Svar på spørgsmål vedr. forsvarsforligskredsens rejse til Kuwait

Udleveret den 24. august 2015
Overblik over den danske militære indsats i Irak
Beslutningsforslag B123 vedtaget den 2. oktober 2014 indeholder tre militære bidrag til be-
kæmpelsen af ISIL: et F-16 kampflybidrag, et kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag og et stabsoffi-
cersbidrag.
Beslutningsforslag B122 vedtaget den 27. august 2014 gav desuden mulighed for at yde
transportstøtte med et C-130J transportfly i bekæmpelsen af ISIL. Mandatet for transport-
flybidraget er nu udløbet.
F-16 kampflybidraget
Bidraget, der er placeret på al-Jaber luftbasen i Kuwait, består af syv kampfly, hvoraf tre er i
logistisk reserve, samt for tiden ca. 90 personer, herunder fem personer, der er placeret ved
luftoperationscentret (Combined Air Operations Center, CAOC) i Qatar.
Missionens formål og opgave er at bidrage til den amerikansk ledede koalition i kampen
mod ISIL i Irak. De danske F-16 har været indsat i det centrale, vestlige og nordlige Irak.
Den seneste tid har operationerne i større grad været fokuseret i det vestlige og nordvestli-
ge Irak.
De danske fly er indsat til støtte for den irakiske regering og de irakiske og kurdiske sikker-
hedsstyrker og indgår som en del af koalitionens samlede luftindsats i Irak. Der er fra dansk
side ikke indlagt nogen geografiske begrænsninger for, hvor de danske fly kan indsættes i
Irak.
Kampflybidraget har pr. 23. august 2015 gennemført i alt 989 flyvninger fordelt på 488 mis-
sioner. Der er anvendt i alt 443 bomber.
Da danske F-16 har i den seneste tid overvejende gennemført missioner i Ninawa og Al An-
bar provinserne. Måltyperne for de gennemførte angreb har været personel, bygninger og
materiel, som ISIL anvender.
Siden det danske kampflybidrag blev deployeret til Kuwait i starten af oktober 2014, har i alt
seks hold været udsendt. Det nuværende hold seks består af knap 90 personer, fordelt på
otte piloter, ca. 30 mekanikere (herunder klarmeldere, våbenspecialister, elektronikmekani-
kere og flymekanikere generelt) og ca. 50 andre medarbejdere, herunder detachementsche-
fen og hans stab, militærpoliti, bevogtning, efterretning, missionsplanlæggere m.fl.
Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn 2014-15 (2. samling)
UPN Alm.del - Bilag 96
Offentligt
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F-16 flyene gennemfører normalt to missioner med hver to fly seks dage om ugen. De dan-
ske fly deltager både i overvågnings- og indhentningsmissioner og i offensive missioner,
hvor flyene eksempelvis indsættes som direkte luftstøtte til styrker på landjorden, eller hvor
flyene angriber på forhånd udpegede og godkendte militære mål. Flyene kan også få til op-
gave at patruljere i luften med det formål at undersøge bestemte objekter eller steder på
jorden. Hvis der i denne sammenhæng identificeres militære mål kan flyene beordres til at
angribe disse.
Alle indsættelser af danske fly koordineres, planlægges og godkendes af et særligt dansk
eksperthold, det såkaldte Mission and Target Approval Authority– hold (MTAA), der er udsta-
tioneret ved CAOC’ en i Qatar. Holdet består af personer med relevante kompetencer inden
for flyoperationer, efterretninger og humanitær folkeret. Ekspertholdet har til opgave at
godkende samtlige danske F-16-missioner inden de udføres med henblik på at tilsikre, at de
danske kampfly kun indsættes mod militære mål og efter bedste evne undgå, at der sker
utilsigtede følgeskader i forbindelse med bombningerne.
I holdet indgår ligeledes den såkaldte Red Card Holder, som er en officer, der på Danmarks
vegne kan sige nej til en opgave, som fx vil overskride de magtanvendelsesregler, som de
danske fly er underlagt. Formålet er at tilsikre, at de danske kampfly kun indsættes mod
militære mål, og at opgaverne ligger inden for rammerne af mandatet samt efter bedste
evne at undgå, at der sker utilsigtede følgeskader i forbindelse med bombningerne.
Der foretages altid en grundig vurdering af risici for følgeskader i forbindelse med udvælgel-
sen af mål , og hvis grundlaget ikke er godt nok, gennemføres missionerne ikke. De efter-
retninger, som måludpegningen er baseret på, skal være valideret fra flere forskellige kilder,
ligesom piloten altid har mulighed for at afbryde missionen og korrigere, hvis tingene udvik-
ler sig anderledes en forventet. Samtidig er piloterne gennem deres uddannelse trænet i at
undgå følgeskader. Desuden anvendes der udelukkende ammunitionstyper, der kan ramme
mål på jorden med stor præcision, således at risikoen for utilsigtede følgeskader begrænses.
Forsvaret har oplyst, at der ikke er modtaget meldinger om eller indikationer på, at der har
været civile tab i forbindelse med de danske bombninger.
Ud over den humanitære folkeret er bidraget underlagt magtanvendelsesreglerne for missi-
onen, samt eventuelle begrænsninger fastsat i Forsvarets direktiver. Reglerne i den humani-
tære folkeret vil altid have forrang.
Missionen forløber hidtil som planlagt. Alle de danske bomber er præcisionsstyrede, hvilket
vil sige, at de styres mod deres mål af enten laser eller GPS.
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I henhold til gældende mandat (B123) er det danske F-16 bidrag indtil videre udsendt i 12
måneder frem til primo oktober 2015.
Kapacitetsopbygningsbidraget
Formålet med kapacitetsopbygningsbidraget er at vejlede og uddanne irakiske sikkerheds-
styrker for derved at skabe forudsætningerne for, at irakerne selv kan gennemføre operati-
oner med henblik på at bekæmpe ISIL.
Det danske kontingent er udsendt til Al-Asad luftbasen i det vestlige Irak og består af ca.
120 trænere, sikringsfolk, logistikere m.v. Selve træningen gennemføres i samarbejde mel-
lem danske og amerikanske soldater, og de to bidrag er fuldt ud integrerede. Kontingentet
er underlagt en amerikansk chef, mens den danske forsvarschef bevarer fuld kommando
over de danske styrker.
Samlet set har det danske træningsbidrag på Al Asad indtil videre har været med til at ud-
danne over 1.400 irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker. Der gennemføres primært infanteriuddannelse
i grundlæggende færdigheder, herunder våbenbetjening og bykamp. Desuden undervises
der bl.a. i imødegåelse af vejsidebomber samt i krigens love.
Siden det danske træningsbidrag ankom til Al Asad i januar, har der været perioder, hvor
det har været vanskeligt at sikre en kontinuerlig tilgang af irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker, der
har kunnet deltage i træningen. Den vigtigste forklaring på dette er, at de irakiske soldater
har været indsat i kampen mod ISIL og derfor ikke har kunnet frigives til at deltage i træ-
ningen. Al-Asad basen ligger midt i et område, hvor ISIL står stærkt, og i komplekse krigs-
situationer, som den i Irak, er det desværre ikke altid muligt at kontrollere de vilkår, som
vores soldater arbejder under.
Gennem de seneste par måneder har der dog været en stabil tilgang af irakiske sikkerheds-
styrker, men erfaringen har dog vist, at der kan ske justeringer i sådanne planer, og at der
kan opstå ændringer i træningssituationen med meget kort varsel – både til det værre og til
det bedre.
Forsvaret har løbende været i kontakt med den amerikansk ledede koalition omkring udfor-
dringerne, og der er fra amerikansk side løbende blevet lagt pres på den irakiske hærledelse
for at sikre tilgangen af nye enheder. Forsvaret har naturligvis sammen med koalitionen
fokus på også fremadrettet at sikre den bedst mulige anvendelse af det danske træningsbi-
drag.
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Ud over det nuværende kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag på al-Asad har Forsvaret tidligere (no-
vember 2014 til februar 2015) udsendt et hold på 28 personer, som sammen med britiske
soldater trænede kurdiske sikkerhedsstyrker i al-Sulaymaniyah-provinsen i det nordlige Irak.
Kombinationen af de to bidrag medfører, at Danmark har bidraget til at træne både kurdiske
og irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker.
Aftalen mellem den amerikansk ledede koalition og den irakiske regering er, at der gennem-
føres udannelse af irakiske enheder på fire kendte lokaliteter i Irak:
 Besmayah (syd for Bagdad)
 Taji (nord for Bagdad)
 Erbil (Kurdistan)
 Al Asad (Al Anbar-provisen)
I henhold til mandatet (B123) er der ikke fastsat noget sluttidspunkt for det danske træ-
ningsbidrag.
Stabsbidraget
Der er i øjeblikket udsendt ca. 15 danske stabsofficerer i koalitionens regionale stabshoved-
kvarterer i Kuwait, Qatar og Irak. Stabsbidraget bidrager til planlægning og gennemførelse
af de militære operationer i Irak.
Fremsat den 30. september 2014 af udenrigsministeren (Martin Lidegaard)
Forslag til folketingsbeslutning
om
yderligere dansk militært bidrag til støtte for indsatsen mod ISIL
Folketinget meddeler sit samtykke til, at et yderligere
dansk militært bidrag – efter anmodning fra den irakiske og
den amerikanske regering – stilles til rådighed for den inter-
nationale indsats til støtte for Iraks militære indsats mod ter-
rorbevægelsen ISIL og for at bistå myndighederne i Irak
med at beskytte civilbefolkningen mod alvorlige overgreb.
Beslutningsforslag nr. B 123 Folketinget 2013-14
Journalnummer
DokumentId
Bemærkninger til forslaget
I. Terrororganisationen Islamic State of Iraq and the Le-
vant (ISIL) udgør en alvorlig trussel mod befolkningerne i
Irak, Syrien og det øvrige Mellemøsten og udgør også en
voksende risiko for dansk og international sikkerhed. ISIL
truer i særdeleshed Iraks stabilitet og integritet som sam-
menhængende stat samtidig med, at gruppen skaber sig et
frirum, hvorfra den bl.a. kan planlægge og gennemføre ter-
rorangreb i regionen og resten af verden.
I samarbejde med lokale bevæbnede sunni-arabiske grup-
per med rødder i Iraks tidligere regerings‐ og sikkerheds-
strukturer har ISIL i perioden fra januar 2014 til august 2014
taget kontrollen over store dele af det vestlige og nordvestli-
ge Irak. Samtidig har ISIL gennem bl.a. pres og trusler for-
mået at få flere lokale sunnistammer til at deltage i kampene
mod de irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker og de shiamuslimske mi-
litser, ligesom gruppen har formået at tiltrække såkaldte
”foreign fighters”. ISIL råder over betydelige militære og
økonomiske midler, der indtil videre har gjort organisatio-
nen i stand til også at gennemføre større og længerevarende
offensive operationer.
ISIL har systematisk begået massive overgreb, herunder
massehenrettelser. FN's sikkerhedsrådsresolution 2178 af
24. september 2014 og resolution 2170 af 15. august 2014
fordømmer ISIL og de grove overgreb mod civile og alvorli-
ge krænkelser af menneskerettighederne. Siden ISIL inten-
siverede sine angreb i Irak i juni i år, er hundredetusindvis
fordrevet. FN anslår, at ca. 1,8 millioner irakere er blevet
fordrevet siden årets begyndelse, heraf omkring 600.000
alene i august. Knap halvdelen af de internt fordrevne er
flygtet til det kurdiske selvstyreområde. Samtidig gør kamp-
handlingerne og ISIL’s tilstedeværelse det svært for huma-
nitære aktører at opnå adgang til de nødlidende i konflikt-
områderne.
ISIL har udnyttet den udbredte utilfredshed med Iraks
centralstyre blandt landets sunni-arabiske mindretal. Util-
fredsheden bunder bl.a. i den forhenværende al-Maliki-lede-
de regerings uforsonlige linje over for det sunni-arabiske
mindretal og den manglende vilje til at inddrage landets kur-
dere og sunnier i den politiske proces. Den 8. september
2014 godkendte det irakiske parlament en ny og mere inklu-
siv samlingsregering under ledelse af premierminister al-
Abadi. Det er forhåbningen, at lokale sunni-arabiske grup-
pers støtte til ISIL på sigt vil vige til fordel for en i højere
grad repræsentativ regering med en mere inddragende poli-
tik.
ISIL’s fremgang i Irak er bl.a. en konsekvens af svage na-
tionale sikkerhedsstrukturer. Dannelsen af en bredere sam-
mensat regering styrker grundlaget for en effektivisering og
styrkelse af landets sikkerhedsstyrker. Hvis de irakiske styr-
ker skal blive i stand til at nedkæmpe ISIL og genetablere
territoriel kontrol, er der samtidig et akut behov for omfat-
tende international støtte til militær træning, uddannelse og
rådgivning.
Den irakiske regering udsendte gennem FN’s sikkerheds-
råd den 25. juni 2014 en generel appel til det internationale
samfund om assistance i kampen mod ISIL. For at standse
ISIL’s fremmarch i Irak og med henvisning til den forværre-
de humanitære situation i Irak, iværksætte USA den 8. au-
gust 2014 målrettede luftangreb på anmodning fra den iraki-
ske regering. Samtidig iværksattes humanitære indsatser til
hjælp af yazidi-mindretallet og andre udsatte grupper såvel
som våbenstøtte til de kurdiske myndigheder. Efterfølgende
har USA sammen med en række lande fra regionen siden
den 22. september 2014 tillige indledt luftoperationer imod
ISIL i Syrien.
Den indledende amerikanske og internationale indsats har
bidraget til at afhjælpe den humanitære krise og gjort det
muligt for irakiske og kurdiske styrker i nogen udstrækning
at håndtere ISIL’s offensiv, herunder at generobre områder,
som ISIL tidligere havde overtaget. Udover at yde humani-
tær bistand stillede Danmark et C-130J transportfly til rådig-
hed for den amerikansk-ledede operation i Irak, jf. B122.
Der vurderes at være behov for yderligere støtte til Iraks
kamp mod ISIL, herunder for, i overensstemmelse med prin-
cippet om Responsibility to Protect, at bistå myndigheder i
Irak med at beskytte civilbefolkningen mod alvorlige over-
greb.
II. Danmark var med bl.a. transportfly-bidraget blandt de
første lande til at støtte den amerikansk-ledede indsats mod
ISIL. Det har været vigtigt for Danmark, at kampen mod
ISIL har opbakning fra så bred en kreds af lande som mu-
ligt, herunder ikke mindst landene i regionen, samt at der
gennemføres en bredspektret indsats til imødegåelsen af
ISIL. Efter USA den 8. august 2014 iværksatte militær støtte
til kampen mod ISIL, har man parallelt arbejdet for at samle
en bred, international koalition mod ISIL for at sikre, at be-
kæmpelsen af ISIL er bredt forankret og nyder opbakning
fra regionen.
Danmark deltog som ét af 10 lande i et møde på ameri-
kansk initiativ om den fremtidige strategi for bekæmpelsen
af ISIL i forbindelse med NATO-topmødet i Wales den 5.
september 2014. Danmark deltog også i den internationale
konference om fred og sikkerhed i Irak med deltagelse af 26
lande og 3 internationale organisationer i Paris den 15. sep-
tember 2014 samt i en særlig debat i FN’s sikkerhedsråd den
19. september 2014.
FN's sikkerhedsråd understregede i en formandskabsudta-
lelse den 19. september 2014, at ISIL udgør en stor regional
trussel og opfordrede det internationale samfund til yderli-
gere at styrke og udvide støtten til den irakiske regering i
kampen mod ISIL og relaterede terrorgrupper. Med henvis-
ning til den tidligere fremsatte appel fra den 25. juni 2014
samt den hastigt voksende koalition mod ISIL genfremsatte
den irakiske regering i brev af 20. september 2014 til FN’s
sikkerhedsråd anmodningen om støtte og gav sit udtrykkeli-
ge samtykke til, at USA leder den samlede internationale
indsats mod ISIL. I sin tale til FN's generalforsamling den
2
26. september 2014 kom Iraks præsident igen med en stærk
appel til det internationale samfund om at fortsætte støtten
til den irakiske regering med at yde beskyttelse til Iraks ud-
satte civilbefolkning og støtte bekæmpelsen af ISIL.
USA har den 25. september 2014 fremsat en konkret an-
modning om yderligere danske bidrag til den internationale
koalitions indsats mod ISIL med henvisning til militære be-
hov af hastende karakter. Anmodningen omfatter bidrag til
luftoperationer i form af informationsindhentning og luftan-
greb i Irak, samt stabsbidrag til koalitionshovedkvarterer.
Da koalitionens luftangreb mod ISIL vil have størst varig ef-
fekt, når de kombineres med opbygning af de irakiske og
kurdiske sikkerhedsstyrkers kapacitet, så de bedre bliver i
stand til at bekæmpe ISIL på jorden og på sigt tage vare på
egen sikkerhed, anmodes der tillige om støtte til kapacitets-
opbygning af de kurdiske og irakiske styrker.
En samlet dansk plan til bekæmpelse af ISIL vil bestå af
diplomatiske, civile og militære bidrag samt humanitære
midler til afhjælpning af den humanitære krise, som ISIL
har afstedkommet. Hermed afspejler det danske bidrag, at
kampen mod ISIL kræver en bredspektret indsats for varig
fred og stabilitet i regionen.
III. Det militære bidrag består af tre dele: Et F-16 kamp-
flybidrag, som vil omfatte op til i alt ca. 140 personer. Et
stabsbidrag bestående af op til ca. 20 personer. Og endeligt
et kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag, inkl. logistikbidrag, som for-
ventes at omfatte op til i alt ca. 120 personer.
Det danske styrkebidrag vil bestå af fire operative F-16
kampfly samt op til tre F-16 kampfly i logistisk reserve. Bi-
draget vil bl.a. indeholde forbindelses- og stabsofficerer ved
relevante hovedkvarterer. F-16-bidraget vil omfatte op til i
alt ca. 140 personer, idet det præcise antal bl.a. vil afhænge
af den konkrete placering og kommandostruktur. Derudover
vil der i forbindelse med etableringen af styrkebidraget på
en luftbase i regionen være behov for midlertidig udsendelse
af yderligere personer til udpakning, opstilling, etablering af
kommunikationsforbindelser og værksteder mv. De danske
fly vil kunne indsættes i det fulde spektrum af luftoperatio-
ner inden for irakisk territorium, hvilket kan indebære delta-
gelse i såvel informationsindhentning som offensive luftope-
rationer. Den luftmilitære indsats forventes koordineret af
USA. F-16 bidraget udsendes foreløbigt i op til 12 måneder,
idet forlængelse vil kunne komme på tale, jf. afsnit IX.
Endvidere vil det danske styrkebidrag bestå af et stabsbi-
drag på op til ca. 20 personer, som vil indgå i koalitionens
hovedkvarterer i og uden for regionen, herunder muligvis i
Irak. Stabsbidraget vil bl.a. skulle bidrage til planlægning og
gennemførelse af de militære operationer i Irak.
Det danske militære bidrag vil desuden bestå af kapaci-
tetsopbygningsbidrag med henblik på kapacitetsopbygning
(rådgivning, træning og uddannelse mm.) af irakiske og kur-
diske sikkerhedsstyrker forventeligt i regionen, herunder i
Irak. Opgaverne vil være rettet mod brigadeniveau og under.
Der foreligger endnu ikke en konkret tidsplan for kapacitets-
opbygningsindsatsen, men et dansk bidrag forventes at ville
indgå i en britisk eller amerikansk ramme. I tilknytning til
kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag vil der være behov for udsen-
delse af logistikbidrag. Kapacitetsopbygningsbidraget inkl.
logistikbidraget forventes at omfatte op til i alt ca. 120 per-
soner afhængig af opgaver mv.
De danske militære bidrag forventes at være under opera-
tiv kontrol af amerikanske myndigheder, men den danske
forsvarschef bevarer fuld kommando.
IV. En bred gruppe af lande støtter den amerikansk-ledede
indsats mod ISIL. Over 50 lande, heraf mere end 10 fra re-
gionen, yder militær, humanitær, politisk og anden støtte til
Irak og koalitionen. Omkring 20 lande bidrager militært
gennem direkte kampstøtte og militær træning, ved tilveje-
bringelse af våben, ammunition og andet udstyr, eller med
logistisk støtte. Udover USA bidrager Storbritannien, Fran-
krig, Nederlandene, Belgien, Australien, Bahrain, Jordan,
Saudi-Arabien, de Forenede Arabiske Emirater og Qatar til
luftoperationerne mod ISIL.
V. FN opgraderede i august 2014 krisen i Irak til den høje-
ste humanitære krisekategori. Mange familier er flygtet med
kort varsel og er i en desperat situation. To dage efter ISIL’s
indtagelse af Mosul i juni bevilligede Danmark sammenlagt
20 mio. kr. til UNHCR’s og WFP’s akutresponser. Som re-
aktion på den seneste fordrivelsesbølge i Irak i august har
Danmark desuden den 26. august 2014 bevilliget sammen-
lagt 15 mio. kr. til Dansk Flygtningehjælp, Røde Kors i
Danmark og Red Barnets humanitære indsatser i det nordli-
ge Irak. Der er ydet yderligere to millioner kroner til Bered-
skabsstyrelsens bidrag til etablering af en lejr for op mod
20.000 internt fordrevne. Sammenlagt har Danmark bidraget
med 49,2 mio. kr. til humanitære indsatser i Irak i 2014.
VI. Det folkeretlige grundlag for det danske bidrag er et
samtykke fra Irak.
Den irakiske udenrigsminister har i brev af 25. juni 2014
til FN’s generalsekretær understreget, at Irak står overfor en
alvorlig trussel fra ISIL. På den baggrund opfordrer Irak
FN’s medlemsstater til efter nærmere aftale med den iraki-
ske regering at yde støtte til Irak med henblik på at bekæm-
pe ISIL og beskytte irakisk territorium og befolkning.
Under den internationale konference om fred og sikkerhed
i Irak, der blev afholdt i Paris den 15. september 2014 med
Irak og Frankrig som værter, gav de deltagende lande, her-
under Danmark, deres tilsagn om at støtte den irakiske rege-
ring i kampen mod ISIL med alle nødvendige midler, herun-
der passende militær assistance. Landenes støtte skal ydes i
overensstemmelse med Iraks behov og folkeretten.
I forlængelse heraf har den irakiske regering i et brev af
20. september 2014 til FN’s sikkerhedsråd anmodet om og
givet sit udtrykkelige samtykke til, at USA leder den inter-
nationale indsats med henblik på at rette angreb mod ISIL’s
tilholdssteder for at fjerne den aktuelle trussel mod Irak, be-
skytte den irakiske befolkning samt udruste de irakiske styr-
ker til at genvinde kontrollen med Iraks grænser.
USA har den 25. september 2014 anmodet Danmark om
yderligere bidrag til den internationale indsats.
På baggrund af Iraks brev til FN’s sikkerhedsråd og den
amerikanske anmodning har Danmark, med forbehold for
3
parlamentarisk godkendelse, tilbudt Irak yderligere dansk
assistance, som beskrevet ovenfor. Den irakiske udenrigsmi-
nister har hilst den tilbudte danske militære assistance
velkommen.
Det danske bidrag vil være undergivet folkeretten, herun-
der den humanitære folkeret.
Indsættelse af danske F-16 fly i offensive luftoperationer
mod ISIL-mål i Irak betyder efter regeringens opfattelse, at
Danmark indtræder på Iraks side, sammen med de øvrige
militært aktive koalitionslande, i den væbnede konflikt mod
ISIL i Irak.
VII. Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (FE) har givet føl-
gende trusselsvurdering for koalitionsstyrkerne:
Generelt set kan sikkerhedssituationen lokalt ændre sig
meget hurtigt i hele Irak. Truslen fra ISIL mod koalitions-
styrker i områder og byer, som er kontrolleret af ISIL, er
MEGET HØJ. Truslen fra beskydning af helikoptere og fly,
der befinder sig i nærheden af kamphandlinger i hele Irak, er
HØJ under 5.000 meter (AGL). Truslen fra beskydning af
alle luftfartøjer, der flyver i irakisk luftrum, er generelt
MIDDEL under 5.000 meter (AGL). FE vurderer videre, at
truslen fra beskydning af luftfartøjer, der flyver over 5.000
meter (AGL) i hele Irak, er LAV. Truslen fra indirekte og
direkte beskydning i Irak er HØJ i områder med kamphand-
linger. I områder, hvor der ikke foregår direkte kamphand-
linger, herunder Bagdad by, er truslen fra indirekte og direk-
te beskydning MIDDEL. I områder, som ikke er truet af
ISIL, er truslen fra indirekte og direkte beskydning LAV.
Terrortruslen i Irak, herunder truslen fra tilbageholdelser,
kidnapninger og IED’er, er HØJ. Truslen fra civile urolighe-
der i Irak er MIDDEL. Truslen fra angreb med improvisere-
de kemiske våben i Irak er MIDDEL i områder med kamp-
handlinger og i områder kontrolleret af ISIL. I andre områ-
der er truslen fra angreb med improviserede kemiske våben
LAV. Truslen fra spionage i Irak er HØJ. Truslen fra de ira-
kiske sikkerhedsstyrker er LAV. Dog vurderer FE, at truslen
fra insiderangreb blandt de irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker er
MIDDEL. Truslen for terror rettet mod Forsvaret i Danmark
er MIDDEL.
VIII. Da det danske militære bidrag vil indgå i en indsats,
hvor der forudses anvendt militære magtmidler, forelægges
sagen for Folketinget under henvisning til Grundlovens §
19, stk. 2, med anmodning om, at Folketinget giver sit sam-
tykke til udsendelse af det danske bidrag, som beskrevet
ovenfor.
IX. Regeringen vil løbende vurdere det danske bidrags
sammensætning med henblik på at sikre en effektiv opgave-
løsning. Såfremt det skulle vise sig hensigtsmæssigt at juste-
re eller forlænge bidraget væsentligt, eller såfremt der skulle
ske en væsentlig ændring i forhold til de i afsnit III beskrev-
ne opgaver, vil regeringen rådføre sig med Det Udenrigspo-
litiske Nævn herom eller om nødvendigt på ny forelægge
sagen for Folketinget.
X. De forventede meromkostninger forbundet med udsen-
delsen af et kampflybidrag i op til et år, er behæftet med be-
tydelig usikkerhed som følge af usikkerheden om indsættel-
sernes varighed samt typer af missioner og mål mv.
Forsvaret anslår, at de samlede meromkostninger forbun-
det med udsendelse af et kampflybidrag i op til et år vil kun-
ne udgøre mellem 110–135 mio. kr., eksklusiv ammuniti-
onsforbrug. Der er betydelig usikkerhed om det forventede
ammunitionsforbrug, da det afhænger af hvilke missioner og
mål, de danske fly tildeles samt varigheden af styrkebidra-
gets indsættelse.
Forsvaret anslår, at meromkostningerne forbundet med
udsendelse af et stabsbidrag på op til ca. 20 personer, som
vil indgå i koalitionens hovedkvarterer i og uden for regio-
nen, vil kunne udgøre op til ca. 15 mio. kr. for et år.
Meromkostningerne forbundet med udsendelse af et dansk
kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag, inklusiv logistikbidrag, vil af-
hænge af størrelsen af det danske bidrag og de opgaver, der
skal løses i regi af koalitionen. Forsvaret anslår, at de for-
ventede meromkostninger ved de mulige bidrag på dette
område samlet set vil kunne udgøre op til ca. 120 mio. kr.
for et år. De konkrete meromkostninger vil afhænge af bi-
dragets endelige sammensætning, opgaven, indsættelsesvil-
kår, samarbejdspartnere mv.
Meromkostningerne forbundet med udsendelsen afholdes
inden for Forsvarets eksisterende økonomiske ramme på §
12.
4
Home | News | News Articles | One year in, officials assess anti­ISIL progress
One year in, officials assess anti­ISIL progress
By Air Force Master Sgt. Sonny Cohrs, U.S. Air Forces Central Command
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SOUTHWEST ASIA, Aug. 7, 2015 – On Aug. 8, 2014, coalition aircraft conducted the first airstrikes against the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant. A year later, senior leaders have had a chance to reflect on the progress thus far and how it shapes
the future of Operation Inherent Resolve.
Defense Secretary Ash Carter said in late July that bolstering Iraq’s security forces and building moderate, vetted Syrian
opposition forces is essential to enabling the two countries to defeat ISIL and work to establish peace within their own
countries.
An F/A­18C Hornet, attached to Strike Fighter Squadron 15, launches from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush in
August 2014. The USS Bush was in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility supporting operations in Iraq. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass
Communication Specialist 3rd Class Brian Stephens)
Iraqi soldiers of the 75th Brigade, 16th Division, prepare to clear a room during a breaching assault course at Besmaya Range Complex, Iraq,
April 18, 2015. The course, part of the Combined Joint Task Force ­ Operation Inherent Resolve’s building partner capacity mission, was led
by U.S. soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division. (Photo by Sgt. Deja Borden)
An Iraqi soldier assigned to 23rd Iraqi Army Brigade discusses a plan with an Australian soldier assigned to Task Group Taji during urban
operations training at Camp Taji, Iraq, Aug. 5, 2015. Through advise and assist and building partner capacity missions, the Combined Joint
Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve’s multinational coalition has trained more than 11,000 Iraqi security force personnel to defeat the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. William Marlow)
“We can help them. We can enable them. We can train them. We can equip them. We can support them,” he said. “But we
can't substitute for them. Because we don't live here … we can't keep them beaten. Only the people who live here can keep
them beaten.”
While coalition air power patrols the skies, ground forces continue to train and equip vetted local forces in Iraq. About 3,550
American personnel are in Iraq, helping to build partner capacities and assisting with ongoing operations.
Training for new Syrian forces is still in the early stages, but Carter views it as a “critical and complex part” of counter­ISIL
efforts.
The air campaign continues to have success in striking ISIL facilities, vehicles and equipment, and it enables both the Iraqi
Security Forces as well as anti­ISIL fighters in Syria, according to U.S. Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Kevin Killea, the chief of staff
for Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve.
“In my opinion, this is not the same fight as it was when it started, and I look at that based on the effects that we have had on
ISIL,” Killea said.
“They are much more territorial ­­ meaning they're defending more than they are on the offensive. Their attacks are smaller,
they are more focused, and they're less enduring, and all you have to do is look at the gains that have been made on the
ground recently to see … there is an effect, and there is progress,” he said.
Unlike ISIL, Killea said, the coalition works to address and minimize the possibility of collateral damage and civilian
casualties.
“We have struck … staging areas and destroyed multiple ISIL armored personnel carriers and other vehicles,” he explained.
“Coalition forces have also focused on destroying ISIL [roadside bomb] facilities. Airstrikes have gone a long way to degrade
ISIL's ability to mount large offensive attacks, as well as reducing their ability to openly control towns and cities, where they so
often inflict terror on those civilian populations."
Air Force Lt. Gen. C.Q. Brown Jr., commander of the combined force air component, said American troops and their coalition
partners have conducted more than 5,900 airstrikes since the start of Operation Inherent Resolve. The airstrikes are intended
to limit ISIL's freedom of movement, Brown said, while constraining its ability to reinforce its fighters and degrading its
command and control.
“Our coalition air power enables [anti­ISIL] ground forces in Iraq and Syria,” he said. “The faster [ISIL] falls, the sooner
innocent civilians can return to a peaceful way of life.”
The general also commended the coalition on its ability to make precise strikes against ISIL targets while minimizing
collateral damage on the ground and restricting freedom of movement for ISIL. Of the 20,000­plus coalition munitions used
against ISIL in the last year, 99 percent of them were precision­guided, Brown said.
“Coalition airstrikes are the most precise in the history of warfare,” he said. “Conducting strikes in heavily populated areas
where [ISIL] hides can present a challenge, but our coalition pilots are well disciplined and our weapon systems are
extremely accurate."
Once the ISIL members are flushed out into the open by advancing anti­ISIL fighters, they are once again susceptible to
coalition targeting, Brown added.
He said coalition forces can redirect the enemy’s advances or retreats, forcing them to travel discreetly or risk coalition
airstrikes.
"Even our combat air patrols ­ merely the presence of coalition aircraft in an area ­ also affect their freedom of movement,"
Brown explained. “And one year into this coalition effort to rid the world of these [ISIL] terrorists, the team can be proud of
what they’ve accomplished. Their hard work and sacrifice have already saved countless lives and we will not stop until we
have defeated this barbaric enemy."
Home | News | News Articles | Coalition leaders assess BPC program, ISF development
Coalition leaders assess BPC program, ISF development
CJTF ­ Operation Inherent Resolve Public Affairs
Coalition members participate in a building partner capacity conference at Camp Taji, Iraq, July 22, 2015. The conference brought together
senior leaders to assess Iraqi security force training programs at BPC sites across the country. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Charles M. Bailey)
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CAMP TAJI, Iraq, Aug. 5, 2015 – Since January, more than 60 coalition partners from around the world have joined
Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve to help Iraq defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
Leaders from the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command – Iraq, a component of CJTF­OIR, recently met to
assess the current training model for Iraqi security forces, and to develop lasting solutions in the building partner capacity
mission.
Among the topics discussed were the length of instruction, capturing lessons learned in training through a comprehensive
assessment program, and leadership development.
For an army currently engaged in a war, the opportunity to send units for longer training isn’t easy. Iraqi leaders have to
balance keeping troops available to fight ISIL and sending them to train at one of the five coalition­led BPC sites across Iraq.
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Capturing lessons learned from both combat and training to improve the readiness of the ISF was one of the most heavily
discussed topics, along with the need for strong leadership within the ranks.
“An effective assessments regime is the mark of a healthy learning organization,” said a coalition officer who oversees ISF
development. “Any gains we make in the field of assessments, especially when it directly involves our Iraqi partners, is a step
in the right direction.”
Command Sgt. Maj. Michael Green, command sergeant major of CJFLCC­I, said that leadership comes with an obligation.
“Anybody assuming a position of authority or responsibility has to meet the competencies required of that position,” Green
said. “The most important part of enhancing leadership is providing an example of 'what right looks like,' and mentorship.”
One of the ways that CJFLCC­I accomplishes this mission is by pairing ISF leaders with coalition leaders during training.
“By way of example and coaching, we look to enhance leadership skills,” Green said.
The conference highlights the coalition’s commitment to the BPC mission in Iraq as security forces fight to defeat ISIL. Nearly
11,000 ISF and Peshmerga forces have been trained at the BPC sites, with approximately 1,100 currently in training.
04/18/2015 01:17 PM
The Terror Strategist
Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State
By Christoph Reuter
An I raqi officer planned I slamic State's takeover in Syria and SPI EGEL has been given
exclusive access to his papers. They portray an organization that, w hile seemingly driven by
religious fanaticism, is actually coldly calculating.
Aloof. Polite. Cajoling. Extremely attentive. Restrained. Dishonest. Inscrutable. Malicious. The rebels from
northern Syria, remembering encounters with him months later, recall completely different facets of the
man. But they agree on one thing: "We never knew exactly who we were sitting across from."
In fact, not even those who shot and killed him after a brief firefight in the town of Tal Rifaat on a January
morning in 2014 knew the true identity of the tall man in his late fifties. They were unaware that they
had killed the strategic head of the group calling itself "Islamic State" (IS). The fact that this could have
happened at all was the result of a rare but fatal miscalculation by the brilliant planner. The local rebels
placed the body into a refrigerator, in which they intended to bury him. Only later, when they realized how
important the man was, did they lift his body out again.
Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi was the real name of the Iraqi, whose bony features were softened by a
white beard. But no one knew him by that name. Even his best-known pseudonym, Haji Bakr, wasn't
widely known. But that was precisely part of the plan. The former colonel in the intelligence service of
Saddam Hussein's air defense force had been secretly pulling the strings at IS for years. Former members
of the group had repeatedly mentioned him as one of its leading figures. Still, it was never clear what
exactly his role was.
But when the architect of the Islamic State died, he left something behind that he had intended to keep
strictly confidential: the blueprint for this state. It is a folder full of handwritten organizational charts, lists
and schedules, which describe how a country can be gradually subjugated. SPIEGEL has gained exclusive
access to the 31 pages, some consisting of several pages pasted together. They reveal a multilayered
composition and directives for action, some already tested and others newly devised for the anarchical
situation in Syria's rebel-held territories. In a sense, the documents are the source code of the most
successful terrorist army in recent history.
Until now, much of the information about IS has come from fighters who had defected and data sets from
the IS internal administration seized in Baghdad. But none of this offered an explanation for the group's
meteoric rise to prominence, before air strikes in the late summer of 2014 put a stop to its triumphal
march.
For the first time, the Haji Bakr documents now make it possible to reach conclusions on how the IS
leadership is organized and what role former officials in the government of ex-dictator Saddam Hussein
play in it. Above all, however, they show how the takeover in northern Syria was planned, making the
group's later advances into Iraq possible in the first place. In addition, months of research undertaken by
SPIEGEL in Syria, as well as other newly discovered records, exclusive to SPIEGEL, show that Haji Bakr's
instructions were carried out meticulously.
Bakr's documents were long hidden in a tiny addition to a house in embattled northern Syria. Reports of
their existence were first made by an eyewitness who had seen them in Haji Bakr's house shortly after his
death. In April 2014, a single page from the file was smuggled to Turkey, where SPIEGEL was able to
examine it for the first time. It only became possible to reach Tal Rifaat to evaluate the entire set of
handwritten papers in November 2014.
"Our greatest concern was that these plans could fall into the wrong hands and would never have become
known," said the man who has been storing Haji Bakr's notes after pulling them out from under a tall
stack of boxes and blankets. The man, fearing the IS death squads, wishes to remain anonymous.
The Master Plan
The story of this collection of documents begins at a time when few had yet heard of the "Islamic State."
When Iraqi national Haji Bakr traveled to Syria as part of a tiny advance party in late 2012, he had a
seemingly absurd plan: IS would capture as much territory as possible in Syria. Then, using Syria as a
beachhead, it would invade Iraq.
Bakr took up residence in an inconspicuous house in Tal Rifaat, north of Aleppo. The town was a good
choice. In the 1980s, many of its residents had gone to work in the Gulf nations, especially Saudi Arabia.
When they returned, some brought along radical convictions and contacts. In 2013, Tal Rifaat would
become IS' stronghold in Aleppo Province, with hundreds of fighters stationed there.
It was there that the "Lord of the Shadows," as some called him, sketched out the structure of the
Islamic State, all the way down to the local level, compiled lists relating to the gradual infiltration of
villages and determined who would oversee whom. Using a ballpoint pen, he drew the chains of command
in the security apparatus on stationery. Though presumably a coincidence, the stationery was from the
Syrian Defense Ministry and bore the letterhead of the department in charge of accommodations and
furniture.
What Bakr put on paper, page by page, with carefully outlined boxes for individual responsibilities, was
nothing less than a blueprint for a takeover. It was not a manifesto of faith, but a technically precise plan
for an "Islamic Intelligence State" -- a caliphate run by an organization that resembled East Germany's
notorious Stasi domestic intelligence agency.
This blueprint was implemented with astonishing accuracy in the ensuing months. The plan would always
begin with the same detail: The group recruited followers under the pretense of opening a Dawah office,
an Islamic missionary center. Of those who came to listen to lectures and attend courses on Islamic life,
one or two men were selected and instructed to spy on their village and obtain a wide range of
information. To that end, Haji Bakr compiled lists such as the following:
List the powerful families.
Name the powerful individuals in these families.
Find out their sources of income.
Name names and the sizes of (rebel) brigades in the village.
Find out the names of their leaders, who controls the brigades and their political orientation.
Find out their illegal activities (according to Sharia law), which could be used to blackmail them if
necessary.
The spies were told to note such details as whether someone was a criminal or a homosexual, or was
involved in a secret affair, so as to have ammunition for blackmailing later. "We will appoint the smartest
ones as Sharia sheiks," Bakr had noted. "We will train them for a while and then dispatch them." As a
postscript, he had added that several "brothers" would be selected in each town to marry the daughters of
the most influential families, in order to "ensure penetration of these families without their knowledge."
The spies were to find out as much as possible about the target towns: Who lived there, who was in
charge, which families were religious, which Islamic school of religious jurisprudence they belonged to,
how many mosques there were, who the imam was, how many wives and children he had and how old
they were. Other details included what the imam's sermons were like, whether he was more open to the
Sufi, or mystical variant of Islam, whether he sided with the opposition or the regime, and what his
position was on jihad. Bakr also wanted answers to questions like: Does the imam earn a salary? If so,
who pays it? Who appoints him? Finally: How many people in the village are champions of democracy?
The agents were supposed to function as seismic signal waves, sent out to track down the tiniest cracks,
as well as age-old faults within the deep layers of society -- in short, any information that could be used to
divide and subjugate the local population. The informants included former intelligence spies, but also
regime opponents who had quarreled with one of the rebel groups. Some were also young men and
adolescents who needed money or found the work exciting. Most of the men on Bakr's list of informants,
such as those from Tal Rifaat, were in their early twenties, but some were as young as 16 or 17.
The plans also include areas like finance, schools, daycare, the media and transportation. But there is a
constantly recurring, core theme, which is meticulously addressed in organizational charts and lists of
responsibilities and reporting requirements: surveillance, espionage, murder and kidnapping.
For each provincial council, Bakr had planned for an emir, or commander, to be in charge of murders,
abductions, snipers, communication and encryption, as well as an emir to supervise the other emirs -- "in
case they don't do their jobs well." The nucleus of this godly state would be the demonic clockwork of a
cell and commando structure designed to spread fear.
From the very beginning, the plan was to have the intelligence services operate in parallel, even at the
provincial level. A general intelligence department reported to the "security emir" for a region, who was in
charge of deputy-emirs for individual districts. A head of secret spy cells and an "intelligence service and
information manager" for the district reported to each of these deputy-emirs. The spy cells at the local
level reported to the district emir's deputy. The goal was to have everyone keeping an eye on everyone
else.
Those in charge of training the "Sharia judges in intelligence gathering" also reported to the district emir,
while a separate department of "security officers" was assigned to the regional emir.
Sharia, the courts, prescribed piety -- all of this served a single goal: surveillance and control. Even the
word that Bakr used for the conversion of true Muslims, takwin, is not a religious but a technical term that
translates as "implementation," a prosaic word otherwise used in geology or construction. Still, 1,200
years ago, the word followed a unique path to a brief moment of notoriety. Shiite alchemists used it to
describe the creation of artificial life. In his ninth century "Book of Stones," the Persian Jabir Ibn Hayyan
wrote -- using a secret script and codes -- about the creation of a homunculus. "The goal is to deceive all,
but those who love God." That may also have been to the liking of Islamic State strategists, although the
group views Shiites as apostates who shun true Islam. But for Haji Bakr, God and the 1,400-year-old faith
in him was but one of many modules at his disposal to arrange as he liked for a higher purpose.
The Beginnings in I raq
It seemed as if George Orwell had been the model for this spawn of paranoid surveillance. But it was much
simpler than that. Bakr was merely modifying what he had learned in the past: Saddam Hussein's
omnipresent security apparatus, in which no one, not even generals in the intelligence service, could be
certain they weren't being spied on.
Expatriate Iraqi author Kanan Makiya described this "Republic of Fear" in a book as a country in which
anyone could simply disappear and in which Saddam could seal his official inauguration in 1979 by
exposing a bogus conspiracy.
There is a simple reason why there is no mention in Bakr's writings of prophecies relating to the
establishment of an Islamic State allegedly ordained by God: He believed that fanatical religious
convictions alone were not enough to achieve victory. But he did believe that the faith of others could be
exploited.
In 2010, Bakr and a small group of former Iraqi intelligence officers made Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir
and later "caliph," the official leader of the Islamic State. They reasoned that Baghdadi, an educated cleric,
would give the group a religious face.
Bakr was "a nationalist, not an Islamist," says Iraqi journalist Hisham al-Hashimi, as he recalls the former
career officer, who was stationed with Hashimi's cousin at the Habbaniya Air Base. "Colonel Samir," as
Hashimi calls him, "was highly intelligent, firm and an excellent logistician." But when Paul Bremer, then
head of the US occupational authority in Baghdad, "dissolved the army by decree in May 2003, he was
bitter and unemployed."
Thousands of well-trained Sunni officers were robbed of their livelihood with the stroke of a pen. In doing
so, America created its most bitter and intelligent enemies. Bakr went underground and met Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi in Anbar Province in western Iraq. Zarqawi, a Jordanian by birth, had previously run a training
camp for international terrorist pilgrims in Afghanistan. Starting in 2003, he gained global notoriety as the
mastermind of attacks against the United Nations, US troops and Shiite Muslims. He was even too radical
for former Al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Zarqawi died in a US air strike in 2006.
Although Iraq's dominant Baath Party was secular, the two systems ultimately shared a conviction that
control over the masses should lie in the hands of a small elite that should not be answerable to anyone --
because it ruled in the name of a grand plan, legitimized by either God or the glory of Arab history. The
secret of IS' success lies in the combination of opposites, the fanatical beliefs of one group and the
strategic calculations of the other.
Bakr gradually became one of the military leaders in Iraq, and he was held from 2006 to 2008 in the US
military's Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib Prison. He survived the waves of arrests and killings by American
and Iraqi special units, which threatened the very existence of the IS precursor organization in 2010,
Islamic State in Iraq.
For Bakr and a number of former high-ranking officers, this presented an opportunity to seize power in a
significantly smaller circle of jihadists. They utilized the time they shared in Camp Bucca to establish a
large network of contacts. But the top leaders had already known each other for a long time. Haji Bakr and
an additional officer were part of the tiny secret-service unit attached to the anti-aircraft division. Two
other IS leaders were from a small community of Sunni Turkmen in the town of Tal Afar. One of them was
a high-ranking intelligence officer as well.
In 2010, the idea of trying to defeat Iraqi government forces militarily seemed futile. But a powerful
underground organization took shape through acts of terror and protection rackets. When the uprising
against the dictatorship of the Assad clan erupted in neighboring Syria, the organization's leaders sensed
an opportunity. By late 2012, particularly in the north, the formerly omnipotent government forces had
largely been defeated and expelled. Instead, there were now hundreds of local councils and rebel brigades,
part of an anarchic mix that no one could keep track of. It was a state of vulnerability that the tightly
organized group of ex-officers sought to exploit.
Attempts to explain IS and its rapid rise to power vary depending on who is doing the explaining. Terrorism
experts view IS as an al-Qaida offshoot and attribute the absence of spectacular attacks to date to what
they view as a lack of organizational capacity. Criminologists see IS as a mafia-like holding company out to
maximize profit. Scholars in the humanities point to the apocalyptic statements by the IS media
department, its glorification of death and the belief that Islamic State is involved in a holy mission.
But apocalyptic visions alone are not enough to capture cities and take over countries. Terrorists don't
establish countries. And a criminal cartel is unlikely to generate enthusiasm among supporters around the
world, who are willing to give up their lives to travel to the "Caliphate" and potentially their deaths.
IS has little in common with predecessors like al-Qaida aside from its jihadist label. There is essentially
nothing religious in its actions, its strategic planning, its unscrupulous changing of alliances and its
precisely implemented propaganda narratives. Faith, even in its most extreme form, is just one of many
means to an end. Islamic State's only constant maxim is the expansion of power at any price.
The I mplementation of the Plan
The expansion of IS began so inconspicuously that, a year later, many Syrians had to think for a moment
about when the jihadists had appeared in their midst. The Dawah offices that were opened in many towns
in northern Syria in the spring of 2013 were innocent-looking missionary offices, not unlike the ones that
Islamic charities have opened worldwide.
When a Dawah office opened in Raqqa, "all they said was that they were 'brothers,' and they never said a
word about the 'Islamic State'," reports a doctor who fled from the city. A Dawah office was also opened in
Manbij, a liberal city in Aleppo Province, in the spring of 2013. "I didn't even notice it at first," recalls a
young civil rights activist. "Anyone was allowed to open what he wished. We would never have suspected
that someone other than the regime could threaten us. It was only when the fighting erupted in January
that we learned that Da'ish," the Arab acronym for IS, "had already rented several apartments where it
could store weapons and hide its men."
The situation was similar in the towns of al-Bab, Atarib and Azaz. Dawah offices were also opened in
neighboring Idlib Province in early 2013, in the towns of Sermada, Atmeh, Kafr Takharim, al-Dana and
Salqin. As soon as it had identified enough "students" who could be recruited as spies, IS expanded its
presence. In al-Dana, additional buildings were rented, black flags raised and streets blocked off. In towns
where there was too much resistance or it was unable to secure enough supporters, IS chose to withdraw
temporarily. At the beginning, its modus operandi was to expand without risking open resistance, and
abduct or kill "hostile individuals," while denying any involvement in these nefarious activities.
The fighters themselves also remained inconspicuous at first. Bakr and the advance guard had not brought
them along from Iraq, which would have made sense. In fact, they had explicitly prohibited their Iraqi
fighters from going to Syria. They also chose not to recruit very many Syrians. The IS leaders opted for
the most complicated option instead: They decided to gather together all the foreign radicals who had
been coming to the region since the summer of 2012. Students from Saudi Arabia, office workers from
Tunisia and school dropouts from Europe with no military experience were to form an army with battle-
tested Chechens and Uzbeks. It would be located in Syria under Iraqi command.
Already by the end of 2012, military camps had been erected in several places. Initially, no one knew what
groups they belonged to. The camps were strictly organized and the men there came from numerous
countries -- and didn't speak to journalists. Very few of them were from Iraq. Newcomers received two
months of training and were drilled to be unconditionally obedient to the central command. The set-up
was inconspicuous and also had another advantage: though necessarily chaotic at the beginning, what
emerged were absolutely loyal troops. The foreigners knew nobody outside of their comrades, had no
reason to show mercy and could be quickly deployed to many different places. This was in stark contrast to
the Syrian rebels, who were mostly focused on defending their hometowns and had to look after their
families and help out with the harvest. In fall 2013, IS books listed 2,650 foreign fighters in the Province
of Aleppo alone. Tunisians represented a third of the total, followed by Saudi Arabians, Turks, Egyptians
and, in smaller numbers, Chechens, Europeans and Indonesians.
Later too, the jihadist cadres were hopelessly outnumbered by the Syrian rebels. Although the rebels
distrusted the jihadists, they didn't join forces to challenge IS because they didn't want to risk opening up
a second front. Islamic State, though, increased its clout with a simple trick: The men always appeared
wearing black masks, which not only made them look terrifying, but also meant that no one could know
how many of them there actually were. When groups of 200 fighters appeared in five different places one
after the other, did it mean that IS had 1,000 people? Or 500? Or just a little more than 200? In addition,
spies also ensured that IS leadership was constantly informed of where the population was weak or divided
or where there were local conflict, allowing IS to offer itself as a protective power in order to gain a
foothold.
The Capture of Raqqa
Raqqa, a once sleepy provincial city on the Euphrates River, was to become the prototype of the complete
IS conquest. The operation began subtly, gradually became more brutal and, in the end, IS prevailed over
larger opponents without much of a fight. "We were never very political," explained one doctor who had
fled Raqqa for Turkey. "We also weren't religious and didn't pray much."
When Raqqa fell to the rebels in March 2013, a city council was rapidly elected. Lawyers, doctors and
journalists organized themselves. Women's groups were established. The Free Youth Assembly was
founded, as was the movement "For Our Rights" and dozens of other initiatives. Anything seemed possible
in Raqqa. But in the view of some who fled the city, it also marked the start of its downfall.
True to Haji Bakr's plan, the phase of infiltration was followed by the elimination of every person who
might have been a potential leader or opponent. The first person hit was the head of the city council, who
was kidnapped in mid-May 2013 by masked men. The next person to disappear was the brother of a
prominent novelist. Two days later, the man who had led the group that painted a revolutionary flag on
the city walls vanished.
"We had an idea who kidnapped him," one of his friends explains, "but no one dared any longer to do
anything." The system of fear began to take hold. Starting in July, first dozens and then hundreds of
people disappeared. Sometimes their bodies were found, but they usually disappeared without a trace. In
August, the IS military leadership dispatched several cars driven by suicide bombers to the headquarters of
the FSA brigade, the "Grandsons of the Prophet," killing dozens of fighters and leading the rest to flee. The
other rebels merely looked on. IS leadership had spun a web of secret deals with the brigades so that each
thought it was only the others who might be the targets of IS attacks.
On Oct. 17, 2013, Islamic State called all civic leaders, clerics and lawyers in the city to a meeting. At the
time, some thought it might be a gesture of conciliation. Of the 300 people who attended the meeting,
only two spoke out against the ongoing takeover, the kidnappings and the murders committed by IS.
One of the two was Muhannad Habayebna, a civil rights activist and journalist well known in the city. He
was found five days later tied up and executed with a gunshot wound to his head. Friends received an
anonymous email with a photo of his body. The message included only one sentence: "Are you sad about
your friend now?" Within hours around 20 leading members of the opposition fled to Turkey. The
revolution in Raqqa had come to an end.
A short time later, the 14 chiefs of the largest clans gave an oath of allegiance to Emir Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi. There's even a film of the ceremony. They were sheiks with the same clans that had sworn
their steadfast loyalty to Syrian President Bashar Assad only two years earlier.
The Death of Haji Bakr
Until the end of 2013, everything was going according to Islamic State's plan -- or at least according to
the plan of Haji Bakr. The caliphate was expanding village by village without being confronted by unified
resistance from Syrian rebels. Indeed, the rebels seemed paralyzed in the face of IS' sinister power.
But when IS henchmen brutally tortured a well-liked rebel leader and doctor to death in December 2013,
something unexpected happened. Across the country, Syrian brigades -- both secular and parts of the
radical Nusra Front -- joined together to do battle with Islamic State. By attacking IS everywhere at the
same time, they were able to rob the Islamists of their tactical advantage -- that of being able to rapidly
move units to where they were most urgently needed.
Within weeks, IS was pushed out of large regions of northern Syria. Even Raqqa, the Islamic State capital,
had almost fallen by the time 1,300 IS fighters arrived from Iraq. But they didn't simply march into battle.
Rather, they employed a trickier approach, recalls the doctor who fled. "In Raqqa, there were so many
brigades on the move that nobody knew who exactly the others were. Suddenly, a group in rebel dress
began to shoot at the other rebels. They all simply fled."
A small, simple masquerade had helped IS fighters to victory: Just change out of black clothes into jeans
and vests. They did the same thing in the border town of Jarablus. On several occasions, rebels in other
locations took drivers from IS suicide vehicles into custody. The drivers asked in surprise: "You are Sunnis
too? Our emir told me you were infidels from Assad's army."
Once complete, the picture begins to look absurd: God's self-proclaimed enforcers on Earth head out to
conquer a future worldly empire, but with what? With ninja outfits, cheap tricks and espionage cells
camouflaged as missionary offices. But it worked. IS held on to Raqqa and was able to reconquer some of
its lost territories. But it came too late for the great planner Haji Bakr.
Haji Bakr stayed behind in the small city of Tal Rifaat, where IS had long had the upper hand. But when
rebels attacked at the end of January 2014, the city became divided within just a few hours. One half
remained under IS control while the other was wrested away by one of the local brigades. Haji Bakr was
stuck in the wrong half. Furthermore, in order to remain incognito he had refrained from moving into one
of the heavily guarded IS military quarters. And so, the godfather of snitching was snitched on by a
neighbor. "A Daish sheik lives next door!" the man called. A local commander named Abdelmalik Hadbe
and his men drove over to Bakr's house. A woman jerked open the door and said brusquely: "My husband
isn't here."
But his car is parked out front, the rebels countered.
At that moment, Haji Bakr appeared at the door in his pajamas. Hadbe ordered him to come with them,
whereupon Bakr protested that he wanted to get dressed. No, Hadbe repeated: "Come with us!
Immediately!"
Surprisingly nimbly for his age, Bakr jumped back and kicked the door closed, according to two people who
witnessed the scene. He then hid under the stairs and yelled: "I have a suicide belt! I'll blow up all of us!"
He then came out with a Kalashnikov and began shooting. Hadbe then fired his weapon and killed Bakr.
When the men later learned who they had killed, they searched the house, gathering up computers,
passports, mobile phone SIM cards, a GPS device and, most importantly, papers. They didn't find a Koran
anywhere.
Haji Bakr was dead and the local rebels took his wife into custody. Later, the rebels exchanged her for
Turkish IS hostages at the request of Ankara. Bakr's valuable papers were initially hidden away in a
chamber, where they spent several months.
A Second Cache of Documents
Haji Bakr's state continued to work even without its creator. Just how precisely his plans were
implemented -- point by point -- is confirmed by the discovery of another file. When IS was forced to
rapidly abandon its headquarters in Aleppo in January 2014, they tried to burn their archive, but they ran
into a problem similar to that confronted by the East German secret police 25 years earlier: They had too
many files.
Some of them remained intact and ended up with the al-Tawhid Brigade, Aleppo's largest rebel group at
the time. After lengthy negotiations, the group agreed to make the papers available to SPIEGEL for
exclusive publication rights -- everything except a list of IS spies inside of al-Tawhid.
An examination of the hundreds of pages of documents reveals a highly complex system involving the
infiltration and surveillance of all groups, including IS' own people. The jihad archivists maintained long
lists noting which informants they had installed in which rebel brigades and government militias. It was
even noted who among the rebels was a spy for Assad's intelligence service.
"They knew more than we did, much more," said the documents' custodian. Personnel files of the fighters
were among them, including detailed letters of application from incoming foreigners, such as the Jordanian
Nidal Abu Eysch. He sent along all of his terror references, including their telephone numbers, and the file
number of a felony case against him. His hobbies were also listed: hunting, boxing, bomb building.
IS wanted to know everything, but at the same time, the group wanted to deceive everyone about its
true aims. One multiple-page report, for example, carefully lists all of the pretexts IS could use to justify
the seizure of the largest flour mill in northern Syria. It includes such excuses as alleged embezzlement as
well as the ungodly behavior of the mill's workers. The reality -- that all strategically important facilities
like industrial bakeries, grain silos and generators were to be seized and their equipment sent to the
caliphate's unofficial capital Raqqa -- was to be kept under wraps.
Over and over again, the documents reveal corollaries with Haji Bakr's plans for the establishment of IS --
for example that marrying in to influential families should be pushed. The files from Aleppo also included a
list of 34 fighters who wanted wives in addition to other domestic needs. Abu Luqman and Abu Yahya al-
Tunis, for example, noted that they needed an apartment. Abu Suheib and Abu Ahmed Osama requested
bedroom furniture. Abu al-Baraa al Dimaschqi asked for financial assistance in addition to a complete set of
furniture, while Abu Azmi wanted a fully automatic washing machine.
Shifting Alliances
But in the first months of 2014, yet another legacy from Haji Bakr began playing a decisive role: His
decade of contacts to Assad's intelligence services.
In 2003, the Damascus regime was panicked that then-US President George W. Bush, after his victory
over Saddam Hussein, would have his troops continue into Syria to topple Assad as well. Thus, in the
ensuing years, Syrian intelligence officials organized the transfer of thousands of radicals from Libya, Saudi
Arabia and Tunisia to al-Qaida in Iraq. Ninety percent of the suicide attackers entered Iraq via the Syrian
route. A strange relationship developed between Syrian generals, international jihadists and former Iraqi
officers who had been loyal to Saddam -- a joint venture of deadly enemies, who met repeatedly to the
west of Damascus.
At the time, the primary aim was to make the lives of the Americans in Iraq hell. Ten years later, Bashar
Assad had a different motive to breathe new life into the alliance: He wanted to sell himself to the world as
the lesser of several evils. Islamist terror, the more gruesome the better, was too important to leave it up
to the terrorists. The regime's relationship with Islamic State is -- just as it was to its predecessor a decade
prior -- marked by a completely tactical pragmatism. Both sides are trying to use the other in the
assumption that it will emerge as the stronger power, able to defeat the discrete collaborator of yesterday.
Conversely, IS leaders had no problem receiving assistance from Assad's air force, despite all of the group's
pledges to annihilate the apostate Shiites. Starting in January 2014, Syrian jets would regularly -- and
exclusively -- bomb rebel positions and headquarters during battles between IS and rebel groups.
In battles between IS and rebels in January 2014, Assad's jets regularly bombed only rebel positions, while
the Islamic State emir ordered his fighters to refrain from shooting at the army. It was an arrangement
that left many of the foreign fighters deeply disillusioned; they had imaged jihad differently.
IS threw its entire arsenal at the rebels, sending more suicide bombers into their ranks in just a few
weeks than it deployed during the entire previous year against the Syrian army. Thanks in part to
additional air strikes, IS was able to reconquer territory that it had briefly lost.
Nothing symbolizes the tactical shifting of alliances more than the fate of the Syrian army's Division 17.
The isolated base near Raqqa had been under rebel siege for more than a year. But then, IS units defeated
the rebels there and Assad's air force was once again able to use the base for supply flights without fear of
attack.
But a half year later, after IS conquered Mosul and took control of a gigantic weapons depot there, the
jihadists felt powerful enough to attack their erstwhile helpers. IS fighters overran Division 17 and
slaughtered the soldiers, whom they had only recently protected.
W hat the Future May Hold
The setbacks suffered by IS in recent months -- the defeat in the fight for Kurdish enclave Kobani and,
more recently, the loss of the Iraqi city of Tikrit, have generated the impression that the end of Islamic
State is nigh. As though it, in its megalomania, overreached itself, has lost its mystique, is in retreat and
will soon disappear. But such forced optimism is likely premature. The IS may have lost many fighters, but
it has continued expanding in Syria.
It is true that jihadist experiments in ruling a specific geographical area have failed in the past. Mostly,
though, that was because of their lack of knowledge regarding how to administer a region, or even a state.
That is exactly the weakness that IS strategists have long been aware of -- and eliminated. Within the
"Caliphate," those in power have constructed a regime that is more stable and more flexible than it
appears from the outside.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi may be the officially named leader, but it remains unclear how much power he
holds. In any case, when an emissary of al-Qaida head Ayman al-Zawahiri contacted the Islamic State, it
was Haji Bakr and other intelligence officers, and not al-Baghdadi, whom he approached. Afterwards, the
emissary bemoaned "these phony snakes who are betraying the real jihad."
Within IS, there are state structures, bureaucracy and authorities. But there is also a parallel command
structure: elite units next to normal troops; additional commanders alongside nominal military head Omar
al-Shishani; power brokers who transfer or demote provincial and town emirs or even make them
disappear at will. Furthermore, decisions are not, as a rule, made in Shura Councils, nominally the highest
decision-making body. Instead, they are being made by the "people who loosen and bind" (ahl al-hall wa-l-
aqd), a clandestine circle whose name is taken from the Islam of medieval times.
Islamic State is able to recognize all manner of internal revolts and stifle them. At the same time, the
hermitic surveillance structure is also useful for the financial exploitation of its subjects.
The air strikes flown by the US-led coalition may have destroyed the oil wells and refineries. But nobody is
preventing the Caliphate's financial authorities from wringing money out of the millions of people who live
in the regions under IS control -- in the form of new taxes and fees, or simply by confiscating property. IS,
after all, knows everything from its spies and from the data it plundered from banks, land-registry offices
and money-changing offices. It knows who owns which homes and which fields; it knows who owns many
sheep or has lots of money. The subjects may be unhappy, but there is minimal room for them to
organize, arm themselves and rebel.
As the West's attention is primarily focused on the possibility of terrorist attacks, a different scenario has
been underestimated: the approaching intra-Muslim war between Shiites and Sunnis. Such a conflict
would allow IS to graduate from being a hated terror organization to a central power.
Already today, the frontlines in Syria, Iraq and Yemen follow this confessional line, with Shiite Afghans
fighting against Sunni Afghans in Syria and IS profiting in Iraq from the barbarism of brutal Shiite militias.
Should this ancient Islam conflict continue to escalate, it could spill over into confessionally mixed states
such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Lebanon.
In such a case, IS propaganda about the approaching apocalypse could become a reality. In its slipstream,
an absolutist dictatorship in the name of God could be established.
URL:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-
1029274.html
Related SPI EGEL ONLI NE links:
Interview with Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Abadi: 'The Liberation of Tikrit Is Very Encouraging' (04/03/2015)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/iraqi-prime-minister-al-abadi-discusses-gains-over-islamic-state-
a-1027059.html
Proxy War in Yemen: Saudi Arabia and Iran Vie for Regional Supremacy (04/03/2015)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/saudi-arabia-and-iran-fighting-proxy-war-in-yemen-a-
1027056.html
Caliphate Under Pressure: Is Islamic State in Trouble in Iraq? (03/26/2015)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/reconquest-of-tikrit-in-iraq-shows-islamic-state-weaknesses-a-
1025138.html
Medieval Fantasies? Islamic State Pursues Apocalyptic Logic (03/19/2015)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-islamic-state-strategy-to-draw-west-into-final-battle-a-
1024438.html
A Threat to Europe: The Islamic State's Dangerous Gains in Libya (02/23/2015)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-advance-in-libya-could-present-threat-to-europe-
a-1019976.html
Daughters of Jihad: The German Women of Islamic State (02/13/2015)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/a-wave-of-women-are-leaving-germany-to-join-islamic-
state-a-1017571.html
The Belgium Question: Why Is a Small Country Producing So Many Jihadists? (01/27/2015)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/belgium-muslim-youth-turning-toward-jihad-in-large-numbers-
a-1015045.html
Terror Expert Louise Shelley: 'Islamic State Is a Diversified Criminal Operation' (01/06/2015)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/terror-expert-shelley-speaks-of-islamic-state-business-
model-a-1011492.html
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2015
All Rights Reserved
Reproduction only allowed with the permission of SPIEGELnet GmbH
VÆRNSFÆLLES FORSVARSKOMMANDO
International Operations
Danish Defence
Week 34/2015
2015-08-20
VÆRNSFÆLLES FORSVARSKOMMANDO
2015-08-20
COALITION: (241) US CENTCOM: 4 CMF HQ: 3 OP INHERENT RESOLVE : 227 OP TRITON, FRONTEX: 7
UN: (51) UNMIL: 5 UNMISS: 13 UNTSO: 11 UNCMAC: 2 MINUSMA: 20
NATO: (222) KFOR: 35 RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION: 180 ACTIVE FENCE: 7
Deployed Danish Forces
514
VÆRNSFÆLLES FORSVARSKOMMANDO
KFOR : 35
2015-08-20
Deployed Danish Forces in NATO
Operations
222
RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION: 180
ACTIVE FENCE : 7
VÆRNSFÆLLES FORSVARSKOMMANDO
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
MILITARY ARMASTICE COMMISION: 2
2015-08-20
Deployed Danish Forces
in United Nations Missions
51
UNITED NATIONS MISSION
IN SOUTH SUDAN: 13
UNITED NATIONS MULTIMENSIONAL
INTEGRATED MISSION IN MALI: 20
UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA : 5
UNITED NATIONS TRUCE
SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION: 11
VÆRNSFÆLLES FORSVARSKOMMANDO
US CENTRAL COMMAND : 4
COMBINED MARITIME FORCES HQ: 3
2015-08-20
Deployed Danish Forces
in Coalitions
241
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE : 227
OPERATION TRITON, FRONTEX : 7
Menu
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Operation Inherent Resolve
Danmarks bidrag til støtte i kampen mod ISIL
Operation I nherent Resolve
Terrorbevægelsen ISIL (også benævnt DAESH) har systematisk begået overgreb og
massehenrettelser i Irak og FN anslår, at flere millioner irakere er fordrevet fra hus og
hjem, som følge af ISIL's fremmarch.
USA har samlet opbakning fra over 50 lande i en international koalition, der skal bekæmpe
ISILi Irak og Syrien.
Den 27. august 2014 giver Folketinget sit samtykke til, at et dansk militært bidrag stilles
til rådighed. Bidraget bliver en del af den samlede internationale indsats til støtte til Iraks
militære indsats mod terrorbevægelsen ISIL og for at bistå myndighederne i Irak med at
beskytte civilbefolkningen mod alvorlige overgreb.
Det danske bidrag består i første omgang af et C-130J-transportfly (Hercules) med
mandskab, der foreløbig frem til årsskiftet 2014/15, skal løse transportopgaver til støtte for
den amerikanskledede operation i Irak. Opgaverne inkluderer, som udgangspunkt, transport
af personel, våben, ammunition, materiel og forsyninger til de irakiske og kurdiske styrker
samt øvrige samarbejdspartnere.
Den 2. oktober bliver det ligeledes ved en folketingsbeslutning vedtaget at udbygge
bidraget. Det udvidede militære bidrag består af tre dele:
1. Et F-16 kampflybidrag, der omfatter ca. 140 personer.
2. Et stabsbidrag bestående af op til ca. 20 personer
3. Et kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag, inkl. logistikbidrag, som omfatter op til ca. 120
personer. Dette bidrag benævnes Building Partner Capacity (BPC) under Operation
Inherent Resolve.
F-16 kampflybidrag
Det danske styrkebidrag består af fire operative F-16 kampfly samt op til tre F-16 kampfly i
logistisk reserve. Bidraget omfatter forbindelses- og stabsofficerer ved relevante
hovedkvarterer. F-16-bidraget vil omfatte op til i alt ca. 140 personer, og er afhængig af den
konkrete placering og kommandostruktur. F-16 bidraget er foreløbig udsendt i op til 12
måneder.
I forbindelse med etableringen af styrkebidraget, er der midlertidigt udsendt yderligere
personer til udpakning, opstilling, etablering af kommunikationsforbindelser og værksteder
mv.
De danske fly er indsat i det fulde spektrum af luftoperationer inden for irakisk territorium,
hvilket indebærer deltagelse i såvel informationsindhentning som offensive luftoperationer.
Stabsbidrag
Hvad er ISIL?
Gruppen hedder på arabisk
"al-dawlat al-islamiyya fi al-
Iraq wa as-sham", som
betyder Den Islamiske Stat i
Irak og Levanten.
Deraf kommer navnet ISIL,
som gruppen kaldte sig, før
den udråbte et kalifat sidst i
juni under navnet Islamisk
Stat.
IS er ikke en stat og det er
således ukorrekt at kalde
terrorbevægelsen for IS
(Islamisk Stat).
Terrororganisationen vil derfor
benævnes ISIL eller DAESH
og den samlede indsats i
bekæmpelsen af denne for
"Operation Inherent Resolve"
Links
Beslutningsforslag B-122
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Forside > Viden om > Udland > IRAK
Et stabsbidrag på op til ca. 20 personer, indgår i koalitionens hovedkvarterer i og uden for
regionen, herunder muligvis i Irak. Stabsbidraget bidrager til planlægning og gennemførelse
af de militære operationer i Irak.
Kapacitetsopbygning
Det danske militære kapacitetsopbygningsbidrag inklusive logistikbidrag er på i alt ca. 120
personer. Bidraget er udsendt med henblik på kapacitetsopbygning (rådgivning, træning og
uddannelse mm.) af irakiske og kurdiske sikkerhedsstyrker i Irak. Opgaverne løses i
samarbejde med amerikanske samarbejdspartnere og det danske kontingent vil være
underlagt en amerikansk chef, mens den danske forsvarschef bevarer fuld kommando over
de danske styrker.
Træningen deles op i forskellige faser.
1. Først trækkes enheder på skift ud af kampen, når operationstempoet tillader det, for
at modtage et træningsforløb på 3-4 uger med fokus på individuelle færdigheder,
lederskab og feltøvelse. Herefter sendes de tilbage i kamp.
2. I anden omgang kommer enhederne tilbage til træningsfaciliteten i 6-8 uger, hvor de
trænes i enhedsramme med fokus på samvirkeøvelser og operationsplanlægning og
føring af operationer. Herefter sendes enheden tilbage i kamp.
3. For at opbygge en varig træningskapacitet ved irakerne etableres et træningscenter,
hvor der gennemføres træning af irakiske trænere, der sidenhen skal overtage
træningen af de irakiske enheder.
Træningsindsatsen indeholder træningsopgaver på brigadeniveau og under.Den dækker
både irakiske og kurdiske styrker i Irak. Opgaven foregår på faste træningsfaciliteter ved
enheder, der ikke er direkte indsat i kamphandlinger. Stabsbidraget og det luftmilitære
bidrag planlægges indsat i op til et år og træningsbidraget indledningsvis i op til to år.- og
landmilitære bidrag er blot nogle af virkemidlerne.
I SI L fakta:
ISIL er en trussel såvel regionalt som globalt. ISIL skaber humanitære kriser og store
menneskelige lidelser.
Danmark indgår i en koalition bestående af en række lande, hvis indsats mod ISIL er
nødvendig, og ikke er rettet mod nogen etniske eller sekteriske grupper.
ISIL’s ekstreme ideologi, terrorisme, ambitioner og tilsidesættelse af international regler
udgør en alvorlig trussel mod Irak og Syrien, men også mod andre lande overalt på
kloden.
Danmark er en del af en stærk global koalition på en lang række lande, hvis indsats mod
ISIL er nødvendig, og ikke er rettet mod nogen etniske eller sekteriske grupper.
Koalitionsstyrkernes militære indsats har til formål at gøre det muligt for de irakiske
sikkerhedsstyrker at bremse ISIL’s fremrykning og at kunne iværksætte modangreb for
at genoprette kontrollen med og herredømmet over irakisk territorium.
Kampen mod ISIL er en langvarig indsats på en lang række område. Fly- og landmilitære
bidrag er blot nogle af virkemidlerne.
Sidst opdateret 24-02-2015 - kl. 13:54
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Fighter Wing Skrydstrup
Opes Foris Vires Domi – Styrken ude, kraften hjemme
De danske F-16 Fighting Falcon har base ved Fighter
Wing Skrydstrup på Flyvestation Skrydstrup. Udover
den almindelige træning og uddannelse af piloter,
udgør de 30 operative F-16 Fighting Fal-
con også det danske afvisningsbered-
skab.
Afvisningsberedskabet
24 timer i døgnet, 365 dage om året, står fire
F-16-fly klar til inden for maksimalt 15 minut-
ter at gå i luften som det danske afvisnings-
beredskab. Hvis uidentificerede fly overskri-
der de danske grænser, går to F-16-fly i luf-
ten for at inspicere det uidentificerede fly og
eventuelt eskortere det ud i internationalt
luftrum. Flyene kan også inspicere civile fly,
som har tekniske problemer. De kan eksem-
pelvis se, om landingshjulene er kommet or-
dentligt ned og derefter give piloten besked.
Luftrumspatruljering
For at være medlem af NATO skal et land
kunne håndhæve sin suverænitet i luften. Nogle med-
lemslande har imidlertid ikke de nødvendige ressourcer,
herunder kampfly. Derfor skiftes de øvrige NATO-lande
til at løse de såkaldte air policing-opgaver ved at patrul-
jere det givne lands luftrum og virke som landets afvis-
ningsberedskab. I 2009 patruljerede danske F-16-fly for
eksempel luftrummet over Estland, Letland og Litauen
samt Island. Fra den 1. september til den 31. december
2011 stod danske F-16-fly igen for patruljeringen af det
baltiske luftrum.
Observationer og havmiljøovervågning
Med den avancerede LANTIRN-pod
kan F-16-flyene også bruges til andet
end at kaste bomber og affyre missiler.
Pod’en har både en fintfølende infrarød
sensor og et videokamera med høj op-
løsning. Den giver muligheden for, at
de danske
F-16-fly kan indgå i internationale ope-
rationer ved at levere billeder og obser-
vationer til landstyrkerne. Herhjemme
bliver pod’en brugt til havmiljøovervåg-
ning, når F-16-fly indimellem afløser
Challenger-flyene på denne opgave.
Fighter Wing Skrydstrup holder til på
Flyvestation Skrydstrup og har cirka
700 ansatte.
Fighter Wing Skrydstrup råder over
30 operative F-16-fly. Flyene forde-
les mellem Fighter Squadron 727 og
730 (også kendt som Eskadrille 727
og 730) efter behov. 13 af flyene har
to sæder og egner sig derfor godt til
uddannelse af nye piloter.
Fighter Wing Skrydstrup
Lilholtvej 2
DK-6500 Vojens
+45 7454 1340
fsnskp@mil.dk
www.forsvaret.dk/wksp
Internationale operationer
De danske F-16-kampfly bliver efter politisk ønske indsat
i internationale operationer. Det skete senest i Operation
Operation Unified Protector over Libyen.
Den startede den 19. marts 2011, hvor flyveforbudszo-
nen over Libyen trådte i kraft, og det danske bidrag til
den internationale koalition gik i luften. Med FN-mandat i
hånden bad Folketinget Flyvevåbnet om at stille med F-
16-kampfly til at støtte oprettelsen og opretholdelsen af
en flyveforbudszone over Libyen. På Sigonella basen i
Sicilien var der udstationeret seks F-16 fly og cirka 110
mand fra Fighter Wing Skrydstrup. Missionen blev afslut-
tet 31. oktober 2011.
Fighter Wing Skrydstrup
Opes Foris Vires Domi – Styrken ude, kraften hjemme
Flyvevåbnet
F-16 Fighting Falcon
F-16 Fighting Falcon er et alsidigt ’multi-role’-kampfly.
Det betyder, at flyet både kan kæmpe imod andre fly i
luften samt gennemføre præcisionsbombning af mål på
jorden. Kampflyene fungerer til dagligt som ”luftens politi”
i Danmark og udgør afvisningsberedskabet, der konstant
er klar til at rykke ud til uidentificerede fly i dansk luftrum.
F-16-flyet fløj første gang i 1974, og i 1980 blev flyet en
del af det danske forsvar. I dag har Flyvevåbnet 30 ope-
rative F-16-fly samt et antal i reserve. Kampflyet findes i
både en enkelt- og tosædet version. Den tosædede bru-
ges især til omskoling af piloter, men har samme kamp-
egenskaber som den enkeltsædede version.
Kampflyene er løbende blevet opdateret og har senest
gennemgået den omfattende ”Mid-life Up-date”, der især
har udviklet flyets sensorpakke og gjort det muligt for
piloten at benytte GPS- og laserstyrede præcisionsvå-
ben med større effekt. Desuden er der tilføjet udstyr til
netværksbaserede operationer, hvilket betyder, at flyene
nu er i stand til at modtage radar-informationer fra andre
enheder – eksempelvis fra andre fly eller skibe.
F-16-flyene bruges også til rekognoscering og overvåg-
ning. Det foregår med den såkaldte LANTIRN-pod, der
fastgøres under maven på flyet. Den kan tage billeder
med et 25 megapixel digitalkamera, og har også en fint-
følende infrarød sensor.
De danske F-16-fly kan efter politisk ønske indsæt-
tes i internationale operationer og har blandt andet
støttet NATO-soldaterne i Afghanistan. Her var de
indsat i direkte kamphandlinger, men udførte også
show of force, hvor flyenes blotte tilstedeværelse
lagde en dæmper på fjendens kampvilje. Senest
blev fire F-16-fly samt to i reserve indsat til at delta-
ge i FN-missionen - senere NATO-missionen - i
Libyen fra marts til november 2011 – kaldet Operati-
on Unified Protector
Flyene har også flere gange udført air policing-
opgaver i de baltiske lande og Island, da disse lande
ikke har et afvisningsberedskab. Senest fra septem-
ber til og med december i 2011 over de baltiske lan-
de.
F-16 Fighting Falcon hører under Fighter Squadron
727 og 730 (også kendt som Eskadrille 727 og 730),
der holder til hos Fighter Wing Skrydstrup.
Fabrik: Lockheed Martin Texas USA
Type: Jager/jagerbomber
Motorer: 1 stk. Pratt & Whitney F100-
PW200 jetmotor med 11.340 kg. trykkraft.
Længde: 14,32 m
Højde: 5,01 m
Spændvidde: 9,14 m
Tomvægt: 5.443 kg.
Fuldvægt: 12.245 kg.
Marchhastighed: 833 km/t
Max-hastighed: 2.376 km/t
Rækkevidde: 1.296 km
Tophøjde: 20.000 m.
Bevæbning: 20 mm. M61A1 Vulcan ma-
skinkanon samt bomber, raketter og missi-
ler.
Flyvevåbnet
F-16 Fighting Falcon
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Mission Update - RDAF F-16 Operation Inherent Resolve
De danske F-16-fly, der er udsendt som bidrag til Operation I nherent Resolve,
har siden seneste opdatering 11. august fløjet 12 missioner og anvendt 14
bomber.
18-08-2015 - kl. 18:37
Missionerne, som de danske fly har deltaget i, har været offensive, og de danske fly har i
den forløbne periode deltaget i missioner i Ninawa, Salah Al Din og Al Anbar provinserne.
Målene for bomberne har været fjendtlige våbenstillinger og bygninger anvendt af ISIL.
De danske fly har fløjet Close Air Support-missioner (CAS), hvor flyene er indsat som
luftstøtte til styrker på landjorden. Her vil flyene patruljere over et bestemt område,
hvorefter de vil kunne blive indsat af koalitionen, når der er behov for støtte. Luftstøtten vil
variere afhængig af, hvad der er behov for. Det kan både dreje sig om overvågningsopgaver
og bombninger af mål.
De danske fly har også gennemført Air Interdiction-missioner. Her gennemføres et specifikt
angreb mod et på forhånd defineret mål, hvor flyene flyver direkte til målet, anvender
bomber og flyver retur. Ved disse missioner har målene for bomberne været bygninger.
På de missioner, hvor de danske F-16 ikke har anvendt våben, har de bidraget med
overvågning og indhentning af efterretninger. På sådanne overvågningsmissioner er flyene
dog altid klar til at anvende våben, hvis der er behov for det.
Siden første mission den 16. oktober 2014, har det danske bidrag i alt fløjet 476 missioner
og anvendt 425 bomber. Alle de danske bomber er præcisionsstyrede, hvilket vil sige, at de
styres mod deres mål ved hjælp af enten laser eller GPS.
Læs mere om koalitionens gennemførte angreb hos US Central
Command:www.centcom.mil
Fakta:
Det danske F-16 bidrag til Operation Inherent Resolve består af syv fly (hvoraf tre er i
logistisk reserve) og op til ca. 140 mand. Lige nu er ca. 90 mand udsendt.
Udover F-16 bidrager Danmark også med et 120 mand stort bidrag fra Hæren, som skal
uddanne og vejlede de irakiske sikkerhedsstyrker i bl.a. skydning, førstehjælp, føring og
stabsarbejde.
Værnsfælles Forsvarskommando - Danneskiold Samsøes Allé 1 - 1434 København K - Telefon: +45 7284 0000 - E-mail: VFK@mil.dk - For ansatte i forsvaret
Nyheder Viden om Temaer Job Uddannelse Om os Kontakt
Søg
Internationale Nationale Øvrige Døgnrapporten Nyhedsbrev
Forside > Nyheder > Internationale
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Irak hold 2 godt i gang
De danske soldater har uddannet 126 irakiske soldater den første måned.
Kampen mod I SI L kræver, at der er irakiske soldater ved frontlinjen hele tiden,
men mange sendes fortsat til Al Asad for at blive uddannet af de danske soldater.
20-08-2015 - kl. 10:09
Tekst og foto: Kaptajn Simone, presseofficer, Inherent Resolve, hold 2
Hold 2 blev ved ankomsten til Al Asad-basen i Irak kastet direkte i arbejdet. Det første hold
irakiske soldater afsluttede deres uddannelse efter få dage, og siden da har danskerne
uddannet i alt 126 irakiske soldater.
Det danske bidrag har uddannet 126 irakiske soldater på en måned.
De irakiske skytter, som var bedre end gennemsnittet, har fået et videregående
skydekursus. Her formåede skytterne at skyde og ramme plet på op til 300 meter, og
sluttesten blev skudt på 200 meter med tilfredsstillende resultater. Den bedste skytte fik
overrakt et særligt diplom af chefen for det danske bidrag, oberstløjtnant Thomas Ø.
Knudsen og hædret foran alle sine kollegaer.
Soldaterne på Hold 2 oplever generelt stor interesse og motivation hos de irakiske soldater,
og i det hele taget har mødet mellem danske og irakiske soldater været en positiv oplevelse.
Nyheder Viden om Temaer Job Uddannelse Om os Kontakt
Søg
Internationale Nationale Øvrige Døgnrapporten Nyhedsbrev
Forside > Nyheder > Internationale
De irakiske skytter bestod skydetesten med tilfredsstilende resultater.
Et hold Irakiske soldater har netop gennemført basisuddannelse i brug af morter, og et
andet har færdiggjort træning i imødegåelse af vejsidebomber, til dagligt kaldet counter-IED
(improvised explosive devices). IED’er er en af de helt store udfordringer, de irakiske
soldater i øjeblikket står overfor i kampen mod ISIL.
Træningen af de iraktiske soldater slutter med en parade, hvor soldaterne får overrakt et
diplom for endt uddannelse.
Undervisningen i stabstræning er også blevet gennemført og afsluttet for de irakiske
officerer. Træningen blev rundet af med en parade og overrækkelse af diplomer for
gennemført uddannelse. Ind til nu har trænerne undervist 50 til 80 irakiske soldater ad
gangen. De danske soldater er gearet til at træne op til 400 ad gangen med alle trænere og
tolke indsat. På grund af de igangværende kampe mod ISIL er det svært at forudsige, hvor
mange irakiske soldater, der kan undværes ved frontlinjen og dermed afsætte tid til
uddannelse. Dog forventes den nuværende situation på Al Asad at ændre sig inden længe,
da en stor gruppe irakiske soldater har meldt deres ankomst. Træningen af dem vil komme
til at strække over en længere periode.
Det danske bidrag til I nherent Resolve
Bidraget består af 120 mand, der bistår i uddannelsen af de Irakiske soldater, så de kan stå
stærkere i kampen mod ISIL. De danske soldater træner blandt andet irakerne i skydning,
førstehjælp, våben-kendskab, imødegåelse af vejsidebomber og stabstræning.
Med enkelte undtagelser afholdes der hver dag uddannelse i de forskellige discipliner.
Værnsfælles Forsvarskommando - Danneskiold Samsøes Allé 1 - 1434 København K - Telefon: +45 7284 0000 - E-mail: VFK@mil.dk - For ansatte i forsvaret
Nyt fra husarerne i Irak
10-08-2015 - kl. 13:24
Nu er vi 65 husarer, som udgør halvdelen af holdet på Operation Inherent Resolve hold 2, ved at være faldet til
i vores nye omgivelser.
Vi bor på Al Asad Airbase ca. 180 km vest for Baghdad. En lejr som på sit højeste husede 20.000 amerikanske
soldater under Operation Iraqi Freedom. Det er vi ikke i nærheden af mere og det irakiske forsvar har ikke haft
ressourcer til at vedligeholde basen, så nogle steder kører man rundt i en spøgelsesby.
Vi bor dog rigtig godt og den primitive måde, som hold 1 boede på med feltrationer og sanktionering på
badevand ser ud til at være fortid. Nu er der aircondition, når vi arbejder indenfor, hvor vi spiser og hvor vi
sover. Med dagstemperaturer på 45-48 grader betyder det en del, at vi kan sove ordentligt og være effektive i
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vores planlægningsarbejde. Som Kenneth fra et af træningsholdene sagde, ”Der er rigtige toiletter, AIRCON,
der bliver serveret mad, vi kan vaske tøj i en vaskemaskine og trådløst internet, så i forhold til sidst jeg var
udsendt og lå i Armadillolejren i Afghanistan, så er det luksus det her.”
Ca. 30 af os husarer gennemfører træning af soldater fra den irakiske hær og vi har allerede haft nogle gode
oplevelser og dannet os vores eget indtryk af, hvordan vi skal gribe uddannelsen af de irakiske soldater an.
De er blevet trænet i skydning, førstehjælp, panserværnsvåben og stabstræning. De irakiske soldater har
været rigtig imødekommende og interesseret i den træning, som vi har tilbudt dem.
Den anden halvdel af os husarer udgøres af SECFOR. De bor sammen med den amerikanske enhed, som de
varetager sikringen af lejren sammen med.
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Her til at starte med har de fået overdraget sikringen af lejren sammen med amerikanske soldater, som har
været hernede i lidt længere tid, så de har sat vores SECFOR ind i alle detaljerne omkring sikkerheden, så vi
kan føle os trygge i lejren.
Vi føler os trygge og vi glæder os til at uddanne endnu flere irakiske soldater, så de kan gøre en forskel til
fordel for det fremtidige Irak.
Fortsat god sommer derhjemme.
Tilbage


_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
HOLMENS KANAL 42 TELEFON: 72 81 00 00 MAIL: FMN@FMN.DK CVR: 25-77-56-35
1060 KØBENHAVN K TELEFAX: 72 81 03 00 WEB: www.FMN.DK EAN: 5798000201200
Folketingets Forsvarsudvalg
Christiansborg
FORSVARSMINISTEREN
25. september 2015
Folketingets Forsvarsudvalg har den 28. august 2015 stillet følgende spørgsmål nr. 45 til
forsvarsministeren, som hermed besvares. Spørgsmålet er stillet efter ønske fra Nikolaj Vil-
lumsen (EL).
Spørgsmål nr. 45:
”Ministeren bedes oversende alle orienteringer og beredskabsnotater udarbejdet i forbindel-
se med turen for forsvarsforligskredsen til Kuwait”
Svar:
Vedlagt er det materiale, som blev udleveret til de deltagende medlemmer fra forsvarsfor-
ligskredsen.
Med venlig hilsen
Carl Holst
Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn 2014-15 (2. samling)
UPN Alm.del - Bilag 96
Offentligt