2025 NATO PA Policy Recommendations

POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
ADOPTED IN 2025
178 SESA 25 E | 13 October 2025
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NPA Alm.del - Bilag 1
NATO's Parlamentariske Forsamling 2025-26
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TAKING NATO DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE TO THE NEXT LEVEL
AT THE HAGUE SUMMIT 1
DECLARATION 496
PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH IN UKRAINE 6
DECLARATION 497
BOLSTERING THE DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE OF EURO-ATLANTIC SOCIETIES TO
FOREIGN INTERFERENCE 9
RESOLUTION 498
MEETING THE MOMENT: NATO’S DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE IMPERATIVES AFTER THE
HAGUE SUMMIT 11
RESOLUTION 499
STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AND SECURITY AFTER
THE NATO SUMMIT IN THE HAGUE 15
RESOLUTION 500
FOSTERING STABILITY AND RECONCILIATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS 18
RESOLUTION 501
SOLIDARITY WITH UKRAINE AND THE IMPERATIVE OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE 20
RESOLUTION 502
PREPARING NATO FOR THE FUTURE OF UNCREWED WARFARE 23
RESOLUTION 503
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TAKING NATO DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE TO THE NEXT LEVEL
AT THE HAGUE SUMMIT
DECLARATION 496*
The Assembly,
1. Stressing that NATO remains the indispensable cornerstone of all Allies’ security and that, for
76 years, it has guaranteed the security of both Europe and North America;
2. Underlining that NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept outlines a security environment marked by
strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks, and identifies Russia as the most
significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and terrorism as the most direct asymmetric threat;
3. Reiterating its firm condemnation of Russia’s unprovoked, full-scale war of aggression against
Ukraine which poses a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic and global security;
4. Reaffirming its unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, right to
self-defence and self-determination, including its irreversible path towards full NATO membership;
5. Convinced that a strong, independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area
and welcoming efforts to bring about a fair and lasting peace that provides for Ukraine’s long-term
security;
6. Clear-eyed about the multiple and systemic challenges the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
poses to Euro-Atlantic security, interests and values as well as to the rules-based international order;
7. Deploring the growing and destabilising collusion between autocratic regimes in Russia,
China, Iran, North Korea and Belarus;
8. Deploring the growing presence of destabilising actors under Russian, Chinese, and Iranian
influence in the Southern Neighbourhood, including the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan
Africa;
9. Welcoming the important decisions taken to address the entire set of threats and challenges
to Euro-Atlantic security at the 2022, 2023 and 2024 Summits, which mark a step change and a new
baseline for a radically enhanced NATO deterrence and defence posture;
10. Underlining the ironclad commitments to the unique transatlantic bond and collective defence
enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty;
11. Stressing that the NATO defence spending target of 2% of GDP — and any future agreed-
upon increases — is not an optional requirement, but an obligation to the citizens of the Alliance;
12. Highlighting the significant progress achieved in defence spending, including an increase of
more than USD 700 billion in European and Canadian defence spending since 2014 and a 20%
increase in 2024, as well as the ongoing outstanding contribution of the United States;
13. Welcoming several Allies’ announcement to increase defence spending significantly;
14. Stressing that, in line with Article 3 of the NATO Treaty, to respond to an unprecedented set
of threats and challenges, Allies must ensure defence plans are fully resourced and deliver
* Adopted by the Plenary Assembly at its Spring Session in Dayton, Ohio, United States on
Monday 26 May 2025
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significant new capabilities, which requires substantial and across-the-board increases in defence
spending;
15. Acknowledging that all NATO Allies understand the importance of increasing their respective
share of responsibility for transatlantic security;
16. Welcoming recent European efforts, including within the framework of the European Union,
to accelerate the mobilisation of the necessary instruments and financing in order to bolster
transatlantic security;
17. Stressing the need for Allies, in line with the Preamble and Article 2 of the North Atlantic
Treaty, to constrain, counter and contest authoritarian powers’ attacks against democracy and the
rules-based international order, and to prevent the Alliance's strength from being undermined by
trade barriers among Allies;
18. Welcoming Allies’ and NATO’s strengthened response to these authoritarian powers’
campaign of hybrid operations targeting Allies, saluting, in particular, the prompt launch of
Baltic Sentry and establishment of NATO Task Force X to strengthen the protection of critical
infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, including against the Russian shadow fleet;
19. Stressing that The Hague Summit must now take NATO’s deterrence and defence to the next
level, rebalance the United States’, Canada’s and Europe’s respective roles in support of
Euro-Atlantic security and enhance the Alliance’s collective and Allies’ national resilience;
20. Recognising that NATO’s partnerships remain vital to enhance stability, contribute to
international peace and security, and uphold the rules-based international order; reaffirming their
essential role in supporting NATO’s three core tasks and the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to
security; and underlining in particular the strategic importance of NATO’s Southern Neighbourhood
in light of the persistent and interconnected challenges emanating from the region, including
terrorism, hybrid threats, irregular migration, and state fragility, as well as the opportunities for
enhanced cooperation with Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and African partners;
21. Noting that Georgia, a candidate country for Euro-Atlantic integration, is currently undergoing
an accelerated process of democratic decline;
22. Reiterating the importance of stability and peace in the Western Balkans and expressing its
serious concern about the latest legislation and initiatives in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and
Herzegovina that undermine and threaten the country’s constitutional order, sovereignty and
territorial and functional integrity, as well as the Dayton Peace Agreement signed 30 years ago;
23. Convinced that NATO’s strength and credibility lies in the unity, cohesion and resolve of Allies
and affirming its determination to continue to support a strong Alliance through parliamentary
dialogue, as it has done for the past 70 years;
24. Recognising both civil and military dimensions of defence planning as mutually necessary
and beneficial when building resilient societies;
25. Recalling that, building on the Defence Production Action Plan agreed at the Vilnius Summit
in 2023, at the NATO Summit 2024 Allies committed to doing more together as Allies, including to
strengthen defence industry across the Alliance, and agreed the NATO Industrial Capacity
Expansion Pledge (NICE);
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26. URGES Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance at their Summit meeting
in The Hague:
a. to agree on a Transatlantic Deterrence Initiative through which Allies will commit to
stepping up efforts to rebalance Allied contributions to transatlantic security, with
individual Allies reconsidering their share of responsibility and adjusting it to match the
reality of a contested threat environment;
b. to commit to the implementation of ambitious capability targets which will ensure NATO
is fit for purpose today and for the long term in order to be prepared for high-intensity
and multi-domain collective defence;
c. to reinforce NATO’s posture in the Baltic Sea region, including by strengthening the
Air Policing and Baltic Sentry missions, towards a credible forward defence posture
aligned with NATO’s New Force Model;
d. to agree on a Hague Defence Investment Pledge including an ambitious new defence
spending target well beyond 2% of GDP, in order to ensure that Allies deliver the
capabilities needed to remedy existing shortfalls, to deny any potential adversary any
possible opportunities for aggression against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity,
and to commit to urgently develop national plans to meet this new target;
e. to commit to provide the necessary forces, capabilities, resources, and infrastructure for
existing Allied defence plans;
f. to continue to ensure NATO retains a modern, credible, effective, safe and secure
nuclear deterrent mission which is the cornerstone of Alliance security;
g. to further modernise and increase the capabilities, readiness, scalability and integration
of NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) to eliminate, either through
individual investment or cooperative initiatives, all single points of failure and ensure full
coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against
the proliferation of ballistic missiles through the full development of NATO Ballistic
Missile Defence;
h. to continue to bolster Allied space capabilities, plans and procedures;
i. to recognise and treat space-based infrastructure, as well as corresponding supply
chains, as critical infrastructure, and apply lessons learned from other sectors to
enhance its safety, protection, and resilience;
j. to continue implementing cyberspace as an operational domain throughout peacetime,
crisis and conflict by strengthening cyber deterrence, defence and cooperation across
the Alliance, including by speeding up plans to operationalise the NATO Integrated
Cyber Defence Centre (NICC);
k. to continue to foster and strengthen cooperation in countering terrorism in all its forms
and manifestations, which constitutes the most asymmetric threat to the security of our
citizens and to international peace and prosperity;
l. to expand NATO-led efforts and funding under the NATO Security Investment
Programme to develop critical military infrastructure across Central and Eastern Europe,
including support for the Eastern Shield initiative and the Baltic Defence Line, enhancing
defensive capabilities and interoperability along NATO’s Eastern Flank, thus improving
the Alliance’s overall readiness and capacity for rapid deployment and sustained defence
operations;
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m. to deliver on NATO’s recent defence innovation initiatives and agree on an ambitious
Rapid Adoption Action Plan to advance NATO’s technological edge by speeding up the
adoption of innovative technologies;
n. to step up work with industry to accelerate the development and delivery of critical
capabilities, including through large scale, multinational procurement;
o. to adopt a plan to increase and strengthen the implementation of NATO standards to
enhance interoperability and interchangeability;
p. to further strengthen NATO’s partnerships, in line with the 2024 Washington Summit
Declaration, by adopting a more strategic and result-oriented approach to engagement
with partners, particularly in NATO’s Southern Neighbourhood where the role of the
Special Representative of the Secretary General for the Southern Neighbourhood should
be strengthened to enhance trust, visibility and cooperation;
q. to further leverage cooperation with the European Union, in particular to support
increased European defence spending and capability development as well as to closely
cooperate on military mobility and logistics, including secure and resilient energy
supplies to the military;
r. to increase cooperation with like-minded partners to enhance the security of supply
chains, support the development of key capabilities and adoption of innovative
technologies;
s. to further leverage cooperation with Ukraine to identify and apply lessons from Russia’s
war of aggression, primarily through the Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Centre
(JATEC), to enhance NATO’s ability to adapt its deterrence and defence posture and
increase Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO;
t. to sustain and increase diplomatic, military, financial, and humanitarian support for
Ukraine, to both address its immediate needs and strengthen its position at the
negotiating table;
u. to recommit to the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine and to make
full use of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), the
NATO-Ukraine Council, the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), JATEC, the
NATO Representation in Ukraine, and other instruments to support Ukraine now and for
the long term;
v. to agree a revised strategy for countering hybrid warfare, which further increases the
Alliance’s and Allies’ resilience to Russia’s and other authoritarian powers’
destabilisation campaigns while imposing costs to deter and defend against further
attacks;
w. to continue to constrain and contest Russia’s aggressive actions and to counter its ability
to conduct destabilising activities against NATO and Allies;
x. to reinforce and communicate an accurate and credible narrative of NATO’s steadfast
commitment to freedom, security, and democracy, stepping up efforts to counter
information manipulation and interference by foreign actors, as well as the spread of
disinformation through traditional and social media – activities aimed at creating
confusion, deepening societal divisions, destabilising democratic institutions, and
ultimately weakening the Alliance;
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y. to continue boosting Allied resilience to China’s systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic
security, including by reducing strategic dependencies, investing in cyber defences and
working with partners of the Alliance, particularly the EU and like-minded Indo-Pacific
partners, while continuing to seek opportunities for constructive dialogue with Beijing;
z. to continue to strengthen the protection of critical undersea infrastructure (CUI), and
enhance Allied ability to deter, detect and respond to threats, including through NATO’s
Centre for Security of CUI, NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network and
NATO Task Force X;
aa. to operationalise NATO’s commitment to defending shared democratic values by
directing the establishment of a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO
Headquarters;
bb. to reiterate the strategic importance of the Black Sea Region for transatlantic security,
continued support to Allied regional efforts aimed at upholding security, safety, stability
and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region including, as appropriate, through the
1936 Montreux Convention, as well as strengthen NATO’s posture and regional
readiness along the Eastern Flank, from the Black Sea to the Baltic area;
cc. to reduce and eliminate, as appropriate, obstacles to defence trade and investment
among Allies;
dd. to continue their commitment to security and stability in the Western Balkans, support
reconciliation across the region, and enhance assistance to regional partners in
countering malign influences;
ee. to keep up pressure on Russia by backing the ramping up and effective enforcement of
sanctions against it and its accomplices, particularly in the oil and gas sector – including
the Russian shadow fleet – as well as metallurgy and the banking and financial sectors;
ff. to encourage Allies to develop and adapt policies that enable a greater flow of investment
and technology among Allies, thereby facilitating the rapid enhancement of defence and
deterrence capabilities and capacities across the Alliance.
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PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH IN UKRAINE
DECLARATION 497*
The Assembly,
1. Reiterating its condemnation of Russia’s unprovoked and brutal war of aggression against
Ukraine, for which Russia bears sole responsibility, and denouncing Russia’s unacceptable attacks
against civilians and civilian infrastructure, which have continued despite pledges to cease fire;
2. Reaffirming its unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity within its
internationally recognised borders, and right to self-defence and self-determination, including its
NATO membership path;
3. Expressing profound respect and admiration for the remarkable bravery, resilience and
resolve of the people, the democratic institutions and the armed and security forces of Ukraine;
4. Denouncing the assistance provided by the Belarusian, Iranian, Chinese and North Korean
regimes to Russia’s war of aggression;
5. Highlighting that Russia’s war against Ukraine is also a critical test of the collective resilience
of democracies and that by supporting Ukraine, Allies also protect their own security and shared
democratic values;
6. Stressing that the outcome of this war will shape the future European and international order
and set a precedent that will influence the future actions and strategic calculations of Russia, China
and other enablers of Russia’s war against Ukraine, as well as those of other malign actors;
7. Welcoming efforts by the United States, in dialogue and consultation with European Allies
and Canada, to bring about a just and lasting peace that provides for Ukraine’s and Europe’s long-
term security, saluting as well efforts initiated by France and the United Kingdom to build a ”coalition
of the willing” to provide a reassurance force in support of peace, and convinced that transatlantic
unity is essential to achieving and securing any sustainable agreement;
8. Emphasising that only a peace through strength can lead to lasting peace;
9. Stressing that there can be no impunity for Russian war crimes and other atrocities, and that
all those responsible must be held accountable for violations and abuses of international law, human
rights and international humanitarian law;
10. Convinced that a strong and independent Ukraine with robust, modernised, coherent, and
well-equipped armed forces, capable of deterring and defending against future aggression, is vital
for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area;
11. Stressing therefore that any negotiated solution includes robust and credible security
guarantees for Ukraine to deter future Russian aggression;
12. Welcoming Allies’ ongoing robust and vital financial and military assistance, which is critical
to Ukraine’s immediate and long-term defence needs and that will aid and support long-term
European security;
*
Adopted by the Plenary Assembly at its Spring Session in Dayton, Ohio (United States) on
Monday 26 May 2025.
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13. Welcoming all EU initiatives supporting Ukraine, including the new EU Security Action for
Europe instrument, which should be employed to the fullest extent in order to accelerate and scale
up Ukrainian military production;
14. Saluting NATO’s political and practical support for Ukraine, particularly through the
NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC), the NATO Representation in Ukraine (NRU), the NATO Security
Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), the
Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, the Joint Analysis, Training and Education
Centre (JATEC), and other instruments to support Ukraine now and for the long term;
15. Reaffirming its readiness and determination to support Ukraine’s further democratic
consolidation, which brings it closer to NATO membership, including through the NATO PA special
fund to support Ukraine’s democracy;
16. URGES the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
a. to sustain and increase diplomatic, military, financial, and humanitarian support for
Ukraine, to both address its immediate civilian and battlefield needs and strengthen its
position at the negotiating table;
b. to continue to work towards fairer burden sharing among all Allies across all types of
assistance to Ukraine;
c. to continue to step up and speed up the delivery of military assistance to Ukraine and to
urgently ramp up Allied and Ukrainian defence industrial capacity and production,
including through direct investments into Ukraine’s domestic defence industrial base,
notably via direct purchases from Ukrainian defence companies to supply the Ukrainian
Armed Forces;
d. to continue to train and equip the Ukrainian Armed Forces to strengthen Ukraine’s
long-term deterrence and defence posture;
e. to keep up pressure on Russia by backing the ramping up and effective enforcement of
sanctions against it and its accomplices, particularly in the oil and gas sector, including
the Russian shadow fleet, as well as the banking and financial sectors;
f. to maintain and bolster transatlantic unity in the pursuit of peace through strength in
Ukraine;
g. to welcome the Summit recently hosted by Türkiye in Istanbul;
h. to work together and with Ukraine to ensure that any agreement deters future Russian
aggression, guarantees Ukraine’s long-term security, and strengthens European and
Euro-Atlantic security;
i. to support efforts to put together a multinational reassurance force to help guarantee a
future peace agreement;
j. to reiterate their longstanding position that they will never recognise Russia's illegal and
illegitimate occupation and annexation of Ukrainian territories;
k. to reaffirm all elements of the July 2024 Washington Summit declaration and NATO-
Ukraine Council Statement, and make full use of all of NATO’s fora and instruments in
support of Ukraine to deepen political consultation, bolster Ukraine’s self-defence,
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transition Ukraine to full interoperability with NATO, and continue bringing Ukraine closer
to eventual membership;
l. to invite Ukraine to participate in the NATO Summit in The Hague and hold a meeting of
the NATO-Ukraine Council at the level of Heads of State and government;
m. to reaffirm that Ukraine’s future NATO membership is a sovereign decision of Ukraine
and the NATO Allies alone, based solely on the will of the Ukrainian people and
authorities and the fulfilment of membership criteria, and to reiterate that no third party –
including the Russian Federation – can have a veto over NATO membership;
n. to set NATO assistance to Ukraine on a sustainable footing by recommitting to the
Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, and providing sustainable funding
and speeding up the delivery of funds for the Comprehensive Assistance Package and
NSATU trust funds;
o. to further leverage JATEC to identify and apply lessons from Russia’s war against
Ukraine and increase Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO;
p. to increase cooperation with Ukraine and its defence industry on technology innovation,
including by implementing joint activities to support Ukraine’s self-defence via such
initiatives as the NATO-Ukraine Innovation Cooperation Roadmap;
q. to bring Ukraine’s defence procurement further in line with Euro-Atlantic best practices,
including through the Strategic Defence Procurement Review process;
r. to continue to use the NUC format, to the fullest extent, for advancing Ukraine’s
Euro-Atlantic aspirations, for discussing issues of common security and as a crisis
consultation mechanism;
s. to step up cooperation with the Assembly in support of Ukraine;
t. to allow for engagement between the NUC and the Assembly on the parliamentary
dimension of the NATO-Ukraine relationship;
u. to continue to strengthen the NRU;
v. to designate a liaison officer in the NRU to work with the Assembly to support
capacity-building efforts for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;
w. to fully support Ukraine’s path of democratic reform, including by establishing a Centre
for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters to serve as a platform for sharing
resources and exchanging best practices as well as by helping Ukraine implement its
adapted Annual National Programme;
x. to work on an ambitious long-term plan for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine,
including by developing legal frameworks to allow for the full use of frozen Russian
assets for Ukraine's reconstruction based on international law and the principle that the
aggressor must pay for the consequences of its aggression;
y. to welcome the Fourth Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2025), due to be co-hosted
by Italy and Ukraine in Rome in July 2025, aimed at mobilising international support for
Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction, reform, and modernisation, as well as to
acknowledge the results of the previous conferences held in Lugano (2022), London
(2023), and Berlin (2024).
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BOLSTERING THE DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE OF EURO-ATLANTIC
SOCIETIES TO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE
RESOLUTION 498*
The Assembly,
1. Recalling that the defence of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law is enshrined
in the North Atlantic Treaty, and that democratic resilience is a pillar of collective security;
2. Highlighting that foreign interference aims to threaten the stability, cohesion and
democratic functioning of Allied societies, and that Euro-Atlantic deterrence and defence are
intrinsically linked to democratic resilience;
3. Deploring that the Russian Federation has intensified its campaign of aggressive hybrid
actions against Allies, directly and through proxies, across the Euro-Atlantic area;
4. Warning that other authoritarian states, including the People’s Republic of China, Iran, and
North Korea, as well as their non-state proxies, are also increasingly resorting to similar hybrid
tactics, including disinformation, cyberattacks, and election interference, to manipulate public debate
and erode democratic institutions in Allied nations;
5. Stressing that authoritarian regimes also target democratic countries outside the Alliance
with foreign interference operations aimed at imposing their repressive models of governance,
disseminating their malevolent narratives and eroding sovereignty, as exemplified by Russia’s
actions before and during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine;
6. Concerned by the way authoritarian regimes increasingly echo and reinforce one
another’s false narratives, and misuse emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, and
social media platforms to amplify the scale, speed and impact of their interference efforts;
7. Noting that terrorist groups also exploit elements of hybrid warfare, notably disinformation
and cyber means, to spread fear, radicalise, and destabilise societies;
8. Reaffirming that the response to foreign interference must uphold the openness,
transparency and freedom of expression that define Allied democracies;
9. Applauding already existing initiatives by individual Allies and NATO to counter hybrid
attacks, including foreign interference, such as the updated NATO Strategy for countering hybrid
threats, and underlining the need to develop national and collective frameworks and initiatives to
identify, expose, and respond to such efforts;
10. Welcoming the inclusion in the Defence Investment Plan adopted at The Hague Summit
of a commitment by Allies to spend 1.5% of GDP on defence and security-related investments,
including the strengthening of national and collective resilience;
11. Recognising the vital role of parliamentarians in upholding and promoting democratic
resilience to foreign interference through legislation, oversight and public engagement;
12. Emphasising that addressing foreign interference is a whole-of-society endeavour,
requiring strong and independent institutions, vibrant civil society, free and pluralistic media, digital
literacy, and transparency in political and electoral systems;
*
Presented by the Committee on Democracy and Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the
71st Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on
Monday 13 October 2025.
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13. Reaffirming the importance of NATO in supporting and coordinating resilience-building
efforts against foreign interference, while recognising that these areas remain primarily national
prerogatives;
14. Underscoring the need for increased cooperation with the European Union, as well as
regular and appropriate exchange with like-minded partners and international institutions, to
effectively deter, address and mitigate foreign interference attempts;
15. URGES Allied Governments and Parliaments and, where appropriate, NATO institutions:
a. to treat foreign interference as a strategic threat to national and collective security and to
democratic governance, and to bolster policies to detect, prevent and respond effectively;
b. to allocate a portion of the 1.5% of GDP in defence and security-related investments
agreed on at The Hague Summit to strengthening the resilience of their societies to foreign
interference;
c. to adopt whole-of-society approaches to countering foreign interference involving national
security institutions, civil society, media, academia, and the private sector;
d. to enhance early-warning and attribution capabilities, and impose meaningful sanctions
and diplomatic consequences on perpetrators;
e. to reinforce legal frameworks and allocate sufficient resources to counter foreign influence
and disinformation and to strengthen electoral and institutional defences, particularly to
cyberattacks;
f. to foster partnerships with technology providers, academia, fact-checkers and civil society
to make information and environments more resilient, and to promote public education in
digital and media literacy, as well as civic awareness;
g. to regulate established and emerging technologies, particularly social media platforms and
artificial intelligence, to prevent their misuse in hostile information operations, while
adequately protecting freedom of speech and promoting transparency and accountability;
h. to strengthen transparency frameworks regarding foreign funding of political parties, media
outlets, academic institutions and civil society, to reduce the risk of covert influence;
i. to consider integrating democratic resilience into NATO’s baseline requirements for
national resilience, at the collective level, and including core democratic institutions and
processes among critical infrastructure, at the national level;
j. to deepen cooperation with the European Union, and to exchange on a case-by-case basis
with like-minded countries and international organisations facing similar foreign
interference risks; and continue to support Ukraine in building its cyber defence and
counter-disinformation capabilities as well as broader democratic resilience;
k. to establish a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO HQ to share best practices and
support Allies and partners in countering foreign interference;
l. to promote comprehensive and sustained media and digital literacy programmes, including
through formal education and lifelong learning, in order to equip citizens of all ages with
the skills to recognise and resist manipulation and disinformation.
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MEETING THE MOMENT: NATO’S DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE
IMPERATIVES AFTER THE HAGUE SUMMIT
RESOLUTION 499*
The Assembly,
1. Recognising that Russia is the most significant and direct threat to Allied security demanding
an immediate and strong response;
2. Aware that Russia’s recent airspace incursions of Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, the most
consequential violations of NATO airspace in its history, are in line with Russia’s escalating and
reckless brinkmanship against Allies’ territory, populations, infrastructure, and interests, which
includes sabotage, targeted assassinations, signals jamming, disinformation campaigns, and
dangerous nuclear rhetoric, among other nefarious actions designed to undermine Allied unity and
weaken support for Ukraine;
3. Recognising that all Allies, particularly those along the Eastern Flank, are exposed to near
constant Russian threats and probing, that could be classified as state terrorism, and that Russia’s
aggressive policies, hostile to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic, will not stop even in the event
of a ceasefire or eventual structured peace agreement in Ukraine;
4. Welcoming the European Union and national commitments to build a drone wall along the
Eastern Flank;
5. Welcoming Allies’ swift decision to launch operation Eastern Sentry, a multi-domain effort to
further enhance Allied defences along the Eastern Flank to shield and protect Allied territory and
populations against any further incursion attempts;
6. Remaining clear eyed that Russia’s unprovoked, brutal, and illegal full-scale war of
aggression against Ukraine is the principal driver of the sea change in the Euro-Atlantic security
environment that has upended longstanding principles and norms and constitutes a direct challenge
to the post-WWII rules-based international order underwritten and defended by NATO Allies and
their partners;
7. Condemning in the strongest possible terms Russia’s systematic and deliberate targeting of
civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine via daily missile and drone strikes – including on
hospitals, schools, power plants, and grain export facilities – in flagrant violation of the Geneva
Conventions and international humanitarian law;
8. Knowing that a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, based on its sovereignty, independence,
and territorial integrity is indispensable for the security of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area, and
that any unjust settlement would deeply damage the principles of sovereignty and rule of law
underpinning global stability and security;
9. Understanding that NATO Allies’ continued high levels of military, financial, and political
support to Ukraine remain vital for its legitimate self-defence efforts, and a core security imperative
for Allies; and applauding the over USD 170 billion in military aid already delivered;
10. Deeply concerned by Russia’s suspension of its participation in New START, and its
continued selective implementation, or total disregard, of its arms control obligations; and
*
Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the
71st Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on
Monday 13 October 2025.
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fully aware that the erosion of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation frameworks and
norms further destabilises the global strategic environment;
11. Deeply troubled by the growing role of China as a strategic enabler of Russia’s war of
aggression against Ukraine through the supply of dual-use technologies, microelectronics, and
satellite imagery, alongside its growing imports from Russia that significantly undermine the impact
and effectiveness of international sanctions;
12. Strongly condemning North Korea’s large-scale transfer of artillery shells, short-range
ballistic missiles, and other munitions to Russia in blatant violation of UN Security Council
resolutions, as well as the deployment of North Korean military personnel to support Russian
operations, materially extending Moscow’s capacity to continue its war of aggression on Ukraine;
13. Also strongly condemning Iran’s supply of thousands of Shahed-136 attack drones, short-
range ballistic missiles, and military advisers to aid Russia’s war effort, which have had an outsized
role on Russia’s indiscriminate attacks on civilians and vital-to-life infrastructure;
14. Understanding clearly the deepening strategic alignment between Russia, China, Iran,
Belarus, and North Korea, whose growing convergence presents a systemic, coordinated, and
pernicious challenge to Allied security, interests, and values;
15. Noting further that China and North Korea’s enablement of and material support to Russia’s
war on Ukraine is the clearest manifestation to date of the increasing interlinkages of Euro-Atlantic
and Asia-Pacific security;
16. Underlining that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations remains the most direct
asymmetric threat to Allied populations and international peace and prosperity;
17. Acknowledging Allies’ substantial and sustained efforts since 2014 to strengthen NATO’s
deterrence and defence posture, including enhanced forward presence, rotational deployments, and
improved rapid reinforcement readiness;
18. Recalling the ambitious and historic decisions taken at the 2022 Madrid and 2023 Vilnius
Summits, including the adoption of the New Force Model, the scaling up of battlegroups to the
brigade level, and significant enhancements in force structure, which mark another fundamental shift
in NATO’s deterrence and defence posture;
19. Highlighting the importance of NATO’s forward presence along the Eastern Flank and
commending the progress achieved in scaling up presence and capabilities, while underlining the
Alliance’s 360-degree approach to security and the interlinkage of threats across the Eastern and
Southern Flanks, where a range of threats recall the need for continued reinforcement;
20. Underscoring that nuclear deterrence remains at the core of NATO’s collective defence, and
that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance and Allies will continue
to take all steps necessary to ensure NATO’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective;
21. Welcoming the significant increases in Allied defence spending over the last two years,
including an additional USD 187 billion by NATO Europe and Canada, which represent a meaningful
step forward to guaranteeing NATO’s future security, and applauding Allied heads of state and
government for taking the necessary and bold steps at The Hague Summit to agree to push for the
most ambitious defence spending and investment requirements in a generation;
22. Appreciating the adoption of the 2024 NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge and the
updated 2025 Defence Production Action Plan resulting in already significantly expanded defence
industrial production across the Alliance, steps to eliminate defence trade barriers among Allies, and
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lower barriers to joint production, and paving the way for a new dynamism in transatlantic and cross-
partner defence industrial cooperation;
23. Acknowledging the potential of innovation initiatives such as the Defence Innovation
Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the NATO Innovation Fund to push new avenues for
defence innovation and to sustain Allies’ technological edge;
24. Supporting deeper and fully complimentary NATO-EU cooperation fostering stronger defence
industrial investment, cooperation and production in the EU and with EU partners; and encouraged
by recent EU initiatives, including Security Action for Europe (SAFE), and the ReArm Europe
Plan/Readiness 2030 to accelerate rearmament, strengthen the European defence industrial base,
and ensure transatlantic interoperability;
25. Recognising Allies’ efforts to promote closer cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners through
instruments such as the 2024 Agenda for Tackling Shared Security Challenges and new Individually
Tailored Partnership Programmes, and via increased joint military exercising, expanded defence
industrial cooperation, and the participation of the IP4 leaders at NATO summits and ministerials;
26. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
a. to demonstrate an ironclad and enduring political will and strength of character to tackle
the significant and complex threats and challenges of the current security environment,
thereby underwriting Article 5 commitments as the cornerstone of the Alliance of today
and for tomorrow;
b. to meet the moment of a generation by raising defence investments to 5% of GDP, as
agreed to at The Hague Summit, with at least 3.5% of GDP allocated to core defence
requirements to meet NATO’s Capability Targets, and to submit the annual plans needed
to demonstrate a credible path to reach the established target;
c. to allocate the further 1.5% of GDP to defence- and security-related investments to
protect critical infrastructure, defend cyber networks, boost civil preparedness and
resilience, jumpstart innovation, and strengthen defence industrial bases;
d. to implement the legislative frameworks needed to send consistent demand signals to
unlock new funding to sustain the new defence spending momentum, vital to the
Alliance’s transformational promise of a new baseline for deterrence and defence;
e. to continue to work to eliminate inter-Allied defence trade barriers and lower barriers to
inter-Allied and partner defence industrial cooperation and innovation;
f. to channel new investments into immediate priorities such as air, missile, and drone
defences, advanced armoured vehicles, all forms of ammunition, enabling capabilities,
long-range precision strikes, uncrewed platforms, and warships and aircraft, and more
according to NATO’s defence planning requirements for today and tomorrow;
g. to support the initiatives of the European Union and individual Allies to build a drone wall,
in close cooperation with NATO and drawing on Ukrainian practical expertise;
h. to understand that Allies must commit to at least a five-fold increase in air and missile
defence systems to eliminate, either through individual investment or cooperative
initiatives, all single points of failure across the Alliance’s Eastern Flank, and to ensure
these systems are interoperable and integrated within a wider integrated air and missile
defence architecture that is tailored to address all air and missile threats emanating from
all strategic directions from state and non-state actors;
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i. to accelerate the implementation of the New Force Model and complete the scale-up of
the battlegroups into brigades along the Eastern Flank, and to reinforce operation
Eastern Sentry, providing them with additional capabilities such as air defence, heavy
armour and forward positioned artillery and other strike capabilities to further strengthen
Allied deterrence posture against increased Russian probing;
j. to agree on a revision of NATO’s rules of engagement, notably to combat the threat of
drones;
k. to continue to increase the quality and quantity of Allied joint-force exercising to further
hone interoperability and readiness;
l. to sustain and expand support for Ukraine to ensure it can defend as well as liberate
territory, and achieve just and durable peace, including via new pledges of vital military
and financial assistance, particularly the delivery of the additional USD 35 billion of
outstanding pledged security assistance, additional contributions to the Prioritised
Ukraine Requirements List, and increased investment in Ukraine’s domestic defence
industry;
m. to strengthen recruitment and retention efforts across the Alliance’s armed forces to
sustain NATO’s enhanced collective defence posture, drawing on best practices from
Allies with effective personnel models;
n. to pursue frank and constructive consultations already underway between European
Allies, the United States, and Canada on global force-posture priorities and equitable
burden sharing;
o. to support a more strategic and results-oriented approach towards the Mediterranean
and the Southern Neighbourhood, as well as NATO’s High North and Arctic;
p. to broaden cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners through expanded joint exercises,
industrial initiatives, and increased Allied presence in the region to secure common
security interests and counter coercive practices targeting Allied and partner interests;
q. to address systemic challenges posed by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, including
through robust cyber and societal resilience efforts by engaging Allied populations in a
whole-of-nation defence concept.
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STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AND
SECURITY AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT IN THE HAGUE
RESOLUTION 500*
The Assembly,
1. Stressing that economic cooperation remains an essential element of the transatlantic
partnership and reaffirming the importance of economic collaboration among NATO members in
line with Article 2 of the NATO Treaty;
2. Observing that NATO Allies must coordinate military and economic strength to create a
powerful deterrent against any threats to the peace, independence and stability of NATO members;
3. Understanding that robust economic security instruments can play a key role in
complementing military and political means of achieving traditional Allied security objectives;
4. Concerned that strategic competition among the world’s largest economies, challenges to
the resilience of vital supply chains and a growing risk of technology theft move the world economy
into a phase of geo-economic fragmentation;
5. Cognisant that Allies face challenges in striking the right balance between achieving security
and remaining economically open;
6. Stressing that overexposure to overly concentrated international supply chains for strategic
commodities needed in the defence industrial, energy, digital, food and other sectors critical to
national security can leave Allies’ militaries and economies vulnerable to enemies and competitors;
7. Reiterating its firm condemnation of Russia’s unprovoked, full-scale war of aggression
against Ukraine which poses a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic and global security;
8. Recognising that Russia’s war against Ukraine as well as Russia’s hybrid campaigns in
Europe and assertiveness in the Global South has had a profound impact on the global economy,
energy and food security as well as migration;
9. Concerned that China uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and
enhance its influence as well as seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical
infrastructure and strategic materials, including critical raw materials and supply chains;
10. Recognising that China’s toolbox for economic coercion has become more sophisticated,
targeted and institutionalised;
11. Convinced that to effectively prepare for the new threats and challenges posed by Russia
and China, NATO Allies should work to build a renewed sense of political and economic cohesion,
recognising that economic issues have important bearing on Allied security;
12. Endorsing Allies’ decision at the NATO Summit in The Hague, committing to invest 5% of
GDP annually on core defence requirements as well as defence- and security-related spending by
2035 to ensure Allies’ individual and collective obligations, in accordance with Article 3 of the NATO
Treaty, as well as The Hague Summit decision to work to eliminate defence trade barriers among
Allies and leverage our partnerships to promote defence industrial cooperation;
*
Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the
71st Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on
Monday 13 October 2025.
178 SESA 25 E
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13. Welcoming NATO’s increased focus on resilience, including resilient energy supplies as well
as food and water resources, and supporting the decision to spend up to 1.5% of GDP annually
on inter alia protecting critical infrastructure, ensuring Allied civil preparedness and resilience,
unleashing innovation, and strengthening the Allied defence industrial base which will strengthen
economic security;
14. Welcoming the Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade
between the European Union and the United States, and the Priority Ukraine Requirements List
(PURL) mechanism established to bolster Ukrainian defence, noting the European Union’s plans
to substantially increase procurement of military and defence equipment from the United States,
with the support and facilitation of the US government, and acknowledging that both parties
commit to cooperate on ensuring secure, reliable, and diversified energy supplies, including by
addressing non-tariff barriers that might restrict bilateral energy trade, while constituting a structured
defence and technology industrial base capable of responding to the Russian threat;
15. Welcoming the Economic Prosperity Deal between the United Kingdom and the United
States and noting that it aims at strengthening among others aerospace and aircraft manufacturing
supply chains;
16. Acknowledging efforts to decrease dependence on Russian energy and noting the recent
European Union legislation to completely phase out Europe’s dependency on imported Russian
natural gas and oil by 2028, while prioritising imports from our allies and fully respecting the specific
geographical dependencies and structural constraints of individual member states, and ensuring
that no Allied nation’s energy security is compromised in the process;
17. Acknowledging that the future of the digital economy, sustainable energy industries and the
defence sector depend on access to a range of critical raw materials;
18. Endorsing Allied actions to reduce their dependence on China for the supply of critical raw
materials and supporting NATO’s Defence-Critical Supply Chain Security Roadmap;
19. Recognising the importance of prioritising and strengthening economic security partnerships,
including with Indo-Pacific partners, the European Union, Ukraine, Georgia, Global South countries
and the private sector as well as acknowledging that deep public-private collaboration is essential
and governments should treat private sector businesses as full partners in shaping and
implementing economic security policies;
20. URGES the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
a. to avoid economic policies that undermine the rules-based multilateral trade and
investment system, recognising that trade wars among friends and Allies could empower
states that do not share the Alliance's values;
b. to ensure that the defence spending increase agreed at The Hague Summit solidifies the
transatlantic economic partnership and the partnerships between Alliance members,
ensures economic growth in Alliance nations, and helps lay the foundation for the
technological strengths of their economies;
c. to recognise economic power as an important pillar of deterrence and a cornerstone of
Allied strategy to enhance transatlantic security more effectively;
d. to revitalise NATO’s approach to economic security by reintroducing regular high-level
meetings and consultations focused on economic matters;
e. to reestablish the NATO Economic Security Committee to handle economic security
issues through monitoring global economic trends, assessing potential security threats,
and coordinating economic security strategies among Allies;
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f. to include economic resilience as a critical part of the update of the seven NATO baseline
requirements for resilience planned for 2026;
g. to strengthen NATO cooperation with the European Union on the economic security
agenda, including defence industry, innovation and technology, resilience, civil
preparedness and critical infrastructure protection, while ensuring inclusion of non-EU
Allies in the EU’s respective efforts in these fields;
h. to foster a more institutionalised NATO-OECD policy alignment, including by the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly’s active participation in the OECD Global Parliamentary
Network, to discuss economic security issues, such as standards;
i. to create a NATO Partnership for Essential Raw Materials to build a common
understanding among Allies on strategic raw materials and align their economic policies
to secure reliable access to them and enhance supply chain resilience;
j. to develop a coherent strategy to counter geo-economic fragmentation in relations
between Allies and countries in the Global South to stimulate economic growth and
reduce pressure of economic migration;
k. to reinforce and make full use of export control mechanisms by ensuring that incentives
are in place for commercial operators to comply with the rules, including criminal statutes
aimed at those violating these export controls;
l. to deepen enforcement cooperation and work to harmonise existing and future sanctions
and trade measures on Russia to facilitate enforcement and make circumvention far
more difficult;
m. to rapidly expand transatlantic defence industrial cooperation and work to eliminate
defence trade barriers;
n. to mobilise private capital engagement in the defence sector and stimulate regionally
dispersed investment to rebuild Allied industrial capacity that should lead to building
cross-national technological and industrial Allied ecosystems;
o. to recognise that economic security requires a cultural shift and both private and public
sectors must adapt long-standing assumptions, practices and operating procedures to
reflect today’s more contested security environment;
p. to encourage the private sector to move from an opportunity-first mindset to one that
prioritises geopolitical risk awareness, resilience planning and investment in security;
q. to leverage the economic security agenda to synchronise military and non-military
instruments of power in order to better integrate private-sector capabilities across
domains, expand industrial base capacity and protect critical infrastructure from kinetic
and non-kinetic attacks;
r. to prioritise moving food to international markets in an unhindered manner, even in a
time of geo-economic fragmentation and recognise the strategic value of food production
and food commodities;
s. continue to work on food security in NATO in the framework of the Food and Agriculture
Planning Group and maintain close cooperation with Ukraine in this regard to ensure the
resilience of food systems across the Alliance, and future-proofing them against
disruption and shocks.
_______________
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FOSTERING STABILITY AND RECONCILIATION IN THE WESTERN
BALKANS
RESOLUTION 501*
The Assembly,
1. Reaffirming NATO’s long-standing engagement in the Western Balkans as essential to
safeguarding peace, security, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and underscoring the region’s
strategic importance to the Alliance;
2. Commemorating the 30th
anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords that ended the
Bosnian War and preserved Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a single state, and recalling the
Spring Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly hosted by the City of Dayton, Ohio, from
23-26 May 2025, attended by Heads of State and Government from across the Western Balkans as
well as key leaders who were instrumental in the negotiations of the Dayton Peace Accords;
3. Commemorating the 30th
anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide, honouring the memory of
the victims, and reaffirming the significance of justice, reconciliation, and the prevention of future
atrocities in BiH and the wider region;
4. Recognising the remarkable transformation of Southeastern Europe over the past 30 years
and the valuable contributions of NATO Allies Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and
Slovenia to NATO operations and to the collective security of the Alliance, and welcoming their
continued efforts to promote regional stability;
5. Expressing deep concern about the political and constitutional crisis in BiH, particularly the
secessionist rhetoric and actions of the Republika Srpska’s leadership and repeated violations of the
Dayton Peace Accords, reiterating that the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
long-term stability must not be questioned or undermined while commending the strong and united
stance of Allied leaders in unequivocally condemning this dangerous and destabilising behaviour;
6. Welcoming the continued presence of EUFOR Operation Althea and KFOR as stabilising
anchors in the region, and reaffirming the importance of coordination and cooperation between
NATO and the EU in the region;
7. Expressing concern about the lack of progress and encouraging further efforts to revitalise
the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue as the principal avenue to normalise relations, ensure
the rights of all communities, and advance both parties’ European aspirations;
8. Expressing concern over increasing external interference, especially from the
Russian Federation, which seeks to exploit unresolved political disputes, fuel polarisation, and
undermine democratic institutions and public trust in the Western Balkans;
9. Recalling NATO’s commitment to the Open Door Policy and supporting the Euro-Atlantic
aspirations of BiH;
10. Emphasising the need to strengthen democratic institutions, the rule of law, and media
freedom across the Western Balkans in order to ensure sustainable peace in the region;
*
Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 71st Annual Session
of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on Monday 13 October 2025.
178 SESA 25 E
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11. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
a. to reaffirm NATO’s enduring commitment to peace and stability in the Western Balkans,
to support the region’s democratic consolidation, and to accelerate its European and/or
Euro-Atlantic integration processes;
b. to continue signalling that the Alliance will not allow a security vacuum to return to the
region and will take action, if necessary, to safeguard peace;
c. to strengthen NATO’s engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including through
support for NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, political engagement, the Defence Capacity
Building Package, and other mechanisms of practical cooperation, in close coordination
with the EU and its EUFOR Operation Althea;
d. to reaffirm NATO’s Open Door Policy and support BiH’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations,
including assistance in implementing its Reform Programme with NATO and fostering
inclusive political dialogue;
e. to condemn inflammatory secessionist rhetoric and actions by RS leadership in BiH,
while supporting efforts to de-escalate tensions, foster reconciliation and, if necessary,
to reform BiH institutions through the constitutional process with the consent of the
country’s three constituent peoples;
f. to ensure continued support for KFOR’s presence and mandate in Kosovo as a
guarantor of stability and deterrent against renewed violence, and to expand support for
confidence-building measures between communities;
g. to support the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and encourage both parties to
refrain from unilateral steps that risk escalating tensions and to seek full and sustainable
implementation of their commitments under the 2013 Brussels Agreement and the
2023 Agreement on the Path to Normalisation (Ohrid Agreement);
h. to maintain their engagement with Serbia, respecting Serbia’s sovereign choices, while
upholding the values and security interests of the Alliance;
i. to further increase NATO-EU complementarity in the Western Balkans, including joint
planning, intelligence-sharing, and coordinated capacity-building for regional partners;
j. to increase efforts to counter malign foreign influence and hybrid threats in the region,
including through enhanced strategic communications, media literacy, infrastructure
security, and resilience-building;
k. to deepen cooperation with civil society actors, local institutions, and independent media
across the region to strengthen democratic resilience, media pluralism, and rule-of-law
frameworks in the face of authoritarian influence;
l. to ensure NATO remains visibly and substantively engaged in the Western Balkans
through high-level visits, public diplomacy, parliamentary outreach, and regular
consultations with regional leaders to foster stability, trust, and shared security.
_______________
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SOLIDARITY WITH UKRAINE AND THE IMPERATIVE OF A JUST AND
LASTING PEACE
RESOLUTION 502*
The Assembly,
1. Pledging to stand firmly with Ukraine until and beyond the achievement of a just and lasting
peace;
2. Condemning in the strongest terms Russia’s ongoing aggression and intensifying attacks
against Ukraine, including missile, drone and artillery attacks against civilians and critical
infrastructure;
3. Denouncing Russia’s reckless and escalatory violations of the airspace of Allied nations in
connection with its aggression against Ukraine, expressing its full solidarity with the Allies
concerned, and welcoming NATO’s decision to execute Eastern Sentry along NATO’s
Eastern flank;
4. Deeply concerned about the Russian shadow fleet and its negative impact on
security, the environment and the economy;
5. Welcoming Allies’ decisions at recent NATO Summits to strengthen deterrence and defence,
institutionalise long-term support to Ukraine, and include direct military support to Ukraine in national
defence and defence-related spending targets;
6. Backing the diplomatic initiatives of the United States, including through the Istanbul
negotiation process, to bring the war to an end while preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity and deterring future aggression, commending the close coordination between the Allies
and Ukraine, based on the principle that nothing about Ukraine should be decided without Ukraine,
and emphasising the role of European Allies in all discussions on the path towards peace;
7. Emphasising the importance and urgency of an immediate, comprehensive and verifiable
ceasefire;
8. Stressing that meaningful and enforceable security guarantees are essential to deter renewed
aggression;
9. Recognising the strategic importance of working towards fairer burden sharing among all
Allies across all types of assistance to Ukraine, and welcoming the commitment of the Coalition of
the Willing to provide robust security guarantees to Ukraine and, if requested by Ukraine, a
multinational reassurance force, while underscoring the indispensable role of the United States’
support in these efforts;
10. Deploring the consistent refusal of the Russian Federation to accept a ceasefire and its
determination to persist in its war of aggression;
11. Saluting the political and practical support that NATO and individual Allies continue to provide
to Ukraine, particularly through the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC), the NATO Representation in
Ukraine (NRU), the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), the
Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for
Ukraine, the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC), NATO Prioritised Ukraine
*
Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 71st Annual Session
of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on Monday 13 October 2025.
178 SESA 25 E
21
Requirements List (PURL) initiative and other instruments to support Ukraine’s ability to defend itself,
its resilience and its Euro-Atlantic integration;
12. Condemning the Russian Federation’s systematic use of torture, inhuman and degrading
treatment, medical neglect and starvation against Ukrainian prisoners of war, in violation of
international humanitarian law, and demanding immediate and unconditional access for
international monitoring missions, including the International Committee of the Red Cross and UN
mechanisms, to all places of detention;
13. Stressing that a just and durable peace requires full accountability for the crime of aggression,
war crimes, and other grave violations of international law, the full exchange of prisoners of war, and
the safe return of all abducted and unlawfully transferred Ukrainian civilians, especially children;
14. Recalling the disproportionate impact of the war on women, and underscoring the
importance of mainstreaming the Women, Peace and Security and Human Security agendas in all
assistance and peace support efforts;
15. Highlighting the importance of continuing to mobilise international support for Ukraine’s
recovery, reconstruction, reform and modernisation, and welcoming the progress achieved in the
recent fourth Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome in July 2025, as well as the previous
conferences held in Lugano (2022), London (2023), and Berlin (2024);
16. Supporting the important work of the Crimea Platform;
17. Emphasising the imperative of nuclear safety and security, including the restoration of full
Ukrainian control over the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and uninterrupted IAEA access;
18. Denouncing the assistance provided by the Belarusian, Iranian, Chinese and North Korean
regimes to Russia’s war of aggression;
19. Acknowledging the vital role of Allied parliaments in sustaining public support and funding for
assistance to Ukraine and for any future peace-support arrangements;
20. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
a. to implement fully and promptly the decisions of the NATO Summit in The Hague on
defence spending in order to strengthen NATO’s collective defence, as well as to support
Ukraine’s defence needs as Ukraine’s security contributes to Allies’ own security;
b. to ensure the timely and continuous delivery of critical capabilities to Ukraine, including
layered air and missile defence, long-range precision strike, artillery systems and
ammunition, multi-role fighter aircraft, armoured vehicles, counter-UAS and electronic
warfare systems, maritime and air domain awareness tools, leveraging
NATO coordination mechanisms, including PURL, and Allied facilities;
c. to ensure that Ukraine, in its international right to defend itself, can use weapons
provided by NATO Allies to strike legitimate targets in Russia;
d. to coordinate closely – among themselves and with Ukraine – diplomatic initiatives to
end the war;
e. to reaffirm that Russia’s attempts to occupy and annex internationally recognised
Ukrainian territory will never be recognised;
f. to deliver, in consultation with Ukraine and interested partners, on the commitments to
establish a multinational reassurance force with a robust mandate to deter and respond
to ceasefire violations, including over-the-horizon support and rapid-reinforcement
mechanisms, as well as clear command and force protection arrangements;
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g. to reaffirm that Ukraine’s path to NATO membership is irreversible, and that Ukraine’s
future NATO membership is a sovereign decision of Ukraine and NATO Allies alone,
based solely on the will of the Ukrainian people and authorities and the fulfilment of
membership criteria;
h. to consider the strongest bilateral or multi-lateral mutual defence guarantees to Ukraine,
to deter future aggression;
i. to commit to assisting Ukraine in sustaining robust, well-trained and well-equipped
armed forces over the long term, including after the war, to serve as Ukraine’s first line
of defence against future aggression;
j. to expand, tighten, and fully enforce sanctions and export controls on Russia and its
enablers, including through secondary measures and by closing evasion channels, to
raise the cost of continued aggression;
k. to support international accountability efforts, including the work of the Special Tribunal
for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine within the framework of the Council of
Europe;
l. to require the full release and exchange of prisoners of war, the safe return of abducted
civilians, particularly children, and to mandate diplomatic missions to assist tracing and
family reunification efforts;
m. to accelerate defence-industrial expansion, including co-production with Ukraine’s
defence sector, secure supply chains, and integration with NATO and EU initiatives;
n. to support Ukraine’s governance and reform agenda, including anti-corruption
institutions and transparent defence procurement, as key enablers for sustained
assistance and Euro-Atlantic integration;
o. to assist Ukraine in reinforcing civilian and energy resilience, including critical
infrastructure protection, cyber defence, and strategic communications;
p. to support Ukraine’s reconstruction through sustained public and private financing,
including the use of frozen Russian assets and windfall proceeds, and to develop
investment frameworks to attract private capital;
q. to continue deepening EU-NATO cooperation on Ukraine, while ensuring full inclusion
of non-EU Allies and coordination with like-minded partners around the world;
r. to continue contributing to Black Sea security, safety of navigation in line with the Vilnius
and Washington Summit decisions, Ukraine’s maritime domain awareness and grain
corridor protection.
_______________
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PREPARING NATO FOR THE FUTURE OF UNCREWED WARFARE
RESOLUTION 503*
The Assembly,
1. Recognising that uncrewed systems are transforming armed conflict, as demonstrated in
recent conflicts, and that leadership in this field is crucial to maintaining NATO’s technological edge;
2. Acknowledging the potential military benefits that integration of uncrewed systems offers in
the air, on the ground and at sea;
3. Stressing that uncrewed systems complement, rather than replace, crewed systems, and
underlining that uncrewed systems necessitate near-constant innovation and adaptation;
4. Highlighting that attacks by drones can represent a form of financial and industrial
denial-of-service attack aiming to overwhelm traditional air defence systems, and that defending
against uncrewed systems poses unique challenges, creating a clear cost asymmetry between
attack drones and interceptors;
5. Observing that uncrewed systems, and their associated pace of innovation and rapid
deployment demand, present opportunities and challenges for armed forces, warranting caution that
international law and ethical and legally binding rules of engagement not be overlooked to meet
demands of rapid deployment;
6. Applauding Ukraine for its development, production, and use of uncrewed systems in its fight
against Russia’s illegal invasion and its pioneering in innovative procurement and production cycles
through the introduction of an online marketplace for military technology, thereby empowering
soldiers to order what they need when they need it and pushing procurement command and control
down to the tactical level; while also emphasising the clear threat posed by Russian uncrewed
systems to NATO airspace and sovereignty;
7. Strongly supporting NATO’s efforts to foster an innovative ecosystem and forward-looking
approach to uncrewed systems and warfare through the NATO Innovation Fund, its investments in
promising start-ups working on uncrewed aerial systems and uncrewed surface vessels, and the
NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic’s (DIANA) 2026 focus on autonomy and
unmanned systems;
8. Encouraging the Alliance to do more joint exercises focusing on uncrewed systems, like
NATO’s Counter Unmanned Aircraft System Technical Interoperability Exercise;
9. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
a. to advance joint efforts on uncrewed systems to ensure that NATO maintains its
technological edge and that its armed forces can leverage the technology’s benefits
while being cognisant of the operational, ethical, and legal challenges, including civilian
oversight, of uncrewed systems;
b. to continue advancing and streamlining the Alliance’s conceptual thinking on uncrewed
systems, and to continuously assess and ensure their interoperability to deconflict their
utilisation in a shared warfighting space, while also ensuring that these systems are
compatible with civilian airspace use during peacetime;
*
Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the
71st Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on
Monday 13 October 2025.
178 SESA 25 E
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c. to develop and enforce joint operational and tactical standards on the integration of
uncrewed systems to legacy systems to strengthen collective defence, and to address
future interoperability challenges by incorporating uncrewed systems in all
Allied exercises;
d. to continue ensuring and enhancing the Alliance’s ability to adapt to volatile
environments by putting in place structures that prepare the Alliance for the rapid cycles
of measures, counter-measures and counter-counter-measures, and innovation,
development and production, while allowing soldiers on the ground to directly engage
with developers and producers of uncrewed systems and a rapid ramp up in production
of new and adapted systems, including through forward-deployed 3D printers that
facilitate production of required materials close to the tactical level;
e. to actively continue delivering on the goal of eliminating defence trade barriers among
Allies and leveraging partnerships with actors like Ukraine to promote further defence
industrial cooperation, as reaffirmed by the Summit Declaration issued in The Hague;
f. to work towards a proactive and coherent strategic framework and activities across
NATO bodies and member countries, enabling governance to keep pace with technical
developments and innovation and ensuring that ethical and legal guidelines are
effectively implemented on the ground;
g. to ensure that the development and acquisition of uncrewed systems at the national
level is coherent with the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP);
h. to further advance the inclusion and streamlining of uncrewed systems in all aspects of
defence planning while ensuring their complementarity with crewed systems, making
sure that Allies consider uncrewed systems as fully part of multi-domain operations, and
not as an either/or, to ensure that their potential is fully leveraged to prepare the Alliance
for the future of uncrewed warfare.
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