Svar på FOU alm. del - spm. 321 om en redegørelse for de internationale erfaringer med anvendelse af enheder bemandet fortrinsvist og for nogles vedkommende udelukkende med reservepersonel/deltidssoldater i form af tidligere tjenstgørende personel, fra forsvarsministeren

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
HOLMENS KANAL 42 TELEFON: 72 81 00 00 MAIL: FMN@FMN.DK CVR: 25-77-56-35
1060 KØBENHAVN K TELEFAX: 72 81 03 00 WEB: www.FMN.DK EAN: 5798000201200
Folketingets Forsvarsudvalg
Christiansborg
FORSVARSMINISTEREN
28. oktober 2016
Folketingets Forsvarsudvalg har den 2. september 2016 stillet følgende spørgsmål nr. 321 til
forsvarsministeren, som hermed besvares. Spørgsmålet er stillet efter ønske fra Marie Kra-
rup (DF).
Spørgsmål nr. 321:
”Ministeren bedes redegøre for de internationale erfaringer med anvendelse af enheder be-
mandet fortrinsvist og for nogles vedkommende udelukkende med reserveperso-
nel/deltidssoldater i form af tidligere tjenstgørende personel. Der bedes herunder redegjort
for australske og canadiske udsendelige enheder og finske erfaringer med enheder til terri-
torialforsvar.”
Supplerende svar:
Som supplement til mit svar på Forsvarsudvalgsspørgsmål nr. 321 afgivet den 30. septem-
ber 2016, kan jeg oplyse, at Forsvarsministeriet nu også har modtaget en rapport fra den
canadiske Auditor General vedr. canadiske erfaringer med reservepersonel. Rapporten ved-
lægges besvarelsen.
Med venlig hilsen
Peter Christensen
Forsvarsudvalget 2015-16
FOU Alm.del endeligt svar på spørgsmål 321
Offentligt


REPORT 5
CanadianArmyReserve—NationalDefence
Reports of the Auditor General of Canada
Spring 2016
Office of the Auditor General of Canada
Bureau du vérificateur général du Canada
Forsvarsudvalget 2015-16
FOU Alm.del endeligt svar på spørgsmål 321
Offentligt
Performance audit reports
This report presents the results of a performance audit conducted
by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada under the authority
of the Auditor General Act.
A performance audit is an independent, objective, and systematic
assessment of how well government is managing its activities,
responsibilities, and resources. Audit topics are selected based on their
significance. While the Office may comment on policy implementation
in a performance audit, it does not comment on the merits of a policy.
Performance audits are planned, performed, and reported in accordance
with professional auditing standards and Office policies. They are conducted
by qualified auditors who
• establish audit objectives and criteria for the assessment of performance,
• gather the evidence necessary to assess performance against the criteria,
• report both positive and negative findings,
• conclude against the established audit objectives, and
• make recommendations for improvement when there are significant
differences between criteria and assessed performance.
Performance audits contribute to a public service that is ethical and effective
and a government that is accountable to Parliament and Canadians.
The Report is available on our website at www.oag-bvg.gc.ca.
Ce document est également publié en français.
© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented
by the Auditor General of Canada, 2016.
Cat. No. FA1-2016/1-5E-PDF
ISBN 978-0-660-04916-8
ISSN 1701-5413
iii
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Focus of the audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Findings, Recommendations, and Responses 2
Guidance on preparing for missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Army Reserve units lacked clear guidance on preparing for major international missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Army Reserve units and groups were not fully prepared for domestic missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Sustainability of Army Reserve units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Army Reserve units did not have the soldiers they needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Army Reserve funding was not designed to be consistent with unit training and other activities . . . . . . . . . . 16
Training of Army Reserve soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Army Reserve soldiers received less training than Regular Army soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Army Reserve and Regular Army unit training were not fully integrated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Conclusion 27
About the Audit 28
List of Recommendations 31
Appendix 35
Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,
2014–15 fiscal year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
Introduction
Background
Canadian Army Reserve 5.1 National Defence is composed of the Department of National
Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. The Canadian Army, including
its Army Reserve, is the component of the Canadian Armed Forces that
conducts missions on land. The Army Reserve is fully integrated into
the Canadian Army’s chain of command. When Army Reserve members
put on their uniforms or volunteer for training or deployment, they are
required, like all other members of the Canadian Armed Forces, to carry
out their missions without reservation, regardless of personal discomfort,
fear, or danger.
5.2 The Army Reserve is the largest component of Canada’s Primary
Reserve Force. As of August 2013, it had provided almost half of
the Canadian Army’s 40,143 soldiers. The Army Reserve consists
predominantly of part-time professional members of the Canadian
Armed Forces who contribute to the defence and security of Canada.
These part-time members must balance the demands of their military
activities with their civilian lives.
5.3 Training and operating the Army Reserve costs about $724 million
annually, based on figures from the 2013–14 fiscal year. Army Reserve
units train to be ready to support domestic and international missions.
In recent years, Army Reserve units and soldiers have contributed to
domestic missions involving fighting floods and forest fires. Army Reserve
soldiers have also served on international missions, including deployments
to Bosnia and Afghanistan. According to the Canadian Armed Forces,
Army Reserve soldiers completed 4,642 deployments to Afghanistan.
Sixteen of these soldiers died and 75 were wounded in action. In addition,
between 2012 and 2015, Army Reserve soldiers were deployed 150 times
on 16 other international missions. At the time of our audit, Army Reserve
soldiers were deployed to international missions in Europe, Africa, the
Middle East, and the Caribbean.
Soldiers—All persons who are enrolled in the Canadian Army, including officers and
non-commissioned members.
Army Reserve units conduct
training to prepare their soldiers
for combat and non-combat
operations.
Photo: National Defence
2 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
Focus of the audit
5.4 This audit focused on the ability of National Defence to organize,
train, and equip its Army Reserve soldiers and units so that they are
prepared to deploy as part of an integrated Canadian Army.
5.5 This audit is important because National Defence has determined
that the Canadian Army needs the support of the Army Reserve to
successfully conduct domestic and international missions.
5.6 We did not examine other components of Canada’s Primary Reserve
Force, such as the Navy Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, or the Military
Police Reserve.
5.7 More details about the audit objective, scope, approach, and criteria
are in About the Audit at the end of this report (see pages 28–30).
Findings, Recommendations, and Responses
Guidance on preparing for missions
Overall finding  5.8 Overall, we found that Army Reserve units lacked clear guidance on
preparing for major international missions. We also found that although
the Army Reserve had clear guidance on preparing for domestic missions,
formal confirmation that they were prepared was not required. In
addition, Army Reserve units and groups lacked access to key equipment
on deployments and training exercises.
5.9 This is important because National Defence needs the Canadian
Army, including a fully integrated Army Reserve, to organize, train, and
equip land forces to meet Canada First Defence Strategy missions.
Context 5.10 The Army Reserve is organized into 123 units and 10 brigade
headquarters in 117 communities across the country (Exhibit 5.1). The
Appendix identifies these units and their local communities. The purpose
of these units is to organize, train, and equip their member soldiers to
work as cohesive teams so that they are prepared to deploy and
accomplish assigned missions.
3
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
5.11 The Canadian Armed Forces is expected to conduct domestic and
international missions, as identified in the 2008 Canada First Defence
Strategy (Exhibit 5.2). The Canadian Army must be prepared to deploy
land forces that are capable of both combat and non-combat missions.
Exhibit 5.1 The Army Reserve is organized into units across the country
Note: The 1st Canadian Division is not responsible for specific Army Reserve units.
Source: Based on information from National Defence
5th Canadian Division
3rd Canadian Division
4th Canadian Division
2nd Canadian Division
Distribution of Reserve units
1 unit
2 to 4 units
5 to 10 units
Exhibit 5.2 The 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy identifies six core missions
• Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic.
• Support a major international event in Canada, such as the Olympic Games.
• Respond to a major terrorist attack.
• Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada, such as a natural disaster.
• Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period.
• Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.
Source: National Defence
4 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
5.12 The Canadian Army has stated that it needs the Army Reserve and
the Regular Army to be fully integrated in order to carry out all of these
missions, which may occur simultaneously. In 2014, the Commander of
the Canadian Army set out what the Canadian Army must do to build an
integrated Army Reserve, including the following:
• ensure that the Army Reserve is prepared for domestic and
international missions;
• provide Army Reserve soldiers and units with access to the
equipment that they need to train themselves;
• recruit and retain Army Reserve soldiers to accomplish Canada First
Defence Strategy missions;
• fully fund all activities, including training, that Army Reserve units
must undertake;
• optimize individual occupational training for the Army Reserve;
• integrate collective training of Army Reserve soldiers and units into
the three-year training cycle of the Regular Army; and
• assess the effectiveness of the Canadian Army’s training system.
Army Reserve units lacked clear guidance on preparing for major international missions
What we found 5.13 We found that the Canadian Army had not given Army Reserve
units clear guidance as to how they should prepare soldiers and teams to
contribute to major international missions. Although the Canadian Army
had given Army Reserve units guidance on general training requirements,
it had not identified what it expected the units to do to organize and train
their soldiers in preparation for international missions.
5.14 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined
and discusses
• guidance for international missions.
Why this finding matters 5.15 This finding matters because Army Reserve soldiers and teams are
essential to the Canadian Army’s ability to conduct international missions.
Recommendation 5.16 Our recommendation in this area of examination appears at
paragraph 5.22.
Analysis to support
this finding
5.17 What we examined. We examined Canadian Army planning
documents and reports. We also interviewed senior Canadian Army
commanders, command teams of Army Reserve units, and Army Reserve
soldiers who would be expected to contribute to international missions.
5
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
5.18 Guidance for international missions. The Canadian Army expects
Army Reserve units to provide up to 20 percent of the soldiers deployed
on major (large-scale, extended-period) international missions. This
means that after Regular Army soldiers are deployed on the first rotation
(planned for up to eight months), Army Reserve units will provide about
1,000 trained soldiers for each subsequent rotation of the mission. These
soldiers could be placed in existing Regular Army units or be part of
dedicated Army Reserve teams of up to 150 soldiers that will undertake
one of the following key tasks:
• Influence Activities,
• Convoy Escort,
• Force Protection, or
• Persistent Surveillance.
5.19 We found that the Canadian Army has directed Army Reserve units
to train soldiers to work in teams of 25 to 40 soldiers so these small teams
can work together in teams of up to 150 or more soldiers. As a result,
more training is required before Army Reserve soldiers and teams can
deploy on major international missions. Individual Army Reserve soldiers
placed in existing Regular Army units are to be given this additional
training when they join these units for their pre-deployment training.
5.20 On major international deployments, the Canadian Army expects
that dedicated Army Reserve teams will perform specific key tasks.
However, we found that individual Army Reserve units had not been given
clear guidance on the training that is required for the key tasks of Convoy
Escort, Force Protection, and Persistent Surveillance until a mission has
been identified. The Canadian Army plans for Regular Army soldiers to
perform these tasks until dedicated Army Reserve teams have been
trained for deployment. In our opinion, the absence of guidance for these
key tasks is inconsistent with the Canadian Army’s expectation that
Army Reserve soldiers will be prepared to provide these tasks as part of
dedicated Army Reserve teams during major international missions.
5.21 We found that the Canadian Army did provide clear guidance for
one key task: Influence Activities. This task coordinates support between
military forces and civilian authorities and shapes the opinions and
perceptions of target groups, be they friendly or hostile. The Army Reserve
is responsible for training almost all of the soldiers needed for the
Canadian Army’s Influence Activities task. At least one Influence
Activities team of 52 soldiers is to be prepared to deploy without delay
with the Regular Army for Canada First Defence Strategy missions.
5.22 Recommendation. National Defence should provide individual
Army Reserve units with clear guidance so that they can prepare their
soldiers for key tasks assigned to the Army Reserve for major international
missions.
6 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
National Defence’s response. Agreed. Providing the necessary training
to soldiers before they participate in international deployments is of
paramount importance to the Canadian Army. Guidance regarding the
required training is provided in the Army’s annual operation plan. Once
Reserve participation in a given expeditionary operation is announced,
specific direction is given with respect to the training required for
individuals and for designated Reserve Teams (to conduct tasks such as
Convoy Escort, Force Protection, and Persistent Surveillance). Every Team
is “confirmed” through a deliberate process before being given the green
light to deploy. The Army will work toward improving its guidance for
anticipated key tasks for major international missions.
Army Reserve units and groups were not fully prepared for domestic missions
What we found 5.23 We found that the Canadian Army had provided the Army Reserve
with clear guidance on preparing for domestic missions. However, we also
found that when Army Reserve units and groups deployed on domestic
missions, they did not always have access to key equipment. Furthermore,
we found that the Canadian Army did not require formal confirmation in
writing that Army Reserve brigade groups were prepared to support
domestic missions.
5.24 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined
and discusses
• guidance for domestic missions, and
• formal confirmation that Army Reserve groups were prepared to
support domestic missions.
Why this finding matters 5.25 This finding matters because the Canadian Army needs the Army
Reserve to be organized, trained, and equipped so that it is prepared to
support civilian authorities in their responses to major domestic events
and to carry out other domestic missions, including sovereignty exercises
in the Arctic.
Recommendation 5.26 Our recommendations in this area of examination appear
at paragraphs 5.32 and 5.34.
Analysis to support
this finding
5.27 What we examined. We examined Canadian Army planning
documents and reports. We also interviewed senior Canadian Army
commanders, command teams of Army Reserve units, and Army Reserve
soldiers who would be expected to contribute to domestic missions.
7
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
5.28 Guidance for domestic missions. We found that the Canadian
Army had given clear guidance to Army Reserve units on preparing for
domestic missions, except for equipment needs. This guidance included
the number of soldiers required, their organization into teams, their
training requirements, and when they needed to be prepared to deploy. For
example, each unit is expected to contribute a specific number of trained
soldiers to assemble groups of 400 to 600 soldiers within three days of
being notified of a domestic mission.
5.29 We found that the Canadian Army has not defined the list of
equipment that all Army Reserve units should have for training their
soldiers and teams for domestic missions. This means that Army Reserve
units may have to rely on other Canadian Armed Forces units to provide
this equipment, but we were told that it is often not available. In our
opinion, this limited access to equipment impedes the ability of units
to train their soldiers and teams.
5.30 We also found that between 2013 and 2015, the Army Reserve
contributed to three domestic missions involving fighting floods in Alberta
and Manitoba and fighting a forest fire in Saskatchewan (Exhibit 5.3).
After each of these missions, the Army Reserve brigade groups and units
conducted a lessons-learned exercise to report on the planning and
conduct of these missions. When we reviewed these reports, we found
many instances of key equipment lacking, such as reconnaissance
vehicles, command posts, and communications equipment.
5.31 In 2013, the Canadian Army directed Army Reserve units to provide
about 500 trained soldiers for four specialized Arctic operations groups
by 2016. The Canadian Army provided these Army Reserve groups with
guidance to train for these operations, including sovereignty exercises.
This guidance included a list of equipment necessary for these Arctic
operations groups to train and deploy in the Arctic. However, following
recent training exercises, these groups reported that they did not always
have access to the equipment they needed to be self-sufficient, such as
reliable communications and vehicles larger than light snowmobiles.
Exhibit 5.3 The Army Reserve helped prevent flood damage in Alberta
During the severe flooding in southern Alberta in 2013, the Canadian Army
deployed 2,300 Regular and Reserve soldiers to assist civil authorities. In that
deployment, the South Alberta Light Horse regiment, an Army Reserve unit located
in Medicine Hat and Edmonton, was called out to prevent damage in the City
of Medicine Hat. Working with citizens, soldiers filled and installed more than
17,000 sandbags in a single day to create a berm to stop flood waters. The action
was reported to have prevented significant damage to the city’s power and water
treatment plants. Soldiers also assisted other emergency responders in pumping
out water from the Canmore hospital. Their combined efforts allowed the hospital
to establish normal access in two days.
Source: Based on information from National Defence
8 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
5.32 Recommendation. The Canadian Army should define and provide
access to the equipment that Army Reserve units and groups need to train
and deploy for domestic missions.
National Defence’s response. Agreed. A procurement plan is under way to
address the shortages within certain fleets. The Canadian Army has defined
and provides the equipment required to conduct domestic operations.
The majority of this equipment is held either within the unit or with the
Canadian Brigade Group. When a specific requirement or gap is identified
that is not within the Brigade Group, the Division will reallocate from within
its own resources or will request additional items from national stocks.
5.33 Formal confirmation that Army Reserve groups were prepared to
support domestic missions. We were told that Army Reserve groups were
not required to formally confirm in writing that they were prepared to
support domestic missions. We found that some brigade groups did
formally confirm that they were prepared to support domestic missions
whereas others did not. In our opinion, given the importance and
significant cost of large-scale training exercises, the Canadian Army needs
to formally confirm in writing that Army Reserve groups are prepared for
domestic missions.
5.34 Recommendation. The Canadian Army should require Army
Reserve groups to formally confirm that they are prepared to support
domestic missions.
National Defence’s response. Agreed. The Canadian Army will review the
process and develop a better-documented confirmation method. The Army
conducts training on an annual basis for the 10 Territorial Battalion
Groups and the four Arctic Company Response Groups. This training may
be verbally confirmed through the chain of command, which is found to be
sufficient for training objectives.
Sustainability of Army Reserve units
Overall finding  5.35 Overall, we found that Army Reserve units do not have the number
of soldiers they need to train so that soldiers and teams are prepared to
deploy when required. The number of Army Reserve soldiers has been
steadily declining because the Army Reserve is unable to recruit and retain
the soldiers it needs. We found that the Canadian Army does not know if
Army Reserve soldiers have the current qualifications they need to deploy
for domestic and international missions. Furthermore, we found that the
Army Reserve units did not have the funding they needed to fully support
all required unit activities.
9
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
5.36 This is important because Army Reserve units need enough trained
soldiers and adequate funding if they are to organize and train soldiers and
teams to be combat-capable and prepared for deployment.
Context 5.37 The National Defence Act established the Reserve Force as “a
component of the Canadian Armed Forces . . . that consists of . . .
members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military
service.” This means that most members of the Army Reserve are
part-time professional soldiers. Army Reserve soldiers may also voluntarily
sign contracts for full-time employment with National Defence. This
full-time employment may be for domestic or international deployments
or for other positions within National Defence. The only time consent
for full-time service is not required is through an order signed by the
Governor General acting on the advice of Cabinet.
5.38 Army Reserve units and groups are responsible for training their
own soldiers so that they can be deployed as part of an integrated Army on
domestic and international missions. To accomplish this, Army Reserve
units need a sufficient number of soldiers to participate in unit activities,
including training exercises.
Army Reserve units did not have the soldiers they needed
What we found 5.39 We found that National Defence has determined that about
29,000 positions in the Army Reserve in the 2014–15 fiscal year would be
its ideal size. This number of positions allows the Army Reserve to expand
when increases to funding are authorized. During the same period, the
Canadian Army provided funding for 21,000 full- and part-time Army
Reserve soldiers. However, we found that the average number of trained
and attending soldiers in the Army Reserve was 13,944, and that 12 of
the 123 Army Reserve units had fewer than half of the soldiers needed for
their ideal unit size.
5.40 Between the 2012–13 and 2014–15 fiscal years, the number of
Army Reserve soldiers declined by about five percent per year, as a result of
several factors. In particular, we found that the National Defence
recruiting system was not able to recruit the number of soldiers needed by
the Army Reserve, and that Army Reserve units had difficulty retaining
their trained soldiers.
5.41 It is critical that the Canadian Army know whether its soldiers are
prepared to deploy for domestic and international missions. However, we
found that the information system used by the Canadian Army to verify
the status of individual soldiers showed that soldiers had low levels of
current qualifications.
10 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
5.42 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined
and discusses
• size of the Army Reserve,
• number of Army Reserve soldiers,
• terms of service,
• medical care, and
• information about qualifications needed for deployment.
Why this finding matters 5.43 This finding matters because having the right number of trained
Army Reserve soldiers prepared to deploy is critical to the Canadian
Army’s ability to perform assigned missions.
Recommendations 5.44 Our recommendations in this area of examination appear
at paragraphs 5.57, 5.62, 5.65, and 5.70.
Analysis to support
this finding
5.45 What we examined. We analyzed data from the information systems
at National Defence that identified the number and current qualifications
for deployment of Army Reserve soldiers. We also reviewed the terms of
service and the use of contracts for full-time employment of Army Reserve
soldiers. We examined National Defence documents, guidance, and
internal analysis. We also interviewed senior departmental and Regular
Army officials, and commanders and soldiers of Army Reserve units.
5.46 Size of the Army Reserve. We found that National Defence has
determined that about 29,000 positions in the Army Reserve would be its
ideal size. This number of positions allows the Army Reserve to expand
when increases to funding are authorized. (The Appendix shows the
strength of each Army Reserve unit as a percentage of the unit’s ideal size.)
5.47 We also found that for the 2014–15 fiscal year, the Canadian Army
had budgeted $334.9 million for about 21,000 Army Reserve soldiers.
This means that the Army Reserve was funded for about 72 percent of its
ideal size: $202.4 million to cover the pay for 19,471 soldiers on part-time
service, $91.3 million for 1,500 full-time soldiers, and $41.2 million for
operating and maintenance costs.
5.48 In the 2014–15 fiscal year, the average number of part-time and
full-time soldiers in the Army Reserve was 19,544. Of that number,
1,732 had not taken part in unit training or other activities in the previous
six months, and 3,868 were undergoing or had not completed the first
phase of their occupational training. This means that approximately
70 percent of the soldiers in the Army Reserve, 13,944 on average, were
trained and had attended unit activities in the previous six months
(Exhibit 5.4).
11
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
5.49 All Army Reserve units are responsible for training their soldiers
and sustaining their day-to-day operations, such as managing human and
financial resources and maintaining their equipment. We found that 58 of
the 123 Army Reserve units were at less than 70 percent of their ideal
unit size. Of these, 12 Army Reserve units were at less than 50 percent of
their ideal unit size. In our opinion, when units get this small they are not
able to train effectively because they lack the qualified instructors, leaders,
or soldiers they need to train in teams of 25 to 40 soldiers. The Canadian
Army recognizes that smaller units are limited in what they can do and
therefore groups them with other units to complete their training to work
in teams.
5.50 Number of Army Reserve soldiers. We found that between
the 2012–13 and 2014–15 fiscal years, the number of Army Reserve
soldiers had been declining at a rate of about five percent, or about
1,000 soldiers per year.
Exhibit 5.4 The Army Reserve had about 14,000 active and trained soldiers
in the 2014–15 fiscal year
* This number of positions allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.
Source: Based on information from National Defence for the 2014–15 fiscal year
19,544
Average number of soldiers
21,000
Number of funded positions
29,000*
Ideal size
13,944
Average number of active and trained soldiers
1,732
Average number who had not taken part in unit
training or other activities in the previous six months
3,868
Average number who were undergoing or had not
completed the first phase of occupational training
12 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
5.51 We found that the National Defence recruiting system did not
recruit the number of soldiers needed by the Army Reserve and that Army
Reserve units had difficulty retaining their soldiers. National Defence
officials stated that the current Reserve recruiting system does not work—
it is too slow and does not recruit the number of Army Reserve soldiers it
needs, given the present rate of attrition.
5.52 Each year, National Defence sets recruitment targets for all components
of the Canadian Armed Forces. We found that in the 2014–15 fiscal year,
the recruiting system’s objective was to deliver 2,200 recruits to the Army
Reserve—far fewer than the 3,000 recruits needed. National Defence has
recognized that it needs to reform the recruiting system.
5.53 We found that National Defence has not developed a retention
strategy for the Army Reserve. For example, in order to train their soldiers,
units must retain a sufficient number of qualified instructors, such as
master corporals or sergeants. We found that units have had difficulty
keeping the qualified instructors they need. For example, from 2012
to 2015, the number of master corporals in the Army Reserve declined
from 1,971 to 1,770, and the number of sergeants declined from 1,645
to 1,593.
5.54 We also found that during the 2012–13 to 2014–15 fiscal years,
almost half of the 7,200 soldiers who left the Army Reserve did so before
they had completed their first level of occupational training. This
represents a lost investment in recruitment and training.
5.55 The Canadian Army knows it needs to take steps to improve
retention in the Army Reserve. The Canadian Army has recognized that
providing challenging, exciting training will help improve retention.
Furthermore, the Canadian Army does not facilitate the transfer of
Regular Army soldiers to the Army Reserve. Doing so would enable the
Canadian Army to retain valuable skills within the Army Reserve acquired
by Regular Army soldiers.
5.56 In late 2015, National Defence set a goal to increase the Army
Reserve by 950 soldiers (five percent) by 2019. In our opinion, this goal
will be difficult to achieve given the present rate of attrition.
5.57 Recommendation. National Defence should design and implement
a retention strategy for the Army Reserve.
National Defence’s response. Agreed. Retention enables Canadian Armed
Forces’ operational and institutional excellence. National Defence will
develop and implement a Canadian Armed Forces retention strategy that
will ensure retaining our members in uniform is a fundamental aspect of
how we manage our people, and is given equal, if not greater, prominence
in our attraction and recruiting efforts. Our approach going forward will be
comprehensive and incorporate the Regular and Reserve Force, creating
greater mobility between these components and accounting for the range
13
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
of requirements inherent in each. While consideration will be given to
transactional requirements in the areas of compensation and benefits,
National Defence will develop effective measures including, but not
limited to, career management, family support, mental health and
wellness support, and diversity requirements.
The Canadian Army is developing a retention strategy for the Army
Reserve, and is in the process of updating the strategy based on Chief
Military Personnel initiatives.
5.58 Terms of service. Part-time Army Reserve soldiers serve and train on
a voluntary basis. Therefore, it is not possible for unit commanders to know
if all their soldiers will take part in scheduled activities, including training.
For example, in 2015, when Army Reserve units met for their annual
large-scale collective training events across Canada, only 3,593 soldiers
(26 percent of trained and attending soldiers) attended these exercises.
5.59 Army Reserve soldiers (and any other Reservists) may accept
contracts for full-time service with their units, with Army headquarters,
or elsewhere in National Defence. These contracts are for periods
of 180 days to three years, and can be renewed for much longer periods.
While Army Reserve soldiers working under such contracts for up to
three years could be regarded as not employed on a continuing full-time
basis, in our view, Army Reserve soldiers engaged on such contracts for
more than three years are employed on a continuing full-time basis. This
is inconsistent with the National Defence Act, which states that Primary
Reserve members are enrolled for other than continuing full-time military
service when not on active service undertaking emergency duties for the
defence of Canada or deployed on international missions. National
Defence has, in effect, created a class of soldiers that does not exist in the
Act. Furthermore, these soldiers receive 85 percent of the salary and lesser
benefits than Regular Army soldiers would receive for the same work.
5.60 We found that in the 2014–15 fiscal year, as many as 1,704 Army
Reserve soldiers were on full-time contracts beyond 180 days with the
Canadian Army. This means that the Canadian Army spent about
27 percent of its overall Army Reserve pay and operating expenses on these
full-time contracts, leaving less available for other Army Reserve activities.
5.61 In 2011, a National Defence report on the employment of full-time
Reserve soldiers noted the need to determine the legal and policy basis for
these full-time contracts. The report recommended that a full regulatory
review of Reserve full-time employment be completed immediately. At the
time of our audit, National Defence had not concluded this review.
5.62 Recommendation. National Defence should review the terms of
service of Army Reserve soldiers, and the contracts of full-time Army
Reserve soldiers, to ensure that it is in compliance with the National
Defence Act.
14 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
National Defence’s response. Agreed. The Canadian Armed Forces will
review the framework for the Reserve Force terms of service and the
administration of Reserve Force service to ensure it complies with the
National Defence Act and the regulations enacted under it.
5.63 Medical care. National Defence policy requires Canadian Armed
Forces personnel to report any injury, disease, illness, or exposure to toxic
material, whether it is service-related or not. We found that over the 2012–13
to 2014–15 fiscal years, Army Reserve soldiers filed about 3,250 reports.
We used representative sampling to examine 846 of these reports and found
that 35 percent of incidents happened during individual or collective
training and 37 percent occurred during physical fitness activities.
5.64 A 2008 report by the Office of the Ombudsman for the Department
of National Defence and the Canadian Forces found that there was
significant confusion throughout the Canadian Armed Forces about
medical care entitlements for Reservists serving in Canada. We found that
access to medical care for Reservists was still not clear. For example, Army
Reserve soldiers do not receive regular medical assessments as Regular
Army soldiers do. Also, if Army Reserve soldiers injure themselves during
physical fitness training to meet Canadian Armed Forces fitness
requirements, Canadian Armed Forces’ medical services do not always
provide for care unless that training was formally pre-approved by their
commanding officer.
5.65 Recommendation. National Defence should review its policies and
clarify Army Reserve soldiers’ access to medical services.
National Defence’s response. Agreed. The Canadian Forces Health
Services Group Headquarters is actively advancing a number of initiatives
to review and support policies for medical assessments that contribute to
Primary Reserve soldiers’ overall readiness for training and deployment, and
that clarify access to medical services, including
• issuing a communiqué to establish the priority for Reservists to receive
medical assessments from Headquarters (released October 2015);
• updating the Queen’s Regulations and Orders, Chapter 34,
Section 2 (Medical Care of Officers and Non-commissioned Members),
currently with the National Defence Regulations Section for
amendment drafting, with estimated anticipated approval six months
after Section work is complete. In 2009, Health Services Group
Headquarters published interim guidance on entitlement to health
care for Reserve Force personnel. This was also communicated to
members in correspondence dated 2011 from the Vice Chief of the
Defence Staff, along with an accompanying guide. Annual reminders
are issued to health care providers with regard to entitlement rules;
• assessing courses of action proposed in the joint Canadian Forces
Ombudsman/Health Services Group study, “The Feasibility of
Providing Periodic Health Assessments to All Primary Reservists”
15
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
(June 2015) and other potential tools to determine medical fitness
and conduct periodic health assessments, through a Reserve Medical
Readiness Working Group. It is anticipated that alternatives will be
developed by August 2016 and implemented in the fall of 2016.
5.66 Information about qualifications needed for deployment. It is
critical that the Canadian Army has information on personnel and
training deficiencies that would constrain its ability to be prepared to
deploy for domestic and international missions. National Defence
maintains a Personnel Readiness Verification system that records soldiers’
current qualifications that are required for deployment.
5.67 We examined reports from the Personnel Readiness Verification
system of the qualifications required for Canadian Army soldiers before
being deployed. These reports listed the following levels of qualification in
place in December 2015 for Army Reserve soldiers:
• defence against nuclear, biological, and chemical threats (5 percent
up to date);
• handling of personal weapon (7 percent up to date);
• first aid training (19 percent up to date);
• physical fitness (55 percent up to date); and
• medical requirements (65 percent up to date).
We found that the system does not capture civilian qualifications such as
language and cultural skills, which Army Reserve soldiers could bring to
the Canadian Army when they are deployed.
5.68 However, senior Canadian Army officials told us that the
information recorded by the Personnel Readiness Verification system was
not up to date and produced information that could not be relied upon.
They also told us that Army Reserve units were not updating this system
because the units had a heavy burden of administrative tasks. In our
opinion, the Canadian Army does not have the assurance that Army
Reserve soldiers have the current qualifications that they need to be
prepared for deployment.
5.69 Before their deployment on any mission, Army Reserve soldiers
must update qualifications that are not current or must receive a waiver.
In 2015, Army Reserve soldiers were deployed to support provincial
authorities in Saskatchewan to fight forest fires, which was a potentially
hazardous mission. However, the commander of the operation waived the
requirement for medical and physical fitness assessments. In the same
year, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Department of National
Defence and the Canadian Forces noted that the practice of deploying
without an assessment of medical fitness may cause soldiers or their team
members harm and increase the potential liabilities of the Canadian
Armed Forces.
16 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
5.70 Recommendation. National Defence should ensure that it has
up-to-date information on whether Army Reserve soldiers are prepared for
deployment. This information should include civilian qualifications held
by Army Reserve soldiers.
National Defence’s response. Agreed. Work is ongoing through the Military
Personnel Management Capability Transformation project to maintain
all Reserve Force personnel readiness using the future military personnel
management tool, Guardian. As part of the project, investigation and analysis
will take into account the possibility of including civilian qualifications.
The Canadian Army will make every effort to utilize existing human
resource systems to keep data up to date in relation to readiness.
Army Reserve funding was not designed to be consistent with unit training and
other activities
What we found 5.71 We found that the annual planned funding for the Army Reserve
was not consistent with the actual activities undertaken by Army Reserve
units. We found that in the 2014–15 fiscal year, $13.5 million in unspent
funds from the Army Reserve budget was reallocated to uses other than
those of the Army Reserve. We also found that in the 2013–14 fiscal year,
National Defence attributed a cost of $166 million to the Army Reserve
for the operation of Canadian Army bases through a calculation that was
not based on actual use and may have overstated reported expenses of the
Primary Reserve.
5.72 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined
and discusses
• annual Army Reserve funding, and
• financial reallocation and reporting.
Why this finding matters 5.73 This finding matters because the Canadian Army needs to fully fund
Army Reserve units’ activities, including training, if the Army Reserve is
going to support the Canadian Army. In addition, National Defence needs
to clearly understand Army Reserve spending if it is to effectively manage
those activities and plan for the future needs of the Canadian Army.
Recommendations 5.74 Our recommendations in this area of examination appear
at paragraphs 5.80 and 5.84.
Analysis to support
this finding
5.75 What we examined. We examined annual Canadian Army and Army
Reserve operating plans and directives, National Defence financial analysis,
and reviews of financial practices. We interviewed National Defence senior
managers and command teams of Army Reserve units and brigades.
17
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
5.76 Annual Army Reserve funding. Since 2000, the Canadian Army
has budgeted annual funding for the Army Reserve on the basis of each
soldier participating in unit activities, including individual and collective
training, for 37.5 days per year. Annual funding also supports a
further 7 days of training, during which the unit trains collectively with
other units. Funding for this 7-day training is calculated at a participation
rate of half the total number of the unit’s soldiers. More funding for
external individual training courses is made available through the
Canadian Army’s national training system.
5.77 Local Army Reserve unit activities that are expected to be covered by
the 37.5 days of funding include
• individual and collective training within the unit;
• training on National Defence policies, such as sexual harassment
and workplace health and safety;
• preparation of training courses;
• administration;
• civic duties in the local community; and
• ceremonial duties.
5.78 We found that the budgeted annual funding for the Army Reserve
is not consistent with the actual activities undertaken by Army Reserve
units. In 2013, an internal Canadian Army analysis was presented for
information purposes to senior Army officers, showing that the 37.5 days
was at least 10 days fewer than what Army Reserve units actually used for
individual and collective training and other activities. For example, the
analysis found that 5 additional training days that were spent on preparing
for domestic missions were not included in the allocated 37.5 days. This
analysis was not endorsed, and no action has been taken to either
acknowledge or address this discrepancy.
5.79 Furthermore, an analysis by the Canadian Army of training in
the 2014–15 fiscal year found that at least 44 percent of Army Reserve
soldiers had participated in fewer than 25 days of training or other unit
activities. We were told that units used some of these unspent funds to
increase spending on the activity of other soldiers or other unit activities.
This analysis questioned whether the present method of funding Army
Reserve units was appropriate and accurate.
5.80 Recommendation. National Defence should ensure that budgeted
annual funding for Army Reserve units is consistent with expected results.
National Defence’s response. Agreed. The Canadian Army assigns
resources to ensure that all mandated tasks are funded. We will monitor
whether these tasks are consistent with the results expected of them.
5.81 Financial reallocation and reporting. We found that in
the 2014–15 fiscal year, the Canadian Army reallocated $8.2 million
in unspent funds from the Army Reserve budget for other purposes
18 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
within the Canadian Army and returned another $5.3 million of the
planned budget of the Army Reserve to National Defence. However,
during visits to Army Reserve units, we were told that many needs were
not being met for training. These included equipment, ammunition,
travel, and administrative support.
5.82 National Defence reported to Parliament that it spent $1.2 billion
to train and operate the Primary Reserve in the 2013–14 fiscal year.
According to the Canadian Armed Forces, $724 million of this amount
was to train and operate the Army Reserve. Of that amount, $166 million
was attributed to the Army Reserve for the operation of Canadian Army
bases. This amount was calculated based on a ratio of the number of
Army Reserve soldiers to the number of Regular Army soldiers, not on the
use of base facilities. The Canadian Armed Forces does not maintain
information on the Army Reserve’s actual use of base facilities. In our
opinion, the $166 million estimate is not well supported and may result
in providing incorrect information to Parliament by overstating the
reported expenses of the Primary Reserve.
5.83 In 2015, to better show the Minister of National Defence the total
amount spent on the Primary Reserve, the Chief of the Defence Staff
directed that an account be used to record how much money is given to,
and spent by, each Reserve Force. National Defence also intends to
establish a separate reporting process that will connect assigned funding to
expected results.
5.84 Recommendation. National Defence should complete planned
changes to the way it reports its annual budgets and the expenses of the
Army Reserve, so that National Defence can link assigned funding to
expected results.
National Defence’s response. Agreed. National Defence utilizes a
financial reporting structure to record how much is allocated to and
expended by the Primary Reserves. Commencing 9 February 2016,
expenditures related to the Reserve Program were incorporated in the
financial reports briefed to senior management. This approach will provide
greater visibility on funding and expenditures, and will support enhanced
reporting and performance measurement.
Training of Army Reserve soldiers
Overall finding  5.85 Overall, we found that the Canadian Army had designed its training
so that Army Reserve soldiers received lower levels of physical fitness
training and were not trained for the same number of skills as Regular
Army soldiers. We found that some Army Reserve soldiers had not
acquired the remainder of these skills before they were deployed. We also
19
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
found that Army Reserve soldiers had lower levels of training as cohesive
teams. Furthermore, we found that collective training for Army Reserve
units was not well integrated with the training of the Regular Army units.
5.86 This is important because the Canadian Army needs physically fit,
well-trained soldiers who can be deployed, either as individuals or in
teams, to meet the challenges of the modern battlefield. Without the
complete range of skills, Army Reserve soldiers and their teams are put at
risk. Furthermore, the flexibility that commanders need to meet the
challenges of domestic and international missions is limited by the skills
and experiences of the soldiers under their command.
Context 5.87 Training to build a strong and effective fighting force is the primary
task of the Canadian Army. Army Reserve training should prepare soldiers
and units to adapt quickly to various types of combat operations,
sometimes within minutes. This training should also prepare Army
Reserve soldiers to perform effectively on non-combat missions, including
domestic deployments (Exhibit 5.5).
Exhibit 5.5 Training should prepare soldiers and units to adapt quickly to various types of non-combat
and combat operations
Source: Based on information from National Defence
Non-combat and
combat operations
Stability operations
• Support civilian
infrastructure and
governance
• Assist other government
agencies
• Provide security
and control
• Support disarmament
and demilitarization
• Support reform of
security services
Enabling operations
• Reconnaissance
• Advancing forces to
engage the enemy
• Transportation and logistics
• Security of locations and
personnel
• Relief of troops in combat
• Retirement
• Withdrawal of forces
Defensive operations
• Defend positions
• Delay enemy forces
• Prevent enemy
movements
Offensive operations
• Attacks
• Raids
• Pursuits
• Deception movements
• Demonstration of strength
• Breakout from
encirclement by
the enemy
20 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
5.88 Canadian Army training is an innately dangerous activity. The
Canadian Army must balance the risks of training against those of not
being fully prepared to deploy on missions. This requires that all soldiers
maintain the highest level of physical fitness and that training be
systematic and progressively more complex, through individual and
collective training, so that soldiers can acquire and confirm their skills.
Army Reserve soldiers received less training than Regular Army soldiers
What we found 5.89 We found that neither legislation, nor a program designed to
support Reservists while on duty or deployed, covered them for all types
of occupational skills training. We also found that compared with the
training for Regular Army soldiers, occupational skills training courses for
Army Reserve soldiers were not designed to provide all of the skills needed
to quickly adapt to various types of combat situations. We further found
that pre-deployment training of Army Reserve soldiers for international
missions did not always address all known gaps in individual occupational
skills training.
5.90 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined
and discusses
• support to attend training courses,
• compensation for employers,
• training programs for individual occupational skills, and
• training for deployment on international missions.
Why this finding matters 5.91 This finding matters because differences in skills and physical
fitness between Regular Army and Army Reserve soldiers limit the ability
of Army Reserve units and soldiers to be prepared for missions. These
differences also increase the risks of injury to soldiers when they train or
deploy. The Canadian Army recognizes that it needs to identify and
address these differences before Army Reserve soldiers can deploy on
missions and be capable of operating in an integrated Army.
Recommendations 5.92 Our recommendations in this area of examination appear at
paragraphs 5.96, 5.98, and 5.106.
Analysis to support
this finding
5.93 What we examined. We examined what steps were taken to enable
Army Reserve soldiers to attend training courses. We also examined and
compared the individual occupational training programs of the Regular
Army and the Army Reserve for infantry, armoured crewmen, and
electrical mechanical engineers. Furthermore, we examined Army
21
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
Reserve soldiers’ records of training for deployment on international
missions. We examined documents, observed training, and interviewed
senior managers and command teams of Army Reserve units as well as
instructors and trainees at training schools.
5.94 Support to attend training courses. National Defence has taken
several steps to enable Army Reserve soldiers to attend training courses.
For example, National Defence works with the Canadian Forces Liaison
Council to encourage employers and educational institutions to provide
leaves of absence when necessary for training and deployment. The
Canadian Army also uses training modules, simulation training, and
distance learning to help Army Reserve soldiers balance their training with
their civilian schedules. However, we found that from 2011 to 2013,
47 training courses were cancelled, 23 because of a lack of candidates.
5.95 National Defence noted that job protection legislation for Army
Reserve soldiers who take time off from civilian employment for military
training or duty differs across the country. We found that federal
legislation does not provide job protection for all Army Reserve training.
The Canada Labour Code and the Reserve Forces Training Leave
Regulations under the National Defence Act permit absences for some
types of training, such as annual training with the soldier’s unit, training
for a specific deployed operation, or leave to attend training for promotion.
However, the Code and the Regulations do not provide leave for Army
Reserve soldiers to undertake all types of occupational skills training.
5.96 Recommendation. National Defence should work with
departments and agencies that have responsibility under the Canada
Labour Code and the Reserve Forces Training Leave Regulations to
consider including coverage of absences to attend all types of occupational
skills training into the Code and the Regulations.
National Defence’s response. Agreed. National Defence will consult with
the Public Service Commission of Canada and other applicable agencies to
determine whether changes to federal job protection legislation can be
justified.
5.97 Compensation for employers. In November 2014, National
Defence announced that it planned to introduce a program to compensate
civilian employers and self-employed Reserve personnel to help offset
costs incurred by employers when a person in the Primary Reserve is
absent from work on designated domestic or international deployments.
The amount is about $400 for each week of absence. We found that this
program did not compensate employers when a Reserve Force soldier
attends occupational skills training. The compensation program is thus
not able to support the full participation of Army Reserve soldiers in
training for Army missions.
22 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
5.98 Recommendation. National Defence should consider amendments to
its proposed Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program to include
absences for all occupational skills training of Army Reserve soldiers.
National Defence’s response. Agreed. Only once the original program is
fully implemented and institutionalized will National Defence undertake
an evidence-based feasibility study on the expansion of the Compensation
for Employers of Reservists Program to include leave for occupational and
career training courses, including associated training activities required for
career progression.
5.99 Training programs for individual occupational skills. The
Canadian Army has taken steps to align standards for individual
occupational skills training received by Army Reserve and Regular Army
soldiers to allow all of them to acquire the same level of competence for a
particular skill. However, we found that individual occupational courses
for Army Reserve soldiers were designed so that they graduated from their
initial occupational courses with fewer professional and leadership skills
than their Regular Army counterparts.
5.100 For example, Regular officers’ initial military training is 70 days.
Its objective is to produce an “operationally focused and physically robust
graduate who will be able to perform their responsibilities” as a
professional soldier and leader of a small team in simple operations.
However, the course that Reserve officers attend is 32 days and has
significantly less training in important skills such as physical fitness,
administration, and leadership of operations and subordinates. Similarly,
a Regular Force non-commissioned member receives 60 days of training
that include developing leadership skills and extensive physical fitness
training. An Army Reserve non-commissioned member receives 23 days
of training that does not include these elements.
5.101 Army Reserve soldiers are trained for a specific occupation, such
as infantry, armour, artillery, logistics, communications, or electrical
mechanical engineering. However, we found that this training was often
limited to a narrower set of individual occupational skills than the training
provided to Regular Army soldiers. For example, the Army Reserve
infantry training course that provides non-commissioned members
(excluding officers) with fighting skills requires 35 training days, compared
with 62 training days for their Regular Army counterparts. This difference
means that these Army Reserve infantry soldiers are not certified to use
several weapons (anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons) that the
Canadian Army considers necessary for infantry teams of 25
to 40 soldiers (Exhibit 5.6).
23
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
5.102 We also found that this lack of individual occupational skills training
continued through later career courses. For example, courses for senior
leaders of infantry Army Reserve units did not include instruction in key
skills such as commanding operations with armoured fighting vehicles,
conducting operations in urban areas, and working in command posts.
We found that Army Reserve infantry soldiers received 25 percent fewer
days of formal individual skills training over their careers than did their
Regular Force counterparts.
5.103 Training for deployment on international missions. The Canadian
Army has recognized that it needs to address gaps during the pre-deployment
training of Army Reserve soldiers for international missions.
5.104 The importance of addressing all gaps in individual training during
pre-deployment training was noted in a 2014 inquiry into a 2010 training
incident in Afghanistan in which four Army Reserve soldiers were injured
and one was killed. The casualties occurred while the soldiers were
training to operate a particular weapon that was part of the mission’s
equipment but had not been included in pre-deployment training.
The inquiry concluded that the lack of this pre-deployment training
contributed to this incident.
Exhibit 5.6 Non-commissioned Army Reserve infantry soldiers receive less initial weapons training than
Regular Army infantry soldiers
Weapons training provided during infantry training course
for non-commissioned members (excluding officers)
Regular Army
infantry training
Reserve Army
infantry training
Personal weapon (rifle) Provided Provided
Pistol Provided Not provided
Light machine gun Provided Provided
General-purpose machine gun Provided Provided
Hand grenades Provided Provided
Grenade launcher Provided Not provided
Short-range anti-armour weapon (light) Provided Not provided
Short-range anti-armour weapon (medium) Provided Not provided
Command-detonated explosive Provided Not provided
Source: Based on information from National Defence
24 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
5.105 More recently, Canadian Armed Forces soldiers began to deploy as
part of NATO’s collective defence in Eastern Europe. When we examined
pre-deployment training records for one rotation, the records confirmed
that Army Reserve soldiers had completed training on a range of weapons.
However, for another rotation, confirmation existed only for their personal
weapons. In both cases, a gap remained in the weapons training between
Army Reserve and Regular Army soldiers before they deployed on
international missions.
5.106 Recommendation. National Defence needs to ensure that training
of Army Reserve soldiers for international deployments addresses all
known gaps in individual occupational skills training.
National Defence’s response. Agreed. The Canadian Army already
provides sufficient detail to ensure that Army Reserve soldiers are trained
to the level required for employment on domestic and international
missions. The Army ensures that Reserve soldiers are trained to their
occupational function point within their trade and that continuation
training is provided annually to enable those soldiers to operate in
platoon- and company-level operations. Gaps or deficiencies in skills are
identified during the pre-deployment training phase, and the designated
Commanders assess and determine how those gaps will be rectified
(through individual training courses or collective level training at the
deploying unit level). Once deployed, whether Regular or Reserve, the unit
will conduct refresher or continuation training to ensure skill proficiency is
maintained. If a new task or piece of equipment is identified, the deployed
unit Commander will provide the level of training as required. The
Canadian Army will ensure the training records of individual soldiers are
kept up to date and will continue to explore ways to minimize all known
skill gaps.
Army Reserve and Regular Army unit training were not fully integrated
What we found 5.107 We found that the level of collective training of Army Reserve units
was designed to be less than the Canadian Army’s required level of
collective training which is vital for success when deployed. We also found
that Army Reserve unit training was not fully integrated with that of
Regular Army units.
5.108 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined
and discusses
• collective training, and
• integrating Army Reserve training with Regular Army training.
Army Reserve soldiers were
deployed to Eastern Europe
in 2015.
Photo: National Defence
25
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
Why this finding matters 5.109 This finding matters because the Canadian Army has stated that it
needs Army Reserve units to train soldiers who can be deployed as part of
an integrated Army to meet assigned missions.
Recommendation 5.110 Our recommendation in this area of examination appears
at paragraph 5.119.
Analysis to support
this finding
5.111 What we examined. We examined the Canadian Army’s
requirements and reports of collective training of Army Reserve units.
We also examined how this training was aligned with the three-year
training cycle of the Regular Army.
5.112 Collective training. The Canadian Army has identified that it is
critical to ensure that its soldiers train to work together in a larger team
of up to 150 soldiers or more, with many different kinds of equipment.
Regular Army units train to this level to have all the skills they require for
fighting as an integrated team that can quickly adapt to various combat
situations. We found that by design, Army Reserve units train for fewer
skills, in smaller teams of 25 to 40 soldiers, and with less access to
equipment.
5.113 We also found that in meeting their collective training requirements,
some Army Reserve units did not follow the Canadian Army’s requirement
that all training be both progressive and safe. During our audit work, it
came to our attention that five Army Reserve post-exercise reports between
2013 and 2015 stated that collective training was not always progressive
and raised safety concerns. For example, in one case, contrary to the
Canadian Army’s guidance, units conducted a live-fire exercise without
“walking” their soldiers through the exercise beforehand.
5.114 We also found that the process used to confirm that Army
Reserve units had achieved the required level of training was inconsistent.
We asked 10 units across all Divisions for information confirming that
the units had achieved their required levels of training. We found that
the quality of confirmations varied greatly, from well documented to not
documented. In six cases, there was no documentation to show that the
units had achieved the required level of training. In our opinion, without
a consistent and documented confirmation process, the Canadian Army
does not have full assurance that all Army Reserve units have achieved
the level of collective training they need to progress to higher levels of
collective training, including pre-deployment training for international
missions.
26 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
5.115 We found that the Canadian Army has taken some steps to improve
the collective training of Army Reserve soldiers. For example, we observed
a recent large-scale exercise involving over 1,000 Army Reserve soldiers
from across Ontario that included Regular Army soldiers instructing and
coaching Army Reserve soldiers on the tactics and skills that they would
need to deploy in a combat role.
5.116 Integrating Army Reserve training with Regular Army training.
We found that the collective training requirements for Army Reserve units
were not integrated into the three-year training cycle of the Regular Army.
Analysis conducted in 2015 by the Canadian Army concluded that
integration into the training cycle of the Regular Army would ensure that
the Army Reserve’s training for domestic and international missions
would be conducted in a progressive and predictable manner and provide
formal confirmation of that training. The analysis also noted that this
enhanced training would increase the retention of Army Reserve soldiers.
5.117 As previously mentioned, the Army Reserve is expected to provide
up to 20 percent of soldiers being deployed on major international
missions. Army Reserve soldiers are deployed as individuals placed in
Regular Army units or in Army Reserve teams that provide key tasks, such
as Convoy Escort, Force Protection, Persistent Surveillance, and Influence
Activities. However, the Canadian Army has determined that, with the
exception of Influence Activities, these key tasks would have to be
performed by Regular Army soldiers during the initial rotation. This is
because the training of Army Reserve units has not been integrated into
the Regular Army’s training plan to prepare for Canada First Defence
Strategy missions.
5.118 In 2009, the Canadian Army took steps to integrate the collective
training of Army Reserve and Regular Army units in the same Division.
This integration was to be achieved by linking units that perform the
same combat operations—for example, Army Reserve infantry units with
Regular Army infantry units. These pairings were to help develop
command and control relationships, and joint training, which would
ensure that Army Reserve units were prepared to meet assigned tasks.
However, we found that, with the exception of artillery units, this has not
happened.
5.119 Recommendation. National Defence should improve the collective
training and integration of Army Reserve units with their Regular Army
counterparts so that they are better prepared to support deployments.
National Defence’s response. Agreed. The Canadian Army is taking the
necessary steps to develop opportunities for stronger integration between
the Regular Army and the Reserve Force.
Regular Army soldiers instruct
and coach Army Reserve
soldiers on tactics and skills
during an exercise at Canadian
Forces Base Petawawa.
Photo: Office of the Auditor General
of Canada
27
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
Conclusion
5.120 We concluded that although Army Reserve units received clear
guidance for domestic missions, the Canadian Army did not require Army
Reserve groups to formally confirm that they were prepared to deploy on
domestic missions. Army Reserve units and groups did not always have
access to key equipment. At the same time, Army Reserve units lacked
clear guidance on preparing for international missions, had lower levels of
training as cohesive teams, and had not fully integrated this training with
that of the Regular Army.
5.121 We concluded that the Army Reserve did not have the number of
soldiers it needed and lacked information on whether soldiers were
prepared to deploy when required. The number of Army Reserve soldiers
has been steadily declining because the Army Reserve has been unable to
recruit and retain the soldiers it needs. Furthermore, funding was not
designed to fully support unit training and other activities.
5.122 We concluded that Army Reserve soldiers received lower levels of
physical fitness training and were not trained in the same number of skills
as Regular Army soldiers. We found that some Army Reserve soldiers had
not acquired the remainder of these skills before they were deployed.
28 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
About the Audit
The Office of the Auditor General’s responsibility was to conduct an independent examination of
National Defence’s Canadian Army Reserve to provide objective information, advice, and assurance
to assist Parliament in its scrutiny of the government’s management of resources and programs.
National Defence is responsible for the readiness of the Canadian Army (Regular Force and Army
Reserve) and ensures that all members and units of the Army Reserve are trained and equipped so
that they are prepared for assigned missions.
All of the audit work in this report was conducted in accordance with the standards for assurance
engagements set out by the Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada (CPA) in the CPA Canada
Handbook—Assurance. While the Office adopts these standards as the minimum requirement for our
audits, we also draw upon the standards and practices of other disciplines.
As part of our regular audit process, we obtained management’s confirmation that the findings in this
report are factually based.
Objective
The objective of the audit was to determine whether the Army Reserve is ready to deploy for domestic
and international missions. (Ready means to be prepared.) The sub-objectives included whether
• National Defence assigned missions and objectives to the Army Reserve and its units with
the necessary resources,
• Army Reserve units had the capacity to accomplish assigned missions, and
• Army Reserve personnel and units were trained to be combat-capable and to achieve their
assigned missions.
Scope and approach
The audit scope included National Defence and focused on the Canadian Army Reserve.
We examined National Defence operational plans, data, and reports, including the funding of Army
Reserve units. We also examined the performance of the recruiting system for the Army Reserve.
We examined guidance and observed training, and interviewed senior Canadian Army commanders,
command teams of Army Reserve units, and Army Reserve soldiers.
When we used representative sampling for analyzing Army Reserve soldiers’ reports of injury, disease,
illness, or exposure to toxic material, sample sizes were sufficient to report on the sampled population
with a confidence level of 90 percent and a margin of error of less than +10 percent.
29
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
Criteria
Management reviewed and accepted the suitability of the criteria used in the audit.
Criteria Sources
To determine whether National Defence assigned missions and objectives to the Army Reserve
and its units with the necessary resources, we used the following criteria:
National Defence assigns clear missions to all Army
Reserve units, which contributes to an integrated,
multi-purpose, and combat-capable military.
• Canada First Defence Strategy, National Defence, 2008
• Departmental Performance Report 2013–14,
National Defence
• Report on Plans and Priorities 2014–15,
National Defence
• Policy on Management, Resources and Results
Structures, Treasury Board, 2012
• Results for Canadians: A Management Framework for
the Government of Canada, Treasury Board of Canada
Secretariat, 2000
National Defence allocates resources to the Army
Reserve to achieve National Defence and Canadian
Army objectives and manages risks to readiness targets,
force generation, and equipment needs.
National Defence monitors Army Reserve performance
and takes appropriate action to ensure that the Army
Reserve can meet assigned missions.
To determine whether Army Reserve units had the capacity to accomplish assigned missions,
we used the following criteria:
Army Reserve units have the people they need to be
effective (for example, unit strength and attending
members).
• Canada’s Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee, National
Defence, 1998
• Canada First Defence Strategy, National Defence, 2008
• Report on Plans and Priorities 2014–15,
National Defence
• Military HR Strategy 2020: Facing the People Challenges
of the Future, National Defence, 2002
• Land Operations 2021—Adaptive Dispersed Operations:
The Force Employment Concept for Canada’s Army of
Tomorrow, National Defence, 2007
Army Reserve units enrol sufficient numbers of recruits.
Army Reserve units retain the people they need (for
example, trainers and command staff).
Army Reserve units have access to the equipment they
need to accomplish assigned missions.
To determine whether Army Reserve personnel and units were trained to be combat-capable
and to achieve their assigned missions, we used the following criteria:
National Defence defines individual training
requirements to achieve a combat-capable reserve
force.
• Canada First Defence Strategy, National Defence, 2008
• Report on Plans and Priorities 2014–15,
National Defence
• Canada’s Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee,
National Defence, 1998
• Training for Land Operations, National Defence,
June 2014
Army Reserve personnel receive the opportunities and
resources they need to achieve individual training
requirements.
Individual members of the Army Reserve meet the
training requirements for their trade, rank, and
deployment.
Army Reserve units receive the collective training they
need to accomplish assigned missions.
30 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
Period covered by the audit
The audit examined the period covered by the 2012–13, 2013–14, and 2014–15 fiscal years,
and reached back over longer periods, as required, to gather evidence to conclude against criteria.
Relevant observations up to January 2016 were also included. Audit work for this report was
completed on 26 January 2016.
Audit team
Assistant Auditor General: Jerome Berthelette
Principal: Gordon Stock
Director: Craig Millar
Françoise Bessette
Glenn Crites
Julie Hudon
John McGrath
31
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
List of Recommendations
The following is a list of recommendations found in this report. The number in front of the
recommendation indicates the paragraph where it appears in the report. The numbers in parentheses
indicate the paragraphs where the topic is discussed.
Recommendation Response
Guidance on preparing for missions
5.22 National Defence should
provide individual Army Reserve units
with clear guidance so that they can
prepare their soldiers for key tasks
assigned to the Army Reserve for major
international missions. (5.18–5.21)
National Defence’s response. Agreed. Providing the necessary
training to soldiers before they participate in international
deployments is of paramount importance to the Canadian Army.
Guidance regarding the required training is provided in the Army’s
annual operation plan. Once Reserve participation in a given
expeditionary operation is announced, specific direction is given with
respect to the training required for individuals and for designated
Reserve Teams (to conduct tasks such as Convoy Escort, Force
Protection, and Persistent Surveillance). Every Team is “confirmed”
through a deliberate process before being given the green light to
deploy. The Army will work toward improving its guidance for
anticipated key tasks for major international missions.
5.32 The Canadian Army should
define and provide access to the
equipment that Army Reserve units and
groups need to train and deploy for
domestic missions. (5.28–5.31)
National Defence’s response. Agreed. A procurement plan is under
way to address the shortages within certain fleets. The Canadian
Army has defined and provides the equipment required to conduct
domestic operations. The majority of this equipment is held either
within the unit or with the Canadian Brigade Group. When a specific
requirement or gap is identified that is not within the Brigade Group,
the Division will reallocate from within its own resources or will
request additional items from national stocks.
5.34 The Canadian Army should
require Army Reserve groups to formally
confirm that they are prepared to support
domestic missions. (5.33)
National Defence’s response. Agreed. The Canadian Army will
review the process and develop a better-documented confirmation
method. The Army conducts training on an annual basis for
the 10 Territorial Battalion Groups and the four Arctic Company
Response Groups. This training may be verbally confirmed through
the chain of command, which is found to be sufficient for training
objectives.
32 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
Sustainability of Army Reserve units
5.57 National Defence should design
and implement a retention strategy for
the Army Reserve. (5.46–5.56)
National Defence’s response. Agreed. Retention enables Canadian
Armed Forces’ operational and institutional excellence. National
Defence will develop and implement a Canadian Armed Forces
retention strategy that will ensure retaining our members in uniform
is a fundamental aspect of how we manage our people, and is given
equal, if not greater, prominence in our attraction and recruiting
efforts. Our approach going forward will be comprehensive and
incorporate the Regular and Reserve Force, creating greater mobility
between these components and accounting for the range of
requirements inherent in each. While consideration will be given
to transactional requirements in the areas of compensation and
benefits, National Defence will develop effective measures including,
but not limited to, career management, family support, mental health
and wellness support, and diversity requirements.
The Canadian Army is developing a retention strategy for the Army
Reserve, and is in the process of updating the strategy based on Chief
Military Personnel initiatives.
5.62 National Defence should review
the terms of service of Army Reserve
soldiers, and the contracts of full-time
Army Reserve soldiers, to ensure that it is
in compliance with the National Defence
Act. (5.58–5.61)
National Defence’s response. Agreed. The Canadian Armed Forces
will review the framework for the Reserve Force terms of service and
the administration of Reserve Force service to ensure it complies with
the National Defence Act and the regulations enacted under it.
5.65 National Defence should review
its policies and clarify Army Reserve
soldiers’ access to medical services.
(5.63–5.64)
National Defence’s response. Agreed. The Canadian Forces Health
Services Group Headquarters is actively advancing a number of
initiatives to review and support policies for medical assessments that
contribute to Primary Reserve soldiers’ overall readiness for training
and deployment, and that clarify access to medical services, including
• issuing a communiqué to establish the priority for Reservists to
receive medical assessments from Headquarters (released
October 2015);
• updating the Queen’s Regulations and Orders, Chapter 34,
Section 2 (Medical Care of Officers and Non-commissioned
Members), currently with the National Defence Regulations Section
for amendment drafting, with estimated anticipated approval
six months after Section work is complete. In 2009, Health Services
Group Headquarters published interim guidance on entitlement
to health care for Reserve Force personnel. This was also
communicated to members in correspondence dated 2011 from
the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, along with an accompanying
guide. Annual reminders are issued to health care providers with
regard to entitlement rules;
Recommendation Response
33
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
• assessing courses of action proposed in the joint Canadian Forces
Ombudsman/Health Services Group study, “The Feasibility of
Providing Periodic Health Assessments to All Primary Reservists”
(June 2015) and other potential tools to determine medical fitness
and conduct periodic health assessments, through a Reserve
Medical Readiness Working Group. It is anticipated that alternatives
will be developed by August 2016 and implemented in the fall
of 2016.
5.70 National Defence should ensure
that it has up-to-date information on
whether Army Reserve soldiers are
prepared for deployment. This
information should include civilian
qualifications held by Army Reserve
soldiers. (5.66–5.69)
National Defence’s response. Agreed. Work is ongoing through the
Military Personnel Management Capability Transformation project to
maintain all Reserve Force personnel readiness using the future
military personnel management tool, Guardian. As part of the project,
investigation and analysis will take into account the possibility of
including civilian qualifications.
The Canadian Army will make every effort to utilize existing human
resource systems to keep data up to date in relation to readiness.
5.80 National Defence should ensure
that budgeted annual funding for Army
Reserve units is consistent with expected
results. (5.76–5.79)
National Defence’s response. Agreed. The Canadian Army assigns
resources to ensure that all mandated tasks are funded. We will
monitor whether these tasks are consistent with the results expected
of them.
5.84 National Defence should
complete planned changes to the way it
reports its annual budgets and the
expenses of the Army Reserve, so that
National Defence can link assigned
funding to expected results. (5.81–5.83)
National Defence’s response. Agreed. National Defence utilizes a
financial reporting structure to record how much is allocated to and
expended by the Primary Reserves. Commencing 9 February 2016,
expenditures related to the Reserve Program were incorporated in the
financial reports briefed to senior management. This approach will
provide greater visibility on funding and expenditures, and will
support enhanced reporting and performance measurement.
Training of Army Reserve soldiers
5.96 National Defence should work
with departments and agencies that have
responsibility under the Canada Labour
Code and the Reserve Forces Training Leave
Regulations to consider including
coverage of absences to attend all types
of occupational skills training into the
Code and the Regulations. (5.94–5.95)
National Defence’s response. Agreed. National Defence will consult
with the Public Service Commission of Canada and other applicable
agencies to determine whether changes to federal job protection
legislation can be justified.
5.98 National Defence should
consider amendments to its proposed
Compensation for Employers of Reservists
Program to include absences for all
occupational skills training of Army
Reserve soldiers.
(5.97)
National Defence’s response. Agreed. Only once the original
program is fully implemented and institutionalized will National
Defence undertake an evidence-based feasibility study on the
expansion of the Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program
to include leave for occupational and career training courses,
including associated training activities required for career
progression.
Recommendation Response
34 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
5.106 National Defence needs to
ensure that training of Army Reserve
soldiers for international deployments
addresses all known gaps in individual
occupational skills training. (5.99–5.105)
National Defence’s response. Agreed. The Canadian Army already
provides sufficient detail to ensure that Army Reserve soldiers are
trained to the level required for employment on domestic and
international missions. The Army ensures that Reserve soldiers are
trained to their occupational function point within their trade and
that continuation training is provided annually to enable those
soldiers to operate in platoon- and company-level operations. Gaps or
deficiencies in skills are identified during the pre-deployment training
phase, and the designated Commanders assess and determine how
those gaps will be rectified (through individual training courses or
collective level training at the deploying unit level). Once deployed,
whether Regular or Reserve, the unit will conduct refresher or
continuation training to ensure skill proficiency is maintained. If a new
task or piece of equipment is identified, the deployed unit
Commander will provide the level of training as required. The
Canadian Army will ensure the training records of individual soldiers
are kept up to date and will continue to explore ways to minimize all
known skill gaps.
5.119 National Defence should
improve the collective training and
integration of Army Reserve units with
their Regular Army counterparts so that
they are better prepared to support
deployments. (5.112–5.118)
National Defence’s response. Agreed. The Canadian Army is taking
the necessary steps to develop opportunities for stronger integration
between the Regular Army and the Reserve Force.
Recommendation Response
35
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
Appendix
Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,
2014–15 fiscal year
Area of
operations Unit name
Percentage
of ideal
unit size* Community
3rd Canadian Division (Edmonton)
British Columbia 39 Canadian Brigade Group Vancouver
The British Columbia Regiment
(Duke of Connaught’s Own)
121% Vancouver
The British Columbia Dragoons 72% Kelowna and Vernon
5th (British Columbia) Field Artillery
Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery
(RCA)
72% Victoria and Nanaimo
15th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA 91% Vancouver and Aldergrove
39 Combat Engineer Regiment 56% Vancouver, Chilliwack, and Trail
39 Signal Regiment 53% Vancouver, Victoria, and Nanaimo
The Rocky Mountain Rangers 106% Kamloops and Prince George
The Royal Westminster Regiment 108% New Westminster and Aldergrove
The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada 106% Vancouver
The Canadian Scottish Regiment
(Princess Mary’s)
72% Victoria, Nanaimo, and Courtenay
39 Service Battalion 56% Victoria and Richmond
Alberta 41 Canadian Brigade Group Calgary
The South Alberta Light Horse 47% Edmonton and Medicine Hat
The King’s Own Calgary Regiment 62% Calgary
20th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA 50% Edmonton and Red Deer
20th Independent Field Battery, RCA 56% Lethbridge
41 Combat Engineer Regiment 72% Calgary and Edmonton
41 Signal Regiment 42% Calgary, Edmonton, and Red Deer
The Loyal Edmonton Regiment 54% Edmonton and Yellowknife
(Northwest Territories)
The Calgary Highlanders 74% Calgary
41 Service Battalion 42% Calgary and Edmonton
* The ideal unit size allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.
36 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
Saskatchewan,
Manitoba, and
Northwestern
Ontario
38 Canadian Brigade Group Winnipeg
The Saskatchewan Dragoons 59% Moose Jaw
The Fort Garry Horse 66% Winnipeg
10th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA 43% Regina
26th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA 54% Brandon and Portage la Prairie
116th Independent Field Battery, RCA 43% Kenora
38 Combat Engineer Regiment 53% Winnipeg and Saskatoon
38 Signal Regiment 36% Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg,
and Thunder Bay
The Royal Winnipeg Rifles 69% Winnipeg
The Lake Superior Scottish Regiment 63% Thunder Bay
The North Saskatchewan Regiment 67% Saskatoon and Prince Albert
The Royal Regina Rifles 56% Regina
The Queen’s Own Cameron
Highlanders of Canada
57% Winnipeg
38 Service Battalion 39% Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg,
and Thunder Bay
4th Canadian Division (Toronto)
Southwestern
Ontario
31 Canadian Brigade Group London
1st Hussars 85% London and Sarnia
The Windsor Regiment, Royal
Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC)
80% Windsor
11th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA 73% Guelph and Hamilton
31 Combat Engineer Regiment
(The Elgins)
51% St. Thomas and Waterloo
31 Signal Regiment 61% Hamilton
The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
(Wentworth Regiment)
91% Hamilton and Burlington
4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian
Regiment
75% London and Stratford
The Grey and Simcoe Foresters 79% Owen Sound and Barrie
The Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada 69% Cambridge and Kitchener
* The ideal unit size allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.
Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,
2014–15 fiscal year (continued)
Area of
operations Unit name
Percentage
of ideal
unit size* Community
37
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
The Essex and Kent Scottish 80% Windsor and Chatham
The Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders of Canada (Princess
Louise’s)
82% Hamilton, Windsor, and Chatham
31 Service Battalion 52% Hamilton, London, Sault Ste. Marie,
and Windsor
Central Ontario 32 Canadian Brigade Group Toronto
The Governor General’s Horse Guards 63% Toronto
The Queen’s York Rangers
(1st American Regiment)
71% Toronto and Aurora
7th Toronto Regiment, RCA 87% Toronto
56th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA 93% Brantford, St. Catharines, and Simcoe
32 Combat Engineer Regiment 84% Toronto
32 Signal Regiment 77% Toronto and Borden
The Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada 100% Toronto and Scarborough
The Royal Regiment of Canada 79% Toronto
The Lincoln and Welland Regiment 68% St. Catharines and Welland
The Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin, and
Halton Regiment)
70% Brampton, Oakville, and Georgetown
48th Highlanders of Canada 92% Toronto
The Toronto Scottish Regiment
(Queen Elizabeth the Queen
Mother’s Own)
76% Etobicoke and Mississauga
32 Service Battalion 73% Toronto
Eastern Ontario 33 Canadian Brigade Group Ottawa
The Ontario Regiment (RCAC) 66% Oshawa
30th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA 92% Ottawa
42nd Field Artillery Regiment (Lanark
and Renfrew Scottish), RCA
67% Pembroke
49th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA 64% Sault Ste. Marie
33 Combat Engineer Regiment 75% Ottawa and Orleans
33 Signal Regiment 89% Ottawa
Governor General’s Foot Guards 98% Ottawa
* The ideal unit size allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.
Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,
2014–15 fiscal year (continued)
Area of
operations Unit name
Percentage
of ideal
unit size* Community
38 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
The Princess of Wales’ Own Regiment 57% Kingston
The Hastings and Prince Edward
Regiment
106% Peterborough, Belleville,
and Cobourg
The Brockville Rifles 51% Brockville
Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry
Highlanders
57% Cornwall
The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa
(Duke of Edinburgh’s Own)
83% Ottawa
The Algonquin Regiment 66% North Bay and Timmins
2nd Battalion, Irish Regiment of
Canada
57% Sudbury
33 Service Battalion 62% Ottawa and North Bay
2nd Canadian Division (Montréal)
Western Quebec 34 Canadian Brigade Group Montréal
The Royal Canadian Hussars
(Montréal)
93% Montréal
Le Régiment de Hull (RCAC) 96% Gatineau
2nd Field Regiment, RCA 98% Montréal
34 Combat Engineer Regiment 91% Montréal and Rouyn-Noranda
34 Signal Regiment 96% Montréal
The Canadian Grenadier Guards 112% Montréal
The Black Watch (Royal Highland
Regiment) of Canada
109% Montréal
4th Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment
(Châteauguay)
104% Laval
6th Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment 102% St-Hyacinthe and Drummondville
Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal 117% Montréal
Le Régiment de Maisonneuve 104% Montréal
The Royal Montréal Regiment 113% Westmount
34 Service Battalion 89% St. Hubert
* The ideal unit size allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.
Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,
2014–15 fiscal year (continued)
Area of
operations Unit name
Percentage
of ideal
unit size* Community
39
Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence Report 5
Eastern Quebec 35 Canadian Brigade Group Québec City
Sherbrooke Hussars 89% Sherbrooke
12e Régiment blindé du Canada 98% Trois-Rivières
6th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA 62% Lévis
62nd Field Artillery Regiment, RCA 85% Shawinigan
35 Combat Engineer Regiment 81% Québec City
35 Signal Regiment 78% Beauport and Sherbrooke
Les Voltigeurs de Québec 124% Québec City
Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent 71% Rimouski, Rivière-du-Loup, and
Matane
Le Régiment de la Chaudière 103% Lévis and Beauceville
Le Régiment du Saguenay 95% Jonquière
Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke 86% Sherbrooke
35 Service Battalion 83% Québec City
5th Canadian Division (Halifax)
Nova Scotia and
Prince Edward
Island
36 Canadian Brigade Group Halifax
The Halifax Rifles (RCAC) 49% Halifax
The Prince Edward Island Regiment
(RCAC)
73% Charlottetown and Summerside
1st (Halifax-Dartmouth) Field
Artillery Regiment, RCA
62% Halifax
84th Independent Field Battery, RCA 45% Yarmouth
36 Combat Engineer Regiment 58% Sydney
36 Signal Regiment 38% Halifax, Glace Bay, and Charlottetown
The Princess Louise Fusiliers 59% Halifax
The West Nova Scotia Regiment 85% Windsor, Aldershot, Middleton, and
Bridgewater
The Nova Scotia Highlanders 66% Amherst, Truro, New Glasgow, Pictou,
and Springhill
Cape Breton Highlanders 64% Sydney
36 Service Battalion 61% Halifax and Sydney
* The ideal unit size allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.
Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,
2014–15 fiscal year (continued)
Area of
operations Unit name
Percentage
of ideal
unit size* Community
40 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada—Spring 2016
Report 5
New Brunswick
and
Newfoundland
and Labrador
37 Canadian Brigade Group Moncton
8th Canadian Hussars
(Princess Louise’s)
52% Moncton and Sussex
3rd Field Artillery Regiment, RCA 56% Saint John and Woodstock
37 Combat Engineer Regiment 72% Fredericton and St. John’s
37 Signal Regiment 47% Saint John and St. John’s
1st Battalion, The Royal New
Brunswick Regiment
(Carleton and York)
70% Fredericton, Edmundston,
and Saint John
The North Shore (New Brunswick)
Regiment
71% Moncton, Campbellton, Bathurst,
and Miramichi City
1st Battalion, The Royal
Newfoundland Regiment
91% St. John’s
2nd Battalion, The Royal
Newfoundland Regiment
61% Corner Brook, Stephenville,
and Grand Falls
37 Service Battalion 54% Saint John and St. John’s
All Divisions
Units that report
directly to
Canadian Army
Division
Headquarters
6 Intelligence Company 47% Vancouver, Winnipeg, and Edmonton
2 Intelligence Company 57% Toronto
7 Intelligence Company 59% Ottawa
4 Intelligence Company 65% Montréal and Québec City
3 Intelligence Company 57% Halifax
* The ideal unit size allows the Army Reserve to expand when increases in funding are authorized.
Source: Based on information from National Defence
Army Reserve unit locations and average strength as a percentage of ideal unit size,
2014–15 fiscal year (continued)
Area of
operations Unit name
Percentage
of ideal
unit size* Community