Offentlige svar på ECPRD-forespørgsel til øvrige europæiske parlamenter om ydelser af en økonomisk fordel i forbindelse med nedlæggelse af et parlamentsmandat.

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Til: Udvalgets medlemmer
Dato: 3. oktober 2025
Vedlagt omdeles som offentligt udvalgsbilag de besvarelser på ECPRD-
forespørgslen om ydelse af en økonomisk fordel i forbindelse med nedlæg-
gelse af et parlamentsmandat, jf. UFO alm. del – bilag 68, hvor de besvaren-
de parlamenter har givet tilsagn om, at besvarelsen kan offentliggøres. Der
henvises i øvrigt til det sammenfattende notat, som er omdelt som del af
UFO alm. del – bilag 68 (internt).
Med venlig hilsen
Sekretariatet
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Reply to ECPRD Request 6116
The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a
seat in parliament
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that
prohibits
i. a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition
that they resign their seat;
The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Rules of Procedure for the
Organization and Activities of the National Assembly do not provide for a Member of
Parliament to resign and leave the National Assembly by receiving financial incentives.
According to Art. 72, para. 1, item 1 of the Constitution, a Member of Parliament may resign
before the National Assembly, which terminates his or her powers. The resignation is
considered a personal act and is not related to receiving financial benefits.
ii. the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member's
own party.
There is no legal norm in the positive legal framework that prohibits the offering of
financial benefits to a member of parliament in order to resign.
It is possible in some cases to prove that this is a crime. The request and receipt of
financial benefits in order to do or not do something in the course of office is called passive
bribery and is a crime under Art. 301 of the Criminal Code:
Article 301
(1) (Amended, SG No. 51/2000, SG No. 92/2002) An official who demands or accepts a
gift or any other undue benefit, or accepts a proposal or a promise for a gift or benefit, in order
to perform or to fail to perform an act connected with his service, or because he has performed
or failed to perform such an act, shall be punished for bribery by imprisonment for up to six
years and a fine of up to BGN 5,000.
(2) (Amended, SG No. 51/2000, SG No. 92/2002) If the official has committed any of the
acts under Paragraph 1 in order to violate, or for having violated his service, where this
violation does not constitute a crime, the punishment shall be imprisonment of up to 8 to eight
years and a fine of up to BGN 10,000.
(3) (Amended, SG No. 95/1975, SG No. 51/2000, SG No. 92/2002) If the official has
committed any of the acts under paragraph 1 in order to perform or because of having
performed another crime in connection with his service, the punishment shall be imprisonment
of up to ten years and a fine of up to BGN 15,000.
(4) (Amended, SG No. 89/1986) In the cases of the preceding paragraphs, the court
shall rule deprivation of the rights under Article 37 (1), sub-paragraphs 6 and 7.
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(5) (New, SG No. 92/2002) Punishment under Paragraph 1 shall also be imposed to a
foreign official who requests or accepts bribery or accepts a proposal for or a promise of
bribery.
Offering and giving such financial benefits is called active bribery and is also a crime
under the Criminal Code:
Article 304 (Amended and supplemented, SG No. 7/1999, amended, SG No. 51/2000,
SG No. 92/2002)
(1) A person who offers, promises, or gives a gift or any other material benefit to an
official in order to perform or not to perform an act within the framework of his service, or
because he has performed or has not performed such an act, shall be punished by imprisonment
for a term of up to six years and a fine from up to BGN five thousand.
(2) If in connection with such bribe the official has violated his official duties, the
punishment shall be imprisonment for a term of up to eight years and a fine from up to BGN
seven thousand, where this violation does not constitute a graver punishable crime.
(3) The punishment as per paragraph (1) above shall be also inflicted on any person
who gives a bribe to a foreign official.
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
There is no such legal regulation.


The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation
of a seat in parliament
Reply from the German Bundestag
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that
prohibits
i. a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition
that they resign their seat;
ii. the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member’s
own party.
No, in German law such a provision does not exist.
On the one hand, Section 108e of the German Criminal Code criminalizes bribery and
corruption of officeholders; on the other hand, Section 44a(2) of the Members of the Bun-
destag Act prohibits the acceptance of benefits and financial advantages below the thresh-
old of criminal liability. However, both provisions pertain exclusively to actions under-
taken “in the exercise of the mandate.” Resignation from the mandate can hardly be sub-
sumed under this.
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
Not applicable.
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The offering of a financial advantage in
exchange for the resignation of a seat in
parliament
ECPRD Request No 6116
Following a specific case, the Folketing is currently engaged in discussions on the more
fundamental legal and constitutional issues that may arise in situations where a
Member of the Folketing is offered or receives a financial benefit from others —
including individuals affiliated with the Member’s political party — on the condition
that the Member resigns their seat. These discussions include consideration of
whether there is a need to introduce a prohibition against such arrangements.
In preparation for a potential future regulation of the matter, answers are therefore
sought to the following questions.
Questions
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that
prohibits
(i) a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the
condition that they resign their seat;
(ii) the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the
member’s own party.
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
To: Maiken Bork Clausen, Denmark - Folketinget
From: Richard Kelly
Research section: Parliament and Constitution Centre
Tel: 0207 219 4948
Email: kellyrj@parliament.uk
Ref: REQ-883781
Date: 24 July 2025
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Commons Library Request Response, 24 July 2025
2
Response
These scenarios would be covered by internal regulation and the rules associated with
exclusive cognisance, that is Parliament has “sole jurisdiction … over all matters subject
to parliamentary privilege”.1
An MP accepting financial advantage may be in breach of any of the following rules of
the Code of Conduct (PDF):
Rule 3
• The acceptance by a Member of a bribe to influence his or her conduct as a
Member, including any fee, compensation or reward in connection with the
promotion of, or opposition to, any Bill, Motion, or other matter submitted, or
intended to be submitted to the House, or to any Committee of the House, is
contrary to the law of Parliament.
Rule 2
• Members must base their conduct on a consideration of the public interest, avoid
conflict between personal interest and the public interest and resolve any conflict
between the two, at once, and in favour of the public interest.
Rule 11
• Members shall never undertake any action which would cause significant damage
to the reputation and integrity of the House of Commons as a whole, or of its
Members generally.
The process for enforcement of the code is set out in the published Procedural
Protocol in respect of the Code of Conduct (PDF).
The offering of a financial advantage could potentially be a contempt of Parliament.
1 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, Parliamentary Privilege (PDF), 3 July 2013, HC 100 2013-14, para 15
2 Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice, 25th edition, 2019, para 12.1; Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege,
Parliamentary Privilege (PDF), 3 July 2013, HC 100 2013-14, para 3
Box 1: Contempts of Parliament
Each House also claims the right to punish contempts. These are actions which, while not
necessarily breaches of any specific privilege, obstruct or impede it in the performance of
its functions, or are offences against its authority or dignity, such as disobedience to its
legitimate commands or libels upon itself, its Members or its officers.2
Commons Library Request Response, 24 July 2025
3
If there was prima facie evidence that a contempt had been committed, the House is
likely to refer the matter to the Committee of Privileges to investigate. The Committee
of Privileges would report its conclusions to the House.
The penal powers of the two Houses of Parliament are uncertain.3 If the committee
found a breach of privilege, it would be likely to recommend the censure of the
individual concerned.
If the committee considered during its inquiry that laws had been broken, it would
refer the matter to the police and put its inquiry on hold while any police investigation
took place.
Because individuals are appointed to the House of Lords, there are sometimes reports
that political parties indicate to their MPs that if they retire at a general election, they
are likely to be appointed to the House of Lords. I am not sure whether this constitutes
financial advantage but I have been advised that party management would not be
considered a contempt.
3 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, Parliamentary Privilege (PDF), 3 July 2013, HC 100 2013-14, chapter
3


SWEDEN - RIKSDAG
Reply to the ECPRD request
6116- The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation
of a seat in parliament
DENMARK - FOLKETINGET
Request date: 02/07/2025
Addressed to: BULGARIA , LATVIA , POLAND , CZECHIA , - EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT , CROATIA , GERMANY , IRELAND ,
ESTONIA , FRANCE , LITHUANIA , HUNGARY , CYPRUS , LUXEMBOURG , FINLAND , GREECE , ROMANIA , SLOVENIA ,
ITALY , UNITED KINGDOM , BELGIUM , MALTA , PORTUGAL , SPAIN , AUSTRIA , NETHERLANDS , NORWAY , SLOVAKIA ,
SWEDEN
Subject areas: Corruption, whistleblowing
Deadline 28/07/2025
Request 6116 The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a seat in parliament
The Riksdag Administration, provides the following answer to the following questions. 1) Is there any legislation or other form of
regulation, such as a code of conduct, that prohibits i. a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition
that they resign their seat; ii. the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the ember’s own party. 2) If so, what
does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
Reply provided by (erik.norlander@riksdagen.se, +46 8 786 56 63) on
Erik Norlander 2025-07-18
ECPRD Correspondent: RYDBERG David
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Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that prohibits: A)
a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition that they resign
their seat; B) the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the members
own party.
The Riksdag Administration, provides the following answer to the questions put.
Regarding the code of conduct, see from 2022. The code of conduct is a
A Code of Conduct for the members of the Riksdag
declaration of intent on behalf of all members of the Riksdag, but is not legally binding (p. 9). The group leaders are responsible for
ensuring that the code of conduct serves as a guide for the members of their own party group (p. 8). Reference is made there to the
provisions on taking and giving bribes in Chapter 10 of the Swedish Criminal Code (p. 7). Anyone who carries out an assignment
and receives, accepts a promise of or requests an undue benefit for the performance of the assignment may be convicted of taking
a bribe (Chapter 10, Section 5 a of the Swedish Criminal Code), while anyone who gives, promises or offers an undue benefit in
cases referred to in Section 5 a may be convicted of giving a bribe (Chapter 10, Section 5 b).
The Code of Conduct provides guidance on what may constitute an improper benefit for the exercise of the duties of a member of
parliament and is therefore punishable under the Criminal Code (pp. 14-17). Among other things, the following excerpt from the
preparatory work for the Criminal Code is cited (Government Bill 2011/12:79 p. 43): “Improper is any transaction that objectively has
the potential to influence the performance of certain tasks or to be perceived as a reward for how tasks have been performed.” (p.
16). It is further stated that a member of parliament should not expose himself or herself to the risk of even being suspected of being
influenced by irrelevant wishes or considerations (p. 16). Examples of benefits that would be improper if offered as a result of the
member’s duties include “gifts in cash, securities and the like” (p. 17).
Reference:
Alexander Edsjö, Legal advisor, Legal Services Department, Riksdag Administration. Written information 2025-07-17.
If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
Please see the answer above.


ECPRD request #6116 - Reply German Bundesrat
The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a seat in
parliament
1) No, in German law such a provision does not exist. As the German Bundestag has
already outlined in its response, Section 108e of the German Criminal Code is not
applicable. Resignation from the mandate is not considered part of performing
parliamentary duties within the meaning of this provision.
In the German Bundesrat, there is no code of conduct.
2) Not applicable
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AUSTRIA - PARLAMENT - NATIONALRAT
Reply to the ECPRD request
6116- The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation
of a seat in parliament
DENMARK - FOLKETINGET
Request date: 02/07/2025
Addressed to: - EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT , NORWAY , FRANCE , LITHUANIA , MALTA , SLOVAKIA , IRELAND , CYPRUS ,
GREECE , LUXEMBOURG , FINLAND , NETHERLANDS , BULGARIA , SPAIN , LATVIA , AUSTRIA , CROATIA , ITALY ,
CZECHIA , UNITED KINGDOM , HUNGARY , ROMANIA , BELGIUM , POLAND , SLOVENIA , SWEDEN , PORTUGAL ,
GERMANY , ESTONIA
Subject areas: Corruption, whistleblowing
Deadline 28/07/2025
The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a seat in parliament
See the attached file and the filled out forum for a detailed response.
Reply provided by (alexandra.becker@parlament.gv.at, ) on
Alexandra BECKER 2025-07-15
ECPRD Correspondent: KONRATH Christoph
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Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that prohibits: A)
a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition that they resign
their seat; B) the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the members
own party.
a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition that they resign their seat;
In Austria, there are no special rules regarding giving up mandates in exchange for financial benefits for Members of Parliament.
The general provisions on corruption in the Criminal Code apply (unfortunately only available in German):
304 Corruption
305 Acceptance of advantage
306 Acceptance of an advantage with the intent to be influenced
There is also a provision in the Criminal Code regarding the purchase of mandates that applies to those responsible for a political
party running in an election:
265a Mandate Purchase
the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member’s own party.
Also, here, there are provisions in the Criminal Code:
307 Bribery
307a Advantage Allocation
307b Advantage Allocation with the intent to influence
308 Prohibited intervention
If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
The criminal investigation department (Kriminalpolizei) and the public prosecutor's office (Staatsanwaltschaft) are obliged, within the
scope of their duties, to investigate ex officio any initial suspicion of a criminal offense that comes to their attention and that is not to
be prosecuted solely at the request of an authorized person.


ECPRD 6116 on The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation
of a seat in parliament
Reply by the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that prohibits
i) a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition that
they resign their seat;
ii) the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member’s own
party.
The legal and regulatory framework of the Republic of Cyprus includes several provisions that,
although not explicitly referring to the above, prohibit the offering or acceptance of financial
advantage in return for the resignation of a Member of the House of Representatives. Such
provisions are included in the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, the Criminal Code (Cap. 154),
the Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives, the Code of Conduct for Members of the
House and the internal rules of political parties.
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
Article 71 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, stipulates that a Member of the House can
vacate their seat under specific conditions, i.e. death, resignation in writing submitted to the
President of the House, loss of eligibility due to conviction for certain criminal offences or mental
incapability of performing their duties, loss of citizenship of the Republic, or upon assumption of an
office/position incompatible with the status of an MP (i.e. Minister, Member of Municipal Council,
Member of Armed or Security Forces, etc). There is no provision allowing for conditional or
transactional resignation in exchange for financial compensation.
Such an arrangement can be considered a criminal offence. As provided for in the Criminal Code
(Cap.154), Article 100, any person who - (a) is a public officer entrusted with the execution of any
official duty and in a manner indicating intent requests, accepts or obtains or agrees to request,
accept or obtain any property or benefit of any kind for themselves or for any other person, or (b)
offers, promises or agrees to offer or provide any property or benefit of any kind to a public officer
with the purpose of influencing the officer to do or omit to do something in the execution of their
duties, is guilty of a misdmeanour and is liable to imprisonment for 7 years and/or a fine.
Furthermore, the Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives uphold the principles of
independence and integrity, while the Code of Conduct for Members of the House of
Representatives, adopted in 2021, explicitly requires MPs to act in the public interest and avoid
conflicts of interest. Specifically, as per Sections 1 and 3 of Part III of the Code of Ethics, MPs must
not accept any gift or other gratuitous benefit, except those expressly provided for and institutionally
permitted under the provisions of the Code. In the performance of their duties, MPs shall not receive
or accept any gift or other benefit, except for items of purely complimentary nature and/or of minor
value with commemorative character, offered within the context of customary protocol. Part IV of the
Code, provides that in the exercise of their duties, MPs are obliged, where possible in advance, to
disclose any existing or potential conflict of interest arising from the existence or possibility of a
certain role, data and/or the occurrence of specific events that relate directly to a personal or private
interest. Any breach of the Code of Conduct can result in disciplinary measures imposed by the
Special Committee on Ethics of the Members of the House of Representatives.
Lastly, most political parties in Cyprus have their own Statutes and Codes of Ethics for their
Members, safeguarding integrity, transparency, internal discipline, party loyalty and ethical conduct,
with consequences for breaches ranging from disciplinary actions to expulsion from the party.
/MKA/
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The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a seat in parliament
ECPRD Request No 6116
July 3, 2025
Dear colleagues,
I am pleased to inform you that, to our knowledge, the issue in question has not arisen in
Estonia, and no such cases have come to public attention.
In any case, a member of the Riigikogu cannot be forced to resign from their seat in Parliament.
The principle of the free mandate is based on § 62 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia,
which states that a member of the Riigikogu shall not be bound by his or her mandate.
The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia–Riigi Teataja
This principle is further elaborated in § 17 of the Status of Members of the Riigikogu Act:
Status of Members of the Riigikogu Act–Riigi Teataja
§ 17. Free mandate
(1) Members of the Riigikogu are independent. They perform the duties of representing the
people in accordance with the Constitution, laws, public interests, and their conscience.
(2) No member of the Riigikogu may be obligated to resign from the Riigikogu.
Thus, according to subsection 1 of § 17, Members of the Riigikogu are independent; they perform
the duties of representing the people in accordance with the Constitution, laws, public interests,
and their conscience.
The principle of the free mandate also excludes the possibility of recalling a member of the
Riigikogu. As stated in subsection 2 of § 17, a member of the Riigikogu may not be obligated to
resign. For example, voters have the opportunity to express their assessment of a member’s
performance in the next parliamentary elections.
Best regards,
Siiri Sillajõe
Deputy Head
Legal and Research Department
Chancellery of the Riigikogu
Estonia
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT REPLY
TO ECPRD REQUEST 6116
The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a
seat in parliament
FROM DENMARK - FOLKETINGET
10/07/2025
ECPRD EP Deputy
Correspondent
Barbara PINTO LEITE
barbara.pintoleite@europarl.europa.eu
Replies provided by Alexis BISTIS (DG FINS)
alexis.bistis@europarl.europa.eu
Pekka NURMINEN (DG PRES)
pekka.nurminen@europarl.europa.eu
QUESTIONS
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that
prohibits
i.) a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition
that they resign their seat;
ii.) the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member’s
own party.
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it en-forced?
REPLY
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Independence of Members
The freedom and independence of Members are enshrined in Article 2.1 of the Statute for
Members of the European Parliament (2005/684/EC, Euratom):
“Members shall be free and independent”
In order to safeguard their independence, Members are entitled to an appropriate salary
(article 9). The salary is set at 38.5% of the basic salary of a judge at the Court of Justice (article
10). For guidance, the gross salary currently is EUR 10 927,44. The net salary after deduction
of Community tax and insurance contributions is EUR 8 517,01.
Legal value of agreements concerning the resignation from office of a Member
According to recital 4 of the Statute:
“Undertakings made by Members to relinquish their office at a given time, or declarations of
their intent to relinquish office on an unspecified date, which political parties can make use of
at their discretion, should be considered as incompatible with Members' freedom and
independence and should therefore not be binding in law.”
"The resignation procedure provided for in Rule 4(2) of the Rules of Procedure intends to
guarantee that any resignation is made voluntarily and in compliance with the Electoral Act
and the Statue of Members.":
Members who resign shall notify the President of their resignation and of the date on which
that resignation is to take effect, which may not be more than three months after notification.
This notification shall take the form of an official record drawn up in the presence of the
Secretary-General or his or her representative, signed by the latter and by the Member
concerned and immediately submitted to the committee responsible, which shall enter it on
the agenda of its first meeting following receipt of the document.
If the committee responsible considers that the resignation is in compliance with the Act of
20 September 1976, a vacancy shall be declared with effect from the date indicated by the
resigning Member in the official record, and the President shall inform Parliament thereof.
If the committee responsible considers that the resignation is not in compliance with the Act
of 20 September 1976, it shall propose to Parliament that it not declare a vacancy.
This safeguard of Members’ freedom is further enshrined in article 2.2 of the Statute:
“Agreements concerning the resignation from office of a Member before or at the end of a
parliamentary term shall be null and void.”
Financing of European political structures
Appropriations from Parliament’s budget allocated the financing of European political
structures may not be used to pay a financial benefit to a Member of the European Parliament
in return for their resignation.
• European political groups
The financing of European political groups is governed by the Rules on the use of
appropriations from budget item 400 (“Rules 400”) adopted by the bureau on 30 June 2003
(as amended). The nature of expenditures covered by the funds allocated to European
political groups is strictly defined in article 1.1.1:
“The appropriations made available from Item 400 are intended to cover:
- the administrative and operational expenditure of the political groups/non-attached
Members' secretariat;
- expenditure on political and information activities conducted by the political
groups/nonattached Members in connection with the European Union's political activities.”
Moreover, the nature of expenditure must conform to the common accounting plan, which
forms an integral part of the rules. In this accounting plan, there is clearly no room for the
“payment of a financial benefit to a Member of the European Parliament in return for their
resignation”.
• European political parties and foundations
The financing of European political parties and foundations is governed by:
- Title XI of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the
Union (“Finacial Regulation”)
- Regulation (EU, Euratom) no 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European
political foundations.
According to article 225 of the Financial Regulation:
“Direct financial contributions from the budget may be awarded to European political parties
as defined in Article 2, point (3), of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 (European political
parties) in view of their contribution to forming European political awareness and to
expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union in accordance with that Regulation.”
Any expenditure that does not comply with the above-mentioned regulations is considered
ineligible. It is our understanding that using funds allocated to European political parties and
foundations for the “payment of a financial benefit to a Member of the European Parliament
in exchange for their resignation” would fall under this category and thus be deemed
ineligible.


EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT REPLY
TO ECPRD REQUEST 6116
The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a
seat in parliament
FROM DENMARK - FOLKETINGET
08/07/2025
ECPRD EP Deputy
Correspondent
Barbara PINTO LEITE
barbara.pintoleite@europarl.europa.eu
Replies provided by Alexis BISTIS
alexis.bistis@europarl.europa.eu
QUESTIONS
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that
prohibits
i.) a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition
that they resign their seat;
ii.) the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member’s
own party.
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it en-forced?
REPLY
I. Independence of Members
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The principle of the free mandate of the Members of the European Parliament is explicitly
stated in Article 6 of the Electoral Act (the Act of 20 September 1976)1:
“Members of the European Parliament [...] shall not be bound by any instructions and shall
not receive a binding mandate.”
The freedom and independence of Members are also enshrined in Articles 2(1) and 3 of the
Statute for Members of the European Parliament (2005/684/EC, Euratom)2, as follows:
Article 2(1): “Members shall be free and independent”
Article 3:
1. “Members [...] shall not be bound by any instructions and shall not receive a binding
mandate.
2. Agreements concerning the way in which the mandate is to be exercised shall be null and
void.”
The Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament also contain an obligation for Members
to exercise their mandate freely and independently, in Rule 2 thereof:
“In accordance with Article 6(1) of the Act of 20 September 1976 and with Article 2(1) and
Article 3(1) of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament, Members shall exercise
their mandate freely and independently, shall not be bound by any instructions and shall not
receive a binding mandate.”
In order to safeguard their independence, Members are entitled to an appropriate salary
(Article 9 of the Statute). The salary is set at 38.5% of the basic salary of a judge at the Court
of Justice (Article 10 of the Statute). For guidance, the gross salary currently is EUR 10 927,44.
The net salary after deduction of Community tax and insurance contributions is EUR 8 517,01.
Apart from the salary and other legal financial benefits to which Members are entitled in
accordance with the Statute, they shall refrain from accepting any gifts or similar benefits
with an approximate value of more than EUR 150, in accordance with Article 6(1) of the Code
of Conduct for the Members of the European Parliament regarding integrity and
transparency3:
“Members of the European Parliament shall refrain from accepting, in their capacity as
Members, any gifts or similar benefits, other than those with an approximate value of less
1
Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage (as
amended by Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom of 25 June and 23 September 2002), OJ L 278, 8.10.1976,
p. 5.
2
Decision of the European Parliament of 28 September 2005 adopting the Statute for Members of the European
Parliament (2005/684/EC, Euratom), OJ L 262, 7.10.2005, p. 1.
3
Annex I to the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament.
than EUR 150 given in accordance with courtesy usage or those given to them in accordance
with courtesy usage when they are representing Parliament in an official capacity.”
II. Legal value of agreements concerning the resignation from office of a Member
According to recital 4 of the Statute:
“Undertakings made by Members to relinquish their office at a given time, or declarations of
their intent to relinquish office on an unspecified date, which political parties can make use of
at their discretion, should be considered as incompatible with Members' freedom and
independence and should therefore not be binding in law.”
This safeguard of Members’ freedom is further enshrined in Article 2(2) of the Statute:
“Agreements concerning the resignation from office of a Member before or at the end of a
parliamentary term shall be null and void.”
Moreover, the resignation procedure provided for in Rule 4(2) of the Rules of Procedure
intends to guarantee that any resignation is made voluntarily and in compliance with the
Electoral Act and the Statue of Members:
“Members who resign shall notify the President of their resignation and of the date on which
that resignation is to take effect, which may not be more than three months after notification.
This notification shall take the form of an official record drawn up in the presence of the
Secretary-General or his or her representative, signed by the latter and by the Member
concerned and immediately submitted to the committee responsible, which shall enter it on
the agenda of its first meeting following receipt of the document.
If the committee responsible considers that the resignation is in compliance with the Act of 20
September 1976, a vacancy shall be declared with effect from the date indicated by the
resigning Member in the official record, and the President shall inform Parliament thereof.
If the committee responsible considers that the resignation is not in compliance with the Act
of 20 September 1976, it shall propose to Parliament that it not declare a vacancy.”
III. Financing of European political structures
Appropriations from Parliament’s budget allocated the financing of European political
structures may not be used to pay a financial benefit to a Member of the European Parliament
in return for their resignation.
• European political groups
The financing of European political groups is governed by the Rules on the use of
appropriations from budget Item 400 adopted by the Bureau on 30 June 2003 (as amended).
The nature of expenditures covered by the funds allocated to European political groups is
strictly defined in Article 1.1.1:
“The appropriations made available from Item 400 are intended to cover:
- the administrative and operational expenditure of the political groups/non-attached
Members' secretariat;
- expenditure on political and information activities conducted by the political groups/non-
attached Members in connection with the European Union's political activities.”
Moreover, the nature of expenditure must conform to the common accounting plan, which
forms an integral part of the rules. In this accounting plan, there is clearly no room for the
“payment of a financial benefit to a Member of the European Parliament in return for their
resignation”.
• European political parties and foundations
The financing of European political parties and foundations is governed by:
- Title XI of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the
Union (“Finacial Regulation”)
- Regulation (EU, Euratom) no 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European
political foundations.
According to Article 225 of the Financial Regulation:
“Direct financial contributions from the budget may be awarded to European political parties
as defined in Article 2, point (3), of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 (European political
parties) in view of their contribution to forming European political awareness and to
expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union in accordance with that Regulation.”
Any expenditure that does not comply with the above-mentioned regulations is considered
ineligible. It is our understanding that using funds allocated to European political parties and
foundations for the “payment of a financial benefit to a Member of the European Parliament
in exchange for their resignation” would fall under this category and thus be deemed
ineligible.


1
ECPRD 6116-“The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the
resignation of a seat in parliament”
Questions:
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of
conduct, that prohibits a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial
advantage on the condition that they resign their seat;
the act of offering such a proposal, including by indi-viduals from the
member’s own party.
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it en-forced?
In the Hellenic Parliament, there is no such regulation referring specifically to the
case described in the question above. However, Article 4 (par.1) on “Gifts and associated
benefits and advantages” of the Code of Conduct for Members of the Hellenic Parliament
specifies that:
“Members of Parliament shall not accept gifts or benefits or other advantages of such a
kind or monetary value that would call into question the impartial exercise of their
parliamentary duties.” Hence, Article 4 refers to any unlawful transaction that may lead
to a biased attitude on the part of the MP.
In general, there is also provisions regarding breach of duty of public officials in
the Penal Code (Article 259).
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25 July 2025
Reply to the ECPRD Request 6116
The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a seat in parliament
With regard to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, the answers to the following questions are as
follows:
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that prohibits
i. a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition that they
resign their seat;
ii. the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member’s own
party.
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
There is no such regulation in the Republic of Lithuania or any known cases of instances of offering a
financial advantage to MP on the condition that they resign his/her seat.
Under Article 59 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, while in office, the Members of the
Seimas shall follow the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, the interests of the State, as well as
their own consciences, and may not be restricted by any mandates.
Prepared by
Mindaugas Skačkauskas
Adviser
Research Unit
Information and Communication Department
Office of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania
Tel.: + 370 5 239 6193
E-mail: Mindaugas.Skackauskas@lrs.lt
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Dear colleagues,
The answers from the parliament of Luxembourg to questionnaire 6116 - The offering of a financial
advantage in exchange for the resignation of a seat in parliament - are the following:
In Luxembourg, there is no specific parliamentary rule prohibiting payments to Members of Parliament
(MPs) in exchange for their resignation. However, such conduct is clearly prohibited under the Penal
Code:
1. Accepting a financial advantage to resign a seat is covered by Article 247 (passive corruption
of public officials).
2. Offering such an advantage is criminal under Article 248 (active corruption).
These provisions apply to any public official, including MPs. Penalties include up to 5 years of
imprisonment and fines up to €187,500, with aggravated penalties in certain cases.
Enforcement is carried out by criminal authorities. There is no supplementary code of conduct or
internal parliamentary rule addressing this matter.
Legal source: Luxembourg Penal Code, Articles 247–248
Best regards
Service Secrétariat Général et Archives
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July 03, 2025
Reply to the ECPRD request No. 6116
The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a seat in
parliament
With regard to Latvia, the answers are as follows:
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that
prohibits
i. a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition
that they resign their seat;
ii. the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member’s
own party.
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
In the Republic of Latvia, there is no such a specific code. There are also no known cases of
criminal proceedings initiated in connection with the buying out of a parliamentary mandate.
In Latvia, the free mandate of a Member of the Saeima is constitutionally protected by the
Constitution of the Republic of Latvia (the Satversme). According to the Section 5 of the
Satversme, the Saeima shall be composed of one hundred representatives of the people,
Section 14 – the electors may not recall any individual member of the Saeima and Section 28
- Members of the Saeima may not be called to account by any judicial, administrative or
disciplinary process in connection with their voting or their views as expressed during the
execution of their duties. Court proceedings may be brought against members of the Saeima
if they, albeit in the course of performing parliamentary duties, disseminate:
1) defamatory statements which they know to be false, or
2) defamatory statements about private or family life.
The Constitutional Court of Latvia (Judgment of 1 August 2019; available in Latvian) expressly
recognised that these provisions give rise to a “free representative mandate” — meaning that
a Member of Parliament is an independent representative of the people, guaranteed by the
democratic constitutional order.
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The Rules of Order of Saeima Section 4 defines the lifespan of a Saeima mandate and the
conditions for its termination:
4. (1) A member of the Saeima shall have the rights of a member of the Saeima until expiry of the powers.
(2) Powers of a member of the Saeima shall expire from the moment when:
1) the newly elected Saeima has convened;
2) he or she has notified of resigning the mandate, and powers have been approved for another member of
the Saeima in his or her place (Sections 5 and 6);
3) he or she has been excluded from the composition of the Saeima (Section 18);
4) he or she has died.
[6 May 1996]
Ethical norms for Latvian MPs are defined and policed inside Parliament by the Mandate,
Ethics and Submissions Committee, with binding force derived from the Saeima’s Rules of
Order. According to the Section 6 Code of Ethics of Members of Saeima (Rules of Order of
Saeima Annex), a member of the Saeima is morally responsible for his or her actions
(speeches, votes etc.); a member of the Saeima may not plead the pressure of representatives
of the government, parties or other persons to justify a vote against his or her conscience; a
member of the Saeima shall admit his or her mistakes and seek to correct them.
In general, Members of the Saeima are also required to comply with the provisions of other
laws such as Criminal Law (regarding bribes) and the Law On Prevention of Conflict of Interest
in Activities of Public Officials.
Reply prepared by Elīna Kļaviņa
Senior Consultant
The Library of the Analytical Service of the Saeima


NORWAY - STORTINGET
Reply to the ECPRD request
6116- The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation
of a seat in parliament
DENMARK - FOLKETINGET
Request date: 02/07/2025
Addressed to: UNITED KINGDOM , NORWAY , GERMANY , NETHERLANDS , GREECE , BELGIUM , MALTA , CYPRUS ,
SLOVAKIA , - EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT , SWEDEN , SLOVENIA , CROATIA , POLAND , ITALY , PORTUGAL , LUXEMBOURG ,
FRANCE , AUSTRIA , BULGARIA , LATVIA , SPAIN , FINLAND , CZECHIA , HUNGARY , IRELAND , LITHUANIA , ESTONIA ,
ROMANIA
Subject areas: Corruption, whistleblowing
Deadline 28/07/2025
Request 6116, answer from the Norwegian parliament
Members of the Storting can not resign. Only the voters who gave them confidence can renew or take away that same confidence.
This derives from the Constitution, section 63, second paragraph which states that: "It is the duty of all persons who are elected as
Members of the Storting to accept election." See further information from this article:
https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Representantene/plikt-til-a-mote-pa-stortinget/ (only available in Norwegian).
Reply provided by (solvi.mathiesen@stortinget.no, 47083753) on
Sølvi Mathiesen 2025-07-03
ECPRD Correspondent: IVERSEN Sissel
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Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that prohibits: A)
a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition that they resign
their seat; B) the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the members
own party.
N.A.
If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
N.A.


POLAND - SENAT
Reply to the ECPRD request
6116- The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation
of a seat in parliament
DENMARK - FOLKETINGET
Request date: 02/07/2025
Addressed to: CZECHIA , HUNGARY , BELGIUM , CYPRUS , SLOVENIA , POLAND , FRANCE , IRELAND , AUSTRIA ,
ESTONIA , SPAIN , SWEDEN , GERMANY , NETHERLANDS , FINLAND , GREECE , UNITED KINGDOM , BULGARIA ,
ROMANIA , MALTA , NORWAY , PORTUGAL , LATVIA , ITALY , - EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT , SLOVAKIA , LUXEMBOURG ,
CROATIA , LITHUANIA
Subject areas: Corruption, whistleblowing
Deadline 28/07/2025
The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a seat in parliament
The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a seat in parliament
Reply provided by (Anna.Stawicka@senat.gov.pl, ) on
Anna Stawicka 2025-07-08
ECPRD Correspondent: Stawicka Anna
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Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that prohibits: A)
a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition that they resign
their seat; B) the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the members
own party.
There are no laws directly addressing the issue in question. However, the acceptance of a financial benefit by an MP in exchange
for relinquishing his or her mandate can be qualified as a corruption crime.
If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
Parliamentarians are required to submit asset declarations, and are prohibited from taking actions that could undermine confidence
in the performance of their mandate, including accepting unauthorized benefits. A deputy who accepts a financial benefit for
relinquishing his or her mandate may be held criminally liable and liable for the rules of procedure in the Sejm or Senate.


1
Reply to the ECPRD request no. 6116 on “The offering of a financial advantage in
exchange for the resignation of a seat in parliament”
Questions
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that
prohibits:
i. A Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition that they
resign their seat;
ii. The act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member’s own
party.
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
Answers
1. There is no explicit provision in Romanian legislation that addresses the resignation of
a Member of Parliament in direct exchange for financial gain. However, such an act would fall
under the umbrella of criminal corruption, as defined by the national criminal legislation and anti-
corruption framework.
According to Article 69 of the Romanian Constitution, the parliamentary mandate is not
subject to binding instructions — meaning that MPs cannot be legally obligated or externally
influenced in how they exercise or terminate their mandate.
Additionally, under Law No. 96/2006 on the Statute of Deputies and Senators, elected
officials are required to observe the principles of legality and good faith, and are prohibited from
entering into financial or contractual commitments with individuals or entities that may
compromise the integrity of their duties.
Thus, if a financial offer is made or accepted with the purpose of inducing a resignation,
this conduct would likely be interpreted as bribery or influence peddling, depending on the
circumstances.
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2
2. The anti-corruption legislation in force, particularly Law No. 78/2000, extends the scope
of criminal liability to such situations through the application of the Criminal Code:
• Bribe-taking (Art. 289 CC) and bribe-giving (Art. 290 CC) apply when money or
other benefits are received or offered to influence official conduct;
• Trading in influence (Art. 291 CC) and buying influence (Art. 292 CC) are also
relevant where the exertion of power or authority is used in exchange for undue
advantages;
• Law 78/2000, Article 13 includes sanctions for individuals in leadership roles (e.g.,
political parties, unions, NGOs) who use their influence to obtain personal or third-
party benefits.
These offenses are prosecuted by the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA), which
has competence over corruption cases involving public officials, including Members of
Parliament.


1
Parliamentary Activity Support Directorate (DSAP)
Legislative and Parliamentary Studies Division (DELP)
REQUEST 6116
The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for
the resignation of a seat in parliament
Requested by DENMARK - FOLKETINGET
Lisbon, 18th July 2025
1. Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that
prohibits a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the
condition that they resign their seat; the act of offering such a proposal, including by
individuals from the member’s own party.
Nothing so specific is provided for.
The rights and duties of Members of the Assembleia da República (MP) are set out in the
Constitution1, the Statute of Members2, the Rules of procedure governing the exercise of
functions by holders of political office and senior public office, and in other applicable legal
provisions, in the provisions of the Rules of Procedure, the Code of Conduct of the MP, and
the regulatory provisions issued under the law.
As provided for in the Code of Conduct, without prejudice to the duties laid down in the
Constitution and the Statute of Members, MPs, in the exercise of their mandate, must comply
with the reporting obligations to which they are subject, in particular regarding any
incompatibilities and disqualifications, assets and the verification of possible conflicts of
interest, within the time limit prescribed by law; and reject gifts, hospitality or any other
advantage as a reward for an action, omission, vote or influence over any decision
[Article 9 c) and d)]. Additionally, they must comply with their reporting obligations as laid
down by law, stating any of their private interests that may affect the pursuit of the public
interest (Article 8) and refrain from accepting gifts from natural or legal persons, public and
private, whether national or foreign, of any type of goods or services that may affect
independence in the exercise of their mandate (Article 10).
1
In particular as provided for in Articles 152 a 160.
2
In particular as provided for in Articles 7, 12, 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 26 and 27-A.
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2
Parliamentary Activity Support Directorate (DSAP)
Legislative and Parliamentary Studies Division (DELP)
It should also be noted that MP must act freely under the Constitution and the law, in
compliance with their electoral commitments, acting in accordance with their conscience and
independently of any natural or legal person (Article 4). In exercising their mandate, they
shall comply with the general principles of conduct of freedom, independence, the pursuit of
the public interest, transparency and political accountability (Article 2) and shall pursue the
public interest and that of the citizens they represent, and shall not benefit from any financial
or asset-related advantages, whether direct or indirect, for themselves or third parties, or any
other unduly received reward by virtue of their office (Article 3).
Furthermore, holders of political office (including MP) must submit, electronically, to the
legally competent authority3
, within 60 days from the date they take office, a declaration of
their income, assets, interests, incompatibilities, and impediments, referred to as the 'single
declaration', in accordance with the model established by law. This single declaration must
include, among other elements, acts and activities likely to give rise to incompatibilities and
impediments, namely the registration of relevant financial interests, which includes the
identification of acts that generate, directly or indirectly, payments, as well as other relevant
interests (Article 13 of the Rules of procedure governing the exercise of functions by holders
of political office and senior public office).
2. If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it en-forced?
It is the the Parliamentary Committee on Transparency and the Statute of Members that
ensures the implementation of the Code of Conduct and exercises the powers provided for
therein, in particular: carrying out inquiries of its own motion, at the request of the MP
concerned or upon a decision of the President of the AR; issuying general statements or
recommendations, as provided for in the Statute of MP and preparing an annual report on
the implementation of the Code and the Committee’s activity in this field (Article 12 of the
Code of Conduct). But there are no sanctions established for breaches of the rules set out in
the Code of Conduct.
Failure to comply with the reporting obligations referred to in the previous answer, following
notification, may result in the declaration of loss of office (for the MP) or prison term of up to
three years for the crime of qualified disobedience (Articles 18 and 18-A of the Rules of
3
Authority for Transparency Authority for Transparency (independent body functioning in conjunction with
the Constitutional Court, responsible for the assessment and oversight of the single declaration of income,
assets, and interests submitted by holders of political office and high-ranking public officials). Statute (only
available in portuguese).
3
Parliamentary Activity Support Directorate (DSAP)
Legislative and Parliamentary Studies Division (DELP)
procedure governing the exercise of functions by holders of political office and senior public
office), without prejudice to parliamentary immunities.4
Finally, it is worth mentioning that Article 335 of the Portuguese Penal Code criminalizes
influence peddling by anyone who, directly or through an intermediary, with their consent or
ratification, requests or accepts, for themselves or for a third party, a pecuniary or non-
pecuniary advantage, or the promise thereof, in order to abuse their real or alleged influence
with any public entity, whether national or foreign. Chapter IV addresses crimes committed
in the exercise of public functions (Articles 372 and following), namely the undue receipt of
advantage and both active and passive corruption.
Answered by Ana Paula Bernardo
e-mail Ana-Paula.Bernardo@ar.parlamento.pt
4
MP may not be heard as witnesses nor as defendants without the authorization of the Assembly, and no
Member may be detained or arrested without the Assembly’s authorization, except in cases of intentional
crime punishable by a maximum prison sentence of more than three years and when caught in the act
(Article 11 of the Statute of MP).


Reply to ECPRD Request No. 6116
The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of
a seat in parliament
IRINA-SORINA ANASTASE, Parliamentary Counsellor
irina.anastase@cdep.ro
PARLIAMENT OF ROMANIA
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
DIRECTORATE FOR STUDIES AND LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTATION
doc@cdep.ro
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Dear Colleagues,
Please find below the answers to the questions raised in ECPRD Request No. 6116: The
offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a seat in parliament.
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that
prohibits:
i. A Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition that
they resign their seat;
ii. The act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member’s own
party.
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
In Romania, according to Article 69 of the Constitution, any imperative mandate is null
and void. Also, Law 96/2006 on the Statute of Deputies and Senators obliges parliamentarians
to respect the principle of legality and good faith, including in the sense that they are forbidden
to assume financial or other obligations towards natural or legal persons, intended to influence
the exercise of their mandate in good faith, according to their conscience (Art. 11).
There are no express provisions in Romanian law regarding the situation in which a
Member of Parliament accepts a financial advantage in exchange for giving up their mandate;
however, this can be categorised as bribery, which is punishable under criminal law.
Thus, Law 78/2000 on the prevention, detection and sanctioning of acts of corruption
provides:
Article 5
(1) Within the meaning of this Law, the offences referred to in Articles 289-292 of the Criminal
Code, including when committed by persons referred to in Article 308 of the Criminal Code,
are corruption offences.
.........................
Article 6
The offenses of taking bribes, referred to in Article 289 of the Criminal Code, giving bribes,
referred to in Article 290 of the Criminal Code, trading in influence, referred to in Article 291
of the Criminal Code, and buying influence, referred to in Article 292 of the Criminal Code,
shall be punished following the provisions of those laws.
........................
Article 13
The offense of a person who holds a leading position in a party, a trade union or an employers'
organization or in a non-profit legal person, to use his influence or authority to obtain for
himself or another person money, goods or other undue advantage, shall be punishable by
imprisonment for a term of one to five years.
In Romania, the vacancy of a parliamentary seat is provided for by Article 70(2) of the
Romanian Constitution:
(2) The capacity of a deputy or senator ceases on the date of the legal meeting of the newly
elected Chambers or in the event of resignation, loss of electoral rights, incompatibility or
death.
The termination of the mandate and the procedures assumed in this situation are dealt
with in detail in Law 96/2006 on the Statute of Deputies and Senators (Article 7), the Rules of
the Chamber of Deputies (Articles 233, 240-242) and in the Law 208/2015 on the election of
the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, as well as on the organization and functioning of the
Permanent Electoral Authority (Article 94, paragraph 13).
Kind regards,
Irina-Sorina ANASTASE


CHANCELLERY OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTE
NÁMESTIE ALEXANDRA DUBČEKA 1, 812 80 BRATISLAVA, SLOVAK REPUBLIC
tel.: +421 2 5972 28 56; e-mail: helena.latakova@nrsr.sk; web: www.nrsr.sk
ECPRD request no. 6116
The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a seat in
parliament
21 July 2025
Country Slovak Republic
Parliament National Council of the Slovak Republic
ECPRD Correspondent Helena Latáková
E-mail address helena.latakova@nrsr.sk
Elaborated by Peter Plenta
Job title
Department
state advisor (research analyst)
Parliamentary Institute
E-mail address peter.plenta@nrsr.sk
Introduction
The Slovak Parliament still has not adopted a code of ethics that would define the expected
standards of behaviour. Nevertheless, a financial offer for the resignation of a seat would
undoubtedly damage the reputation of the individual MP as well as the political party involved.
Thus, it is hard to imagine that such an offer would be made – and that the public would become
aware of it.
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that
prohibits
a) a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition that they
resign their seat;
b) the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member’s own party.
There are several legislation acts that could/should prevent such behaviour of MPs and other
persons, most notably:
➢ Constitution (available in English, though not necessary up-to date)
➢ Act No. 350/1996 Coll. on Rules of Procedure of the National Council of the Slovak Republic
(available in English, though not necessary up to date)
➢ Constitutional Act No. 357/2004 Coll. on the Protection of the Public Interest in the
Performance of the Duties of Public Officials
➢ Act No. 300/2000 Coll. Criminal code
Constitution
Article 75
(1) A Member of Parliament is sworn in at the first meeting of the National Council of the Slovak
Republic in which he participates, by taking the following oath:
"I swear on my honour and conscience to be faithful to the Slovak Republic. I will discharge my
duties in the interest of its citizens. I will uphold the Constitution and other laws and work
toward their implementation into life."
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2
Act on Rules of Procedure (even though the National council of the Slovak Republic did not
approve the Ethical code, it is still expected for MPs to follow moral and ethical norms and protect
public interest).
§ 9a
Ethical Code
Each Member while serving his term must oblige by the moral and ethical code of conduct, abide
the Constitution, laws, and the Ethical Code of the Member, which shall be approved by the National
Council resolution.
Constitutional Act on the Protection of the Public Interest in the Performance of the Duties of
Public Officials
§ 4
General Duties and Restrictions
(1) A public official is obliged to promote and protect the public interest in the performance of
their duties. In the exercise of their office, a public official shall not give precedence to personal
interest over the public interest.
(2) In the performance of their duties, a public official must refrain from any conduct that may be
in conflict with this constitutional act. For this purpose, a public official shall not:
a) use their office, the powers arising from it, or any information acquired in connection with or
during the performance of their office to obtain benefits for themselves, for persons close to them,
or for other natural or legal persons; this shall not apply to activities or tasks arising from the
proper exercise of their official duties,
b) request gifts, accept gifts, induce others to provide gifts, or obtain other advantages in
connection with the performance of their office; this shall not apply to gifts customarily given in
the course of holding public office or gifts provided in accordance with the law.
Criminal code
Part Three
Corruption
Acceptance of a Bribe
§ 328
(1) Whoever, directly or through an intermediary, accepts, requests, or agrees to accept a bribe
for themselves or for another person, in order to act or refrain from acting in breach of their
duties arising from their employment, profession, position, or office, shall be punished by
imprisonment for up to four years.
§ 330
(1) Whoever, as a public official or a foreign public official, directly or through an intermediary,
accepts, requests, or agrees to accept a bribe for themselves or for another person in
connection with the performance of official duties or in connection with the exercise of their
office, with the intent to obtain or retain an undue advantage, or for the purpose of acting or
refraining from acting in accordance with their duties or in the performance of their functions in a
3
manner that harms or may harm the financial interests of the European Union, shall be punished
by imprisonment for a term of three to eight years.
Bribery
§ 334
(1) Whoever, directly or through an intermediary, provides, offers, or promises a bribe to a
public official, a foreign public official, or another person in connection with the performance
of official duties or in connection with the exercise of the office of a public official or foreign
public official, with the intent to obtain or retain an undue advantage, or for the purpose of inducing
them to act or refrain from acting in accordance with their duties or in the performance of their
functions in a manner that harms or may harm the financial interests of the European Union, shall
be punished by imprisonment for a term of one to five years.
§ 336 Indirect Corruption
(1) Whoever, directly or through an intermediary, for themselves or for another person, accepts,
requests, or agrees to accept a bribe in return for exerting influence, or for having exerted
influence—either through their own influence or through the influence of another person—
a) on the exercise of the powers of a public official,
b) on the exercise of the powers of a foreign public official,
c) on a person in connection with the handling of matters of public interest, or
d) on a person in order to induce them to act or refrain from acting in breach of their duties arising
from employment, profession, position, or office,
shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of one to five years.
(2) Whoever, directly or through an intermediary, promises, offers, or provides a bribe to
another person in return for that person exerting influence, or having exerted influence—
either through their own influence or through the influence of another person—
a) on the exercise of the powers of a public official,
b) on the exercise of the powers of a foreign public official,
c) on a person in connection with the handling of matters of public interest, or
d) on a person in order to induce them to act or refrain from acting in breach of their duties arising
from employment, profession, position, or office,
shall be punished by imprisonment for up to four years.
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
Aside from law enforcement authorities, the National Council has established two committees
that oversee the actions of MPs and have certain powers in this context. The details are defined
by the Act on the Rules of Procedure.
§ 57 Mandate and Immunity Committee
(1) The Mandate and Immunity Committee shall, in particular,
a) submit to the National Council proposals to verify the validity of Members' mandates [§ 8 section
(2)];
4
b) ascertain whether a Member has taken the pledge or has taken the pledge with reservations.
Where the Committee finds that a Member has refused to take the pledge or has taken a pledge with
reservations, it shall recommend the National Council to adopt a resolution on the loss of the
Member's mandate;
c) ascertain whether a Member has lost eligibility;
d) consider whether there are grounds to refuse to permit a Member to be detained in custody;
e) decide on requests to permit the detention of a Member who has been caught and detained
while committing a crime. This decision shall report to the Speaker of the National Council and
the National Council at the next session;
f) conduct disciplinary proceedings (§ 136-140);
g) debate on matters dealing with the loss, resignation or expiration of a Member's mandate,
moving proposals thereon to the National Council;
h) discuss termination of employment or related contract of a Member, which is to be performed
against Member's will.
§ 135
Each Member is subject to the disciplinary authority of the National Council in the case of:
a) any statement made during the performance of a Member's functions in the National Council or
any of its bodies,
b) any breach of the ban on voting for another Member [§ 39 section (6)],
c) any major breach of the Member’s pledge,
d) any breach of the Member’s Ethical Code,
e) breach of order at a session of the National Council (§ 32) or at a committee meeting (§ 49a).
§ 58 The Committee for Incompatibility of Functions
(1) The Committee for Incompatibility of Functions shall, in particular,
a) examine whether a Member performs any other duties or holds any function incompatible with
the office of a Member of the National Council or a function due to which his or her mandate cannot
be fulfilled;
b) discharge tasks related to the examination of the conduct of state officials, and to whether
such conduct is in contravention of a special law,
c) submit reports on the results of the examinations conducted under (a) and (b) to the National
Council, and propose a proposal for a resolution to be adopted by the National Council.
Additionally, the committee conducts proceedings in matters concerning the protection of the
public interest and the prevention of conflicts of interest for breaches of duties and restrictions
established by the constitutional law, including sanctions that may be imposed on a public official
for failure to fulfill or for violation of such duties or restrictions.


Ljubljana, 3 July 2025
ECPRD Request 6116
The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for the resignation of a seat
in parliament
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that
prohibits:
i. a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition that
they resign their seat;
ii. the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member’s
own party.
No.
Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia in Article 82 provides:
(1) Deputies of the National Assembly are representatives of all the people and shall not be bound by any
instructions.
(2) The law shall establish who may not be elected a deputy, and the incompatibility of the office of deputy
with other offices and activities«
The Constitution thus gives MPs autonomy, which means that they are not bound by any
instructions, including party instructions. They are obliged to exercise their mandate in
accordance with the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Procedure of the National
Assembly. A Member of the National Assembly may not hold any office or engage in any
activity that is incompatible with the office of a Member of the National Assembly under the
law. Otherwise, the right to immunity is guaranteed by the Constitution.
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it en forced?
/.
Prepared by:
Marinka Bogolin
Deputy Correspondent,
Documentation and Library Section
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ECPRD 6116: The offering of a financial advantage in exchange for resignation
UK Parliament, House of Lords
Questions
1) Is there any legislation or other form of regulation, such as a code of conduct, that prohibits:
a) a Member of Parliament from accepting a financial advantage on the condition that they
resign their seat
b) the act of offering such a proposal, including by individuals from the member’s own party
2) If so, what does the regulation entail, and how is it enforced?
Response
For context, please note the overall size of the House of Lords is not fixed and a member’s
resignation does not automatically mean another individual will be appointed in their place.
As is the case in the House of Commons, there is no explicit rule preventing the resignation of a seat
for financial advantage. However, members must observe a code of conduct which states (pp 3–5):
• Members of the House should conduct themselves in a manner that maintains and
strengthens public trust and confidence in the integrity of the House of Lords.
• Members of the House should observe the seven general principles of conduct identified
by the Committee on Standards in Public Life:
(a) Selflessness: holders of public office should act solely in terms of the public
interest.
(b) Integrity: holders of public office must avoid placing themselves under any
obligation to people or organisations that might try inappropriately to
influence them in their work. They should not act or take decisions in order to
gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their family, or their
friends. They must declare and resolve any interests and relationships.
(c) Objectivity: holders of public office must act and take decisions impartially,
fairly and on merit, using the best evidence and without discrimination or bias.
(d) Accountability: holders of public office are accountable to the public for their
decisions and actions and must submit themselves to the scrutiny necessary to
ensure this.
(e) Openness: holders of public office should act and take decisions in an open
and transparent manner. Information should not be withheld from the public
unless there are clear and lawful reasons for so doing.
(f) Honesty: holders of public office should be truthful.
(g) Leadership: holders of public office should exhibit these principles in their own
behaviour and treat others with respect. They should actively promote and
robustly support the principles and challenge poor behaviour wherever it
occurs.
[…]
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• Members of the House should act always on their personal honour. This means that they
should observe the standards expected by the House as a whole of its members, obeying
the spirit as well as the letter of this code of conduct: the expression of a clear
willingness to breach the code is a breach of this rule.
[…]
• Members of the House must not:
(a) seek by parliamentary means to confer an exclusive benefit on an outside
organisation or person in which they have a financial interest (e.g. salary,
shareholding); or
(b) accept or agree to accept payment or other incentive or reward in return for
providing parliamentary advice or services.
Facilities and services may be withdrawn from former members of the House under the code’s
enforcement provisions should investigations of breaches be upheld and sanctions agreed.
In addition, the House of Lords may also in theory punish contempts of Parliament although its
powers are uncertain in the modern era. The House’s procedural guide explains:
Disciplinary and penal powers
The House’s disciplinary and penal powers are part of the control exercised by Parliament
over its affairs. Conduct, whether of a member or non-member, which improperly interferes
with the performance by either House of its functions, or the performance by members or
staff of their duties, is a contempt of Parliament. Thus the House has the right to institute
inquiries and require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents, and
wilful failure to attend committee proceedings or answer questions or produce documents
could be judged to be a contempt.
The House of Lords has historically possessed the power to punish contempts by
imprisonment, fine and reprimand. Although these powers have never been abolished, they
have not been used since the nineteenth century, and there is doubt over whether the
House’s powers to punish non-members could in practice be used today.