The OSCE’s Military Pillar: The Swiss FSC Chairmanship

© 2018 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 1
ETH Zurich
CSS
CSS Analyses in Security Policy
No. 237, December 2018, Editor: Fabien Merz
The OSCE’s Military Pillar:
The Swiss FSC Chairmanship
In January 2019, Switzerland will take over the rotating chairmanship
of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). The FSC is a little-known,
integral decision-making body of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Every week in Vienna, the FSC discusses
and negotiates measures to strengthen security in Europe.
By Christian Nünlist
In January 2019, Switzerland will assume
the chairmanship of the OSCE Forum for
Security Co-operation (FSC) in Vienna
for four months. Following the Swiss
Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2014,
which was praised at home and abroad and
was dominated by the management of the
Ukraine Crisis,Switzerland will once again
assume a visible role in the OSCE to pro-
mote peace and security in Europe.
In principle,the task is a routine matter,but
since the outbreak of the Ukraine Crisis,
nothing in the OSCE has been routine.The
FSC has also suffered from the harsher po-
litical climate between Russia and the West.
Nevertheless, especially in times of crisis,
the FSC offers the opportunity for contacts
between Russia and the West, especially
military-to-military contacts. The FSC
deals with politico-military issues. Among
its most important tasks are the negotiation
and adoption of politically binding deci-
sions in the area of arms control and confi-
dence- and security-building measures
(CSBMs), as well as ensuring compliance
with the commitments entered into in this
area by the OSCE participating States.
Promoting the effectiveness of the OSCE
has traditionally been one of the priorities
of Swiss foreign policy. With its approach
of co-operative and comprehensive security
and its commitment to inclusive dialogue,
the OSCE reflects essential elements of
Switzerland’s foreign policy strategy. Since
July 2017, Swiss Ambassador Thomas Gr-
eminger has headed the organization as
OSCE Secretary General. His election can
be seen as a sign of appreciation within the
OSCE for Switzerland’s constructive role
in the world’s largest regional security or-
ganization and its 57 participating States,
including the US and Russia.
Switzerland sees itself as a bridge-builder
in the struggle between Russia and the
West over the future European order.Swit-
zerland supports both the OSCE’s crisis
management in the Ukraine Crisis and a
dialogue on core issues of European secu-
rity, including an eventual re-launch of
conventional arms control in Europe.Swit-
zerland is also committed to better imple-
mentation of the OSCE’s existing arms
control acquis and a modernization of CS-
BMs. These were agreed in the Vienna
Document and include the exchange of in-
formation on armed forces, defense plan-
ning and expenditure, prior notification
about major military exercises, and onsite
verification.
At the 881st meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security-Cooperation, CSS Senior Researcher Christian
Nünlist (r.) presents new ideas for arms control (25 April 2018). Micky Kroell / OSCE
OSCEs Parlamentariske Forsamling 2018-19
OSCE Alm.del - Bilag 7
Offentligt
© 2018 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 2
CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 237, December 2018
How the FSC Works
Since 1992, the FSC has consisted of the
Vienna-accredited delegations of the
OSCE participating States, represented by
diplomats and/or military advisers. Swit-
zerland has already held the FSC Chair-
manship four times, most recently in
2001–02, when it was still rotated in
monthly intervals.The current four-month
rotation principle was only introduced in
February 2002 and allows the setting of
priorities.In 2019,Switzerland will assume
the modern, longer FSC Chairmanship for
the first time. Switzerland now wants to
skillfully set priorities and strengthen coor-
dination with subsequent chairs.
In the FSC, as in all OSCE forums, all 57
participating States have equal rights.Deci-
sions are always taken by consensus, giving
every OSCE participating State a veto
right. This often makes the decision-mak-
ing process difficult and time-consuming,
but consensual decisions, once taken, have
great legitimacy.The work of the chairman-
ship is supported by the “FSC Troika”, con-
sisting of the current FSC chair, the prede-
cessor, and the successor. Switzerland will
therefore be engaged in the FSC for a full
year.The Troika sets the agenda and ensures
the continued work of the FSC through
joint coordination.For its part,the Troika is
supported by the OSCE Secretariat.
Which country will take over the chair
from Switzerland in April 2019 is current-
ly still open. It would be Tajikistan’s turn,
followed by the Czech Republic,Turkmen-
istan, and Turkey. Tajikistan has not yet
made a definitive statement on whether it
plans to carry out this task.This is rather an
exception, because the vast majority of
states, including small states, normally do
so. The Czech Republic is working with
two scenarios: Either it will assume the
chairmanship in April 2019 directly after
Switzerland, or it will do so later in the fall
of 2019.Since Turkmenistan has not yet is-
sued an official statement either, Turkey
could assume the chairmanship as early as
autumn 2019.
Innovative Ideas
The FSC began its work in Vienna on
22 September 1992 as an integral part of
the CSCE. The 1990s were dynamic years
for the CSCE/OSCE. After the end of the
Cold War, pan-European ideas of inclu-
sive, cooperative security with Russia in-
vigorated the CSCE. The semi-permanent
conference marathon was re-established as
an organization at the end of 1994 – the
OSCE.
Five negotiated normative basic documents
stand out in the 25-year history of the
FSC. Firstly, a “Code of Conduct on Polit-
ico-Military Aspects of Security” was ad-
opted in December 1994. It is regarded as
one of the OSCE’s landmark documents.
The Code of Conduct deals with the de-
fense policy of the participating States even
in peacetime and obliges them to cooperate
in security policy, to establish and maintain
democratic control of the armed forces and
to observe obligations under in-
ternational law (such as the
proportionality of the use of
force to the fulfilment of inter-
nal security tasks). Despite hav-
ing solemnly subscribed to the
Code of Conduct in Budapest
in December 1994, Russia’s deployment of
its armed forces in Chechnya massively vi-
olated the Code just a few days later. This
shows that it is very difficult for the OSCE
to enforce CSMBs against major powers.
Secondly, the “Catalogue of Stabilizing
Measures for Localized Crisis Situations”
adopted in 1993 has been recalled more
frequently in OSCE circles in recent years,
as the document offers an interesting start-
ing point for “status-neutral arms control”
(i.e., mechanisms that can be applied even
in controversial territories such as Crimea).
Regarding potential conflict parties, the
document states: “If these parties are not
states, their status will not be affected by
their identification and subsequent partici-
pation in the prevention, management
and/or resolution of the crisis”. The docu-
ment is not very well known, but actually
contains useful confidence-building ideas
for current conflicts, even though the cata-
log has so far never been used in practice.
The document also covers irregular forces,
non-state actors, and intra-state conflicts –
and is therefore potentially suitable for
modern, hybrid wars. States and non-state
conflict parties, regardless of their status,
could partner in arms control measures if
all sides agree.
Thirdly, after the Dayton Agreement, dis-
cussions on regional arms control under
the auspices of the FSC in January 1996
led to the “Agreement on Confidence
Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. As a
result, a large number of weapons systems
were destroyed, and confidence was re-
stored through arms control measures in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. A verification proto-
col was inspired by the Treaty on Conven-
tional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE),and
in some cases even went beyond it. The
treaty established a military balance of
power between the countries and set upper
limits for heavy weapons. The OSCE thus
positioned itself at the regional level as a
successful arms control agency. It might be
possible to build on this model today in the
Baltic States or the Black Sea – two regions
that have been at the center of rearmament
and military maneuvers since 2014 and
could therefore benefit from CSBMs and
regional arms control.
Fourth, an OSCE Document on Small
Arms and Light Weapons (2000) and an
OSCE Participating States and OSCE Partner States (2018)
Switzerland supports
a dialogue on core issues
of European security.
© 2018 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 3
CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 237, December 2018
OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Con-
ventional Ammunition (2003) were adopt-
ed. Small arms, light weapons, and surplus
conventional ammunition – mostly relics
from the Cold War – pose a significant
threat to the population, infrastructure,
and environment. Among other things,
these documents have helped to destroy
stocks of mélange, a highly toxic rocket fuel,
in Albania and Ukraine.
Fifth, the regular modernizations of the
Vienna Document – in 1992, 1994, 1999,
and lastly in 2011 – were also highlights of
the FSC’s history.The 1990 Vienna Docu-
ment is the most important CSBM in the
OSCE area. The politically binding agree-
ment provides for the exchange and verifi-
cation of information on armed forces and
military activities.
This brief overview shows that the FSC ex-
perienced its most dynamic phase in the
first ten years after its establishment. Since
2004, similar highlights have failed to ma-
terialize. The importance of arms control
diminished dramatically in the 21st centu-
ry until the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis
in 2014.
War of Words in Vienna
One of the greatest problems is the delib-
erate political linking of arms control with
totally unrelated issues. Individual OSCE
participating States can thus abuse the
consensus principle and the de-facto right
of veto of any delegation to hijack issues
such as the modernization of existing re-
gimes. Since 1999, territorial conflicts in
the Southern Caucasus have blocked the
adaptation of the CFE Treaty to new reali-
ties, such as NATO’s admission of former
Warsaw Pact states.
This pattern has been repeated since the
outbreak of the Ukrainian Crisis, including
in the FSC. The US, Canada, the UK, and
other transatlantic-oriented OSCE partic-
ipating States as well as Ukraine are basi-
cally unwilling to enter into any substantial
negotiations with Russia until Moscow re-
verses the annexation of the Crimea and
withdraws militarily from Eastern Ukraine.
Paradoxically, however, the Ukrainian Cri-
sis has also highlighted the need to adapt
Cold War regimes to the conflicts of the
21st century. Since 2014, military issues
such as doctrine developments, percep-
tions, and the need for verifiable transpar-
ency have been raised more frequently in
the FSC and since 2017 in the OSCE’s
“Structured Dialogue” on core issues of
European security.
In general, the Ukraine Crisis is both a
“curse and a blessing” for the OSCE, as
Thomas Greminger noted back in 2014.
On the one hand, the war in Ukraine has
led to a “war of words” in the OSCE fo-
rums.The tone has intensified and the dis-
cussions within the “OSCE family” are in-
creasingly tough and uncompromising.The
fronts are clearly defined. Every Wednes-
day, the FSC discusses the Ukrainian con-
flict. The debates have become a ritual.
First, the Ukrainian representative presents
in detail all recent military incidents for
which Kiev holds Russia responsible. Then
the US, Canada, the UK, and the EU take
the floor and signal their support for Kiev
and demand that Russia should comply
with the Minsk agreements, return the
Crimea, and withdraw from the Donbass.
The Russian representative then explains
the Russian view of the conflict. This is far
from the constructive dialogue the FSC
experienced in the 1990s. The fronts are
hardened, and it has become extremely dif-
ficult to build consensus. But the OSCE
still remains the best multilateral frame-
work for finding political solutions, where
necessary. Contacts are maintained in the
corridors of the Hofburg, and informal dis-
cussions are held during breaks.
On the other hand, the FSC has also expe-
rienced a kind of comeback since 2014.The
variability of the FSK and the states’ inter-
est in the forum have increased significant-
ly. However, the OSCE – like its predeces-
sor, the CSCE – was originally more a
community of interests than values. Differ-
ent values and worldviews have always
clashed, and the great achievement of the
OSCE has always been to find common,
sustainable solutions to pressing security
policy challenges in Europe by consensus.
Swiss Priorities for 2019
Switzerland is tasked with chairing 13 of-
ficial meetings of the FSC between 16 Jan-
uary and 10 April 2019, every Wednesday
morning, and to find the most constructive
aspects possible on classic FSC issues (see
box). Switzerland plans to use the Chair-
manship to focus on six themes.
First, it devotes a security dialogue to the
issue of outsourcing parts of the state mo-
nopoly on the use of force to private sector
actors and related challenges. To address
the growing influence of private military
security companies (PMSC), Switzerland,
together with the ICRC, launched an ini-
tiative in 2006 that led to the Montreux
Document (2008), the first international
document to provide an overview of the in-
ternational legal obligations of PMSC in
armed conflicts.The topic is now to be dis-
cussed more prominently in the OSCE
and existing commitments, including the
1994 Code of Conduct, are to be better
implemented.
Secondly, Switzerland is organizing two
meetings on small arms and light weapons
(SALW) and conventional ammunition –
one of the few dynamic areas in the
OSCE’s politico-military dimension that
continues to function even in a tense geo-
political environment.The OSCE supports
participating states with financial or tech-
nical assistance and expertise and imple-
ments between 10 and 20 projects each
year, mostly in cooperation with OSCE
field missions in Southeastern Europe,
Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and in the
Southern Caucasus.
Thirdly, a security dialogue will address the
issue of “modern warfare aspects”. Rapidly
evolving technology and the resulting con-
stantly changing doctrines of armed forces
and security forces also call into question
the applicability of OSCE instruments.
Furthermore, the topic will be examined
from an international law perspective.
Fourthly, a joint meeting of the FSC and
the Permanent Council of OSCE Ambas-
sadors was originally planned for the
“Structured Dialogue” (SD) on politico-
military issues launched in 2016/17. An
initiative by the then German foreign min-
ister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to revitalize
conventional arms control in Europe had,
contrary to expectations and despite great
skepticism on the part of both the US and
16.01.2019 Opening session
23.01.2019 Private military and security
companies
30.01.2019 Small Arms and Light Weapons /
Conventional Ammunition I
06.02.2019 Aspects of modern warfare
13.02.2019 Vienna Document 2011
20.02.2019 European Security
27.02.2019 Annual Implementation
Assessment Meeting (AIAM)
06.03.2019 Regional CSBMs
13.03.2019 SALW / SAC II
20.03.2019 Security Sector Governance and
Reform
27.03.2019 Women, Peace, Security
03.04.2019 Code of Conduct
10.04.2019 Closing session
Swiss Chairmanship 2019
CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 237, December 2018
© 2018 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 4
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Russia, led in 2017 to a “Structured Dia-
logue”on issues of European security in or-
der to overcome the political blockade be-
tween Russia and the West and gradually
rebuild lost confidence. In 2018, however,
the momentum of the SD meetings was
unfortunately somewhat lost, and it is cur-
rently unclear in what form the SD will be
continued in 2019, and under whose lead-
ership. Critical voices in the OSCE have
apparently suggested that the debates on
politico-military issues be transferred back
from the SD to the FSC. Switzerland, on
the other hand, together with countries
such as Germany or Austria, prefers to
continue the SD with a narrow focus on
CAC. Switzerland will now dedicate the
joint FSC Permanent Council meeting in
February 2019 to the general topic of “Eu-
ropean Security” – to build momentum to
revive the SD under Belgium, Dutch, or
German leadership.
Fifth, Switzerland wants to recall common
values and principles in the Code of Con-
duct in order to remind the participating
states of their political duties at a FSC
meeting despite breaches of rules – includ-
ing in particular against the background of
the current weakening of the rule-based
European security order.The Code of Con-
duct was adopted in Budapest in 1994, and
it is intended that its 25th anniversary in
2019 should be an occasion for critical re-
flection.
Sixth, 2019 is to be the “year of SSG/R”. In
a prescient measure, the topic of “Security
Sector Governance and Reform” had al-
ready been codified in the 1994 Code of
Conduct, even before the term became
known as SSR or SSG/R respectively. The
topic is also a declared focus of the Slovak
OSCE Chairmanship in 2019.The OSCE
lacks a strategic overview of all SSG/R-
relevant activities. Switzerland will give the
issue a boost by holding a joint FSC/
Council meeting together with the Slovak
OSCE Chairmanship; after all, with the
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Con-
trol of Armed Forces (DCAF) founded in
2000, Switzerland is one of the world’s
leading players in the field of SSR.
Big Expectations, Small Steps
Switzerland has traditionally enjoyed an
excellent reputation in the multilateral en-
vironment of the OSCE as an active, in-
novative, and independent participating
state, and increasingly so since the OSCE
Chairmanship in 2014.The OSCE partici-
pating states therefore have high expecta-
tions for Switzerland’s FSC Chairmanship.
Nevertheless, geopolitical conditions and
the politicized climate at OSCE Head-
quarters in Vienna make it difficult even
for a trustworthy Chairmanship to achieve
tangible results. Existing instruments from
the period immediately after the end of the
Cold War, intended to create long-term
confidence and security, are of little use in
dealing with a “hot conflict” such as the
Ukraine Crisis, where short-term results
are needed. The consensus-based OSCE,
including the FSC, is not made for apply-
ing far-reaching measures to create trans-
parency. Arms control and CSBMs in gen-
eral, including outside the OSCE, are
increasingly being held hostage by realpoli-
tik and are losing importance.
In this sense, the FSC Chairmanship of
Switzerland in 2019 should not be expect-
ed to produce miracles. But small steps to
improve mutual trust between Russia and
the West and new constructive impulses to
reduce military risks and the future of con-
ventional arms control in Europe are al-
ready valuable achievements today. Certain
objectives of the Swiss FSC Chairmanship
are deliberately aimed at geopolitically un-
controversial topics such as small arms.
Switzerland’s commitment to peace and
security in Europe and better implementa-
tion of OSCE commitments is a good ex-
ample of an engaged, independent foreign
policy.
Dr. Christian Nünlist is Senior Researcher at the
Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. He
is author of, among others, Reviving Dialogue and
Trust in the OSCE in 2018 (2017) and Neutrality
for Peace: Switzerland’s Independent Foreign
Policy (2017).
Hans Lüber, Schweizer Vorsitz des Forums
für Sicherheitskooperation der OSZE,
in: ASMZ 11 (2018): 4–6.
Matthias Z. Karádi, Das Forum für Sicher-
heitskooperation, in: OSZE-Jahrbuch (1996):
379–391.
Jan Kantorczyk / Walter Schweizer, The OSCE
Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC):
Stocktaking and Outlook, in: OSCE Yearbook
(2008): 238–292.
Further reading