in 2001, including: improved access to running water, electricity, and medicine, increasing
overall health indices; a stronger and more inclusive educational system; the incorporation of women
into all sectors of society, particularly law enforcement and peace-building efforts; and a more diverse
and growing economy;
13. Encouraged both by the significant advances made by Afghan women across all sectors of
society and by the determination Afghan women have shown in seeking to preserve and safeguard
those gains;
14. Acknowledging, however, that socioeconomic progress has been highly uneven across the
country and that international financial support will remain vital to cover Afghanistan’s continuing
operational budgets and development programmes;
15. Reaffirming the commitment made by NATO member states to extend financial support for
Afghan security forces through 2024 and recognising the vital role that this support and broader
development assistance plays in developing the Afghan government and improving the lives of
Afghans;
16. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and their partners
contributing to international efforts in Afghanistan:
a. to continue to assist the ANDSF by enhancing the effectiveness of ongoing security assistance
programmes to build a capable, self-sustaining, and professional military force working to create the
conditions for enduring peace and stability in Afghanistan;
b. to maintain their security force assistance missions in Afghanistan until a peace agreement is
reached to provide a necessary counterbalance to the ongoing efforts by insurgent groups to spoil a
potential peace settlement, reconstruction efforts, and regional stability;
c. to fully support inclusive intra-Afghan peace negotiations and to help sustain a resulting peace
agreement by providing long-term financial and technical assistance to major post-conflict challenges,
such as the reintegration of former Taliban fighters into society, the promotion of economic growth,
and the development of the Afghan National Police;
d. to support the Afghan parliament in its efforts to become an essential legislative body working for
the broader good of the entire Afghan nation;
e. to do everything possible to ensure that Afghan women have seats at the table during peace
negotiations and to support a final settlement that preserves the hard-won rights of Afghan women
and girls;
17. CALLS UPON the government and National Assembly of Afghanistan:
a. to insist upon a peace settlement protecting the political, economic, and civil society
achievements reached in Afghanistan since 2001, and to include the significant and enduring
participation of women across all sectors of society in that settlement;
b. to stop factional infighting and respect the Afghan parliament’s rightful role in the legislative
process, and to accelerate broad-based institutional reforms to create the conditions necessary for
legitimate and effective governance and the broad enforcement of the rule of law across the country.
* Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on
Monday 14 October 2019, London, United Kingdom.
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COMMENTS ON RESOLUTION 456
I welcome the views expressed in Resolution 456 and reiterate NATO’s steadfast commitment to
Afghanistan’s long-term security and stability. Defence Ministers of countries contributing to the
Resolute Support Mission reaffirmed this promise at the dedicated session on Afghanistan at NATO
Headquarters on 25 October 2019. The Afghan government, in turn, reaffirmed their obligations to
lead on security, peace and reform.
I honour the Allied and Partner servicemen and women who paid the ultimate sacrifice in their efforts
to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorism. I pay tribute to the Afghans
who have lost their lives, limbs and homes in the senseless violence caused by the Taliban and other
terrorist organizations.
NATO is proud of the courage and professionalism of the personnel from thirty-eight countries that are
currently serving as part of the Resolute Support Mission. We work side by side with our Afghan
partners who persevere, daily, to improve their country’s security.
Over the past year, the security situation remained volatile but manageable for the Afghan security
forces. The Afghan security forces were able to protect cities, secure the presidential elections and
control or manage major roads while increasing offensive operations overall. The Afghan Special
Security Forces (ASSF) and Afghan Air Force continued to demonstrate improvement with the ASSF
increasing its number of independent, offensive operations. The Afghan government instituted a
number of leadership changes in the security ministries to improve professional development in the
Afghan security forces. Afghanistan’s Ministries of Defence and Interior introduced reforms which
allowed for the merit-based appointment of the next generation of Afghan officers to senior leadership
positions.
NATO’s Resolute Support Mission has supported implementation of the Women, Peace and Security
agenda by helping facilitate Afghan women’s integration into the security sector. We see the increasing
participation of women in Afghanistan’s ministries of defence and interior, and in the army and police,
as a positive trend. Yet, setting the conditions for women to succeed in their jobs must remain the
focus. This starts with changing perceptions and attitudes. It is coupled to providing opportunities for
professional development such as Turkey’s training programme for policewomen in Sivas.
Allies’ agreement to extend financial sustainment of the Afghan forces through 2024 is conditional to
the commitment made by the Afghan government to steadily increase its share of funding for the
Afghan security sector. NATO’s Afghan National Army Trust Fund is one of three funding mechanisms
that finance Afghanistan’s security roadmap. The roadmap aims to enhance national combat
capabilities, counter corruption, develop new military leaders, and establish proper command and
control arrangements among different elements of the Afghan security forces.
Afghanistan’s presidential elections were held for the fourth time since the fall of the Taliban regime in
2001. Despite a number of high-profile attacks leading up to the elections, Afghans have shown
immense courage in going to the ballots on 28 September 2019 and participating in the democratic
process. The Afghan security forces were essential in securing the polling stations on the day.
I welcome peace talks in Afghanistan. The Taliban needs to make real compromises to achieve a
credible deal. By maintaining support for a more professional and self-sustaining Afghan security
sector, NATO is helping set the conditions for an inclusive and resilient political settlement.
I encourage regional actors to constructively contribute to the peace and stability of Afghanistan and
its neighbourhood by fully supporting the intra-Afghan peace dialogue. Reducing external enablement
of the insurgency is key to setting the conditions for a political settlement.
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There is every reason to celebrate the improvements of almost two decades of transformation and
development of Afghanistan. Millions of children are enrolled in schools; a national press has
developed, vanguard for its openness in the region; the largest cohort of university students graduated
across the country; skilled civil servants, women and men, are now in positions of leadership in the
government; and Afghanistan’s National Assembly has a higher percentage of female members of
parliament than in many of our own countries. Afghans should take the credit for this
transformation. NATO and the international community helped, and continue to help, catalyse this
transformation.
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RESOLUTION 457
on
NATO @ 70: CELEBRATING 70 YEARS OF PEACE AND SECURITY*
The Assembly,
1. Underlining that NATO has advanced peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area for more
than 70 years and reaffirming that the Alliance remains the cornerstone of transatlantic security;
2. Stressing that its unique strength lies in Europe and North America’s commitment to ensure
each other’s security, and reaffirming that all Allies are committed to the fundamental principle,
enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, that an attack against one Ally is considered as an
attack against all Allies;
3. Acknowledging that threats such as extreme nationalism and polarised societies challenge the
Alliance from within;
4. Welcoming the meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in London in
December 2019 to celebrate NATO's anniversary as an opportunity to ensure that the Alliance is
prepared for future security challenges;
5. Noting that NATO continues to be the most successful security organisation because it has
been credible and that that credibility is based on NATO’s military capabilities and a common unity of
purpose;
6. Emphasising that NATO’s success is also due to its adherence to common values: a
commitment to democracy, individual liberty, human rights, and the rule of law;
7. Welcoming the tangible progress on Allied defence spending and military equipment
modernisation following the Defence Investment Pledge made at the 2014 Wales Summit, but also
noting that the relative imbalance in defence spending and military capabilities within NATO remains to
be addressed;
8. Convinced that the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security
promote stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and reaffirming its commitment to, and
support for, NATO’s Open Door policy;
9. Stressing the crucial contribution of NATO partnerships, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue, to
security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, the MENA region and beyond;
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10. Applauding the important steps taken to strengthen NATO-EU cooperation, and
recognizing the strategic potential that could be realised by further exploiting their
complementary capabilities;
11. Recognising that Russia’s aggressive stance and actions and continued instability on NATO’s
southern flank challenge the security of NATO member and partner countries and pose new security
threats, including in the cyber domain;
12 Aware that global trends such as shifts in economic and military power, demographics, and
rapidly developing technologies require NATO to continuously revisit its strategic outlook;
13. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
a. to update the Strategic Concept to reflect the new security environment, in particular with
regard to cyber and hybrid threats, the aggressive behaviour of Russia, the growing prominence of
China, the threats to the Alliance's southern flank due to the persistence of Islamist terrorist groups
and the fragility of some state structures in that region;
b. to continue and reinforce efforts to implement the Defence Investment Pledge as fair sharing
of the defence burden is crucial for Alliance cohesion and necessary to rebuild and maintain the
military capabilities to deter and defend against potential adversaries;
c. to rededicate the Alliance to the shared democratic values that constitute its founding principles
by developing democracy resiliency programmes in member states and by considering the creation
of a Democratic Resiliency Coordination Centre (DRCC) within NATO’s institutional structure in
order to help NATO member states strengthen democratic institutions;
d. to ensure adequate support to relevant Centres of Excellence, particularly the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of
Excellence and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, in order to
support democracy resilience programmes in member states;
e. to develop the NATO-EU relationship further, particularly in the fields of cyber defence and
military mobility;
f. to continue supporting its partners in the East – Ukraine and Georgia in particular – against
Russian interference, and to maintain, and if possible increase, assistance for their reform
processes, especially for those countries aspiring to integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures (currently
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine);
g. to continue to develop political and practical cooperation with NATO partners, including the
United Nations, the African Union, the Arab League, and the Gulf Cooperation Council;
h. to work towards opening up more partnerships with Latin American countries,
following the example of Colombia, to strengthen the security and stability of the Euro-
Atlantic area and to promote our shared commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human
rights, and individual liberty.
* Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly
on Monday 14 October 2019, London, United Kingdom.
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COMMENTS ON RESOLUTION 457
I welcome the strong support for NATO expressed in the Assembly’s Resolution 457. NATO Leaders
expressed similar strong support for the Alliance at their meeting in London in December 2019, and
unity in particular on 3 points: First, an ironclad commitment to Article 5 collective defence; Second,
the need to make further progress on burden sharing, and; Third, that NATO must and will continue
to adapt, militarily and politically.
Like the Assembly, Leaders also stressed NATO’s unique role as a political-military alliance – and
that its military punch depends on the effectiveness of its political debate. Hence they agreed to
initiate a forward-looking reflection process, not to question the purpose or fundamentals of NATO,
but to further strengthen the Alliance’s role as the only transatlantic forum for political consultation
and decisions among Allies.
I welcome the call in Resolution 457 to develop the NATO-European Union relationship further. The
EU remains a unique and essential partner for NATO, and there has been unprecedented progress
in implementing the 74 proposals for NATO-EU cooperation agreed between our two organisations.
On military mobility, we have achieved coherence between the EU and NATO sets of military
requirements, and have launched a Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility bringing together key
stakeholders from both organizations. In the field of cyber defence, active interaction continues
between staffs, notably with exchanges on concepts and doctrines and reciprocal participation in
cyber exercises.
As Leaders also stated in London, NATO works to increase security for all. We have
strengthened partnerships in our neighbourhood and beyond, deepening political dialogue,
support, and engagement with partner countries and international organisations. NATO’s
partnerships are, and will continue to be, essential to the way NATO works, making a
strategic contribution to Alliance and broader international security.
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RESOLUTION 458
on
TACKLING SECURITY CHALLENGES FROM AFRICA*
The Assembly,
1. Emphasising that security on NATO’s southern flank is closely intertwined with the stability of
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which is itself heavily impacted by the volatility of
the countries further south;
2. Deeply concerned about the deteriorating security situation in Libya caused by jihadists and
the strengthening of Russian military support to Libyan militia leaders, which escalates insecurity
and chaos and leads to further destabilisation;
3. Recognising that the interplay between corruption, weak institutions, radicalisation, terrorism,
and illicit trafficking of arms, drugs, and people causes endemic insecurity in large parts of the
continent;
4. Recognising that the expansion of militant Islamist groups beyond the Sahel region creates
a belt of violent extremism in Africa;
5. Welcoming the decrease in irregular migration over the Mediterranean but acknowledging
that the underlying causes driving migration have not yet been addressed;
6. Noting that NATO has recently been putting greater emphasis on challenges emanating from
Africa and that the Framework for the South seeks to integrate and streamline NATO’s approach to
its southern neighbours;
7. Applauding the creation of the NATO Hub for the South in Naples, as it increases awareness
of security not only in the MENA region but also in the areas south of it;
8. Recognising that NATO’s approach to the South focuses on three pillars:
a) strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defence against threats from the South,
b) contributing to international crisis management efforts in the region, and
c) helping regional partners build resilience against security threats such as terrorism;
9. Underlining the need for enhanced cooperation between NATO, the EU and the African Union
(AU) to provide in-depth support to countries in Africa and the Middle East interested in
comprehensive political and economic reform programmes;
10. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and
NATO partners:
a. to improve situational awareness, by enhancing early-warning capabilities to monitor instability
and security in Africa e.g. through improved intelligence sharing among Allies and partner
countries at the Hub for the South and through greater coordination with the early-warning
mechanism within the EU, in order to create a new NATO-EU cooperation area thus enhancing
NATO’s capabilities to monitor potential threats
b. to engage in capacity-building efforts, dialogue and information exchange, and training of
security forces in the Sahel region to prevent regional terrorist movements from merging with similar
groups, thereby creating an immediate threat to the security of NATO Allies, some of which are
already taking action to provide an adequate response, including when their links with the continent
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are more recent than those of the Allies with an established presence;
c. to strengthen assistance to partner countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) in the
development of adequate counterterrorism strategies that foster interethnic reconciliation and an
inclusive political process;
d. to explore the potential that member countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece could
offer for reinforcing security in Africa thanks to their privileged geographical position as a bridge
between Europe and the African continent;
e. to explore options for a shared EU-NATO approach on promoting stability in Africa and the
MENA region so that both organisations can pursue common objectives, identify necessary means
and mutually reinforce the respective efforts of each other;
f. to further develop NATO’s fledgling relationship with African actors, particularly the African
Union;
g. to further develop the Alliance’s cooperation with the AU on security- and politics-related
topics, such as the operationalisation of the African Standby Forces (ASF) and the promotion of
good governance through the expansion of NATO’s Building Integrity Programmes;
h. to consider expanding NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme to Sub-Saharan
African states interested in formalising their cooperation with the Alliance on political and security-
related issues in a manner which complements other missions engaged in stabilisation processes,
including the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel.
* Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the PlenaryAssembly on
Monday 14 October 2019, London, United Kingdom.
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COMMENTS ON RESOLUTION 458
Building on the strong partnerships built over the years with Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)
and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) countries, NATO Allies are engaged in a range of
activities to promote long-term peace, security and stability across the Middle East and North
Africa region. Allies are also keeping a close eye on developments in the Sahel region and
Sub-Saharan Africa and their possible implications for Allied security.
The implementation of Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programmes with MD and
ICI countries has enabled us to tailor dialogue and cooperation to our partners’ changing
security needs and priorities. Our practical cooperation has steadily increased, helping our
partners to further develop their defence capabilities in key priority areas such as counter-
terrorism; small arms and light weapons; counter-IED training; cyber defence; mine
detection; enhanced explosive remnants of war detection; chemical, biological, radiological
and nuclear defence; and civil emergency planning and crisis management.
In 2019, regional partners’ have continued to actively participate in NATO’s education and
training activities in NATO schools and institutions. In-country training has also taken place
with 37 mobile training teams in MD countries and 17 in ICI countries. MD and ICI countries’
participation in NATO exercises has helped the modernization of their armed forces and
their interoperability with NATO.
NATO’s Defence Capacity Building Initiative has become a key tool to strengthen the
defence capabilities of our regional partners, including Jordan and Tunisia. Defence
capacity building in partner countries has also been identified as a key area for cooperation
between NATO and the European Union. Our two organisations work in full
complementarity in several areas, including good governance and education and training.
NATO’s Hub for the South in Naples is contributing to the Alliance’s situational awareness
and understanding of regional challenges, threats and opportunities. It is supporting the
collection, management, and sharing of information, and is contributing to coordinating
NATO’s activities in the South.
I share the Assembly’s concerns about the deteriorating security situation in Libya. I fully
support the efforts of the United Nations Special Representative for Libya aimed at reaching
a political solution to the crisis. NATO remains committed to provide advice to Libya in the
area of defence and security institution building, taking into account the political and security
situation.
NATO and all NATO Allies take part in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. NATO’s mission
in Iraq is an important contribution to the Coalition’s effort. At the invitation of the Iraqi
government, we are helping to train forces and prevent the return of ISIS. Following
developments on the ground and ensuing tensions across the Middle East at the beginning
of 2020, Allies suspended our training on the ground and took all precautions necessary to
protect our people.
The NATO-ICI Regional Centre in Kuwait is a hub for training and cooperation between
NATO and its ICI partners, as well as Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC). Since its inauguration in 2017, the centre has hosted some 1000 participants from
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ICI and GCC countries, as well as more than 200 experts from NATO nations. The purpose
of the centre is to promote the exchange of expertise among professionals in the defence
and security sector and improve interoperability between NATO and its partners in the
region. Its activities have included cyber defence; chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear defence and crisis management; maritime security; energy security; political
dialogue; public diplomacy; and military-to-military cooperation.
NATO’s practical cooperation with the African Union continues, including in assisting the
operationalization of the African Stand-by Force, and through building integrity discussions.
An updated AU-NATO agreement was signed in November to enable expanded practical
cooperation as well as a more robust political dialogue.
NATO’s partnerships are demand driven. Therefore, it is up to Sub-Saharan African states
to take the initiative in approaching NATO. Recently, the Republic of Ghana expressed an
interest in exploring the possibility of developing partnership relations with the Alliance.
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RESOLUTION 459
on
STRENGHTENING NATO CYBER SECURITY, DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE*
The Assembly,
1. Recognising the increasingly complex international cyber threat landscape;
2. Increasingly facing persistent cyber campaigns falling below the threshold of armed
conflict and acknowledging an important role for the Alliance in countering them;
3. Remaining vigilant regarding increasing cyber threats from terrorist and extremist groups;
4. Underlining that cyber attacks by states or their proxies present the biggest cyber threat to
NATO;
5. Stressing that cyber attacks can threaten national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and
stability and could, thus, lead to the invocation of the collective defence clause (Article 5) of the
NATO’s founding treaty;
6. Underscoring that Allies have an individual responsibility to maintain and develop both
individual and collective capacity to resist cyber attacks, but highlighting NATO’s crucial support
role;
7. Emphasising NATO’s defensive mandate, its continued adherence to international law, and
the principle of strong political oversight of military operations;
8. Recalling the need to operate and defend in cyber space as effectively as in other
military domains;
9. Lauding recent Allied and NATO progress on strengthening cyber security, defence,
and deterrence;
10. Recalling the difficulty of attributing cyber attacks and stressing the danger of escalation
and the need for states to decide on appropriate responses;
11. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
a. to fulfil their national cyber commitments under the NATO Defence Planning Process and the
NATO Cyber Defence Pledge;
b. to adopt a NATO cyber space doctrine by the end of 2019
Cyber Security and Defence
c. to redouble their efforts on:
i. cyber capability development
ii. cyber defence expenditures;
iii. adaptation of Allied and NATO structures;
iv. integration of cyber effects into military operations;
v. refinement of cyber strategies and policies at the national and NATO levels;
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vi. cooperation and exchange of best practices;
vii. situational awareness, information sharing, and assessment;
viii. enhancement of skills and awareness across all national and NATO
stakeholder communities;
ix. fostering education, training and exercises;
x. strengthening effective cyber partnerships with industry, academia, partner nations, and other
international organisations, especially the EU as part of the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership;
d. to strongly consider making defensive and offensive cyber effects available for NATO
operations on a voluntary basis, if not already committed to do so;
Cyber Deterrence
e. to continue to signal their resolve and credibility to deter cyber attacks;
f. to maintain a cyber deterrence policy of ambiguity concerning the threshold at which a cyber
attack is considered an armed attack and possible collective responses if that threshold is crossed;
g. to continue to seek to reduce escalatory risks through clear diplomatic messaging and
engagement, a high level of transparency on cyber capabilities and policies, and support to norm-
development and confidence-building measures in cyber space;
Persistent Cyber Campaigns
h. to recognise the long-term strategic risk constituted by persistent cyber campaigns and
intensify consultations within the Alliance and with partners with membership aspirations;
j. to counter persistent cyber campaigns with the right mix of security, defence, and deterrence,
including increased civil preparedness and resilience;
k. to attribute malicious cyber operations, when feasible, in a timely and coordinated fashion while
respecting the sovereignty of governments; and
m. to continue to refine their strategies for countering hybrid threats.
* Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday
14 October 2019, London, United Kingdom.
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COMMENTS ON RESOLUTION 459
I welcome Resolution 459 and the Assembly’s attention to the improvement of Allied and NATO
cyber defences. Significant work is underway to tackle cyber threats by increasing NATO’s capacity
as a collective defence organization; building resilience and capability across the Alliance; and
working with our partners.
Allies stated clearly at the 2014 Wales NATO Summit that a cyber attack could lead to the invocation
of Article 5, and hence cyber defence now is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. The
2016 Warsaw NATO Summit declared cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must
defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea. Neither of these decisions alter
NATO’s defensive mandate or its commitment to act in accordance with international law.
At the 2018 Brussels NATO Summit, Allies agreed to establish a new Cyberspace Operations
Centre, which will coordinate NATO’s operational activity in cyberspace, build situational awareness,
and integrate cyber aspects into NATO’s planning at all levels. Allies also agreed how to integrate
voluntary sovereign cyber effects into Alliance Operations and Missions, and to date nine Allies have
publicly offered to use their capabilities in this context. Further, while recognizing that attribution is a
sovereign national prerogative, Allies declared that individual Allies may consider, when appropriate,
attributing malicious cyber activity and responding in a coordinated manner. Allies also affirmed their
determination to counter the full spectrum of cyber threats, including those conducted as part of a
hybrid campaign.
In February 2019, Allies agreed a NATO Guide that sets out strategic response options to significant
malicious cyber activities. These response options focus on situational awareness, resilience,
communications, and partnerships, and are designed to enable timely decision-making and action.
NATO is an important platform for exchanging information, including on individual and collective
responses by Allies.
In addition to these strategic and organizational changes, NATO must continue to improve its
technical defenses. While we have extended and improved protection of our networks, cyber threats
to the security of the Alliance are still becoming more frequent, complex, destructive, and coercive.
In the face of this challenging threat landscape, the capability and resilience of all Allies must be
further strengthened. The Cyber Defence Pledge taken at the 2016 Warsaw NATO Summit commits
Allies to continue to enhance the cyber defences of national networks and infrastructures as a matter
of priority. In each of the past three years, Allies have assessed their own cyber programmes and
reported on progress. The Pledge has helped drive senior political attention and investment in cyber
defence, and to facilitate the sharing of national best practices. All Allies have made progress, but
we must continue to advance: challenges remain in appropriately resourcing cyber defence and
finding sufficient numbers of trained personnel. NATO will continue to serve as an impetus for
improvement and forum for discussion on cyber defence issues.
Cyber defence concerns reach beyond NATO and its Allies -- to industry, academia, partner nations,
and international organizations. We are stronger and better prepared when working together, and
so we are always striving for closer cooperation with our partners to strengthen our cyber defence.
Through the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership, we are strengthening our collaboration with industry
and academia on such critical topics as innovation. We also continue to engage closely with the
European Union on cyber issues at both a technical and policy level. Focus areas are as diverse as
integrating cyber into crisis management procedures, developing skills of cyber defenders, and the
security of next generation communication networks.
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The 2019 edition of ‘Cyber Coalition’ -- NATO’s annual flagship cyber exercise and one of the largest
in the world -- included a broad range of partners, including Ukraine, Georgia, Switzerland, Finland,
Ireland, Sweden, and the European Union
Finally, while NATO itself does not set norms, it supports the work being undertaken in other fora
such as the UN and the OSCE on confidence building measures and norms of responsible state
behaviour. Allies have underscored the importance of prioritizing the implementation of such
measures, including as part of current UN processes focusing on cyber stability between states.
Cyber defence is and will remain a top priority for NATO. Both NATO as an organization and Allies
individually are taking important steps to build our defences, develop our capability and resilience,
and strengthen our partnerships. Continued parliamentary support will be critical to the success of
these efforts.
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