Opfølgning fra Europaudvalgets rejse til Canada 7-10/2-17: Sager under NAFTA's kapitel 11 om investor-stat tvistbilæggelsesprocedure

1 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes
to January 1, 2015
Compiled by Scott Sinclair, Trade and Investment Research Project, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
and updated with the assistance of Hadrian Mertins-Kirkwood
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
March 4, 1996 Signa SA Mexican generic drug manufacturer
claims that Canadian Patent
Medicines’ “Notice of Compliance”
regulations deprived it of Canadian
sales for its drug ciprofloxacin
hydrochloride.
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
CAD $50
million
Notice of intent on March
4, 1996. Arbitration never
commenced. Notice withdrawn
by investor.
April 14, 1997 Ethyl
Corporation
U.S. chemical company challenges
Canadian ban on import and inter-
provincial trade of gasoline additive
MMT, which auto-makers claim
interferes with automobile on-board
diagnostic systems. Manganese-based
MMT is also a suspected neurotoxin.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$250 million After preliminary tribunal
judgments against Canada,
Canadian government repealed
the MMT ban, issued an
apology to the company and
settled out-of-court with Ethyl
for US $13 million.
July 22, 1998 S.D. Myers
Inc.
U.S. waste disposal firm challenges
temporary Canadian ban (Nov. 1995
to Feb. 1997) on export of toxic PCB
wastes.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standards of
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$20 million Tribunal ruled that Canada
violated NAFTA articles 1102
(national treatment) and
1105 (minimum standards of
treatment). It awarded CAD
$6.05 million, plus interest in
compensation. Canada applied
to the federal court to set aside
the tribunal’s award. On Jan.
13, 2004 the court dismissed
Canada’s application.
December 2,
1998
Sun Belt
Water Inc.
U.S. water firm challenges British
Columbia water protection legislation
and moratorium on exports of bulk
water from the province.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standards of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$10.5 billion Claim is inactive.
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2 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
December 24,
1998
Pope & Talbot
Inc.
U.S. lumber company challenges
lumber export quota system put in
place by Canadian government to
implement Canada-U.S. softwood
lumber agreement.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$508 million Tribunal ruled that Canada
violated NAFTA Article
1105 (minimum standards
of treatment). Canada was
ordered to pay $460,000 in
compensation (plus interest)
and part of the investor’s legal
costs, totaling CAD$870,000.
January 19,
2000
United Parcel
Service of
America Inc.
Multinational U.S. courier company
alleges that Canada Post’s limited
monopoly over letter mail and its
public postal service infrastructure
enable Canada Post to compete
unfairly in express delivery. UPS also
alleges that Canada Post enjoys other
advantages denied to the investor (e.g.
favourable customs treatment).
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1502(3)
(monopolies and state
enterprises)
Art 1503(2) (state
enterprises)
$160 million On May 24, 2007 the tribunal,
in a 2-1 decision, dismissed the
investor’s claims. One tribunal
member dissented, in part.
The Tribunal determined that
key NAFTA rules concerning
competition policy could not
be invoked by an investor
under Chapter 11 dispute
procedures. It also ruled that
certain activities of Canada
Post were essentially arms-
length from the Canadian
government and therefore not
subject to challenge by the
investor. (Such activities could
be scrutinized in a government-
to-government dispute.) It also
rejected claims that Canada
Post unduly benefited from
more favourable treatment.
December 22,
2000
Ketcham
Investments
Inc. & Tysa
Investments
Inc.
U.S. lumber company challenges
lumber export quota system put in
place by Canadian government to
implement Canada-U.S. softwood
lumber agreement.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$30 million Complaint withdrawn by
investors in May 2001.
September 7,
2001
Trammel
Crow Co.
U.S. property management company
alleges that Canada Post treated it
unfairly in the outsourcing of certain
real estate services.
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
$32 million Complaint withdrawn by the
investor in April 2002 after
it reached an “out-of-court”
settlement with Canada Post.
3 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
November 6,
2001
Chemtura
Corp.
(formerly
known as
Crompton
Corp.)
U.S.-based agro-chemical company
challenges the Canadian government
ban on the sale and use of lindane,
an agricultural pesticide. Lindane
is a persistent neurotoxin and
suspected carcinogen now banned in
more than 50 countries worldwide.
Following a 1998 decision by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
to close the border to Canadian
canola treated with lindane, Canada
restricted, and later banned, the
domestic use of lindane. Since 2004,
Crompton’s seed treatment business
in North America has been owned by
Bayer Crop Sciences, a subsidiary of
the German multinational corporation,
Bayer AG.
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$83 million Chemtura filed its first notice of
arbitration on Oct. 17, 2002 and
a second on February 10, 2005.
On August 2, 2010 the tribunal
dismissed the investor’s claims.
Furthermore, the tribunal
ordered the investor to pay
the costs of the arbitration (US
$688,000) and to pay 50% of
the Government of Canada’s
costs in defending the claim
(CAD $5.778 million).
February 19,
2004
Albert J.
Connolly
(Brownfields
Holding)
U.S. investor claims that actions
by Ontario’s Ministry of Northern
Development and Mines resulted in
the forfeiture of the investor’s interest
in a quarry site that was subsequently
protected under Ontario’s Living
Legacy Program, a natural heritage
protection program.
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
Not available Notice of intent received Feb.
26, 2004. Claim is inactive.
June 15, 2004 Contractual
Obligation
Productions
LLC
U.S. animation production company
challenges decision that it is ineligible
for Canadian federal tax credits
available only to production firms
that employ Canadian citizens or
residents. It is further alleged that
Canadian immigration and work rules
restrict U.S. citizens from working on
Canadian film and television projects
and are NAFTA-inconsistent.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$20 million Notice of intent received
June 15, 2004. Statement of
claim submitted Jan. 31, 2005.
Amended statement of claim
submitted June 16, 2005.
Claim is inactive.
July 26, 2005 Peter Pesic U.S. investor claims that a Canadian
government decision not to extend
his temporary work visa impairs his
investments in Canada.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Not available Notice of intent to submit a
claim to arbitration received in
July, 2005. Notice subsequently
withdrawn by investor.
February 28,
2006
Great Lake
Farms (USA)
and Carl
Adams
U.S. agribusiness challenges Canadian
provincial and federal government
restrictions on the export of milk. It
also challenges requirements that
milk producers in Ontario must obtain
a quota authorized under Canada’s
supply-management system for dairy
products.
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
Art 1502(3)
(monopolies and state
enterprises)
$78 million Notice of intent to submit a
claim to arbitration received
on Feb. 28, 2006. Notice of
arbitration received on June 5,
2006. Claim is inactive.
4 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
September 25,
2006
Merrill
and Ring
Forestry, L.P.
Washington-state forestry company
alleges that Canadian federal and
provincial regulations and policies
restricting the export of unprocessed
logs favour log processors in BC
at Merrill and Ring’s expense,
expropriate its investment in BC
timber lands, and violate minimum
standards of treatment.
Canadian log export controls are
exempted from NAFTA obligations
governing trade in goods (Annex
301.a.)
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$25 million Notice of intent to submit a
claim to arbitration received
on Sept. 25, 2006. Final
award issued on March 31,
2010. The panel dismissed
all the investor’s claims and
ordered that the costs of the
proceedings be split between
the two parties.
The tribunal members were
divided on the appropriate
benchmarks to be applied
regarding Art. 1105, minimum
standard of treatments,
but agreed that, whichever
benchmarks were applied,
the investor had not proven
minimum standards had been
violated.
October 12,
2006
V. G. Gallo A Canadian company (Notre) planned
to dispose of Toronto’s municipal
waste by dumping it in a huge
man-made lake located on a former
open-pit mine in northern Ontario
(Adams Lake). In 2002, following the
breakdown of negotiations between
the company and the city of Toronto,
Notre allegedly transferred the
ownership and control of the project
to a numbered company involving a
U.S. citizen, V.G. Gallo. In June 2004,
the newly elected Ontario provincial
government enacted legislation
preventing the controversial project
from proceeding by banning the
dumping of garbage in Adams Lake or
any other Ontario lake.
The claimant argues that this
measure, and others, were
“tantamount to expropriation”
without compensation and deprived
it of the minimum standard of
treatment under international
law. The Ontario law provided for
compensation of reasonable expenses
incurred by investors related to the
proposed project, while precluding
compensation for any loss of goodwill
or possible profits. Ontario came to
terms with Notre on compensation,
but the Gallo enterprise did not avail
itself of compensation under the
provincial law.
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
CAD $105
million
Notice of arbitration submitted
March 30, 2007. Statement of
claim submitted June 23, 2008.
Jurisdictional hearing held
February 2011.
On September 15, 2011, the
tribunal dismissed the claim
on jurisdictional grounds. The
tribunal concluded that Mr.
Gallo could not prove the date
when he acquired ownership
and control of the enterprise
or that this transfer occurred
prior to the enactment of the
Ontario legislation.
Mr. Gallo was ordered to
pay the full costs of the
proceedings.
5 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
August 3,
2007
Mobil
Investments
Canada, Inc.
& Murphy Oil
Corporation
Mobil Investments is the U.S.-based
holding company for the Exxon-Mobil
group’s investments in Canada. Exxon-
Mobil, the world’s largest oil and gas
company, is a partner in the Hibernia
and Terra Nova oil and gas fields
off the coast of Newfoundland and
Labrador. Murphy Oil Corporation is a
U.S. oil and gas company also active in
the Newfoundland offshore.
The investors allege that Canadian
guidelines stipulating that energy
companies active in the offshore
invest in research and development
within Newfoundland and Labrador
are NAFTA-inconsistent performance
requirements. The claimants
previously challenged these guidelines
in the Canadian courts and lost.
The investors contend that 2004
requirements that companies spend
a fixed minimum amount on local
research and development are more
onerous than pre-existing local
benefits agreements, which were
expressly reserved from NAFTA by
Canada. The investors also allege
that the provincial R&D guidelines
represented a “fundamental shift”
in regulation that undermined the
investors’ “legitimate expectations”,
in violation of minimum standards
of treatment under customary
international law.
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
CAD $60
million
Notice of arbitration submitted
November 1, 2007. Preliminary
hearing held May 2009.
Arbitral hearing on merits held
October 2010.
On May 22, 2012, the tribunal
ruled that the local R&D
requirements constituted
a “prohibited performance
requirement” under Article
1106. The tribunal rejected,
with one dissenting opinion,
Canada’s arguments that the
guidelines fell within the scope
of the Canadian reservation
with respect to Article 1106
for benefits plans under the
authority of the Canada –
Newfoundland Atlantic Accord
Implementation Act.
The tribunal also dismissed the
investors’ claim that the R&D
guidelines breached Article
1105.
Canada is now liable to pay
monetary damages, with the
exact amount to be determined
by the tribunal in a subsequent
award. The tribunal majority
found Canada in continuous
violation of NAFTA Article
1106 since 2004, meaning that
as long as the R&D guidelines
remain in effect, damages will
accrue.
6 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
October 30,
2007
Gottlieb
Investors
Group
U.S.-based private investors allege
that changes in the tax treatment of
energy income tax trusts constituted
NAFTA-inconsistent discrimination
against U.S.-based energy trusts; were
equivalent to expropriation of their
investment in energy income trusts;
and violated minimum standards of
treatment since the investors had
relied on the Canadian Conservative
government’s promise not to change
the rules governing income trusts.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$6.5 million Notice of intent received on
October 30, 2007.
NAFTA Article 2103(6) provides,
in the case of an investor-
state claim involving taxation
measures, that national tax
officials can vet the claim.
Where the competent national
authorities agree that a
taxation measure is not an
expropriation, the investor is
precluded from invoking Article
1110 as a basis for a claim.
In April 2008, Canadian and
U.S. tax authorities determined
that the taxation measures at
issue in the Gottlieb claim were
not an expropriation under
NAFTA Article 1110.
Although the investors could
still proceed on the basis of the
remaining allegations in their
notice of intent, the claim is
inactive.
February 5,
2008
Clayton/
Bilcon Inc.
Bilcon Inc., a U.S. company controlled
by members of the Clayton family,
proposed to construct and operate a
massive quarry and marine terminal on
the Digby Neck, an environmentally
sensitive region in southwestern Nova
Scotia. The company intended, for
a period of 50 years, to mine basalt,
crush it into aggregate, and ship it in
post-Panamax-size freighters through
the Bay of Fundy to the U.S. eastern
seaboard. In 2007, a joint federal-
provincial environmental assessment
panel recommended that the
proposed project be rejected because
of its potentially significant adverse
environmental impacts. Following the
panel report, the NS and Canadian
governments notified Bilcon that they
would not approve the controversial
project. The investor alleges that the
administration of the environmental
assessment review, along with various
provincial and federal government
measures, were discriminatory and/
or violated minimum standards of
treatment.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
$101 million Notice of intent received on
February 5, 2008. Statement
of claim submitted on January
30, 2009. Canada’s statement
of defence submitted on May
4, 2009. Investor’s memorial
submitted July 25, 2011 and
Canada’s counter-memorial on
Dec. 9, 2011. Investor’s reply
submitted on Dec. 21 2013 and
Canada’s rejoinder on Mar. 21
2013.
Final tribunal hearing on
jurisdiction and liability held
from October 22 to 31, 2013.
The tribunal process continues.
7 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
February 5,
2008
Georgia
Basin
Holdings LLC
Washington-state forestry company
alleges that Canadian federal and
provincial regulations and policies
restricting the export of raw (i.e.
unprocessed) logs favour log
processors in BC at the investor’s
expense, expropriate its investment in
BC timber lands, and violate minimum
standards of treatment.
The claimants’ allegations are very
similar to those at issue in the Merrill
and Ring arbitration (see above), in
which the tribunal dismissed all the
investors’ claims.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$5 million Notice of intent received on
February 5, 2008.
In late 2007, counsel for
Merrill and Ring requested
that Georgia Basin Holdings be
added as a party in the Merrill
and Ring arbitration, which
had already commenced (see
above). On January 31, 2008 the
tribunal decided not to allow
Georgia Basin Holdings to
participate in that arbitration.
Claim is inactive.
July 11, 2008 Melvin J.
Howard,
Centurion
Health
Corporation
U.S. investor alleges that its plans to
establish private, fee-for-service health
clinics in Vancouver, British Columbia
and Calgary, Alberta were frustrated
by various local, provincial and federal
regulatory measures.
The investor alleges that federal
regulation, in particular the Canada
Health Act which prohibits extra
billing for publicly insured medical
services, adversely affected its
planned investments.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1104 (standard of
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1502(3)
(monopolies and state
enterprises)
Art 1503(2) (state
enterprises)
$4.7 million Notice of intent received
on July 11, 2008. Notice of
arbitration submitted on
January 5, 2008.
Revised statement of claim
submitted on February 2, 2009.
In August 2010 the tribunal
terminated the claim on the
basis that the investor had
not made a deposit required
to cover its share of the initial
arbitration costs.
August 25,
2008
Dow Agro
Sciences LLC
Dow Agro Sciences LLC is a wholly
owned subsidiary of the U.S-based
multinational corporation, Dow
Chemical Company. Dow Agro
Sciences manufactures “2,4-D”, an
active ingredient in many commercial
herbicides.
In 2006, the Province of Quebec
banned the use of certain chemical
pesticides, including 2,4-D, on lawns
within the province. Several other
provincial and municipal governments
are considering, or have already
enacted, similar bans on the use of
pesticides for cosmetic lawn care
purposes. The constitutional validity of
such pesticide bans has been upheld
by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Dow Agro Sciences alleges that the
ban is without scientific basis and
was imposed without providing
a meaningful opportunity for the
company to demonstrate that its
product is safe. Dow further alleges
that the ban is “tantamount to
expropriation.”
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$2 million + Notice of intent received on
August 25, 2008. Notice of
arbitration received on March
31, 2009.
On May 25, 2011, the parties
reached a settlement under
which Dow withdrew its claim.
In return, the Government of
Quebec formally acknowledged
that 2,4-D does not pose an
“unacceptable risk” to human
health. The disputed regulatory
measures related to pesticides
are maintained and no
compensation has been paid to
the claimant.
8 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
September 16,
2008
William Jay
Greiner and
Malbaie River
Outfitters
Inc.
The investor, a U.S. citizen, owns
and operates an outfitting business
including a hunting and fishing lodge
in the Gaspé region of Quebec.
The investor alleges that conservation
measures taken by the Quebec
provincial government to reduce the
number of salmon fishing licenses and
to restrict access to certain salmon
fishing areas were tantamount to
expropriation, discriminated against
the investor in favour of Canadian-
owned fishing lodges, and violated
minimum standards of treatment.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$8 million Notice of intent received on
September 16, 2008. Notice
of arbitration submitted
November 2, 2010. Amended
notice of arbitration submitted
December 2, 2010.
The claim was withdrawn
by the investors on June 10,
2011 following an undisclosed
settlement with the
Government of Canada.
October 8,
2008
Shiell Family U.S. family group of investors alleges
that the Canadian courts and various
Canadian government agencies
treated them improperly during the
bankruptcy proceedings of their
Canadian firm.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
Article 1109
(transfers)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$21.3 million Notice of intent received on
October 8, 2008. Claim is
inactive.
October 17,
2008
David Bishop The investor, a U.S. citizen, owns
and operates an outfitting business
in Quebec. The investor alleges that
conservation measures taken by
the Quebec provincial government
to reduce the number of salmon
fishing licenses and to restrict access
to certain salmon fishing areas
were tantamount to expropriation,
discriminated against the investor
in favour of Canadian-owned fishing
lodges, and violated minimum
standards of treatment.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1104 (standard of
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$1 million Notice of intent received on
October 17, 2008. Claim is
inactive.
April 2, 2009 Christopher
and Nancy
Lacich
U.S. private investors allege that
changes in the tax treatment of energy
income tax trusts were discriminatory,
equivalent to expropriation of their
investment in energy income trusts,
and violated minimum standards of
treatment.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$1,178.14 Notice of intent received
on April 2, 2009. Notice
subsequently withdrawn by
investor.
9 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
April 23, 2009 Abitibi-
Bowater Inc.
AbitibiBowater, one of the world’s
largest pulp and paper firms, was
formed in 2007 from the merger of
Bowater Inc of the U.S. and Abitibi
Consolidated Inc. of Canada. In 2009,
AbitibiBowater filed for bankruptcy
protection.
In November 2008, AbitibiBowater
announced it would close its last
pulp and paper mill in Newfoundland
and Labrador (NL). The company had
operated mills in the province since
1905.
In December 2008, the provincial
government enacted legislation to
return the company’s water use and
timber rights to the crown and to
expropriate certain AbitibiBowater
lands and assets associated with the
water and hydroelectricity rights.
The NL legislation provided for
compensation at fair market value for
AbitibiBowater’s expropriated assets,
but the company spurned that process
and launched a NAFTA claim.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$467.5 million Notice of intent received on
April 23, 2009. Statement of
claim submitted February 25,
2010.
In August 2010, the Canadian
federal government announced
that it had agreed to pay
AbitibiBowater CAD $130
million to settle the claim.
The decision to settle, without
litigating, is controversial
for several reasons. First, it
is the largest NAFTA-related
monetary settlement to date.
Second, AbitibiBowater was
compensated, in large part, for
the loss of water and timber
rights on crown lands, which
are generally not considered
compensable rights under
Canadian law. Finally, while the
Canadian federal government
has stated that it will not
seek to recover the costs
of the settlement from the
Newfoundland government
in this instance, in future it
intends to hold provincial and
territorial governments liable
for any NAFTA-related damages
paid by the federal government
in respect of provincial
measures.
January 25,
2010
Detroit
International
Bridge
Company
Detroit International Bridge Company
is the owner and operator of the
Ambassador Bridge between Detroit
and Windsor, one of the busiest
crossings between Canada and the
U.S. The investor objects to Canadian
government plans to build a second
bridge across the Detroit River.
The dispute concerns Canadian federal
legislation, the International Bridges
and Tunnels Act of 2007, which gives
the Government of Canada authority
over the construction, operation and
ownership of international bridges.
The investor asserts that the Act
violates the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909 and Canadian commitments to
the investor made under the authority
of that treaty. Canada contends that
the arbitration should be “time-
barred” because the investor filed
the claim more than three years after
learning about the alleged breaches.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$3.5 billion Notice of intent received on
January 25, 2010. Notice of
arbitration submitted April
28, 2011. Amended notice
of arbitration submitted in
January 2013. Statement of
claim submitted January 31,
2013. Procedural hearing held in
March 2014.
The tribunal process continues.
10 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
March 19, 2010 John R. Andre The investor, a Montana-based
businessman, operates a hunting lodge
on Aboriginal land in the Northwest
Territories, one of Canada’s northern
territories.
The investor alleges that conservation
measures taken by the territorial
government to decrease the number
of caribou that can be hunted annually
expropriated its investment in the
hunting and outfitting lodge.
The investor further alleges that the
allocation of the quota for caribou and
other regulatory measures favoured
local and aboriginal hunters and
outfitters over non-residents.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1104 (standard of
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$4 million + Notice of intent received
on March 19, 2010. Claim is
inactive.
May 13, 2011 St. Mary’s
VCNA, LLC
St. Mary’s VCNA is a U.S.-based
cement corporation, which is a
subsidiary of the Brazilian-owned
Votorantim Group. St. Mary’s VCNA
alleges that its Canadian subsidiary, St.
Mary’s Cement Inc., was the victim of
political interference in its attempt to
open a quarry at a site near Hamilton,
Ontario.
St. Mary’s Inc. took over the site in
2006 from Lowndes Holdings Corp.,
which had begun the approval process
for a quarry in 2004. However, as
early as 2005 local residents began
campaigning against the quarry on
environmental and social grounds. Due
to concerns related to groundwater,
and in response to public pressure,
the Ontario Ministry for Municipal
Affairs and Housing issued a zoning
order that prevented the site from
being converted from agricultural to
extractive industrial use.
St. Mary’s claims the 2010 zoning
order was unfair, arbitrary,
discriminatory and expropriatory.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$275 million Notice of intent submitted May
13, 2011. Notice of arbitration
submitted September 14, 2011.
Canada attempted to have
the claim dismissed pursuant
to NAFTA Article 1113 (denial
of benefits) on the grounds
that St. Mary’s VCNA was a
Brazilian-owned company
without substantial U.S.
business activities and
therefore did not qualify as
a U.S. investor. St. Mary’s
challenged this move in an
Ontario Court, but abandoned
the case before the court could
rule.
The parties reached a
settlement on February 28,
2013, which saw St. Mary’s
withdraw the claim in exchange
for $15 million in compensation
from the Ontario government.
11 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
July 6, 2011 Mesa Power
Group, LLC
Mesa Power Group is a Texas-based
energy company owned by billionaire
T. Boone Pickens. Mesa controls four
wind farm projects in southwestern
Ontario.
Ontario’s 2009 Green Energy Act
is intended to boost renewable
energy production and create jobs
in the green energy sector. The Act’s
Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) program provides
incentives for renewable energy
producers. Under the FIT program,
projects are ranked to determine
priority for government Power
Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and
access to the transmission grid.
The claimant alleges that 2011 changes
to the FIT program discriminated
against Mesa by favoring other local
and international investors, including
Korea’s Samsung C&T, which secured a
PPA. According to the investor, these
“sudden and discriminatory” changes
cost them access to a number of
lucrative contracts. Mesa also alleges
that “local content” requirements
related to the FIT program are
NAFTA-inconsistent performance
requirements.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1104 (standard of
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
Art 1503(2) (state
enterprises)
CAD $775
million
Notice of intent submitted July
6, 2011. Notice of arbitration
submitted October 4, 2011.
The tribunal process continues.
January 26,
2012
Mercer
International
Inc.
Mercer International is a U.S.
investor which, through its Canadian
subsidiary, owns and operates a pulp
mill and biomass co-generation facility
in Castlegar, British Columbia. The mill
is both a consumer and producer of
electricity.
The company alleges that it has been
disadvantaged vis-a-vis other mills
in the province with self-generating
capabilities, which Mercer claims
enjoy access to cheaper electricity
from BC Hydro (a provincial energy
utility) along with preferential
rates for the power they produce.
The company alleges that various
regulatory and other measures by
the provincial government, the BC
Utilities Commission and BC Hydro
are responsible for this unfavourable
treatment. Mercer also claims
that it has been denied “direct
subsidies, low-interest loans or other
financial incentives” available to its
competitors.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1502(3)
(monopolies and state
enterprises)
Art 1503(2) (state
enterprises)
CAD $250
million
Notice of intent submitted
January 26, 2012. Request for
arbitration submitted April 30,
2012.
The tribunal process continues.
12 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
October 17,
2012
Windstream
Energy, LLC
Windstream Energy is a U.S.-based
wind power company, which in 2008
proposed an offshore wind farm in
Lake Ontario: Windstream Wolfe
Island Shoals Inc (WWIS).
In 2009, Windstream signed a 20-year
Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) contract with a
provincial government regulatory
body, the Ontario Power Authority, for
the purchase of renewable energy. The
FIT contract was expressly subject to
WWIS receiving all the regulatory and
environmental approvals required to
proceed with the project.
In February 2011 the Government of
Ontario announced a moratorium on
freshwater offshore wind development
on the grounds that further scientific
research was needed into the impacts.
Windstream claims that the
moratorium is discriminatory and
tantamount to expropriation.
Although other firms were also
affected by the moratorium,
Windstream claims it was uniquely
discriminated against because it was
the only offshore wind developer with
a FIT contract.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
CAD $475
million
Notice of intent submitted
October 17, 2012. Notice of
arbitration submitted January
28, 2013. Amended notice
of arbitration submitted
November 5, 2013.
The tribunal process continues.
13 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
November 7,
2012
Eli Lilly and
Company
Eli Lilly is a U.S.-based multinational
pharmaceutical company, which
produces and markets the drugs
Zyprexa (olanzapine) and Strattera
(atomoxetine), among others.
Zyprexa was first patented in Canada
in 1980, but Eli Lilly received a patent
extension in 1991 on the grounds that
it had found new uses for the drug
not covered by the original patent. In
2009, however, the Canadian Federal
Court invalidated the patent extension
because the drug had not delivered
the promised utility. Olanzapine
was subsequently made available to
generic competition. Eli Lilly’s 1996
patent for Strattera was invalidated on
similar grounds in 2010.
Eli Lilly is contesting the invalidation
of its patents and the Canadian courts’
application of the internationally
accepted “utility standard,” which
stipulates that an innovation must
be “useful” in order to merit patent
protection.
Eli Lilly claims that the Canadian
courts’ decisions denied it minimum
standards of treatment under
international law and constituted
expropriation without compensation.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
CAD $500
million
Notice of intent submitted
November 7, 2012 but
subsequently withdrawn.
Second notice of intent
submitted June 13, 2013. Notice
of arbitration submitted
September 12, 2013.
Canada’s statement of defence
filed June 30, 2014. Claimant’s
memorial filed September 29,
2014.
The tribunal process continues.
November 8,
2012
Lone Pine
Resources
Inc.
Lone Pine Resources is a Calgary-
based oil and gas developer. Between
2006 and 2011, Lone Pine acquired an
exploration permit covering 11,600
hectares under the St. Lawrence River,
with the intention of mining for shale
gas. Hydraulic fracturing (or fracking)
is highly controversial in Quebec and
elsewhere.
In 2011, the Government of Quebec
passed, after extensive public and
legislative debate, Bill 18 (An Act to
Limit Oil and Gas Activities). The
legislation revoked all permits for oil
and gas development under the St.
Lawrence River and prohibited further
exploration by resource companies.
Lone Pine, which is suing the
Government of Canada through its
U.S. affiliate, claims that it was not
meaningfully consulted regarding
Bill-18 or compensated for the revoked
permit and loss of potential revenue.
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
CAD $250
million
Notice of intent submitted
November 8, 2012. Notice
of arbitration submitted
September 6, 2013.
The tribunal process continues.
14 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST CANADA
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US)2
Status
February 14,
2014
J. M.
Longyear
U.S. investors in a forestry company
that owns and operates a 63,000
acre woodlot in Ontario assert
that the enterprise was improperly
denied provincial tax incentives for
sustainable forestry management.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured- nation
treatment)
CAD $250
million
Notice of intent submitted
February 14, 2014. Notice of
arbitration submitted May 20,
2014.
The tribunal process continues.
15 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
October 30,
1998
The Loewen
Group Inc.
and Raymond
Loewen
Loewen, a Canadian funeral home
operator, challenges a civil case
verdict by a jury in a Mississippi state
court that awarded $500 million in
compensation against it. Loewen also
alleges that bond requirements for
leave to appeal were excessive.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$725 million Notice of arbitration submitted
on October 30, 1998.
In June 2003, the tribunal
determined that it “lacked
jurisdiction” to determine
the investor’s claims and
dismissed them. During the
course of the arbitration
proceedings the Loewen
Group went bankrupt and its
assets were reorganized as a
U.S. corporation. It assigned
its NAFTA claims to a newly
created Canadian corporation
owned and controlled by the
U.S. corporation. The panel
ruled that this entity was not
a genuine foreign investor
capable of pursuing the NAFTA
claim.
On October 31, 2005 a U.S.
court denied Raymond
Loewen’s petition to vacate the
tribunal’s award.
May 6, 1999 Mondev
International
Ltd.
The investor is a Canadian real
estate developer which had a
contract dispute with the Boston
Redevelopment Authority, a municipal
government body.
The investor alleges that a
Massachusetts state law immunizing
local governments from tort liability
and a subsequent Massachusetts
Supreme court ruling upholding that
law violate minimum standards of
treatment under international law and
other NAFTA obligations.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$50 million In October 2002, the tribunal
dismissed the investor’s
claims. The tribunal ruled that
Mondev’s claims were time-
barred because the underlying
dispute pre-dated NAFTA.
June 15, 1999 Methanex
Corp.
Canadian chemical company
challenges California’s phase-out of
MTBE, a gasoline additive which has
contaminated ground and surface
water throughout California.
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$970 million On August 9, 2005, the tribunal
dismissed the investor’s claims.
The tribunal ordered Methanex
to pay the U.S. government
legal costs of approximately $3
million and the full cost of the
arbitration.
February 29,
2000
ADF Group
Inc.
Canadian steel contractor challenges
U.S. “Buy-America” preferences
requiring that U.S. steel be used
in federally-funded state highway
projects.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
$90 million In January 2003, the tribunal
dismissed the investor’s claim.
The tribunal concluded that
the measures in question
were procurement measures
exempted under Article 1108.
16 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
November 5,
2001
Canfor Corp. Canadian lumber company challenges
U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duties against Canadian softwood
lumber exports. The investor also
challenges aspects of the Byrd
Amendment authorizing the payment
of countervailing and antidumping
duties collected on Canadian softwood
lumber imports to U.S. softwood
lumber producers.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$250 million Notice of arbitration submitted
on July 9, 2002.
On September 7, 2005,
at the request of the U.S.
government, the Canfor,
Terminal and Kembec claims
were consolidated into a single
arbitration.
On June 6, 2006, The Tribunal
ruled that it had no jurisdiction
on claims concerning U.S.
antidumping and countervailing
duty law, but that it does
have jurisdiction to decide
claims concerning the Byrd
Amendment.
Canfor withdrew its claim as a
condition of the October 2006
Softwood Lumber Agreement
between the governments of
Canada and the U.S.
January 14,
2002
Kenex Ltd. Canadian manufacturer of industrial
hemp products challenges seizure of
industrial hemp products under U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) rules.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1104 (standard of
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
$20 million Notice of arbitration submitted
on August 2, 2002.
In February 2004, a U.S. court
granted a petition by Kenex and
others to prohibit enforcement
of DEA rules barring non-
psychoactive hemp products.
Claim is inactive.
March 15,
2002
James Russell
Baird
Canadian investor challenges U.S.
measures banning the disposal of
radioactive wastes at sea or below the
seabed.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1104 (standard of
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106 (performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$13.58 billion Notice of intent submitted on
March 15, 2002.
Claim is inactive.
17 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
May 1, 2002 Doman Inc. Canadian lumber company challenges
U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duties against Canadian softwood
lumber exports. The investor also
challenges aspects of the Byrd
Amendment authorizing the payment
of countervailing and anti-dumping
duties collected on Canadian softwood
lumber imports to U.S. softwood
lumber producers.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1104 (standard of
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$513 million Notice of intent submitted on
May 1, 2002.
Claim is inactive.
May 3, 2002 Tembec Inc. Canadian lumber company challenges
U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duties against Canadian softwood
lumber exports. The investor also
challenges aspects of the Byrd
Amendment authorizing the payment
of countervailing and antidumping
duties collected on Canadian softwood
lumber imports to U.S. softwood
lumber producers.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$200 million+ Notice of arbitration and
statement of claim submitted
on December 3, 2004.
At the request of the U.S.
government, the Canfor,
Terminal and Kembec claims
were consolidated into a single
arbitration.
In December 2005, Tembec
withdrew its claim. It then
unsuccessfully challenged the
consolidation order in the U.S.
courts.
In July 2007, after a lengthy
process, the tribunal awarded
costs of the proceedings to the
U.S. government, requiring a
$271,000 payment by Tembec.
September 9,
2002
Paget, et.
al & 800438
Ontario
Limited
An Ontario numbered company
operated three subsidiaries in Florida
that sold or leased bingo halls.
Between 1994 and 1995, the state
of Florida accused it of violating the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act and subjected it
to a tax audit. As a result, the state
of Florida seized the company’s
property. Ontario Ltd. claims that the
state improperly refused to return its
property and destroyed its financial
records.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$38 million Notice of intent to submit
a claim to arbitration on
September 9, 2002.
Claim is inactive.
18 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
June 12, 2003 Terminal
Forest
Products Ltd.
Canadian lumber company challenges
U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duties against Canadian softwood
lumber exports. The investor also
challenges aspects of the Byrd
Amendment authorizing the payment
of countervailing and antidumping
duties collected on Canadian softwood
lumber imports to U.S. softwood
lumber producers.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$90 million Notice of arbitration submitted
on March 31, 2004.
At the request of the U.S.
government, the Canfor,
Terminal and Kembec claims
were consolidated into a single
arbitration.
On June 6, 2006, the tribunal
ruled that it has no jurisdiction
on claims concerning U.S.
antidumping and countervailing
duty law, but that it does
have jurisdiction to decide
claims concerning the Byrd
Amendment.
Terminal Forest Products
withdrew its claim as a
condition of the October 2006
Softwood Lumber Agreement
between the governments of
Canada and the U.S.
July 21, 2003 Glamis Gold
Ltd.
Canadian mining company alleges
that regulations intended to limit the
environmental impacts of open-pit
mining and to protect indigenous
peoples’ religious sites made its
proposed gold mine in California
unprofitable, thereby expropriating
its investment and denying it “fair
and equitable” treatment as required
under NAFTA Article 1105.
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$50 million+ Notice of arbitration submitted
on December 9, 2003.
The first session of the arbitral
hearing on merits was held
from August 12–17, 2007 and
the second session from Sept.
17–19, 2007.
On June 8, 2009 the tribunal
issued its award, dismissing
Glamis’s claims. The tribunal
found that the economic
impact of the environmental
regulations on the company’s
investment was not substantial
enough to be deemed an
expropriation. It also rejected
the investor’s claim that a
range of state and federal
government measures related
to the mining project violated
minimum standards of
treatment.
The tribunal ordered the
company to pay 2/3 of the costs
of the proceeding.
19 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
September 15,
2003
Grand River
Enterprises
Six Nations,
Ltd., et al.
Canadian indigenous-owned
manufacturer of tobacco products
based in Ontario and a Canadian
indigenous-owned tobacco wholesaler
operating in the United States allege
that their business was harmed by
the treatment of “non-participating
manufacturers” under the terms of a
settlement agreement between 46
U.S. states and the major tobacco
companies to recoup public monies
spent to treat smoking-related
illnesses.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$340 million Notice of arbitration submitted
on March 12, 2004. Preliminary
hearing on jurisdiction held
in March 2006. The arbitral
hearing on merits was held
in February 2010. In January
2011, after protracted and
fiercely contested proceedings,
the tribunal dismissed the
manufacturer’s claim on
jurisdictional grounds and
dismissed the wholesaler’s
claim on its merits. The
tribunal ruled that the costs
of arbitration be split equally
between the parties.
August 12,
2004
Canadian
Cattlemen
for Fair Trade
Canadian cattle producers challenge
the U.S. ban on imports of Canadian
live cattle following the discovery in
2003 of a cow infected with bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (or BSE)
from an Alberta herd.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
$235 million+ First notice of arbitration
submitted on March 16, 2005.
Approximately 100 claims
were consolidated into a single
arbitration.
In January 2008, the tribunal
dismissed the claims on
jurisdictional grounds. It
ruled that the Canadian
cattle producers did not have
standing to bring the claim
because they “do not seek to
make, are not making and have
not made any investments in
the territory of the U.S.”
April 16, 2007 Domtar Inc. Domtar Inc. is a large North American
pulp and paper company, with
headquarters in Montreal, Quebec.
Domtar alleges that the collection of
U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duties against Canadian softwood
lumber exports was unlawful under
U.S. law and inconsistent with
the NAFTA obligations of the U.S.
government.
Furthermore, the investor challenges
aspects of the Byrd Amendment
authorizing the payment of
countervailing and anti-dumping
duties collected on Canadian
softwood lumber imports to U.S.
softwood lumber producers. The
investor also contests aspects of the
2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement
between Canada and the U.S.
It asserts that these measures
discriminated against Domtar, denied
it minimum standards of treatment
under international law and prevented
the timely transfer of profits from
Domtar’s U.S. operations.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1104 (standard of
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1109 (transfers)
$200 million+ Notice of arbitration and
statement of claim submitted
on April 16, 2007.
Claim is inactive.
20 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
September 21,
2007
Apotex Inc. Apotex Inc. is a Canadian
pharmaceutical company which
develops and manufactures generic
drugs. In 2003 Apotex sought U.S.
Food and Drug Administration
approval to develop a generic version
(sertraline) of Pfizer Inc.’s anti-
depressant medication Zoloft once
Pfizer’s patent expired in 2006.
Apotex later went to court to attempt
to dispel uncertainty regarding the
status of patents on Zoloft, thereby
avoiding the possibility of a patent
infringement lawsuit by Pfizer. The
U.S. courts dismissed Apotex’s suit
for a declaratory judgment clarifying
the patent situation. Meanwhile, a
competing generic drug manufacturer
was able to develop and market its
own generic version of Zoloft, thereby
allegedly causing further harm to
Apotex. Apotex alleges that the
U.S. court judgments discriminated
against it, denied it minimum standard
of treatment, and expropriated its
investment in sertraline.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$8 million Notice of intent submitted on
September 21, 2007. Notice
of arbitration submitted
on December 10, 2008.
Preliminary hearing held in
February 2012.
On June 14, 2013, the tribunal
dismissed both the sertraline
and pravastatin (see below)
claims on jurisdictional
grounds, ruling that Apotex
did not have investments in
the U.S. that qualified for
protection under NAFTA
chapter 11.
Apotex was ordered to pay all
costs of the proceedings.
April 2, 2009 CANACAR CANACAR is the association
representing Mexican independent
truckers.
The Mexican truckers assert that the
U.S. has violated its NAFTA obligations
by 1) not permitting the truckers to
enter the U.S. to provide cross-border
trucking services and 2) barring them
from investing in U.S. enterprises
that provide cross-border trucking
services. They further allege that the
U.S. has violated minimum standards
of treatment by refusing to comply
with a 2001 NAFTA government-to-
government panel ruling.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
$2 billion
annually
Notice of arbitration submitted
on April 2, 2009.
In 2011, the Mexican and U.S.
governments agreed to a three
year memorandum that allowed
Mexican trucks into the U.S
under certain conditions. In
exchange, Mexico eliminated
$2.3 billion worth of tariffs on
U.S. goods.
CANACAR’s NAFTA claim is
unresolved. Depending on
the permanent outcome of
the temporary Mexico-U.S.
agreement, which expires in
mid-2014, the claim could be
abandoned or renewed by
CANACAR.
21 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
June 4, 2009 Apotex Inc. Apotex Inc. is a Canadian
pharmaceutical company which
develops and manufactures generic
drugs.
Apotex sought U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval to
develop a generic version (pravastatin)
of the heart medication marketed
by Bristol Myers Squibb (BSM) under
the brand name Pravachol, once
BSM’s patent expired in 2006. Apotex
subsequently became involved in
court disputes over delays in the
development of its product due to
data exclusivity rights claimed by
competing manufacturers of generic
pravastatin.
Apotex alleges that certain U.S.
court judgments and FDA decisions
discriminated against it, denied it
minimum standard of treatment,
and expropriated its investment in
pravastatin.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$8 million Notice of arbitration submitted
on June 4, 2009. Preliminary
hearing held in February 2012.
On June 14, 2013, the tribunal
dismissed both the sertraline
(see above) and pravastatin
claims on jurisdictional
grounds, ruling that Apotex
did not have investments in
the U.S. that qualified for
protection under NAFTA
chapter 11.
Apotex was ordered to pay all
costs of the proceedings.
22 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
September,
2009
Cemex Cemex , a Mexican corporation, is
one of the world’s largest cement
manufacturers. It is embroiled in a
dispute with the state government of
Texas over royalty fees on quarrying.
The NAFTA claim is an attempt by
Cemex to indemnify itself against
potential losses in the Texan courts.
Not available Not available Notice of intent reportedly
submitted in September 2009.
November 23,
2011
Apotex
Holdings Inc.
and Apotex
Inc.
Apotex Holdings Inc. is a Canadian
investor, which owns and controls
Apotex Inc., a Canadian pharmaceutical
company specializing in generic drugs,
and Apotex Corp., which distributes
these drugs in the U.S.
Following an inspection of Apotex’s
Canadian manufacturing facilities
in 2009, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) discovered
deficiencies and issued an import
alert on drugs produced in Apotex’s
Signet and Etobicoke facilities. The
alert, which was in place from August
2009 to July 2011, prevented Apotex’s
U.S. distributor from importing the
majority of its products from Canada.
Apotex claims that the import alert
“decimated” its American business
resulting in “hundreds of millions of
dollars” in lost sales. Apotex claims that
similar measures were not taken by
the FDA against Apotex’s competitors
and therefore the measures were
discriminatory and violated minimum
standards of treatment.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
$520 million
(reported)
Notice of arbitration submitted
March 6, 2012.
A hearing on jurisdiction and
merits was held in November
2013.
On August 25, 2014, the
tribunal dismissed all claims.
By a 2-1 majority, the tribunal
ruled that it lacked jurisdiction
over certain claims because
Apotex was barred from
revisiting the issue of whether
Apotex Inc.’s “abbreviated
new drug applications”
constituted NAFTA-protected
“investments.” A previous
NAFTA tribunal had ruled
against Apotex on this matter
(see cases above). On the
remaining claims, the tribunal
unanimously concluded that
the Import Alert was a “lawful
and appropriate” exercise of
the FDA’s regulatory authority.
The tribunal ordered Apotex to
pay the U.S. government’s legal
costs and three-quarters of the
costs of the arbitration.
23 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
April 21, 1995 Amtrade
International
U.S. company claims it was
discriminated against by a Mexican
company while attempting to bid for
pieces of property, in violation of a
pre-existing settlement agreement.
Not available $20 million Arbitration never commenced.
August, 1995 Halchette
Corp.
No details available. Not available Not available Notice of intent has not been
made public. Arbitration never
commenced.
October 2,
1996
Metalclad
Corp.
U.S. waste management company
challenges decisions by Mexican local
government to refuse it a permit to
operate a hazardous waste treatment
facility and landfill in La Pedrera,
San Luis Potosi and by the state
government to create an ecological
preserve in the area where the facility
and site were to be located.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1104 (standard of
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106
(performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$90 million In August 2000, the tribunal
ruled that Mexico’s failure to
grant the investor a municipal
permit and the state decree
declaring the area an ecological
zone were “tantamount
to expropriation” without
compensation and breached
the “minimum standard of
treatment” in NAFTA Article
1105.
Mexico was ordered to pay
$16.7 million in compensation.
Mexico applied for statutory
review of the tribunal award
before the BC Supreme
Court on the grounds that
the tribunal had exceeded
its jurisdiction. The court
set aside part of the award
dealing minimum standards of
treatment, but allowed most of
the tribunal’s original award to
stand. Mexico was eventually
ordered to pay $15.6 million
plus interest to Metalclad.
December 10,
1996
Robert
Azinian et
al.(Desona)
U.S. waste management company
challenges Mexican court ruling
revoking its contract for non-
performance of waste disposal and
management in Naucalpan de Juarez.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$17 million+ Notice of arbitration received
on November 10, 1997. On
November 1 1999, the tribunal
dismissed the investor’s claims.
24 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
February 16,
1998
Marvin Roy
Feldman
Karpa
(CEMSA)
U.S. cigarette exporter challenges
Mexican government decision not to
rebate taxes on its cigarette exports.
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$50 million On December 16, 2002, the
tribunal rejected the investor’s
expropriation claim, but upheld
the claim of a violation of
national treatment. Mexico was
ordered to pay compensation
of $0.9 million plus $1 million in
interest.
Mexico initiated a statutory
review of the award in the
Ontario Superior Court of
Justice to set aside parts of the
tribunal’s award. In December
2003, the judge dismissed
Mexico’s application. Mexico’s
appeal of this decision was
rejected by the Ontario Court
of Appeal on January 11, 2005.
June 30, 1998 USA Waste
Management
Inc.
U.S. waste management company
challenges state and local government
actions in contract dispute with
a Mexican subsidiary over waste
disposal services in Acapulco.
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$60 million In June 2000, the tribunal
ruled that it lacked jurisdiction
because Waste Management
Inc. had not properly waived
domestic legal claims as
required by NAFTA. The
investor resubmitted its
notice of intent. The tribunal
subsequently confirmed its
jurisdiction. In April, 2004
the tribunal dismissed the
investor’s claims.
May 21, 1999 Scott Ashton
Blair
U.S. citizen who purchased a
residence and restaurant in Mexico
claims he was victimized by Mexican
government officials on the basis of his
nationality.
Not available Not available Arbitration never commenced.
November 15,
1999
Fireman’s
Fund
Insurance Co.
U.S. insurance company alleges that
the Mexican government discriminates
against it by facilitating the sale by
Mexican financial institutions of
peso-dominated debentures, but not
the sale of U.S. dollar-denominated
debentures by Fireman’s Fund.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
Art 1405 (national
treatment)
$50 million Notice of arbitration submitted
on October 30, 2001. On July
17, 2006 tribunal dismissed the
investor’s claim.
A censored version of the
final award became publicly
available during 2007.
The tribunal determined that,
while the investor had been
subjected to discriminatory
treatment, under the NAFTA
financial services chapter
rules only claims involving
expropriation were open to
investor-state challenge. The
tribunal ruled that Mexico’s
treatment of the investor
did not rise to the level of
expropriation.
25 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
November 11,
2000
Billy Joe
Adams et al.
A group of U.S. property investors
disputes a Mexican superior court
decision regarding title to real estate
investments and related matters.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$75 million Notice of arbitration submitted
on February 16, 2001.
Claim is inactive.
August 28,
2001
Lomas de
Santa Fe
U.S. investor alleges that it was
unfairly treated and inadequately
compensated in a dispute over the
expropriation of land by Mexican
Federal District authorities.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1104 (standard of
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106
(performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$210 million Notice of intent submitted on
August 28, 2001.
Claim is inactive.
October 1,
2001
GAMI
Investments
Inc.
U.S. shareholders in a Mexican
sugar company claim that their
interests were harmed by Mexican
government regulatory measures
related to processing and export
of raw and refined sugar, as well as
the nationalization of failing sugar
refineries.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$55 million Notice of intent submitted on
October 1, 2001. On November
15, 2004, the tribunal ruled
that it had no jurisdiction and
dismissed the investor’s claim.
December 12,
2001
Francis
Kenneth
Haas
U.S. investor in a small manufacturing
company in the State of Chihuahua
challenges alleges unfair treatment by
the Mexican courts and authorities
in a dispute with local partners in the
company.
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
$35 million,
approximately
Notice of intent submitted on
January 9, 2002.
Claim is inactive.
January 11,
2002
Calmark
Commercial
Development
Inc.
U.S. property development company
challenges decisions of the Mexican
courts in a property dispute in Baja
California.
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1109 (transfers)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$0.4 million Notice of intent submitted on
January 11, 2002.
Claim is inactive.
26 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
February 12,
2002
Robert J.
Frank
U.S. investor seeks compensation from
Mexican government in dispute over
development of a beachfront property
in Baja California.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106
(performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$1.5 million Notice of arbitration submitted
on August 5, 2002.
Claim is inactive.
March 21,
2002
International
Thunderbird
Gaming Corp.
Canadian gaming company challenges
the regulation and closure of its
gambling facilities by the Mexican
government agency that has
jurisdiction over gaming activity and
enforcement.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1104 (standard of
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$100 million Notice of arbitration submitted
on August 1, 2002. On
January 26, 2005 the tribunal
dismissed the investor’s claim.
Thunderbird Gaming was
ordered to pay Mexico’s legal
costs of approximately $1.2
million and three-quarters of
the cost of the arbitration. On
February 14, 2007 a U.S. court
rejected Thunderbird Gaming’s
petition to vacate the NAFTA
tribunal’s ruling.
January 28,
2003
Corn
Products
International
U.S. company challenges a range of
Mexican government measures that
allegedly discouraged the import,
production and sale of high-fructose
corn syrup (HFCS), including a tax on
soft drinks sweetened with high-
fructose corn syrup.
Mexico argues that it applied the
20% tax to protect its sugar cane
industry which is losing domestic
market share to imported HFCS, while
facing barriers in selling sugar in U.S.
markets.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106
(performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$325 million In January 2008, the tribunal
ruled that Mexico had violated
NAFTA’s national treatment
obligation. The tribunal
dismissed the investor’s claims
that the tax was a prohibited
performance requirement and
tantamount to expropriation.
The panel report was not
publicly released until April
2009, more than a year after
the award was rendered.
Mexico was ordered to pay the
investor $58.38 million.
27 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
October 14,
2003
Archer
Daniels
Midland,
Tate and Lyle
Ingredients
A large U.S. agri-business and the U.S.
subsidiary of a British multinational
company challenge a range of Mexican
government measures that allegedly
discouraged the import, production
and sale of high-fructose corn
syrup, including a tax on soft drinks
sweetened with high-fructose corn
syrup.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106
(performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$100 million Notice of intent submitted on
October 14, 2003.
In November 2007 the tribunal
ruled that Mexico had violated
NAFTA’s national treatment
obligation. In contrast to the
Corn Products International
panel, the tribunal ruled
that the tax on HFCS also
constituted a prohibited
performance requirement.
Mexico was ordered to pay the
investors $33,510,091.
August 27,
2004
Bayview
Irrigation
District, et.
al.
Seventeen Texas irrigation districts
claim that the diversion of water
from Mexican tributaries of the Rio
Grande watershed discriminated
against downstream U.S. water users,
breached Mexico’s commitments
under bilateral water-sharing treaties
and expropriated water “owned” by
U.S. interests.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$554 million Notice of intent submitted on
August 27, 2004. On June 21,
2007 the tribunal dismissed the
claims.
The tribunal ruled that the
claimants, who were U.S.
nationals whose investments
were located within the
territory of the United States,
did not qualify as foreign
investors (or investments)
entitled to protection
under NAFTA’s investment
chapter, simply because their
investments may have been
affected by Mexico’s actions.
Significantly, however, the
tribunal concluded that “water
rights fall within [NAFTA’s]
definition of property.”
September 30,
2004
Cargill Inc. A large U.S. agri-business challenges
a range of Mexican government
measures that allegedly discouraged
the import, production and sale of
high-fructose corn syrup, including
a tax on soft drinks sweetened with
high-fructose corn syrup.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1106
(performance
requirements)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$100 million+ Notice of intent submitted on
September 30, 2004. Notice
of arbitration submitted on
December 29, 2004.
The tribunal found against
Mexico in an award rendered
on September 18, 2009. The
award has not yet been publicly
released.
The tribunal reportedly ruled
that the Mexican tax on HFCS
violated NAFTA’s national
treatment and minimum
standards of treatment
obligations, and constituted
an illegal performance
requirement.
Mexico was ordered to pay the
investor $77.3 million plus $13.4
million in interest for a total
award of $90.7 million.
28 nafta chapter 11 investor-state disputes
CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO
Date
Complaint
Filed1
Complaining
Investor Issue
NAFTA
Articles Cited
Amount
Claimed
($US) Status
February 15,
2011
Internacional
Vision
(INVISA),
et. al
A group of U.S. investors allege
a decision not to renew a 10-year
agreement to erect billboards on
Mexican federal land near a U.S-
Mexico border crossing constituted
expropriation and abusive treatment.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1104 (standard of
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standards of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$7.5 million Notice of intent submitted
February 15, 2011. Arbitration
never commenced.
Claim is inactive.
February 19,
2013
Kellogg,
Brown & Root
(KBR)
A U.S. energy services company
is seeking damages against the
government of Mexico related to a
2011 decision by the Mexican courts to
annul a $320 million arbitration award
issued by the International Chamber of
Commerce in December of 2009.
The original arbitration related to a
contract dispute between Pemex, the
Mexican state energy company, and
COMMISA, a KBR subsidiary.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured- nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standards of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
Article 1503(2) State
enterprises
$400 million+ Notice of intent submitted
February 19, 2013. Notice of
arbitration submitted August
30, 2013.
The tribunal process continues.
May 23, 2014 B-Mex, et. al U.S. gaming investors allege that
after parting ways with their Mexican
business partner, their five Mexican
casinos were targetted and harassed
by Mexican authorities.
Art 1102 (national
treatment)
Art 1103 (most-
favoured-nation
treatment)
Art 1105 (minimum
standard of
treatment)
Art 1110
(expropriation and
compensation)
$100 million Notice of arbitration on May 23,
2014. Claim is ongoing.
500-251 Bank Street, Ottawa, on k2p 1x3
tel 613-563-1341 fax 613-233-1458
email ccpa@policyalternatives.ca
SUMMARY OF CASES FILED UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER 11
to January 1, 2015
Respondent
Country
Number
of Cases
Filed Claimants’ Industries
Types of Measure
Challenged
Total Compensation
Awarded3
Disposition of Cases
Canada 35 11 Resources (lumber, water, etc.)
4 Private investors
4 Energy (oil, gas, renewables, etc.)
3 Chemicals
3 Leisure & tourism
2 Pharmaceuticals
2 Waste disposal
6 Other
12 Environmental protection
10 Resource management
3 Financial regulation, taxation
3 Health care, pharmaceuticals
2 Postal services
1 Agriculture
4 Other
CAD $172.7 million 3 decided against Canada
6 settled out-of-court
6 dismissed
4 withdrawn
8 inactive
8 ongoing
United
States
20 7 Resources (lumber, water, etc.)
3 Pharmaceuticals
2 Agriculture & food processing
8 Other
3 Trade remedies
4 Administration of justice
3 Health care, pharmaceuticals
2 Environmental protection
4 Resource management
1 Agriculture
3 Other
$0 0 decided against U.S.
0 settled out-of-court
11 dismissed
2 withdrawn
5 inactive
2 ongoing
Mexico 22 4 Agriculture & food processing
4 Private investors
3 Waste disposal
4 Real estate
7 Other
5 Land use planning
4 Environmental protection
4 Agriculture
3 Administration of justice
2 Financial regulation, taxation
4 Other
US $204.2 million 5 decided against Mexico
0 settled out-of-court
6 dismissed
0 withdrawn
9 inactive
2 ongoing
Overall 77 20 Resources (lumber, water, etc.)
9 Private investors
7 Agriculture & food processing
5 Waste disposal
5 Energy (oil, gas, renewables, etc.)
5 Pharmaceuticals
26 Other
18 Environmental protection
11 Resource management
7 Administration of justice
6 Agriculture
6 Health care, pharmaceuticals
5 Trade remedies
5 Land use planning
5 Financial regulation, taxation
2 Postal services
11 Other
Approx.
US $341 million4
8 decided against state
6 settled out-of-court
23 dismissed
6 withdrawn
22 inactive
11 ongoing
sources Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (http://www.international.gc.ca), U.S. Department of State (www.state.gov), Mexico’s Secretaria de Economia
(www.economia-snci.gob.mx), NAFTA Claims (www.naftaclaims.com), Investment Treaty News (www.iisd.org/investment/itn), Investment Arbitration Reporter (www.
iareporter.com), and Public Citizen (www.citizen.org).
notes 1 Date of notice of intent, except where indicated. 2 All figures are in $US except where indicated. 3 Including awards of legal costs and interest (where
available) plus out-of-court settlements where compensation was paid and made public. 4 This figure is an estimate based on the approximate exchange rate ($CAD to
$US) at the time of each award.
30 an analysis of nafta investor-state disputes
When NAFTA came into force 21 years ago, there was
plenty of debate about its impact on jobs, energy and
sovereignty. Unfortunately, little attention was paid to
an obscure provision in the treaty that allowed foreign
investors to invoke binding investor-state arbitration to
challenge government measures that allegedly diminish
the value of their investments. The dubious rationale for
granting this extraordinarily sweeping right to foreign
investors was that the Mexican courts of the day were
prone to corruption and political interference.
Over two decades later, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and its
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system have be-
come notorious. Of the 77 investor-state claims filed to
date under NAFTA, only a handful pertain to the admin-
istration of justice in the Mexican courts. Instead, foreign
investors have used Chapter 11 to target a broad range
of government measures, especially in the areas of envi-
ronmental protection and natural resource management,
which allegedly impaired corporate profits (see Figure 1,
NAFTA claims by measure challenged).
Since most government regulations or policies affect
property interests, NAFTA’s investor-state mechanism
and similar investment rules in other international trea-
ties have been rightly criticized for giving multinational
corporations too much power while constraining the fun-
damental role of democratic governments. Around the
world, this private, parallel justice system for foreign in-
vestors is coming under increasing fire for its structural
biases, conflicts of interest, legal capriciousness and lack
of independence.1
Background
NAFTA’s controversial ISDS mechanism allows foreign
investors to bring claims directly against governments in
the three signatory countries. Previously, ISDS had been
a feature of bilateral investment treaties between devel-
oped and developing countries, but the signing of NAFTA
marked the first time ISDS was integrated into a compre-
hensive regional trade agreement. While national gov-
ernments alone are responsible for defending challenged
measures, measures at the federal, provincial, state and
local levels can, and have, been targeted by investors.
Arbitration can be invoked unilaterally by foreign in-
vestors from the three NAFTA countries. Investors do
not need to seek consent from their home governments
and are not obliged to try to resolve a complaint through
the domestic court system before launching a NAFTA
claim. Under Chapter 11, all three parties have given their
“unconditional, prior consent” to submit investor claims
to binding arbitration, allowing investors to simply by-
pass the domestic courts. Cases are decided by tribunals
of three members: one chosen by the investor, one cho-
sen by the challenged government and a third selected
by mutual agreement. Tribunal decisions are final, and
beyond the reach or review of domestic courts.
Claimants can challenge government measures that
are allegedly unfair or inequitable (NAFTA Article 1105),
discriminatory (NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1103), constitute
direct or indirect expropriation (NAFTA Article 1110) or
apply performance requirements such as local develop-
ment benefits (NAFTA Article 1106). While tribunals can-
not force a government to change NAFTA-inconsistent
measures, they can award monetary damages to inves-
tors. These damage awards are fully enforceable in the
domestic courts.2
The significant number and variety of claims under
Chapter 11 underscores how making such broadly framed
investment rights enforceable through investor-state
arbitration greatly increases both the frequency and
controversy of disputes. Governments tend to be more
cautious about bringing matters to formal dispute settle-
ment. They must consider diplomatic relations and weigh
the consequences for their own similar domestic policies
if the challenge should succeed.3
Private investors, on the
other hand, have been far quicker to invoke dispute set-
tlement and are much more aggressive in their interpre-
tation of investment rights.
Democracy Under Challenge
Canada and Two Decades of NAFTA’s Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism
By Scott Sinclair, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
31 an analysis of nafta investor-state disputes
Canada’s Experience With NAFTA ISDS
Canada has been the target of 35 investor-state claims,
significantly more than either Mexico (22 claims) or the
U.S. (20 claims), despite the fact that the latter’s econo-
my is 10 times larger than Canada’s. (See Figure 2, NAFTA
ISDS cases by country.)
The trend in recent years is even more disquieting. The
number of challenges against Canada is rising sharply-
From 1995–2005, there were 12 claims against Canada,
while in the last ten years there have been 23. Moreo-
ver, Canada is attracting the lion’s share of new NAFTA
challenges. Over 70% of all NAFTA investor-state claims
since 2005 were brought against the Canadian govern-
ment (see Figure 3, NAFTA ISDS claims by country, 5-year
blocks).
Of decided cases—those which ended either in an
award by the tribunal or a negotiated settlement—gov-
ernments have won 24 (69%) and lost 11 (31%). But break-
ing these down by countries is revealing. Canada has
won seven and lost six decided cases.4
Mexico has won
six and lost five of decided cases. Only the U.S. has an
unbroken winning record, having won 11 decided cases
and lost none.5
(See Figure 4, Decided NAFTA cases by
country).
Canada has already paid out NAFTA damages totalling
over $172 million. With nine active investor-state claims
outstanding (and one damages award in a case Canada
has already lost still outstanding) this financial toll will
certainly increase. Mexico has incurred the highest mon-
etary damages, paying out more than US$204 million
($238 million) to foreign investors. Having never lost a
case, the U.S. has paid no damages.
All three parties have incurred tens of millions of dol-
lars in legal costs defending themselves against NAFTA
claims. The cost of administering a NAFTA arbitration
panel typically runs over $1 million (and sometimes
more).6
Serving on an arbitration panel is lucrative work,
with arbitrators charging fees of up to $3,000 per day,
plus expenses.7
The costs of legal advice and representa-
tion are usually much higher than the costs of the panel
itself. Governments routinely incur costs of several mil-
lion dollars or more to defend themselves before a NAF-
TA tribunal.8
Even in frivolous or nuisance claims that
never get to a full hearing, the defending government in-
curs costs investigating the charges and preparing its de-
fence.9
Tribunals have complete discretion regarding how
to apportion legal costs between the parties, but tribu-
nals usually don’t award winning governments their full
costs.10
A conservative estimate of legal costs incurred
by Canada alone over the last two decades is more than
$65 million.
Canadian Losses
NAFTA’s investor rights system has been used repeat-
edly to attack regulations in all three countries. In the
Figure 1 NAFTA Claims by Measure Challenged
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Environmental protection
Resource management
Administration of justice
Health care, pharmaceuticals
Agricultural
Land use planning
Financial regulation, taxation
Trade remedies
Public services, Postal services
Other
3
5
5
6
6
8
14
2
18
10
32 an analysis of nafta investor-state disputes
cases of Canada and Mexico, such challenges have suc-
ceeded far too often. All of Canada’s losses concerned
important public policy issues or regulatory matters. It
is worth briefly reviewing each of Canada’s six losses to
appreciate how profoundly NAFTA chapter 11 impinges
on sovereign regulatory authority.
In the Ethyl case (1997), a U.S. chemical company used
NAFTA’s investor-state mechanism to successfully chal-
lenge a Canadian ban on the import and interprovincial
trade of the gasoline additive MMT, a suspected neuro-
toxin which automakers also claim interferes with auto-
mobile on-board diagnostic systems. The company won
damages of US$13 million ($15 million) and, disturbingly,
the Canadian government was compelled to overturn the
regulatory ban and issue a formal apology.
In the S.D. Myers case (1998), a U.S. investor success-
fully challenged a temporary Canadian ban on the export
of toxic PCB wastes in response to the opening of the
U.S. border to toxic wastes for a short period. The ban
was applied impartially to all PCB wastes. Nevertheless,
the tribunal concluded that the ban was discriminatory
and that it violated NAFTA’s minimum standards of treat-
ment requirements. The NAFTA tribunal rebuffed Can-
ada’s arguments that an international treaty, the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, obliged it to dis-
pose of its toxic wastes within its borders. The tribunal
awarded S.D. Myers $6 million in damages, plus $1.1 mil-
lion in costs.
The Pope and Talbot dispute (1998) arose after Canada
had been pressured into addressing the long-running
softwood lumber dispute by restricting its lumber ex-
ports to the U.S. The Pope and Talbot claim added insult
to injury when the U.S. forestry company successfully
challenged the administrative measures taken by Canada
to implement these lumber export quotas. The tribunal
interpreted NAFTA’s minimum standards of treatment
provisions expansively to impugn rather mundane gov-
ernment conduct (for example, rejecting the investor’s
request that meetings be held outside Ottawa). The
tribunal’s controversial ruling disregarded explicit repre-
sentations by all three NAFTA parties that the minimum
standards of treatment obligations were intended to be
read narrowly, applying only to truly egregious govern-
ment conduct. The U.S. investor was awarded damages
totalling $870,000, but the legal issues at stake were
more critical. In particular, the tribunal’s defiant attitude
towards binding interpretations accepted by all three
governments underscores the lack of accountability in-
herent in the ISDS procedure.
The AbitibiBowater case (2009) involved a bankrupt in-
vestor that had closed its last timber mill in the province
Figure 2 NAFTA ISDS Cases by Country (Running Total)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Canada
Mexico
United States
33 an analysis of nafta investor-state disputes
of Newfoundland and Labrador, leaving behind a host of
problems including unpaid bills, unemployed workers,
unhonoured pension obligations, and highly contami-
nated industrial sites. Provincial legislation expropriating
the abandoned mill provided a process for determining
compensation for the expropriated assets, but the inves-
tor did not avail itself of this process. Instead, it turned
to NAFTA chapter 11 through which it was successful in
wresting a $130 million payout from the federal govern-
ment, the largest single NAFTA-related monetary set-
tlement to date. AbitibiBowater (now Resolute Forest
Products) was compensated, in large part, for the loss
of water and timber rights on crown lands, which are
generally not considered compensable property rights
under Canadian law. And while the federal government
stated it will not seek to recover the costs of the settle-
ment from the Newfoundland and Labrador government
in this instance, in future it intends to hold provincial
and territorial governments liable for any NAFTA-related
damages paid by the federal government in respect of
provincial measures.
The St. Marys claim (2011) involved a U.S.-based (but
Brazilian-owned) company that attempted to open a
quarry near Hamilton, Ontario. Local residents cam-
paigned against the quarry on environmental and social
grounds. In response to this public pressure, and due to
concerns related to groundwater, the Ontario govern-
ment issued a zoning order that prevented the site from
being converted from agricultural to extractive indus-
trial use. The parties reached a settlement on February
28, 2013, which saw St. Marys withdraw the claim in ex-
change for $15 million in compensation from the Ontario
government. This case is part of a deeply concerning
trend11
where foreign investors turn to NAFTA chapter 11
simply when their proposals for environmentally contro-
versial projects do not receive regulatory approval.
In the Mobil Investments/Murphy Oil (2007) case,
one of the world’s largest and most profitable compa-
nies (ExxonMobil)12
challenged requirements that energy
companies active in Atlantic offshore production carry
out research and development within Newfoundland
and Labrador. The province has a history of massive re-
source projects that bring few benefits to the province
and its residents. Determined not to repeat this history
in the offshore oil sector, the province had negotiated an
accord with the federal government to ensure benefits
would accrue to the local economy. These economic de-
velopment provisions, which included local research and
development requirements, were duly exempted under
NAFTA. Yet the ExxonMobil claim was successful despite
this explicit exemption, or reservation, from the agree-
ment’s investment protections. The tribunal, with one
Figure 3 NAFTA ISDS Claims by Country (5-Year Totals)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1995–99
5
3
8
6
11
11
9
1
3
15
5
0
2000–04 2005–09 2010–14
Canada Mexico U.S.
34 an analysis of nafta investor-state disputes
dissenting opinion, rejected Canada’s legal arguments
that the guidelines fell within the scope of the Canadian
reservation with respect to Article 1106 for benefits plans
under the authority of the Canada–Newfoundland Atlan-
tic Accord Implementation Act. The majority took a very
narrow view that the Accord and any subordinate meas-
ures were reserved only exactly as they existed in 1994
when NAFTA took effect. No changes could be made to
strengthen them, and the discretionary authority under
the Act, which both Canada and the provincial govern-
ment had reasonably assumed was protected, could not
be exercised to make the R&D requirements more effec-
tive. Canada is now liable to pay monetary damages, with
the exact amount to be determined by the tribunal in a
subsequent award. It is likely that the tribunal will find
Canada in continuous violation and subject to ongoing
monetary damages from 2004 onwards.
Two decades ago, when NAFTA’s chapter 11 was put in
place, neither governments nor the public grasped that
it would be used to successfully attack the regulation
of harmful chemicals or toxic waste exports, to second-
guess routine bureaucratic and administrative decisions,
to expand private property rights to encompass publicly-
owned water and timber, to compensate investors when
governments refuse to approve contentious proposals,
or to restrict the ability of local governments to enforce
local economic development requirements in return for
an investor’s access to resources. Buoyed by their past
successes, foreign investors and their legal advisors are
now turning to NAFTA chapter 11 with increasing fre-
quency and assertiveness.
Ongoing Claims Against Canada
Currently, Canada faces nine active ISDS claims challeng-
ing a wide range of government measures that allegedly
impair the expected value of foreign investments. While
it is difficult to predict the outcome of these arbitra-
tions, in several of these claims foreign investors stand
a realistic chance of success. In fact, extrapolating from
Canada’s past track record in defending claims, foreign
investors can reasonably be expected to win nearly half
of these ongoing cases.
Cumulatively, foreign investors are seeking over $6 bil-
lion in damages from the Canadian government. Based
on previous arbitrations, investors can only expect to
gain a small percentage of this amount. Nevertheless,
from the perspective of the investors, the modest legal
costs of bringing a claim, the negligible adverse conse-
quences for claimants of losing, the decent odds of win-
ning and the lure of a financial payout make rolling the
Figure 4 Decided Cases & Settlements by Country
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Total
U.S.
Mexico
Canada
Government Wins Government Losses
7
6 6
5
11
0
24
11
35 an analysis of nafta investor-state disputes
dice on NAFTA chapter 11 an attractive option.
While none of the nine claims should be taken lightly,
two in particular are deeply troubling. These cases relate
to a ban on fracking under the St. Lawrence River by the
Quebec provincial government (Lone Pine) and a deci-
sion by a Canadian federal court to invalidate a pharma-
ceutical patent on the basis that it was not sufficiently
innovative or useful (Eli Lilly).
Lone Pine
Lone Pine Resources is a Calgary-based oil and gas de-
veloper incorporated in the state of Delaware. Between
2006 and 2011, Lone Pine acquired an exploration permit
covering 11,600 hectares under the St. Lawrence River.
The company intended to mine for shale gas by drilling
horizontally under the St. Lawrence River, the province’s
largest river connecting the Great Lakes to the Atlantic
Ocean.
Hydraulic fracturing (or fracking) is highly controver-
sial in Quebec, as it is elsewhere. In 2010, after extensive
public hearings, consultation and debate, a government-
appointed commission recommended that shale gas ac-
tivities be halted until further study of the environmental
consequences. In 2011, the Government of Quebec acted
on this recommendation by passing Bill 18 (An Act to Lim-
it Oil and Gas Activities). The legislation suspended all
permits for oil and gas development under the St. Law-
rence River and halted further exploration by resource
companies.
At the time Bill 18 was passed, Lone Pine had not re-
ceived the full authorization required to commence frack-
ing in the St. Lawrence River basin. In Quebec, mining ex-
ploration permits are granted by the Ministry of Natural
Resources, at minimal cost, on a first-come, first-served
basis. While exploration permit holders acquire priority
rights if a long-term exploitation licence is approved for
their holding, this step is by no means automatic. Min-
ing projects are subject to further authorizations and ap-
provals. In the case of the embryonic shale gas industry,
the Ministry of Environment also has to grant approval,
which in the Lone Pine case was never done.13
Given the high levels of public debate and concern over
fracking, any prudent investor should have been well
aware that gaining full regulatory approval would be far
from certain. This type of business risk is integral to op-
erating within a democratic society. Yet Lone Pine’s chief
executive has publicly characterised the Quebec govern-
ment’s easily anticipated and broadly supported regula-
tions as “the summary expropriation of its asset for no
reason other than political expediency.”14
In its NAFTA
claim, Lone Pine asserts that Quebec’s actions violated
the company’s “legitimate expectation of a stable busi-
ness and legal environment” and expropriated its invest-
ment without compensation. It is seeking $250 million in
damages, including for the loss of future revenue.
Eli Lilly
In another highly controversial claim, Eli Lilly, the U.S.-
Figure 5 NAFTA Claims Against Canada by Measure Challenged
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Environmental protection
Resource management
Health care, pharmaceuticals
Financial regulation, taxation
Public services, Postal services
Other
2
3
3
10
12
5
36 an analysis of nafta investor-state disputes
based multinational pharmaceutical company, is chal-
lenging Canadian court decisions that invalidated extend-
ed patents on two of its products, Zyprexa (olanzapine)
and Strattera (atomoxetine). Zyprexa was first patented
in Canada in 1980, but Eli Lilly was provisionally granted
a second patent in 1991 on the grounds that it had found
new uses for the drug not covered by the original pat-
ent. In 2009, the Canadian Federal Court invalidated the
second patent on olanzapine because Eli Lilly failed to
produce compelling evidence supporting its claims re-
garding new uses. Eli Lilly’s patent for atomoxetine, first
granted in 1996, was invalidated on similar grounds in
2010. Following the rulings, both drugs were opened to
generic competition, thereby reducing costs to Canadian
consumers and the public health care system.
Eli Lilly took its loss to the Federal Court of Appeal,
which upheld the lower court’s ruling. The company then
applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Can-
ada, which was rejected. The company, a well-resourced
and well-represented litigant, was clearly accorded due
process.
Yet, having lost repeatedly in the domestic courts, Eli
Lilly has now turned to the NAFTA investor-state tribunal
as a “supranational court of appeal.”15
This legal option
is available only to foreign investors, raising basic con-
cerns about equality before the law. More tellingly, by
asserting that they were denied minimum standards of
treatment, Eli Lilly expresses contempt for the Canadian
federal court system. Unfortunately, NAFTA chapter 11
enables, even invites, such arrogance and a sense of enti-
tlement on the part of multinational corporations.
Eli Lilly’s second key legal argument—that its patents
were expropriated without compensation—is similarly
contentious. As the Canadian government succinctly
observes in its statement of defence, “Court decisions
invalidating an initial patent grant do not amount to
a taking of ‘property’, either direct or indirect: rather,
they amount to determinations whether or not property
rights exist at all.”16
Patents are monopoly privileges, granted by the state,
in order to encourage innovation. To qualify for patent
protection, a product or invention must be useful. Eli Lilly
vehemently disagrees with the Canadian courts’ applica-
tion of the internationally accepted “utility standard,”
which stipulates that an innovation must be “useful” in
order to merit patent protection. Under domestic law,
the court’s well-reasoned decision on the validity of a
patent could not be construed as an expropriation. But
with a NAFTA tribunal, all bets are off.17
Other Notable Cases
The other measures being challenged in ongoing NAF-
TA chapter 11 claims include provisions under the On-
tario Green Energy Act to promote the rapid adoption
of renewable energies; a moratorium on offshore wind
projects in Lake Ontario; the decision, based on the rec-
ommendation of a federal-provincial environmental as-
sessment panel, to block a controversial mega-quarry in
Nova Scotia; and a mixed bag of other grievances and
complaints by investors who have been disappointed by
policy decisions or regulatory initiatives that didn’t meet
their expectations.
While the high-profile Lone Pine and Eli Lilly cases, in
particular, raise fundamental issues concerning the right
to regulate and the rule of law in a democratic society,
the sheer number of other challenges and wide variety of
investor complaints underscore deeper concerns about
NAFTA chapter 11 and ISDS.
Is Canada an Easy Mark?
Canada has been sued more times and faces more active
claims than any other NAFTA party. Indeed, according
to the latest figures on ISDS claims from the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Canada is now the most sued developed country in the
world.18
This dubious distinction is entirely due to law-
suits under NAFTA chapter 11.
It is hard to determine exactly why Canada is a fa-
voured target of foreign investors and their lawyers. But
it is reasonable to conclude that the federal government’s
ideological commitment to ISDS and its demonstrated
willingness to settle and pay compensation encourages
investor-state claims against Canada. Just as Ottawa’s
regrettable 1998 settlement with Ethyl Corporation trig-
gered a wave of NAFTA claims related to environmental
regulations,19
the federal government’s 2010 decision to
pay off AbitibiBowater has unleashed a rash of new inves-
tor-state compensation claims and threats.20
The success rate of foreign investors in cases against
Canada has been fairly high, with claimants being suc-
cessful in 46% of decided claims. When looking at all con-
cluded ISDS cases on a global basis, UNCTAD found that
37 an analysis of nafta investor-state disputes
approximately 31% were decided in favour of the inves-
tor, 43% in favour of the state, and the remaining 26% of
cases were settled.21
Canada’s recent experience under NAFTA chapter 11
must also be viewed within the rapidly rising number of
ISDS claims globally. In the mid-1990s, when NAFTA was
signed, there were only a handful of known ISDS cases
each year in the entire world. By 2013, recourse to ISDS,
a process now found in thousands of bilateral investment
treaties and free trade agreements, had grown dramati-
cally to nearly 60 new claims annually.22
The increase in NAFTA investment claims against
Canada is part of a large global jump (57%) in investment
treaty arbitrations initiated over the last five years.23
As
UNCTAD notes, in 2013, “an unusually high number of
cases (almost half of the total) were filed against devel-
oped States,” the majority by investors based in other
developed countries.24
This trend reflects a growing
awareness among foreign investors and corporate trade
lawyers of NAFTA investment rights, and an increasing
willingness to invoke them to contest public policy meas-
ures.
ISDS can no longer be rationalized as simply a mecha-
nism to protect foreign investors in developing countries
with spotty investment protection records or unreliable
court systems. In truth, it is a coercive tool with which
multinational corporations can assail and frustrate gov-
ernment regulation in both developing and developed
countries. ISDS has truly evolved into a private, parallel
system of justice for foreign investors—to which they
are resorting with increasing alacrity.
The Chilling Effect
A persistent concern about NAFTA chapter 11 in par-
ticular and ISDS in general is that the threat of corpo-
rate retaliation exerts a “chilling effect” on public policy
and regulation. The risk of investment treaty litigation
and sanctions, even if uncertain, can deter governments
from acting in the public interest or distort policy choices
towards options that are more amenable to foreign com-
mercial interests.
While policy chill is difficult to prove conclusively, it
is evident that the threat of legal action can inhibit or
discourage legitimate public policy or regulation. Multi-
national corporations have repeatedly invoked NAFTA
chapter 11 to contest policy and regulatory proposals.
Over the last two decades, certain of these contested
proposals were subsequently abandoned or weakened to
assuage corporate concerns.
In the mid-1990s, as part of intensive lobbying against
proposed federal regulations to require plain packaging
of cigarettes, the tobacco industry procured a legal opin-
ion by former NAFTA chief negotiator Carla Hills that
asserted such regulations infringed NAFTA’s intellectual
property rules and constituted expropriation in violation
of NAFTA’s investment chapter. The multinational tobac-
co industry repeatedly threatened the Canadian govern-
ment with trade treaty action, including an investor-state
challenge. The federal government’s proposals for plain
packaging were abandoned and replaced with watered-
down requirements to increase the size of health warning
labels on packages.25
Another documented example of policy chill concerns
the fate of proposals for public automobile insurance
in New Brunswick in 2004.26
Spurred by excessive pri-
vate insurance rates—especially for the young and sen-
iors—and attracted by the success of public automobile
insurance programs in other Canadian provinces, the
New Brunswick government pledged to pursue public in-
surance. The private insurance industry, which vigorously
opposes public insurance plans, threatened to take ac-
tion under NAFTA’s investor-state dispute settle mecha-
nism to gain compensation for lost profits. 27
Despite a
unanimous recommendation to proceed from an all-
party legislative committee, and widespread political and
public support, the proposed policies never went ahead.
Currently, the Canadian federal government has pro-
posed tough new anti-graft rules that would disqualify
companies convicted of corruption or bribery anywhere
in the world from receiving Canadian government con-
tracts for up to ten years. These proposals are being vig-
orously attacked by multinational corporate lobbies on
the grounds that they are inconsistent with international
trade and investment treaty rules. A report prepared for
Canada’s chief big business lobby, the Canadian Council
of Chief Executives, explicitly refers to the prospect of
a NAFTA investor-state challenge if the new policy goes
ahead.28
While federal officials insist that the policy is ful-
ly compliant with NAFTA and other Canadian trade and
investment treaties, time will tell if the policy proceeds
in its current form.
These and other highly publicized examples are un-
38 an analysis of nafta investor-state disputes
doubtedly just the tip of the iceberg. Many threats of
investor-state litigation against proposed or contemplat-
ed measures never become public knowledge. In some
instances, risk-averse public officials may avoid even
proposing initiatives in fear of attracting investor-state
litigation. The insidious nature of policy chill underlines
that democratic governance is as much about what does
not happen, or is not even contemplated as an option for
policy, as it is about the specific policy initiatives that are
actually undertaken.29
The pervasive threat of investor-
state challenge under NAFTA chapter 11 has warped the
relationship between multinational corporations and
democratically elected governments to the detriment of
other social groups and the broader public interest.
Conclusion
There is a growing global backlash against ISDS. Alarmed
by increasingly aggressive corporate recourse to inves-
tor-state arbitration to challenge public policy and regu-
latory measures, many governments around the world
are seeking to extricate themselves from this anti-dem-
ocratic feature of modern trade and investment treaties.
Opposition is strongest within Latin America, where
Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela have withdrawn from the
World Bank body responsible for administering investor-
state arbitrations and are terminating their bilateral in-
vestment treaties. Brazil has never ratified a treaty that
included ISDS, and Argentina, which still faces billions of
dollars in unresolved claims from its 2001 financial crisis,
is a vocal critic. South Africa intends to end the use of
ISDS in its trade and investment treaties. After being hit
with a series of contentious claims, India has expressed
similar misgivings. Indonesia has also indicated it will let
its existing treaties that include ISDS expire. The former
Australian government, after a thorough independent re-
view, officially spurned ISDS, although the newly elected
conservative government has reversed that stand. Even
in Europe, where ISDS was conceived in the post-colonial
era, the German and French governments have indicated
they would prefer that ISDS be left out of impending
commercial treaties with the U.S. and Canada.
Despite a bruising experience under NAFTA chapter 11,
Canada is moving in the opposite direction to much of
the world and global public opinion on ISDS.
• The current federal government boasts that it has
concluded or negotiated over two-dozen Foreign
Investment Protection Agreements (FIPAs), includ-
ing a controversial and highly imbalanced pact with
China, which the federal cabinet quietly ratified in
the fall of 2014.30
• New trade agreements inked with South Korea and
the European Union include comprehensive invest-
ment protection chapters and ISDS, as does the im-
pending Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.
• The federal government has pressured the provinces
into agreeing to Canadian ratification of the Conven-
tion on the Settlement of Investment Disputes be-
tween States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID
Convention), which will make tribunal awards even
easier to enforce, in part by removing the right of
domestic courts to review tribunal decisions on pro-
cedural grounds, such as conflict of interest or cor-
ruption.31
The inclusion of ISDS in pacts with major capital-ex-
porting countries such as the EU, China and South Korea
is especially troubling and will certainly accelerate the
growth of ISDS claims against Canada. The Canada-EU
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
actually contains expanded protections for investors re-
garding fair and equitable treatment, which is the most
often–invoked article in NAFTA chapter 11 disputes, and
the most successfully used in global investment disputes.
The CETA also expands the grounds, beyond NAFTA,
upon which foreign investors can challenge financial
regulation.32
Under NAFTA chapter 11’s most-favoured
nation obligation (NAFTA Article 1103), U.S. and Mexican
investors will be able to take advantage of CETA’s beefed-
up investor protections.
Supporters of this aggressive expansion of investor
rights and ISDS often point out that governments don’t
always lose, with respondent states prevailing in about
half of cases. What they neglect to mention is that in-
vestment protection treaties and ISDS are completely
one-sided. Governments can be sued, but there are no
corresponding obligations for foreign investors or mech-
anisms to hold them—frequently wealthy multinational
companies—accountable for their behaviour. In a bril-
liant analogy, Manuel Perez Rocha at the Institute for
Policy Studies likens ISDS to, “playing soccer on half the
39 an analysis of nafta investor-state disputes
field. Corporations are free to sue, and nations must de-
fend themselves at enormous cost—and the best a gov-
ernment can hope for is a scoreless game.”33
Another commonly heard argument is that it would be
impossible to persuade developing countries to accept
ISDS if Canada and other developed countries did not fully
embrace it as part of their overall trade agenda. In reality,
Canadian investors have had very little success winning
cases using ISDS, notably against the U.S. but also in cases
involving developing countries. This is generally a good
thing. High-profile cases pursued by Canadian investors
abroad are bringing Canada and Canadian firms into disre-
pute. For example, Pacific Rim challenged the El Salvador
government for its moratorium on gold mining, enacted
to protect the country’s scarce water, drawing global criti-
cism. The threat from Gabriel Resources to use a Canada-
Romania FIPA to sue over the Romanian government’s
decision to block the environmentally destructive Rosia
Montana gold mine is similarly outrageous given the level
of opposition to the project. There are far more appropri-
ate options than ISDS for foreign investors to manage risk,
including private and publicly-backed risk insurance.
ISDS supporters also argue that some NAFTA tribu-
nals have ruled in favour of the state’s right to regulate,
proving concerns about regulatory chill are unjustified.34
As previously noted, some NAFTA tribunals have reject-
ed investor challenges to government regulation.35
The
Methanex ruling, in particular, has been praised even by
critics of NAFTA Chapter 11 as a well-reasoned defence of
the state’s police powers and right to regulate.36
The fact
remains, however, that tribunals, unlike domestic courts,
are not bound by the law of precedent. The basic defect
in ISDS is that arbitral tribunals have complete freedom to
interpret broadly worded investment protections as they
see fit. And if they stray from reasonable interpretations,
or concoct rationales to support their own biases or preju-
dices, they are completely beyond the reach of domestic
courts and legislatures. This radical judicial autonomy may
make sense in commercial arbitration, where both parties
have provided explicit consent to submit a specific mat-
ter to dispute settlement. But it is perverse where states
have unwisely provided unconditional consent to submit
any matter, including those that concern public law, policy
and regulation to final, binding arbitration.
We now have two decades of experience with NAFTA
chapter 11. Clearly, the agreement’s broadly worded in-
vestment rights, now reproduced in dozens of other Ca-
nadian treaties, give foreign investors a coercive tool to
deter legitimate public interest regulation and to seek
compensation when governments have the courage to
proceed with regulation despite this intimidation. Demo-
cratically elected governments are being forced to pay
to govern.
Canada is already one of the world’s top targets un-
der ISDS, and the number and frequency of claims are
growing rapidly. The majority of these disputes deal with
sensitive regulatory or policy matters. Current trends,
unless checked politically and legally, will only worsen.
Canadians and their elected officials should be deeply
concerned. Unfortunately, in stark contrast to opinion
in much of the world, there is surprisingly little political
debate about the corrosive influence of NAFTA chapter 11
and ISDS on public policy and democracy in Canada. In-
stead, prevailing trade and investment policy is entrench-
ing ISDS even more deeply.
As Naomi Klein argues persuasively in her latest
book37
, meeting humanity’s global challenges, includ-
ing reining in multinational financial firms or addressing
the existential threat posed by rapid climate change, will
require more, and more assertive, government interven-
tion and regulation. Extreme investor rights agreements
are relics of an era when market fundamentalism—the
belief in the virtues of fully liberalized markets—was the
prevailing political wisdom. It is time to move on from
NAFTA chapter 11 and ISDS.
About the Author
Scott Sinclair is a senior research fellow with the Cana-
dian Centre for Policy Alternatives, where he directs the
centre’s Trade and Investment Research Project. He has
written widely on the impacts of trade and investment
treaties on public services and public interest regulation.
Prior to joining CCPA, Scott was a senior trade policy ad-
visor with the Government of British Columbia.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank the dedicated staff at CCPA,
especially Bruce Campbell, Kerri-Anne Finn, Stuart Trew
and Tim Scarth for his work on layout. Gary Schneider
assisted with editing. Special thanks are due to Hadrian
Mertins-Kirkwood, who assisted in updating the table of
disputes and prepared the graphics for the analysis. This
is an independent study; the views expressed are those
of the author.
40 an analysis of nafta investor-state disputes
Notes
1 For example, in a statement of concern leading experts in invest-
ment law, arbitration and regulation noted that: “awards issued by in-
ternational arbitrators against states have in numerous cases incor-
porated overly expansive interpretations … that have prioritized the
protection of the property of and economic interests of transnational
corporations over the right to regulate of states and the right to self-
determination of peoples.” The experts, from 24 universities in nine
countries, went on to say that the current international investment
regime, typified by NAFTA’s Chapter 11, “lacks fairness and balance,
including basic requirements of openness and judicial independence.”
See “Public Statement on the International Investment Regime,” Au-
gust 31, 2010. Accessible at: http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_
statement/.
2 “The award is given the force of domestic law through existing
structures of international commercial arbitration – represented pri-
marily by the New York Convention – which enshrine the principle of
judicial deference to arbitration tribunals.” Gus Van Harten, “Judicial
Supervision of NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration: Public or Private Law?.”
Draft of version appearing in: (2005) 21 Arbitration International 493,
page 1. Accessible at http://ssrn.com/author=638855.
3 To date, there have been only three formal disputes under Chapter
20 of the NAFTA which handles government-to-government dispute
resolution. See NAFTA Secretariat, “Dispute Settlement,” www.nafta-
sec-alena.org.
4 Two claims against Canada were settled on undisclosed terms.
5 A win for government is a decided case or settlement that ends with
no compensation to the investor, while a loss is a decided case or set-
tlement that ends in payment to the investor.
6 The tribunal costs in the Merrill and Ring arbitration, for example,
came to $959,500. Merrill and Ring v. Canada, Award, March 31, 2010,
p. 107. Accessible at, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agree-
ments-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/merrill_archive.aspx?lang=en.
7 International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC-
SID) arbitrators “receive reimbursement for any direct expenses rea-
sonably incurred in the course of the arbitration, and unless otherwise
agreed between them and the parties, a fee of US$3,000 per day of
meetings or other work performed in connection with the proceed-
ings.” Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian
National University “Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement”, Submission to the Australian Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade, May 19, 2010. Accessible at http://
www.dfat.gov.au/trade/fta/tpp/subs/tpp_sub_tienhaara_100519.pdf.
8 For example, in the Chemtura arbitration Canada’s legal costs
amounted to nearly 6 million (the tribunal ordered Chemtura, which
lost its case, to pay half of Canada’s legal costs ($2.9 million). Cromp-
ton (Chemtura) Corp. v. Government of Canada. Award of the Arbi-
tral Tribunal. August 2, 2010. Accessible at: http://www.international.
gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/
chemtura-14.pdf. The U.S. federal government estimated its costs in
the Grand River arbitration at $2,792,000. Grand River Enterprises
Six Nations Ltd., et. al. v. the United States of America, “U.S. Submis-
sions on Costs,” March 31, 2010. Accessible at http://www.state.gov/
s/l/c11935.htm.
9 The government of Canada estimated its legal costs in the aborted
Centurion Health case at $228,000, expenses which were never recov-
ered. Centurion Health Corporation v. Government of Canada, Gov-
ernment of Canada’s motion on termination and costs, April 29, 2010.
Accessible at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-ac-
cords-commerciaux/disp-diff/centurion_archive.aspx?lang=en.
10 In certain instances, such as Methanex and Chemtura, tribunals
have ordered investors to cover all or part of responding governments’
legal expenses.
11 See Metalclad (1996), Gallo (2006), Clayton/Bilcon (2008), and
Windstream (2012).
12 In 2008, the year in which its NAFTA arbitration commenced,
Exxon Mobil reported a profit of $USD45.22 billion, the largest an-
nual profit ever reported by any corporation. Associated Press (2013)
“Exxon’s 2012 profit of $44.9B just misses record: Exxon Mobil annual
profit hits $44.9 billion, just short of company’s 2008 record.” Febru-
ary 1, 2013. Accessible at: http://news.yahoo.com/exxons-2012-profit-
44-9b-170340809.html.
13 Dominique Neuman, LL.B. “Lessons learned from the contesta-
tion under NAFTA of the Fracking Moratorium in Quebec.” Presen-
tation to the National Caucus of Environmental Legislators (NCEL),
Montpelier,Vermont. May 16–17, 2014.
14 Tim Granger, Chief executive, Lone Pine Resources, letter to the
editor, The Economist, Oct. 25, 014. Accessible at: http://www.econo-
mist.com/news/letters/21627551-letters-editor.
15 “Eli Lilly and Company is a disappointed litigant. Having lost two
patent cases before the Canadian courts, it now seeks to have this Tri-
bunal … transform itself into a supranational court of appeal from rea-
soned, principled, and procedurally just domestic court decisions.” Eli
Lilly v. Canada, Government of Canada, “Statement of Defence”, June
30, 2014. Paragraph 1. Accessible at: http://www.international.gc.ca/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/
eli-statement-declaration.aspx?lang=eng.
16 Eli Lilly v. Canada, Government of Canada, “Statement of Defence”,
June 30, 2014. Paragraph 9. Accessible at: http://www.international.
gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/
disp-diff/eli-statement-declaration.aspx?lang=eng.
17 The outcome is highly uncertain, especially if the investor-state
panel assumes it has the authority to judge Canada’s compliance with
not only with the NAFTA’s investment protection rules, but also to in-
terpret the treaty’s intellectual property obligations as it sees fit.
18 Canada has been sued more than any other developed country and
is the sixth most sued country overall (after Argentina, Venezuela, the
Czech Republic, Egypt and Ecuador). UNCTAD. Recent Developments in
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). April 2014. p. 8.
19 Under the terms of a 1998 settlement with U.S. investor Ethyl Cor-
poration, Canada agreed to repeal the challenged measure (a ban on
the gasoline additive MMT, a suspected neurotoxin), issue an apology
to Ethyl and pay the company damages of $US 13 million ($CAD 19.5
million at 1998 exchange rates). The cash settlement to Ethyl exceeded
the total 1998 Environment Canada budget for enforcement and com-
pliance programmes ($CAD 16.9 million). See Ken Traynor, “How Can-
ada Became a Shill for Ethyl Corp: NAFTA and the Erosion of Federal
Environmental Protection,” Canadian Environmental Law Association,
The Intervenor: Vol 23. No 3 July - September 1998.
20 Because the Canadian government’s settlement implicitly em-
braced an expansive notion of property rights in the resource sector,
whenever natural resource concessions are revised or revoked, how-
ever legitimate the reasons, foreign investors can now be expected to
invoke NAFTA’s Chapter 11.
21 UNCTAD’s annual reviews do not track whether the settlements
favoured the investor or the defendant state.
22 UNCTAD. Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS). April 2014. p. 1.
500-251 Bank Street, Ottawa, on k2p 1x3
tel 613-563-1341 fax 613-233-1458
email ccpa@policyalternatives.ca
23 “In 2009, the number of known treaty-based investor–State dis-
pute settlement cases filed under international investment agree-
ments (IIAs) grew by at least 32, bringing the total number of known
treaty-based cases to 357 by the end of 2009 (figure 1). Of those, 202
– or 57 per cent – were initiated during the last five years (starting
2005).” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD), “Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement,”
2010, p. 2.
24 UNCTAD. Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS). April 2014. p. 1.
25 Physicians for a Smoke-free Canada. “Packaging Phoney Intellec-
tual Property Claims.” June 2009. Accessible at: http://www.smoke-
free.ca/plain-packaging/documents/2009/packagingphoneyipclaims-
june2009-a4.pdf.
26 Schneiderman, David. ‘Banging Constitutional Bibles: Observing
Constitutional Culture in Transition.’ University of Toronto Law Journal
55(3). 2005. pp. 848–50. See also Shyrbman, Steven and Scott Sinclair,
“Public Auto Insurance and Trade Treaties.” Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives. (2004).
27 The industry made threats of trade action not only under NAFTA,
but also the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
When it made its GATS commitments covering financial services, the
Canadian federal government exempted existing programs of pub-
lic auto insurance in four provinces. These not-for-profit public insur-
ance systems provided superior coverage, lower administration costs
and more affordable premiums (particularly for youth, seniors and ru-
ral drivers), than the private, for-profit insurance systems operating in
most provinces (Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick, 2004). But
Canada’s GATS limitations did not provide future policy flexibility to
adopt similar programs in other provinces and territories. Unlike NAF-
TA Chapter 11, however, the WTO Dispute Settlement system is strictly
government-to-government.
28 Brian Stewart. “Ottawa’s crackdown on foreign graft riles corpo-
rate Canada.” CBC News, December 9, 2014. Link: http://www.cbc.
ca/news/world/ottawa-s-crackdown-on-foreign-graft-riles-corporate-
canada-1.2864622
29 Cf. Scott Sinclair. “Trade agreements, the new constitutionalism
and public services.” in Stephen Gill and A. Claire Cutler, eds. New
Constitutionalism and World Order. Cambridge University Press. 2014.
p. 184.
30 For a complete list, see Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
Canada. “Opening New Markets: Trade Negotiations and Agree-
ments.” September 2, 2014. Accessible at: http://www.international.
gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/index.aspx.
31 Gus Van Harten. “Harper’s Boon to the Arbitration Industry.”
14 Nov 2013. The Tyee. Accessible at: http://www.thetyee.ca/Opin-
ion/2013/11/14/Harper-Arbitration-Industry/.
32 See “Financial Services” in Making Sense of the CETA: An analysis of
the final text of the Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic
and Trade Agreement. Scott Sinclair, Stuart Trew and Hadrian Mertins-
Kirkwood, eds. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. September 25,
2014.
33 Manuel Pérez-Rocha. “When Corporations Sue Governments.”
New York Times. December 3, 2014. Accessible at: http://www.ny-
times.com/2014/12/04/opinion/when-corporations-sue-govern-
ments.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0.
34 See Barrie McKenna. “In free-trade deals, sovereignty rules.”
Globe and Mail. August 29 2014.
35 A sceptic, however, might observe that the most deferential rulings
(such as Methanex and Apotex) have involved claims against the U.S.
The Chemtura case, won by Canada, is an exception.
36 Howard Mann. “The Final Decision in Methanex v. United States:
Some New Wine in Some New Bottles.” International Institute for Sus-
tainable Development. August 2005. Accessible at: http://www.iisd.
org/pdf/2005/commentary_methanex.pdf.
37 Naomi Klein. This Changes Everything. Alfred A. Knopf Canada.
2014.