COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document Fifth Progress Report on Ukraine's implementation of the action plan on visa liberalisation

EN EN
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 18.12.2015
SWD(2015) 705 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Accompanying the document
Sixth Progress Report on Ukraine's implementation of the action plan on visa
liberalisation
{COM(2015) 905 final}
Europaudvalget 2015
KOM (2015) 0905
Offentligt
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1. INTRODUCTION
This Commission staff working document (CSWD) accompanies the Sixth Progress Report
on the Implementation by Ukraine of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation (VLAP).1
Together with the report, the CSWD builds on the information and the assessment provided in
the Fifth Progress Report on the Implementation by Ukraine of the VLAP2
and, in line with
the methodology outlined in the VLAP, provides a detailed analysis of the most relevant
developments relating to the implementation of the second-phase VLAP benchmarks for
effective and sustainable implementation of relevant measures. The annex to the CSWD
includes an updated assessment of the potential migratory and security impacts on the
European Union (EU) of future visa liberalisation for Ukraine.
The factual information and assessment included in the CSWD is based on the evaluation
missions led by the European Commission, assisted by experts from EU Member States, to
Ukraine between 31 August 2015 and 2 October 2015, and updated information received by
the Commission from the Ukrainian authorities.
The annex to the CSWD — the Assessment of Migratory and Security Impacts — is primarily
based on information provided by EU Agencies and the EU Border Assistance Mission to the
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), and other available sources, including Eurostat
data.
The CSWD follows the VLAP structure. In the sections corresponding to VLAP blocks, it
lists all the second-phase benchmarks and describes their state of implementation, focusing in
particular on developments that took place after the fifth progress report was published on
8 May 2015.
2. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VLAP
2.1. Block 1: Document security, including biometrics
¾ Gradual roll-out of biometric international passports in compliance with ICAO
standards, including at Ukrainian consulates abroad, and phase-out of non-
ICAO compliant passports
The production and issuance of a new type of passport started on 12 January 2015 with the
ordinary passport (passport of the citizen of Ukraine for travelling abroad). Since the same
conditions and procedures still apply the previous positive assessment is confirmed.
To mid-August 2015, the State Migration Service (SMS) issued 581 000 biometric passports
and 800 000 non-biometric passports. The balance between the two has shifted: half of the
current applications are for biometric passports. The issuance of the new ordinary passport in
the Ukrainian diplomatic representations overseas where the applications can be lodged
started in April 2015.
1
COM(2015)905 final.
2
COM(2014) 336 final.
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Electronic diplomatic and service passports started to be issued in May 2015. The pattern and
security features used are the same as for the ordinary passport but with different colours for
the cover (black for the service passport and green for the diplomatic passport).
An important change to the legislative framework for phasing out non-biometric passports is
under consideration. A set of amendments to the Law on the Unified State Demographic
Registry was approved by the Government on 2 September 2015. These changes make the
electronic passport and live capture of fingerprints mandatory except in cases of obvious
incapacity or for children under 14 years of age. This removes the current option of obtaining
a non-biometric passport. Other amendments in this decision aim to increase the number of
authorities assigned to processing front-office passport applications; progressively replacing
the existing internal passport with a new electronic ID card and using facial recognition
technology together with the fingerprint identification system currently in place.
The new biometric ID cards are being tested and will be issued from 1 January 2016.
¾ High level of integrity and security of the application, personalisation and
distribution process for international passports, as well as domestic passports
and other breeder documents;
The Personalisation Centre for passports is in the state enterprise Polygraph Combine
Ukraina. Since March 2013 the State printer has been certified according to ISO standards
9001, 14001 and 27001 for quality and information security management systems. It produces
a wide range of secure documents including passports, ID cards, driving licences and bank
cards.
The necessary works have been carried out to house the personalisation and processing
machines to produce the biometric ID card, which is planned to be issued from January 2016.
This ID card, which will gradually replace the current internal passport, will be an ID-1-
format polycarbonate-based document, including a contactless chip. The personalisation
equipment will include three sets of machines able to produce 3.5 million cards a year.
The biometric ID card is part of a new strategic approach to identity management and secure
document issuance from the Ukrainian authorities. It aims to build a coherent and trustworthy
system while increasing the quality of service for Ukrainian citizens and ensuring data
protection. The Ukrainian authorities are committed to phasing out the current internal
passport within five years.
Amendments to the rules of procedure were adopted on 19 August 2015 to tackle any side-
effect of name changes on the issuance of travel and ID documents. Both the internal passport
and the passport for travelling abroad are cancelled in the event of a name change. Since the
decision on name changes is taken by the Ministry of Justice, it has to send the relevant
information electronically to the State Migration Service and the border guard service. The
passport issued on the basis of the former name is cancelled. Restrictions on citizens’ freedom
to change their name and surname have been also introduced. The request can be denied for
reasons to do with crime; if the applicant is under investigation or administrative surveillance;
if there is a request to enforce foreign law or if the applicant has submitted incorrect or false
data. In 2014 2 680 name changes were decided; in the first half of 2015 the number was
9 313.
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¾ Prompt and systematic reporting to Interpol / the LASP database on lost and
stolen passports; regular exchange of passport specimens and cooperation on
document security with the EU
Reporting to Interpol / the LASP database on lost and stolen Ukrainian passports occurs daily.
A daily update of the situation is performed and the relevant information is permanently
available to the border guard service via a direct link.
2.2. Block 2: Integrated Border Management, Migration Management, and Asylum
2.2.1. INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT
¾ Effective implementation of the Law on Border Control of November 2009
through adequate border checks and border surveillance, procedures and
operational effectiveness, situational picture at national, regional and local level,
including implementation of risk analysis, intelligence and data-flow
management as well as direct access and consultation of relevant national and
international databases
The period covered by the Integrated order Management (IBM) Strategy and its Action Plan
expires at the end of 2015. The State Border Guard Service (SBGS) has drafted a proposal for
the period after 2015. The main objectives are to increase border security in response to
current challenges and threats, to improve national integrated border management in line with
European standards, to improve systems for recruitment, training and human resources and to
ensure openness and transparency. The proposal is divided into two phases, the first up to
2017 and the second up to 2020.
On 17 September and 22 October 2015, meetings of the virtual analytical contact centre
discussed the updates to the IBM Concept. As of 6 November 2015 the SBGS was gathering
proposals from line ministries and agencies on the draft Concept and its implementing Action
plan. The strategy was intended to enter into force on 1 January 2016.
To ensure a comprehensive approach, the Ukrainian President endorsed a “Road Map on joint
operational border management with EU Member States and Moldova at the end of 2014.
The road map and accompanying Action Plan envisages shared border control, joint border
patrolling and operational exchange of data and risk analysis. In line with the road map,
Ukraine has taken some steps in the past months, including preparation of the Shared Border
Crossing Point Agreement with Slovakia and, on 4 November 2015, and signing an agreement
on automated exchange of border crossing data on persons and vehicles across the Moldova-
Ukraine border.
¾ Provision of adequate infrastructure, technical equipment, IT technologies,
financial and human resources in accordance with the IBM Strategy to be
adopted, and effective implementation of training programmes and
anticorruption measures
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Recent progress in developing technical equipment and IT systems includes updating the
Arkan system, an integrated inter-agency information/telecommunication system for checking
people, vehicles and goods crossing the state border. In 2015, parts of the operational system
Hart-10 (the SBGS’s internal IT system) will be updated. An electronic register of authentic
and forged travel documents is in trial use. This new national database is to provide
information on travel documents in addition to that from (international and national) sources
such as Interpol and Arkan.
¾ Improvement of inter-agency cooperation (including exchange of data between
the Border Guard Service and law enforcement agencies) and international
cooperation, including implementation of working arrangement with Frontex to
a high level of effectiveness
Intra-agency cooperation is changing. Firstly, the process of reducing the number of
authorities working at the border has begun. All current stakeholders will continue to
participate in IBM, but control both of people and goods crossing the border will be carried
out only by the SBGS and Customs. Secondly, the SBGS and Customs have worked together
more through the Virtual Centres. Since the beginning of August 2015, representatives of the
SBGS and Customs have provided information for passengers on border crossings and
customs procedures. The SBGS also launched a public survey to obtain feedback on the work
of SBGS staff.
Very good progress was made in checks on cross-border traffic. Border checks are carried out
extensively for every passenger and checks against national databases are carried out. The
current situation enables staff to read the open data on a chip and the closed data on Ukrainian
passports.
2.2.2. Migration management
¾ Continued effective implementation of the EU-Ukraine readmission agreement
and measures for the reintegration of Ukrainian citizens (returning voluntarily
or readmitted)
As of 25 September 2015, Ukraine had 17 bilateral agreements. The readmission agreement
with the European Union entered into force on 1 January 2008. Negotiation procedures (‘draft
readmission agreements’) are still ongoing with Kazakhstan, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The dialogue on implementing protocols (to
the readmission agreements) is continuing with 11 European Union countries (the Benelux
countries, Portugal, Cyprus, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Malta and Italy). The texts
of the Agreement and the Implementing Protocol with Switzerland and Serbia are also under
discussion.
The overall implementation of the readmission agreement is satisfactory in terms of daily
follow-up, which is reflected in high acceptance rate of readmission applications by Ukraine
(over 90 % for the 2014 (84.2 %) and 80 % for 2015 — up to 31 August 2015) and met
deadlines in accordance with Section II of the Agreement between the European Community
and Ukraine on readmission of persons (Official Journal L 332, 18/12/2007).
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Ukraine participates in the EU Pilot Initiative to Monitor Readmission in Ukraine and
Pakistan (Monitor).
¾ Effective implementation of legal framework for migration management,
including provision of administrative structures with adequate human resources
with clear and relevant competences for all aspects of migration management, as
well as effective cooperation between relevant agencies
The Law on External Labour Migration was adopted on 5 November 2015. The law was
signed by the President on 21 November. This is a very positive step, as the law will regulate
reintegration, including employment opportunities in Ukraine when Ukrainian nationals
return after working abroad. The new scheme setting out responsibilities, the competent
authorities, measures and tasks should be drafted immediately after adoption.
The State Migration Service (SMS) is the main authority within the Ministry of the Internal
Affairs responsible for migration and asylum issues in Ukraine.
Training, including language training, was given to staff working in accommodation centres,
case handlers and judges. In cooperation with the Taras Shevchenko National University of
Kiev, the State Migration Service has developed a targeted curriculum, ‘English for
professional communication in the migration processes’. The course is designed to improve
the English skills of the State Migration Service.
¾ Migration profile established and regularly updated and effective analysis of data
on migration stocks and flows
The migration profile for 2014 has been completed and published on the SMS website. On
29 April 2015, the Methodology for Irregular Migration Risk Analysis was approved. With a
view to creating a database for monitoring migration processes, the current software is being
upgraded and steps are being taken to incorporate the SMS databases. On 29 May 2015, a
Contact Analytical Centre for Monitoring Migration Processes was created. On 18 June 2015
the State Migration Service approved its Working Plan for 2015.
The centre will perform various tasks including: establishing the ‘Ukraine migration profile’,
evaluating the risks of migration issues, informing other competent State bodies about
migratory issues, etc. The reports produced will be shared with other stakeholders.
¾ Consistent implementation of an effective methodology on inland detection of
irregular migration, risk analysis (including the reporting of relevant agencies
and analysis on each administrative level e.g. local, central), and investigation of
cases of organised facilitated irregular migration, including effective cooperation
between relevant agencies
Currently, the SMS conducts operations to apprehend irregular migrants jointly with the
Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Ukrainian Security Service. The SMS has no operational
capacity to perform such tasks independently due to its civil status and lack of law
enforcement capacity to detect and apprehend irregular migrants inland. However, the SMS
cooperates with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Border Guard Service.
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The structure of the SMS has also been optimised and several units whose work involves
‘migration control’ have been allocated more staff.
¾ Provision of adequate infrastructure (including detention centres) and
strengthening of responsible bodies to ensure effective expulsion of illegally
residing and/or transiting third country nationals from Ukrainian territory
In 2015 the structure of the SMS was optimised and staffing of the units responsible for
migration control was increased. On 27 May 2015 the Government of Ukraine adopted a
resolution envisaging that from 1 January 2016 the number of SMS staff would increase by
500, including officers tasked with fighting illegal migration and inland detections.
There are two Migrant Accommodation Centres for irregular migrants located in Chernihyv
(Rozudiv), with a capacity of 208 persons, and Valin (Zhuravichy), with a capacity of 156
persons. And a building in Mykolaiv (Martynivske) has been completed, with a capacity for
about 100 persons.
2.2.3. Asylum policy
¾ Effective implementation of asylum legislation, including provision of adequate
infrastructure (including reception centres) and strengthening of responsible
bodies, in particular in the area of asylum procedures, reception of asylum
seekers and protection of their rights (including documentation of asylum seekers
and refugees in order to ensure effective access to their rights), as well as
integration of refugees
Reception of asylum seekers has been reformed: food corresponding to a certain daily amount
of required nutritional value per person, independent of cost, is provided in kind in line with
the Council of Ministers Decree on food standards provided at the temporary accommodation
centres for persons seeking international protection and for beneficiaries of international
protection of 11 March 2015 (CMU Decree, No 144). They are thus no longer linked to
financial limits. At the Odessa reception centre, applicants are said to receive three meals a
day (adjusted to the religious beliefs of the applicants), receive clothes, have access to proper
education, UNHCR, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and interpreters, and can take
part in leisure activities (sports, local activities organised at the centre such as art workshops)
or join language courses. There is also a playroom for children (that is filled with games and
toys). Special attention is said to be granted to family unity, care for persons with special
needs, separate accommodation for single men, women, etc. As regards healthcare, depending
on the medical problem, the applicant is referred to a local medical centre or to a bigger
facility if a specialist institution/intervention is needed. The centre covers primary healthcare
needs.
Registration practices were further consolidated: The ‘refugee’ subsystem of the foreigners’
database was installed. The transfer of existing data to the new subsystem. The State
Migration Service has a clear and concrete view of the IT process, and further IT progress is
expected to be completed by the end of 2015 or the beginning of 2016.
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Reception capacity has not been increased in the reporting period. Ukraine currently has a
reception capacity of 100 places available in Odessa and 130 places in the Transcarpathian
Region. The opening of a new accommodation centre in Yahotyn, Kyiv Region with around
353 additional places was postponed from this year to 2017. In 2015, UAH 17 303 million has
been allocated for this accommodation centre, of which UAH 15 089 million is allocated to
setting up the centre. The refurbishment of 100 additional places in the Odessa temporary
accommodation centre depends on unblocking the funds earmarked. A rough estimate puts the
renovation costs for the accommodation wing at around UAH 12 million. The administrative
building would also need to be renovated, costing an extra UAH 10 million.
The detention of asylum seekers in Ukraine is not currently regulated by law. In practice,
asylum seekers are detained under certain conditions. The main reason for administrative
detention of international protection applicants on Ukrainian territory appears to be to prevent
further attempts at irregular border crossing into another country.
Article 30.3 of the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners and Stateless Persons only regulates
the detention of irregular migrants. A draft law on foreigners was sent to Parliament on
21 September 2015 and adopted in first reading on 10 November 2015. It envisages the
following amendments concerning the detention of persons subject to return procedures:
• There will be a three-monthly judicial review / court review of forced return cases for
migrants in closed facilities (detention centres), to determine the effectiveness of the
(State Migration Service’s) identification and documentation activities to ensure
forced return and to take into account new information that may prevent forced return
(Ukraine ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in 1997).
• The maximum detention period for irregular migrants will be extended from 12
months (under the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners and Stateless Persons,
Article 30.4) to 18 months.
These amendments are intended to be inserted into the Administrative Code in a ‘new’ Article
183(7): ‘Peculiarities of proceedings in cases on detention of foreigners and stateless persons
who are subject to forced return’. Appeals have suspensive effect (including appeals to the
European Court of Human Rights).
Procedural safeguards have been strengthened: 100 regional and local legal aid centres, which
are publicly financed (under Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the Law on Free Legal Aid) started
work on 1 July 2015, under Order No 331/5 of 10 March 2015. Every region of Ukraine has
between three and nine centres. According to the Ukrainian authorities, a budget of some
UAH 300 million has been allocated to set up the centres, which have a roster of 5 000
lawyers available according to need. Interpreters are to be paid from the budget for the
centres, which requires amendments increasing their budget to cover this. The centres’
establishment followed amendments to the Law on Free Legal Aid covering both ‘free
primary legal aid’ (Section II of the law) and ‘free secondary legal aid’ (Section III). Article
13 defines ‘secondary legal aid’: defence against prosecution (2.1), representation in the
courts, other State agencies, etc. (2.2), and drafting procedural documents (2.3). The Ministry
of Justice is responsible for ‘free secondary legal aid’. It applies to a broad category of people,
including those covered by the 2011 Law on Refugees, including asylum seekers. The legal
aid centres already have access to the list of interpreters used by the State Migration Service.
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The legal aid centres have so far received few requests relating to asylum. Flyers and
information leaflets are being drafted. According to the ‘Ukrainian Administrative Justice
Court Code’, the deadline for appealing against first-instance decisions on asylum
applications is five days from the date of receipt of the first-instance decision. The asylum
seeker must first appeal against the decision in writing, without having to substantiate the
appeal or needing representation. They are then invited (by the appeal body) to substantiate
the appeal.
Several steps have been taken to improve implementation of asylum law. According to the
Ukrainian authorities, country of origin information is available to case handlers on the
website of the State Migration Service.
‘Information on advanced training of the State Migration Service employees in 2013-2015’
(State Migration Service, 7 October 2015) indicates the number of State Migration Service
employees that have undergone advanced training, including ‘Professional development on
foreign languages’. The information sheet ‘Information on number of employees of the State
Migration Service of Ukraine, Temporary Accommodation Centres for Refugees and
Temporary Accommodation Centres for Foreigners and Stateless Persons who illegally reside
in Ukraine who speak and study foreign languages’, State Migration Service, 7 October 2015,
indicates the number of employees mastering one or several foreign languages (including
English) and to what extent these staff members are spread across the countries.
In 2015 the National School of Judges carried out a series of specialised training courses (in
Ukraine) on ‘case adjudication’, and ‘the relationship between the 1951 Refugee Convention
and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’.
Since 2012 (‘Statistical information for 2012, 2013, 2014, 6 months of 2015 on protection
seekers in Ukraine’, State Migration Service, 7 October 2015) the rate of ‘protection’
(encompassing ‘refugee status’, ‘complementary protection’ and ‘subsidiary protection’
within the meaning of Articles 1 and 5 of the Law on Refugees and Persons in Need of
Subsidiary or Temporary Protection in Ukraine) has significantly increased. From roughly
15 % (2011: 241 people given protection as against 1 573 applications) to 70 % (2014: 806
people protected; 1 173 applications). Afghanistan and Syria are the main countries of origin.
As regards rules on the status, rights and obligations of those foreigners who cannot be
returned, but who are entitled to international protection, under Article 17.4 of the Law on
Legal Status of Foreigners and Stateless Persons, foreigners and stateless persons who have
not been forcibly returned from Ukraine before their stay in a closed (detention) facility
expires are provided with a ‘temporary residence permit’ because, for some reason, the person
could not be removed from the territory (for instance because no substitute passport or
‘laissez-passer’ could be issued). The maximum stay at a detention facility is currently 12
months (Article 30.4). The ‘temporary residence permit’ confirms the holder’s personal
identity (as declared) and permission to stay in Ukraine. The permit can be renewed and
grants a series of rights and obligations: access to healthcare, social services, to register a
marriage, etc. After three years, the permit can be made ‘permanent’ if further conditions —
governed by the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners — are met. A ‘Strategy of the State
Migration Policy for the period to 2025 (to be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers) includes
as ‘Objective 10’: ‘introduce(s) a proper mechanism and programmes for regularisation of
irregular migrants’.
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2.3. Block 3: Public Order and Security
2.3.1. Preventing and fighting organised crime, terrorism and corruption
¾ Implementation of the strategy and action plan to fight against organised crime
including effective coordination between the relevant authorities
The National Security Strategy of Ukraine (Strategy), approved on 26 May 2015 envisages a
series of measures to reform the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Ministry will be
transformed into a civilian central body of executive authority that drafts and implements state
policy on law enforcement, protection of the state border, migration and civil protection. The
strategy provides for most law enforcement functions, except combating crimes against
national security, to be transferred from the Security Service to the law enforcement
authorities. The National Defence Security Council is drafting an action plan.
The reform of internal affairs bodies is ongoing. The Law on Amendments to certain pieces of
Legislation Regarding the Reform of the Bodies of the Interior, of 12 February 2015, was
intended to optimise the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. When the GUBOZ was
dismantled, the task of fighting organised crime was transferred to the Directorate of Criminal
Search. A specialised Department was set up and specialist units were also created in regional
offices to investigate crime, including radicalised, organised crime and organised criminal
groups formed on ethnic or international lines.
On 2 July 2015, Parliament adopted the Law on the National Police, entered into force on
7 November 2015. The National Police would be subordinated to the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and would also carry out some tasks related to combating organised crime and
ensuring public order.
Under Article 5.3 of the Law on Organisational and Legal Principles of Combating Organised
Crime, the state authorities involved in combating organised crime include the following:
• the internal affairs authorities of Ukraine
• the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU);
• the prosecution authorities of Ukraine;
• the tax authorities, the authorities of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the
state financial monitoring authorities;
• the penitentiary authorities and facilities, pre-trial detention facilities;
• the intelligence authority of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine;
• the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
• the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU).
The tasks of the above authorities are primarily detection, investigation, suppression and
prevention of offences committed by participants in organised criminal groups, and bringing
of perpetrators to justice. Their remits are set out in the Law on Organisational and Legal
Principles of Combating Organised Crime, the Law on Operative and Search Activities, the
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Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Law on the Police (the Law on National Police, of
7 November 2015), the Law on the Security Service of Ukraine, the Criminal Procedure
Code, and other laws.
Jurisdiction over crimes of this type is governed by Article 216 of the Criminal Procedural
Code, based on the general criminal jurisdiction of the internal affairs authorities, the Security
Service (SSU), the Prosecutor’s Office (the State Bureau of Investigations once established),
the authorities monitoring compliance with tax legislation, and the National Anti-Corruption
Bureau. This jurisdiction in turn is derived from the areas of activity of the relevant law
enforcement authorities (combating general crime, crimes against national security, crimes in
office, tax crimes, and criminal corruption).
The authorities proposed to limit the functions of the Security Service of Ukraine in drafting
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code in line with the EU’s recommendations on
Ukraine’s implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation, with a view
to clarifying the jurisdiction of pre-trial investigation authorities. On 10 November,
Parliament adopted the law, which aims to streamline the chain of responsibilities for the
various steps of investigation. The amendments to Article 216, ‘Investigative Competence’, of
the Criminal Procedure Code provide for limiting the SSU’s remit to pre-trial investigation of
cases in the sphere of national security, defence and terrorism; and strictly delineating the
investigative remit of the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI), which was to be set up under
the Criminal Procedure Code.
On 12 November 2015, Parliament adopted the law establishing the State Bureau of
Investigation. The SBI was to be set up by 20 November 2017 and would be entitled to
conduct pre-trial investigation of the following crimes:
1. crimes committed by high-ranking officials under Article 9 of the Law on the Public
Service, certain public service officials, judges, prosecutors and officers of law
enforcement authorities, except where they fall to the NABU under Section 5 of
Article 9;
2. crimes committed by NABU officials and prosecutors in the Specialised Anti-
Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, unless investigation falls to the NABU’s Internal
Control Unit under Section 5 of Article 9;
3. crimes under Article 333 of the Criminal Code;
4. crimes against the reputation of State authorities or local government or civil
associations, against journalists and the judiciary, except for crimes under Articles 354
(in relation to employees of legal entities under public law), 359, 383, 384, 385, 389,
390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396 of the Criminal Code;
5. crimes using computers, computer systems and networks, or telecommunication
networks;
6. crimes in the sphere of official and professional public service activities, unless they
fall to the NABU under Section 5 of Article 9;
7. military crimes, except for crimes under Article 422 of the Criminal Code;
8. crimes against peace, human security and international law;
9. crimes against peace and security of humanity and international order.
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Until the SBI was operational, investigations which fell to it would be conducted by the
prosecution authorities, internal affairs bodies and the security service.
Ukrainian witness protection law provides for protective measures including surveillance,
replacement of identity documents, change of appearance, relocation, etc. Funding of the most
sensitive measures to protect judicial witnesses, such as relocation and identity change, should
be ensured.
Overall, a unitary vision for fighting organised crime is still work in progress. As the complex
reform process — shifting powers from law enforcement agencies to new institutions such as
SBI — is ongoing, implementation of the reforms in practice needs to be monitored.
¾ Implementation of the State Programme for Combating Trafficking in Human
Beings, including effective coordination between state agencies and effective
protection of victims of trafficking including children
A new State Programme to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings has been proposed for
approval by the Cabinet of Ministers and is scheduled to run from 1 January 2016 until 2020.
The programme aims to prevent trafficking in human beings, make prosecution of traffickers
more effective, protect the rights of victims and assist them.
The Interdepartmental Council in charge of supervising policy and action against trafficking
should be reinforced, taking into account need to improve coordination of anti-trafficking
activities by ensuring that the Council and the coordinating councils set up at oblast level
work well.
Among other actions, it is planned to improve the procedure for deciding the status of a victim
of trafficking (by amending the Law on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and other
regulations) by making the local state administrations and local self-government bodies
responsible for this. Further amendments should be envisaged, establishing a recovery and
reflection period for those whom the relevant anti-trafficking authorities have reasonable
grounds to believe are victims of trafficking.
The process of identifying victims is based on a formal procedure introduced as an integral
part of the national anti-trafficking mechanism. A national mechanism to allow the relevant
bodies to work together was also set up. However, identification relies on the victims
themselves applying for it. Therefore, further important measures should be taken to improve
the process of granting ‘victim of trafficking’ status.
Regarding victim identification and monitoring, attention should be paid to internal
trafficking, especially given the huge number of internally displaced persons (IDP). The vast
majority of this group face severe difficulties in normalizing their life conditions, which
makes them highly vulnerable to trafficking. Moreover, only a few foreign victims have been
formally identified.
The number of registered victims of trafficking for all forms of exploitation, including the sex
industry and labour, is considered low. Although relevant statistics are compiled by several
sources (the Ministry of Social Policy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the International
13
Organisation for Migration (IOM) mission to Ukraine), no centralised monitoring system is in
place. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ statistics, up to September 2015, 93
trafficked victims had been reported: 53 women, 37 men and 3 children. In 2015, ‘victim of
trafficking’ status has been granted to 45 people: 21 women, 22 men, and 2 children.
Various training courses have been given to professionals who come into contact with victims
and potential victims of trafficking, but frontline border officials need to be given operational
indicators and guidelines to expand their capacity for proactive identification, and to be
trained in using such tools. The indicators should be regularly updated, in line with emerging
trends in human trafficking, especially in the context of local conflict (internal trafficking,
trafficking of children). The indicators are essential to proactive identification of victims and
so should reflect the changing nature of trafficking and types of exploitation. Ukrainian
authorities should ensure that all professionals likely to come into contact with potential
victims of human trafficking are fully aware of the identification procedure and receive
regular training that enables them to adopt a proactive attitude and take action to identify
victims, particularly among vulnerable groups such as children and IDPs.
Prevention measures have been taken by central authorities, NGOs and international
organisations in the last year. Bearing in mind the vulnerability of the rural population to
trafficking, and particularly the risk of trafficking and various forms of exploitation that IDPs
face, state anti-trafficking actors need to increase their efforts to discourage demand for
services ‘offered’ by potential victims and vulnerable people, in partnership with civil society
and the private sector.
NGOs play a vital role in combating trafficking in Ukraine through awareness-raising,
training relevant professionals (e.g. police officers, social workers, medical doctors, lawyers,
and teachers) and assisting victims of trafficking. Expanding cooperation with civil society on
anti-trafficking action should be considered, including involving trade unions and the private
sector in planning and implementing national policy.
The International Women’s Rights Centre La Strada Ukraine, which has been active in the
anti-trafficking field since 1997, conducts research, carries out preventive activities, provides
assistance to victims, and prepares reports on the implementation of the national anti-
trafficking programme and issues recommendations for improving anti-trafficking policy. La
Strada Ukraine operates a toll-free telephone hotline for victims and potential victims of
trafficking.
The All-Ukrainian Coalition of NGOs for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings,
consisting of 28 NGOs from different parts of the country, carries out awareness-raising
activities for the general public and target groups such as school children, students, people in
areas in a difficult economic situation, migrant workers, etc. They also provide training on
trafficking to different professionals.
The IOM office in Ukraine has been crucial to assisting victims of trafficking. Since 2000, it
has provided direct assistance to 11 237 victims, including financial support and legal aid,
medical and psychological assistance, counselling, and vocational training. The office also
operates a Medical Rehabilitation Centre. It carries out awareness-raising activities with
Ukrainian NGOs and other international organisations, and cooperates with law enforcement
agencies on improving their capacity to investigate trafficking offences and to cooperate with
other countries and developing an effective witness protection system.
14
Despite progress in counter-trafficking activities, the concerns expressed in the fifth progress
report remain. The low number of registered victims is a concern. There is a need for the
government to increase its efforts to identify victims of trafficking.
¾ Implementation of legislation on preventing and fighting corruption, ensuring the
efficient functioning of the independent anti-corruption agency; development of
ethical codes and training on anti-corruption, especially targeting public officials
involved in law enforcement and the judiciary
The Government approved the State Anti-Corruption Strategy Programme Implementation for
2014-2017 and it was published on the website of the Ministry of Justice.
In September 2015, the President of Ukraine signed a decree approving the composition of the
National Council for Anti-Corruption Policy and appointing the head of the Council.
On 14 July 2015, Parliament adopted amendments to several laws aiming at enhancing
transparency of ownership, in particular as regards property registers, vehicles, and land plots.
Under the law, the public will gain access to information about the owners of registered
vehicles and real estate and complete information about the land plots contained in the State
Land Cadastre. The law promotes public scrutiny of officials’ tax payments and contributes to
openness and transparency in central and local government. The law came into effect on
6 October 2015.
On 8 October 2015 Parliament adopted legislation amending some laws against political
corruption, introducing direct public funding for political parties and increased transparency
of party funding from 2017. The law sets criteria for state funding, and legitimate expenditure.
It also sets ceilings on annual contributions to political parties by businesses and individuals.
Tangible results on anti-corruption reforms have yet to follow the setting up of anti-corruption
institutions, which are either in the early stages of establishment or, if established, have not
yet started to build a track record. In relation to the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, good
progress was achieved. The director was appointed on 16 April 2015. The Director of the
NABU is appointed and dismissed by the President of Ukraine according to the procedure laid
down in the NABU Law. Parliament may dismiss the director on grounds expressly provided
by the NABU Law. The NABU has entered into a number of agreements with other agencies
including the fiscal service and the Security Service (SSU). The NABU is entitled under its
statutes to access all the databases of national agencies, which are required to respond to
requests for access within three days.
Around 100 detectives have been appointed so far and training started on 7 September 2015.
This is already enough staff to start investigations.
There is another aspect of the NABU’s work that relates to the broad powers of the Security
Service of Ukraine (SSU). In the Law on National Security, corruption is listed among the
threats to state security, and so is considered a matter of national security by the SSU.
Amendments proposed to Article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code will delineate the
15
powers of the different law enforcement agencies, including the SSU, which will have its pre-
trial investigation powers reduced.
The NABU cannot be effective in its work without the specialised anti-corruption
prosecution office. The independence of this prosecution office is key, as the follow-up of
NABU’s investigative work and decisions on whether to take a case to court fall entirely
within its remit. From the outset, however, the selection process gave rise to concerns about
the risk of political influence, the lack of clear and objective criteria for the selection
committee, unclear requirements and procedures, and overreliance on the discretion of the
Prosecutor General, which appears to contradict the office’s status under the law, i.e. its
independence and operational autonomy from the Prosecutor General.
According to the existing procedures, the Prosecutor General appoints four members of the
selection committee, while Parliament appoints seven members. It was originally intended
that the four prosecutors to sit on this committee should be chosen by the Prosecutorial
Council, but that body will not exist until the reform of public prosecution is complete. The
selection committee started work on 21 September 2015; however, the appointments to it,
notably those of the Prosecutor General, were met with distrust from the public and civil
society in terms of their credibility, integrity and reputation. Currently there are no set
eligibility criteria for members of the selection committee. On 6 November 2015, two
appointments to the selection committee were withdrawn by the Prosecutor General and the
two members replaced, but concerns about the credibility of and trust in the process remained.
On 30 November, the General Prosecutor appointed the head of the specialised anti-
corruption office. After the appointment of the head of the specialised anti-corruption
prosecution, the recruitment process of the specialised anti-corruption staff must be merit-
based, competitive, transparent, integrity-based and independent.
Overall, the shortcomings in the selection process highlighted the need for ensuring the
credibility of this institution as well as the removal of political influence on the selection
process. As a matter of priority, the independence and credibility of the selection committee
should be ensured, and amendments to the legislation drafted to provide by early 2016
effective independence safeguards for the appointment and dismissal of the leadership and the
staff of the specialised anti-corruption prosecution office.
The reform of the prosecutor’s office has started. The aim is to restructure the prosecution
service in order to ensure higher standards of efficiency, results-oriented strategic approaches
and high standards of integrity, along with effective prevention and prosecution. To this end,
prosecutors will undergo a new testing process to determine their suitability, skills and
knowledge for a position. External candidates may also apply. The total number of
prosecutors under the reformed office will be considerably reduced. The figure stood at
18 500 in 2013 and has now fallen to 15 000; it will be further reduced to 10 000 by 2017.
This is partially enabled by removing the power of general supervision from the prosecutor’s
office. The reform also aims to address the considerable risks of corruption and challenges
within prosecution offices. However, despite the commendable efforts of a number of reform-
minded players, there the necessary support and drive from the leadership of the Prosecutor
General’s Office is still much needed to ensure continued implementation of the reform.
With regard to asset recovery, the Ukrainian government envisaged an agency which would
function as both an Asset Recovery Office (ARO) and Asset Management Office (AMO) and
16
ensure coordination of asset recovery work between all relevant agencies. Ukraine had
committed to establishing a national Asset Recovery Office, which would also have the
powers and capacity to manage frozen and confiscated assets, and to undertake further
improvements of the legislative framework, notably by addressing existing shortcomings
which made freezing and confiscating criminal assets cumbersome and ineffective. The
setting up of a multidisciplinary, independent agency working as both ARO and AMO is in
line with the standards developed in the EU, where many AROs have a multidisciplinary
structure. The indicators of effectiveness for AROs used in the peer reviews between the EU
Asset Recovery Offices include multidisciplinarity, involvement in asset management, links
with mutual legal assistance procedures and access to judicial statistics.
On 10 November 2015, Parliament adopted a set of laws aimed at improving the asset
recovery framework. In the form proposed by the Government the draft laws aimed to set up
an Asset Recovery Office which would also cover management of frozen and confiscated
assets, and they included substantive and procedural provisions on the freezing and
confiscation process. The drafts aimed at improving Ukraine’s track record on asset recovery
as an important component of anti-corruption policies. There are particular concerns about
amendments that seem to have limited the Agency's functions of active management of the
seized assets that would allow increasing the economic value of assets during freezing.
Adequately managing any kind of frozen property necessarily implies activities that go
beyond the mere storage of assets to impede any potential loss of value. The provisions on
asset management submitted by the Ukrainian Government were more specific on issues
pertaining to management of assets. In the newly adopted law, the purpose of the asset
management function appears to have been limited from "based on principles of efficiency,
preservation and appreciation of the value" to "controlling the preservation of the value". This
may for instance discourage in practice the seizure of assets. In order to preserve the value of
assets, specific expertise and a more active management of the assets would be required. If
these powers are not granted, it might prove very difficult for prosecutors and judges to freeze
businesses. The provision in the law may also prevent the implementation of best practices,
such as the assignment of the management of assets to its employees, which continue the
managing until confiscation without losing their job.
The amendments could also render cumbersome the freezing and confiscation of assets
transferred to third parties, which is a very common practice used by offenders, together with
amendments which removed the management of frozen/seized and confiscated assets from the
proposed Asset Recovery Office. Further, the freezing regime against third parties of the
Criminal Procedure Code falls short of providing judicial remedies and safeguards to
guarantee the preservation of fundamental rights (right to property, right to a fair trial). The
special confiscation regime against third parties should also cover the assets directly acquired
by a third party following a criminal offense for which special confiscation applies.
Several provisions fall short of the confiscation Directive (2014/42/EU) at the very least the
provisions enabling confiscation in case of illness or absconding of the suspect or accused
persons, the provisions on extended confiscation, the safeguards and the provisions on
effective confiscation and execution.
In relation to preventing corruption, the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption
(NAPC) will be in charge of designing and implementing anti-corruption programmes, and
checking on asset declarations and conflicts of interest for public officials. The Law on
Corruption Prevention defines the new agency as a central executive authority with a special
17
status under the Government. After a selection process which was re-run due to allegations of
manipulation, a new selection committee has been appointed. The five members of the
Selection Board are expected to be appointed in December 2015. The selection and
appointment process for members of the Agency and their support staff should include
safeguards of their professional independence.
As regards checks on asset declarations and conflicts of interest for holders of public office
and managers of state owned/controlled companies, no progress has been made since the last
VLAP report. These checks are the responsibility of the State Fiscal Service, but in practice
they are not being conducted. Once established, the NAPC will take over this task. It is
nevertheless imperative to ensure that assets declared before that date and potential conflicts
of interest before that date are also subject to scrutiny and followed up.
The web portal for asset declarations is being developed and will be administered by the
NAPC. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has announced a tender to
select an IT company to develop the software for e-declaration systems. In the first stage the
system will include only submission and publication of declarations; the verification module
will be added by mid-2016. The verification mechanisms must include effective safeguards of
independence and a system of deterrent sanctions should be put in place for unjustified wealth
and conflicts of interest.
A draft law amending certain legal acts in the sphere of public procurement, to align them
with international standards, and granting additional safeguards to fight corruption, was
adopted by Parliament on 15 September 2015. It is intended that full information about
contracts will be made public as soon as they are awarded. Parliament adopted laws on
prevention and counteraction of political corruption and funding of political parties on
8 October 2015.
The issue of immunity for judges, prosecutors and MPs is unchanged since the last report.
¾ Implementation of the strategy and action plan for the prevention of money
laundering and financing of terrorism, implementation of the law on the
prevention of financing of terrorism, implementation of relevant legislation on
confiscation of assets of criminals (including the provisions addressing cross-
border aspects)
As highlighted in the fifth progress report, the 2014 ‘Law on prevention and counteraction to
legalisation (money laundering) of the proceeds from crime or terrorism financing, as well as
financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’, which came into effect on
7 February 2015 brought Ukraine closer to the international standards on combating money
laundering and terrorism financing. The new law has been published with a commentary and
translated into English with the support of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE). This can be seen as an instrument to facilitate international cooperation.
The non-disclosure of ultimate beneficial ownership by banks to the National Bank was
highlighted as an area of concern in March 2015. As of October 2015, 132 out of 135
commercial banks had disclosed their ultimate beneficial ownership, in line with new
regulations. Checks on the accuracy of the information provided by 22 banks are ongoing.
The relevant information is regularly published on the official National Bank of Ukraine
website.
18
Despite the new law, increasing numbers of suspicious transaction reports are coming into the
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU); it does initially freeze large amounts, but the value of assets
then confiscated and the number of court cases ending in confiscation of the proceeds of
crime remains low.
On 2 September 2015, a new unit was created in the Department of Supervision in Criminal
Proceedings of the Prosecutor General’s Office and specialised prosecutors were appointed at
regional level. The unit is tasked with coordinating investigations in cases of money
laundering and terrorism financing.
As new technologies are evolving fast, it is important to stay up-to-date (a) to prevent new
instruments from being used/abused for money laundering, and (b) to include new
technologies in national law/regulation. All online services (not registered as banks or
financial institutions) that do not have client identification or monitor the origin of the money
must be seen as a risk. Client identification is not only needed to prevent money laundering
but to prevent corruption. The National Bank of Ukraine is making efforts to try to regulate
payment systems that are not offered by banks. It maintains a register of payments systems,
settlement systems, participants in these systems and payment infrastructure service providers
and it regulates payment systems set up by banks and non-banking institutions. It also
cooperates with law enforcement authorities to ensure that payment systems that are not in the
NBU Register comply with the legislation.
Since March 2015, the Government has introduced 35 new anti-money laundering
regulations. These cover:
• aspects of the Unified Information System for preventing and counteracting the
legalisation (laundering) of illegally derived income, financing terrorism, and
financing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Resolution of the Cabinet of
Ministers, 14.05.2015 No 299);
• the procedure for the submission of undertakings, businesses institutions and
organisations that are not the subjects of primary financial monitoring information at
the request of the State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine (Resolution of the
Cabinet of Ministers, 17.06.2015 No 411);
• the procedure for determining States (territories) that do not fulfil or improperly fulfil
recommendations of international, inter-governmental organisations operating in the
sphere of preventing and counteracting the legalisation (laundering) of illegally
derived income, financing terrorism, and financing proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers, 17.07.2015 No 510);
• regulations on the State Financial Monitoring Service (Resolution of the Cabinet of
Ministers, 29.07.2015 No 537);
• some aspects of the organisation of financial monitoring (Resolution of the Cabinet of
Ministers, 05.08.2015 No 552);
19
• regulations on the organisation and coordination of retraining and professional
development of specialists in financial monitoring (Resolution of the Cabinet of
Ministers, 19.08.2015 No 610);
• the procedure for granting state agencies, state registrars permission to request initial
financial monitoring of entity customer information (Resolution of the Cabinet of
Ministers, 08.09.2015 No 693);
• the issue of organisation national risk assessment legalisation (laundering) of proceeds
from crime and terrorist financing (Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers, 16.09.2015
No 717);
• the procedure for granting state agencies and local governments, state registrar
information on financial transactions and their participants to the State Financial
Monitoring Service (Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers, 16.09.2015 No 708).
The FIU received more than 1 million transaction reports in 2014. Transactions of
UAH 150 000 or more must be reported to the FIU in accordance with the 2014 anti-money
laundering law. The figures and trend are unchanged in 2015. Banks (and financial
institutions in a broader sense) are the largest group reporting to the FIU. It remains a
challenge to motivate other reporting entities to report any suspicion of money laundering.
¾ Implementation of the national anti-drug strategy and action plan, ensuring
adequate working of the Inter-Agency Coordination Council on Combating Drug
Abuse, making the information on drug seizures and persons involved accessible
at border crossing points, and further developing cooperation and information
exchange with relevant international bodies in the drug field; establishing
cooperation with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
The Cabinet of Ministers approved Action Plan for 2015 for the implementation Strategy of
Drug Policy to 2020 on 25 March 2015. Work has begun on a draft action plan for the next
period. The line ministries considered consolidating provisions regulating drugs issues in a
single legal instrument, for instance a Drugs Code, and believe that Ukraine’s legislation on
drugs is harmonised and provides a coherent state policy. In particular, state policy is shaped
by:
• the Law on Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors;
• the Law on Measures to Counteract Illicit Circulation of Drugs, Psychotropic
Substances and Precursors, and their Abuse
• Article 44 of the Code on Administrative Misdemeanours
• Articles 305-321 of the Criminal Code;
• the strategy on state drug policy for the period to 2020.
The Ministry of Health cooperates with other drug policy institutions which implement state
policy on drugs control by means of regular exchanges of information on drug situation in the
country, improvements in data collection methods concerning the emergence of new
psychoactive substances, and preparation of joint reports on narcotic drugs, psychotropic
20
substances and precursors, on counteracting illicit trafficking, and on trends and developments
in this field for international institutions.
In the first seven months of 2015, police reported 16 500 criminal offences in the narcotics
sphere. Further efforts should be made to tackle the low level of seizures.
Since 2011, annual reports have been submitted by the Monitoring and Medical Centre on
Drugs and Alcohol (UMMCDA) to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drugs
Addictions.
2.3.2. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters
¾ Implementation of international conventions concerning judicial cooperation in
criminal matters (in particular Council of Europe Conventions);
¾ High level of effectiveness of judicial cooperation in criminal matters of judges
and prosecutors with the EU Member States.
The cooperation agreement between Ukraine and Eurojust is awaiting signature pending the
outcome of the consultation of the European Parliament expected in late December 2015.
The judicial cooperation in criminal matters benchmark was already deemed to have
been achieved in the fifth progress report.
2.4.3. LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION
¾ High level of operational and special investigative capacity of law enforcement
services and its consistent and efficient use to tackle cross-border crime
The national security strategy, approved on 26 May 2015 by the President, envisages the
transfer of most law enforcement functions, except fighting crimes against national security,
from the Security Service of Ukraine to other law enforcement agencies.
As of 7 November 2015 the Ministry of the Internal Affairs was to focus on policymaking on
internal affairs and directing the activities of other agencies (the National Police, the National
Guard, the State Border Guard Service, the State Migration Service and State Emergency
Service). The latter become functionally independent executive bodies.
The Law on the National Police entered into force on 7 November 2015. Accordingly, the
police, among others, will work on combating crime, particularly organised crime, and
ensuring public safety. The law envisages the optimisation of the National Police, a clear
separation of structural units’ powers, elimination of duplicate functions, and new
departments: patrol police and special purpose police (CORD — the operational and
immediate action corps). The new approach to recruitment and career development, which
envisages open competition for applicants, a contract and promotions based on the individual
achievements of each employee, will make it possible to form professionals and match the
best practice of EU countries. The Law establishes a clear framework for the use of force by
police and provides a list of special means and the reasons for their application, which meets
international standards of policing. The police may use force only on the grounds provided by
this law.
21
In view of the current reform, which envisages the transfer of powers between law
enforcement institutions and new ones being established, the effectiveness of law enforcement
services still needs to be further pursued.
¾ High cooperation among relevant national agencies — especially border guards,
police, customs officers, as well as cooperation with the judicial authorities
Inter-agency cooperation continues to be considered satisfactory but is still subject to
important improvements, which would contribute to the effectiveness of investigations.
The main forms of interaction between law enforcement agencies are working meetings;
information exchange and joint (coordinated) actions. Cooperation between investigative
units is governed by the Criminal Procedure Code. Article 38 (pre-trial investigation) of the
Code provides for pre-trial investigation by investigation group. As the prosecution exercises
procedure management of a pre-trial investigation in criminal proceedings, including
corruption cases, it is possible to create joint investigative teams with its agreement. The
SBGS now has access to the Interpol database at border crossing points and this is welcome
progress which will contribute to tackling cross-border crime.
¾ Strengthened regional law enforcement cooperation and bilateral and
multilateral operational cooperation agreements, including by sharing on time
relevant information with competent law enforcement authorities of EU Member
States.
Ukrainian law enforcement bodies engage in international cooperation through Interpol and
Europol channels for the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences.
The exchange of information is also carried out through Interpol channels. A Department of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs acts as the Ukrainian bureau of Interpol. In addition, there are
units of Interpol in all major departments, and there are departments of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs in Kiev and the regions. Information is exchanged via a system of query-
response. From January to August 2015, 33 609 queries were processed, comprising 14 868
requests from the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine and 18 741 from the law enforcement
agencies of foreign countries.
Information is also exchanged through the national contact point for emergency assistance in
the investigation of cybercrimes, which is based in the Ministry of Internal Affairs’
Department for Combating Cybercrime. Since the beginning of 2015, 62 requests from law
enforcement agencies of other countries had been received. Of these, 17 had been worked out,
aiming to obtain information on fighting cybercrime and helping other Ministry of Internal
Affairs departments to obtain relevant information. 47 requests had been sent, 38 responses
had been received.
The procedure for the conclusion of the Europol operational agreement is very advanced. On
4 June 2015 Parliament adopted a law ratifying a Memorandum of Understanding between
Ukraine and Europol on establishing a secure communication channel; the law came into
22
force on 13 July 2015. Currently the Ukrainian Bureau of Interpol is conducting negotiations
with Europol to start work on setting up the SIENA secure communication channel.
2.3.4. Data protection
¾ Implementation of the law on the protection of personal data and ensuring
efficient functioning of the independent data supervisory authority also through
the allocation of the necessary financial and human resources
Giving responsibility for oversight of the data protection law to the Ombudsman meets the
necessary requirement that there should be an independent supervisory authority. One
potential concern about placing this responsibility within an organisation that has a number of
other functions is that the structural arrangements might dilute the focus on data protection.
However, that does not seem to be the case. The Data Protection Department that has been
established in the Ombudsman’s Office has no duties other than data protection, and it
pursues those with vigour, commitment and a good understanding of a complex topic.
The budget of the Ombudsman’s Secretariat was increased by UAH 7 million (25 %),
allocated to three areas: the Data Protection Department, the Non-Discrimination Unit and the
Unit for Access to Public Information.
Further to the budget increase, the staff of the Data Protection Department was increased to
23. In October 2015, the Department recruited a new staff member and launched a
competition in order to fill the remaining vacant posts. In addition to the staff working full-
time on data protection, the Department is able to draw on support from other parts of the
Ombudsman’s Office. For example, the Department employs no IT specialist. However, when
technical expertise is needed, for example when on-site inspections of data controllers are
carried out, the Department is assisted by the Ombudsman’s IT specialists.
2.4 Block 4: External Relations and Fundamental Rights
2.4.1 Freedom of movement within Ukraine
• Ensuring that freedom of movement within Ukraine of Ukrainian citizens and
legally staying foreigners or stateless persons is not subject to unjustified
restrictions, including measures of a discriminatory nature, based on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language,
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation
• Providing accessible information on registration requirements to foreigners
wishing to reside in Ukraine, and ensure equal and transparent implementation
of respective legislation
23
The Ministry of Health of Ukraine issued an order (No 329) on 11 June 2015, excluding
HIV/AIDS infection from the list of contagious diseases (order No 415 of 19.10.2001), which
had served as the basis for refusing immigration permits.
Ukrainian authorities have progressively improved the application of the legal framework for
the access to and from the territories not under government control (TNGC) and have
introduced measures simplifying the crossing of the contact line. After consulting interest
groups, two new sets of orders were issued in June and September to this effect (Cabinet of
Ministers Resolution No 367 of 4 June 2015 as amended by Resolution No 722 of 16
September 2015; State Security Service Antiterrorist Centre Order No 415 of 12 June as
amended by decree No 810 of 15 September 2015).
Concerning the TNGC in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, a web-portal for
applying for and receiving permits online, launched by the Government of Ukraine on 7 July,
significantly simplifies the procedure for civilians and reduces the potential for abuse and
corruption at the check points. In parallel, there is an alternative procedure for people without
internet access. The closed list of grounds for entering/leaving the TNGC was expanded to
cover grounds such as work, studies and healthcare. Detailed rules for refusing to issue a
permit were introduced. On the ground, all security guards must have their license on them. If
a checkpoint is closed in one sector, another one can be used. Following the tragic incident in
Volnovakha, public transport was forbidden. In the period from July to September 2015,
362 100 online requests were processed, out of which 9 000 were rejected, mainly due to the
incorrect filling of the form according to the Ukrainian authorities. NGOs reported some
incidents, including corruption and difficulties in crossing the check points. Queues at
checkpoints were reported to be long. For the access to Crimea/Sevastopol, the grounds for
entry were expanded; crossing by children was regulated well in detail. Work is under way on
simplifying the acquisition of birth and death certificates. The Ukrainian authorities should
continue to monitor the situation in close cooperation with civil society and the
Ombudsperson and to address the needs on the ground while respecting fundamental rights.
2.4.3 Citizens’ rights, including protection of minorities
• Effective implementation of legislation and policies on anti-discrimination,
implementation of relevant UN and Council of Europe instruments.
Ukraine demonstrated a strategic approach to developing the administrative capacity of the
equality institution (the Ombudsperson's Office), the key institution dealing with the
prevention of and the fight against discrimination. The number of staff has been increased
since the 5th progress report by more than 100%; another 9 posts were created, bringing the
total to 15 positions in three units. Training courses were held for the newly recruited officers.
In addition, the institution put in place a network of experts at the regional level which allows
better coverage of the country. The budget of the equality institution was altogether increased
by UAH 7 million (25%) and the outlook for the 2016 budget is good, according to the
equality institution.
With the amended Law on non-discrimination having entered into force in 2014, the available
data on anti-discrimination case law shows that there are complaints and legal proceedings. .
However, the implementation and enforcement of the legal framework shows that further
24
improvement of the legislation would be needed to address in particular the protection of the
victimisation; effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions and derogations (occupational
requirement) in line with international standards. The Ministry of Justice included these needs
in the draft action plan on the implementation of the national human rights strategy.
Amendments to redress these gaps were drafted.
As mentioned in the fifth progress report, the Ukrainian government committed in 2014 to
explicitly prohibiting in its upcoming reform of the Labour Code discrimination on grounds of
sexual orientation. On 12 November, Rada adopted draft law No 3442 of 10.11.2015, which
amended the current Labour Code to explicitly prohibit the discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. The legislation was signed by the President on 21 November and entered into
force on 27 November. A draft new Labour Code was adopted in the first reading, it did not yet
include such explicit prohibition. The timing of the second reading is not known. From
January to August 2015, the NGO Nash Mir Centre documented 34 cases of incidents and
crimes motivated by homophobia. The number of acts against LGBT people increased.
Ukraine continued to implement at a reasonable level the legal framework on the protection of
persons belonging to national minorities. Consultations of national minorities were held in
decisions at central and local level on issues that might affect their rights. In this context,
attention should be paid to national minorities' concerns about the possible impact of the
process of decentralisation on their rights. Data on national minorities were collected. Given
budgetary constraints, reasonable resources for implementation of the rights of national
minorities were allocated. At the moment of writing of this report, the draft action plan on the
implementation of the national human rights strategy encompassed measures concerning the
protection of rights of national minorities. This included additional classes of Ukrainian
language for pupils studying in national minority languages, which would help them pass the
baccalaureate exam. A dialogue should be maintained between the Ukrainian authorities and
representatives of persons belonging to national minorities in order to address their concerns.
• Effective implementation of the Action Plan on fight against discrimination;
general awareness raising campaigns against racism, xenophobia, anti-semitism
and other forms of discrimination; strengthening the responsible bodies for
antidiscrimination policy and combating racism, xenophobia and anti-semitism.
The equality institution continued to be dynamic in performing its anti-discrimination duties,
in close cooperation with civil society and international organisations, and to implement the
strategy on preventing and combating discrimination in Ukraine 2014-2017 and the relevant
action plan: Between 1 January and 8 September 2015, the institution considered 314
complaints on discrimination on the basis of different grounds including the ethnic origin,
religion, disability and sexual orientation. Furthermore, the body initiated 39 proceedings with
respect to hate crime, hate speech and discrimination. Lawyers, judges, Roma youth and
Roma rights activists, representatives of ethnic minorities, public servants and law
enforcement officials received training on anti-discrimination provided by the equality
institution. Since it is expected that the anti-discrimination agenda will gradually continue to
develop, the allocation of financial and human resources should progressively continue to
ensure the compliance of the equality institution with its legal duties.
The equality institution is actively raising awareness against discrimination. It launched a
campaign 'Discrimination restricts, Counterac' through different media (website, social
25
networks, video clips). In addition, it issued publications on different, relevant topics targeting
different groups, e.g. a handbook for trainers 'How to teach non-discrimination'; 'Gaps in
preventing, documenting, investigating and prosecuting hate crimes in Ukraine'; 'State Policy
toward Roma: report on the state of implementation'; 'Human Rights of Roma'. The institution
also issued a recommendation for lawyers on how to develop effective arguments in
discrimination cases and a recommendation on investigation of hate crimes.
Relevant ministries launched campaigns and activities to inform citizens and officials about
anti-discrimination: e.g. a campaign on empowering women in local elections and a special
training for representatives of the executive and legislative branch on the needs of IDPs, both
by the Ministry for Social Policy (MSP). A special section 'Combating discrimination' on the
MSP official website covers relevant national and international legislation. Due to budgetary
constraints, most awareness-raising campaigns continued to be financed by international
donors through projects developed by NGOs, in some cases in cooperation with public
authorities.
The President adopted the national human rights strategy on 25 August 2015 by decree (No
501/2015). Preventing and combating discrimination is one of the strategy's guiding
principles. Prevention of and the fight against discrimination is also dealt with as one of the
strategic areas for public action. The document sets strategic goals for an efficient system of
preventing and combating discrimination and the expected outcomes, including awareness-
raising programmes, positive actions at national and local level and efficient investigation of
discrimination. Furthermore, it has special chapters on issues such as ensuring the rights of
national minorities and indigenous people, protecting the rights of internally displaced
persons and preventing and combating discrimination between women and men.
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and protection of the Roma population are
not addressed.
In line with the presidential decree, the Cabinet of Ministers, in close cooperation with civil
society and international organisations, elaborated the 2020 action plan to implement the
national human rights strategy of Ukraine and adopted it on 23 November. At the moment of
writing of this report, it was not made public. The latest available draft version of the Action
Plan covered among others actions related to the Roma community and LGBT people.. The
presidential decree tasked to allocate funds for financing the implementation of the action
plan and to present a report on its implementation by 1 November each year.
• Provision of specific training to law enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges
potentially involved in the prosecution of hate crimes.
Significant progress was made on ensuring a more systematic and permanent approach to
training on anti-discrimination. The National School of Judges in Ukraine, the National
Academy of Prosecutors and the Policy Academy amended their training curricula to this end.
The tests for candidate judges, current judges as well as those aspiring to obtain management
positions, and the tests for prosecutors include topics on the prevention and sanctioning of
discrimination. Experts from NGOs trained the new patrol police on anti-discrimination
issues, human rights and the rights of national minorities.
26
ASSESSMENT OF MIGRATORY AND SECURITY IMPACTS
UKRAINE
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
Under the visa liberalisation action plan (VLAP) methodology, the Commission committed
itself to assessing the potential migratory and security impacts of future visa liberalisation for
Ukrainian citizens travelling to the Schengen area.3
This had to be done before Ukraine moves
to the second phase of the VLAP.
In the Commission's fourth report on Ukraine's implementation of the action plan (adopted in
May 2014,4
concluding that Ukraine had met the first phase benchmarks), it took the view that
the exceptional emergency situation in eastern Ukraine meant that issuing an assessment at
that time would be of limited value.
Once Ukraine started the second phase of its VLAP, the Commission provided an assessment
of the possible consequences of Ukrainian nationals travelling to the Schengen area without
visa restrictions. It published the results in the Commission staff working document
accompanying the fifth progress report on Ukraine's implementation of the action plan,
adopted in May 2015.5
1.2. Methodology
This document updates the most recent assessment published in May 2015. This assessment is
based on information provided by EU Agencies and the EU Border Assistance Mission to the
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). This document also draws on a combination of
official Ukrainian and international organisation sources, and Eurostat data. Given the current
crisis in and around Ukraine, it has been difficult to obtain reliable data for the territories not
under effective control of the Government.
This update on the assessment of impact aims to identify new possible phenomena and
emerging trends in the areas of migration, mobility and security in relation to Ukraine and the
possible impact of a visa-free regime for the EU and the Schengen area.
This assessment reflects the state of play as of October 2015 and therefore provides only a
snapshot of the situation. This assessment does not constitute a benchmark of the VLAP.
Nevertheless, this assessment also list below some measures the Ukrainian authorities have
taken while implementing the visa liberalisation action plan to address the prospective
migration and security issues identified by the assessment of impacts. In the conclusion of
this document we also provide some possible measures that EU Member States could take to
reduce migration and security risks.
3
The visa waiver would apply to the Schengen area including: EU Schengen States, EU Member States who do
not yet fully apply the Schengen acquis and non-EU Schengen States.
4
COM (2014) 336.
5
SWD (2015) 104.
27
2. ASSESSMENT OF MIGRATORY IMPACTS
2.1. Regular and irregular migration: trends and possible consequences of a visa-free
travel
2.1.1. General overview
According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 70 % of labour migrants
from Ukraine are male and aged between 20 and 49. Men work mainly in manual labour (such
as construction and agriculture), while women tend to be domestic or seasonal agricultural
workers. The conflict in eastern Ukraine, the sharp devaluation of the Ukrainian currency,
growing inflation and falls in workers' real wages are inevitably causing Ukrainians' living
conditions to deteriorate. As the situation on the Ukrainian job market remains difficult,
working abroad remains an attractive option for many would-be migrants. Furthermore, with
16 % of the population aged under 15 in 2013,6
Ukraine will have to provide inclusive
economic opportunities in the near future to avoid large emigration flows. Available figures
on unemployment in Ukraine indicate very low annual rates ranging between 6 % and 9 %
since 2004. However, figures on monthly gross wages indicate a very low level of earnings.
The differences between wages in Ukraine and many of its neighbouring countries in the EU
are therefore the most likely reason for Ukrainians to leave their home country and seek work
abroad.
Ukrainian labour migrants can be found all over the world. The Russian Federation remains
one of the main destination countries for Ukrainian labour migrants with an estimated number
of 3.6 million Ukrainians, although for economic reasons it is currently losing its appeal.
Other labour migrants opt for EU Member States and, to a lesser extent, Canada, the USA,
Turkey, Israel and Belarus.
Ukraine is located in the immediate neighbourhood of EU countries, and has a land border
with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, making travel to the EU relatively
straightforward and affordable. Travel flows and cultural, political, linguistic and economic
links with the EU result in large migratory movements between Ukraine and neighbouring EU
Member States. Other Member States such as Italy and Germany are also attractive
destinations for Ukrainians labour migrants. A number of airlines provide direct flight
connections from Kiev to various destinations across Europe.
According to Frontex (the European agency for the management of operational cooperation at
the external borders of the European Union), Ukrainian's migration preferences depend on
which part of the country they come from: western Ukraine prefer Poland and other EU
Member States, while people from central and eastern Ukraine prefer the Russian Federation
for cultural and linguistic reasons. The Zakarpatia region in the far west of Ukraine has the
highest proportion of labour migrants. People from this region prefer to migrate to Czech
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia due to language similarities.
6
IOM – www.iom.int - Ukraine country profile.
28
2.1.2. Regular migration facts
The data available for 2014 confirm that Ukrainians are spread across Europe and not
clustered in the EU States neighbouring Ukraine.
Eurostat data suggest that in 2013 there were over 850 000 Ukrainian nationals legally
residing in the EU. Of these, 750 000 were in the five EU countries that host the largest
Ukrainian diaspora populations, namely Italy, Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic and
Spain.
In 2014, Ukrainian nationals were mainly registered in Italy (236 346), Poland (210 402),
Germany (111 650), the Czech Republic (110 712), Spain (82 726) and Portugal (37 849).
The data also show a substantial increase between 2011 and 2014 in the number of valid
residence permits held by Ukrainian citizens in the EU Member States and Schengen area as a
whole, corresponding to a growing interest among Ukrainians for the EU. Poland recorded the
largest increase in valid residence permits held by Ukrainians.
Table 1: All valid residence permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship
(Ukrainians), 2011-2014
EU Member States and Schengen area 2011 2012 2013 2014
European Union (28 countries) 756 289 782 712 849 946 NA
Belgium 3 613 3 745 3 850 3 853
Bulgaria 773 900 1 072 2 623
Czech Republic 119 083 103 165 107 254 110 712
Denmark 6 259 6 573 7 045 7 909
Germany 112 016 111 747 109 781 111 650
Estonia 5 909 6 025 5 994 6 649
Ireland 3 076 2 609 1 959 1 624
Greece 20 182 18 477 18 487 NA
Spain 76 180 78 214 80 866 82 726
France 7 478 8 009 8 524 9 294
Croatia NA NA 247 262
Italy 223 790 224 681 233 604 236 346
Cyprus 5 080 NA 2 775 2 842
Latvia 3 380 3 641 3 931 4 747
Lithuania 2 801 3 239 3 714 5 277
Luxembourg 387 499 513 562
Hungary 19 221 13 802 13 149 NA
Malta 215 235 395 570
Netherlands 2 898 2 796 2 651 NA
Austria 5 338 5 930 6 453 NA
Poland 76 162 122 274 175 656 210 402
Portugal 48 022 44 079 41 090 37 849
Romania 1 409 1 317 1 401 1 574
Slovenia 1 460 1 501 1 565 1 728
Slovakia 5 515 6 193 6 361 7 450
29
Finland 2 454 2 678 1 782 3 157
Sweden 2 946 3 267 3 531 3 465
United Kingdom NA 6 311 6 296 6 569
Iceland 154 162 163 NA
Liechtenstein NA NA 48 46
Norway 1,706 1 803 1 845 1 821
Switzerland NA 5 828 6 147 6 319
Source: Eurostat data. Last updated 09.10.15, extracted on 13.1.2015
The main pull factors for Ukrainians going to Poland, Italy, Germany, Sweden and Czech
Republic are better working conditions compared with Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
At the same time, factors attracting Ukrainian migrants to Italy, Spain or Portugal include
higher wages, frequent regularisation programmes and the presence of a large diaspora.
As the data in Table 2 suggest, the number of Ukrainian citizens receiving valid residence
permits in the EU increased from 166 950 in 2010 to more than 300 000 in 2014. Demand for
residence permits in all other EU Member States apart from Poland was roughly stable in
2014: there was a decrease in the Czech Republic, Italy and UK; in contrast with growing
interest in Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. The overall
increase in the numbers of residence permit is overwhelmingly due to a sharp rise in the
number of first permits issued in Poland. Indeed, Poland issued the highest number of
residence permits in 2014 at 247 397, accounting for almost 82 % of the permits.
Table 2: First residence permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship (Ukraine),
2009-2014
EU Member States and
Schengen area 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
European Union (28
countries) 87 740 166 950 125 754 160 222 236 472 302 772
Belgium 647 760 681 599 518 518
Bulgaria 250 249 297 398 476 598
Czech Republic 7 945 13 679 5 521 18 152 18 622 12 867
Denmark 3 174 2 604 2 287 2 181 2 341 2 603
Germany 3 294 3 288 3 179 4 548 4 838 6 163
Estonia 595 252 645 403 440 853
Ireland 378 211 211 208 252 265
Greece 798 964 821 742 885 836
Spain 5 112 3 857 4 413 3 687 3 637 3 595
France 1 008 1 067 1 152 1 241 1 429 1 577
Croatia NA NA NA NA 67 98
Italy 39 640 48 249 15 409 8 493 13 996 8 761
Cyprus 983 897 752 611 576 779
Latvia 378 267 466 733 678 1 316
Lithuania 366 222 409 773 873 2 053
Luxembourg 81 43 60 60 59 89
Hungary 2 829 2 681 2 104 1 119 930 1 164
Malta 63 55 58 78 126 306
30
Netherlands 505 508 603 632 879 938
Austria 700 832 903 1 053 903 936
Poland 8 447 76 485 75 168 104 730 171 769 247 397
Portugal 2 409 2 064 1 789 1 517 1 126 1 038
Romania 294 257 214 309 254 339
Slovenia 221 209 262 181 175 258
Slovakia 1 356 969 686 782 1 040 1 592
Finland 600 658 813 866 938 1 119
Sweden 1 908 1 348 1 459 1 412 1 192 1 322
United Kingdom 3 759 4 275 5 392 4 714 7 453 3 392
Iceland 24 20 31 29 32 NA
Liechtenstein NA NA NA NA 19 14
Norway 822 687 873 778 787 840
Switzerland NA NA NA 1 133 1 499 743
Source: Eurostat data. Last updated 12.10.15, extracted on 13.10.2015
The Polish-Ukrainian land border and local border traffic agreements
Regular passenger flows at EU's eastern land border with Ukraine tend to be fairly large,
despite the current visa obligation. Poland has a specific role due to its geographical position
and registers many Ukrainians going to Poland for shopping on daytrips. According to
Frontex, there were over 4.7 million border crossings recorded in the first half of 2015 at the
border between Poland and Ukraine (on entry to Poland). The Polish-Ukrainian border section
remained by far the busiest section of the EU eastern land border, with an increase of 15.5 %
during January-June 2015 compared with the first half of 2014. Most Ukrainians crossing the
border do so in order to shop in Poland and stayed there for up to a a day. The main flows of
travellers come from towns located up to 30 km from the border.
Ukraine has concluded separate local border traffic agreements (LBTAs) with Poland,
Slovakia and Hungary that lay down simplified border crossing procedures for residents in the
border area. LBTAs are primarily intended to increase cross-border trade, social and cultural
exchanges and regional cooperation.
Visa applications
On short-stay visas, the Commission has data from the Member States on issuing and refusal
rates. Table 3 below shows a 12 % decrease in visa applications by Ukrainian citizens in 2014
compared with 2013. 1.35 million C visas were issued to Ukrainian citizens in 2014
(compared with roughly 1.54 million in 2013).
In 2014 the countries that received the most visa applications from Ukrainian citizens were
Poland (566 976), Greece (145 621), Hungary (118 740), Germany (101 867) and Spain (76
983).
The proportion of multiple entry visas (MEVs) issued to Ukrainian nationals during 2014
increased to 52.4 % (compared with 39 % in 2013). This is likely a direct result of the
implementation of the provisions introduced by the upgraded visa facilitation agreement with
Ukraine since 1 July 2013, which limited the discretion of Member State consuls when
issuing MEVs for the categories of Ukrainian visa applicants covered by the facilitations. Half
31
of all MEVs issued to Ukrainian nationals in 2014 (708 826) were delivered by Poland (368
515) followed by Hungary (65 665), Greece (52 189), Germany (39 338), Slovakia (35 251)
and Lithuania (30 746).
The average visa refusal rate for short-stay visa applications submitted by Ukrainian nationals
in 2013 was 1.70 %, while in 2014 the average refusal rate was 2 %.
The consular authorities of Member States have differing perceptions of irregular migration
risks when it comes to issuing short-stay visas to Ukrainians. Refusal rates differ among
Member States, ranging in 2014 from 4.6 % for Sweden to just 0.6 % for Lithuania.
These differing perceptions of the irregular migration risks are likely to remain even after
possible visa liberalisation and will be driven by similar considerations i.e. risk of overstay or
abuse of visa-free travel to engage in illegal work.
Table 3: Applications for short-stay and multiple entry Schengen visas in Ukraine, 2013-
2014 (countries with consular presence in Ukraine)
Schengen
State
C visas
applied
for 2013
C visas
issued
2013
MEVs
issued
2013
MEVs
issuing
rate
2013
C visas
not
issued
2013
C visa
refusal
rate
2013
C visas
applied
for 2014
C visas
issued
2014
MEVs
issued
2014
MEVs
issuing
rate
2014
C visas
not
issued
2014
C visa
refusal
rate
2014
C visas
applied
for
change
13-14
C visas
issued
change
13-14
Austria 30,633 30,405 8,273 27.2% 224 0.7% 22,510 22,334 8,552 38.3% 173 0.8% -26.5% -26.5%
Belgium 9,098 8,435 2,814 33.4% 487 5.4% 8,416 7,521 3,281 43.6% 803 9.5% -7.5% -10.8%
Czech
Republic
79,343 78,197 14,096 18.0% 1,092 1.4% 59,607 58,382 17,468 29.9% 1,191 2.0% -24.9% -25.3%
Denmark 6,957 6,357 2,251 35.4% 117 1.7% 7,734 7,435 3,516 47.3% 136 1.8% 11.2% 17.0%
Estonia 17,576 15,925 9,146 57.4% 530 3.0% 14,993 14,441 9,558 66.2% 357 2.4% -14.7% -9.3%
Finland 16,803 16,470 2,707 16.4% 229 1.4% 13,772 13,126 2,698 20.6% 626 4.5% -18.0% -20.3%
France 49,360 48,965 7,264 14.8% 387 0.8% 35,865 35,520 7,285 20.5% 327 0.9% -27.3% -27.5%
Germany 112,209 104,800 35,605 34.0% 7,390 6.6% 101,867 96,807 39,338 40.6% 5,005 4.9% -9.2% -7.6%
Greece 203,098 201,858 23,109 11.4% 1,214 0.6% 145,621 143,789 52,189 36.3% 1,832 1.3% -28.3% -28.8%
Hungary 152,073 150,697 58,930 39.1% 1,376 0.9% 118,740 117,177 62,665 53.5% 1,522 1.3% -21.9% -22.2%
Italy 63,609 57,344 10,353 18.1% 859 1.4% 53,626 48,939 14,805 30.3% 832 1.6% -15.7% -14.7%
Lithuania 30,495 29,546 18,568 62.8% 350 1.1% 38,993 37,349 30,746 82.3% 236 0.6% 27.9% 26.4%
Netherlands 27,063 26,141 12,868 49.2% 831 3.1% 22,303 21,127 14,395 68.1% 955 4.3% -17.6% -19.2%
Norway 7,179 7,003 1,666 23.8% 176 2.5% 6,221 5,991 2,441 40.7% 218 3.5% -13.3% -14.5%
Poland 538,181 517,725 298,124 57.6% 9,904 1.8% 566,976 556,503 368,515 66.2% 10,219 1.8% 5.4% 7.5%
Portugal 6,528 6,493 1,554 23.9% 35 0.5% 6,008 5,938 2,554 43.0% 70 1.2% -8.0% -8.5%
Slovakia 88,144 82,275 64,171 78.0% 711 0.8% 49,466 48,840 35,251 72.2% 739 1.5% -43.9% -40.6%
Slovenia 8,707 8,471 7,803 92.1% 213 2.4% 5,956 5,860 5,521 94.2% 96 1.6% -31.6% -30.8%
Spain 105,956 104,692 4,447 4.2% 535 0.5% 76,983 75,734 13,179 17.4% 1,024 1.3% -27.3% -27.7%
Sweden 9,133 8,736 4,513 51.7% 223 2.4% 9,325 8,142 4,698 57.7% 426 4.6% 2.1% -6.8%
Switzerland 13,083 12,861 5,873 45.7% 213 1.6% 10,231 9,763 4,797 49.1% 467 4.6% -21.8% -24.1%
Total 1,587,223 1,534,972 598,364 39.0% 27,165 1.7% 1,387,086 1,351,757 708,826 52.4% 27,273 2.0% -12.6% -11.9%
Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs.
October 2015
According to experts at the EU institutions and border agencies of the neighbouring countries,
at present, the migration situation at the EU's common border with Ukraine is considered
stable and under control.
It is not possible to measure the extent to which the visa requirements have deterred
Ukrainians from travelling to the EU. However, it is reasonable to assume that lifting visa
requirements for Ukrainians would increase the likelihood of them leaving their home country
to travel to the EU. However the decision of Ukrainians whether or not to travel to the EU
will also depend to a large extent on their financial means.
32
Abolishing the visa requirement would also be expected to result in increased circularity in
migratory flows between Ukraine and the Schengen area. This in turn would strengthen
people-to-people contacts.
2.1.3. Irregular migration trends
Refusals of entry at the border
In 2014, Ukrainian nationals ranked second (after Morocco and followed by Albanians) in
being refused entry at the EU's external borders.
The number of Ukrainians refused entry decreased from 2012 to 2014 (see the Eurostat
indicators in Table 4). 16 150 refusals of entry were issued to Ukrainians in 2014, a decrease
of roughly 1 000 cases compared with 2013. However, provisional data from Frontex
indicates that in 2015 the number of refusals of entry issued to Ukrainians has increased and
was mostly concentrated on the land border with Poland.
Already in 2014, most of refusals (almost 70 %) occurred at the Polish land border. Hungary
and Romania issued the second and third largest number of refusals of entry to Ukrainians
nationals (2 040 and 855 refusals respectively).
Table 4: Ukrainian citizens refused entry at the EU's external borders 2011-2014
EU Member States and Schengen area 2011 2012 2013 2014
European Union (28 countries) 16 440 18 655 17 095 16 150
Belgium 15 25 25 25
Bulgaria 65 185 130 50
Czech Republic 15 10 10 10
Denmark 0 5 0 10
Germany 120 135 150 165
Estonia 30 35 30 45
Ireland 50 30 30 75
Greece 35 60 55 60
Spain 20 30 15 10
France 40 40 35 45
Croatia NA NA 220 185
Italy 75 60 125 150
Cyprus 25 15 20 50
Latvia 45 70 65 50
Lithuania 60 55 60 70
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0
Hungary 4 560 2 985 2 190 2 040
Malta 5 0 0 0
Netherlands 70 55 50 45
Austria 15 0 5 5
Poland 9 115 12 555 12 060 11 185
Portugal 5 5 5 10
Romania 1 125 1 320 1 000 855
33
Slovenia 100 125 80 25
Slovakia 550 530 395 410
Finland 15 20 25 30
Sweden 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom 300 305 295 535
Iceland NA NA NA NA
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 0
Norway 0 0 0 10
Switzerland 10 25 25 30
Source: Eurostat data. Last updated 20.08.2015, extracted on 13.10.2015
A large proportion of the refusals of entry into the EU and Schengen area are issued to
Ukrainian nationals were due to them not holding valid visa or residence permits or because
they did not have the appropriate documentation to justify the purpose and conditions of stay.
Ukrainian nationals are prominent among other nationalities using of false documents to enter
the EU: 981 Ukrainians were identified as using falsified documents at the EU and Schengen
border in 2014 and 516 in the first half of 2015. Most cases were detected exiting Ukraine at
its land borders with Poland and Hungary. In most cases, those caught had counterfeit border
crossing stamps in their passports, typically to fabricate their travel history and extend their
periods of stay. People do this to avoid being caught overstaying, which usually has quite
negative consequences for the migrant in question i.e. removal and an entry ban. False border
stamps are intended to show that the person has exited the Schengen area and give the
impression that the person is now re-entering.
The visa information system recently launched in Ukraine (as of 23 June 2015) should
improve the management of visa issues in the long-term.
Border management
Compared with nationals of countries in the western Balkans prior to visa liberalisation,
would-be labour migrants from Ukraine have fewer incentives to try to cross borders illegally.
This is because Ukrainian nationals have sufficient legal travel channels for entering the EU
such as: fully functional local border traffic agreements with neighbouring Member States;
simplified rules for short-term employment in some Member States and low single visa
rejection rates.
Indeed, despite rapid political and economic changes resulting from the drawn-out conflict in
the east of Ukraine, the figures show few illegal border crossings with the purpose of irregular
migration. Frontex reports that illegal border crossings are a marginal issue. In 2014, only 60
out of 154 cases of illegal crossings at border crossing points involving Ukrainian nationals
were linked to irregular migration. The number of cases is negligible given the size of
Ukraine's population (roughly 45 million) and the length of its borders with the EU.
Ukraine has been able to keep border surveillance on migratory issues at a sufficient level
despite the crisis. EUBAM had found that although Ukraine still has to make progress on
capacity building, it has improved operational capacities at its borders, particularly at the
border with Moldova where EUBAM is actively involved in bringing the border protection
34
system into line with EU standards. Ukraine also operates joint patrols with the border
services of neighbouring EU member States and with Moldova and Belarus.
The ongoing conflict will continue to have a significant impact on the capacity of Ukraine to
manage its borders adjacent to the conflict area, including flow of people and goods in and out
of the country. Ukraine adopted legislation regulating entry into and exit from the territories
not under Government control: access from/to the rest of Ukraine is allowed only through
several check points on the basis of a special permit. Foreigners travelling from another
country to Ukraine cannot enter legally the country through these check points. Based on the
Minsk Package of 12 February 2015, Ukraine should re-establish control of the currently
uncontrolled sections of its eastern border with the Russian Federation by the end of 2015.
However, following the summit in Normandy format in Paris on 2 October 2015, it was
publicly admitted that some provisions of the Minsk package of measures will not be possible
to implement by that deadline.
Detection of irregular migrants
Ukrainians tend to travel to the EU and the Schengen area using legal and regular travel
channels. Most Ukrainian nationals move to the EU and Schengen area by using to work and
stay as regular migrants. "Illegal stays" cover two possible situations: cases where people
have entered the country irregularly and are detected staying illegally; cases where people
entered legally but overstayed the duration of their regular visa or residence permits. This
second situation can also involve cases where Ukrainian citizens fail to have their first or
successive residence permits renewed because they lose their jobs and might be requested to
leave the EU country in which they are residing. Ukrainian nationals reluctant to return home
have largely continued to use the same modus operandi over the past several years, i. e.
abusing the legal entry channels. Therefore it is logical that the countries hosting the largest
number of Ukrainian citizens with visa/temporary residence permits also detect the highest
number of illegal stays.
Many Ukrainian migrants have been detected staying illegally in the EU and Schengen area.
In 2014, Ukrainian nationals were the eighth most likely third country nationals to be detected
staying illegally in the EU.
Eurostat data show that although the number of detections of Ukrainian illegal stayers was
relatively stable between 2008 and 2010 at about 12 000 detections a year, in 2014 the figure
jumped to 16 600, a 37 % rise on 2013. In 2014, Poland was the EU country where most of
the Ukrainian illegal stayers were detected (7 455 persons) followed by Hungary (1 460),
Germany (1 455), Sweden (where the 2014 figure of 1 225 showed a very high increase on
2013) and the Czech Republic (1 020). Based on the figures available so far for 2015, Frontex
suggests that there may be a further increase in 2015.
Nevertheless, compared with the number of valid permits, the number of irregular migrants
detected is not high. Furthermore, Frontex has also found that almost half of Ukrainian
irregular migrants were identified when exiting the EU's external air and land borders (mainly
at the Polish and Hungarian borders with Ukraine). In other words, those people were
voluntarily returning home.
During the first half of 2015, there was a significant increase (85 %) in detections of
Ukrainian illegal stayers exiting Poland to return to Ukraine compared with the same period
35
in 2014. This seems to indicate ongoing transit through Poland in both directions i.e. circular
migratory pattern.
Table 5: Third country nationals found to be present illegally (annual data for
Ukrainians), 2009-2014
EU Member States and Schengen area 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
European Union (28 countries) 11 220 10 875 11 880 12 555 12 060 16 600
Belgium 150 145 130 165 135 225
Bulgaria 10 10 15 10 5 5
Czech Republic 1 500 955 1 125 1 065 890 1 020
Denmark 10 5 5 0 5 0
Germany 1 155 1 070 1 095 1 280 1 265 1 455
Estonia 15 20 35 35 45 60
Ireland 60 35 15 35 25 5
Greece 150 105 100 75 95 115
Spain 1 060 955 840 640 380 590
France 355 290 375 310 340 565
Croatia NA NA NA NA 5 10
Italy 1 480 1 460 690 720 570 490
Cyprus 120 120 180 135 120 70
Latvia 15 10 5 5 10 5
Lithuania 130 125 90 70 75 75
Luxembourg 0 5 0 5 0 0
Hungary 1 000 1 605 1 095 1 310 1 370 1 460
Malta 10 5 20 10 5 5
Netherlands 125 140 105 NA NA NA
Austria 220 230 195 185 190 410
Poland 2 070 1 885 3 995 4 800 5 210 7 455
Portugal 520 470 425 480 280 235
Romania 105 85 120 75 70 55
Slovenia 5 145 105 20 10 10
Slovakia 410 365 370 335 355 500
Finland 25 25 30 40 35 70
Sweden 135 105 165 105 95 1 225
United Kingdom 385 510 555 640 490 490
Iceland 0 NA NA NA NA NA
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 0 0 0
Norway 10 NA 10 45 20 45
Switzerland 75 65 50 60 70 65
Source: Eurostat data. Last updated 20.08.15, extracted on 13.10.2015
2.1.4. Possible consequences of a visa-free regime
Simplified travel arrangements are expected to result in increased circularity in migratory
flows between Ukraine and the EU. This is turn will strengthen people-to-people contacts. It
36
is likely that if a visa-free regime with the EU/Schengen area is implemented, flows of
Ukrainian immigrants will become more self-regulated and more regularised.
Regarding labour migration, if there is no demand for specific jobs, Ukrainian nationals will
either refrain from entering the EU countries and/or leave the EU area. In the latter case, they
will leave safe in the knowledge that they can return if better economic opportunities arise.
Regarding irregular migration, Eurostat data shows roughly that the most popular countries
for Ukrainian nationals' first place of residence also have the highest number of detections of
irregular migration. The detection of irregular migrants has grown significantly since 2013.
The number of irregular migrants detected is not very high at present compared with the
number of valid residence permits, but the number of irregular migrants being detected is
increasing. The most likely modus operandi will continue to be the use of false entry/exit
stamps and abuse of legal forms of entry, although visa-free regime arrangements could limit
this trend.
Nevertheless almost half of the detected overstayers were identified when exiting the EU's
external air and land borders i.e. voluntarily returning home. Visa liberalisation will not
reduce the effectiveness of measures in the EU and Ukraine to counter irregular migration.
Ukraine's successful implementation of local border traffic agreements with neighbouring EU
countries has enabled many Ukrainian citizens to enjoy visa-free travel. The local border
traffic agreements can be considered as a test run for visa liberalisation.
According to Passport Index,7
Ukrainian citizens are already exempted from a short-stay visa
obligation by 96 countries. The rules of stay for these visa-free regimes are largely being
complied with.
2.2. Asylum: trends and possible consequences of a visa-free travel
In 2014, 14 060 Ukrainian nationals applied for asylum in EU Member States (14 415 in the
Schengen area). According to Eurostat data asylum applications from Ukrainian citizens are
widely distributed throughout Europe, with highest numbers of applicants registered in
Germany (2 705) followed by Poland (2 275), Italy (2 080), France (1 425), Sweden (1 320),
Spain (895), Belgium (570), the Czech Republic (515) and Austria (455). The most popular
countries for asylum applications are also the most popular destination countries of Ukrainian
migrants. With the exception of Poland, EU countries neighbouring Ukraine received very
few applicants.
Table 6: Asylum applicants by citizenship (Ukraine), 2008-2014
EU Member States
and Schengen area 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
European Union (28 countries) 925 935 830 940 1 095 1 055 14 060
Belgium 65 35 65 75 90 65 570
Bulgaria 0 10 5 0 10 0 40
7
www.passportindex.org
37
Czech Republic 320 200 115 150 175 145 515
Denmark 5 5 5 20 15 40 135
Germany 45 85 70 55 135 150 2 705
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 60
Ireland 20 15 5 10 15 10 50
Greece 55 50 50 30 45 20 110
Spain 5 10 5 10 20 15 895
France 75 75 90 100 145 135 1 425
Croatia NA NA NA NA NA 0 10
Italy 15 10 20 20 35 35 2 080
Cyprus 15 25 10 10 5 0 95
Latvia 0 0 0 5 0 0 75
Lithuania 5 0 0 0 5 5 70
Luxembourg 5 0 5 0 0 0 25
Hungary 0 10 10 5 0 5 35
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 40
Netherlands 20 20 30 50 30 35 265
Austria 140 120 80 65 80 60 455
Poland 40 35 45 65 70 45 2 275
Portugal 0 5 0 5 5 0 155
Romania 0 10 10 5 0 10 35
Slovenia 0 0 0 5 5 0 15
Slovakia 30 15 20 5 5 15 25
Finland 10 5 10 10 15 5 300
Sweden 55 130 120 190 130 170 1 320
United Kingdom : 65 55 50 60 75 285
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Liechtenstein 0 5 0 0 10 0 5
Norway 20 25 10 15 30 25 130
Switzerland 30 30 15 25 30 40 210
Total 975 995 855 980 1 165 1 120 14 415
Source: Eurostat data. Last updated 09.09.15, extracted on 13.10.2015.
Significant pull factors for Ukrainian nationals' choice of the destination country include the
presence of an established Ukrainian diaspora or previous experience in the destination
country for work or study, although there are also other factors that play a role. Therefore the
presence of Ukrainian residents in different countries seems to be mirrored in the
geographical distribution of Ukrainian applicants for asylum.
Certain characteristics of the asylum system in a particular EU country / Schengen state may
also act as pull factors for people who are not in need of international protection, but who
instead want to come to the EU and access other benefits linked to the asylum procedure.
The experience of EU countries with applicants from countries in the western Balkans has
been that the combination of a lengthy procedure and cash benefits (which are substantial
when compared with the usual level of income in the country of origin) may act as a pull
38
factor for large numbers of unfounded applications, including repeat applications, made by
people with no valid grounds for claiming international protection. 8
2.2.1. Consequences of the Ukrainian crisis
About 1 000 Ukrainians per year sought asylum in the EU and Schengen area between 2008
and 2013. Based on Eurostat statistical data, the highest number of applications were recorded
in 2003 (5 100) and 2004 (4 655), coinciding with times of political change in the country.
Even if Ukrainians are not primarily interested in seeking international protection and prefer
using other channels to legalise their stay, the number of asylum applicants has grown
substantially as a result of the ongoing crisis in the eastern part of the country.
Eurostat data show that the number of asylum applications by Ukrainian nationals rose
significantly in 2014 in a large number of the EU and Schengen countries. In 2014 there were
over 14 060 applications for asylum by Ukrainian nationals, compared with only 1 055 in
2013. The figure rose each month during the first 10 months of 2014, with the highest number
of applicants (2 260) being recorded in October 2014.
Despite some countries reporting an increase in the number of refusals of entry, Ukrainians
have been able to obtain a visa to travel legally to the EU and Schengen country of their
choice and then apply for international protection.
It is also important to note that according to OCHA9
reports, the total number of Ukrainians
who entered in neighbouring countries stood at 1 123 800 as of 7 September 2015, with the
majority going to the Russian Federation (911 500) and Belarus (126 450).
At the beginning of 2015 the number of Ukrainian applicants remained stable but still stood at
about 1 500 applicants a month, in spite of hopes for a peaceful solution to the crisis in the
east of the country after the signature of ceasefire agreements in September 2014 (the Minsk
Protocol and Memorandum) and February 2015 (Minsk Package of Measures). The current
number of applications is more than 15 times the average monthly level of applicants
registered before the crisis. However, a decrease has been observed in the second half of
2015.
From the beginning of EU-level data collection in 2008 until 2013, recognition rates for
Ukrainian applicants at first instance were rather low, ranging on average from 7 % to 14 %
per year. In 2014, however, the rate rose to 18 %, as did the number of positive decisions.
This reflected the changes in the situation in the country, as indicated by Eurostat data's
hereafter in Table 7 below, which shows a total of 520 positive decisions at first instance in
the EU out of the 2 860 applications received in 2014 (figures updated in October 2015).
There is, however, a large disparity in the recognition rate at first instance between
EU/Schengen States. Furthermore, according to information on safe countries of origin
available, Ukraine is still on the safe country of origin lists of Bulgaria, Luxembourg and the
UK. By contrast, France, Belgium and Switzerland have removed Ukraine from their lists.
8
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) report: Asylum applicants from the western Balkans: comparative
analysis of trends, push-pull factors and responses, update May 2015.
9
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
39
Table 7: First-instance decisions on applications by citizenship (Ukraine), 2012-2014 and
positive decisions in 2014 per country
EU Member States and Schengen area 2012 2013 2014
Positive decisions
in 2014
European Union (28 countries) 880 855 2 860 520
Belgium 95 50 205 5
Bulgaria 0 5 0 0
Czech Republic 195 160 375 150
Denmark 5 35 10 0
Germany 40 40 60 20
Estonia 0 0 5 0
Ireland 15 10 30 5
Greece 30 30 85 5
Spain 15 15 80 0
France 120 165 255 30
Croatia 0 0 5 0
Italy 15 40 245 165
Cyprus 5 0 0 0
Latvia 0 0 5 0
Lithuania 5 0 30 25
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0
Hungary 0 0 20 5
Malta 0 0 20 20
Netherlands 35 35 160 5
Austria 80 45 NA NA
Poland 50 45 655 15
Portugal 5 0 20 15
Romania 0 5 30 15
Slovenia 0 0 10 0
Slovakia 5 10 10 5
Finland 5 15 200 5
Sweden 115 110 180 20
United Kingdom 45 30 170 5
Iceland 0 0 5 5
Liechtenstein 10 5 0 0
Norway 20 30 80 0
Switzerland 10 30 60 0
Total 915 915 3 005 525
Source: Eurostat data. Last updated 18.09.2015, extracted on 13.10.2015
40
2.2.2. Challenges following the Ukrainian crisis
The determining factor behind the influx of people in need of asylum in the EU since March
2014 is the political and security situation in and around Ukraine (including Crimea10
) and the
developments in the conflict areas in eastern Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk regions in
particular).
An agreement brokered during talks of the Trilateral Contact Group on 26 August 2015 has
resulted in a noticeable de-escalation of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, where it was agreed to
strictly stick to the ceasefire as of 1 September. This has brought an end to a period of intense
movements by Ukrainians directly affected by the conflict. However, the situation remains
tense and Ukraine needs to manage the mass exodus of civilians from the regions outside its
control. As of 7 September 2015 there were 1 460 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs)
registered by the Ukrainian Ministry of Social Policy.11
It cannot be ruled out that some of
these people might consider emigration and applying for asylum in the EU as an option in
future if they do not receive enough state support with monthly targeted social assistance i.e.
social protection for families and children, legal assistance, education, offers of employment,
guaranteed pension funds. Ukraine is actively cooperating with many international
organisations on international technical and humanitarian assistance for IDPs. Ukraine also
adopted a special legislation on IDPs.
To note also that whereas the unstable security and political situation was initially the main
reason given for asylum applications, this pattern has changed since mid-2014, with
applicants now citing grounds not immediately related to the conflict. These include hostility
faced by IDPs, military service and subsequent waves of mobilisation into the Ukrainian
army.
As long as the situation in the east of the country remains unstable, we cannot rule out a rapid
increase in asylum applications in EU neighbouring countries. Ukrainian citizens and a high
number of IDPs are struggling to find proper accommodation and face an uncertain future.
2.2.3. Possible consequences of a visa-free regime
Most Ukrainian migrants have so far preferred to use legal migration channels rather than the
asylum procedure. A visa-free regime may not radically change this trend.
We may see a decrease in the number of asylum applications from Ukrainian citizens, as a
result of visa liberalisation, since they may see less need to use asylum as a means to stay in
the EU or Schengen area.
Conversely, in the context of current flows, a visa-free regime could result in an increase of
the number of asylum applicants because it would open up legal travel channels and make it
easier to access to the asylum procedure.
10
The Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol are not under the effective control of the
Ukrainian authorities following their illegal annexation by the Russian Federation. The EU condemns and does
not recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation.
11
According to UNHCR, as of 26 June 2015 there were 1 354 000 registered internally displaced persons in
Ukraine.
41
In this context, the number of Ukrainian asylum applicants could also rise if Ukrainian
overstayers lodge applications for international protection as a means of legalising their stay.
To counter this potential abuse of the asylum procedure, Ukraine must continue to implement
the readmission agreement in place with the EU already since 2008 (including implementing
protocols with EU Member States). At the most recent meeting of the Joint Readmission
Committee on 6 May 2015, the Committee recommended that Ukraine further implement the
agreement in an effective manner. As of November 2015, Ukraine has concluded 17 bilateral
agreements on readmission with third countries.
The ongoing crisis in and around Ukraine will continue to be an important factor affecting
population movements. So far, the conflict areas are limited to parts of two regions in eastern
Ukraine, which has triggered only limited migration toward the EU in contrast with the scale
of migration to the Russian Federation for instance. Should the crisis evolve in a way that
would degrade the security situation in western regions of Ukraine, where the population has
more ties with neighbouring EU countries, we could see significant population movements
towards the EU.
The long-term challenges facing IDPs may also result in an increased flow of Ukrainians for
which emigration and asylum application to the EU might be an option even if Ukraine is
actively cooperating with international organisation to manage assistance for IDPs.
3. ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY IMPACTS
According to various assessments, the shadow economy in Ukraine has achieved a historic
high, accounting for between 42 % and 60 % of Ukraine's GDP12
, which means that the
shadow economy and the State effectively exist in parallel. The shadow economy covers
active illegal economic activities, VAT fraud, all kinds of smuggling and high-level
corruption. Economic pressure from the conflict in eastern Ukraine continues to create
demand for goods and sustain the already flourishing black market economy.
3.1. Organised crime: trends and possible impacts of a visa-free travel
Ukrainian organised crime groups (OCGs) are active in a large number of EU Member States,
as well as in countries neighbouring the EU such as Moldova, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland,
the Russian Federation and Turkey. The spread of Ukrainian OCGs in the EU reflects their
increasing international reach.
Such groups tend to be structured as small to medium sized semi-independent cells with links
to broader networks. They use several types of transport, including private cars, taxis,
minibuses and trains. The deliberately use of multiple means of transportation across several
routes as an effective means of evading law enforcement.
Russian speaking OCGs, which include Ukrainians among their members invest mainly in
construction, transportation and logistics, real estate, wholesale and retail trade, hotels, bars
12
International Monetary Fund estimates that Ukraine's underground, and non-tax-paying economy accounted
for 50 % of the GDP in 2014.
42
and restaurants, while also developing activities in cybercrime. Their activities in the legal
economy are often aimed at laundering the proceeds of their criminal activities.13
Ukrainian motorcycle gangs are present in some EU Member States and are known to use
violence as an integral part of their business strategy. Outlaw motorcycle gang members adopt
a multi-crime approach.
Recent data on OCGs inside Ukraine is limited due to the crisis in and around Ukraine, which
impedes data collection. Nevertheless, available resources show that the Donetsk, Crimea and
Odessa regions have the highest criminality rates. The eastern Donbass region, which includes
Donetsk and Luhansk is the historical industrial heart of Ukraine but also the region with the
highest level of unemployment and criminality increasing since the 1990s. In view of the
conflict, it is likely that criminal groups will expand their activities not only inside Ukraine
but also in neighbouring countries. The use of the Russian language facilitates their
cooperation with other groups from the region.
The general pattern of cross-border crime and irregular migration has not substantially
changed: smuggling activities continue to take place at Ukraine's borders. The smuggling of
goods and illegal border crossing remained key challenges. According to EUBAM, Ukraine's
priorities for the period to come are to formalise practical cooperation between police and
customs on information exchange and analysis, and to put in place integrated operational
procedures on intelligence. To note that border control points have been connected to the
Interpol databases.
In order to counter security threats, Ukraine aims to strengthen border infrastructure at its
border with Russia. Ukraine may also create special customs police units for combating
smuggling from Transnistria. Ukraine and Republic of Moldova continue in cooperation with
EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) enhancing the overall border and customs
management capacities and their abilities to fight against cross border and organised crime
and to approximate the standards of the border and law enforcement authorities to those of the
EU.
Visa liberalisation may open up new opportunities for Ukrainian (or Ukraine based) OCGs.
They will presumably adapt their methods to the new conditions created by visa liberalisation
and operate with greater flexibility. However, removing the visa obligation for Ukrainians
citizens would not have a major impact on organised crime activities in the EU, because most
criminals already travel through the EU. It is therefore unlikely that visa liberalisation will
result in drastic changes in the Ukrainian or EU criminal landscapes.
3.2. Trafficking in human beings: trends and possible consequences of visa-free travel
Ukraine is a country of origin, transit and increasingly a destination for trafficking in men,
women and children. Over 120 000 Ukrainians have fallen victim to Trafficking in Human
Beings (THB) since 1991, making Ukraine one of the main countries of origin of trafficking
13
Transcrime study: "From illegal markets to legitimate businesses: The portfolio of organised crime in Europe"
March 2015.
43
in human beings in Europe. Economic hardships and unemployment have made the
population more vulnerable especially in rural areas.
Ukraine is a source and a transit country for THB victims from some European countries
(Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) towards western
Europe (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands) the Baltic countries and Russia. The
Russian Federation remains the top destination country for human trafficking from Ukraine,
but EU is second on the list.
Most victims are used for forced labour and sexual exploitation in EU countries. Ukrainian
OCGs involved in THB use residence permits or legal businesses owned in EU Member
States to issue invitation letters for visas. Although there is not enough reliable information on
the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on THB it can be assumed that OCGs are taking the
increased number of vulnerable people as an opportunity.
Indeed, Ukraine may face a heightened risk of an increase in trafficking in human beings due
to the high numbers of persons fleeing from the territories not under the effective control of
the Government. This displaced population is deemed to be very vulnerable to intermediaries
looking for potential victims. Through regular press monitoring and discussions with
internally displaced persons, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) identified the
following trends by separatists in conflict-affected areas: kidnapping of women and girls who
are then subjected to sexual exploitation and/or forced labour; forced recruitment of men and
boys into the separatist groups for exploitation in conflict and forced labour. The IOM is
helping the Ukrainian government to counter fraud in employment linked to THB.
We are likely to see an increase in THB from Ukraine to the EU as a result of the combination
of the current crisis in the country and the increased freedom of movement under a visa-free
regime.
To counter this, Ukraine has put together a comprehensive raft of measures to fight against
THB: the law on the combat of human trafficking, the national strategy for human rights, the
state targeted social programme combating human trafficking. Ukraine has also approved the
concept for the State programme combating human trafficking until 2020. Ukraine aims to
further improve the coordination between law enforcement agencies (police, border,
migration, etc.) both inside the country and internationally to prevent, detect and stamp out
crimes related to human trafficking.
3.3. Facilitation of irregular immigration: trends and possible consequences of visa-free
travel
Document security
Little information is available on the extent to which Ukrainians OCGs are involved in
facilitating irregular migration to the EU, but this phenomenon remains a significant threat to
the Ukraine's internal and border security. However, Ukrainian criminals use stolen, forged
and counterfeit identity documents to facilitate the movement of irregular migrants. In some
cases, Ukrainian nationals with a residence permit or dual nationality in an EU Member State
have been known to help migrants travel to the EU by issuing them with invitations for work.
Furthermore, false visa stickers for EU Member States and the Schengen area are produced in
factories in Ukraine.
44
Migrant crisis
Ukraine plays multiple roles as a country of destination and as a transit zone for illegal
migrants heading for Europe.
The crisis in Syria has changed the structure and composition of migratory flows in Ukraine,
with an increased number of migrants from Syria but also from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and
Pakistan. Data from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs show that most asylum
applicants in Ukraine in 2014 were Afghans (275) and Syrians (267). In 2014, the Ukrainian
State Migration Service processed applications by 1 173 persons. Of these, 105 were granted
refugee status and 222 were recognised as being in need of subsidiary protection. On irregular
migration, the State Migration Service reports that 3 135 irregular migrants were detected in
2014, and 1 420 during the first quarter of 2015.
The conflict in eastern Ukraine could make the destabilised border regions more attractive as
a transit area for migrants from eastern European, central Asian and ex-USSR countries. It is
also possible that migrants wishing to reach the EU may increasingly use Ukraine as an
alternative route to the harsher restrictions being put in place in some transit countries.
European and western Balkans criminal groups currently active in illicit trafficking may
change their focus to facilitating irregular immigration due to the high demand for such
services. Ukrainian OCGs are already involved in smuggling migrants into the EU: we are
seeing more reports of Ukrainian nationals acting as facilitators though there is no evidence of
an organised network. In 2015 the Ukrainian government dismantled 16 criminal groups
involved in moving people illegally across borders.
The increased freedom of movement of Ukrainian OCGs could lead to an increase in the
smuggling of people towards Europe, even if the figures are not as high as for Turkey and the
Balkans. Nevertheless, Ukraine is developing measures to counter the facilitation of irregular
migration.
3.4. Arms and drug trafficking: trends and possible consequences of visa-free travel
There is no evidence available to suggest that Ukrainian OCGs are involved in arms
trafficking within the EU but violent OCGs could take advantage of the possible proliferation
of weapons in Ukraine, resulting in weapons being smuggled into EU Member States by
firearms traffickers. Given the conflict, access to weapons has likely become easier and
cheaper but even if we can assume that weapons are diverted from the conflict zones it is not
clear whether these firearms remain in the country or are trafficked to destination outside of
Ukraine for criminal purposes, potentially presenting a threat to the EU with border traffic
increases.
Regarding drugs, in the context of a destabilised Ukraine, drug trafficking OCGs could seize
the opportunity to use the northern route from Afghanistan to western Europe through Iran,
Turkey, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania. A rising trend can be seen in significant seizures of
heroin at the Ukrainian borders. The Black Sea port in Odessa is known as a hub for heroin
trafficking to the EU.
45
In this context, a visa-free regime may increase drug flows and make it harder to detect them,
especially when drugs are transported by rail or air: OCGs may also use people travelling
from Ukraine to the EU as drug couriers.
3.5. Excise fraud: trends and possible consequences of visa-free travel
Ukraine is a country of origin and transit country for counterfeit alcohol, cheap cigarettes,
medicines and pesticides. Cigarettes are one of the most frequently smuggled goods through
Ukraine's borders. The scale of the trafficking to the EU is significant: Ukraine plays a central
role in supplying the EU markets with counterfeit tobacco products.
The scale of the smuggling is difficult to assess given the lack of detailed data. However it
might be assessed that although OGCs are often involved, individuals with no prior criminal
background may also get involved in the trafficking and take advantage of a visa-free regime.
3.6. Property crime: trends and possible consequences of visa-free travel
Available data suggest that Ukrainian OCGs involved in motor vehicle crime cooperate with
Lithuanian, Moldovan and Russian networks. Other nationals involved in this criminal
activity include Bulgarians and Belarusians. Ukrainian groups are also active in northern
European countries, smuggling large amounts of stolen goods through central European
countries. Such activities could develop with increased movements under a visa-free regime.
3.7. Financial crime: trends and possible consequences of visa-free travel
Ukraine is a victim of several types of financial crime. As Ukraine's banking system is less
robust, it is used for money laundering, particularly of the proceeds of offences such as grand
larceny, illegal gambling, abuse of online banking and VAT fraud. The proceeds of crime are
laundered by the same groups that commit the initial offences. No specialised OCGs
providing money laundering services have been detected although Ukrainian nationals with
EU residence permits are also involved in money laundering. Currently there are no grounds
to believe that a visa-free regime would affect this type of criminal activity.
3.8. Terrorism financing: trends and possible consequences of visa-free travel
There is no official information to suggest that there are any foreign terrorist fighters from the
EU or abroad in Ukraine, that foreign terrorist fighters transit Ukraine heading for conflict
zones such as Syria and Iraq, or that terrorism is financed from inside the country. The
preferred route for foreign terrorist fighters from the EU to reach conflict areas is through
central European countries to Turkey. However, increased law enforcement controls on these
routes are making travel more difficult for foreign terrorist fighters.
As a result, OCGs may consider alternate routes and there is concern that Ukraine may be
used as an indirect route to middle eastern conflict zones. Some evidence suggests that
Ukrainian groups are already involved in the smuggling of Syrian citizens into the EU, so it is
possible to assume that irregular migration channels could be also used to facilitate the
movement of foreign terrorist fighters from the EU to conflict zones.
46
4. MAIN CONCLUSIONS SUMMARY IN CASE OF VISA FREE-REGIME
The data and information available give prospective main trends in migration and security
areas, showing that the EU remains an attractive destination for migrants from Ukraine with
potential migratory and also security challenges to be monitored.
4.1. Key possible impacts on migration trends
a) Ukrainians nationals are widespread across Europe, with roughly 850 000 nationals
legally residing in the EU in 2013. The most recent trends show a growing interest for
migration towards the EU. Regular passenger and circular migration flows between
the EU and Ukraine will increase significantly in the coming years due to rising
regional and global mobility. Visa liberalisation for Ukraine will reduce the barriers to
travel to the EU and will encourage regular temporary and circular migration,
strengthening people-to-people contacts.
b) Given the current economic situation in Ukraine, the demand for residence in EU
Member States will remain robust and EU will continue to be attractive for Ukrainian
would-be labour migrants.
c) Ukrainian nationals tend to use legal travel channels. The level of irregular migration
is not high compared with the number of valid permits, and almost half of all cases
were identified when exiting the EU's external air and land borders i.e. voluntarily
returning home. Still, the number of irregular migrants being detected is increasing,
Ukrainian nationals' most likely modus operandi will continue to be the abuse of legal
forms of entry to the EU and Schengen area, although a visa-free regime could limit
this trend. However, the successful implementation of local border traffic agreements
with EU Member States are already enabling many Ukrainian citizens to travel visa-
free and as such can be seen as a test run for visa liberalisation.
d) The number of asylum applications from Ukraine will probably decrease as a result of
visa liberalisation as asylum will no longer be seen as one of the best ways of entering
EU Member States and the Schengen area. On the other hand, it is possible that a visa-
free regime could increase the number of asylum applicants because it would open up
legal travel channels and make access to the asylum procedure easier. Applying for
asylum could also be used as a means of legalising overstays and avoiding being sent
home.
e) As long as the situation in eastern Ukraine remains unstable, the EU Member States
and the Schengen area will remain an option for asylum seekers. Rapid increases of
asylum applications at the EU's borders with Ukraine cannot be ruled out if there is an
important escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
f) Population movements will continue to be affected by the ongoing crisis in eastern
Ukraine. The challenges facing IDPs might also result in an increased flow of
Ukrainians emigrating to the EU or seeking asylum there. Ukraine is actively
cooperating with international organisations to manage the assistance for IDPs.
Possible mitigation measures to be undertaken by the EU Member States
The EU Member States could consider taking the following actions to reduce migratory risks:
47
• Work more actively to establish circular/temporary/seasonal migration schemes with
the Ukrainian government to facilitate legal migration of qualified Ukrainian nationals
to EU Member States;
• Work to establish of legal channels for irregular migrants from Ukraine to regularise
their status, provided they qualify and meet the needs of EU Member States' labour
markets;
• Provide opportunities for university graduates from Ukraine who have graduated in an
EU Member States to extend their stay in order to look for work;
• Work with the Ukrainian government to better protect the rights of Ukrainian labour
migrants in the EU Member States and to establish bilateral social benefit transfer
systems;
• Revise the approach to processing asylum applications, especially in those EU
Member States and Schengen associated States where the numbers of asylum claims
are particularly high, to limit abuse of asylum benefits. Further improve the
implementation of the readmission agreement EU-Ukraine at the level of each
Member State.
4.2. Key possible impacts on security trends
a) The increased spread of Ukrainian organised crime in the EU underlines a trend
towards the internationalisation of Ukrainian OCGs. Such groups have already found
ways to circumvent travel restrictions and are already present in several EU Member
States. The removal of the visa obligation for Ukrainians citizens would not have a
major impact on organised crime in the EU. Measures are in place to limit and
subsequently tackle possible impacts.
b) A visa-free regime for Ukrainian citizens would not significantly affect the
effectiveness of customs and border control procedures. However, there are concerns
that visa liberalisation with Ukraine may facilitate criminal activities, especially
trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of goods from Ukraine to EU Member
States.
c) Ukraine is a platform for drug trafficking and plays a central role in supplying EU
markets with counterfeit tobacco products. A visa-free regime may create additional
opportunities for Ukrainian citizens to take part in illegal activities associated with
tobacco and drug smuggling.
d) Ukraine plays multiple roles as a country of destination, and to a lesser extent, as a
transit zone for irregular migrants heading for Europe. OCGs will probably have less
opportunity to facilitate the irregular migration of Ukrainian nationals into the EU,
compelling criminals to seek new opportunities such as helping Ukrainians to arrange
long term stays in the EU, or by facilitating the irregular migration of other
nationalities or ethnic minorities from neighbourhood countries in eastern Europe or
migrants from central Asia or the Middle-East. Ukraine is already developing
measures to counter irregular migration services.
e) Despite the improved security measures in place, eastern regions of Ukraine remain
high risk zones for the smuggling of goods in and out of the country. The current
instability in eastern Ukraine opens the door to significant growth in activities by
Ukrainian and other Russian-speaking OCGs activities in the region, posing a threat to
the EU. For example, OCGs may use the conflict in eastern Ukraine as a source for
firearms, which may be trafficked to the EU in the future.
48
f) Under the Minsk Package of 12 February 2015, Ukraine is supposed to re-establish
control of the currently uncontrolled sections of eastern border with the Russian
Federation by the end of 2015. However, following the summit in Normandy format in
Paris on 2 October 2015, it was publicly admitted that some provisions of the Minsk
package of measures will not be possible to implement by that deadline. In order to
counter security threats, Ukraine aims to strengthen border infrastructure at the border
with Russia. Ukraine regulated entry into and exit from the territories not under
Government control. Ukraine may also create special customs police for combating
smuggling from Transnistria. In addition, the EU Border Assistance Mission
(EUBAM) will continue enhancing the overall border and customs management
capacities and the abilities of Moldova and Ukraine to fight against cross border and
organised crime and to approximate the standards of the border and law enforcement
authorities to those of the EU. These measures will help to address the above
mentioned concerns over the security situation, trafficking in human beings and the
smuggling of people and goods.
Possible mitigation measures to be undertaken by the EU Member States
The EU Member States could consider taking the following actions to reduce the possible
security impacts of visa free regime with Ukraine:
• Conclude bilateral agreements on cooperation in the fight against organised crime and
establish relevant contact points, and where applicable deploy police attachés;
• Invite Ukrainian counterparts to participate in joint investigation groups (Ukraine-EU
Member States), to exchange expertise and information on the modus operandi of
Ukrainian criminals;
• Further develop existing risk analysis cooperation with EU Member States to combat
irregular migration;
• Speed up conclusion of an agreement with Europol to improve Ukrainian’s tools for
crime analysis and to facilitate information exchanges.