Henvendelse af 11/5-14 fra Corporate Europe Observatory om ISDS og frihandelsaftalen mellem EU og USA

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Europaudvalget
Til:
Dato:
Udvalgets medlemmer
12. maj 2014
KOM (2013) 0136
Henstilling med henblik på Rådets afgørelse om bemyndigelse til at indlede
forhandlinger om en frihandelsaftale mellem Den Europæiske Union og USA
Henvendelse af 11/5-14 fra Corporate Europe Observatory om investor-
stat tvistbilæggelse (ISDS) og frihandelsaftalen mellem EU og USA
Med venlig hilsen
Niels Yde,
Europaudvalgets Sekretariat
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Til Folketingets Europaudvalg
I anledning af forespørgselsdebatten i Folketingssalen om ”Investor-stat
tvistbilæggelse” (ISDS) under forhandlingerne med USA om en handels- og
investeringsaftale (TTIP)
Hermed fremsendes materiale vedrørende ISDS til evt. brug ved forberedelse af forespørgselsedebatten
onsdag om investor-stat tvistbilæggelse under en fremtidig handels- og investeringsaftale med USA.
Udvalget har tidligere modtaget en del materiale om ISDS fra flere danske organisationer, herunder fra
organisationer, der er meget kritiske over for ISDS, og anbefaler at tage ISDS helt ud af forhandlingerne.
Det vedhæftede materiale fremsendes overvejende for at understrege, at denne grundlæggende kritiske
indstilling ikke er forbeholdt NGOer eller organisationer, der overvejende er optaget af en aftales
indvirkning på f.eks. danske eller europæiske miljø- eller forbrugerlovgvning. Kritikken er langt mere
udbredt end som så.
Der er tale om to meget forskellige dokumenter. Dels en artikel af Simon Lester fra den liberale tænketank
CATO Institute, dels en rapport skrevet af tre forskere ved London School of Economics, herunder danske
Lauge Skovgaard.
Sidstnævnte er skrevet for at vurdere, hvilke fordele og ulemper en ISDS-ordning ville føre til for
Storbritannien, og konkluderer, at risikoen fsva. national regulering, kan være betydelig, lige som det
tidligere har vist sig, at prisen for Canada var betragteligt større end forudset, da landet indgik NAFTA-
aftalen med USA. Denne artikel vil snart blive fulgt op af en vurdering fra de samme forskere om
indvirkningen på EU som helhed – en artikel, som angiveligt vil rumme samme konklusion for hele EU.
I den forbindelse er det også værd igen at understrege, at flere medlemslandes regeringer er overordentligt
kritisk indstillede, herunder den tyske og franske regering, og at den danske regering må regne med at
skulle indgå i flere diskussioner fremover om dette spørgsmål, bl.a. i regi af Rådets handelspolitiske
arbejdsgruppe.
Derfor giver forespørgselsdebatten Folketinget en god mulighed for at forholde sig aktivt til denne debat
ved at give regeringen henstillinger om hvordan den bør forholde sig i denne debat.
Med venlig hilsen
Kenneth Haar, Corporate Europe Observatory
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Commentary
Does U.S. and EU Foreign Investment Need
“Protection”?
By Simon Lester
This article appeared in National Interest on December 12, 2013.
European negotiators will be in DC next week for the third round of talks on the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP). While much of the media focus for these negotiations is on
trade issues, foreign investment will be covered in the talks as well. One of the most important, but
least well understood, aspects of the foreign investment-related portions of the talks is the idea of
rules for “protecting” foreign investment. While one might think that foreign investors such as
BMW or Google are powerful companies that can assert their rights effectively, even when they are
outside their “home” country, current international investment agreements treat them as ninety-
eight-pound weaklings who are likely to be pushed around by mean foreign governments when they
go abroad. In the TTIP negotiations, the US and EU will be considering provisions that “protect”
these and other foreign investors. These talks provide a good opportunity to rethink the rules.
In many of their other trade and investment agreements, the US and EU have pushed hard for
investment rules that provide for “investor state dispute settlement” (ISDS), in order to “protect”
companies who invest abroad. While many international agreements only allow for states to make
claims against each other, under ISDS, foreign investors can bring claims against states directly in
an international tribunal. Such rules have been part of international economic policy in the US and
Europe for many years. But should these rules be extended to the TTIP? More specifically, should
we use international agreements to “protect” U.S. and EU foreign investment in this way?
In answering these questions, a key issue is, protection from what exactly? Looking at the existing
rules in other agreements, there are three main kinds of government behavior that are at issue here
(that is, from which investors supposedly need protection):
- Discriminatory treatment of foreign investors and investments;
- Expropriation of foreign investments; and
- Treatment that is not “fair or equitable.”
Let’s consider each of these separately.
The idea of nondiscrimination in international economic relations is probably the least controversial
of these. It is a long-standing component of the world trading system, and simply means that each
party promises to treat foreigners the same way it treats its own nationals.
The other issues are more difficult. Expropriation of private assets, once very common, has gone
out of favor in recent decades, although it still occurs occasionally. But the international
expropriation rules also cover regulatory expropriation, which means that government regulation is
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sometimes so extensive that it can be deemed the equivalent of an actual expropriation. In U.S.
constitutional law, there is a similar concept known as “regulatory takings.” A wide range of
regulatory actions can be challenged on this ground. While a nondiscrimination principle is clearly
about international economic relations, putting regulatory expropriation (and actual expropriation)
rules in a treaty is more akin to elevating domestic constitutional law principles to the status of
international law.
Finally, provisions related to “fair and equitable” treatment similarly take domestic legal principles
to the international arena. While they have been interpreted differently by different international
tribunals, in general terms they seem to encompass the “due process” concerns seen in domestic
legal systems.
The origin of such “protections” has its roots in U.S. and EU investment in unstable, undemocratic
developing countries many decades ago. It was thought that the court systems of these countries
could not address improper government behavior, and thus international remedies would be useful.
And to some extent, these countries were eager to adopt the rules, so as to give assurances to, and
encourage, foreign investment.
The big change that has happened recently is the expansion of the international investment system
to wealthy democracies. But even if rules were useful for the older investments in unstable regions,
it is not clear why they are needed for investments in stable democracies, who have effective
domestic mechanisms to prevent government abuses.
This takes us to the TTIP. The two parties both have mature, stable, and well-developed legal and
political systems. In this situation, what “protections” does foreign investment need beyond what is
already provided in domestic law? The analysis may vary depending on the particular obligation.
There is a case to be made that mutual promises of nondiscrimination are useful. At times, there are
emotion-based concerns about foreign takeovers of domestic assets in both the US and EU. The
French expressed dismay about a possible takeover of yogurt maker Danone; Americans were
concerned about a takeover of pork producer Smithfield Foods. Perhaps a legal obligation of
nondiscrimination could prevent backsliding towards nationalistic impulses.
With regard to the other principles, though, it is difficult to see what is added. These principles
already exist, in one form or another, in U.S. and EU domestic law. What is the value of a separate
process exclusively for foreign investors?
Just as importantly, it seems clear that something is lost with these provisions. They have become a
lightning rod for criticism of international economic agreements, and make these agreements much
harder to get through the domestic political process. That means core free-trade objectives such as
lowering tariffs are harder to achieve.
For years now, these provisions have been carried over from agreement to agreement with only
minor refinements. A US-EU agreement will have such a big impact in terms of the amount of
investment covered that it merits a rethinking of these issues. In recent years, there has been an
explosion of litigation under these investment rules, as foreign investors (and their clever lawyers)
have taken advantage of the vague legal obligations to make ever-more-creative claims. The large
amount of US-EU cross-border investment — almost 4 trillion dollars — will provide many new
opportunities for this.
In the final analysis, there are two main considerations with regard to whether U.S. and EU foreign
investment needs extra “protection” in the TTIP. First, if a U.S. (or EU) company chooses to make
an investment abroad, why should the U.S. (or EU) government go to bat for it at all? In the past,
we used “gunboat diplomacy” to protect our companies. Now we use international lawyers. But
why should we do anything? These companies have chosen another jurisdiction for their
investment, which is fine. Companies should invest in whatever location makes the most economic
sense. But in that situation, it is not clear why the investment is “ours” to worry about anymore.
When multinationals invest all over the world, are they really “ours,” or are they now just global
entities?
And second, when the place of the investment is the EU or US, which have plenty of their own
protections in domestic law, international law seems largely duplicative. International investment
rules are an opportunity for lawyers to bring additional claims, but are not necessary for
“protection” of foreign investment. Without some evidence that more is necessary, perhaps US-EU
investment rules should be limited to a basic promise to treat each other’s investors equally, let
governments settle disputes between themselves, and leave the international constitutional
protections out of it.
Simon Lester is a trade-policy analyst at the Cato Institute.