COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the documents Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 'AgoraEU' programme for the period 2028-2034, and repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/692 and (EU) 2021/818 and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Erasmus+ programme for the period 2028-2034, and repealing Regulations (EU) 2021/817 and (EU) 2021/888

EN EN
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 16.7.2025
SWD(2025) 550 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT
Accompanying the documents
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing
the 'AgoraEU' programme for the period 2028-2034, and repealing Regulations (EU)
2021/692 and (EU) 2021/818
and
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing
the Erasmus+ programme for the period 2028-2034, and repealing Regulations (EU)
2021/817 and (EU) 2021/888
{COM(2025) 550 final} - {SEC(2025) 547 final} - {SWD(2025) 551 final}
Offentligt
KOM (2025) 0550 - SWD-dokument
Europaudvalget 2025
1
1. INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT.................................................4
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION ......................................................................................................8
3. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ..........................................................................................15
4. OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? .................................................................19
5. WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? ......................................................26
6. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? .............................................28
7. HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE?..............................................................................38
8. PREFERRED OPTION ........................................................................................................43
9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?....................43
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION..............................................................................44
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION.........................................................................49
ANNEX 3: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE .............................................64
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS .......................................................................................77
ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK ................................................................................108
ANNEX 6: SME CHECK ............................................................................................................125
ANNEX 7: POLICY, LEGAL CONTEXT AND FUNDING PROGRAMMES COVERED BY
THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT ..........................................................................................132
ANNEX 8: RESULTS OF MID-TERM EVALUATIONS..........................................................140
ANNEX 9: PROBLEMS, PROBLEM DRIVERS AND THEIR EVOLUTION .........................149
ANNEX 10: INTERVENTION LOGIC.......................................................................................158
ANNEX 11: OBJECTIVES-BASED MERGER. MODELLING OF INSTRUMENTS,
SYNERGIES AND COMPLEMENTARITIES..................................................................165
2
Glossary
Term or acronym Meaning or definition
AI Artificial Intelligence
AVMS Directive Audiovisual Media Services Directive
CCS Cultural and Creative Sectors
CERV Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme
CREA Creative Europe programme
CSO Civil Society Organisation
(DG) CNECT (Directorate-General) for Communication Networks,
Content and Technology
(DG) EAC (Directorate-General) for Education, Youth, Sport and
Culture
(DG) JUST (Directorate-General) for Justice and Consumers
EACEA European Education and Culture Executive Agency
EMFA European Media Freedom Act
ESC European Solidarity Corps
IA Impact Assessment
IP Intellectual Property
MFF Multiannual Financial Framework
OPC Open public consultation
SMCE Social-multi-criteria evaluation
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SWD Staff Working Document
3
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
VET Vocational education and training
4
1. INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT
The implementation of the current and previous EU programmes has shown that the
complexity of the funding architecture can hinder the impact of the EU budget. This has
been underlined through programme evaluations. Currently, many programmes may
finance similar activities, but with varying rules and conditions, also impeding the
flexibility to respond to unforeseen needs. This may lead to inefficiencies and
administrative burden for beneficiaries, Member States and the Commission. The difficult
budgetary situation (with the start of NextGenerationEU repayments, the increasing
number of EU priorities and the tight fiscal situation of Member States) reinforces the need
to reduce such inefficiencies and administrative burden.
The Political Guidelines1
acknowledge that ‘our spending is spread over too many
overlapping programmes – many of which fund the same things but with different
requirements and difficulties to combine funding effectively’. The Guidelines set out that
the new long-term budget needs to be more focused, simpler, with fewer programmes and
more impactful. In line with the Political Guidelines, the College adopted on 11 February
2025 the Communication ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’2
. This
states that ‘the next long-term budget will have to address the complexities, weaknesses
and rigidities that are currently present and maximise the impact of every euro it spends’.
The Communication also underlines that flexibility is key in guaranteeing the budget’s
ability to respond to a changing reality.
In this political context, impact assessments for programmes under the next multiannual
financial framework (MFF) focus on streamlining the EU budget architecture, thereby
assessing the most important policy choices underpinning the future legislative proposals.
Policy aspects are considered in the analysis of the context, the problem definition and the
objectives, informing the choices on architecture. Given that the structure of the new MFF
will significantly differ from the current one, budget assumptions for each programme are
unreliable at this stage. Therefore, the impact assessment (IA) excludes funding scenarios,
allowing only qualitative cost benefit analysis. This reflects the specificities of this
exercise, as acknowledged in the Commission’s better regulation rules - which this IA
follows – that state that the special case of preparing a new multiannual financial
framework is a unique process requiring a specific approach as regards scope and depth
of analysis’ (Tool #9). This IA has been adjusted following the comments made by the
Regulatory Scrutiny Board.
1.1. Scope and legal context
This impact assessment focuses on EU funding for cross-border education and
training, solidarity, youth, media, culture and creative sectors, values, and civil
society3
.
The EU is a community of values ingrained in Europe's history and identity and anchored
in the EU Treaty. These encompass democracy, fundamental rights, non-discrimination,
equality, inclusion, tolerance, the rule of law, solidarity, cultural diversity, freedom of
expression, including media and artistic freedom and pluralism. These shared values define
the European project. They offer a guiding direction to Europe’s younger generations in
their aspirations for a better future. Justice, civil society, media, culture, sport, as well as
formal, non-formal and informal education are all crucial vehicles to realise these
principles, delivery mechanisms for a fair, free, inclusive and united society. They help
5
citizens connect around shared values and equip them with the skills and key competences
to thrive and contribute to a strong, cohesive, resilient and competitive Europe.
Democracies in the EU face internal and external threats. Fundamental rights, equality and
non-discrimination, EU values4
, the rule of law, justice and democratic structures
themselves need to be nurtured as the foundation of an inclusive and prosperous society.
There remain major structural issues relating to fundamental rights, including inequalities,
discrimination and violence in our societies, with particular consequences for women,
children, LGBTIQ persons or persons with disabilities, and minorities5
. In today's rapidly
changing environment, people need skills that enable them to navigate, accelerate, and
embrace opportunities. To remain competitive, Europe must tackle barriers to human
capital, including the need for new job profiles, swift skills adaptation and lifelong learning
through an inclusive, agile, forward-looking and lifelong learning-based education and
training landscape, both formal and informal. A vibrant civic space and opportunities to
demonstrate real solidarity are central to a democratic society. On top of its economic
value, the media is a cornerstone of democratic resilience as well as cultural vitality.
Media, including audiovisual, and cultural expressions have an important role to play in a
values-based Union, recognising and appreciating the tapestry of national and regional
diversity, and also as a source of sustainable and inclusive growth. In all these areas,
proactive action is needed to develop the full potential of people, their skills, talent, critical
thinking, creativity and safeguard their rights6
.
The importance for the EU’s future to continue investing in the policy areas covered by
this IA has been reflected in the recent EU political agendas and strategic reports of the
EU (cfr. Annex 7 for more information).
“Protecting our democracies and upholding our values” is one of the Political Guidelines’
priorities for 2024-2029. President von der Leyen underlined her commitment as well to
support free media and reunite our societies “through education, supporting young people
and building on the things that we have in common as Europeans”, as well as the “uniting
power of Europe’s rich and varied cultural tapestry”. This combined with the need for “a
radical step change in ambition and action – for all skill levels and for all types of training
and education”. These themes feature strongly in the Mission letters of Vice-Presidents
and Commissioners. They are also well aligned with the European Council’s Strategic
Agenda for Europe 2024 – 2029.
To meet these objectives, EU funding is indispensable. The next MFF should be built
around three main pillars, with a limited number of targeted self-standing programmes.
This cluster belongs to the latter category. The scope of the IA has been intentionally
limited to programmes under direct and indirect management that share a strong cross-
border and people-focused logic, including Erasmus+; the European Solidarity Corps
(ESC); Creative Europe; Citizens, Equality, Rights, and Values (CERV); the Justice
programme; as well as other budgetary prerogative lines (e.g. multimedia actions).
Other EU funding programmes also contribute to these policy goals to varying degrees
while supporting other policies under the current MFF, as shown in Annex 7 Section 3,
including: Digital Europe programme; Horizon Europe, InvestEU, as well as Union
cohesion policy funds, the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the Technical Support
Instrument7
. In parallel, another key tool to promote EU values and the rule of law, and
to ensure that shortcomings do not undermine EU budget delivery, has been the
development of conditionality tools such as the Conditionality Regulation and the
Horizontal Enabling Conditions.
6
1.2. Lessons learnt from evaluations
The results of the mid-term evaluations for the period 2021-2027 indicate that the existing
programmes have largely delivered on their policy objectives and provided EU added
value, while highlighting areas for improvement in terms of design. For example, the
midterm evaluation of the CERV programme confirmed that the programme occupies an
otherwise largely empty space in the values and fundamental rights funding landscape8
, as
the dedicated EU instrument to support organisations working on safeguarding and
promoting fundamental rights, equality and non-discrimination, democracy and the rule of
law in Europe, organisations often lacking other funding sources. Creative Europe has
contributed to the general objective of supporting cultural and linguistic diversity by
increasing people’s access to content and to the objective of competitiveness by helping
audiovisual, and other creative and cultural operators to scale up at European level. It has
a unique place as the only source of funding for transnational cooperation, circulation and
mobility in these sectors. Finally, the Erasmus+ and ESC evaluations show that both
programmes deliver strong European added value for individuals, organisations and
policy, a result which cannot be matched at national level alone.
At the same time, the evaluations point to significant areas of improvement in terms of
design. These include expanding the reach of the programmes, easing access, simplifying
management, enhancing monitoring, strengthening synergies and avoiding overlaps with
other programmes, and increasing flexibility to address new challenges. For instance, the
evaluation of Erasmus+ found some overlap between Erasmus+ Youth Participation
activities and Solidarity projects funded under ESC, both supporting youth-led
initiatives run by informal groups of young people.9
The evaluations therefore offer an
important basis to explore the issue of the scope of financing, the justification for EU-level
financial intervention and the complementarities with Member States financing, which are
the largest source of financing in some policy areas. More information on the results of the
evaluations can be found in Annex 8.
1.3. Approach taken for the impact assessment
This IA examines current challenges and problem drivers in the policy areas referred
above. The problem drivers were split into (a) those relating to policy content and (b)
those relating to design of the funding instruments. The response that future funding
EU instruments may offer to address these problems is then articulated in general and
specific objectives. In line with the political context for the MFF exercise, policy aspects
are considered in the analysis of the problem definition and the objectives, in turn
informing the choices on the architecture of future funding programmes for this cluster.
An intervention logic is presented below, then analysed through a social-multi-criteria
evaluation (SMCE) presented in Chapter 7 and Annex 4. SMCE criteria have been set to
analyse the priorities of both policy and design of the funding instruments of the cluster.
The IA draws extensively on the results of the mid-term evaluations of the current
programmes and final evaluations of preceding programmes, the spending review
exercises, as well as various existing monitoring reports, studies and research offering
sectoral evidence, and latest strategic reports10
. Finally, the assessment integrates the
outcomes of an Open Public Consultation (OPC) launched to inform this IA, and as well
as of other stakeholder consultations held by the Commission in the context of the different
policies. Information complementing this IA is available as endnotes.
7
Figure 1: Simplified intervention logic
8
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
2.1. What are the problems?
As illustrated in the intervention logic above, the EU budget has an unachieved potential
to help address the challenges affecting the policy areas in this cluster. The analysis
identified three sets of problems affecting the EU financial intervention: two relating to
policy content, the other to design and implementation. A table illustrating the nature
and typology of policy-related problems is available in Annex 9.
2.1.1. Problem 1: Threats to democracy, fundamental rights and EU values, culture and
cultural diversity, and shrinking civic and media spaces
The EU faces challenges to democratic participation11
, cultural diversity, and in the civic12
and media spheres. The common values of the EU increasingly face challenges – such as
from hostility towards the rule of law and democratic institutions, corruption and violations
of fundamental rights, impacting on the EU level as well as the national, regional and local
levels. These increase obstacles to building a fully integrated area of justice and the
uniform application of EU law, essential to ensure fair and efficient legal proceedings and
uphold EU values13
. The traditional role of civil society organisations in counterbalancing
these trends is challenged by a weakening of financial and political support. Economic
losses due to inequality, discrimination and violence amount to billions annually,
highlighting the extent to which values are also a driver of prosperity14
.
The media sector comprises of two main pillars: audiovisual and news media. These sub-
sectors display some commonalities but face also different challenges. For example, news
media is experiencing decreasing pluralism, as well as declining advertising revenues and
sales, as audiences have shifted online, where they are increasingly exposed to
disinformation; while European audiovisual content does not travel enough across the
Single Market15
and faces fierce competition from the US. Disruptions to the European
media sphere and obstacles to participation in European culture undermine the economic
potential of the media and creative industries, as well as weakening connections between
Europeans. Technological dependence on non-EU actors hampers innovation in the civic
spaces, media, and other cultural and creative sectors.
2.1.2. Problem 2: Shortfall of skills and key competences for life and jobs
Equipping all citizens with the skills and key competences required for a demanding and
rapidly evolving labour market and an increasingly diverse, knowledge-based society, is a
constant challenge.
Education and training systems in the EU overall fail to provide people with a minimum
proficiency in basic and digital skills, and to foster the advanced competencies and soft
skills needed, across all stages of life 16
. Based on the 2022 results of the OECD’s PISA17
,
the EU is lagging behind other OECD countries in basic skills, with a downward trend in
mathematics (-18 points), reading (-12) and science (-3.4). The EU also falls short in
generating skilled graduates from higher education and vocational education with the
highly specialised skills needed in the rapidly evolving technological landscape18
. There
are growing labour and skills shortages across Member States, with nearly four out of five
employers reporting difficulties in finding workers with the right skills19
. Recognition of
qualifications, skills and learning periods abroad is far from automatic and often requires
9
cumbersome procedures both between Member States, and with third countries. This
prevents the best possible use of all skills needed in the labour market and of learning
opportunities across Europe and beyond20
. So too do gender gaps, with almost twice as
many men than women studying STEM, and major socioeconomic and territorial
disparities in the level and the access to quality formal and non-formal education across
the EU.
The skills challenge is not only about competitiveness. It is about a healthy, resilient,
engaged, inclusive, united and prepared society. Today, close to 18 million young people
in the EU are at risk of social exclusion21 22
; in 2024, almost half of them reported recent
emotional or psychosocial problems23
. It is crucial to equip individuals with skills and
competences for life, enabling them to navigate the complex and rapidly changing world
we live in, and take a more active role in society.
2.1.3. Problem 3: Challenges to the design and architecture of the EU financing
instruments to address the policy-related problems.
The EU funding architecture is complex. One of the results can be gaps. The 2021-2027
MFF supports many policy areas covered by this IA, but it does not comprehensively
address all key emerging priorities set out in the Political Guidelines. For instance, the
current funding programmes have struggled to respond to emerging challenges faced by
news media, quality journalism and the fight against disinformation, challenges on a
dramatically different scale than when the current budget was conceived24
. In addition,
there is high demand for financing at EU level, as shown by the high rate of
oversubscription of the current EU programmes in these areas25
.
A second challenge relates to overlaps, untapped synergies and complementarities. Policy
areas under this cluster are often addressed from different angles by multiple instruments,
with limited coordination. The lack of flexibility, the multiplication of programmes, and
the differences in the legal provisions which apply, have effectively prevented synergies
among EU programmes.26
In specific cases, a more coordinated funding approach is
needed between European and national funds. In some policy areas (e.g. education and
skills), ensuring coordination between direct, indirect, and shared management EU
instruments has been a long-lasting issue. While some measures to mitigate these problems
were introduced already for the 2021-2027 programming period, the next MFF provides
for an opportunity to structurally improve synergies. For example, EU investments in
education and skills are delivered through different programmes which lack a coherent
strategic framework and operational alignment, hindering the ability of the budget to
address cross-cutting and structural skills challenges. Finally, access to EU funding is
hampered by a complexity of rules and a limited user-friendliness in funding processes.
Applicants to EU funding must navigate different requirements under different
programmes. Implementation of EU-funded projects can be burdensome, especially for
small organisations with limited resources and capacity.27
2.2. What are the problem drivers?
Drivers linked to problem 1 – Threats to democracy, fundamental rights and EU values,
culture, and shrinking civic and media spaces
2.2.1. Threats to EU values
Deep-seated internal and external pressures lie behind threats to the respect of EU values.
These include structural inequalities,28
the persistence of violence29
and discrimination30
on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual
10
orientation, often shown in racism, anti-gypsyism, antisemitism, or anti-Muslim hatred31
.
Hate speech and hate crime have been steadily on the rise over the past decade32
,
exacerbated by the spread of digital tools and social media.
While many actors have a key role to play in protecting EU values, shrinking civic spaces
are a key factor in putting EU values at risk. Civil society organisations and human rights
defenders find it increasingly difficult to fully participate in decision-making and act
independently33
. Shortcomings identified in the consultation process included a lack of
support and compliance mechanisms across the EU, as well as a lack of public awareness
of the role of civil society,34
including in the promotion of equality and inclusion35
.
2.2.2. Challenges to the rule of law and judicial systems
Recent years have seen direct challenges to the rule of law and judicial independence at
national level. Corruption has been recognised as a deep-seated problem. There is a
growing recognition that such trends at national level also have a direct impact at EU level,
making them key drivers of the problem. The impact at EU level is not only an obstacle to
building a fully integrated area of justice and the effective delivery of EU policies. It also
hinders a strong business environment encouraging investment, innovation and growth36
.
The erosion of judicial independence and challenges to the right to a fair trial are
undermining mutual trust among Member States and weaking the effectiveness of our
justice systems. Structural weaknesses, such as still predominant paper-based judicial
processes, uneven digitalisation, complex and time-consuming procedures, as well as slow
communication between authorities, limit cross-border judicial cooperation, and obstruct
effective access to justice and the ability to handle threats like cybersecurity. The
opportunity to address these issues through cross-border cooperation is constrained by the
fact that justice professionals often lack a solid knowledge of EU law and cross-border
judicial cooperation procedures and are not sufficiently equipped to embrace the increasing
digitalisation of justice37
. This impedes mutual recognition of judicial decisions and the
consistent implementation of cross-border EU instruments and policies.
2.2.3. Obstacles to democratic participation and societal resilience
Citizens’ participation and engagement (including turnout), and transparency and
accountability in decision-making contribute to the vitality of European democracy. Of
particular importance is to promote full and meaningful participation in political and social
life and inclusive democratic participation, including of young people, children, women,
persons with disabilities, and mobile EU citizens, including at regional and local level.
Public trust in democracy and democratic institutions, the fairness and integrity of
elections, and the legitimate concerns and expectations of citizens about their well-being
are key challenges for democracy in Europe.38
Confidence in democracy is under pressure,
proactive steps needed to address issues such as a lack of transparency and accountability
in political funding and the distortion of the democratic level playing field online. A 2024
Eurobarometer39
showed that EU citizens saw the largest single threats to democracy as
growing distrust and scepticism towards democratic institutions (36%). The integrity of
the information space available to citizens is being undermined through foreign
information manipulation and interference (FIMI), disinformation, and abusive use of
technology. This is reflected in a lack of access to fact-checked information, hate speech,
and polarisation, which threaten freedom of expression, artistic freedom, democratic
accountability, diversity of views, and free democratic debate.40
11
2.2.4. Pressures on European media and the information landscape
European media companies today compete with giant online platforms for the attention of
citizens and consumers. Revenues are increasingly shifting to platforms, which dominate
online distribution methods41
.In the audiovisual sector, the circulation of EU content
beyond national borders is weak42
. Europeans continue to watch more content from the
US than from other EU countries, as US films capture 70% of the box office, whilst US
streamers capture 80% of all subscriptions. Similarly, cross-media intellectual property
continues to be an asset which is underexploited by European media43
. At the same time,
unequal access to high-quality and diverse European content, such as films, persists. This
limits media’s full potential to be socially and culturally relevant for all citizens,
particularly for young Europeans.
The effects of disruptions of the media extend beyond issues of viability; they also impact
public debate.44
Media pluralism is threatened across the Union45
. The growth of online
platforms has opened the door to disinformation – which impacts the democratic and social
fabric of the EU and erodes public trust in media institutions.46
It has also intensified the
need for digital and media literacy, as well as for tools for accessible digital information.
2.2.5. Obstacles to cultural cooperation and preservation of cultural heritage
The resilience, creativity potential and competitiveness of the cultural and creative sectors
(CCS), as well as access to a variety of cultural expressions are key tenets of the Union’s
cultural and linguistic diversity. Yet fragmentation along national and linguistic lines
continues to drive cultural expressions, limiting transnational artistic collaboration,
audience reach, and the development of innovative practices. CCS professionals struggle
working across borders and accessing new markets47
, which exacerbates geographical
imbalances and reduces the circulation of European cultural works. The lack of cross-
border mobility and cooperation hinders networking, economies of scale, pooling
expertise, and co-creation, all that is crucial for sustaining careers and strong CCS.
Europe’s rich cultural heritage, including in digital format, is a shared legacy, but it faces
a growing threat from a combination of budgetary constraints, nationalist
misappropriation, and deliberate destruction, as seen in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, heritage sites face increasing vulnerability to pollution, climate change, and
natural disasters, requiring urgent resilience-building and point to a need to accelerate
digital preservation as a factor in safeguarding the EU’s cultural heritage.
2.2.6. Obstacles to innovation and technological dependencies affecting democratic,
societal, cultural and media players
Recent technological innovations, largely driven by non-EU actors, have transformed the
democratic, societal, cultural, and media landscapes.48
Conversely, the financial weakness
of European players limits investment in innovative business models, tools, and new
content formats. Private investment in culture and media remains relatively low, with
venture capital investment significantly trailing behind the US.49
Similarly, societal impact
investments, such as philanthropic funds for long-term societal and democratic returns, are
lacking. Innovation uptake is stifled by significant sectoral skills gaps, requiring a mix of
creative, business, technical and digital skills.50
These structural obstacles are compounded by Europe’s technological dependence. Non-
EU tech giants increasingly influence the democratic debate, civic space and media
landscapes, shaping content consumption through algorithmic recommendations,
automated distribution models, and AI-generated content. The growth of online
12
advertising, which is expected to triple by 2029, indicates the need to leverage (audience)
data across all media sectors to adapt to new business models.51
Drivers linked to problem 2 – Shortfall of skills and key competences for life and jobs
2.2.7. Low and unequal capacity to deliver high quality, innovation, inclusiveness and
insufficient cooperation and knowledge sharing
The education and skills gaps are closely tied to the structural weaknesses of the Union’s
27 distinct education and training systems, many of which remain insufficiently agile,
inclusive or resilient in responding to the digital, green, and demographic transformations.
Diverging levels of performance across countries and regions exacerbate social and
economic inequalities and limit the EU’s ability to retain and develop lifelong talent — a
key factor for global competitiveness. European education and training institutions also
face deepening challenges in securing and retaining talent. As education remains a national
competence, the EU cannot directly reform or finance national systems. But transnational
cooperation in education and skills plays a major key role in mitigating these problems –
allowing education and training providers to accelerate convergence, share innovation, and
improve quality in ways no national system can achieve alone. The potential for EU-level
cooperation to drive change is widely recognised52
.
However, barriers to cross-border cooperation, including insufficient funding and lack of
organisational capacity, hold back this potential, in particular for smaller organisations,
heavily dependent on EU funding as the main funding source for international learning
mobility and cooperation for education and training, youth and sport.53
In addition, many
of the key strategic initiatives supported by EU funding – such as the European Universities
alliances, Teacher Academies, and Centres of Vocational Excellence – are relatively recent
innovations, and have not yet been scaled to a level that delivers systemic impact. As a
result, EU-level investment remains below the critical mass needed to support high-quality,
future-proof inclusive education systems and achieve shared policy goals.
2.2.8. Obstacles to cross-border learning mobility, including insufficient opportunities
for all
Learning mobility is a key component of cross-border education and has proven to be a
highly valuable experience for both learners and staff, such as teachers, in gaining
knowledge and skills needed for personal, educational, and professional development and
employability. It also strengthens the European dimension of education, training, youth,
and sport and helps to enhance the quality and inclusiveness of learning offered. Demand
for mobility was illustrated through the OPC, with over 88%54
supporting mobility for
Higher Education students and staff, schools and learners, language learning opportunities,
and for vocational education and training (VET), as well as for university alliances55
.
The potential for learning mobility is held back in different ways. Opportunities are not
equally distributed across Member States, fields and sectors of education, and the scale of
national and international schemes supporting learning mobility of learners and staff
remains limited.56
This is not reflective of demand, with heavy oversubscription in
Erasmus+ and the ESC (only 1 out of 10 volunteering opportunities requested can be
supported). Financial and social constraints prevent higher mobility uptake,
disproportionately affecting individuals from less affluent backgrounds, students with
disabilities and marginalised groups including Roma, exacerbating inequalities. High
living costs, access to affordable and adequate housing, tuition fees, and insufficient
scholarships57
deter many from studying, volunteering, or working abroad.
13
2.2.9. Barriers to transparency and recognition of qualifications across borders
The barriers driving the inability to make best use of the skills available include diverse
national legislations and administrative practices. These make it difficult to work in
another country, set up joint programmes and to award joint degrees, especially those with
embedded learning mobility components. This limits opportunities for the free movement
of workers and for more innovative educational offerings, factors that also attract talent
from third countries and support Europe’s competitiveness.
Obstacles exist also to non-formal and informal learning. The very nature of "soft skills",
which are less tangible and harder to measure than "hard skills", makes it more difficult to
gauge and quantify non-formal learning outcomes. This also discourages learning
mobility, resulting in wasted talent and resources, as individuals may not be able to provide
evidence of their competences, may have to repeat courses to meet local requirements or
navigate cumbersome recognition procedures.58
2.2.10. Unexploited potential of lifelong learning, including non-formal and informal
Once people complete their formal education, most will spend up to four decades in the
labour market. There is huge potential to meet the EU’s skills needs through up- and
reskilling throughout adults’ working lives, yet too few adults still take part in training
each year, far below the EU headline target for 203059
. The reasons for this shortfall
include limited access to upskilling programmes, a lack of awareness of lifelong learning,
of time or of financial resources, low level of basic skills and insufficient support for
effective reskilling initiatives – including appropriate incentives for companies.
Non-formal and informal learning, volunteering and sport are complementary to formal
education and crucial for the development of skills and attitudes for jobs and life. However,
the offer and quality of youth work differ considerably across countries.60
In addition,
transnational cooperation in these fields is held back by a lack of networking and peer
learning opportunities. Sport is also currently insufficiently exploited in formal education.
2.2.11. Obstacles to societal engagement, civic education and solidarity
Young people participate less in institutional politics than other age groups and less than
many young people in the past61
. Young people, as with other citizens, can be confronted
with obstacles in their participation in democracy, such as insufficient knowledge of their
democratic rights, difficult access to information and limited involvement in decision-
making processes. Citizenship education on the EU and its values remains uneven62
. This
can be seen as driven by limited opportunities for civic engagement, solidarity, and cultural
and sports participation. This limits social capital development, particularly among young
people, preventing them from becoming empowered, active citizens, and fosters a culture
of preparedness and resilience.63

Drivers linked to problem 3 – Challenges to the design and architecture of the EU
financing instruments to address the policy-related problems
2.2.12. Rapidly evolving policy areas not covered coherently by existing EU programmes
Rapidly evolving policy areas and the emerging priorities outlined in the 2024-2029
Political Guidelines are increasingly outpacing the possibilities offered by existing EU
programmes. In some cases, actions are constrained by incompatible provision in the legal
basis and by pre-allocated funding which falls short of changing needs, needs which cannot
be efficiently managed by transferring funding between different programmes64
. One
consequence of this has been a multiplication of actions often implemented through annual
14
EU Pilot Projects and Preparatory Actions (PPPA), lacking stable financing and systemic
planning. The implications of the structure of current instruments are confirmed by the
results of the OPC: approximately two thirds of respondents signalled that the “lack of
flexibility of the EU budget to adapt to new and unforeseen developments” is an obstacle
preventing the budget to fully delivering on its objectives.
2.2.13. Untapped synergies in EU funding across complementary policy areas.
Priorities under this cluster are currently addressed from different perspectives by several
EU instruments – sometimes also through instruments beyond this cluster65
. While some
progress was made during the current MFF, synergies and complementarities have not
been fully exploited. The current interplay between instruments does not help to offer an
effective response to key evolving issues (such as the fight against disinformation). This is
also reflected in the limited coordination among the national contact points for some of the
instruments covered by this cluster and the implementation mechanisms of other clusters.
There is also insufficient coordination with bodies managing programmes at national level.
Lack of upstream coordination in the implementation, and differing management
provisions all play a part. The result is a difficulty to implement joint actions which might
bring about increased impacts, or cross-cutting, innovative actions that do not fit into the
scope of a single programme.
Similar issues have also increased the risk of potential duplications, as funding is spread
over several programmes, budget lines and actions. Areas risking overlap as a result
include media literacy or youth non-formal activities66
, currently covered by several
programmes. Insufficient coordination between EU and national funding has also
hampered the ability to optimally address policy areas implemented through multi-layered
financing. This was also highlighted in the OPC where aspects such as “lack of consistency
and effectiveness to deliver on EU policy priorities” (52%) and “too many programmes
with overlapping policy areas” (53%) were singled out by respondents as obstacles
preventing the EU budget from delivering on its objectives67
.
2.2.14. Limited coordination of EU funding and complementarities with other EU
interventions.
Coordination within and across programmes is hampered by a lack of common operational
frameworks - with aligned criteria, funding rules, and implementing tools (e.g. work
programmes68
, consistent third country participation, monitoring and reporting indicators).
Different programme committee structures, each governed by their own rules and
procedures, adds to the complications of coordination69
. For cross-border education and
skills, fragmented EU support limits impact, coordination, and scalability. This hinders the
ability to address cross-cutting and structural skills challenges, to scale up effective action
across instruments, or to align EU funding with national reforms and private investment.
While the EACEA and National Agencies efficiently implement several programmes or
large chunks of programmes covered by this cluster70
, obstacles are created by a lack of
integrated monitoring, as well as robust approaches to data collection and analysis71
between direct and indirect management. This is particularly important considering that
programmes under this cluster often involve the disbursement of small grants to many
different beneficiaries. In addition, though blended instruments, which coordinate and
combine funding from different EU instruments72
within an EU policy framework with
agreed objectives, have proved their value in mobilising private and public investment,
their potential has been very rarely exploited in many of the policy areas in this cluster.
15
2.2.15. Access to EU funding hampered by complexity and insufficient user-friendliness
Policy areas and funding covered in this cluster target multiple small scale and grassroot
actors (e.g. local schools, youth organisations, small and medium-sized enterprises, small
municipalities, and civil society organisations). These actors often have limited capacity
to apply for, implement and manage EU funds and this has been an obstacle to best use of
the funds. For example, they have more difficulties to effectively use corporate tools,
which do not consider their specificities and lower size of grants. Efforts to improve user-
friendliness and accessibility and to reduced administrative burden for beneficiaries
through novelties under existing funding instruments73
need to be increased.
Both the evaluations and the OPC74
confirm significant obstacles. Application processes
and reporting procedures are not always proportionate to the level of grant and capacity of
smaller beneficiaries. In some cases, insufficient information (e.g. learning mobility
opportunities) hinders participation and uptake75
. Under some of the programmes covered
by this IA, many calls are still launched annually, increasing the administrative burden.
Real costs are still used in the implementation of programmes, as opposed to more user-
friendly methods of financing not linked to cost. This is confirmed by the OPC76
.
2.3. How likely are the problems to persist?
The policy-related problem drivers described above have been compared to the megatrends
identified by the Commission’s Competence Centre on Foresight77
. These trends are long-
term global driving forces that are most likely to continue to have a significant influence
in coming decades. The identified problem drivers were found especially congruent with
seven megatrends: (a) accelerating technological change and hyperconnectivity; (b)
changing nature of work, requiring constant reskilling and upskilling; (c) changing security
paradigm, with hybrid threats, such as foreign information manipulation and interference
(FIMI); (d) diversification of education, training and learning, outside formal systems; (e)
widening inequalities; (f) growing consumption, influenced by algorithms; (g) increasing
influence of new governing system (Annex 9 includes a table linking the problem drivers
and megatrends).
Consequently, there is a strong likelihood that the problem drivers outlined in section 2.2
will persist and even intensify without EU support78
. The evolving nature of these
challenges will also increase pressure on the design and impact of EU funding, as some of
them, such as the disruption of the information space, are insufficiently covered by the
current generation of instruments. This pressure will manifest also in new needs and
priorities, shifting synergies and complementarities, growing complexities, and increased
need for higher flexibility.
3. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT?
The policy areas covered by this IA are firmly anchored in the EU Treaties, which provide
the legal bases for EU action through financial interventions and reflect the Union’s core
values, long-term objectives, and political and legal commitment in these areas.
3.1. Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action
The EU budget in these areas is crucial to the foundations of the EU. The EU cannot rely
solely on national funding to protect EU values, including fundamental rights, the rule of
law, equality and non-discrimination, democratic participation, media, culture, education
and skills. Many European citizens, especially young people, believe that safeguarding
16
these policy areas cannot be left to Member States alone79
. EU level action helps to drive
progress across all Member States. It is particularly necessary to: (1) address transnational
and common challenges; (2) achieve systemic impact by filling gaps and ensuring a
European approach; and (3) enhance coherence between internal and external policies.
3.1.1. To address transnational and common challenges
Several of the problem drivers mentioned in Chapter 2 are common to all Member States
and/or have a clear transnational dimension. National-level action alone would be less
efficient and impactful than EU level efforts, which enable cooperation, capacity building,
mutual learning and the pooling of resources, sharing of expertise and best practices.
Whilst financial intervention is not the only way in which the EU can act in these areas, it
often plays a decisive role in the policy response mix.
First, the problem of skills80
has a Union-wide dimension. Member States face similar
challenges and struggle individually to make their education and training systems fit to
meet contemporary and future educational and skills needs. PISA 2022 results are
worrying for all EU countries81
. Major digital gaps persist in education systems across the
EU82
while rapid technological advancement, such as generative AI, tests their ability to
keep up with the necessary digital skills and literacy. While the bulk of funding will come
from national budgets, EU-supported transnational cooperation mechanisms and capacity
building are crucial to provide joint impactful approaches and leverage/scale up innovative
solutions to help education, training, youth and sport sectors address skills gaps and
improve performance and inclusiveness. Funding can strengthen the cross-border
dimension to build networks and trust among the education and training systems, increase
the transparency and recognition of skills and qualifications across borders, as well as the
circulation of staff, learners and workers in Europe.
Second, Member States have differing capacities to counter global phenomena such as
online hate speech, cyberviolence, data protection issues, threats against the information
space and risks associated with the use of generative AI – all of which affect EU values,
citizens’ fundamental rights and economic development of media and culture. The growing
complexity of digital environments, disparities in digital skills, and inconsistent
application of data protection rules across the EU83
underscore the need for unified EU
action to ensure rights are effectively protected and to reinforce the EU's global standard-
setting role. Financial support can galvanise the raising of skills and capabilities to levels
which are both higher and more consistent84
.
Third, EU agencies and bodies such as Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor’s
Office, and EU judicial cooperation tools, play a pivotal role in supporting cooperation
among national authorities, enabling information exchange of critical information, joint
operations, and consistent application of justice standards. EU financial interventions for
training and capacity-building can have a decisive impact on raising standards85
.
Fourth, EU action in the field of culture is also key to supporting transnational cooperation,
cross-country circulation of cultural works, (co)creation, networking, capacity-building
and cultural diversity, as well as the social, economic and international dimension of the
CCS. Financial interventions are indispensable to addressing common challenges, such as
digital innovation, sustainability, artistic freedom and equal access to a diversity of cultural
content, with EU action bringing results often beyond the reach of national schemes.
Finally, in the audiovisual sector, EU action to facilitate collaboration and pooling of
resources and know-how can more effectively address common challenges, stemming
from fierce international competition and disruptions by global players. EU funding for
17
news media sector is crucial as individual Member States cannot - or in some cases will
not - address the risks on their own. EU funding can more effectively provide a common
response and promote a trustworthy debate, including by tackling disinformation. Recent
shocks to the financial and political support for civil society and news media across Europe
further highlight the value of EU-level financial support.
3.1.2. To achieve systemic impact by filling gaps
Actions at EU level can address challenges that are not prioritised by Member States. EU
action on values, fundamental rights and equality can offset political pressure on the civic
space, protecting EU values and democracy at EU as well as national level, and slower
progress towards equality. The mid-term evaluation of the CERV programme showed that
for many CSOs, the programme is the only substantial source of funding. Without EU
direct support, CSOs’ activities would end precisely where they are most needed, where
EU values are under threat86
. Specific needs such as those of victims of domestic violence
do not find sufficient national funding. EU funding can also offer services at EU level
which would simply not be viable on a national scale in all Member States, such as
children's helplines or victim support hotlines87
.
As private and philanthropic investment in media, including audiovisual, in the EU is
limited, such support contributes to fill the funding gap.
Most beneficiaries under the Justice programme believe they could not secure alternative
funding in the absence of such a programme88
. The EU is best placed to foster cross-border
opportunities for justice professionals to connect, develop and contribute to a shared
European legal culture. This is particularly true for EU-wide legal networks, where the
absence of EU funding would end collaboration between these networks89
.
EU funding also creates EU added value by supporting transnational cooperation in testing
and transfer of innovative practices in education, training, youth, and sport. EU funding
offers the economies of scale needed to provide a laboratory for deeper sectoral
transformation, as seen with the European Universities Alliancesand Centres of Vocational
Excellence or the European degree.
Finally, learning mobility is far more complex to organise on a bilateral basis and Member
States alone cannot make it accessible to all. EU action is necessary to compensate for the
lack of transnational learning mobility opportunities, remove obstacles and break silos.
This creates the foundation for a deeper and more regular cooperation than would be
possible without the intervention of the EU level, whether for pupils, students (including
VET students), young people and volunteers, also delivering a positive impact on local
communities in the country of destination (e.g. for volunteers). The EU has also an added
value through European transparency tools (Europass) and the organisation of cooperation
to facilitate the free movement of people for learning and working in another Member
State. EU action also fosters excellence and innovation and enhances the capacity of
education and training systems to attract and retain talents based on equal opportunities90
.
3.1.3. To enhance coherence between internal and external policies
EU action is critical to promote EU values at international level, implementing
international standards coherently with internal policies. For instance, the Commission
serves as the focal point for implementing the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities91
. In this role, it must report to the UN Committee on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities while EU funding can be used as a leverage to promote shared
strategic interests and maintain the EU’s role as a global standard setter, particularly in
areas like data protection and rights.
18
The participation of candidate and potential candidate countries in EU funded programmes
alongside Member States, including funding for capacity building, has accelerated
regulatory reforms (e.g. justice and education reforms) and a faster alignment with the EU
acquis (e.g. audiovisual92
). EU action in the field of culture contributes to building trust
and forging long-term partnerships with the EU’s neighbours and partners. EU funding can
play an important part in opening the door to a strong EU role in promoting European
interests in education, youth, and sport, at international level.
3.2. Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action
The added value of EU action, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, is reflected in
different areas. Notwithstanding the significance of the problems, the relevance of policy
areas addressed under this cluster, and the positive results of the evaluations, the added
value and impact needs to be taken forward in the context of available budgetary resources.
3.2.1. Nurturing a sense of EU citizenship, solidarity and belonging
EU actions nurture a sense of EU citizenship and mutual understanding, through the
promotion of EU values, supporting democratic and societal resilience, and a trustworthy
information space, objectives that national interventions alone cannot fully achieve. This
includes cross-border EU support for transnational civil society networks, for learning and
volunteering mobility activities93
, including those starting from a younger age, as well as
for awareness raising initiatives that engage citizens in democratic life and broaden access
to diverse media and cultural expressions while highlighting our shared heritage. These
actions also bring Europe closer to its people. Different EU actions help build a shared
European identity and enhance citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU.94
3.2.2. Ensuring high standards across the EU
EU action ensures uniformly high standards across the EU and consistent interpretation
and application of EU law across Member States. This is essential for the proper
functioning of the internal market and for effectively protecting EU citizens’ rights. EU
steering is essential to ensure the implementation of EU policies by Member States,
promote good practices, address issues and gaps in national approaches and frameworks
and engage all relevant stakeholders.
The interplay between financial interventions and policy tools is critical to ensuring this
impact. In the field of justice, the EU is best placed to ensure that justice systems operate
in a harmonised manner across the EU. For instance, supporting EU judicial training has a
clear added value as it fosters a coherent understanding and application of EU law and the
delivery of key tools like the European Arrest Warrant. In the media sector, the EU has
promoted and funded the development of journalistic standards to complement the
regulatory obligations of EMFA, which also establishes an EU-funded European Board for
Media Services. In the field of education and training, youth and solidarity, financial
support complements EU-wide instruments to ensure quality and recognition through the
development of common standards, tools and procedures, such as the accreditation of
volunteering structures and the development of tools for recognising qualifications.
Similarly, the EU plays a fundamental role in supporting the development of standards and
their technical implementation for accessibility.
19
3.2.3. Supporting and reinforcing the Single Market and improving fair access across
the EU
With sector-specific Single Market legislation in place95
, EU action ensures that
audiovisual and media companies and creators can fully benefit from the Single Market
and contribute to cultural diversity and inclusion. Fragmentation in the media sector is
exacerbated by a lack of coordination between Member States and the EU96
. EU funding
helps overcome this by encouraging cooperation and pooling of EU and national resources
for larger scale audiovisual and media projects, thus improving access for more EU citizens
and enhancing the competitiveness of the European industry.
EU-level action plays a key role in promoting the recognition of skills and qualifications
across the EU by financial support to a common toolbox supporting transparency, the
simplification of recognition procedures for qualifications, the validation of skills acquired
through non-formal learning, and quality assurance. It supports the development of
European education, through trans-national cooperation, and through the development of
European degrees. It also promotes mobility and cross-border exchanges from an early
age. These efforts collectively contribute to greater circulation of people, including for
employment, ultimately benefiting the Single Market. Additionally, EU-level action is also
essential to the functioning of the internal market for accessible products and services.
Finally, as explained earlier, the Justice programme brings significant added value by
supporting a harmonised justice framework which enables enabling smoother cross-border
business operations and investments.
3.2.4. Added value through better delivery
EU initiatives can also offer added value through the very nature of larger, cross-border
financial interventions. This is the basis justifying much of the EU budget, and it applies
particularly strongly in financial interventions where cross-border action is the core
objective of the action. Cooperation between universities or judicial training institutions
can naturally be provided more efficiently and consistently within a single cross-border
frame than through multiple bilateral or plurilateral arrangements. Audiovisual
organisations and cultural bodies in different Member States can pool resources and reach
economies of scale if they can work within a common frame. This added value can be felt
in terms of developing wider projects addressing a policy goal (instead of separate smaller
projects under different programmes), reducing the burden on applicants and number of
staff and the resources required to manage programmes, as well as the reduced
administrative burden of dealing with a single way of working.
4. OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED?
4.1. General objectives
The objectives below aim to address the main problems and drivers identified in Chapter
2. Tables outlining these logical links are shown in Annex 10.
General objective 1: Enhance and deepen the EU ability to financially contribute, provide
added value and promote fundamental rights and EU values, democracy, media and culture
The EU financial intervention must contribute to address the threats against EU values,
fundamental rights and democracy, media and culture, thus enhancing a free, democratic,
cohesive, inclusive and competitive Europe based on the rule of law. The Union will
therefore protect, promote and fulfil fundamental rights and EU values, and a thriving civic
20
space; support a free, viable, competitive, and pluralistic media and audiovisual space;
safeguard and protect cultural and linguistic diversity and heritage.
General objective 2: Enhance and deepen the EU ability to financially contribute, support
and provide added value to cross-border education and training, youth, sport and solidarity,
contributing to skills for life and jobs
The EU financial intervention must also contribute to address the shortfalls of skills and
key competences for life and jobs, thus contributing to a resilient, competitive, cohesive
and united Europe and a European identity. The Union will foster high quality lifelong
learning, enhance skills and key competences for all, in line with a swiftly changing society
and labour market needs, while promoting societal engagement and civic education,
solidarity and social inclusion.
General Objective 3: Enhance and deepen the EU ability to financially contribute and
provide added value in these policies with a design fostering adequacy of funding to policy,
simplification, coordination and synergies
The EU intervention must better reflect and protect policy objectives. It must be designed
and implemented to effectively support policy delivery, including through a feedback loop
from results to policy making, and greater cooperation among all relevant stakeholders. It
should be flexible enough to cater for new emerging needs and evolving priorities. EU
instruments should build up mechanisms to foster synergies within and across policy areas,
to make the EU intervention more impactful, achieve economies of scale and streamline
the management of the different programmes. Finally, it must be user friendly and offer
visible, simplified and easily accessible opportunities.
4.2. Specific objectives
4.2.1. Specific objectives linked to general objective 1
Specific objective 1.1: Contribute to upholding the rule of law, fundamental rights and
equality, reduce discrimination and empower civil society
EU financial intervention will (1) raise awareness and build capacity of relevant actors97
for the effective application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; (2) promote the
rule of law and combat corruption; (3) promote equality, and support prevent and fight
against discrimination98
, including through training, education, awareness raising, mutual
learning, and exchanges of good practices and capacity building; (4) support actions to
promote and protect women’s rights and gender equality (e.g. improving work-life
balance, reducing gender gaps, combating stereotypes, and gender mainstreaming); (5)
support actions to promote accessibility and the rights of persons with disabilities to an
independent life, to participation in the community, including fighting stigma and
violence; (6) support actions to combat all forms of intolerance99
; (7) raise awareness on
the benefits of diversity and inclusion; (8) promote and protect the rights of the child,
including their right to meaningfully participate ; (9) in synergy with objective 1.4, support
actions to combat hate speech and hate crime and promote freedom of expression,
including by increasing knowledge of EU and national legislation, improving reporting
and recording mechanisms, empowering victims and witnesses and enhancing resilience
of civil society organisations; (10) support actions to protect and promote rights and values
in the digital space, including data protection; (11) nurture a vibrant civic space by
building the capacity, empower and fund the activities of civil society organisations at all
levels, and human rights defenders ; and (12) reinforce the protection of whistleblowers,
including through better implementation of EU legislation.
21
Specific objective 1.2: Contribute to fighting against gender-based violence, violence
against children and other groups at risk
The EU financial intervention will contribute to (1) support good practice exchanges
among stakeholders, build the capacity of stakeholders and relevant professionals to
address issues related to gender-based violence, and strengthen integrated child protection
systems and the deinstitutionalisation of child care and care systems for persons with
disabilities; (2) support actions for the protection of and support for victims and survivors
of violence, including by increasing knowledge about victims’ rights, improving data
collection and protection and support standards for victims; (3) strengthen a
multidisciplinary and multi-actor approach to prevent and combat violence; and (4) support
the EU implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating
violence against women and domestic violence and the UN Convention on the rights of
persons with disabilities.
Specific objective 1.3: Contribute to enhancing democratic resilience and participation.
The EU financial intervention will contribute to (1) promote all citizens‘ participation and
engagement in democracy, through elections (including electoral turnout), democratic
debates and engagement in public policy making; (2) promote and protect Union
citizenship rights, including by raising awareness of the value and benefits deriving from
those rights; (3) support to free, fair, resilient, accessible and inclusive electoral processes
and democratic check and balances, processes and frameworks (including by supporting
independent elections observers) as well as by addressing foreign information
manipulation and interference; (4) raise awareness, facilitate exchanges and engagement
in democratic processes, and build citizens’ knowledge in view to better understand the
Union, its history, cultural diversity, and European remembrance; and (5) strengthening of
situational awareness and preparedness across societies, in synergy with the objective
below (on the protection of the integrity of the media and information space).
Specific objective 1.4: Contribute to supporting news media, media independence and
tackling disinformation.
The EU financial intervention will strive to enhance a viable and diverse information
ecosystem in the EU. It will promote, on the one side, free, independent and viable media;
and on the other, contribute to fighting disinformation. It will enhance the availability and
consumption of professionally produced news media content, including on EU affairs and
in peripheral areas, addressing the fact that 25% of citizens currently believe that news are
divisive, harmful or spread lies100
. It will protect media and journalists, address risks to
market plurality, financial viability and increasing political interference, and contribute to
the implementation of the media freedom regulatory rulebook.101
As regards
disinformation, it will enhance an independent monitoring of the information ecosystem
and role of entities detecting and analysing disinformation, including fact-checking. It will
promote digital and media literacy, to empower EU citizens to make well-informed
choices. Promoting media independence and media pluralism and fighting disinformation
were signalled as an important policy objective by 83.1% of OPC respondents.
Specific objective 1.5: Enhance production,102
circulation, and consumption of EU
audiovisual/media content.
The current EU support to the audiovisual industry has successfully contributed to the
sectors’ competitiveness and cultural diversity. Building on this, a renewed financing
intervention will enhance the societal, economic and cultural relevance of media and
22
audiovisual content. Citizens’ access to high quality European media and audiovisual
content (films, TV series, documentaries) will be fostered to promote a sense of mutual
understanding whilst strengthening the competitiveness of the industry. The potential of
such content to appeal to wider audiences across borders will be enhanced by fostering
European collaborations, notably cross-border productions, distribution and promotion.
Efforts will be renewed to increase cross-border circulation of EU audiovisual, and media
works as well as to reach isolated communities in media and cinema “deserts”. Actions
will be updated to respond to market trends, notably the increasing shift of audiences
online. The participation of all Member States will be broadened through increased
collaborations between countries with different audiovisual capabilities. Support will
promote crossovers among media content sectors, transmedia IP development and
exploitation to foster audience engagement in Europe and beyond.103
It will also support
the development, marketing and promotion of videogames and interactive content, which
are particularly popular among young audiences.104
Specific objective 1.6: Increase in cross-border cultural cooperation, cultural participation
and accessibility, and circulation of diverse cultural works, while strengthening cultural
and creative sectors.
A renewed financing intervention will keep a strong focus on cooperation to promote
cultural diversity, circulation and mobility, to test innovative solutions, scale up good
practices and accelerate the development curve in the CCS, while giving local/national
initiatives a European dimension/perspective. Through cooperation, the financing
intervention would help address pressing common needs, in particular the needs to
continue supporting cultural and artistic creation in full respect of artistic freedom, to
promote inclusiveness and intergenerational fairness through culture, to help the CCS be
more resilient and competitive and benefit from the dual transition, and to promote the use
of new (for example digital) tools, including protecting cultural heritage. The financing
intervention would also contribute to building trust and forging long-term partnerships
with the EU’s neighbours and partners. Finally, there would be a focus on participation
and access of all, especially the younger generation, to a diversity of cultural and creative
contents, in particular those coming from beyond national or linguistic borders as well as
to all forms of cultural heritage, be it tangible, intangible or, more and more often, also in
digital format.105
Specific objective 1.7: Spur cross-cutting innovation and promote sustainability of media,
cultural and societal entities.
Media and CCS are well positioned to spearhead innovation in Europe’s economy and
society, as they blend creativity and design with digital tools, accessible solutions and new
business models. However, innovation in media and CCS is underfinanced and mainly
relies on non-European technologies and foreign private investments106
. Innovation can
help tackle the problem of media viability, with media organizations turning to alternative
income sources (e.g. event organisation, e-commerce)107
: for example, the ‘promotion of
trustworthy AI that respects EU values’ was mentioned as an ‘important’ policy objective
by 73% of OPC respondents108
. Furthermore, the current intervention has shown the value
of blended instruments combining funds from different programmes in attracting private
funding in nascent markets and should be expanded in the future. Finally, there is a need
to enhance professionals’ skillset to adapt to the emerging media, cultural and societal
needs.
23
4.2.2. Specific objectives linked to general objective 2
Specific Objective 2.1: Support transnational cooperation around education and skills
The EU action will support cross-border cooperation, allowing for pooling of expertise,
exchange of good practices, networking, peer learning and capacity-building of education
and training, youth, sport and volunteering organisations. EU investments will also cover
systematic, large-scale institutional cooperation (through support for example to European
University Alliances or Centres of Vocational Excellence), to promote innovation in
curriculum design, joint degrees, partnerships with businesses, recognition of
qualifications and validation of skills, as well as and research across borders. This will
build on a more integrated Education Area and contribute to the creation of the Union of
Skills.
Actions to foster the development of high quality and state-of-the-art teaching and training
practices as well as youth work methods will be supported. They will aim to enhance
inclusion, digitalisation, innovation and excellence in education and training, youth and
sport and lead to improvements of performance and modernisation of the overall
functioning of the institutions and organisations thus increasing their capacity to develop
the skills and competences needed for jobs and life. It will also aim to attract and retain top
talent and securing and keeping high-quality educators and staff crucial to enhance
academic reputation and drive institutional success.
Specific Objective 2.2: Support to transnational learning mobility and learning
opportunities.
The goal is to make learning mobility a reality for all, as early as possible, ensuring that
opportunities are accessible across all sectors of education and training, youth, and sport.109
EU action will help address the current obstacles and support cross border learning
mobility for all learners and staff, providing as well sufficient funding and support
measures to promote diversity and ensure equal access for individuals regardless of their
gender, cultural, social, economic, or geographical background, or any special needs they
may have.
By supporting learning mobility for all, and exposing learners from an earlier age, allowing
them to develop key competences, language skills, and adaptability, those EU actions
contribute to build skilled, engaged, united and prepared individuals. Through active
involvement in cross-border learning mobility opportunities, organisations increase their
capacity as well to operate at international level, improve ways of operating and integrate
good practices enhancing their overall performance. In addition, transnational mobility for
workers will be facilitated by supporting the transparency and recognition of skills and
qualifications across borders.
Specific Objective 2.3: Promote lifelong learning, improving skills and new competences.
EU action will promote lifelong learning enabling individuals to gain invaluable skills and
competences across their life span, through formal education but also upskilling and
reskilling opportunities, non-formal and informal learning experiences, sport or
engagement in volunteering.
EU action will aim to contribute to build a skilled and competitive workforce through
supporting the acquisition of the whole spectrum of skills (including digital and STEM
skills) from basic to highly specialised skills for all - from learners to staff, at all levels of
formal, non-formal and informal education and training. It will also aim to support the
24
development of the transversal skills (such as critical thinking, civic skills, socio-emotional
skills) enabling full and meaningful participation in society and making citizens more
resilient, thus enhancing social cohesion and contributing to the Union’s preparedness
efforts. Strengthening and orchestrating funding to cover all the skills acquisition spectrum
in a lifelong learning perspective would increase reach and achieve critical mass, enabling
more systemic impact.
Specific Objective 2.4: Support policy experimentation and development accelerating
modernisation.
EU action will aim to facilitate and accelerate reforms of education systems (early
childhood education and care, primary, secondary, higher education, VET) as well as
support the development of national policy initiatives in the field of youth and sport, in
line with the EU policy agenda. Such EU action would take the form of testing innovative
solutions, scaling-up of successful initiatives and practices, evidence and knowledge
gathering about education, training, youth and sport systems and policies and policy
dialogues.
Specific Objective 2.5: Foster solidarity, civic education and engagement
EU action will aim to empower and support all young people to acquire relevant knowledge
and skills to become active and engaged citizens and Europeans. It will also promote
solidarity, intergenerational fairness and common values, and contribute to reduce social
divergences, advancing social inclusion and cohesion. EU action will also address physical
and mental health challenges, particularly of young people, and contribute to building
citizens’ resilience, in line with the preparedness strategy. To this end, EU support will
also enhance opportunities for exposure to transnational solidarity from an earlier age.
EU action will support opportunities to engage in non-formal and informal learning
opportunities, volunteering activities, youth participation, and promote healthy lifestyles
through sport. Additionally, EU action will build capacity of those who work with young
people and organisations that represent their interest, contributing, and include all young
people’s voices in EU policymaking. Civic and education will be supported, including for
media literacy in schools Capacity for meaningful participation and civic engagement in
EU and cross-border affairs among young people and among all organisations that
represent their interest should contribute to young people’s voices becoming more central
in EU policymaking.
4.2.3. Specific objectives linked to general objective 3
Specific Objective 3.1: Increase effectiveness of EU funding by addressing linked EU
challenges, improving cooperation, and fostering coordination of the main policy areas
There is a need for a policy-based EU intervention aligning political priorities and funding
support, taking as a basis the political guidelines of the new Commission. This will mean,
for instance, setting objectives aligned with EU priorities, which may change over time.
Prioritising projects with high added value that contribute to the EU strategic priorities was
mentioned by 73% of OPC respondents110
as something that could help the EU budget
become more effective and efficient.
The design of the programmes and the approach to funding should steer cooperation
between EC services and agencies, as well as between institutions and organisation within
EU member states, where relevant. Performance indicators should help track outcomes
beyond actual expenditure or participation levels and monitor horizontal policy goals.
25
“Feedback to policy” mechanisms, addressing monitoring challenges identified in the mid-
term evaluations, should be strengthened to make sure that the result of the EU intervention
inform policy making. Given the increased focus on policy monitoring, resources may need
to be reallocated through efficiency savings on project selection and execution.111
Similarly, blending financial instruments which have proved their value in one policy area,
will also be expanded to other relevant policy fields, ensuring economies of scale and
reducing overheads.
Specific Objective 3.2: Improve efficiency for applicants and beneficiaries, and at EU
level
The future programmes should streamline EU management, governance and
implementation of EU programmes to improve efficiency for applicants, beneficiaries and
EU institutions. Application and reporting procedures should be simplified and further
harmonised, through the introduction of common or aligned rules, making it easier for
applicants to apply to calls addressing complementary policy objectives. The application,
management and reporting should be less complex and entail fewer administrative
burdens.
To simplify implementation and reduce administrative burden for beneficiaries, the use of
simplified forms of funding (including financing not linked to costs and lump sums) should
become the standard form of contribution for reimbursing grants. The use of financial
support to third parties, which has proven efficient in making EU funding more accessible
to small organisations, should also continue and could be extended where appropriate.
Moreover, increasing the use of multi-annual grants would also have a positive impact.
Obstacles encountered by grassroots organisations and first-time applicants should be
addressed through targeted simplification measures addressing their circumstances,
enhanced communication, and promotion of funding opportunities. Pooling of resources,
including in areas such as monitoring, internal and external communication could bring
economies of scale and enhance the predictability of EU funding more widely among
beneficiaries, stakeholders and EU citizens.
Specific Objective 3.3: Increase coherence by promoting synergies and complementarities
Maximising policy impact requires moving from fragmented implementation to coherent,
complementary, and coordinated funding. Fewer programmes would facilitate
coordination and consistency, thereby helping to reduce existing overlaps and gaps and
increasing synergies and complementarities within this cluster and with other clusters. This
would also maximise synergies with national,regional and local levels, by providing
overall direction and strategy across various policy areas. It should also help better
coordinate with and leverage national, regional, local, private and institutional financing –
thereby strengthening complementarities in relevant policy areas.
Programming should ensure synergies through cross-cutting actions and integrated calls
that span multiple policy domains, currently covered by different programmes in this
cluster. The design of the programmes should allow to re-channel funds between areas
within a programme and reduce overlaps between funding actions. For instance, actions
could be launched to combine news media funding with supporting the role of civic society
organisations (CSOs) active in the civic and media spheres.
Building bridges between the different funding instruments at EU, national,regional and
local levels will be important. This will be particularly beneficial for enhancing inclusion,
scaling up projects, ensuring sustainability and a sense of ownership of results, supporting
26
different dimensions of activities and removing silos between specific fields, e.g. such as
education, research and innovation. Similarly, strengthened provisions to ensure easy
transfer of funds between the different EU instruments and timely and appropriate
coordination will enable to increase effectiveness of EU interventions and better address
policy priorities.
Specific Objective 3.4: Ensure proportionality by improving reactiveness to new
challenges and minimising risks
Greater flexibility should be built-in to be able to respond quickly to new emerging
challenges and priorities, through easily adaptable funding instruments or rapid response
mechanisms112
. Achieving operational excellence in programme management will require
harmonising programme arrangements, based on annual and multiannual work
programmes, streamlining evaluation procedures, and leveraging IT tools. Increasing the
flexibility of funding instruments to re-allocate funding can also help to improve their
reactiveness to new challenges. At the same time, it is crucial to ensure that policy goals
are not diluted.
5. WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS?
5.1. What is the baseline from which options are assessed?
In a baseline “continuity” scenario, the current programmes would continue to exist. They
would continue providing added value on their respective areas of intervention, as
evidenced by the respective evaluations. However, the same evaluations highlight the
needs for the Union to further enhance and improve its action. For instance, the existing
programmes have a limited scope in addressing emerging challenges such as those linked
to threats to media freedom, pluralism, and to addressing disinformation; face funding gaps
in areas such as gender equality113
; or need to further address accessibility challenges,
continuing to expand their reach to participants with fewer opportunities114
. The
megatrends referred to in Annex 9 would likely reinforce these issues in a baseline scenario.
5.2. Description of the policy options
Commission services have explored several strategic options to address the challenges
described in the previous sections, considering that the current matrix of challenges is
likely to persist in the future and that there is scope for valuable EU intervention. The three
options described hereafter illustrate architectural designs to meet the specific
objectives presented under Chapter 4. Additional options, which were considered yet
discarded at an early stage, are also presented.
The options were developed using various criteria115
, based on an initial mapping and
analysis of components and implementation aspects of each relevant, existing programmes
and policy areas. Options were subsequently organised in three distinct and mutually
exclusive packages.
The first option represents the baseline, continuing existing programmes and instruments
as stand-alone programmes. The second option proposes to align policies and instruments
in two programmes, based on the two policy-driven general objectives outlined under
Chapter 4. The third option considers a full integration of all policies in this cluster under
a single programme. The extent to which each option addresses the objectives presented
under Chapter 4 is shown in Annex 4. For legal reasons, as explained in this chapter, the
Justice programme remains standalone in all scenarios.
27
Option 1: Continuity
This option would maintain the current programmes untouched: CERV, Creative Europe,
European Solidarity Corps, Erasmus+, and relevant prerogative lines (i.e. Multimedia
Actions, activities on fundamental rights), in addition to the Justice programme. Each
programme would continue to be established by its own legal act and would follow its
specific rules and objectives. Under a dynamic baseline, some incremental improvements
could be introduced, for instance building on the simplification measures already
introduced in the 2021-2027 period. However, aligning the programmes (in their current
architecture), with the Political Guidelines for 2024-2029 would be partial, at best 116
.
Option 2: Objective-based consolidation
This option proposes to align instruments based on the two main policy-driven general
objectives. It would result in targeted mergers of existing programmes: on one hand, it
would bring together programmes primarily aimed at protecting fundamental rights, EU
values, democracy, media and culture, thus upholding mutual understanding. It would thus
address all objectives under General Objective 1, combining policy areas currently covered
by CERV, Creative Europe and related budgetary prerogative lines, as well as addressing
emerging challenges (e.g. disruptions of the democratic and media space), and increase
action on cross-cutting priorities and synergies affecting the societal, media and cultural
sectors (e.g. sectoral skills, access to finance, innovation uptake, etc.).
On the other hand, it would merge Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps, two
instruments predominantly supporting cross-border education and training, youth, sport
and solidarity, contributing to the acquisition of skills for jobs and life (cf. General
Objective 2), and thus to competitiveness and social cohesion.
In conclusion, this option would result in two EU funding programmes, aligning the
architecture of the EU budget with existing actions and two basic priorities outlined in the
Political Guidelines: (i) Protecting democracy, upholding values and increased societal
resilience (primarily addressed by the first merger) and (ii) the Union of Skills (primarily
addressed by the second merger). The two instruments would be designed with a view to
fostering adequacy of funding to policy, simplification, coordination and synergies, thus
in line with General Objective 3.
Option 3: Full integration
The third option proposes a full integration of all policies under this cluster under a single
instrument. This would result in a new single fund integrating all policies covered today
by CERV, Creative Europe, Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps117
. This would thus
consolidate all policy-oriented general and specific objectives, supporting current policy
priorities while addressing all emerging challenges and new policy areas through a single
instrument.
5.3. Options discarded at an early stage
A discontinuation of the EU funding
The option of discontinuing the EU intervention in these policy areas was discarded at an
early stage, given the importance of the problems affecting the sectors, the prominence
given to these policies in the Political Guidelines and the added value of the EU
interventions (see Chapter 3), underpinned by the respective mid-term evaluations (see
28
Annex 8). A discontinuation of the EU funding in these areas would also contradict the
responses to the OPC (see Annex 2).
Merging the Justice programme with other programmes in this cluster
The interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme confirms that the programme
provides unique added value that would be difficult to replicate at national level (see Annex
8). However, for legal reasons, this programme cannot be merged with others, as not
all 27 EU Member States participate in the Justice programme (contrary to the other
existing programmes in this cluster). The legal bases of the Regulation establishing the
2021-2027 Justice programme are article 81(1) and (2) and article 82 TFEU. These articles
are part of Title V TFEU, which covers the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. By
virtue of Protocols annexed to the Treaty, Denmark does not take part in decisions made
under Title V in line with Protocol No 22 – known as ‘opt-out’ – and Ireland can choose
to take part in certain measures if it decides to ‘opt-in’, in line with Protocol No 21. The
other programmes in the scope of this impact assessment are open to all Member States,
and they are thus incompatible with the legal bases of Title V118
.
Other potential merging configurations
The analysis considered different, partial merging combinations across policies and
existing programmes. None of those offer a similar level of consistency compared to the
three proposed options. Alternative configurations for merging programmes (for instance,
merging only the Media strand of Creative Europe with the CERV programme) would not
effectively align with political priorities, and/or would not adequately cater for the
challenges as presented in chapters 1 and 2, notably the need to reduce the fragmentation
of funding, as they would offer less potential for synergies119
.
6. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS?
This section outlines the main potential impacts of the chosen options across the social,
economic and environmental dimensions. It also analyses, where relevant, costs and
benefits, impacts on competitiveness and SMEs and on digitalisation, as well as their
contribution to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).
Policies under this cluster target a wider variety of groups and a stronger impact on
people’s lives, as shown by the Public Consultation, which registered 5,845 responses, the
largest across the consultations on the MFF120
. More information on the results of the
consultation is provided in Annex 2 while on target groups and benefits in Annex 3.
29
Impact
dimension
Option 1: Continuity Option 2: Objective-based consolidation Option 3: Full integration
Social impact121
– Citizens’
personal,
social,
civic and
profession
al
developme
nt
– A continued positive direct impact on the
academic, social, personal, and in terms of
the employability development of individuals
and particularly young people122
. For
example, under the current instrument,
annually, Erasmus+ engages over 1 million
participants, and the European Solidarity
Corps involves 20 000 volunteers, with for
instance, over 90% self-reporting benefiting
from their participation including through
increased skills. Creative Europe has
increased EU citizens’ access to European
audiovisual content, thus contributing to
cultural exchange and societal resilience.123
Similar benefits would be expected in the
future.
Objective-based merger would enhance the already positive
direct impact on citizens’ personal, social, civic and
professional development. Merging Erasmus+ and the ESC,
brings all opportunities for young people under a single
framework and favours a pathway for individuals to take part
in different type of learning experiences thereby likely
increasing the number of participants benefiting from them
(currently Erasmus+ for students is known by 49% of the
young people surveyed in the recent Eurobarometer 545 on
youth and democracy, but only 8% were aware of the
European Solidarity Corps). A single programme would also
help promote the development of lifelong learning more
efficiently. This option would also have a positive impact
through the consolidation of Creative Europe and CERV. It
would further enhance the development of a vibrant civil
society, increase the capacity of organisations to support
cultural exchanges and cross-border collaborations, and
provide higher access to cultural, audiovisual and media
content for citizens.
The impact of option 3 on the
personal, social, civic and
professional development of
individuals might be weakened
due to the broad set of priorities
that a full integration would create.
Merging all funding instruments
could make accessibility to the
learning opportunities, and to
media and cultural participation,
more challenging.
–
– Citizens’
participati
on
– The separate programmes would continue
their positive contribution to citizens’
participation (e.g. raising awareness on rights
as EU citizen through CERV124
, support to
youth participation activities or solidarity
activities in Erasmus+ and the ESC) but with
limitations imposed by a fragmented
framework.
Objective-based merger would have positive effects on
citizens’ participation. A merger of programmes under GO1
would enhance synergies between democratic participation,
access to media and culture content, and the integrity of the
information space having a positive impact on the citizens’
participation. Similarly, by providing a comprehensive
approach to citizen’s engagement and especially children and
young people, a merge of the Corps and Erasmus+ would
bridge the gap between citizenship education e.g. schools and
hands-on participation through non formal learning activities
or volunteering. By combining education, training, youth,
– This option would have a limited
positive impact, due to a risk of
policy dilution, heterogenous
stakeholders, and a more complex
governance. This might lead to
less tailored and effective EU
intervention.
30
sport, and volunteering opportunities under one framework,
the programme would offer a cohesive and accessible
pathway for young people to learn about citizenship, civic
rights, EU and then a wide range of opportunities to engage,
likely increasing their skills and competences in this regard.125
– Democrac
y and
societal
resilience
– There will be continued positive support to
democracy and societal resilience, via
separate programmes. However, this option
has limited capacity to react to emerging
challenges linked to preparedness or media
viability, for instance. Under status quo,
contribution to democracy comes from
separate interventions, lacking a coordinated
and agile approach.
– This option would provide an integrated funding framework
for the actors contributing to supporting fundamental rights
and values and strengthening democratic resilience in the EU.
This would come from a fund focused on democracy, rights,
media, audiovisual and culture, allowing for a more holistic
and targeted approach to building democratic resilience. For
instance, by enhancing the contribution of culture to
democratic participation, this option would generate systemic
social benefits. This option would also provide the tools to
effectively support activities promoting societal resilience
and crisis preparedness, particularly those implemented by
and involving civil society126
. Improved coordination
between civic, cultural, and media actors would help address
disinformation, polarisation, and democratic backsliding with
greater coherence and effectiveness.
– The second merger would leverage the impact of all
opportunities for young people in formal, non-formal and
informal education and volunteering, by combining
complementary activities, positively affecting its contribution
to democratic and societal participation and resilience e.g. this
option would allow to support population preparedness127
through an effective combination of awareness raising
volunteering activities and preparedness activities in schools
and thus better support the European Preparedness Union
Strategy.
– The effective contribution of this
option to democracy and societal
resilience might have a limited
impact due to a broad and not
focused framework. If all these
funding instruments, and related
EU policies, are merged in the
future programming period, there
is a risk of policy dilution,
weakened stakeholder
engagement, and delayed
response.
– Social
inclusion
– On the one hand, the Erasmus+ and European
Solidarity corps have a positive impact on
social inclusion and cohesion that would
– This option would likely have a strong contribution to social
inclusion and cohesion. For instance, with 38% of
participants with fewer opportunities, the Corps is highly
– Full integration would not bring
significant additional impact for
social inclusion and cohesion,
31
and
cohesion
remain stable in the case of continuity. The
programmes’ actions directly positively
affect individuals’ attitudes – and in
particular young people’s – with e.g. 89% of
Erasmus+ participants declaring increased
tolerance awareness and 90% increased
European sense of belonging. In addition,
both instruments have a strong focus on
inclusion, with specific measures to support
the participation of individuals with fewer
opportunities. On the other hand, the CERV
programme supports the work towards a
union of equality where all people can live
free from discrimination, thus building a truly
inclusive society (up to 88% of participants to
CERV-funded activities know about the EU
legislation to promote and protect values).
inclusive and has lower barriers to participation, making it
more accessible to young individuals outside formal
institutional frameworks. By bringing this additional
inclusive dimension into Erasmus+, option 2 would enable to
widen the access to the future merged instrument to people
from different background further boost its inclusion
dimension and raise positive direct impact on individuals’
attitudes and indirect societal impact.
– Similarly, with an enhanced effectiveness and efficiency, the
EU intervention under this option will increase citizens’
access to cultural, audiovisual and media content, which are
essential elements of social inclusion and cohesion.
e.g.., in learning mobility and
volunteering, CCIs, audiovisual
and media industries This is due to
a risk of policy dilution,
heterogenous beneficiaries, and
complex governance.
Value of
public
debate
through a
trustworth
y media
sphere
– The impact is deemed to be moderately
positive, but fragmented. Creative Europe,128
CERV, and prerogative lines such as
Multimedia Actions already include certain
measures to support media pluralism and
viability, and public debate.129
Fragmentation, lack of coordination and
untapped synergies between programmes
limits integrated and comprehensive
responses to complex challenges, such as
media capture, threats against the information
space, and erosion of trust in public discourse
(as developed in Chapter 2). Opportunities to
strengthen the link between media policy and
civic engagement are missed due to
programme silos.
– The impact is expected to be strongly positive. Merger 1
results in a dedicated cluster focused on democracy, media,
culture, rights and civic resilience. It enables coherent and
strategic support for trustworthy media, including media
independence and pluralism,130
disinformation
countermeasures, and democratic participation, which are not
covered under Option 1.131
This option enhances thematic
synergies and streamlining access for applicants. In addition,
it will foster a more comprehensive public debate ecosystem,
where civic engagement and quality journalism are reinforced
together in transversal actions.
– The impact has a broad potential,
because it offers flexibility to
reallocate resources and support
cross-sectorial initiatives.
However, it brings in risks of
policy dilution. Media-specific
objectives may become lost within
a large single fund as this would
weaken targeted support for
journalism, civic engagement and
access to audiovisual content.
Heterogeneous stakeholders (e.g.
universities, cultural institutions,
media companies, civil society
etc.) would be served under one
umbrella, making it harder to tailor
32
funding calls to the specific needs
of the relevant sectors.
Economic impact132
– Impacts
on
competitiv
eness133
The continuity option would have positive
impacts, although with limited capacity to
respond to current and emerging challenges
to competitiveness. There are ongoing
positive impacts on costs and international
competitiveness of media organisations
through co-productions and cross-border
circulation of audiovisual content, and
blended equity instruments.134
Ongoing
positive impact on other cultural and creative
sectors includes networking, capacity-
building and sharing of good practices.
Opportunities for cross-sector innovation and
digital transformation (e.g., immersive
technologies, AI) are underexplored due to
limited synergies between programmes.
Continued contribution of EU funding for
basic skills will have a positive impact on
multifactor productivity growth: OECD
simulations assuming a gradual improvement
over 15 years show that increasing basic
skills by 25 PISA points could lead to a 0.5
pp higher average annual growth rate in EU
GDP in the long term.135
While it is difficult
to quantify the exact contribution of the
intervention, it is worth mentioning that 90%
of participants in Erasmus+ and the European
Solidarity Corps report increased skills and
The existing contribution to competitiveness will be increased
under Option 2 (See Annex 5). It will directly enhance the
international competitiveness of media and audiovisual
companies by continuing to promote cross-border circulation
of films and series and international co-productions137
but also
other types of content such as video games and immersive
content. It will also boost international audiences and
competitiveness by optimising intellectual property
exploitation across different media.138
It will boost innovation
capacity by better integrating support to innovation and skills
development. The existing blended equity instrument will be
strengthened and expanded to other copyright-intensive
sectors. International competitiveness is also strengthened by
reinforcing Europe’s attractiveness as a talent hub and
expanding global presence. Action towards news media
sectors would contribute to their financial viability, and thus,
their competitiveness. The expected administrative benefits
will allow beneficiaries for a higher access to funding.
Transversal intervention would bring in horizontal benefits,
such as applied innovation and new sectoral skills needs.
Option 2 has a greater potential to have a positive indirect
impact on competitiveness, as it would facilitate the access to
learning opportunities through a single entry point, in
particular for young people, and foster the development of the
skills needed for jobs.
– This option has potential for cross-
sector collaborations, greater
flexibility in funds allocation, but
this comes with certain limitations.
First, some specific sectors (e.g.,
audiovisual and cultural sectors)
may lose policy focus amid the
much broader range of objectives
and diverse beneficiaries. This
option risks weakening specialised
support mechanisms, such as to
distribution networks, sector-
specific international
collaborations. Overly
heterogeneous stakeholder base
could lead to challenges related to
prioritising different needs.
33
employability. As also stressed by the Draghi
report136
, in an evolving socio-economic
context, lifelong learning increases the
competitiveness of the economy by putting
stronger emphasis on continuous skills
development.
– Impacts
on
SMEs139
–
This option will have a moderately positive
impact on SMEs. Most Creative Europe
beneficiaries are SMEs, and the calls are
SMEs-targeted,140
hence to their benefit.
However, some limitations remain. This
includes administrative burden deriving from
fragmented support, application and
reporting costs. Continuous support to
learning mobility and cooperation actions
under Erasmus+ is expected, including in the
VET and adult learning sectors that reach out
to the highest rate of SMEs in the programme
and in flagship actions such as Centres of
vocational excellence or Alliances for
innovation.141
As far as VET is concerned,
continuous work on the attractiveness,
quality, inclusiveness of this sector has the
potential to increase SME’s competitiveness
in the economy, notably in view of the digital
and green transitions. 142
This option will have a strong and positive impact on SMEs
(based on the analysis in Annex 6). This comes from a list of
direct benefits, which are deemed to be enhanced by synergies
and complementarities, higher efficiency and effectiveness,
and harmonised and streamlined procedures, which will
enhance accessibility for SMEs.
Positive impacts are both for sectors currently covered by the
programmes as well as cross-media collaborations and
synergies and a wider range of SMEs covered by the
intervention (e.g. video games, news media). Strengthened
blended equity instruments will help increase financial
liquidity and reduce IP risks of SMEs.143
Simplified processes
(e.g., lump sums, national desks) and targeted support for
micro-enterprises and under-networked regions will help
mitigate previous access barriers.
– This option would have a
moderately positive impact. Some
of the existing benefits would
continue to be pursued, but they
could be limited by some
challenges. This stems from a
complex governance, which in
turn will increase administrative
burden for both the administration
and SMEs. In addition, the highly
heterogeneous nature of
beneficiaries might hinder the
accessibility of SMEs, due to a
potential overlook of their needs.
– Individual
s’
employabi
lity
Support to education and skills as per this
option will continue to have a positive direct
impact on individual’s employability as they
will keep supporting learning periods abroad
that develop skills (e.g. flexibility, resilience)
increasingly valued by companies144
. 83% of
Erasmus+ participants confirm improved
This option is likely to enhance benefits on individuals’
employability, indirectly also impacting EU’s
competitiveness and economy growth. In the evolving socio-
economic context, a merged programme bringing together
Erasmus+ and the Corps, would allow for more flexible
mobility pathways, enabling participants to combine
– Option 3 is likely to continue
generating benefits on individuals’
skills and employability while
possibly enhancing them.
34
competences useful for their studies or work
and 81% believe they have better career
opportunities. In addition, students with
experience in studying, working and
volunteering abroad have better academic
and career outcomes including higher
salaries145
. A large scale meta-analysis
showed that, on a global level, the private rate
of return on one extra year of schooling is on
average about 7% in Europe 146
, which is
significantly higher for people with medium-
level vocational education (84.9%) and those
with tertiary education (89.7%) as compared
for the low-educated (64.1%).147
PIAAC data
also demonstrate that basic skills cater to
economic outcomes. In the EU17, an increase
of skills by around 40 points (slightly less
than one skills level) is linked with an
increase in wages ranging from
approximately 5% in Denmark, Finland and
Italy to more than 10% in the UK.148
While
the contribution of the current instruments to
these projections is difficult to assess,
research papers also show that students with
experience in studying, working and
volunteering abroad have better academic
and career outcomes including higher
graduate salaries.149
The Erasmus+ Higher
Education impact study underlines as well
that Erasmus+ graduates report higher values
on the Job Quality Index, which measures
aspects of the current job such as job security,
career prospects.
educational, training, and volunteer experiences, leading to
more dynamic career prospects, increased employability of
participants, including by developing their language and
transversal skills or acting as a steppingstone towards a work
experience in another country.150
– In addition, as also stressed by the Draghi report, certification
of skills should become less reliant on formal education
attainment, and more flexible and granular. Under option 2,
by fostering cross sectoral cooperation under a unified
umbrella, the programme would support greater recognition
of skills across fields of formal, non-formal, informal
education as well as further support the certification of formal
and non-formal learning. In terms of sectoral skills for the
media and audiovisual sectors, Merger 1 will provide for
transversal actions, creating connectors across skills.
35
– Impacts
on costs
and
benefits
Each programme operates under its own
framework, fewer opportunities for inter-
programme synergy or joint actions. Some
areas (e.g. countering disinformation) are
object of scattered and/or unstructured
funding, limiting effectiveness and impact.
Fragmented systems and duplicated
structures lead to higher implementation and
transaction costs.
Direct benefits stem from reduced overlaps and
administrative burden through consolidation of structures,
shared platforms, fewer committees, savings at Commission,
national and beneficiary level. Option 2 brings streamlined
processes, single point of entry and harmonised rules for the
two proposed programmes, reduced application effort, better
support for low-capacity applicants. For instance, the merger
of Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps, will require
some initial adaptation for national authorities and
implementing bodies, but there would be a positive impact on
administrative costs and economies of scale in the long-term
perspective. It would facilitate removing the current
duplications at level of Commission’s and National Agencies’
programming, monitoring, reporting and supervision
processes, required by the financial rules, and enable full
standardisation of documents and procedures, streamlined
back office, improved co-ordination, more efficient use of
administrative resources151
.
– Limited additional efficiency
beyond Option 2, given the limited
number of stakeholders who
would benefit from a unified
approach in the two programmes.
In addition, benefits could be
offset by increased complexity and
reduced tailored accessibility.
High transition costs may arise due
to reorganisation of all systems,
brands and frameworks; risk of
disruptions and delays during
implementation. Single access
points may be too broad.
Environmental impact
– Environm
ental
impact152
– Overall limited environmental impact. Each
programme pursues some green initiatives
(e.g. green learning mobility, more
sustainable cultural and creative sectors;
MEDIA carbon calculator), contributing
marginally to climate goals.
– Positive, though modest, improvement compared to option 1.
Positive impacts can stem from easier to share best practices
on greening across sectors,potential for more projects
combining environmental themes (through joint calls) and
strengthening of the MEDIA carbon calculator.
– Similar benefits to Option 2.
Other impacts
– Impacts
on
digitalisati
on
– Under Option 1, there would be fragmented
digital sectorial transformation efforts across
programmes. Digital skills development will
be addressed separately with partial coverage
– Option 2 offers more coherent digital strategy across
education, skills, solidarity, youth aligned with sectoral needs.
Coherent investments in digital methods and platforms and
digital tools widen participation, including for marginalised
– The broad scope of Option 3 could
support transformation, risks
losing strategic focus and sectoral
depth. Digital skills potential
36
and lower scalability. There will be untapped
potential for education technologies and
digital innovation. Digital outreach improves
access but remains uneven, particularly for
those with fewer opportunities. Untapped
potential of digital uptake and innovation
shortcomings across the media sectors, as
well as in the other cultural and creative
sectors.153
groups, better accessibility features and outreach capacity.
Option 2 enables scaling pilots across Member States, also
addressing problem 3.
– In the area of media and audiovisual cross-platform synergies
in IP use and digital distribution (e.g. books/games/films)
supports transmedia storytelling and market reach. Option 2
would build on the success of the current programme,
allowing for cross-cutting support to digital transformation of
societal, cultural and media stakeholders.154
Option 2 also
simplifies processes and increases flexibility, allowing for a
horizontal intervention while keeping a sector-specific
approach.
maintained, but fragmented
sectorial implementation could
limit systemic coverage. Digital
tools: single interface possible but
risks becoming too complex or
generic, reducing ease of use.
Centralisation of digital platforms
could improve coverage but
confuse users due to lack of
thematic clarity. Dilution of cross-
cutting synergies among societal,
cultural and media organisations
within a larger pot of priorities and
beneficiaries.
– Impacts
on
fundamen
tal rights
and on
equality155
– Promotion of fundamental rights, equality
and non-discrimination through the set of
objectives of the CERV programme156
.
– Some limitations157
with insufficient scale or
coordination on the side of Creative Europe
and Erasmus+, or a funding gap for equality,
rights and gender equality, and for combating
violence against women, children and other
groups at risk on the side of the CERV
programme.
– Promotion of fundamental rights, equality and non-
discrimination continues through targeted actions, with
enhanced synergies and alignment with the political
guidelines. Stronger policy coherence (e.g., by
comprehensively addressing aspects related to equality and
AI bias).
– Risk that the focus on promotion
of fundamental rights, equality and
non-discrimination is diluted, with
larger programme diffusing
visibility and political signalling.
Stakeholder feedback confirms
that clear mandates and thematic
continuity are key to maintaining
legitimacy and operational
strength in the support to
fundamental rights and equality
(see Annex 2).
– Contributi
on to the
relevant
Sustainabl
e
Developm
– Contributions to the relevant SDGs through
the existing programmes. The analysis has
identified SDGs 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 16 and
17 as relevant for policies under this IA. (See
Annex 3, Table 3)
– On top of the baseline, this option provides more efficient
support to public access to information, thereby contributing
to indicators 16.10.1 (protection of journalists) and 16.10.2
(policy guarantees for public access to information).
– Similar as option 2.
37
ent Goals
(SDGs)158
38
7. HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE?
7.1. Description of the analysis’ methods
On top of the impacts presented in the table above, the policy options were compared by
applying the Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation (SMCE). The SMCE was deemed useful
due to the diversity of policies and interventions in the cluster. This analysis compares the
three options along four dimensions, namely effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and
proportionality. For each of these dimensions, a set of objectives were agreed upon,
reflecting the priorities outlined under General Objectives 1, 2 and 3 (see Figure below).
For each objective, a set of indicators was selected (39 indicators overall).
Figure 2: relationship between SMCE objectives and IA intervention logic
For each indicator, a score was given, evaluating the impact of the three policy options.
This was based on an expert assessment from the relevant Commission services, relying
on current sets of data presented in Annex I (Evidence, Sources and quality), and on results
of current evaluations, Spending Reviews, political guidelines and policy reports, studies,
OPC, and independent sectoral reports and surveys. The criterion scores were measured in
the following range: --- (the most negative), --, -, =, +, ++, +++ (the most positive). The
neutral score (=) was understood as the option not having impact on the assessed indicator,
or where the positive and negatives were seen as to balance out. A ranking was obtained,
under the assumption that all indicators have the same weight, by applying the SOCRATES
model.159
The robustness of results was checked by means of local and global sensitivity analyses.
It should however be acknowledged that data available was used for the triangulation of
the results to the extent possible, as there remain gaps at EU27 level. Annex 4 provides
39
further explanation of the methodology, the expert assessment, including argumentation
behind each criteria score, the sensitivity analysis, and the ranking of the policy options.
7.2. Results of the Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation (SMCE)
7.2.1 Effectiveness
Objective 1.1: continue to promote fundamental rights, EU values, democracy, media
and culture: Option 2 achieves strong score (++ across all) in reducing discrimination,
strengthening media independence and pluralism and tackling disinformation, enhancing
audiovisual content circulation and boosting civic engagement and participation, and
creating opportunities for cross-cutting innovation and sustainability of media, culture and
societal entities. It brings together key programmes in a way which will allow both policy
coherence and cooperation between beneficiaries working on areas like democracy, media,
and anti-discrimination efforts, while preserving sufficient thematic clarity to avoid
undermining dedicated objectives. The narrative coherence of Option 3 is less clear.
Although Option 3 has positive impact on each indicator, it risks diluting cultural,
democracy, and rights-focused programmes by absorbing them into a broad, less focused
framework with less clarity of goal. In contrast, the status quo (Option 1) offers strengths
in preserving specific objectives for areas like culture and prevention of violence, but it
fails to address fragmentation and underfunding in areas like media independence,
countering disinformation, and democratic participation.
Objective 1.2: continue to improve cross-border education and training, youth, sport,
and solidarity, contributing to skills for life and jobs: Concerning learning mobility,
transnational cooperation, lifelong learning, policy experimentation, and social
engagement, Option 2 stands out as the preferred alternative. Option 2 delivers clear added
value by fostering greater synergy between Erasmus + and European Solidarity Corps, by
supporting learning mobility (+) and lifelong learning (+) and enabling stronger
transnational cooperation (++). It also encourages policy experimentation (+) and
significantly enhances social engagement via education and solidarity (++). In contrast,
while Option 3 shows some potential advantages in terms of support to mobility (++) and
lifelong learning (+), it risks dilution and loss of coherence in key areas such as
transnational cooperation and policy experimentation. At the same time, Option 1 largely
maintains the status quo with limited progress (=), and with a negative impact on policy
experimentation and development (-).
Objective 1.3: Addressing linked EU challenges: Considering the contribution to
democracy and competitiveness, Option 2 emerges as the strongest and most balanced
choice. While all options score positively in enhancing democracy and competitiveness,
Option 2 offers a notable improvement in policy coherence and alignment with EU
priorities on democracy. Specifically, Option 2 (++) enhances democracy via two areas –
one focused on rights, values, media, and democracy, and another on skills, education, and
solidarity – ensuring tailored approaches for both. This option provides a closer alignment
with two priorities outlined in the political guidelines for the new mandate (i.e., Protecting
democracy, upholding values and increased societal resilience; and the Union of Skills).
In contrast, Option 3, also scoring highly (++), contributes to democracy through many
different angles than the baseline, but risk diluting priorities and losing focus due to the
complexity and broad scope of a full integration model. For competitiveness, Option 2
(++) scores the highest, as it enables economies of scale without undermining the specific
objectives of key programmes, whereas Option 3 risks weakening the focus on
40
competitiveness due to fragmented priorities (+). Status quo has a positive but still limited
contribution to democracy (+) and competitiveness (+).
Objective 1.4: Improve cooperation: Both Option 2 (Objective-based consolidation) and
Option 3 (Full integration) outperform the status quo (which is limited by legal basis and
fragmented funding) in terms of cooperation between EC services and agencies (+),
cooperation between institutions/organisations in EU Member States (+), transnational
cooperation within EU, and potentiality to integrate inter-related projects (++). However,
Option 2 is deemed more efficient than Option 3 in terms of cooperation between EU and
Third Countries (+), due to avoiding additional governance requirements and coordination
costs associated with full integration (Option 3).
Objective 1.5: Foster coordination of main policy areas: Option 2 stands out as the most
balanced and effective approach in fostering coordination of main policy areas. While
Option 1 would have a positive impact in continuity (+), it has a low flexibility between
programmes (-) and does not prevent the dilution of policy goals (=). Option 3 offers the
highest flexibility (++), but this comes at the cost of significant risks to continuity (--) and
potential dilution of policy objectives (-). In contrast, Option 2 strikes an effective balance;
it introduces valuable flexibility (+) to respond to emerging policy needs, although
maintains a low risk to continuity (-), and strengthens the alignment of planning with policy
goals (+).
7.2.2 Efficiency
Objective 2.1: Improve efficiency for applicants and beneficiaries: In terms of
accessibility, time required and administrative burdens for beneficiaries, Option 2 emerges
as the most favourable approach. It scored the highest for ease of access (++) given the
expected simplifying procedures without introducing excessive complexity, unlike Option
3 (+), where the full integration risks making requirements heterogeneous for certain calls.
Both Option 2 and 3 reduces the time required for applications (+) thanks to streamlined
calls, but Option 2 has a more positive impact in reducing the administrative burdens for
beneficiaries (+). Although both Option 2 and 3 might imply administrative complexities,
in the case of Option 2, these are offset by introduced administrative simplifications,
whereas Option 3 does not sufficiently counterbalance its added complexity (=).
Objective 2.2: Improve efficiency at EU level: From a governance and implementation
standpoint, Option 2 delivers meaningful simplifications without the excessive complexity
introduced by a full integration under Option 3. It is expected that Option 2 reduces the
number of FTEs (+), although Option 3 offers a higher reduction in FTEs in long run (++).
Option 2 scores the highest (++) among the alternatives in streamlining types of
management (direct and indirect) as it would lead clusters to broadly align with existing
management structures, whereas Option 3 risks of mixing different types of management
modes (-). In terms of impact on comitology, Option 2 would lead to a slight improvement
compared to status quo/Option 1 (+) due to fewer programme committees. Conversely, in
Option (3), there would be too much heterogeneity for committee members, leading to a
negative impact (-). The status quo, by comparison, offers no improvements (=) and
maintains fragmented, less efficient governance.
7.2.3 Coherence
Objective 3.1: Promote synergies and complementarities: Option 2 has the best
prospects in promoting synergies and complementarities. Both Option 2 and Option 3
would improve synergies and complementarities between clusters, compared to the status
41
quo (+). Within the cluster, synergies and complementarities would be achieved more
under Option 2 (++), by enabling organic synergies with logical groupings. Option 3 risks
creating links that dilute coherence (+). In terms of synergies with national and regional
policies, both Option 2 and 3 offer improvements (+) over the status quo (=). Moreover,
Option 3 would have the highest flexibility in rechannelling funds (++), while Option 2
provides a meaningful but more moderate increase (+) compared to the rigid status quo (-
). In reduction of overlaps, Option 2 is the strongest (++), having a structured way to reduce
overlaps while maintaining policy focus; Option 3 risks introducing dilution despite some
overlap reduction (+).
7.2.4 Proportionality
Objective 4.1: Improve reactiveness to new challenges: In terms of reactiveness to new
challenges, Option 2 consistently emerges as the most suitable alternative across all
criteria. Option 2 is the most effective in addressing each of the specific problem drivers
(++), as new areas are covered (which are currently not addressed by existing
programmes), and overlaps are avoided. Option 2 also stands out by addressing some of
the unaddressed policy objectives (++) and allows to sufficiently priorities each of the main
policy areas (++), such as those addressed by the Political guidelines (‘Promoting our
democracies and upholding our values’, the Union of Skills, etc.). In contrast, Option 3
introduces risks of fragmentation and complexity, weakening its capacity to address
problem drivers (+), effectively addressing specific objectives (=), and maintaining clear
policy priorities (=). Meanwhile, the status quo under Option 1 is the weakest (- across all
criteria), being limited by existing legal bases and an inability to cover emerging policy
areas such as media and countering disinformation.
Objective 4.2: Minimise risk: Option 1 and Option 2 register the same score in terms of
minimising risks. In terms of risk of loss of customised approaches to (policy) specific
needs and target groups, Option 2 offers a clear advantage (++) by enabling better
delineation of policy boundaries and improved alignment between EU policy priorities and
funding. In contrast, Option 3 risks excessive heterogeneity by merging highly diverse
target groups and beneficiaries (-), leading to challenges in addressing the distinct needs
of groups as varied as Erasmus+ students and business in the media sector. The status quo
already functions reasonably well in targeting (+), however, without the added clarity and
coordination provided by Option 2. Regarding the risk of losing established programme
branding and visibility among target audiences, the status quo maintains the strongest
position (+). Option 2 entails some loss of visibility for programmes well known to the
public (-); Option 3 introduces the highest risks in this criterion (--), with larger
programmes possibly eroding the identity of smaller programmes.
7.3. How do the options compare?
The ranking of the social and economic impacts (SMCE) is thus:
First Second Third
Objective-based
merger (Option 2)
Full integration of all
programmes (Option 3)
Status Quo
(Option 1)
Third ranked option. The “continuity” option would build on the achievements of the
current programmes under this cluster and incrementally improve their implementation,
42
while maintaining the current architecture. While the programmes benefit from well-
established brands, which would continue ensuring visibility and recognition among target
groups, this option would not be fully aligned with the Political Guidelines for 2024-2029,
nor with the ambition set for the next Multiannual Financial Framework to build a more
focused, simpler and more flexible EU budget. This option would not build synergies
between programmes and would lack the flexibility to address new challenges. It would
continue to rely on a multiplicity of implementation modes, work programmes, and
stakeholder relations, including those with non-EU countries (e.g. on mobility of students
and young volunteers).
Second ranked option. The “full integration” option would generate efficiency gains by
streamlining relevant implementation processes and enhancing coordination. It would also
offer flexibility. However, despite these potential benefits, several downsides must be
considered. The new and growing focus on supporting democratic and societal resilience
might be overshadowed by the skills and education component and differing budget shares
within the cluster. It might result in lesser focus being put on enhancing democracy and
respect of rights, the rule of law, and EU values. The option might more generally result
in less tailored approaches to specific needs and target groups and make it more
challenging to combine EU spending with the right policy tools, as the combination of all
the policies significantly widens the spread of EU activities involved. This option is
unlikely to provide significant extra synergies compared to option 2, due to different
management modes, varying degree of EU competences, and different constituencies.
Existing stakeholders might find it challenging to adapt to such an all-encompassing
merger, which in addition might negatively impact brand recognition and the visibility of
EU interventions.
First ranked option. The objectives-based merger achieved the best scoring on all four
dimensions of the SMCE (effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and proportionality), being
the highest ranked option in nine out of the ten SMCE objectives160
and in 21 out of the 39
criteria161
. Conversely, this objectives-based merger registered negative scores for just 2
out of the 39 criteria considered.
• From the standpoint of effectiveness, Option 2 offers an optimal balance between
greater integration and the preservation of policy-specific objectives. First, it
strengthens cooperation, consolidating relationships between EU, Member States and
third countries, and enhancing cooperation among Commission services. Secondly, by
allowing greater adaptability within its defined policy areas, it overcomes the current
rigidity of the status quo while maintaining clear thematic boundaries and preventing
policy dilution that may occur under option 3. Finally, this option enhances the
contribution to the political priorities.
• In terms of efficiency, option 2 strikes a balance between simplifying processes and
keeping operational complexity manageable. It would ease access and reduce
administrative burdens for stakeholders through harmonisation of documentation, calls
and processes. Option 2 would also better consolidate existing programmes under
common management modes. This would allow implementing bodies to work within
familiar operational models, while preserving clarity of roles and responsibilities.
Likewise, the same agencies would be working on the same clusters (or parts of them),
following the same implementation logic.
• From the perspective of coherence, option 2 would create meaningful and targeted
synergies and complementarities, bridging gaps while reducing overlaps between
funding and policy objectives. In terms of synergies with other EU programmes, the
43
more focused structure of option 2 would make it less prone to inefficiencies or
conflicting priorities and create new opportunities for alignment, for instance with
programmes in shared management. Option 2 brings important benefits in rechanneling
funds for evolving policy needs.
• Lastly, in terms of proportionality, option 2 strikes a balance between 1) flexibility to
react to new challenges by enabling reallocation of resources and 2) addressing specific
problem drivers and policy objectives. Clearer lines of accountability and strategy due
to the grouping by objectives and management modes would increase the performance
and impact of these policy priorities. At the same time, this option presents only minor
risks of loss of customised approaches to policy-specific needs and target groups. To
address the concerns related to brand recognition, a way forward could allow for strands
of actions within programmes, to preserve brands and identity of the policies.
8. PREFERRED OPTION
The evidence gathered shows that option 2 (“objective-based consolidation”) offers
better potential compared to the two alternatives and the discarded options. This option
allows for reinforced coordination, targeted flexibility, and a more impactful use of the EU
budget – without sacrificing policy focus or accessibility. It offers the optimal balance
between simplification and policy relevance. It is congruent with stakeholders’ calls, who
ask for the simplification of access to funding, flexibility of resource allocation and the
application of common rules (see Annex 2).
The option follows a ‘funding-follows-policy’ principle, clustering the programmes
around the most salient and core policy-related challenges. It will build on the success of
current programmes, best practices of the current MFF, as evidenced by evaluations, better
addressing transnational and common challenges, filling funding gaps at Member States
level, and enhancing coherence between internal and external policies, while enhancing
synergies, efficiency and effectiveness, and reducing overlaps. It will simplify operations
and enable a rationalisation of resources by streamlining work programmes and developing
harmonised rules as well as reporting and monitoring mechanisms. It will pay due visibility
to each of the policy areas under this IA.
Further information on this option is presented in Annex 3 (Table 1, expected benefits) and
Annex 11 (with examples of how proposed actions would contribute to the new policy
priorities).
9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?
This initiative will be monitored through the performance framework for the post-2027
budget, which is examined in a separate impact assessment. The performance framework
provides for an implementation report during the implementation phase of the programme,
as well as a retrospective evaluation to be carried out in accordance with Article 34(3) of
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509. The evaluation shall be conducted in accordance
with the Commission's Better Regulation Guidelines and will be based on indicators
relevant to the objectives of the programmes.
Logical links between specific objectives and areas of intervention and examples of how
success will be measured, are illustrated in Annex 10.
44
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION
Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references
The lead DGs are (alphabetical order) CNECT, EAC and JUST.
There is no DECIDE Planning reference number.
The proposals for the post-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework are listed as Item 44 in
Annex I of the Commission Work Programme 2025, under the headline “Delivering
together and preparing our Union for the future”.
Organisation and timing
This impact assessment was coordinated by an Inter-Service Steering Group (ISSG),
involving the following Commission services: Secretariat-General (SG); Legal Service
(SJ); Directorate-General for Budget (BUDG); Directorate-General for Communications
Networks, Content and Technology (CNECT); Directorate-General for Education, Youth,
Sport and Culture (EAC); Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and
Inclusion (EMPL); Eurostat (ESTAT); Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry,
Entrepreneurship and SMEs (GROW); Joint Research Centre (JRC); Directorate-General
for Justice and Consumers (JUST); Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy
(REGIO); Reform and Investment Task Force (SG REFORM).
The Inter-Service Steering Group met four times in 2025: 28 January, 21 February, 17
March, and 15 May. It was consulted throughout the different steps of the impact
assessment process, notably on the questionnaire for the open public consultation and the
draft staff working document.
The IA is based on an extensive desk review, including the results of the midterm-
evaluations for 2021-2027 and ex post evaluations for 2014-2020 for the programmes
within the scope of this initiatives. The report is underpinned by a broad public consultation
(no call for evidence). The analysis of the policy options is based in particular on a Social
Multi-Criteria Evaluation (SOCRATES) model developed and carried out by the Joint
Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission.
Consultation of the RSB
The draft report was submitted to the RSB on 21 May 2025 and was discussed by the Board
on 11 June 2025. The RSB gave an opinion to the impact assessment on 13 June 2025.
RSB made a series of comments and recommendations on scope, problem definition and
the use of evaluations, intervention logic and objectives, comparison of options and cost-
benefit analysis, governance, coherence and future monitoring and evaluation. The text of
the IA has been adjusted taking into account the comments made by the RSB.
Table: Overview of the RSB board’s recommendations addressed
The text of this Impact Assessment (IA) has been adjusted taking into account the
comments made by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and its recommendations. The IA was
revised further to these comments. The following table provides information on how the
RSB comments, when possible, were integrated in the text.
RSB recommendation Justification
“On scope: The report does
not explain why other EU
funding instruments
The reviewed IA includes further explanations in Chapter 1 on
why other EU funding instruments do not fall within the scope of
this initiative. Coherence with other instruments and MFF clusters
45
addressing the same policy
priorities and objectives as
this MFF cluster, do not
fall within the scope of this
initiative.”
will be further pursued, notably with national envelopes, future
programmes on competitiveness, research and innovation.
Annex 11 of the report has been expanded with an additional table
showing that the architecture is conducive to an effective delivery
of the policy objectives.
Annex 8, on evaluations, shows that the current EU intervention
in these policy areas is broadly successful. At the same time, the
new table prepared under Annex 9 (cfr. Below) shows how some
of the problems are new, requiring new and enhanced responses.
“On the problem
definition and on the use
of evaluations: The report
should clearly state the
degrees of uncertainty in
the conclusions from prior
evaluations of individual
programmes and how
strongly the conclusions
are supported by a reliable
evidence base, taking also
into account opinions from
the RSB.”
A new table was included in Annex 9 to respond to the
recommendations related to the problem definition, providing
greater clarity. The table addresses the Board’s recommendation
regarding the types of problem drivers (new or recurrent; social,
market vs. regulatory), as well as the magnitude of gaps. The
second column of the table classifies the policy-related problem
drivers, as either new or recurrent. The third column describes the
type of problem driver (societal, market, vs. regulatory), and also
indicates which drivers are perceived as shortcomings of already
existing public interventions. The fourth column provides
examples of gaps, drawing on evaluations or other data sources.
Chapter 1, Annex 8 (on the results of the evaluations) and the
newly added table in Annex 9, which contextualises the problem
definition in Chapter 2, draw on data and results from evaluations,
and show how and to what extent, existing challenges have been
addressed through the current programmes.
We acknowledge that discussion on how to ensure synergies
between different MFF clusters to address common challenges is
still ongoing. At the time of finalising this document, consultations
are still in progress.
“On the intervention logic
and objectives: The report
does not explain the
magnitude of the gaps and
market failures to be
addressed. The proposed
objectives are not
S.M.A.R.T.”
The reviewed IA presents the magnitude of gaps and market
failures in a newly created table under Annex 9. However, the
broad and diverse scope of problem drivers and challenges across
a variety of policy areas makes prioritisation particularly complex,
taking also into account that the size of the financial envelopes
allocated to this cluster has still to be determined.
The reviewed IA addressed the recommendation: “describe the
objectives in S.M.A.R.T. terms to define the success and to
facilitate monitoring and evaluation”. Two new tables were added
under Annex 10, which provide a detailed list of examples of
output and/or result indicators to measure how success would look
like. The tables were prepared to show causal links of areas of
intervention, per policy-related specific objective.
As regards the point on “how the proposed options address
general objectives 1 and 2”, the justification under the Social
46
Multi-Criteria Evaluation (SMCE) addresses this aspect. More
specifically, objectives 1 and 2 under the effectiveness dimension
of the evaluation model are directly aligned to general objectives
1 and 2 of the IA, showcasing that Option 2 best contributes to the
objectives. At the same time, the justification under indicator
4.1.2. ‘Ability to address each of the specific programme
objectives’ under the proportionality dimension of the SMCE
further explains how the proposed options address general
objectives 1 and 2.
Annex 11 of the Impact Assessment provides examples of
synergies across objectives (e.g., in the area of disinformation and
media literacy).
“On comparison of
options and cost-benefit
analysis: The report does
not adequately assess the
costs and benefits of the
options.”
The amended IA has strengthened Chapter 6 on comparison of
options by including additional endnotes, building on a broader
range of data points from the existing evaluations, public and
stakeholders’ consultations, and other data sources. It also
provides a clearer distinction between direct and indirect impacts.
The new table included in Annex 10 on monitoring and evaluation
outlines key areas of intervention, highlighting which aspects
would be central for each key policy area.
Success of policies across different areas remains closely linked to
the size of the financial envelope allocated to this cluster, which
has yet to be determined.
The IA did not provide additional analysis of administrative costs
and quantitative benefits given that the size of the financial
envelope allocated to this cluster, has yet to be determined.
“On governance: The
report does not sufficiently
describe the governance
mechanisms.”
Governance issues, which were partly addressed in the Social
Multi-Criteria Evaluation (e.g. comitology), have been further
strengthened in Annex 4 of the Impact Assessment, and provides
more detailed explanations on the overall methodology.
Annex 11 was reviewed and includes a visual presentation of the
architecture and objectives of the future programme bringing
together Creative Europe and CERV.
The decisions on the future internal governance are a prerogative
of the European Commission, and as such beyond the scope of the
impact assessments accompanying the MFF.
“On coherence: The report
does not sufficiently
specify how the proposed
initiative links with other
parts of the post-2027
MFF, such as National
Chapter 1 of the reviewed IA provides further explanations on the
rationale behind the cluster.
As explained in Point 1, coherence with other instruments and
MFF clusters will be further pursued, notably with national
envelopes, future programmes on competitiveness, research and
innovation.
47
Envelopes and
Competitiveness Fund.”
“On future monitoring
and evaluation: The
report is not clear what
monitoring and evaluation
arrangements will be put in
place to measure the
achievement of the
initiative’s objectives and
how the Performance and
Monitoring framework
would be implemented in
this case.”
Monitoring and evaluation arrangements are addressed
horizontally for all MFF proposals under a dedicated impact
assessment.
The amended AI includes two new tables in Annex 10 clarifying
the links between specific objectives, and areas of intervention and
providing examples of indicators on how success will be
measured.
The Impact Assessment has been further adapted to take into account the latest comments
received from other Commission services during consultations leading to the adoption of
the new MFF programme proposals.
Evidence, sources and quality
The impact assessment is based on several sources, including those listed hereafter (non-
exhaustive list):
• Report on the ex-post evaluation of the Rights, Equality and Citizenship (REC)
programme (second part), the ex-post evaluation of the Europe for Citizens (EfC)
programme, and the interim evaluation of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values
(CERV) programme.
• Report on the ex-post evaluation of the 2014-2020 Justice programme and interim
evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme.
• The final evaluation of the 2014-2020 Creative Europe programme and interim
evaluation of the 2021-2027 Creative Europe programme.
• The final evaluation of the 2014-2020 Erasmus+ programme and the interim
evaluation of the 2021-2027 Erasmus+ programme.
• The final evaluation of the 2018-2020 European Solidarity Corps programme and
interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 programme.
• Spending review for the 2021-207 multiannual financial framework.
• Mario Draghi’s report on the future of EU competitiveness.
• Enrico Letta’s report on the future of the Single Market.
• Niinistö Report on Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and
Readiness.
• Results of Standard Eurobarometers; results of Special Eurobarometers as
referenced in the footnotes
• The Open Public Consultation, carried out between 12 February 2025 and 7 May
2025.
• The Media Industry Outlook SWD European Commission (to be published early
July).
48
• The analysis of the impacts was carried out with the Social Multi-criteria
Evaluation (SOCRATES) model developed by the Joint Research Centre.
SOCRATES (SOcial multi CRiteria AssessmenT of European policieS) is a
multiple criteria assessment software tool, explicitly designed for ex-ante Impact
Assessment (IA) problems162
. Details of the analysis are presented in Chapter 7 and
Annex 4.
49
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION
Introduction
This report provides a detailed overview of stakeholder participation in the Open Public
Consultation (OPC), which informed the impact assessment for EU programmes in the domains
of cross-border education, youth, culture, media, values and civil society under the post-2027
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Conducted between 12 February and 7 May 2025,
the OPC was designed in line with the European Commission's standards for consultation and
aimed to ensure inclusiveness, transparency, and evidence-based policymaking.
In total, the consultation gathered 5,845 valid replies. The consultation was structured around
133 closed questions and four open-ended questions, and participants were also invited to
submit supporting materials such as position papers, analyses, and practical testimonies. A total
of 383 attachments were submitted. These inputs helped assess public perception of programme
relevance, EU added value, barriers to impact, and potential improvements to programme
architecture. The wide scope and accessibility of the questionnaire allowed for a nuanced data
set that reflects a diversity of lived experiences, professional assessments, and institutional
capacities across sectors and countries.
Methodology
The analysis and synthesis presented in this annex was developed through a structured and
iterative process combining both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the OPC. The
extraction of key thematic clusters was informed by three primary data streams: (1) aggregate
response trends to closed questions, (2) disaggregated data by respondent type, age, and
geography, and (3) content analysis of 383 attached documents and open-text answers.
Quantitative data from the OPC questionnaire were processed using dashboards provided by
the Joint Research Centre (JRC), dashboards developed by DG EAC (Qlik) which enabled
segmentation by respondent category and geographic origin, as well as other categories.
Response rates for each question and dimension were evaluated based on Likert-scale
responses. Items scoring consistently above 60% across both citizens and organisations were
flagged for inclusion as broadly endorsed priorities. Cross-tabulations were used to identify
divergence or reinforcement patterns by age (especially under-30s), stakeholder type (NGOs,
academic institutions, public authorities, SMEs), and regional clusters (Eastern vs. Western
Europe).
Qualitative analysis was carried out using a combination of AI-assisted text mining and manual
coding. Open-text submissions and attachments were run through a dual-model NLP pipeline
(informed by values, emotion, sentiment, and keyword clustering) to identify recurring themes
and positions. Manual validation ensured thematic accuracy and representative phrasing of
cited quotes. Contributions advocating structural reforms (e.g. simplification, funding scale-
up, integrated campuses) were tracked and tagged with frequency indicators, then cross-
checked against closed-question alignment. This triangulated methodology ensured that the
analysis distils stakeholder sentiment in a transparent, proportionate, and evidence-grounded
manner—aligned with Better Regulation Tool #54.
50
Demographics
Overall participation
51
The public consultation received 5,845 responses.
Responses were relatively evenly split between individuals and organisations. Just under half
(2,780) were submitted by EU citizens. Within this group, around 1,372 respondents were
under the age of 30, meaning that nearly half of citizen participants came from a younger
demographic. This demographic had a particularly high level of engagement with questions
concerning solidarity, mobility, digital transition, and democratic values, and their views will
be revisited in later analytical sections through the lens of the Commission's Youth Check
priorities. Additionally, 169 respondents (3%) declared themselves as non-EU citizens.
The remaining 2,896 responses (50%) were submitted by organisations and institutions. These
included 952 submissions from academic and research bodies, making up 16% of all responses.
The majority of these institutions were large in size, with 69% employing more than 250
people. Another 835 submissions came from non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
representing 14% of the total number of respondents to the consultation but with several of
them representing either large quantities of individuals or representing themselves several other
organisations (e.g. umbrella networks of civil society organisations or representing the interests
of various cultural and creative sectors). Roughly half of the NGO respondents reported that
they were micro-organisations with fewer than ten employees.
Public authorities accounted for 317 submissions, including a mix of international, national,
regional, and local entities. A further 259 responses came from companies and businesses,
especially those active in the culture, media, and audiovisual sectors. A small number of
responses (123) were received from trade unions, business associations, consumer groups, and
environmental organisations. These groups often contributed through both survey replies and
technical attachments outlining sector-specific needs.
Geographically, participation spanned 110 countries, with EU Member States a accounting for
94% of all contributions. Germany submitted the largest number of responses, contributing
2,228 in total (38% of all replies). Among these, 1,302 were from citizens (including 862 from
citizens under 30), and 926 from organisations. A notable concentration of responses occurred
between 10 and 13 March 2025, potentially indicating a coordinated mobilisation campaign.
Italy and France were the next most represented Member States, each accounting for around
552 and 467 responses (or 9% and 8% of the total respectively). The remaining EU Member
States together submitted approximately 2,253 responses. Participation from outside the EU
totalled 345 responses, or 6% of the total. Ukraine was the most represented third country,
contributing 41 responses (0.7%). This international component is of interest not only for its
scale, but for the qualitative focus of the submissions, which often related to EU values,
enlargement, and external action.
Youth engagement stood out as a strong feature of this consultation. About 50% of citizen
respondents were under the age of 30, and this age group consistently expressed strong support
for funding initiatives that promote democratic engagement, equality, mobility, and civic
cooperation. Their feedback aligned well with the Commission’s strategic focus areas for
youth, including those highlighted under the Youth Check initiative. Their engagement also
demonstrated a high level of awareness and investment in the values-based and cross-border
elements of EU programming. In addition to this, responses from youth organisations and
informal youth groups (especially within the NGO category) emphasised the importance of
accessibility, digital inclusion, and opportunities for direct co-creation in programme design.
52
Several called for greater recognition of non-formal learning outcomes and closer integration
of volunteering, civic service, and mobility schemes.
Among the 383 attachments submitted, 189 came from NGOs, 38 from academic or research
institutions, and about 26 from public authorities. The remaining 130 came from umbrella
organisations or networks representing youth groups, media stakeholders, and cultural or civil
society sectors. These documents took various forms—formal position papers, project
assessments, or thematic policy proposals. A number of them came from established EU-level
platforms and civil society coalitions, while others were submitted by local or regional
organisations. In several cases, contributions included detailed examples of successful or
problematic project experiences under Erasmus+, Creative Europe, CERV, and related
programmes. Collectively, these contributions enriched the consultation’s quantitative findings
by providing deeper, context-specific insight into stakeholder challenges and ideas for
programme reform. They also revealed areas of emerging policy interest, such as the
intersection between cultural participation and democratic resilience, or the role of mobility
and volunteering in inclusion and labour market integration.
Justification for the validity of results
A key methodological consideration was the substantial share of responses originating from
Germany, which represented 38% of the total submissions (2,228 out of 5,845 responses). This
figure is notably higher than Germany’s share of the EU population (approximately 18%) and
far exceeds the expected range of 15–20% based on previous consultations. Given the
demographic weight of German respondents, a detailed analysis was conducted to assess
whether this disproportionality might have introduced bias into the overall consultation
findings.
To examine this issue, responses from Germany were statistically compared with the responses
submitted from all other countries combined. The analysis focused on the proportion of
answers selecting the most positive categories—"very important" or "to a large extent"—across
all closed questions (133 in total), and more specifically for the seven main policy clusters
assessed in the questionnaire.
The data were analysed using dashboards created by the JRC in Tableau, enabling
segmentation by country and cross-comparison by question. The key indicator used was the
similarity in ranking and distribution of positive responses between German respondents and
the aggregate of other EU countries. If significant discrepancies were found in how Germany
answered compared to the rest of the EU, it would raise the possibility that the overall results
were being skewed. However, the analysis revealed a high level of alignment.
The distribution of answers from German respondents did not diverge meaningfully from pan-
European trends in either absolute values or relative importance. The overrepresentation was
found to be largely quantitative rather than qualitative in nature. Additionally, there was no
evidence of coordinated campaigning or form responses, and no single narrative or agenda
dominated the free-text submissions or attachments from Germany. The peak in responses
between 10 and 13 March 2025 – when 851 entries were received – prompted a further quality
check. However, closer examination revealed this spike did not correspond to identical answers
or suspicious response patterns. Instead, it is likely the result of increased awareness and
mobilisation by youth and academic networks, which remain consistent with open democratic
participation. A similar pattern occurred in the previous MFF OPC in 2018, suggesting that
53
mid-campaign outreach or advocacy events can sometimes generate temporary surges in
responses.
In conclusion, while the high share of responses from Germany initially raised a
methodological flag, robust internal controls and comparative analysis confirmed that this did
not compromise the representativeness or interpretability of the OPC data. The consultation
findings can therefore be considered valid and reflective of broader stakeholder perspectives
across the EU. Germany’s higher turnout should be interpreted as a reflection of greater
awareness and mobilisation within the country rather than a source of analytical distortion.
These findings reinforce the overall credibility of the evidence base supporting this impact
assessment.
Respondent’s views on policy priorities
Question 1/7 – How important are these policy priorities to you?
54
The responses to Question 1 reveal a clear affirmation of the EU’s continued role in fostering
cross-border cooperation and supporting democratic and social objectives. Among answers,
“support for study/training abroad” was ranked as “very important” by 81% of citizens and
70% of organisations. This priority was frequently tied to the broader theme of long-term
investment in skills, employability, and European identity. Respondents linked learning
mobility not only with educational benefit but with social integration, civic engagement, and
labour market readiness. Many referenced the role of EU funding in supporting student
exchanges, vocational training, language learning, and cross-border partnerships as levers for
developing a more inclusive and competitive society. Similarly, “protect democracy, promote
democratic standards” received 80% support among citizens and 72% among organisations,
showing high convergence between individual and institutional stakeholders. Respondents saw
democratic protection as a foundation for participation, rule of law, and social trust – frequently
noting the link between educational investment and democratic resilience. Several
contributions argued that inclusive access to learning, critical thinking, and civic education are
essential pillars in safeguarding European democratic systems.
Geographic variations
Some differences in emphasis emerged based on respondent geography:
• Respondents from Eastern and Southern Europe more frequently rated EU action in
education, youth mobility, and inclusion as "very important," reflecting structural
inequalities and a higher dependency on EU funding.
• Western and Northern countries placed relatively more emphasis on excellence, innovation,
and internationalisation.
• Respondents from non-EU countries (notably Ukraine, Western Balkans) emphasised the
EU’s role in solidarity, external cooperation, and value promotion. This was particularly
evident in open responses highlighting expectations of the EU as a democratic partner.
55
Natural patterns in priority attribution
Statistical correlation analysis revealed consistent and statistically significant groupings among
priority responses, highlighting interlinked policy preferences cutting across stakeholder
categories. Looking at response matrices for closed-question data, several clusters emerged,
indicating how respondents evaluated related priorities.
• Respondents who rated study/training abroad as highly important (78%) also tended to
prioritise policies promoting cross-border cooperation (88%), language learning
opportunities (77%) mutual recognition of qualifications (75%), and cooperation with
non-EU countries (65%), but also stressed the importance of protecting democracy and
promoting democratic standards (79%) and fundamental/human rights (73%). This
cluster reflects a mobility-driven integration logic.
• Those who prioritised democracy and civic participation (62%) also prioritised support
for fundamental rights (84%), grassroots civil society organisations (77%), as well as
media pluralism and independence (76%), suggesting a coherent rights-based
governance cluster. These preferences were especially pronounced among NGOs,
youth organisations, and respondents from countries experiencing civic space
contraction.
• Respondents who assigned high scores to youth participation also showed strong
affinity (at least 60%) for non-formal education, access to cultural life, and media
literacy training. This reflects a participatory empowerment cluster linking civic and
cultural engagement.
These patterns suggest a coherent internal logic in how stakeholders understand and connect
EU policy priorities, reinforcing the notion that programme effectiveness in one area (e.g.
mobility) depends on complementary support in others (e.g. recognition frameworks, inclusive
access, civic rights). This correlation-based clustering substantiates the case for maintaining
synergies across programmes that contribute from complementary perspectives to overall
policy objectives.
Qualitative reflections from open text contributions
Narrative responses and attachments frequently expanded on the policy priorities identified in
Question 1. For example:
• Many NGOs stressed that inclusion and participation are not only desirable goals but
preconditions for democratic legitimacy and societal cohesion.
• Academic networks spoke of the transformative potential of transnational cooperation
and student/staff mobility to foster European identity and institutional innovation.
• Media contributors warned that without greater protection for journalism and media
pluralism, democratic erosion could become irreversible.
• Several youth-led submissions demanded that the EU go beyond tokenistic youth
engagement and instead mainstream youth participation into all areas of policymaking,
monitoring, and implementation.
56
Analysis of obstacles preventing the EU budget from delivering on its objectives (Q6)
Question 6/7 – To what extent do you see the following as obstacles that prevent the EU budget
from fully delivering on its objectives in these policy areas?
Respondents were asked to evaluate to what extent specific obstacles hinder performance,
including administrative burden, complex funding rules, fragmentation, lack of flexibility, and
delays. Respondents generally welcomed the Commission’s focus on greater efficiency in
57
funding, and advocated to keep “identity” and “trust”, preserving thematic clarity and
stakeholder ownership of the interventions. This section provides an in-depth analysis of Q6,
based on 5,845 total responses, distinguishing between different respondent groups (citizens
vs. organisations), stakeholder types, regional origin, and age group. It also integrates insights
from qualitative responses and statistical correlations to unpack how obstacles interact and
what implications they hold for policy design.
Quantitative results show that the most frequently cited obstacles across all groups were
administrative burden (identified by 52% of citizens and 58% of organisations) and complex,
fund-specific compliance rules (50% of citizens and 53% of organisations). These issues
reflect concerns not only with regulatory complexity but also with fragmentation between
instruments and inefficiencies in delivery.
Additional barriers included lack of flexibility to reallocate resources in response to emerging
needs (32% of citizens and 32% of organisations), delays in programme implementation and
funding disbursement, and insufficient communication or clarity about funding opportunities.
Public authorities and NGOs in particular emphasised delays as a source of reduced impact and
local credibility.
Variation by stakeholder type
Disaggregated analysis reveals significant differences in the perception of obstacles based on
stakeholder identity, with each type of respondent highlighting distinct structural and
procedural challenges that hinder their participation and impact.
• NGOs and micro-organisations were consistently the most vocal about the administrative
burden and procedural complexity. 66% of small NGOs rated these issues as "to a large
extent" problematic. These organisations often operate with limited staffing, rely heavily
on volunteers, and lack dedicated financial management expertise. The reporting
requirements and co-financing rules were seen as disproportionate to their operational
capacity, particularly for smaller grants. Many NGOs also expressed concern about
unstable funding timelines and shifting eligibility rules that added unpredictability to
project planning.
• Academic institutions, particularly large universities and university alliances were more
concerned with systemic inefficiencies across funding programmes. While acknowledging
bureaucratic complexity, they pointed to overlapping rules between Erasmus+, Horizon
Europe, Digital Europe, and regional development funds (e.g., European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF)). These respondents highlighted duplicated registration
processes, inconsistent cost categories, and mismatched timelines. The lack of
interoperability between platforms and evaluation frameworks was flagged as a missed
opportunity for integration and strategic alignment.
• Public authorities, especially those at regional and local levels, emphasised the rigidity of
programme design and the limited discretion available to adapt funding to emerging local
needs. Respondents referred to crises such as the Ukrainian refugee influx, the COVID-19
pandemic, and climate-related emergencies as situations where EU programmes lacked the
necessary responsiveness. Several contributions argued for the creation of emergency
reallocation mechanisms within mainstream programmes to allow rapid funding shifts
under predefined governance rules.
58
• Youth organisations, both formal and informal, described complex rules and
administrative procedures as a primary deterrent to participation. This was especially true
for informal groups of young people, often active in remote or rural areas, who do not have
legal personality or administrative infrastructure. These groups are typically ineligible
under current application models, even when their objectives align with programme goals.
The absence of flexible formats such as microgrants or simplified sub-granting schemes
was cited as a structural barrier, especially for first-time applicants lacking national-level
intermediary support.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
The findings from Q6 suggest that perceived obstacles are not isolated or episodic but systemic
and interlinked. Administrative burden, complexity, rigidity, and delays reinforce each other
and create barriers to access, especially for smaller actors, first-time applicants, and those in
less developed regions.
To address these challenges, stakeholders proposed a mix of short- and long-term solutions:
• Simplification and proportionality: Respondents called for the creation of tiered
compliance systems that distinguish between small and large grants. For instance,
organisations proposed that microgrants below €60,000 should use simplified cost options,
lighter reporting, and reduced audit risk. One NGO suggested a "compliance light" track
for first-time applicants with capped administrative requirements and pre-filled templates.
• Better digital tools: Several stakeholders highlighted the need to unify fragmented digital
platforms such as, e.g., EU Login, the Participant Portal, and the Beneficiary Module.
Respondents called for a one-stop-shop interface with integrated guidance, live chat
support, and multilingual features. One proposal recommended adapting national public
grant platforms that already offer predictive text, auto-save functions, and flexible
management of ongoing applications.
• Flexible envelopes: Public authorities and cultural operators in particular advocated for
setting aside flexible budget components within larger programme envelopes, allowing
dynamic reallocation in response to crises. Examples included a “local priorities window”
within Erasmus+ or ESC that regions could activate for targeted challenges such as post-
disaster recovery or refugee inclusion.
• Technical assistance: Many stakeholders proposed regional hubs or rosters of "EU funding
coaches" to support onboarding for new applicants, especially in remote and
underrepresented areas. Some suggested replicating the European Social Fund’s Technical
Assistance Units model, including template kits, peer learning sessions, and pre-submission
clinics.
• Transparency and predictability: Respondents requested a publicly accessible, regularly
updated calendar of calls and deadlines with 12-month visibility. Proposals included
harmonised guides for cost eligibility and evaluation standards, as well as a requirement to
publish reviewer feedback summaries, enabling unsuccessful applicants to learn and
reapply more effectively.
In-depth stakeholder analysis revealed differentiated preferences and priorities for improving
budgetary effectiveness:
59
NGOs and youth organisations strongly endorsed simplification, especially as it relates to
first-time and grassroots applicants. Many underscored the disproportionate burden posed
by complex financial reporting, cost justification, and delays in fund disbursement. Their
emphasis on procedural equity reflected broader concerns about structural exclusion from
funding opportunities. Several youth organisations recommended pre-defined lump sum
schemes and the expansion of localised sub-granting via trusted intermediaries to support
smaller, less formal groups.
Academic and cultural institutions prioritised predictability, continuity, and programme
alignment. They called for unified grant management systems across Erasmus+, Horizon
Europe, and Creative Europe. Recurring recommendations included a harmonised cost
model and standardised eligibility rules to reduce duplication and misalignment between
parallel programmes. Institutions managing multiple grants reported cumulative
inefficiencies, citing the lack of interoperability between EU portals as a drain on human
resources.
Public authorities—particularly at regional and municipal levels—emphasised the need for
vertical and horizontal coordination. They supported interoperability between EU and
national funding frameworks and proposed integrated calendars, joint application formats,
and aligned eligibility criteria. Some also called for multi-programme investment platforms
to allow bundling of cultural, youth, and education funding under territorial development
plans. This approach, they argued, would strengthen regional policy coherence and improve
impact traceability.
Small and micro-organisations, especially in the media, culture, and social innovation
sectors, advocated for proportionate rules, simplified cost accounting, and faster
disbursement processes. Their contributions frequently cited the value of microgrant
schemes with low entry barriers and minimal administrative obligations. Many urged that
future programmes expand the use of fixed-cost and flat-rate options under simplified cost
models (SCOs). A number of independent cultural professionals and creative SMEs also
noted that infrequent calls and short application windows limited their ability to plan, apply,
and scale up impact.
Analysis of attached papers and free-text responses
A detailed review of the 383 submitted documents - including position papers from NGOs,
educational institutions, local authorities, and sectoral organisations – revealed complex,
differentiated, and in many cases deeply relevant inputs across all thematic areas.
Education: Across nearly 40% of the position papers, education emerged as a pillar of
European integration and competitiveness. Stakeholders underscored the foundational role of
Erasmus+ in fostering transnational mobility, employability, and institutional innovation. They
called for a significant expansion of the Erasmus+ programme (Erasmus for all), with many
advocating for a significant increase, aligned with inflation and the cost of living in high-cost
countries. Numerous papers cited the disproportionate administrative burden as a deterrent to
smaller institutions and first-time applicants. Stakeholders proposed a simplification roadmap,
which included flat-rate financing, enhanced lump sums, and modular budget architectures.
The lack of parity in access across Member States – especially between Western/Northern and
Eastern European regions – was cited repeatedly. Respondents also stressed the importance of
maintaining Erasmus+ as a standalone brand, warning against dilution through broader
programme integration. Several university alliances advocated for reinforced synergies with
60
Horizon Europe, Digital Europe, and ESF+ without compromising the autonomy or identity of
the programme.
Youth and Solidarity: Documents from youth organisations, national youth councils, and
solidarity networks highlighted the European Solidarity Corps (ESC) as a critical tool for civic
engagement and soft skills acquisition. Stakeholders demanded structural and multiannual
funding for youth-led projects, arguing that current project-based financing often excluded less
experienced applicants or those from underserved areas. Respondents proposed participatory
budgeting mechanisms and a minimum percentage of the programme reserved for grassroots
youth initiatives. A dominant theme was the geographical imbalance in volunteer distribution,
with rural, peripheral, and Eastern areas systematically disadvantaged. Recommendations
included financial incentives for placements in less popular regions, standardised recognition
tools for ESC learning outcomes, and digital platforms for matchmaking. Many respondents
tied ESC objectives to broader EU values, urging that any future architecture reinforce the
rights-based and inclusive nature of youth engagement.
Culture and Creativity: Cultural operators and creative professionals stressed that the
Creative Europe programme must remain autonomous and sufficiently funded. A widely
shared concern was that merging CREA with broader values or youth programmes would lead
to "mission drift". Stakeholders argued for a recalibration of funding rules to accommodate the
operational realities of artists and micro-enterprises. Recurrent themes included cultural
sovereignty, support for at-risk professionals (e.g. in exile or post-pandemic recovery), and the
need to codify fair remuneration as an eligibility criterion. With over a dozen submissions
referencing generative AI, the growing unease around intellectual property protection in the
digital era was prominent. Respondents advocated for a dual-track approach: preserving
support for traditional forms of cultural expression while also investing in capacity-building
around digital distribution, audience analytics, and platform regulation. Minority and regional
languages, often underrepresented in mainstream funding calls, were another critical concern,
with proposals for linguistic equity earmarks.
Media: Media and audiovisual stakeholders – from independent newsrooms to European film
distributors – emphasised the geopolitical and democratic stakes of a robust, pluralistic media
landscape. A majority supported retaining the MEDIA strand within Creative Europe but called
in addition for dedicated budget lines for investigative journalism, digital transition of
audiovisual SMEs, and copyright frameworks supporting EU rules and values. Many flagged
growing asymmetries between large streaming platforms and local producers, urging
regulatory counterbalances and safeguards. Views on cross-border collaborations were
nuanced: while some stressed their importance for market access and resilience, others argued
that rigid co-production rules or linguistic quotas limited flexibility. Several stakeholders from
smaller Member States asked for upward budget adjustments to reflect higher relative costs in
small markets. Ethical journalism, media literacy, and training for next-generation journalists
were also highlighted as emerging priorities.
Civil Society and Values: Almost all civil society actors reiterated concerns about the
shrinking space for civic action, particularly in Member States facing democratic backsliding.
Respondents advocated for a massive expansion of the CERV programme – many suggested
tripling its budget – to match the rising scope of its mission. Emphasis was placed on ensuring
regional balance, predictable multiannual funding, and a stronger role for CSOs in monitoring,
evaluation, and agenda-setting processes. Several organisations proposed the creation of a
European Civil Society Forum, co-financed under CERV, to serve as a consultative body for
61
EU democracy and values policies. Key barriers identified included lack of core funding, legal
uncertainty, and administrative burden. Proposals ranged from specific policy instruments (e.g.
civic action observatories, solidarity grants) to structural reforms, such as recognising CSOs as
strategic implementation partners within the MFF logic.
Across all thematic clusters, stakeholders converged around a demand for systemic equity,
stable and predictable financing, proportionality in compliance, and clearer eligibility
guidance. Framing patterns in the documents leaned heavily on EU identity, intergenerational
justice, and the imperative of democratic renewal amidst global turbulence. Many stakeholders
explicitly linked programme success to broader geopolitical resilience, competitiveness, and
social cohesion within the Union
Youth respondents
Youth respondents made up nearly half of all EU citizen contributions, equating to
approximately 1,367 participants out of 2,780 EU citizen submissions. The high level of
engagement highlights the relevance of EU programmes to young people and offers an
important opportunity to understand the emerging expectations, policy preferences, and
engagement patterns of younger Europeans.
The analysis draws on both quantitative indicators and qualitative content, enabling a layered
understanding of how youth perspectives align with or differ from the general respondent pool.
By comparing under-30 responses with those from individuals aged 30 and above, the report
identifies key points of convergence and divergence in support levels, values, priorities, and
ideas for programme reform. This approach ensures that youth views are not only heard but
analytically integrated into the broader findings of the consultation.
Quantitative overview of youth response patterns
Youth respondents consistently indicated higher support for most proposed EU actions
compared to their older counterparts. These differences were particularly notable in areas
linked to democratic values, inclusion, mobility, non-formal education, and international
solidarity. For example:
In Question 1, which assessed the importance of various policy priorities, young respondents
were more likely to rate support for study and training abroad, civic participation, and equity-
focused measures as "very important."
Question 5, which evaluated potential future actions in the area of values and civil society,
showed that 74% of under-30s prioritised mutual learning, exchange of good practices, and
coalition-building, compared to 69% of those aged 30 and over. Similarly, 65% supported
actions strengthening grassroots civil society organisations, aligning with their emphasis on
bottom-up engagement.
In Question 6, youth respondents ranked administrative complexity, lack of clarity in
procedures, and burdensome compliance mechanisms as more significant barriers than other
age groups.
Qualitative overview of youth-specific themes and priorities
62
A more detailed review of open-text answers and attached position papers revealed several
recurrent themes among youth respondents:
• Inclusion and accessibility: Young people strongly advocated for making EU programmes
more inclusive by simplifying application processes, reducing bureaucratic hurdles, and
providing better support for newcomers and marginalised groups. Many emphasised the
need for multilingual outreach, local partnerships, and targeted funding for rural youth.
• Recognition of non-formal and informal learning: Many young participants stressed the
importance of acknowledging the educational value of volunteering, youth work, activism,
and digital learning. They proposed including microcredentials, experience-based
assessments, and digital portfolios as part of recognition frameworks.
• Democracy, rights, and civic space: Young respondents consistently identified EU
funding as a tool to counter disinformation, hate speech, and shrinking civic space. They
called for greater investment in civic education, participatory democracy projects, and
support for youth-led initiatives that promote tolerance, equality, and critical thinking.
• Digital and green skills and transitions: Many highlighted the need for EU programmes
to support climate education, youth-driven green innovation, and environmental
volunteering. In digital fields, youth expressed interest in digital literacy training, support
for ethical AI education, and safe online participation platforms.
• Mobility and international solidarity: Respondents endorsed continued and expanded
investment in Erasmus+, European Solidarity Corps, and partnerships with candidate and
neighbouring countries. This was framed not only in terms of individual development but
as a collective European project rooted in solidarity and intercultural understanding.
Youth-driven proposals and innovations
Beyond endorsing existing initiatives, many youth respondents offered forward-looking ideas
to enhance the effectiveness and inclusivity of EU programmes. Some of the most recurrent
proposals included (examples):
• Establishing a "European Youth Civic Campus" combining education, solidarity, and civic
action across Erasmus+, ESC, and CERV frameworks.
• Setting aside a dedicated percentage of funding within each major programme for youth-
led, grassroots initiatives, including microgrants and project incubators.
• Developing tools for participatory monitoring, enabling young people to co-create
indicators, assess programme impacts, and shape annual priorities.
• Creating digital hubs or local support centres to connect rural and underrepresented youth
with EU-level opportunities.
Youth check
These trends underscore a forward-looking, collaborative, and values-based approach among
youth respondents. Their consistently higher response positivity also suggests a strong belief
in the potential of EU programmes to address current and future challenges. Findings from the
OPC align strongly with the Commission’s Youth Check framework, confirming that the
63
perspectives of young people not only match the broader results but reinforce the most forward-
leaning policy directions. While there are no fundamental divergences in terms of programme
objectives or values, youth inputs offer important added value in their emphasis on
intersectionality, long-term social impact, and innovation.
Their responses offer – in particular in this cluster of interconnected policies – strong
justification for embedding youth considerations into every stage of programme design – from
conception and budgeting to delivery and evaluation. It also supports the case for stronger
youth representation in governance structures, including advisory groups and midterm review
panels.
64
ANNEX 3: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE
Who is affected and how?
The following groups can be distinguished as the most affected groups by the future
instruments under this cluster.
1) Individuals
Citizens and communities at large – Citizens are impacted insofar the respect of their
fundamental rights is ensured, and by the rights and opportunities they have to live freely,
participate in the democratic process and engage in society, access quality education and
culture, regardless of their gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or
sexual orientation. Between 2021-2024, more than 60 million people were expected to be
reached by the activities supported by the CERV programme. Through the focus on access to
cultural content and heritage in the Culture strand of Creative Europe, the general public is also
impacted: according to a conservative estimate, under the first iteration of the Creative Europe
programme, cultural activity funded by this strand was accessed 91.5 million times in the
period 2014-2020.
Children and young people: this group is particularly affected by the environment in which
they are growing up and by all forms of violence, both offline and online, including in the
domestic sphere and at school. They are increasingly facing mental health issues, heightened
by unhealthy use of digital media and the repercussions from Covid-19 pandemic. They are
also the most impacted by the quality and methods of teaching and training, as well as access
to formal education and other learning opportunities (for example non-formal and informal
learning, volunteering or sport), which equip them with the necessary skills and competences
needed for their future life and jobs. Their capacity to participate to the democratic life at all
levels of society needs to be increased.
Education and training, youth and sport staff: Teachers, trainers, educators, coaches, youth
workers need continuous opportunities to expand their professional and personal skills. This
ensures that they can deliver high-quality content and methods, which not only benefits learners
but also enhances their own job satisfaction and motivation. Under the current Erasmus+,
200.000 staff in the field of education and training, youth and sport are directly involved
yearly.
Human rights defenders, whose work is essential to protect and promote EU values on the
ground.
Artists, media and cultural and creative professionals: This group relies on opportunities to
explore cultural and creative endeavours, directly impacting their capacity to innovate and
create. As an example, around 7,200 artists and creative professionals have benefited from the
individual mobility scheme of the Creative Europe’s Culture strand from 2021 to 2024.
2) Public authorities
EU and national public authorities, who are often the ones implementing EU policies and
legislations on the ground, thus contributing to the achievement of overall EU objectives. Local
authorities and public institutions, notably in town twinning, civic education, and rule of law
promotion, improve enhanced democratic culture, memory and cohesion through citizen-
centred projects.
65
Education and training institutions and providers, including schools, VET providers,
higher education institutions (HEIs), adult education providers, as well as Erasmus+ National
Agencies and Jean Monnet centres, which promote EU studies, in their ability to deliver
improved teaching quality, institutional capacity and European cooperation in education,
enhanced institutional modernisation, internationalisation and innovation capacity. Under the
current Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps, close to 20.000 unique education and
training institutions and providers are directly involved yearly.
Other public authorities at local, regional and national levels in charge of education, youth,
sport, and training systems, non-governmental and public entities hosting and coordinating
solidarity activities, including municipalities, social enterprises and non-profits, and local
communities, through enhanced civic participation, intergenerational solidarity and support to
vulnerable populations. They will strengthen their ability to steer reforms, address challenges,
and coordinate EU-wide actions in the policy areas of the cluster but also deliver increased
social capital and community development from e.g. volunteer involvement.
3) Civil society at large
Civil society organisations play a vital role in European society and democracy, contributing
to the enrichment of the sectors in this cluster through community involvement and advocacy,
promoting EU values, citizens' rights, cultural diversity, representing young people’s voices
etc. Their work benefits from opportunities to build capacity, network and (co)operate
transnationally. Between 2021-2024, more than 5000 civil society organisations were directly
supported by the CERV programme.
Civil society organisations and rights defenders, including those working on inclusion, gender
equality, anti-discrimination, child protection, and LGBTIQ rights, who will see improved
ability to sustain advocacy, inclusion and watchdog roles contributing to EU fundamental
values. Victims of violence or discrimination, as well as organisations offering legal,
psychological and social support, offering better protection, support and visibility of victims'
rights and services. Academic and legal networks, supporting evidence-based rights policy and
democratic resilience, who will see better informed rights-based policymaking and enhanced
rule of law awareness.
Youth and grassroots sport organisations, including NGOs and clubs promoting
participation, inclusion and healthy lifestyles, who will increase capacity and make use of
quality and innovative practices, leading to broader reach and impact in fostering inclusion,
active citizenship and social cohesion. Under the current Erasmus+ and European Solidarity
Corps, close to 6.000 unique youth and sport organisations are directly involved yearly.
Cultural and creative entities of various types163 that benefit from the cooperation,
networking, peer learning and exchange of ideas and experiences. 80% of beneficiaries of the
Culture strand of the current Creative Europe programme are entities employing less than 49
employees, 9% are medium-sized entities (between 50 and 249 employees) and 11% are large
entities (250 or more employees), reflecting the general structure of the CCS in the EU.
Between 2021 and 2023, the Culture strand of Creative Europe benefitted 2,176 organisations.
4) Companies
66
Companies across sectors that are facing skill shortages, underscoring the need for effective
education and training systems that equip individuals with the skills required by the labour
market.
According to the Erasmus+ evaluation, the connection with businesses has increased,
especially in the Vocational education and training (VET) sector, while the adult education
sector was the second – after VET – registering the highest level of participation of SMEs in
indirectly managed actions supporting cooperation projects 164
.
Audiovisual and media companies: According to 2023 European Media Industry Outlook,
SMEs account for 99.8% of all companies active in the audiovisual, news media and video
games, mainly independent companies. In the current MEDIA Strand under Creative Europe,
99% of the direct beneficiaries were SMEs (reflecting the 99% of SMEs amongst European
AV enterprises), of which 25% were small and nearly 70% micro. Micro and Small
organisations account for 50% and 40% of total value of grants respectively under Creative
Europe 2014-2020.
5) Countries
Partner, candidate and third countries and organisations and institutions in these countries
which benefit from increased cooperation and people-to-people contacts with the EU. This is
particularly relevant for candidate and potential candidate countries, as enhanced cooperation
can aid their integration efforts and prepare them for future EU membership. In addition,
learning mobility will support the cooperation efforts with third countries in the framework of
e.g. talent partnerships. Under the current Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps, some
2.5000 unique organisations and institutions from non-EU countries are directly involved
yearly.
Overview of benefits
Table 1: Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option
Measures Who will benefit? Direct and indirect benefits
SO 1.1 Contribute to upholding the rule of law, fundamental rights and equality, reduce discrimination and empower civil
society
Support to
fundamental
rights
Citizens; civil society
organisations; society at large
Increased visibility and awareness of fundamental rights and relevant EU
policies and tools supported by the programmes.
Most participants to CERV-funded activities self-report higher level of
awareness of rights as an EU citizen (84%), knowledge of EU legislation to
promote and protect values (88%) as well as relevant EU tools and
initiatives (68%), and awareness of common European history (91%), than
the general public165
.
Promote equality
and fight against
discrimination
Citizens, civil society
organisations, society at large
Citizens will feel less discriminated against and experience less
harassment166
. A more gender equal EU would have strong, positive GDP
impacts growing over time, higher level of employment and productivity
and could better respond to challenges related to the ageing population in
the EU167
.
67
Nurture a vibrant
civic space and
protect human
rights defenders
and
whistleblowers
Citizens, civil society
organisations and human
rights defenders, society at
large
Citizens and organisations will be enabled to participate meaningfully in
the political, economic, social and cultural life in their societies. Civil
society will be able to play their key role in bringing to life the values shared
between the EU and its Member States as specified in Article 2 of the Treaty
on European Union (TEU). Civil society will also be able to make a
substantial contribution to the implementation of EU policies in the area of
human rights.
A significant majority (88%) of respondents to the public consultation
carried out for the mid-term evaluation of the CERV programme agreed
that, if CERV funding were to cease, the impact on civic space would be
negative168
.
SO 1.2 Contribute to fighting against gender-based violence, violence against children and other groups at risk
Address gender-
based violence,
violence against
children and
other groups at
risk
Girls, women, children and
other groups at risks, citizens,
society at large
Girls, women, children, LGBTIQ and other groups at risk in the EU will
be protected and supported, their rights will be safeguarded. Citizens will
be safe and empowered in all their diversity.
SO 1.3 Contribute to enhancing democratic resilience and participation
Diversity and
viability of the
civic and media
sphere
Society at large In a healthy and thriving democracy, citizens can freely express their views,
choose their political leaders, and have a say about their future. Free media
and civil society will be able to play their role in stimulating open debate,
free from interference, either foreign or domestic.
SO 1.4 Contribute to supporting news media, media independence and tackling disinformation
Structural
support to news
media
Media organisations; Citizens Media organisations, in particular SMEs, will benefit from better business
models, potential avenues to scaling up and improve their uptake of digital
technologies; Enhanced digital transition, innovation and automation;
Increased financial viability; Support to local and investigative journalism;
Improving audience engagement;
Citizens will benefit from enhanced access to quality news on EU affairs
and diverse offerings of professionally produced news content.
Preserve the
integrity of the
information
space
Citizens; Civil Society
Organisations including
Factcheckers; Media
organisations
Strengthened capacity and speed to monitor the integrity of the online
information space; Strengthened situational awareness on hybrid threats;
better protection of information spaces from manipulation; Acceleration in
detection through new technology and tools; better collaboration between
multidisciplinary communities; enhanced detection and exposure of
disinformation narratives & campaign as well as information manipulation
attempts
Addressing
media literacy
Citizens; Factcheckers; Media
organisations
Strengthened societal resilience against disinformation and information
manipulation, including among vulnerable groups; increased democratic
participation of all segments of the population; improvements of online
safety: contributions to boost basic skills, including critical thinking and
understanding of online media;
SO 1.5 Enhance production, circulation, and consumption of EU audiovisual/media content.
68
Support the
production of EU
audiovisual and
media content
Audiovisual and media
organisations/ companies
Strengthened European cultural diversity, societal resilience, ‘soft power’
and competitiveness; enhancement cross-border collaboration between
audiovisual and media companies; increase in content development and
(international) co-productions including among countries with different
audiovisual capabilities; more internationalisation and market promotion of
EU audiovisual companies; enhanced. Support the production of video
games; support the production of transmedia content
Support the
circulation of EU
audiovisual and
media content
Audiovisual and media
organisations/ companies
Increased transnational circulation, promotion, visibility impact of
audiovisual and media content (e.g., films, video games), across Europe and
worldwide;
Increasing the level-playing field across participating countries.
Deepen the Single Market in the audiovisual media sector;
Facilitate the adoption of innovative business models responding to global
market developments, especially digital media and AI
Enhance access
to audiovisual
content
Citizens; Audiovisual and
media organisations/
companies
Better facilitate access to European AV works to people across the EU,
including in areas currently not well served; Attract international audiences
to European AV works.
Enhanced export
possibilities and
increased access
to export markets
for audiovisual
SMEs
Audiovisual companies Increase the presence of European content and strong European intellectual
property outside Europe, expanded market shares of European companies
in overseas markets (international competitiveness)
SO 1.6 Increase in cross-border cultural cooperation, cultural participation and accessibility, and circulation of diverse
cultural works, while strengthening cultural and creative sectors
Promote
cooperation,
creation,
networking and
pooling of
experience in
CCS
Support
circulation of
diverse cultural
content and
access to cultural
diversity and
heritage
Support mobility
of artists and
CCS
professionals
Cultural and creative entities
of all types (SMEs,
institutions, associations,
networks etc.); Artists and
CCS professionals; Citizens
and society at large (in
particular youth)
Stronger CCS better equipped to address key challenges, such as market
fragmentation, the dual transition and surge of AI etc.
A significant majority (87%) of respondents to the Beneficiary Survey
caried out for the final evaluation of Creative Europe 2014-2020 and the
mid-term evaluation of Creative Europe 2021-2027 said that capacity-
building support had an impact in terms of helping them develop skills to
work transnationally, with around 70% saying it had either a major or
significant impact.169 40 European networks are currently supported by
Creative Europe (representing 4,000 members) offering capacity-building
activities to cultural and creative sectors’ professionals.
Reinforced CCS creative potential in respect of artistic freedom; a more
diverse cultural content circulating across national and linguistic borders
Data from projects supported shows that cultural activity supported by
Creative Europe’s Culture strand was accessed either virtually or in person
91.5 million times over the course of 2014-2020.170
More artists and CCS professionals expanding their careers beyond national
and linguistic borders and developing innovative practises
69
beyond national
borders
Strengthen all
dimensions of
CCS (social,
economic and
international)
From 2014 to 2020, the Creative Europe’s Culture strand supported 22,763
professionals internationalise their careers and gain experience in other
countries, corresponding to a total of 296,083 mobility days.171 The
individual mobility scheme of the Creative Europe’s strand launched in
October 2022 supported the cross-border mobility of of 3,800 artists
between end 2022 and 2023172.
Increased and more inclusive access of all, in particular the younger
generations, to more diverse cultural content and heritage
Monitoring data from Creative Europe’s Culture strand show that over the
period 2014-2020, one in four projects had a specific focus on reaching an
underrepresented group, including minority ethnic groups, younger people
and migrants, with 76% of projects being effective in reaching audiences
that do not tend to visit, watch or consume culture.173
Increased number of international cultural partnerships and exchanges
20% of the projects funded under the Culture strand involve third-country
organisations, supporting in this way the Union’s global strategy for
international relations174.
Increase
digitisation,
access,
preservation and
reuse of digital
heritage
Cultural and creative entities
of all types (SMEs,
institutions, associations,
networks etc.); Artists and
CCS professionals; Citizens
and society at large (in
particular youth)
Increase in the number of digitised cultural assets for preservation purposes.
Increased access, in particular digital access to high quality cultural content;
Increase in opportunities to reuse digital heritage for a variety of purposes
such as for education, tourism or creative purposes;
More efficient and performing digitisation and preservation processes.
Gain deeper knowledge of the origin and evolution of heritage assets
through the wider use of cutting-edge technologies such as AI and 3D;
Allow more cultural heritage institutions to benefit from technology
advancement, especially smaller institutions and those in remote
regions/locations.
SO 1.7 Spur cross-cutting innovation and promote sustainability of media, cultural and societal entities
Support
innovation in
technology and
business models
Audiovisual and media
organisations/ companies
Organisations/companies
from other cultural and
creative sectors.
Citizens accessing cultural
heritage, cultural heritage
institutions such as galleries,
libraries, archives, museums,
Experimentation and testing of technology and business models; Faster
uptake digital tools and successful business models; Cost and operational
efficiency (cost and price competitiveness); Expanding market reach
(international competitiveness).
Increase in the number of digitised cultural assets for preservation purposes;
(indirect benefit) Increased opportunities for cultural tourism, especially in
less visited regions.
Expansion of
equity
instruments to
more IP-intensive
sectors. Improve
access to finance
of the media,
Audiovisual and media
organisations/ companies
Organisations/companies
from other cultural and
creative sectors
Stimulating more private investment; Enhancing co-investment;
Improvements in Supporting IP exploitation and ownership by European
players; Financial strength (e.g., liquidity); Lowering the risk of IP.
70
cultural and
societal sectors.
Improve access
to finance of the
media, cultural
and societal
sectors.
SO 2.1 Support transnational cooperation around education and skills
Transnational
cooperation in
the areas of
education and
skills, youth and
sport to elevate
quality across all
fields
Individual level: learners
(pupils, students, VET
learners, Higher Education
students, adult learners, youth
workers, young people, people
active in sport) – Staff:
teachers, trainers, educators,
youth workers, sport coaches
Organisational level:
Education and training
institutions and providers,
including schools, VET
providers, higher education
institutions, adult education
providers, private companies
and SMEs, Youth,
volunteering and sport
organisations.
Indirectly: Individuals at all
stages of learning and training,
including school pupils, VET
learners, students in higher
education, adult learners,
young people overall
Increased quality of teaching and training practices and youth work
methods
Increased networking and internationalisation of the staff and the
organisations
Improved capacity and performance of the education and training, youth
and sport institutions and organisations
Modernisation of the education and training, youth and sport systems
institutions and organisations
Increased excellence and innovation through strategic, long-term and
enhanced cooperation eg the European Universities Alliances
Increased development, retention and attraction of talent
Further ~20,000 organisations/institutions benefit annually from Erasmus+
and the ESC. They report improved teaching quality, institutional capacity,
and stronger international cooperation.
65 European University Alliances are currently supported, involving more
than 560 universities in Europe and beyond cooperating on strategic
domains like green and digital sectors.
SO 2.2 Support to transnational learning mobility and learning opportunities
Support to
transnational
mobility
Individuals at all stages of
learning and training,
including school pupils, VET
learners, students in higher
education, adult learners,
young people overall
Education and training, youth
and sport staff: Teachers,
trainers, educators, youth
workers, sport coaches
Education and training
institutions and providers,
including schools, VET
providers, higher education
institutions, adult education
providers
Improved skills development, certification and portability Improvement
and development of new and improvement of existing skills,
Increased employability
Increased transparency, certification and recognition of skills and
competences cross-border
Increased inclusivity and accessibility for individuals with fewer
opportunities
Improved mental and physical health, increased self-confidence.
Increased employability. Transnational mobility will boost key transversal
skills, employability, and personal development.
71
Youth and sport organisations
SO 2.3 Promote lifelong learning, improving skills and new competences
Promote lifelong
learning,
improving skills
and new
competences
Citizens
Institutions active in the fields
of education, training, youth
and sport
Or Individuals at all stages of
learning and training,
including school pupils, VET
learners, students in higher
education, adult learners,
young people overall
Education and training, youth
and sport staff: Teachers,
trainers, educators, coaches,
youth workers
Education and training
institutions and providers,
including schools, VET
providers, higher education
institutions (HEIs), adult
education providers
Youth, volunteering and sport
organisations
Improvement and development of new and improvement of existing skills,
across lifelong learning including increase of upskilling and reskilling
Increased employability
Increased transparency, certification and recognition of skills and
competences cross-border
Improved skills development (over 88% of Erasmus+ participants self-
report improved competences), certification and portability
Increased inclusiveness
SO. 2.4 Support policy experimentation and development accelerating modernisation
Policy
experimentation
and development,
accelerating
modernisation
across education
and training
Education and training
systems, policies/policy
makers at national and
subnational level
Youth and sport
policies/policy-makers at
national or subnational level
Education and training
institutions and providers,
including schools, VET
providers, higher education
institutions (HEIs), adult
education providers
Youth and sport organisations.
Increased evidence based policy making in the fields of education and
training, youth and sport
Increased transparency, certification and recognition of skills and
competences cross-border
Increased recognition of the role of non formal learning and youth work
profession
Facilitate national reforms through the development, testing of solutions
and innovative practices which are then scaled-up and transferred at
national level.
Increased policy dialogues in the fields of education and training, youth and
sport and cooperation with relevant stakeholders.
As example, Erasmus+ triggered the Bologna Process which led to a reform
of the higher education area in 48 countries by introducing the three-cycle
72
higher education system and ensuring the mutual recognition of
qualifications and learning periods abroad completed at other universities.
Indirect long-term impact on the overall quality of the education and
training systems, acquisition of skills for life and jobs, and competitiveness
SO. 2.5 Foster solidarity, civic education and engagement
Foster solidarity,
civic education
and engagement
Local communities,
Education, training, youth and
sport institutions, local and
regional authorities
Youth and sport
organisations
Individuals at all stages of
learning and training,
including school pupils, VET
learners, students in higher
education, adult learners,
young people overall
Increased sense of belonging and community spirit - Civic and European
Identity: 88% of Erasmus+ and 71% of Solidarity Corps participants
reported a stronger sense of European belonging.
Increased knowledge about the EU, democracy, citizens rights, EU values
Increased civic engagement
Increase of a culture of solidarity
Improved mental and physical health, increased self-confidence.
Increased inclusivity and accessibility for individuals with fewer
opportunities
Increased tolerance and intercultural understanding - 94% of Erasmus+
participants declared that they have increased their tolerance awareness and
53% stated that they have reached a better understanding of inclusion and
diversity.
Civic and European Identity: 88% of Erasmus+ and 71% of Solidarity
Corps participants reported a stronger sense of European belonging. Over
6,000 organisations engage in Erasmus+ and ESC. They support inclusion
through sport, youth engagement, and social cohesion projects.
Lower access barriers: Students from rural or disadvantaged backgrounds
face compounded barriers, especially when information, digital skills,
housing, or guidance are lacking. For example, only 8% of youth were
aware of the Solidarity Corps versus 49% for Erasmus+.
SO 3.1 Increase effectiveness of EU funding by addressing linked EU challenges, improving cooperation, and fostering
coordination of the main policy areas
Administrations (i.e.,
European Commission,
relevant agencies, national
authorities where relevant)
More impactful results through more effective use of impact indicators and
feedback to policy mechanisms.
SO 3.2 Improve efficiency for applicants and beneficiaries, and at EU level
Administrations (i.e.,
European Commission,
relevant agencies, national
authorities where relevant)
Productivity gains for the Commission. There would be significant gains
for several Commission services, including central services, as a number of
procedures that are currently duplicated will be reduced (e.g. two work
programmes to be adopted and prepared; two programme committees to be
held instead of four - with a reduction of the hours of interpretation needed,
73
the number of translations, the reduction by 50% of validation steps;
common evaluations, communication campaigns, etc.).
Productivity gains for Implementation bodies. There would be significant
productivity gains, in the case of a single programme for Erasmus+ and the
European Solidarity Corps, as a number of horizontal activities carried out
by National Agencies such as information sessions, maintenance of
different websites, large scale communication campaigns) will be common
and thus reduced compared to today.
Productivity gains for beneficiaries. Beneficiaries (especially small actors)
benefit from one-stop-shop, fewer portals, harmonised rules, and simplified
reporting rules. Reductions in the overall burden of participating in the EU
programmes (grant management reporting and checks reduced through
simplification). For Creative Europe, 66% of beneficiaries report that the
administrative burden is high or very high, and the length of the application
and grant process is among the main difficulties in preparing an application
(56% believe that the process to make applications is hard or very hard).
Paperless systems are seen as a source of simplification. The current
programme has reduced the number of beneficiary organisations that have
to submit financial capacity checks by 51%. Under Creative Europe,
lumpsums account for 62% of funded projects (vs 24% in the previous
programme). Multiannual financing entails as well reductions of the
number of days spent by beneficiary organisations on making repeat grant
applications. The usage of cascading grants equally reduces the number of
beneficiary organisations that contract with the Commission. Qualitative –
reduced time and effort – In the case of the merge of the Corps and
Erasmus+, this benefit will be significant for 30% of the current Corps
beneficiaries, also applying and managing projects through separate process
while option 2 would bring opportunities under common call and
application process.
SO 3.3 Increase coherence by promoting synergies and complementarities
Administrations (i.e.,
European Commission,
relevant agencies, national
authorities where relevant)
Productivity gains for funding bodies. Maximisation of impact stemming
from reduction of overlaps and study of complementarities.
Productivity gains from better coordination at local, national, EU levels,
allowing for scaling up projects and ensuring sustainability of results.
SO 3.4 Ensure proportionality by improving reactiveness to new challenges and minimising risks
Administrations (i.e.,
European Commission,
relevant agencies, national
authorities where relevant)
Gains resulting from the adaptability of the funding to new policy areas
and support better structured along tested policy problems over long
periods, ensuring predictability.
Beneficiaries obtain gains from better flexibility of the funding.
Increased visibility of all EU opportunities and policies for stakeholders
young people and youth organisations. Youth participation in formal
democracy is declining, with few pathways into civic decision-making.
OPC feedback confirms strong support for structured civic and EU
education starting from early ages. Option 2 provides for clear-cut
interventions per policy areas, which will guarantee and prevent any
dilution of the policy goals and visibility and recognition across the
relevant sets of different stakeholders.
74
Overview of costs
Table 2: Overview of costs – Preferred option
Citizens/Consumers Businesses Administrations
One-off Recurrent One-off Recurrent One-off Recurrent
Objective-
based
merger
Direct adjustment
costs
n/a n/a
Learning and
getting used to
streamlined
application
systems
Low
IT system
changes, staff
training,
migration
costs
Minor
Direct
administrative costs
n/a n/a
Integration of
processes and
support systems
Lower under
simplified
procedures
Alignment of
back-office
functions,
calls and
oversight
Net decrease
due to e.g.
merged
comitology,
joint calls, and
simplification
for national
agencies
Direct regulatory
fees and charges
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Direct enforcement
costs
n/a n/a n/a n/a
a) Audit
costs
harmonised
across
merged
programmes
(e.g.
decentralised
model)
b) Funding
support to
media-related
regulatory
framework
(European
Board for
Media
Services)
a) Small
increase in short
term, decrease
long term of
audit costs
Indirect costs n/a n/a Minor Minor Coordination
with national
institutional
and sector-
specific
actors
Offset by
reduced
fragmentation
(1) Estimates (gross values) to be provided with respect to the baseline; (2) costs are provided for each
identifiable action/obligation of the preferred option otherwise for all retained options when no preferred
option is specified; (3) If relevant and available, please present information on costs according to the
standard typology of costs (adjustment costs, administrative costs, regulatory charges, enforcement costs,
indirect costs;).
75
Relevant sustainable development goals
Table 3: Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred Option(s)there are
Relevant SDG175
Expected progress towards the Goal Comments
SDG no. 3 – Ensure healthy
lives and promote well-being
for all at all ages
The proposed option will contribute to improved
health, including mental health/well-being, for
instance by supporting organisations working with
victims of violence, through a focus on cultural
participation and access and through the
promotion of sport and healthy life habits e.g. in
schools but also local communities through
volunteering activities.
Cultural and sport activities will also have a
significant on health in general, as well as on
mental health.
Measures taken related to addrressing
disinformation, cyberbullying, support for
disadvantaged groups area also expected to have a
positive role on mental health.
The contribution of the future instruments to
the achievement of the SDGs is hardly
quantifiable. This applies to all SDGs listed
in this table.
SDG no. 4 – quality
education
The proposed option, primarily supporting
objective 2, will contribute to raise quality,
accessibility and inclusiveness of education and
training systems.
Achievement of these goals should be
possible through a combination of national
policies and funding, EU funds (Erasmus+,
European Solidarity Corps; but also cohesion
funds, future competitiveness fund etc).
SDG no. 5 – Achieve gender
equality and empower all
women and girls
The proposed option will make specific
contributions to gender equality, for instance by
providing dedicated funding to support Member
States in transposing the Pay Transparency
Directive, by bolstering the capacity of
organisations fighting gender-based violence, by
enabling grassroots civil society organisations to
engage at the local level and promote an active
civil society, empower active and informed
citizens to counter gender-based discrimination
and promote gender equality. |It will also
contribute to the protection and fulfilment of the
fundamental rights of women and girls.
/
SDG no. 8 – Promote
sustained, inclusive and
sustainable economic
growth, full and productive
employment and decent work
for all
The proposed option will support projects
contributing to equal access to work, equal
participation in the labour market, diversity in
public- and private-sector organisations and the
elimination of barriers to career progression in all
sectors. Through support to high quality and
inclusive education and training and development
of skills for all, the proposed option supports
employability of individuals including those with
fewer opportunities.
Support to audiovisual and media industries have
multiplier effects on competitiveness, and thus
economic growth. This support will be
strengthened and costs will be minimised, to
ensure an efficient and effective EU intervention.
/
SDG no. 10 – Reduce
inequalities within and
Through transnational projects sharing good
practices, training courses and awareness-raising
/
76
among countries SDG no. 10
– Reduce inequalities within
and among countries
activities, the proposed option will contribute to
reducing inequalities and eliminating
discrimination among EU citizens and among
Member States.
SDG no. 16 - Promote
peaceful and inclusive
societies for sustainable
development, provide access
to justice for all and build
effective, accountable and
inclusive institutions at all
levels –institutions at all
levels
The proposed option will promote an inclusive
society, the rule of law, democratic participation,
and the end all forms of violence (against women,
children, LGBTIQ people, and other groups at
risk). EU funds will support entities that contribute
to helping the EU’s common values, fundamental
rights, freedoms and equality, and its rich cultural
diversity.
The proposed option will strengthen potential
actions around media freedom and pluralism.
Access to information will also be enhanced by a
coordinated support to news media production and
distribution.
/
SDG no. 17 – Strengthen the
means of implementation and
revitalise the Global
Partnership for Sustainable
Development
The proposed option will contribute to the goal by
building the capacity of civil-society organisations
and promoting strong partnerships among
stakeholders.
/
Other SDGs Other connections can be established with SDG 11
(Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe,
resilient and sustainable) via the synergies between
some projects and the New European Bauhaus;
and SDG 12 (Ensure sustainable consumption and
production patterns) through the cross-cutting
focuses on greening.
77
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS
1. MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION ANALYSIS
This Annex describes the analysis of the impacts with the Social Multi-criteria Evaluation
(SOCRATES) model developed by the Joint Research Centre (BR Tool#62, pp. 550-553).
1.1. Description of Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation (SMCE) methodological framework
and software tool
SOCRATES (SOcial multi CRiteria AssessmenT of European policieS) is a multiple criteria
assessment software tool, explicitly designed for ex-ante Impact Assessment (IA) problems 176
.
Quantitative evidence plays an important role in many IAs, but also qualitative data such as
stakeholder input, conclusions of evaluations, as well as scientific and expert advice are
frequently used. This generates a multitude of criteria, which should be consistently integrated
and evaluated when comparing policy options. The most widespread multidimensional
approach to ex-ante IAs is multi-criteria decision analysis, which forms the basis for social
multi-criteria evaluation (SMCE177
), which has been explicitly designed for public policy.
Overall, the objective of SOCRATES and the underlying SMCE methodology is not to
substitute policy-makers through a mathematical model, but to improve their understanding of
the main features of the problem at hand, such as key assumptions, degree of uncertainty,
robustness of results and overall technical and social defensibility of options chosen. While
SMCE has about three decades of applications in a multitude of policy problems around the
World, its recent technical implementation SOCRATES has been applied in various EC Impact
Assessments.
SMCE proceeds on the basis of the following main concepts: dimensions, objectives, criteria,
weights, criterion scores, impact matrix and compromise solution.
• Dimension is the highest hierarchical level of analysis and indicates the scope of
objectives, criteria and criterion scores.
• Objectives indicate the direction of change desired, e.g. growth has to be maximized,
social exclusion has to be minimized, and carbon dioxide emissions have to be
reduced.
• A criterion is a function that associates alternative actions with a variable indicating
its desirability.
• Weights are often used to represent the relative importance attached to dimensions,
objectives and criteria. The idea behind this practice is very intuitive and easy, that is,
to place the greatest number in the position corresponding to the most important
factor.
• A criterion score is an assessment of the impact consistent with a given criterion with
reference to a policy option. Criterion scores can be both qualitative and quantitative.
• The impact matrix presents in a structured way the information on the various
criterion scores, i.e. each element of the matrix represents the performance of each
option according to each criterion.
78
In general, in a multi-criterion problem, there is no solution (ideal or utopia solution)
optimizing all the criteria at the same time, and therefore “compromise solutions” have to be
found.
In summary a SMCE approach can supply a methodological framework where the hierarchical
structure of the option comparison step of a typical ex-ante IA (including dimensions,
objectives and evaluation criteria) is clarified as much as possible by means of well-established
concepts in the decision theory literature. This might help in increasing the degree of
homogeneity across IA studies. The SOCRATES software helps structuring such a
methodological framework.
A typical SOCRATES input requires the definition of policy options (called alternatives)
dimensions, objectives and criteria. This information leads to the construction of an impact
matrix, which may include crisp, stochastic or fuzzy measurements of the performance of an
alternative with respect to an evaluation criterion. Qualitative information can be introduced
too (in the form of linguistic or ordinal criterion scores). Weights as importance coefficients,
may also be introduced. They can be attached to dimensions or criteria. Indifference and
preference thresholds can also be introduced when needed. A social conflict matrix can also be
constructed, where the impacts of each policy option on each social group are presented in a
transparent way.
2.1 Assessment structure, criterion scores and impact matrix
This analysis compares the three options along four dimensions, namely effectiveness,
efficiency, coherence and proportionality. For each of these dimensions, a set of objectives
were agreed upon, reflecting the priorities outlined under General Objectives 1, 2 and 3 (see
Figure below). For each objective, a set of indicators was selected (39 indicators overall).
For each indicator, a score was given, evaluating the impact of the three policy options. This
was based on an expert assessment from the relevant Commission services, relying on current
sets of data presented in Annex I (Evidence, Sources and quality), and on results of current
evaluations, Spending Reviews, political guidelines and policy reports, studies, OPC, and
independent sectoral reports and surveys. The criterion scores were measured in the following
range: --- (the most negative), --, -, =, +, ++, +++ (the most positive). The neutral score (=) was
understood as the option not having impact on the assessed indicator, or where the positive and
negatives were seen as to balance out. A ranking was obtained, under the assumption that all
indicators have the same weight, by applying the SOCRATES model.178
The assessment structure developed here has the following dimensions, objectives and criteria:
1. EFFECTIVENESS
1.1. Continue to promote fundamental rights, EU values, democracy, media and
culture
1.1.1. Upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights, degree of reduction of
discrimination
79
1.1.2. Contribute to fighting against gender-based violence, violence against children
and other groups at risk
1.1.3. Enhance democratic resilience and participation
1.1.4. Support to news media, media independence and capability of tackling
disinformation
1.1.5. Production, circulation, and consumption of EU audiovisual/media content
1.1.6. Increase in cross-border cultural cooperation and increased cultural
participation and accessibility, and circulation of diverse cultural works
1.1.7. Cross-cutting innovation and promote sustainability of media, cultural and
societal entities
1.2. Support cross-border education and training, youth, sport and solidarity,
contributing to skills for life and jobs
1.2.1. Support transnational Cooperation in the area of education and skills
1.2.2. Support to transnational learning mobility and learning opportunities
1.2.3. Promote lifelong learning, improving skills and new competences
1.2.4. Support policy experimentation and development accelerating modernisation
1.2.5. Foster solidarity, civic education and engagement
1.3. Addressing linked EU challenges
1.3.1. Enhance contribution to democracy
1.3.2. Enhance contribution to competitiveness
1.4. Improve cooperation
1.4.1. Cooperation between EC services and agencies
1.4.2. Cooperation between institutions/organizations in EU member states
1.4.3. Cooperation between EU and Third Countries (international cooperation)
1.4.4. Transnational Cooperation (within EU)
1.4.5. Potentiality to integrate inter-related projects
1.5. Foster coordination of main policy areas
1.5.1. Planning impacts continuity
1.5.2. Prevention of dilution of policy goals
1.5.3. Flexibility between programs to address policy issues
2. EFFICIENCY
2.1. Improve efficiency for applicants and beneficiaries
2.1.1. Ease of access for applicants
2.1.2. Time required for application
2.1.3. Reduction of administrative burdens for beneficiaries
2.2. Improve efficiency at EU level
2.2.1. Number of FTEs managing the program
2.2.2. Potential to streamline types of management (direct and indirect) to simplify
EU governance
2.2.3. Potential to use the same implementing
bodies/agencies/institutions/approaches for several programmes/policy areas
2.2.4. Impact on comitology/ interaction with national authorities
3. COHERENCE
3.1. Promote synergies and complementarities
3.1.1. Synergies/complementarities between clusters
3.1.2. Synergies/complementarities within the cluster
3.1.3. Synergies/complementarities with national & regional policies
3.1.4. Possibility of a rechannelling of funds between areas within a program
3.1.5. Reduce overlaps between funding actions addressing a policy objective
4. PROPORTIONALITY
80
4.1. Improve reactiveness to new challenges
4.1.1. Ability to address each of the specific problem drivers
4.1.2. Ability to address each of the specific programme objectives
4.1.3. Ability to sufficiently prioritise each of the main policy areas
4.2. Minimize risk
4.2.1.1. Risk of loss of customised approaches to (policy) specific needs and
target groups
4.2.1.2. Risk of loss of branding fostered by visibility of current programmes
vis-à-vis existing target groups
81
Table 1: Impact Matrix
Dimension Objective Indicator Scoring Alignment
with the
intervention
logic
Status
Quo
(1)
Object
ive-
based
merger
(2)
Full
integra
tion
(3)
1. Effectiveness 1.1 Continue to promote
fundamental rights, EU
values, democracy,
media and culture
1.1.1. Upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights,
degree of reduction of discrimination
+ ++ +
GENERAL
OBJECTIVE 1
1.1.2. Contribute to fighting against gender-based
violence, violence against children and other groups at
risk
++ + -
1.1.3. Enhance democratic resilience and participation - ++ ++
1.1.4 Support to news media, media independence
and capability of tackling disinformation
- ++ +
1.1.5. Production, circulation, and consumption of EU
audiovisual/media content
+ ++ +
1.1.6 Increase in cross-border cultural cooperation and
increased cultural participation and accessibility, and
circulation of diverse cultural works
+ = -
1.1.7. Cross-cutting innovation and promote
sustainability of media, cultural and societal entities
- ++ -
1.2. Support cross-
border education and
training, youth, sport
and solidarity,
contributing to skills for
life and jobs
1.2.1. Support transnational cooperation in the area of
education and skills
= ++ =
GENERAL
OBJECTIVE 2
1.2.2. Support to transnational learning mobility and
learning opportunities
= + ++
1.2.3 Promote lifelong learning, improving skills and
new competences
= + +
1.2.4. Support policy experimentation and development
accelerating modernisation
- + =
1.2.5. Foster solidarity, civic education and engagement = ++ +
82
1.3. Addressing linked
EU challenges
1.3.1 Enhance contribution to democracy + ++ ++
GENERAL
OBJECTIVE 3,
SO 1
1.3.2 Enhance contribution to competitiveness + ++ +
1.4. Improve
cooperation
1.4.1. Cooperation between EC services and agencies = + +
1.4.2. Cooperation between institutions/organisations in
EU member states
= + +
1.4.3 Cooperation between EU and third countries
(international cooperation)
= + =
1.4.4. Transnational cooperation (within the EU) = + +
1.4.5 Potentiality to integrate inter-related projects = ++ ++
1.5. Foster coordination
of main policy areas
1.5.1 Planning impacts continuity + - --
1.5.2 Prevention of dilution of policy goals = + -
1.5.3 Flexibility between programmes to address policy
issues
- + ++
2. Efficiency 2.1 Improve efficiency
for applicants and
beneficiaries
2.1.1 Ease of access for applicants - ++ +
GENERAL
OBJECTIVE 3,
SO 2
2.1.2 Time required for application = + +
2.1.3 Reduction of administrative burdens for
beneficiaries
= + =
2.2 Improve efficiency
at EU level
2.2.1 Number of FTEs managing the programme = + ++
2.2.2 Potential to streamline types of management
(direct and indirect) to simplify EU governance
= ++ -
2.2.3 Potential to use the same implementing
bodies/agencies/ institutions/approaches for several
programmes/policy areas
= ++ +
2.2.4 Impact on comitology/interaction with national
authorities
= + -
3. Coherence 3.1. Promote synergies
and complementarities
3.1.1 Synergies/complementarities between clusters = + +
GENERAL
OBJECTIVE 3,
SO 3
3.1.2 Synergies/complementarities within the cluster -- ++ +
3.1.3 Synergies/complementarities with national and
regional policies
= + +
3.1.4 Possibility of rechannelling of funds between
areas within a programme
- + ++
83
Table 2: Explanation of criterion scores
3.1.5 Reduce overlaps between funding actions
addressing a policy objective
- ++ +
4.
Proportionality
4.1 Improve
reactiveness to new
challenges
4.1.1 Ability to address each of the specific problem
drivers
- ++ +
GENERAL
OBJECTIVE 3,
SO 4
4.1.2 Ability to address each of the specific programme
objectives
- ++ =
4.1.3 Ability to sufficiently prioritise each of the main
policy areas
- ++ =
4.2 Minimise risk 4.2.1 Risk of loss of customised approaches to (policy)
specific needs and target groups
+ ++ -
4.2.2 Risk of loss of branding fostered by visibility of
current programmes vis-a-vis existing target groups
+ - --
Criteria Explanation of Assigned Impact Matrix Values Ranking Value by Alternative
Status Quo
(1)
Objective-
Based
Merger
(2)
Full
integration
of all
programm
es (3)
Upholding the rule of law
and fundamental rights,
degree of reduction of
discrimination
Option (1) provides the possibility to continue addressing the sources of
discrimination as a dedicated objective supporting policy goals (even without a
merger). Option (2) would allow to address objectives related to the fight against
discrimination with a comprehensive approach (e.g., covering aspects related to
biases in algorithms and IA tools). Option (3) might offer a similar benefit as
Option (2) but risks reducing the dedicated focus on anti-discrimination because
of the combination with several other policy areas (and hence, the effectiveness in
supporting the implementation of the relevant EU policies).
+ ++ +
84
Degree of fighting against
gender-based violence,
violence against children
and other groups at risk
Option (1) preserves a long-standing history and identity of the funding. Option
(2) comes with similar benefits as Option (1) but also with a risk of loss of focus.
Under Option (3), dedicated support could be lost.
The support of study/training is seen as an important policy priority for 90% of
the respondents in OPC179
.
++ + -
Enhance democratic
resilience and
participation
Under the status quo, we score (-), as certain areas particularly important for civic
engagement and participation such as countering disinformation and media
literacy are underfunded. The new mergers under Option (2) and Option (3)
would in any case lead to a better focus on these aspects.
- ++ ++
Support to news media,
media independence and
capability of tackling
disinformation
Option (1) provides insufficient/inexistent funding and scope to certain policy
areas and in others the support is fragmented and unstructured. For example, news
media sectors and disinformation are today insufficiently supported through EU
programmes, and rely on pilot projects and preparatory actions decided on an
annual basis, or through prerogative lines (e.g., Multimedia Actions). In short,
fragmented and insufficient support fails to address the growing threats to
independent journalism and diverse media landscapes, especially in vulnerable
Member States.
Option (2) would reduce the aforementioned problems of the status quo and allow
for additional cross-fertilisation between protection of media and democracy. An
Objective-based consolidation allows for targeted calls and streamlined
procedures that can prioritise media independence, notably by creating a strong
pole of intervention linking media and democracy, potentially addressing the
emerging policy priority, as stated in the policy guidelines.
Option (3): Compared to Option (1), this option would still offer an opportunity to
adapt the new MFF and insert media and disinformation related aspects into the
next generation of EU programmes. However, this positive aspect is mitigated by
the fact that media issues risk being diluted because of the lack of clear thematic
boundaries, risk of confusion and complexity among many competing priorities
and policy areas. Option (3) would allow to address disinformation also through
education by, e.g., allowing better coordination between Erasmus+ and CERV.
However, this would happen at a risk of dilution and not responding to specific
needs of beneficiaries.
- ++ +
85
The support of study/training is seen as an important policy priority for 90% of
the respondents in OPC180
.
Production, circulation,
and consumption of
audiovisual/media
content
Option (1) is addressing this aspect. The mid-term evaluation of the Creative
Europe 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 2014-
2020. already confirms the success of MEDIA.181
Yet, untapped opportunities
remain and the challenges faced by the industry exceed the EU intervention. For
example, on the demand side, EU audiovisual works are facing tough
competition182
, the EU industry experiences a gap in equity financing of €399
million per year, the opportunities of cross-media IP exploitation remain
underexplored.
Option (2) would enhance the current success (e.g., foster competitiveness of the
AV industry, increase citizens’ access to audiovisual content, explore cross-media
IP exploitation), but also would offer more flexibility of the legal bases, would
allow for horizontal intervention in cross-cutting challenges such as innovation,
investment (by increasing access to finance) and skills, and would contribute to
administrative benefits in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.
Option (3) would provide similar benefits as Option (2) but also comes with
dilution of policy objectives, and complexity of governance.
+ ++ +
Increase in cross-border
cultural cooperation and
increased cultural
participation and
accessibility, and
circulation of diverse
cultural works
Option (1) is the strongest option and scores (+) because with a stand-alone
programme fully dedicated to the cultural and creative sectors, the risk of using
cultural cooperation and cultural participation to reach other policy goals is
decreased as all the objectives of the programme would be centered around
culture and not on culture and values. The reason is that the current Creative
Europe programme operated under Option (1) already finances many types of
cultural works, coming from all the countries participating in the programme and
from very different types of stakeholders, many of them fighting various forms of
discrimination, as cultural diversity is precisely the key objective of the current
programme.
The risk of Options (2) and even more of Option (3) is that they both would move
the centre of gravity of the existing Creative Europe programme away from
culture (encompassing the cultural and creative sectors and audiovisual) towards a
more values-based approach. The importance of culture would then be reduced to
+ = -
86
reach other policy goals. Option (2) would come with the risk of diluting culture
with media because of, e.g., the focus on disinformation which again would be
even intensified under Option (3), making the score of a full integration lower
than of an objective-based merger. However, under Option (2), CERV’s anti-
discrimination could lead to increased types of work. This is why, Option (2)
would score (=) and Option 3 would score negatively (-).
OPC: 72% state that cross border support to cultural and creative sectors as an EU
action would bring a positive impact in the future. OPC: 72% state that EU
distribution, promotion and circulation EU content would bring a positive impact
in the future183
.
Cross-cutting innovation
and promote
sustainability of media,
cultural and societal
entities
Option (1) is the baseline, where there were no transversal actions addressing
commonalities among all three societal, cultural and media entities. Financing
responses to aspects such as innovation, access to finance, and sectoral skills have
been fragmented, whereas there are challenges common to all sectors (such as
digital transformation, rise of AI, financial weaknesses). The existing intervention
shows examples of success (blending through MediaInvest, Creative Europe
cross-sectoral strand). Option (2) creates a transversal response exploring the
synergies across all objectives in General Objective 1, to address these aspects,
and updating and uplifting the intervention of these areas and vertical policies.
Option (3) makes the new model unworkable, as all policies would be merged
together with other sectors, such as solidarity, youth and sport. It is not clear that
the work of sectoral skills would benefit from being on a common pot with a
general intervention on skills, whereas the other aspects (innovation and access to
finance for media, cultural, societal entities) risk dilution within the wider
priorities of a full merger.
- ++ -
Transnational cooperation
in the area of education
and skills
Option (1) is the baseline, where cooperation exists but there is a clear possibility
for improvement. Option (2) would bring Erasmus+ and ESC together and offer
additional cooperation potential, Option (3) provides no added value to Option (2)
under this criterion, while also leading to loss of coherence and dilution.
= ++ =
Support to transnational
learning mobility and
learning opportunities
As opposed to Option (1), Option (2) showcases additional synergy between
Erasmus+ and ESC. Option (3) could stimulate mobility in other areas than
= + ++
87
education, e.g., there could be bridges between Erasmus+ and mobility for artists
currently under CREA.
OPC: Cooperation and mobility in education, training, and solidarity is considered
as part of the most impactful factors for young respondents under 30. The support
of study/training is seen as an important policy priority for 90% of the private
citizens under 30 responding to the OPC184
.
Promote lifelong learning,
improving skills and new
competences
Option (1) is the baseline. Option (2) and Option (3) would both strengthen and
orchestrate funding in a way that better covers all the skills acquisition spectrum
in a lifelong and lifewide learning perspective, including upskilling and reskilling.
This would increase reach and allow to achieve critical mass, thereby enabling
more systemic impact.
= + +
Policy experimentation
and development acceler
ating modernisation
Option (1) is characterized by restrictive legal bases that limit the scope. Option
(2) could lead to (limited) new areas of experimentation like, e.g., new policy
activities with Erasmus+ and ESC. Option (3) would provide similar benefits to
Option (2) but would also put policy coherence at risk. The relative difference in
size of the relevant programmes could lead to dilution of comparatively smaller
ones.
- + =
Foster solidarity, civic
education and
engagement
Compared to Option (1), Option (2) well aligns with the wording “via education
and solidarity” of the criterion name. Option (3) allows for a better integration of
the aspects of social engagement and thus scores better than Option (1), but there
is less potentiality than Option (2).
= ++ +
Enhance contribution to
democracy
The current Option (1) already works quite well under this criterion. Option (2)
provides much stronger policy coherence with respect to Option (1), by bringing
together skills, education and solidarity on one side, and fundamental
rights/values, countering disinformation/media support and democratic resilience
on the other side. On the one hand, it would bring together programmes primarily
aimed at protecting democracy and upholding EU values, media freedom and
culture. It would combine CERV, Creative Europe and related budgetary
prerogative lines (cf. General Objective 1). On the other hand, it would merge
Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps, two instruments predominantly
supporting the acquisition of skills and key competences for life and jobs (General
+ ++ ++
88
Objective 2), contributing to competitiveness and fostering solidarity and
cohesion. This option would provide a closer alignment with two priorities
outlined in the political guidelines for the new mandate: (i) Protecting democracy,
upholding values and increased societal resilience and (ii) the Union of Skills.
Option (3) would allow for an enhanced contribution to democracy through
different angles (fundamental rights, EU values, media, culture, education and
solidarity) than the baseline but comes with a risk of dilution given the high
number of EU policies that would be addressed under one single instrument. This
might result in a disequilibrium between longstanding priorities of protecting
rights and combating violence, the growing focus on democratic resilience, and
the skills and education component, including due to differing budget share within
the cluster. Overall, this type of harmonisation may result in less tailored
approaches to specific needs and target groups. Moreover, it may overly simplify
complex policies that reflect different areas and degrees of EU competence and
Treaty provisions and might result in lesser focus being put on enhancing
democracy and respect of rights and EU values, especially in those areas where it
is most needed.
OPC: democracy, equality, rule of law, fundamental rights) and civil society are
considered as part of the most impactful factors for young respondents under 30.
The protection of democracy is seen as an important policy priority for 90% of the
private citizens under 30 responding to the OPC185
.
Enhance contribution to
competitiveness
Option (1) shows good performance as the status quo already delivers an approach
towards competitiveness, but it can be improved upon by Option (2). Option (2)
could allow for larger economies of scale of EU expenditure. Option (3) comes with
similar benefits to (2) but after a full merger, it could dilute the objective of
programmes that specifically target competitiveness, like, e.g., Erasmus+. 186
+ ++ +
Cooperation between EC
services and agencies
Currently, the status quo presents room for improvement from the cooperation
side. Option (2) would showcase better coordination, because services would
cooperate more on the preparation of programme documents.
= + +
89
Option (3) is similar to (2), there would be even more cooperation which would
come, however, with an increase in coordination costs due to further complexity.
Moreover, not all the DGs involved have a standing cooperation with those that
would be implied by this merger.
Cooperation between
institutions/organisations
in EU Member States
Currently, the status quo presents room for improvement from the cooperation
side. Although some policy areas are not politically and/or financially supported
by certain MSs, Option (2) is scored as + because it would foster cooperation
between applicants and participants.
Option (3) is analogous to Option (2).
= + +
Cooperation between EU
and Third Countries
(International
Cooperation)
Option (1) comes with difficulties that stem from legal obligations and framework
under the current programmes. Indeed, it is not easy to manage the large number
of agreements and the decentralised management of the call for funds. However,
it facilitates cooperation because Third Countries are able to choose to which
specific programme(s) they want to participate in. There are insufficiencies as
there are many programmes with different conditions to assess Third Countries.
Option (2) would create two more coherent clusters, and it would be easier to
manage the reduced number of agreements. However, it would be harder for
Third Countries to single out specific policy areas where they wish to collaborate
with the EU (on this matter, there are already concerns from EFTA). The success
of this option depends on the condition for associations of Third Countries, e.g.,
requests for setting up an agency.
Option (3) shares some characteristics with Option (2), but the mandates of
specific programmes offer excessively diverse coverage of Third Countries,
which leads to certain inefficiencies, and consequently to a total score of (=).
= + =
Transnational cooperation
(within EU)
Under Options (2) and (3), there could be additional benefits for transnational
cooperation within the EU between organisations that receive EU funding, e.g.,
cultural, media, civil society, and additionally for Option (3), educational
organisations etc. Although these benefits would reach a larger pool of
organisations under Option (3), the resulting heterogeneity of organisations could
also limit cooperation. Thus, we assign a (+) to both Option (2) and Option (3), as
= + +
90
in both cases there is an improvement with respect to the status quo. Indeed, under
Option (1), there is generally no possibility for the abovementioned cross-
fertilisation, e.g., on civic education.
Potentiality to integrate
inter-related projects
As opposed to Option (1), where it is desirable to improve coordination, Option
(2) allows for easier collaboration. Option (3) would produce a similar result to
Option (2), although it might come with the potential for some additional
integrated projects, e.g., between education and democratic participation.
= ++ ++
Planning impacts
continuity
By not altering the status quo, Option (1) preserves continuity. Option (2) comes
with comparatively little risk. Option (3) might allow for significant shifts of
funding between programmes, reducing the predictability of the budget of the
individual components.
+ - --
Prevention of dilution of
policy goals
Unlike Option (1), Option (2) would see a planning that better matches the policy
areas.
Although Option (3) would allow for covering the new policy areas, it could also
lead to dilution, e.g., for culture and rights and values, and unwanted
redistribution of budget.
= + -
Flexibility between
programmes to address
policy issues
Under Option (1), it is currently difficult to move funds between programmes.
Option (2) would create clusters of common policy issues. There would also offer
more flexibility to allocate funding to newly emerging policy needs. Option (3)
would provide the highest degree of flexibility to reallocate budget within a single
programme.
OPC: more flexibility should be introduced, to react to crises and emerging needs.
67% of the respondents still say that the lack of flexibility to adapt to new and
unforeseen developments is an obstacle to the effective use of the EU budget187
.
- + ++
Ease of access for
applicants
Currently, there are already problems in the accessibility of the programmes,
justifying a (–) as the score for the status quo. Option (2) would lead to some
simplification as the new level of heterogeneity in the clusters would not be
overly complex. Also, Option (3) would go in this direction, but there are overly
- ++ +
91
heterogenous requirements for certain calls which could result, e.g., in pushing for
same the rules for all applicants, thus complicating their procedures.
Time required for
application
In contrast to the status quo which is ranked as (=), Option (2) and Option (3) will
lead to a lower time required for applicants due to fewer calls needed to be
compiled.
= + +
Reduction of
administrative burdens
for beneficiaries
Thus, we see a score of (=) as the baseline status quo. In contrast, Option (2)
would indeed increase complexity, which is offset by simplification in
administration leading to an overall positive effect. In case of a full integration,
the strong increase of complexity is too much to compensate with simplification
alone, leading to a (=) score.
OPC: The top obstacle cited by EU citizens (80%) and organizations (86%) was
the administrative burden for beneficiaries188
.
= + =
Number of FTEs (Full
Time Equivalents)
managing the programme
Although the status quo might allow for improvements that could occur in the
long term, it remains difficult to measure how much an employee works on
specific programme-related tasks, justifying the score (=). Under Option (2), there
would be increased coordination costs but fewer programme committees, fewer
evaluations etc., and thus, this option simplifies the management as not every DG
has the same type of managerial workload as before. Under Option (3), there
might be the highest implementation costs in the short run, but in the long run
even less programme committees, fewer evaluations, fewer FTEs etc. would need
to be handled such that a full integration is the highest ranked option.
= + ++
Potential to streamline
types of management
(direct and indirect) to
simplify EU governance
Under the “Status quo”, the management of the programmes would continue to
follow the existing management boundaries, while “Objective-Based Merger”
would lead to some degree of alignment and streamlining, for example as regards
programme committees. Compared to the status quo, an objective-based merger
will not change the implementation mode of the programmes: clusters will follow
the same implementation logic, meaning the continuation of indirect and direct
management structures, e.g., for Erasmus+ and ESC, and only direct management
for CREA and CERV. Conversely, “Full Integration of all Programmes” would
mix different types of management mode and lead to overly blurred lines between
= ++ -
92
different implementation modes across policies, thus worsening the status quo.
Moreover, compared to status quo, Option (2) would lead to a constant number
and a consistent type of national authorities to interact with. Thus, an objective-
based merge would lead to a slight streamlining of programme committees.
Conversely, in Option (3), there would be too much heterogeneity for committee
members.
Potential to use the same
implementing
bodies/agencies/institutio
ns/approaches for several
programmees/policy
areas
Compared to the status quo, an objective-based merger would lead to the same
agencies working on the same programmes, and clusters following the same
implementation logic. This would lead to streamline work for indirect and direct
management structures, e.g., for Erasmus+ and ESC, and only direct management
for CREA and CERV. In case of a full integration, there would be direct and
indirect managements in one programme with separation per ‘strand’ as it is
currently the case in Erasmus+. Consequently, there is a risk of politicization for
support for the area of democracy and rights. The extra layer of complexity would
require interaction with more heterogeneous entities. Thus, the positive effect in
Option (3) is lower than in Option (2).
= ++ +
Impact on
comitology/interaction
with national authorities
Compared to Option (1), Option (2) would lead to a constant number and a
consistent type of national authorities to interact with. Thus, an objective-based
merge would lead to a slight improvement due to fewer programme committees.
Conversely, in Option (3), there would be too much heterogeneity for committee
members.
= + -
Synergies/complementarit
ies between clusters
Currently under the status quo, there are untapped synergies, and complementarity
has not worked in some cases, e.g., with CREA and HORIZON. An objective-
based merger or a full integration would make it easier to receive and combine
funding from multiple programmes.
= + +
Synergies/Complementari
ties within the cluster
Today, we have limited synergies between the programmes and have no
complementarities at all. This also did not work in the past, and due to the lack of
legal bases, synergies could not be exploited. Under Option (2), there is a better
identification of potential gaps and overlaps per each objective. This speaks in
favour of increased synergies between Erasmus+ and ESC as well as CREA and
-- ++ +
93
CERV. These organic synergies would solve the synergy problem at least for this
cluster. The effect in case of a full integration is still positive, but there is a risk of
policy dilution, due to the somewhat artificial set up of the cluster, such that the
structure could force unproductive alliances coming in hand with the risk of lower
complementarities.
Synergies/Complementari
ties with national &
regional policies
Under Option (1), there is no reasonable argument for the possibility of synergies
with national and regional policies. By merging programmes, irrespective of using
Option (2) or (3), there is a slight chance for an improvement.
= + +
Possibility of a
rechanneling of funds
between areas within a
programme
In the status quo, it is difficult to move funds between programmes. Under Option
(2), there would be more flexibility to allocate funding to newly emerging policy
needs. Logically, Option (3) would provide the highest possibility of
rechannelling funds and the highest degree of flexibility to reallocate budget.
OPC: Currently, 81% of the respondents see the different and often complex fund
specific rules for access to funding as an obstacle preventing EU budget from
fully delivering its objectives in these policy areas189
.
- + ++
Reduce overlaps between
funding actions
addressing a policy
objective
In practice, it is still impossible to reduce overlaps between the funding actions in
the status quo, as also indicated in the OPC: 53% of respondents think that there
are many programmes with overlapping policy goals harming EU’s objectives
delivery190
. An objective-based merger would provide an increased coordination
to prevent overlaps. This would also hold for a full integration of all programmes
but with some risk of dilution.
- ++ +
Ability to address each of
the specific problem
drivers
Under the status quo, the challenge is that some problem drivers are not addressed
now, as problems keep evolving and reshaping the ecosystem, while the legal
bases are fragmented or not sufficiently flexible. Moreover, some important
problem drivers that would be covered under other options are not yet covered
under the status quo, such as the disruptions to the media market. Therefore,
fundamental problem drivers, which were also identified in the political
guidelines, remain under-addressed under option (1). Using Option (2), new areas
can be covered, and economies of scale would arise due to the merge by the
specific policy objectives. For example, the problem drivers 1.3. and 1.4. could be
- ++ +
94
addressed under an objective-based merger, avoiding overlaps, and problem
driver 1.6 can be specifically addressed by the new instrument. A full merge in
Option (3) would not solve all issues of the status quo and would be a step
towards Option (2). However, some problem drivers might not be addressed in a
targeted manner, due to loss of focus of a fully merged programme. This is in
particular the case of problem driver 1.6, which would be diluted as it is cross-
cutting for just societal, cultural and media entities, and directly related to the
objective-based merger. Therefore, the high risk of dilution only speaks for the
score (+) for Option (3).
Ability to address each of
the specific programme
objectives
Under the status quo, the problem is that some policy objectives are not funded
right now as they are a direct response to new problems (while the applicable
rules are overly strict) or because these are recent priorities of the Commission.
Moreover, some important policy objectives that would be covered under other
options are not yet covered under the status quo, such as contributing to a viable
and diverse trustworthy information ecosystem. Under Option (2), the broader
scope allows for adaptability and expansion, facilitating the achievement of both
existing and emerging objectives. Synergies from thematic alignment improve
strategic coherence in addressing programme objectives. This is the case in
particular of specific objective 1.7, which seeks to spur innovation and promote
sustainable financing models in media, cultural sectors and societal ecosystems to
enhance their innovation. A full merge in Option (3) would not solve all issues of
the status quo and would be a step back compared to Option (2). A high risk of
dilution applies for the score = for Option (3). This is specially the case for the
cross-cutting dimension of the objective based merger under problem 1, which
creates strong synergies for societal, cultural and media players in adapting to
digital transformation and increasing access to finance, as it is unclear how this
cross-cutting part would not be dilute under a full merger. Altogether, the merging
of disparate policy areas introduces complexity. Risk of trade-offs between
conflicting objectives weakens the ability to pursue each one effectively.
- ++ =
95
Ability to sufficiently
prioritise each of the main
policy areas
Under the status quo, the problem is that some policy areas are not funded right
now as a result of the emerging policy priorities as the applicable rules are overly
strict.
Option (2): Prioritisation is preserved due to thematic coherence and alignment
with two new main priorities of the European Commission, as expressed by the
political guidelines: the Democracy Shield (merger 1) and the Union of Skills
(merger 2).
A higher flexibility (compared to status quo) enables proactive reallocation of
resources based on the evolving nature policy areas. Clearer lines of
accountability and strategy due to the grouping by objectives and management
modes will increase the performance and impact of these policy priorities.
A full merge in (3) would not solve all issues of the status quo and would be a
step back compared to Option (2). It is nevertheless valuable because it covers
sufficient grounds of adaptation. The high risk of fragmentation and dilution is the
reason for the score (=) for Option (3). In fact, in Option (3), the wide range of
objectives increases the risk of fragmentation. Dilution of focus likely undermines
the ability to treat an area as a clear priority. Although policy areas in the cluster
are people’s driven, there is a second risk of confusion of policy areas and
priorities on areas that in principle have little relation (e.g. audiovisual
competitiveness with students' mobility). It is to note that the public survey
included 37 different policy priorities, which illustrate the extent to which a full
merger risks mixing too many areas of interest under a common pot. As such,
Option (3) presents a risk of complexity.
- ++ =
Risk of loss of
customised approaches to
(policy) specific needs
and target groups
The status quo already works sufficiently well, whereas Option (2) would be a
step forward as it would then become easier to clearly define the policy
boundaries and to determine a clear nexus between the EU strategy and funding.
Furthermore, it would provide more clarity on the target groups of the different
policy clusters. However, a full integration of the programmes would lead to an
overly extensive heterogeneity between the target groups, as it would be too
+ ++ -
96
difficult to compare different beneficiaries such as e.g., compare an Erasmus+
student to a competitor of Google.
OPC: 67% of the respondents say that the limited reach to relevant/diverse/more
diverse target groups is an obstacle preventing the EU budget from fully
delivering its objectives191
.
Risk of loss of branding
fostered by visibility of
current programmes vis-
à-vis existing target
groups
The status quo works, although some segments are not covered and existing target
groups are accustomed to current branding of programme which would ease
continuity in the next MFF. Yet, the OPC shows that there is an overwhelmingly
positive attitude towards the EU programmes, most notably Erasmus+. An
objective-based merger could lead to risks of slightly reduced visibility for
CREA. Under Option (3), there is a risk of reduced visibility of individual
programmes that are highly popular such as Erasmus+ and to some extent
Creative Europe.
+ - - -
97
2.2 Ranking of policy options
The importance of mathematical approaches in SMCE is their ability to allow a consistent
aggregation of the diverse information. Otherwise, even if everybody would agree on the
multidimensional nature of an IA study, the implementation in a real-world assessment
exercise would be impossible. The standard objection might be that the aggregation of
apples and oranges is impossible. Multi-criteria mathematics does answer to this objection
in a definitive way. When using mathematical rules, consistency between the problem
structuring and the ranking of policy options is guaranteed, this makes the overall IA study
much more defensible.
SOCRATES makes all required computations. From a mathematical point of view, the
information contained in the impact matrix useful for solving the so-called multi-criterion
problem is:
• Intensity of preference (when quantitative criterion scores are present).
• Number of criteria in favour of a given alternative.
• Weight attached to each single criterion.
• Relationship of each single alternative with all the other alternatives.
Combinations of this information generate different aggregation conventions, i.e.
manipulation rules of the available information to arrive at a preference structure. The
aggregation of several criteria implies taking a position on the fundamental issue of
compensability. For example, in evaluating a policy option that presents a very bad
environmental impact and a very good economic impact, it is clear that allowing or not for
compensability and to which degree is the key assumption.
An aggregation rule that is simple, non-compensatory and minimises the rank reversal
phenomena is the Kemeny rule. Its basic idea is that the maximum likelihood ranking of
policy options is the ranking supported by the maximum number of criteria (or criterion
weights) for each pair-wise comparison, summed over all pairs of options considered.
There is agreement in the literature that the Kemeny method is “the correct method” for
ranking options, and that the only drawback of this aggregation method is the difficulty in
computing it when the number of options grows. A numerical algorithm solving this
computational drawback in an efficient way has been developed recently at JRC and it has
been implemented in SOCRATES 137
.
Overall, the objective of SOCRATES is NOT substitution of policy-makers through a
mathematical model, on the contrary, the objective is to improve their understanding of the
main features of the problem at hand, such as key assumptions, degree of uncertainty,
robustness of results and overall technical and social defensibility of options chosen. The
philosopher Socrates said: “I cannot teach anybody anything. I can only make them think.”
This is the main inspiring principle of the SOCRATES software too.
Three main components constitute the core of SOCRATES: multi-criteria, equity and
sensitivity analyses. Multi-criteria analysis requires the definition of relevant dimensions,
objectives and criteria. It uses weights as importance coefficients and clarifies their role in
the hierarchical structure. The impact matrix may include quantitative (including also
stochastic and/or fuzzy uncertainty) and qualitative (ordinal and/or linguistic)
measurements of the performance of an alternative with respect to an evaluation criterion.
98
It supplies a ranking of the alternatives according to the set of evaluation criteria (i.e. the
technical compromise solution/s).
By applying SOCRATES to the information contained in the impact matrix (see Table 2),
the following ranking, described in Figure 1 is obtained (under the assumption that all
dimensions have the same weight, see Figure 2).
Figure 1. Ranking of all options
The ranking shows that “Objective-Based Merger” is the best choice followed by “Full
Integration of all programmes”, while “Status Quo” is definitely the worst option.
Figure 2. Equal dimension weighting assumption
2.3 Sensitivity analysis
The result robustness will be further checked by means of local and global sensitivity
analyses. A degree of uncertainty always affects all model outcomes; consequently,
effective and transparent practice in policy support requires identifying and quantifying
the different sources of uncertainty as much as possible. In decision sciences, the main
objective of sensitivity analysis is reinforcing the arguments supporting a decision
recommendation.
In the framework of SOCRATES, the objective of sensitivity analysis is to check the
ranking robustness and determine which of the input parameters influence more the results.
Consistently with this objective, local sensitivity analysis looks at the sensitivity of
rankings obtained with respect to a) the exclusion/inclusion of different criteria and
dimensions; and b) dimensions and criterion weights changes; all parameters are changed
one per time. A very important point is that both dimension/criterion weights are increased
up to a maximum of 50% of the total importance, consequently any “dictator” effect is
99
avoided. Global sensitivity analysis explores the whole weight space, thus accounting for
all possible combinations and interactions of criterion weights; all parameters are changed
simultaneously. The whole information produced by local and global sensitivity analyses
is synthesised into simple graphics.
Let us then first look at the influence of the exclusion of the various criteria and
dimensions, one per time, and at the effect of using the subset of criteria belonging to one
dimension only (i.e. first one criterion per time is eliminated and the corresponding ranking
is obtained later a whole dimension with all its criteria is eliminated and the effect on the
final ranking is checked). The objective of local sensitivity analysis is to better understand
the overall assessment structure.
When considering dimensions, “tilde” means without that specific dimension, while
without “tilde” means considering only that specific dimension. Figure 3 presents the
results of this exercise. As one can see ranking of options is very robust. “Objective-Based
Merger” is always the winner, followed by “Full Integration of all programmes” and
“Status Quo”. Only when considering the assessment structure without “Proportionality”,
there is an uncertainty in the comparison between “Full Integration of all programmes”
and “Status Quo”, since both of them might be second or third, however, also in this case,
there is no doubt that “Objective-Based Merger” is the most desirable one.
Figure 4 describes the influence on the overall ranking of each single criterion deletion
(the “tilde” means without that specific criterion). No criterion alone can modify the
ranking, thus from this point of view results are very robust, “Objective-Based Merger” is
the clear winner, “Full Integration of all programmes” is second and “Status Quo” is third.
Figure 5 synthesises all results as a frequency matrix, where it is indicated how many times
each option is present in any rank position, and the percentage each rank position is
occupied by each single option. In this way, it becomes clear that option “Objective-Based
Merger” is the most desirable one, in fact it occupies the first position in the 100 per cent
of all the rankings obtained, while “Full Integration of all programmes” is second in the
97.2 per cent of all rankings and “Status Quo” is in the bottom position with no doubt.
Figure 3. Rankings obtained by eliminating one dimension per time or by using only one
dimension
100
Figure 4. Rankings obtained by eliminating one criterion per time
101
Figure 5. Summary of results on criteria and dimensions
Finally, the issue of robustness of results with respect to weights is particularly relevant.
The ranking robustness can be further checked by means of local and global sensitivity
analyses. In local sensitivity analysis, the weight corresponding to one dimension/criterion
per time is increased till a maximum of 50 per cent of the total importance, while all other
weights are reduced proportionally and they are all identical. In global sensitivity analysis,
all possible combinations of criterion weights are considered (all weights are changed at
the same time and extreme cases are considered, too).
As one can see in Figure 6, describing local sensitivity analysis of dimension weights, the
ranking is corroborated in the 100 per cent of simulations; the same result applies when
performing local sensitivity analysis of criterion weights, as shown in Figure 7. This
ranking stability is confirmed by global sensitivity analysis in which, as shown in Figure
8, all simulations confirm the original ranking. In summary, we can conclude that the
weights attached to dimensions and criteria have no role in determining the final ranking
which is very stable.
102
Figure 6. Local sensitivity analysis of dimension weights
Figure 7. Local sensitivity analysis of criterion weights
103
2.4 Pairwise comparison
Finally, more information can be obtained by checking the pairwise comparisons, which
allow one to be fully aware of the mutual weaknesses and strengths on each single
assessment criterion. This information is summarised graphically in Figure 9, where the
degrees of credibility that any option is preferred or indifferent with respect to another one
on each single criterion are illustrated.
From Figure 9 it is possible to deduce that option “Objective-Based Merger” is better than
“Status Quo” in most of criteria considered, with the exception of “Degree of fighting
against gender-based violence, violence against children and other groups at risk”,
“Increase in cross-border cultural cooperation and increased cultural participation and
accessibility, and circulation of diverse cultural works”, “Planning impacts continuity” and
“Risk of loss of branding fostered by visibility of current programmes vis-à-vis existing
target groups”.
When comparing “Objective-Based Merger” with “Full Integration of all programmes”,
there are various criteria where the two options show a similar performance (ten criteria),
but most of the remaining ones are in favour of “Objective-Based Merger” (25 criteria).
Only four criteria evaluate “Full Integration of all programmes” better than “Objective-
Based Merger”.
104
Figure 9: Pairwise comparison
105
106
107
108
ANNEX 5: COMPETITIVENESS CHECK
Contribution of media industries to competitiveness
Overview of impacts on competitiveness
Dimensions of Competitiveness
Impact of the initiative
(++ / + / 0 / - / -- / n.a.)
References to sub-sections of
the main report or annexes
Cost and price competitiveness +
Assessment below under ‘Cost
and Price Competitiveness’
International competitiveness ++
Assessment below under
‘International Competitiveness’
Capacity to innovate +
Assessment under ‘Capacity to
Innovate’
SME competitiveness ++
Assessment under ‘Cost and
Price Competitiveness’ and
‘International Competitiveness’
Synthetic assessment192
Challenges and Contextualisation
Beyond their societal and cultural importance, copyright intensive sectors with a very
broad user base such as audiovisual, news and publishing, video games and music,
are strategic for the EU economy and are similarly disrupted due to digitalisation.
Valued at EUR 206bn in 2023, these sectors together are expected to reach EUR 240bn by
2030. In the EU, online distribution already makes up around 30% of the revenues of these
sectors, in the US this is close to 50%193
. The audiovisual market (cinema, TV, streaming)
is the biggest segment, accounting for almost half of revenues. Video games are the second
largest segment, followed by news/publishing and audio (music/radio/podcasts).
Global companies outweigh EU companies in the dynamic online segment of the
audiovisual market. Global video sharing platforms such as YouTube and TikTok have
grown enormously over the last few years, reaching 23% of the audiovisual sector and
forecast to double by 2029. Global, mainly US, streamers control 80% of European
subscriptions. Streaming as a whole has grown to 17% of audiovisual revenues and is
projected to grow by 31% by 2029. EU companies have the strongest position in the
traditional segment of broadcasting (53% of revenues) but this is under severe competitive
pressures in terms of advertising revenues and audiences. Cinema represents under 5% of
audiovisual revenues. Meanwhile the share of US companies in the revenues of the top
100 audiovisual companies in Europe went up to 40% in 2023.194
The EU audiovisual sector is fragmented, and dependent on public funding (mostly
national). 99% of the almost 100,000 EU audiovisual companies, especially producers and
distributors (the main beneficiaries of MEDIA), are SMEs. EU audiovisual players,
including larger players like broadcasters, typically have a national focus in contrast to
global competitors (Hollywood majors, large tech companies and Netflix). National public
funding to public sector broadcasters accounts for around half of EU broadcasting revenues
and public funding is also the main source of financing for EU films. Furthermore, there
109
are substantial differences between funding across Member States leading to uneven
audiovisual capacities across the EU195
.
The EU video games industry captures a limited share of global revenues (13%), with
only two companies among the 25 biggest game industry firms. It is mostly
characterised by the high fragmentation of its industrial ecosystem, with a vast array of
developers and a limited number of leading publishers. Europe’s lag is aggravated by the
dependence on non-European technologies (e.g., game engines and cloud) and distribution
platforms. The number of available games is increasing in almost all segments (nearly
tripled for PC between 2020 and 2024), making European games less discoverable since
consumers are spending much of their time on older and non-EU titles (in 2024, games
over 6 years old accounted for 57% of playtime on PC and consoles).196
The news media sector is experiencing a decline of total revenues, with a decrease of
8% between 2019 and 2023. Traditional sources of revenues accounted for 89% of the total
revenues generated by the sector in 2024, despite a general gradual decline. Digital
advertising rose from EUR 4.4 billion in 2019 to EUR 5.4 billion in 2023 and is expected
to reach EUR 7.1 billion by 2028 but does not compensate for the drop in traditional
revenues, leading to a revenue gap. In addition, the total number of news media companies
in the EU-27 is decreasing, and small enterprises dominate the market across the EU. In
2023, there were 85.087 news media companies operating across the EU-27. The total
number of employees shrank by 7.5%, between 2021-2023. Material and staff costs for
news media companies have increased over the last 10 years by 13% and by 14%,
respectively. All in all, media viability is at risk in nearly all EU countries. In 2023, nearly
all countries (except the Netherlands and Luxembourg) experience a medium to high risk
on media viability (i.e. lack of sufficient resources to finance the media).
Cost and price competitiveness
The preferred option is expected to increase competitiveness, by further encouraging
international co-productions with a potential to achieve popularity with
transnational audiences online. International co-productions allow for more cost
efficiency in audiovisual productions (through more diverse sources of financing,
economies of scale and sharing know-how) and access to additional national markets,
thereby increasing addressable demand. 55% of MEDIA supported projects over the past
10 years were co-productions vs. unsupported projects, and the difference has increased
under the current MEDIA programme (82% of all supported projects are co-
productions).197
Moreover 30% of developed works were produced and released, thus
reducing the commercial risks in investing in production by thorough pre-production
preparations which increase the potential for quality works.
Regarding video games, more support would be granted to European developers and
their quality IPs who have been behind many recent commercial and critical
successes. The EU has a strong mobile gaming ecosystem that could be, if supported
appropriately, an asset for the EU economy as the mobile gaming sector is forecast to
grow198
. The video games industry also needs support to be able to cooperate with other
European creative industries in digital and non-digital value chains to strengthen local and
national game developer communities199
.
Moreover, the preferred option is expected to increase competitiveness, by extending
current blended equity instruments to other copyright-intensive sectors which face
funding gaps. Further funding of the loan guarantee facility launched in 2016 and of the
110
equity investment instrument launched in 2022 (MediaInvest, targeting €400 millions in
private investment) is also crucial. This will continue attracting capital in the video games
and other creative sectors, where EU market operators have not yet demonstrated mature
investment dynamic.200
MediaInvest provides risk capital, encouraging the creation of
dedicated equity funds and enlarging the available sources of financing for audiovisual and
gaming companies. In 2023, the value of private equity deals in the audiovisual sector
(including movies, video games and entertainment) was close to its lowest annual level
since at least 2019201
, leaving the gap in equity financing of €399 to €649 million per year
identified in the Media and Audiovisual Action Plan partially unaddressed.
Finally, the preferred option will scale up support to news media, promoting new
business models and economies of scale, thereby improving the viability of news
media outlets. In the field of news media, the limited EU-level funding (under existing
Creative Europe MEDIA and Multimedia Actions line) has enhanced cost efficiency and
supporting sustainable business models, especially through cross-border collaborations
and multilingual content production202
. This indicates a direct contribution to production
efficiency, partly due to innovative business models (e.g., podcasting) and centralised
coordination.
International competitiveness
The preferred option will further improve international competitiveness, through better IP
exploitation and an increased focus on discoverability of works, including online. There
will be a strengthened emphasis on supporting business models leading to a broader
exploitation of IP, also across different content formats. The preferred option would also
continue supporting the non-national demand for European films, building on the success
of MEDIA so far.
a) Cross media IP exploitation
Exploiting the same IP across different content formats (films, series, books, games, music)
can have a positive impact on competitiveness. It can reduce costs (development,
distribution and marketing) and increase access to consumers e.g. gamers may watch a film
adaptation of a game and vice versa. Young people especially seem to be loyal to IP203
.
Transmedia exploitation helps with discoverability and increases commercial success for
both the original and adapted version. For example, the box office revenues of a film
adapting pre-existing content (books) is around 50% higher than films with an original
screenplay, while TV dramas adapted from books attract 58% more viewers.204
Music
tracks, similarly, can generate substantial revenues from their inclusion in video games,
films or TV series.
However European industry needs support in this regard. More than two-thirds of the top
100 films and series in 2024 were based on pre-existing ideas and IP205
. However, none of
the top 20 franchise commissions were from the EU. Also, none of the titles reaching more
than 10 million admissions in the EU were from the EU. Therefore, there is a considerable
gap in performance, with potential opportunities for growth. Producers and distributors
are mainly micro and small national enterprises which often do not have the resources,
expertise or contacts to forge links with other creative sectors and explore collaborative
projects across Europe. Similarly, writers, editors, game developers and publishers and
music labels lack structured opportunities to collaborate at European level. Therefore, the
European IP industries need support to structure their collaboration.
111
This option would have added value in promoting the exploitation of IP across different
formats on a pan-European basis. MEDIA already has a relevant track record. The
broadcasting of Babylon Berlin, a TV series based on a book and co-financed by MEDIA
for EUR 1 mio, was followed by the book series selling hundreds of thousands of copies
in 22 languages.206
The release of the MEDIA-supported videogame The Witcher 3: Wild
Hunt was followed by the book series selling over 15 million copies worldwide207
. Under
this option MEDIA would build on this experience to support cross media IP through the
value chain through a dedicated “IP hub”. This would enhance support to development
and production of IP with cross-media potential. It would also create professional fora
which would bring together professionals from across the IP industries to stimulate
collaboration. Distribution through relevant channels, notably online, would be funded.
b) Boost circulation and consumption of European content
The European audiovisual industry needs to reach wider audiences to increase its market
share, generate revenues, strengthen its independence and grow. As currently only an
average of 25% of admissions for EU films come from abroad, there is great potential to
increase growth across the EU single market. Whilst there has been a high level of
production by Member States this has not been translated into higher European audiences
and therefore more efforts are needed in particular to boost circulation and discoverability.
Therefore, MEDIA funding will be particularly relevant since it is focused on the cross-
border dimension. MEDIA support between 2014-2020 is correlated with increased
circulation of films and series with over 9 more EU countries across TV, 6 more countries
on TV and 3 more countries on online streamers. MEDIA is also correlated with an over
240 million more non-national admissions in EU27 cinemas. Also, 80% of works
supported are co-productions, which several studies have confirmed are more successful
internationally.
Under this option there will be more focus on content creation, promotion and marketing
for works online as this sub-segment is driving growth and attracting younger audiences.
Activities to support distribution of works online will be increased including through
European VOD services. Innovative hybrid business models between cinema theatres and
streamers will be pursued, drawing on findings which show that theatrical releases increase
chances of success online208
. Innovative online marketing tools209
will be further
encouraged, as well as the use of Artificial Intelligence for data analytics on audiences to
assist in content creation and distribution210
and boost the performance of promotion
campaigns.
Beyond the EU, films represented only 1% of screenings in cinemas211
. However, the
highest share of EU content was reached in Mexico and Argentina, largely driven by the
popularity and success of Spanish films in these markets: the share of Spanish titles within
EU showings there has been more than 30%212
. Online, only a few EU works are in the
top 10 worldwide in a market dominated by three giant US streamers.
Thus, MEDIA will also be relevant in increasing the focus on supporting circulation and
consumption of European works in key international markets beyond the EU, both
theatrically and online.
AlsoAlso, the preferred option will provide enhanced opportunities to increase the
international appeal and exposure of the European gaming sector. MEDIA funding
for game development significantly increased the chances of videogames being
112
finalised and released (on average, 89% of development projects supported became
prototypes). The central role of non-European global digital platforms for the distribution
of European games creates the need for enhanced EU funding support to improve the
exploitation of these games213
. These include marketing, promotion and post-release
operations.
Capacity to Innovate
The audiovisual and other content media sectors are among the most disrupted when it
comes to digital technology and AI. For example, Generative Artificial Intelligence in
audiovisual (including music) outputs are projected to grow significantly, with a recent
study forecasting a market size of EUR 48 bn by 2028 for AI-driven virtual production,
with a compound annual growth rate of 85% between 2023 and 202837
. Media markets in
the EU are increasingly influenced by global tech companies who have made major forays
into all copyright intensive, mass-market content sectors (audiovisual, games, news, music,
books). Other major global players include online players e.g. Netflix and Hollywood
studios who cooperate on technology through a structure called ‘MovieLabs’. Netflix
allocated approximately 7% of its annual revenue (EUR 2.4 bn) to R&I, while Walt Disney
has more than 6,000 patents, outpacing EU players overall.
European media companies need support to take up tech innovation as they lag behind
other sectors. The 2024 EU R&D Investment Scoreboard shows that among the top 2,000
companies analysed, only 23 are media companies, including Denmark's TV2 and France's
Vivendi. Venture capital investment into media technology is much lower than in the US.
In 2023, US tech companies in the audiovisual sector attracted EUR 3.6 bn while EU
counterparts only EUR 520 million in venture capital investment38
. Based on a recent
survey of companies in the creative and cultural sectors, only 30% have adopted a digital
transformation strategy and companies have indicated that investment in AI represents less
than 1% of their total investments.39
Therefore European media companies, which are
mainly small enterprises, are widely dependent on non-EU tech tools, for example as
regards AI. They need funding to develop and/or use innovative tools and business models
which are operational and adapted to their activities on content production and
distribution. Also the mid-term evaluation of the current Creative Europe programme
confirmed these needs are more pronounced for a number of specific copyright-intensive,
mass-market content industries40
.
The preferred option will increase the capacity to innovate by focusing on larger-scale
collaborations in innovation with a stronger focus on cross-sectoral deployability for the
creation, discoverability, marketing and monetisation of EU-produced content across all
media segments. Collaborative projects at European level can be effective in sharing
knowledge and gaining economies of scale. Funding will thus aim to bridge current gaps
by supporting larger-scale collaborations and more directly aligning funded projects with
industry needs for scalable content creation, discoverability, and monetisation
solutions. MEDIA support will build on its record of supporting innovation, notably
through the Innovative Tools and Business Models action launched in 2021 which is
starting to deliver results, notably in analytics and AI tools to support production,
marketing and subscription models41
. This option would also exploit synergies with other
programmes such as the European Innovation Council funding of start-ups and scale ups,
which could scale up project seed funding of MEDIA. Also it would complement the
fundamental research and innovation projects of Horizon and Digital Europe, for example
113
the media data spaces project which has the potential to provide a pool of data relevant for
media applications.
SME competitiveness
Over 99% of companies in the creative and cultural sectors are SMEs. EU funding for the
IP-intensive industries is overwhelmingly targeted at SMEs, notably in the independent
production, distribution and theatrical exhibition as well as the independent gaming
development sector. Therefore, the above findings on competitiveness apply to SME
competitiveness as well. For a detailed analysis of the impact on SMEs, consult Annex 6.
Conclusion
All in all, the preferred option (Option 2) is deemed to have a positive impact on the
competitiveness of the audiovisual and media industries. The proposed architecture will
enhance effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and proportionality of the EU intervention,214
which in turn, would strengthen the existing contribution to competitiveness. The current
interventions, which were proven to be successful, will be enhanced, this concerns
promotion of cross-border circulation of films and series, international co-productions,
with a stronger focus on other types of media content, but also optimising IP exploitation
across different formats and strengthening and expanding the existing blended equity
instrument. The intervention will be enhanced through improved cooperation and
coordination of main policy areas; improved efficiency for applicants and beneficiaries, by
streamlining EU management, governance and implementation; synergies and
complementarities, and reduced overlaps; improved reactiveness to new challenges.
Contribution of the other cultural and creative sectors to competitiveness
Dimensions of Competitiveness
Impact of the
initiative
(++ / + / 0 / - / -- /
n.a.)
References to sub-sections of the main
report or annexes
Cost and price competitiveness n.a.215
International competitiveness + Annex on evaluation
Capacity to innovate + Annex on evaluation
SME competitiveness n.a.216
Challenges and contextualisation
The cultural and creative sectors other than the media and audio-visual sectors encompass
a wide range of sectors from heritage to music, from books & publishing to visual arts,
performing arts and architecture. Some of these sectors are partly industry-based while
others are much more dependent on public support. These sectors are mostly made off a
myriad of small and medium-sized entities of all types (organisations, associations,
institutions, SMEs, self-employed workers etc.). The development and competitiveness of
these sectors is impacted by different global trends. Digitalisation has already changed the
114
value chains in some CCS subsectors (for example in the music industry). Digital
technologies are more than a ‘contextual factor’; they are often an ‘enabling factor’, or
even a radical step in the context of the new industrial revolution, changing the way culture
and CCS products and services are produced and accessed, and how knowledge is
transferred. Other trends that have an impact on, or offer new possibilities to,
entrepreneurship and innovation in the CCS include the sharing economy, new
technologies (virtual reality, real-time data, smart home technology, AI etc.), changes in
working life, and climate change. 217
Finally, Europe’s market fragmentation by language
and country has sometimes impeded the emergence of globally dominant players in these
fields. Additionally, digital giants from the US control much of the distribution (e.g.
streaming platforms, app stores), posing challenges for European content creators to
capture value.
The preferred option would impact on the CCS international competitiveness and capacity
to innovate through providing CCS organisations and professionals with capacity-building
and networking opportunities on how to market works and reach new audiences including
at international level, to develop greener cultural activities or to to developing funding
applications, testing new business models in a rapidly evolving digital context and
developing managerial capacity.
Contribution of education, training, youth, sport and skills to competitiveness
The preferred Option – objectives-based merger – is expected to have a positive overall
impact on EU competitiveness across all pillars (cost and price competitiveness,
innovation capacity, international competitiveness and SME competitiveness).
Table below summarises the key competitiveness impacts and indicators, with comparative
benchmarks where relevant.
Overview of impacts on competitiveness
Dimensions of Competitiveness
Impact of the
initiative
(++ / + / 0 / - / -- / n.a.)
References to sub-sections of the main
report or annexes
Cost and price competitiveness +
Assessment below under ‘Cost and Price
Competitiveness’
International competitiveness +
Assessment below under ‘International
Competitiveness’
Capacity to innovate ++
Assessment below under ‘capacity to
innovate’
SME competitiveness ++
Assessment below under ‘SME
competitiveness’
Synthetic assessment
115
Investment in education and skills are very important. A JRC paper analysed the
impact of EU investment in skills (ESF, YEI, and React-EU) and found one of the highest
multipliers by 2030: investing 1 euro would yield 1.603 euro218
Simulations219
assuming a gradual improvement over 15 years show that increasing basic
skills by 25 PISA points could lead to a 0.5 pp higher average annual growth rate in EU
GDP in the long term. At national and European level, it has been estimated that if Europe
achieved its current literacy benchmark, this could lead to an aggregate GDP gain of 21
EUR trillion over the lifetime of the generation born in 2010220
.
Evidence also shows that low-income countries with higher shares of graduates with
tertiary education experienced stronger catching-up towards the average GDP per capita
between 2008 and 2021.
VET graduates generally have good employment prospects. In 2023, 81.0% of young
medium-level graduates who had completed their VET programme were in employment,
putting the 2025 EU-level target of at least 82% within reach221
.
An analysis of the OECD (2013) shows that countries with high rates of participation in
adult learning are more competitive. PIAAC data illustrate the central role that basic skills
play in shaping economic outcomes. In the EU17, an increase of skills by around 40 points
(slightly less than one skills level) is linked with an increase in wages ranging from
approximately 5% in Denmark, Finland and Italy to more than 10% in the UK. In the
upskilling scenario (7.4% ) of the low-skilled, total net benefits over ten years could equal
2 013 billion EUR278 and 3,528 billion EUR in a zero low-skilled (0%) scenario with
increases in annual GDP (2025-50) at 200 billion EUR and 410 billion EUR respectively
die to the reduction or elimination of low skilled adults222
.
Education and skills reforms are important. Efficient spending ensures that resources are
channelled to areas where they have sufficient impact and are spent effectively, enhancing
value for money. Research suggests that reducing inefficiencies in spending on education
could lead to substantial gains in the EU, with the potential to increase annual growth of
GDP per capita by 0.8 pp in the long term223
.
Cost and price competitiveness
The preferred option contributes to cost and price competitiveness largely through
efficiency gains and improved productivity in the education, training and CCSIs.
Cost competitiveness: Since education is largely publicly provided in Europe, cost
competitiveness is less about firm operating costs and more about system efficiency.
Europe’s systems tend to be cost-effective relative to outcomes (e.g. EU countries spend
roughly 30% less per tertiary student than the US, yet produce comparable skill levels in
many fields). One advantage the EU has internationally is affordability of education –
low or no tuition in many countries – which can be seen as a competitive strength in
attracting foreign students (where cost is a factor, in contrast to high tuition in the US).
The preferred option’s continued support for student mobility (often with scholarships)
and potential new talent attraction schemes (like expanding Erasmus Mundus) will
reinforce this cost advantage by reducing financial barriers for incoming talent. On the flip
side, the sector’s cost competitiveness can be hindered by demographic changes (declining
student populations in some countries could raise per-student costs) and by administrative
overhead. The merger helps by streamlining funding – meaning universities and schools
face less administrative cost when tapping EU funds for innovation or exchange projects,
improving their operational efficiency.
116
Streamlined administration and economies of scale: the double merger is projected to
reduce overhead and compliance costs for both participating organisations and managing
authorities. By sharing resources, IT systems and support structures, the more integrated
implementation will contribute to eliminate, over the long run, certain duplicative
processes for beneficiaries and achieving economies of scale. For example, better
coordination, common application portals and harmonised reporting and support will lower
the cost of accessing funds for schools, universities, cultural SMEs, entreprises active
under the EU education, training, youth and sport programmes, small-scale organisations
active in training, and civil society and will also reduce access costs for applicants and
project holders. In addition, the Commission and National Agencies can expect potentially
lower management and transaction costs (e.g. fewer committees, unified monitoring and
evaluation), translating into savings that can be reallocated to core activities, cutting
administrative costs in the long run, improving the cost-efficiency of EU funding delivery.
Lower costs for participants and SMEs: A unified programme simplifies the funding
landscape for small organisations, including SMEs224
. Currently, an estimated one-third of
Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps beneficiaries are the same entities. Under the
preferred option, they would face a single process and interface rather than navigating
multiple programmes. This will reduce application overhead, especially benefitting SMEs
and micro-organisations that often have limited administrative capacity. Also, exploiting
strong synergies between the two sets of merged instruments, will avoid duplicated effort
(for instance, one joint call can cover both educational, citizenship and cultural objectives),
the initiative lowers compliance costs and improves small organisations’ cost
competitiveness.
Sector-specific cost considerations: In education and training, better recognition of
learning (including non-formal learning) and skills portability facilitated under the
preferred option across the spectrum of learning activities can reduce the cost of re-training
or remedial education. Workers will carry portable, certified EU skills (including those
gained via volunteering or informal learning) which employers trust, reducing duplication
of training efforts.
Enhanced labour productivity through skills: in the medium to long term, the preferred
option will indirectly reduce unit labour costs by improving the skill level and productivity
of the European workforce. Continuous upskilling and reskilling, emphasised by the
Draghi report as key to competitiveness, will be supported through a more flexible, lifelong
learning-oriented Erasmus+ that works in tandem with the Competitiveness (skills)
agenda. A better-skilled workforce means higher employability and output, helping firms
produce more value with the same or lower cost. For example, digital and STEM skill
investments can support the mitigation of skill shortages that currently force firms to pay
a premium for digital talent. As of 2023 only 56% of EU adults have at least basic digital
skills and companies lacking skilled ICT specialists incur higher costs and lost
opportunities. The preferred option’s integrated funding for digital education and training
addresses this gap, eventually lowering hiring and training costs for employers in all
sectors. In sum, by raising productivity and reducing skill mismatches, the initiative
strengthens cost competitiveness across the economy.
More generally, by making the use of EU funds more efficient (yielding more output per
euro spent) and by enabling small organisations and institutions in the targeted sectors to
operate more cost-effectively, saving would be generated. These savings may not
dramatically alter unit labour costs economy-wide in the short term, but they provide
important support for SMEs and educational or training institutions, strengthening their
117
financial sustainability. The magnitude of cost competitiveness gains is moderate but
meaningful: for example, administrative cost reductions in the high double-digit millions
of euros annually are plausible, and participating organisations could see cost overheads
drop in certain funding actions. These gains, which would need to be monitored
consistently, are likely to be permanent, accruing each year, as the streamlined structures
are expected to remain in place through the MFF programming period and likely beyond.
International competitiveness
International competitiveness refers to the ability of EU sectors to compete globally –
attracting talent and investment, and achieving success in international markets. The
preferred option has a strong international dimension, which is vital for Europe’s education
to thrive on the world stage.
Europe’s education sector competes globally primarily in higher education and research.
By metrics like international student enrolments and universities in top-100 rankings,
Europe is competitive but behind the very top. For example, the UK (previously part of
EU) and some EU countries like Germany and France attract many international students,
but the US still hosted the largest number (1.1 million) until recently and countries like
Australia and Canada have rapidly increased their share by aggressive recruitment policies.
The EU’s collective 1.66 million foreign students in 2022 shows strong performance, and
with the preferred option we anticipate this could grow (due to more integrated promotion
and possibly new joint offerings). Retaining talent is a noted weakness – many
international graduates from EU universities currently depart (either home or to third
countries) after studies. The preferred option will put emphasis on talent retention (for
instance, through follow-up opportunities in the Solidarity Corps or easier transitions to
work) can improve Europe’s “yield” from its education attractiveness. When European
education retains global talent, it directly boosts the skilled workforce available to EU
industries and research. Inter-sectorally, the education sector’s internationalisation is
behind sectors like tourism or tech in pure economic terms, but it has strong value in soft
power and long-term influence. Every international alumnus of an EU programme can
become an ambassador for Europe or even an entrepreneur in Europe.
Europe as a talent magnet: a core goal of the merged programmes is to increase the
international attractiveness of Europe’s education and training systems. By uniting
Erasmus+ (known worldwide for mobility) with solidarity corps and enhancing synergies
with other instruments, and by potentially branding the initiative around global
competitiveness, the preferred option can elevate Europe’s profile as a destination for all
learners, also attracting present and future researchers. The EU already hosts about one-
third of globally mobile tertiary students (with Germany and France in the top host
countries), roughly on par with the US share. In 2022, 403,500 international students
studied in Germany and 265,000 in France. This performance is strong, but competition is
intensifying from Anglophone and Asian education hubs. Through expanded Erasmus
Mundus joint degrees, scholarship schemes, and more flexible mobility pathways, the new
programme will allow the EU to grow its share of global talent. An integrated approach
means students can more easily move between European universities (including through
the alliances), making a pan-European education more seamless. Similarly, the new
programme will also seek to boost the internationalisation of VET to increase its
attractiveness at global level, including capacity building in VET and expansion of
mobility of vocational learners worldwide.
118
Additionally, the inclusion of cultural and solidarity components can make European
education unique – offering not just academic excellence but also rich cultural experience
and civic engagement, which can be a selling point for globally minded students. The
international competitiveness of EU higher education is expected to improve, contributing
to the goal of retaining Europe’s status as a leading academic destination. This also feeds
the talent needs of European industry and research. However, a noted risk is varying
national immigration rules for graduates; the programme can encourage Member States to
align on policies that allow talented graduates to stay, complementing the attractiveness of
the study experience itself.
Global skills and mobility networks: The preferred option will deepen international
partnerships, not only within the EU but also with third countries. Erasmus+ already has a
global outreach component, and Creative Europe engages with international cultural
partners. Although the programmes will not merge, enhanced synergies could create
coherent international cooperation frameworks, for example, linking an EU university
alliance with universities in Africa or Asia under a common project, or supporting cultural
exchanges that also have an educational dimension, leading to increase skills for the labour
market. These efforts, including cultural diplomacy, strengthen the EU’s international ties
and influence. They also prepare Europeans to succeed globally: participants gain language
skills, intercultural competencies, and international experience, all of which improve the
competitiveness of European firms and institutions abroad. Survey data (impact study)
shows employers value international experience – e.g. in some countries, half of employers
are willing to pay higher salaries to hires with study-abroad experience. By producing more
globally savvy graduates and professionals, the programme enhances the international
competitiveness of Europe’s workforce. Intra-EU mobility also indirectly boosts
competitiveness by optimising the allocation of skills across Member States (helping fill
labour shortages and spreading knowledge).
Benchmarking and competitive position: From a sectoral competitive position
standpoint, European education sectors are not in a state of crisis but face intense
competitive pressures. European higher education boasts many top universities, but in
global rankings it is somewhat eclipsed by the US (and increasingly Chinese universities)
in terms of research output and funding. The Draghi report noted that formal lifelong
learning and skills development need to scale up for Europe to maintain a competitive
economy. The preferred option addresses these issues by fostering integration and
critical mass: scaling up talent pipelines, aligning efforts across countries, and focusing
resources on strategic areas (e.g. digital skills, green skills in culture) will improve each
sector’s competitiveness relative to global peers. Quantitatively, Europe’s share of world
R&D and innovation in education is expected to rise (academic R&D spending in the EU-
27 already reached €100 billion, topping the US in absolute terms), and the gap in cultural
export performance between the EU and Asia/US should narrow as European creative
firms innovate and collaborate more effectively.
In summary, the preferred option strengthens international competitiveness by enhancing
Europe’s ability to attract talent, by improving the global market performance of its
education, and by leveraging synergies to present a compelling international profile. The
effects are expected to be significant: higher inflows of international students and
researchers (potentially boosting EU international student numbers by a few hundred
thousand over the next decade), and greater global engagement by European youth and
professionals.
119
Capacity to Innovate
Option 2 is strongly oriented towards boosting the EU’s capacity to innovate through
investments in human capital, cross-border cooperation in research and education, and
support for the creative and cultural ecosystems that drive innovation.
Education, skills and innovation performance: a well-educated, mobile and skilled
population is the foundation of innovation. The preferred option’s emphasis on lifelong,
lifewide and long-term skills development and a “Union of Skills” is expected to
strengthen Europe’s innovation potential. By merging the Erasmus+ and solidarity corps
programmes and exploiting internal and external synergies, the new framework encourages
cross-sectoral knowledge exchange – for instance, universities, vocational institutes and
companies can collaborate in projects that link Erasmus+ mobility with innovation-
oriented objectives (such as joint curricula in emerging technologies or entrepreneurial
training in the creative arts). European University Alliances (fostered under Erasmus+)
will benefit from a more coherent funding stream, enabling deeper integration of
universities across borders in teaching and research. These alliances aim to create
“European campuses” pooling expertise and resources, which can become globally
competitive hubs of innovation. Over the long term, such integrated networks should
increase the quality and quantity of R&D outputs in the education sector. Already, the EU-
27’s academic R&D intensity (roughly 0.5% of GDP) has been on the rise, surpassing the
US in relative terms (0.36% of GDP) and narrowing the gap with innovation leaders like
South Korea. Strengthening higher education collaboration through Option 2, which
encompasses strong synergies between sources of funding, can further raise R&D intensity
and innovation outcomes in the education and training sphere.
Research and development in targeted sectors: the merger of Erasmus and Solidarity
Corps, operating under a more effective MFF enabling stronger and more flexible
synergies, will allow leveraging complementarities between educational mobility
programmes and future research funding to spur innovation. For example, joint funding
could support more industry-academia partnerships in doctoral training or post-doctoral
research applied to societal challenges. Moreover, Erasmus+ projects focusing on digital
and STEM skills will feed more qualified graduates into R&D roles. Innovation in
educational methods themselves will also accelerate, as the future instruments can fund
digital education pilots, EdTech development, and innovative pedagogies at scale across
the EU. This addresses the historically low innovation investment in the education and
training sector; by treating educational outcomes as part of competitiveness, the initiative
may encourage education systems to adopt new technologies and evidence-based practices
more rapidly (helping modernise curricula, use AI tutors, etc.). The innovation capacity
of Europe’s education and training sector will thus be improved, with spillover benefits
as students bring advanced skills into the labour market.
Talent development and retention for innovation: Europe’s capacity to innovate
depends on attracting and retaining top talent. Option 2 explicitly targets talent circulation
and retention through enhanced mobility and exchange schemes. By expanding
opportunities for students, researchers, and young professionals to gain international
experience (within Europe and globally), the future programme not only broadens their
skills but also encourages knowledge transfer across borders – a known catalyst for
innovation. Importantly, the programme can help retain talent in Europe by creating
more attractive conditions: for instance, European University Alliances and excellence-
120
driven projects can entice high-potential students from around the world to study and stay
in the EU. While the EU already hosts a large number of international students (1.66
million in 2022 - tbc), many historically chose the US or other countries for post-
graduation opportunities. By improving integration of foreign students (through language
support, work placements, and post-study mobility via the Solidarity Corps or other
streams), the preferred option can convert a higher share of these students into skilled
workers in Europe’s innovation ecosystems. Some Member States are adopting more
welcoming post-study visa policies, but a coordinated EU approach under this programme
could further boost retention. In addition, Erasmus+ alumni themselves are a proven source
of innovation and entrepreneurship: they have higher rates of developing start-up ideas and
managerial roles. The mobility experience fosters an entrepreneurial mindset – in Eastern
Europe, 38% of Erasmus alumni plan to start a company, significantly higher than non-
mobile peers. By nurturing entrepreneurship and leadership skills, the merged
programme will increase the pool of innovators and business founders in Europe. Over
time, this replenishes and expands Europe’s innovation capacity in both established and
emerging industries.
Non-formal learning and social innovation: Option 2 will also support non-formal
learning and civic engagement, which can drive social innovation. Volunteer projects,
youth exchanges, and community initiatives often produce innovative solutions to local
problems (e.g. new approaches to social inclusion, digital literacy training for seniors,
creative community spaces). These kinds of innovations, while not always commercial,
enhance societal resilience and indirectly benefit economic competitiveness by fostering a
more adaptive and cohesive society. Social innovations can be scaled up across the EU via
the networks built in the programme, creating a culture of innovation at all levels – from
classrooms to community centers.
Overall, the preferred option significantly strengthens the EU’s capacity to innovate by
investing in the human and creative capital that underpins innovation. The effects will
materialise progressively: improved educational outcomes and research cooperation yield
dividends over years and decades in the form of higher innovation rates, productivity
growth, and new ventures. The risk that innovation benefits do not fully materialise (e.g.
due to absorption capacity limits or coordination challenges) is mitigated by the clusters
programmes’ design, which focuses resources on known drivers of innovation (skills,
collaboration, creativity), including through synergies. By reinforcing both the supply side
of innovation (skilled and innovative people) and the demand side (creative industries,
digital transformation needs), Option 2’s competitiveness impact on innovation is expected
to be high and enduring.
Competitive position of key sectors and ecosystems: the education and training
ecosystem (covering schools, vocational education and training (VET), higher education,
and adult learning) is crucial for the EU’s competitiveness, as it produces the human capital
for all other sectors. It stands for a significant economic sector itself – primarily public-
funded – employing millions of staff (teachers, trainers, researchers) and consuming about
5% of EU GDP in public expenditure. While not a tradable sector in the traditional sense,
its outputs (skilled graduates, research, innovation) directly affect productivity and
competitiveness across the economy. For instance, with 81%, the employment rate of
recent medium-level VET graduates is very high, which underlines the relevance of VET
for the labour market and companies’ competitiveness. In terms of global standing,
European education systems rank among the world’s best on many indicators: several
Member States consistently score above OECD averages in school achievement, and the
121
EU-27 produces a large share of the world’s STEM graduates (e.g. over 2.0 million tertiary
graduates per year, ~25% in STEM fields).
The EU’s tertiary educational attainment for young people has risen to 41% (2022),
catching up to levels in the US and exceeding those in most emerging economies.
However, acute challenges remain: skill mismatches and shortages (particularly in digital,
engineering, and ICT fields), brain drain from certain regions (talented graduates moving
to richer Member States or outside EU), and varying quality of education and training
across the Union. Evidence shows that low-income countries with higher shares of
graduates with tertiary education experienced stronger catching-up towards the average
GDP per capita between 2008 and 2021.
Productivity and innovation: The education sector’s productivity is hard to measure in
economic terms, but one indicator is the student performance per expenditure. Many EU
countries manage to achieve high learning outcomes at moderate cost (e.g. Poland and
Finland have strong PISA results with average spending), indicating good efficiency.
Nonetheless, there is room to innovate and adopt new methods to improve learning gains
without proportional cost increases – a process which has been slower in education than in
other sectors. R&D and innovation within the education and training sector (such as
developing new pedagogical technologies or evidence-based teaching methods) have
historically been limited. Academic R&D spending in the EU is mostly directed to
scientific fields rather than education science itself, and the sector has lacked a strong
culture of R&D in schooling. EU funding and in particular a adequately funded EU
intervention like the preferred option can help change this by funding pilots and scaling up
successful innovations in education and training. In higher education, European
universities are a backbone of R&D (contributing ~21% of total EU R&D expenditure)
and perform well on research output, but they face increasing competition for talent and
research leadership from the US and China. The competitiveness gap in higher education
often comes down to funding and integration: the US spends more per student and attracts
more top researchers, while Europe’s efforts are split across countries. The European
University alliances and greater mobility for researchers (supported by this initiative) aim
to give the EU a more unified higher education R&D area, boosting critical mass and
efficiency. An inter-sectoral comparison is relevant in this: the education sector’s cost
structure is dominated by labour (teachers, professors). Wage levels in Europe are
moderate and generally aligned with productivity, but global competition for star
professors and researchers means European universities sometimes struggle to offer
competitive salaries compared to top US institutions. By enabling transactional
collaborative networks between institutions and resource pooling, the preferred option can
alleviate some cost pressure (for example, synergies across EU funding for shared digital
infrastructure for e-learning across universities reduces the need for each to invest
separately).
Innovation capacity: The education and skills ecosystem is both a recipient of innovation
(using new tech in classrooms) and a generator of innovation (through research and the
creation of innovators). Currently, the EU’s capacity for educational innovation is
improving – accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic which forced adoption of digital
learning. Under the preferred option, with dedicated funding for digital education and
STEM, broader uptake of innovative teaching tools may be expected (such as online
platforms, virtual labs, AI-driven personalised learning). European initiatives like the
Digital Education Action Plan align with this and will find support through the merged
programme’s objectives. A more innovative education sector means students graduate
122
with better skills (critical thinking, adaptability) that feed into the economy’s overall
innovative capacity. Additionally, synergies between education and industry will be
strengthened – e.g. VET programs cooperating with SMEs to update curricula for new
technologies, or students working on real-world innovation projects (hackathons, etc.).
Such linkages ensure the skills developed are at the cutting edge of industry needs,
thereby improving the innovative output when these students join the workforce225
.
A key strength of Europe’s education ecosystem is its diversity and quality – multiple
centers of excellence and a strong foundation of public education. The preferred option
builds on this by fostering cooperation rather than competition among European
institutions, turning diversity into complementarity. Another strength is the ingrained
culture of mobility and multilingualism in Europe, which the programme leverages – intra-
European mobility is far higher than mobility within other world regions. This gives EU
students a comparative advantage in adaptability. A risk, however, is that reforms and
innovation in education can be slow due to governance and consensus needs; if the
programme’s incentives and support are not sufficient to overcome inertia in curricula or
qualifications recognition, some competitiveness benefits might take time to emerge.
There is also the risk of unequal uptake: top universities might benefit more from EU
networks than smaller or less experienced institutions, potentially widening gaps. To
mitigate this, the preferred option includes an inclusive approach (widening participation,
supporting capacity building for less experienced organisations), ensuring broad-based
improvement. The magnitude of competitiveness effects in education is substantial in the
long run – improved skills can raise GDP growth, with studies showing that even a small
increase in average skills has large economic returns over decades. These effects are also
permanent – once a population is more skilled, it tends to remain so, and institutions built
up (like strong university networks) continue to generate benefits.
SME competitiveness
The preferred option links skills development directly more closely with market needs
(including SMEs’ needs). SMEs can more easily partner with educational actors to define
curricula or offer apprenticeships (Erasmus+ and other funding will be more flexible to
support such collaborations). This SME competitiveness aspect is crucial: SMEs form the
vast majority of businesses and often lack in-house training capacity. By tapping into EU-
supported talent pipelines and innovation projects, SMEs, including those in traditional
sectors, can become more innovative and competitive. For example, a small manufacturing
firm could host an Erasmus+ VET apprentice who brings the latest digital techniques from
their training, boosting the firm’s productivity. The SME check (Annex 6) further ensures
that impacts on SMEs will be scrutinised and optimised in the detailed design of the Option
2.
Cross-sectoral synergies and other competitiveness dimensions
One of the distinctive benefits of the preferred option is the promotion of cross-sectoral
synergies withing the future two instruments that themselves can enhance competitiveness.
By merging programmes following an objectives-based merger, the initiative creates
interfaces between EU values, fundamental rights, media and culture on one side and
education, skills, and civic engagement on the other that did not exist formally before.
Social inclusion and competitiveness: While social policy and competitiveness were
once seen as separate, it’s increasingly recognised that inclusive growth supports
123
competitiveness by mobilising all of society’s talent and maintaining social stability.
Option 2’s strong inclusion dimension (e.g. specific measures to involve people from
diverse backgrounds, vulnerable groups, and a “leave no one behind” ethos) means that
the competitiveness gains are broadly shared. This helps regions with weaker starting
positions (such as rural areas or poorer Member States) to catch up through capacity
building in education and culture – reducing internal EU disparities. A more balanced
development across the EU can in this context prevent brain drain within the EU (talent
leaving less developed regions), thereby optimising the use of talent domestically.
In a way, the preferred option contributes to cohesion competitiveness: every region
building on its strengths (be it a cultural heritage sector or a technical university) to
compete in its niche, adding to the EU’s mosaic of competitiveness. Moreover, enhanced
social cohesion has economic benefits – as noted in the analysis, it leads to more stable
environments and can increase productivity and innovation.
Equality, non-discrimination, regulatory and values environment: Investing in
promoting rights, equality, non-discrimination, and EU values strengthens the foundation
of a just and prosperous society, also ensuring that the benefits of growth and development
are shared by all226
. The EU’s efforts to hone its competitive edge need to be guided by
EU values, which contribute to our region’s prosperity. Integrating equality, diversity and
inclusion considerations also helps foster a more innovative and competitive economy,
promotes social cohesion, and strengthens democracy. Competitiveness is also affected by
the regulatory and values environment. The preferred option will boost support to rule of
law, good governance, and active citizenship. Over time, this reinforces a business-friendly
environment (fair courts, engaged civil society, low corruption) which is a comparative
advantage of the EU in attracting investment. Companies, especially innovative ones,
thrive in open societies with freedom of expression and robust legal protections (for IP, for
example). By investing in these “intangibles”, the future programmes indirectly safeguard
Europe’s competitiveness model – one built on high standards, creativity, and trust.
Finally, it is worth noting long-term performance implications from this cluster, as the
preferred option is future-oriented. The skills and networks fostered beyond 2030 could
set the trajectory for Europe’s competitiveness in 2050. For example, today’s support for
digital and STEM education might be the seed for Europe’s leadership in quantum
computing or green tech in two decades. Likewise, today’s cultural collaborations may
ensure that European values and content maintain global influence in an era of significant
geopolitical competition.
Conclusion
The objectives-based merger (preferred Option 2) is expected to deliver a net positive
competitiveness outcome by continuing the financing in these areas and by streamlining
the way of delivering the funding. By examining education and training, it may be shown
that strengths are reinforced and weaknesses addressed under this option: skills gaps are
narrowed, talent flows are improved, innovation ecosystems are nurtured and energised in
the policy fields, and cross-border collaborations are significantly intensified. These
effects contribute to a more competitive European economy that can sustainably grow and
generate high-value jobs, while also preserving the rich cultural fabric that distinguishes
Europe globally. The risk versus reward balance is also favourable – potential risks
(administrative complexity, transition costs, need for coordination) are manageable, unlike
Option 3, and transient, whereas the competitiveness benefits are multi-dimensional and
124
enduring. The reinforced competitiveness proofing thus supports Option 2 as a strong
contributor to the EU’s long-term competitive sustainability.
125
Annex 6: SME check
OVERVIEW OF IMPACTS ON SMES
Relevance for SMEs
Audiovisual and Media:
Based on SME filter and the ISG discussion, this initiative is deemed relevant for
SMEs227
. SMEs are not a monolithic group but are deeply entangled across the policy
domains under scope. Their effective participation depends on whether EU instruments
are modular, transparent, and accessible, and whether they offer incentives and entry
points adapted to SME realities.
The EU’s cultural and creative industries (CCIs) ecosystem encompasses around 1.2
million enterprises (99.9%), and around 8 million employees.228
According to 2023
European Media Industry Outlook, the picture is the same in sub-sectors such as
audiovisual, news media and video games, within SMEs account for 99.8% of all
companies active in these sub-sectors.
In the current MEDIA Sub-programme, 99% of the direct beneficiaries were SMEs
(reflecting the 99% of SMEs amongst European AV enterprises), of which 25% were
small and nearly 70% micro. Micro and Small organisations account for 50% and 40%
of total value of grants respectively under Creative Europe 1.229
Education and skills:
In education and skills, SMEs benefit indirectly through the improved employability of
learners trained via Erasmus+ mobility and vocational education. They also directly
participate as trainers (for the majority of VET learners)230
, as project partners in staff
exchanges, adult learning, and upskilling schemes—particularly in digital, green, or
sector-specific training. These SMEs value EU actions that help address skills shortages,
and the OPC shows strong SME support for actions like a European VET diploma and
adult education mobility.
Although less prominent in youth, solidarity, and civil society, SMEs intersect with these
areas via social enterprises, hosting arrangements for trainees or volunteers, and civic
education services. Some SMEs (especially in Vocational Education and Training or
adult learning sectors, or on specific topics such as digital education) participate as
project partners or providers in transnational consortia. Among more than 380,000
participating organisations in Erasmus+ between 2021 and 2024, 8600 were SMEs.
(1) IDENTIFICATION OF AFFECTED BUSINESSES AND ASSESSMENT OF RELEVANCE
Are SMEs directly affected? (Yes/No) In which sectors?
Audiovisual and Media:
SMEs in (news) media and IP-intensive mass-market reach content sectors, especially
independent production, distribution SMEs, can benefit. The EU’s current funding
programmes and support initiatives mainly revolve around MEDIA and cross-sectorial
strands of the Creative Europe programme and Multimedia line. The main areas of focus
of these funding programmes include:
• Audiovisual industry: film production, distribution and exhibition; television
(public and private broadcasting, digital TV); animation and immersive content
(e.g., VR, AR);
126
• Media sector: print and digital journalism news media (including cross-border
journalism); media pluralism and freedom of expression;
• Video Games and interactive content: video games development; interactive
storytelling and transmedia;
• Other copyright-intensive sectors, such as music and publishing, working with
audiovisual companies,
In the Eurostat NACE classification, the sectors that are directly affected by the
intervention are:231
• Audiovisual and multimedia (i.e., motion picture, video and television
programme production, sound recording and music publishing activities; radio
and TV broadcasting; publishing of computer/video games)
• Programming, broadcasting, news agency and other content distribution
activities (i.e., news agency activities, pre-press and pre-media services)
• Publishing Activities (i.e., book publishing, printing, translation and
interpretation activities)
• Visual and performing Arts (i.e., artistic creation; specialised design activities,
operation of arts facilities; performing arts and its support activities)
• Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities
The Eurostat NACE classification has been updated with new rev 2.1 version that will
capture more accurately all the relevant sectors, in view of recent market and
technological developments, especially the rise of digital media, including segments
such as streaming (audiovisual and music), e-books, online business models in gaming
etc.
Education and skills:
SMEs engaged indirectly, through the supply of better-skilled workers, notably via
mobility and vocational education and training (VET). SMEs from all sectors benefit
from EU programmes such as Erasmus+ that support apprenticeships, staff mobility, and
institutional cooperation, as these improve labour market preparedness and foster local
innovation.
Directly engaged SMEs participating as project partners or providers in transnational
consortia. Some SMEs are involved in hosting trainees, apprentices or volunteers from
EU mobility schemes. In particular, SMEs have shown support for actions such as a
European VET diploma or adult education mobility, reflecting their interest in upskilling
current employees and attracting future talent.
While youth and volunteering activities are primarily not-for-profit, there are indirect
effects on SMEs. SMEs benefit from the soft skills and civic engagement capacities of
young participants in Erasmus+ or ESC.
Estimated number of directly affected SMEs
Audiovisual and Media:
30,000 – 50,000 enterprises232
Education and Skills:
Estimated 15,000 SMEs involved in Erasmus+ 2021-2027
Estimated number of employees in directly affected SMEs
Audiovisual and media:
84,000-140,000 employees
127
Education and Skills:
40,000 estimate
Are SMEs indirectly affected? (Yes/No) In which sectors? What is the estimated
number of indirectly affected SMEs and employees?
Audiovisual and Media:
SMEs supplying goods and services to core CCI activities may be impacted. E.g. in the
audiovisual sector, this includes companies providing catering, construction, costumes,
technical services, logistics etc for productions, ICT services and analytics for online
distribution, etc. The indirectly affected sectors can include, but is not limited to
manufacturing of goods, wholesale and retail of products, event production and technical
services, specialised ICT services linked to creative content. One important sector that
benefits from the cultural sectors is tourism, which is also characterised by a high number
of SMEs.
Education and skills:
Potentially all SMEs in Europe are positively impacted by improved education and
training systems and a better skilled workforce.
CONSULTATION OF SME STAKEHOLDERS
How has the input from the SME community been taken into consideration?
Through a public consultation for the Impact Assessment
Are SMEs’ views different from those of large businesses? (Yes/No)
The results of the Open Public Consultation indicate different views between SMEs and
large enterprises. When it comes to importance of policy priorities, SMEs included
these as the most important ones: 1) Protect democracy and promote democratic
standards (importance score of 3.67 vs. 3.42 of large enterprises); 2) Promote media
independence and media pluralism, fight disinformation (3.65 vs. 3.36); 3) Promote
entrepreneurship, access to market and scaling-up for small businesses in the creative
sector (3.61 vs. 2.20).
In terms of cooperation and mobility in the area of education, training and solidarity,
both the SMEs and large enterprises valued more positively cooperation partnerships in
education and training and mobility for VET learners and staff. However, SMEs also
ranked mobility for higher education students and staff in top 3 actions, whereas large
enterprises mobility for schools and learners.
In the areas of culture, creative sectors and media, the top 3 actions ranked by SMEs
are: European cooperation projects involving cultural and creative organisations from
different countries, cross-border collaboration in media content creation, development
and production, and cross-border cooperation and business support to cultural and
creative sectors,
In terms of actions for values (democracy, equality, rule of law, fundamental rights)
and civil society, there were no significant differences in ranking between the SMEs and
large entreprises.
Both SMEs and large enterprises see administrative burden for beneficiaries as the main
obstacle that prevent the EU budget from fully delivering on its objectives, followed by
different and often complex fund-specific rules for access to funding and compliance,
128
and lack of flexibility to adapt to new and unforeseen developments. For both SMEs and
large companies, simplifying access to funding for beneficiaries and introducing more
flexibility into resource allocation were ranked in top 3, while SMEs also ranked higher
the better preventing and combating fraud, corruption and other illegal activities targeting
EU funds, while large companies valued more applying common rules, timelines and
eligibility criteria to all relevant EU funds.
(2) ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON SMES233
What are the estimated direct costs for SMEs of the preferred policy option? (Fill
in only if step 1 flags direct impacts)
Qualitative assessment
Audiovisual and Media:
The preferred initiative does not introduce mandatory compliance costs, since the
cluster’s initiatives focus on facilitating access to funding rather than introducing
regulatory obligations. Those SMEs wishing to apply for funding will incur some
administrative costs due to application and reporting requirements linked to EU funding
calls and participation in capacity-building programmes.
Key cost drivers:
• Preparing funding applications
• Reporting obligations during/after project implementation
• Costs related to co-financing requirements (for grants requiring matching funds
or audit certificates)
However, these costs are expected to be reasonable because of the following:
1) Costs are borne at the discretion of the SMEs (unlike regulation) so when an
SME makes an application, they are well placed to make the assessment whether
potential benefits are worth incurring these costs. Execution and success rates
for the current programme (with success rates being below 30% for several
actions) suggest that the costs are reasonable.
2) No new regulatory compliance costs are introduced under the preferred option.
The costs associated with administration are expected to have already declined
under the current programme (thanks to the introduction of eGrants and lump
sums for example.). Further simplification measures will be introduced to reduce
the administrative burden (e. g., simplified application process).
Education and skills:
There are no specific costs for SMEs under the preferred policy option compared with
other potential applicants or beneficiaries.
Quantitative assessment
Precise data is not available
What are the estimated direct benefits/cost savings for SMEs of the preferred
policy option234?
Qualitative assessment
129
Audiovisual and Media:
The main direct benefits for SMEs stem from:
• More export possibilities / increased access to export markets
• More possibilities to scale-up, pursue international activities and take advantage
of the Single Market (e.g., international co-productions)
• Adoption of innovative business (revenue and financing) models and
diversification of risks (e.g., cross-format IP)
• Reduction of risks of developing new IP and content and increased chances of
successful development
• Strengthen skills and innovation with high relevance to their sector and activities
• Better access to finance, including equity finance, in sectors traditionally viewed
by financial institutions/investors as high risk.
These measures directly improve financial liquidity, investment capacity, and
resilience of SMEs in a sector marked by high rates of micro-enterprises and project-
based revenues.
Education and skills:
SMEs are likely to benefit from the complete contribution to lifelong learning and skills
development that the preferred option aims at achieving, and from the easier access for
all applicants that this would provide.
Quantitative assessment
Audiovisual and media:
Quantitative assessment is possible for the audiovisual sector, which accounts for almost
two thirds of funding under current programming. Based on the evaluation of previous
MFF programming (Creative Europe MEDIA), the current quantification is available
(beneficiaries are overwhelmingly SMEs).
• Increased export access: MEDIA support is associated with 85% of all non-
domestic territories in which supported works were shown in cinemas 86%
and 87% of the total non-domestic audience of supported works. On average,
a film or series supported from the MEDIA programme can be accessed in
9.5, 6.6 and 3.2 additional EU countries across TV, cinema and VoD
respectively, compared to an unsupported film or series.
• Scaling up/more competitive business models/taking advantage of the Single
Market/optimising financing and better access to international markets: 55%
(under current programme, 86%) of supported projects over the past 10 years
were international co-productions vs 12% of unsupported projects.
• Reducing development risks: 29% of works supported for development got
made and released eventually, on average within 3 years, which compares
well to wider industry practice.
• MediaInvest offers co-investment from private investors, by supporting
investments totalling €400 million between 2022-2027.
130
In addition, competitiveness and innovation spillovers235
may arise but are difficult to
quantify at this stage.
Education and skills:
Precise data not available
What are the indirect impacts of this initiative on SMEs? (Fill in only if step 1 flags
indirect impacts)
Audiovisual and media:
Indirect impacts include:
• Due to the diverse types of activities on which the support is likely to have
indirect impacts it is difficult to quantify exactly these impacts. However,
impacts are expected to be positive.
• As regards a critical indirect impact on tourism and hospitality: in a recent survey
two thirds of travellers said their choice of destination was influenced by films
and TV shows.236
Furthermore, the increasing use of tax incentives and the high
level of competition among countries to attract international productions is
further proof of the positive effects of audiovisual production on the local
economy, especially in areas where SMEs and self-employment are prominent
(technical crews, catering, hospitality, etc).
Education and skills:
• SMEs are likely to benefit also indirectly from the contribution to lifelong learning
and skills development that the preferred option also aims at achieving.
(3) MINIMISING NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON SMES
Are SMEs disproportionately affected compared to large companies? (Yes/No)
No, the initiative is mainly targeted at SMEs as regards Audiovisual and media, and does not
negatively impact on SMEs for the other components.
If yes, are there any specific subgroups of SMEs more exposed than others?
Audiovisual and media:
Although the initiative is SME-targeted, it can be assumed smaller SMEs and micro-
enterprises face greater challenges in navigating EU funding application processes
compared to larger players with dedicated administrative capacity. These costs are voluntary
and minimal, however, the following subgroups of SMEs can be more exposed than others:
• Micro-enterprises (0–9 employees) face higher relative administrative burden
• SMEs in less networked, rural, or peripheral regions with lower access to EU
information points and fewer support structures
• SMEs operating in niche or experimental creative fields with weaker access to
traditional finance channels
131
Have mitigating measures been included in the preferred option/proposal? (Yes/No)
Measures have already been introduced to facilitate access for SMEs for Audiovisual and
Media with less programme ‘know-how’: cascading grants, lump sums for example.
Furthermore, the preferred option would continue supporting a network of national desks
whose main purpose is to help potential applicants navigate the process.
CONTRIBUTION TO THE 35% BURDEN REDUCTION TARGET FOR SMES
Are there any administrative cost savings relevant for the 35% burden reduction target
for SMEs?
Not Applicable
132
ANNEX 7: POLICY, LEGAL CONTEXT AND FUNDING PROGRAMMES COVERED BY THE
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
1. Policy areas covered by the Impact Assessment
1.1 Fundamental rights, EU values, democracy, justice, culture, civic and media spaces
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between
women and men prevail.
An EU area of Justice based on the rule of law, is a prerequisite for protecting and
promoting rights and EU values. Effective justice systems ensure that the rights of each
person are defended. Fostering public integrity and fighting corruption is essential also for
economic growth and public trust as well as ensuring that public funds are not diverted to
private interests.
Media (including audiovisual, news media, etc.) remains a critical, strategic industry for
the EU, in cultural, societal and economic terms. Media policy also benefits European
citizens, through increased access to diverse quality content, protection from illegal and
harmful content, and a more diverse and pluralistic media offer. The digital shift is quickly
transforming European media. Audiovisual and media services are increasingly available
online and across borders. In the information space, disinformation is rapidly spreading,
posing threat to our societies. Journalists and media outlets face numerous obstacles in
various countries.
Culture is central to Europe’s values, identity, and democracy. The originality and success
of the European Union lies in its ability to respect the varied and intertwined history,
languages and cultures of its Member States. Culture fosters a sense of belonging and a
collective European identity while giving voice to a diversity of expressions and preserving
European cultural heritage. It also contributes to strengthening social cohesion and
enhancing the attractiveness of our regions and cities. In doing so, it leads to a stronger
democracy and more actively engaged citizens. Europe’s cultural richness and diversity
also strengthen its role and influence in the world, projecting the image of a Union firmly
committed to peace, the rule of law, freedom of expression, and mutual understanding
1.2. Skills and key competences for quality life and jobs
Education and training, youth and sport are primary means of societal engagement and
collective participation. Europe’s strength lies in its people – their skills, talent and
potential. Human capital is the foundation of competitiveness, social cohesion, and equal
opportunities. Yet, Europe faces critical challenges, as highlighted in the Draghi, Letta,
and Niinistö reports: global competition, technological disruption, and demographic shifts.
To respond, Europe must urgently equip its population with basic, digital, and advanced
skills. This requires a radical: greater investment, reformed education and training systems,
and better coordination of education and skills policies at all levels. Only through bold
action can Europe bridge the skills gap, drive sustainable growth and innovation, and
ensure global leadership.
133
2. Policy and Legal context
Justice: The EU promotes a European area of justice and protects the rule of law, by
strengthening judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, enhancing the
effectiveness and integrity of judicial systems, and supporting judicial training and access
to justice.
Significant legislative and policy initiatives include the European Judicial Training
Strategy237
, the EU Strategy on Victims' Rights238
, and the forthcoming Commission
Strategy on Digitalisation of Justice, that will aim at promoting the digital transformation
within judicial systems, fostering more efficient and accessible justice services across
Europe. Moreover, to further uphold the rule of law, the European Commission established
the Rule of Law Mechanism239
, including the annual Rule of Law Report, which evaluates
developments in judicial independence, anti-corruption frameworks, and access to justice
in Member States. The Commission’s Anti-Corruption Package240
, adopted in 2023,
introduced comprehensive measures to combat corruption, enhance transparency, and
safeguard judicial integrity throughout the Union. The EU has also adopted an Internal
Security Strategy241
and a Counter-Terrorism Agenda242
.
Fundamental rights, EU values and democracy: The EU upholds the rights enshrined
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and promotes and protects
EU values. It fights for equal treatment, the universal application of rights and combats all
forms of discrimination.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union243
enshrines certain civil and
political, social, and economic rights for European Union citizens and residents into EU
law, including freedom of the arts and science (art. 13)
The Commission has adopted a series of initiatives – on gender equality, Roma equality,
inclusion and participation, LGBTIQ equality, disability rights, anti-racism to help build a
Union of Equality244
, as well as strategies on combating antisemitism, rights of the child245
,
and the initiatives to combat hate speech and hate crime246
, to promote EU values and
strengthen European democracies247
. In 2023, the EU adhered to the Council of Europe
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,
which has then been followed recently by the first-ever EU law combating violence against
women248
. The EU also adopted rules on pay transparency, for men and women to be paid
equally for the same work or work of equal value.249
The EU also strengthens democratic institutions and processes by supporting and
safeguarding free civic space, free and fair elections and encouraging the participation of
citizens of all ages in democratic processes.
The first EU comprehensive framework on democracy has been developed through the
2020 European Democracy Action Plan250
, the 2021 package of measures to reinforce
democracy and protect the integrity of elections251
and the 2023 Defence of Democracy
Package252
. The most recent legislation in this context includes the Regulation on
transparency of political advertising253
, European Media Freedom Act and the EU law
protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims
or abusive court proceedings ('strategic lawsuits against public participation')254
. In recent
years, many Commission initiatives have also achieved meaningful advances for EU
citizenship rights, including the regular EU Citizenship reports and the 2023 EU
Citizenship Package255
. The upcoming European Democracy Shield will seek to further
protect and strengthen our democracy256
.
134
Media: The EU has adopted single market legislation for the copyright-intensive industries
including for the audiovisual and media sectors. It promotes an independent, diverse and
trustworthy media landscape, ensures a safe online environment and combats
disinformation. It supports the production, circulation and promotion of audiovisual and
media content across borders. The audiovisual and media sectors have specific
characteristics and needs, which have shaped the EU’s media policy as reflected in the EU
acquis and policy developments, namely the AVMS Directive, Copyright Directive, Media
Action Plan and EMFA. The Commission has further recognised the crucial role of these
sectors through the adoption of the European Democracy Action Plan and the Media and
Audiovisual Action Plan in 2020, followed by the European Media Industry Outlook in
2023.
Culture: The EU supports cultural and creative sectors, by promoting cultural and
linguistic diversity and cross-border exchanges, cooperation, circulation and mobility, and
preserving Europe's rich cultural heritage. The role of culture and cultural heritage in
upholding EU values and fundamental principles is at the core of the framework for EU
cooperation in the field of culture and of European initiatives such as the New European
Bauhaus, the European Capitals of Culture and the European Heritage Label. Key policy
initiatives include the European Agenda for Culture, the EU Strategy for International
Cultural Relations, the European Framework for Action on Cultural Heritage, the Council
Work Plans for Culture, and the upcoming Culture Compass for Europe257
. The
Commission is working on a proposal for a Culture Compass for Europe, as a strategic
framework to guide the multiple dimensions of culture. This is a major policy initiative
giving more centrality to culture in the overall EU policy making for years to come.
Finally, the Union and its Member States are parties to the 2005 UNESCO Convention on
the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which entered into
force on 18 March 2007.
Education and training: The EU supports Member States in their efforts to improve the
quality and efficiency of education and training at all levels of education from early
childhood and care to adult education, implements a vocational training policy in line with
labour market needs, promotes lifelong learning and mobility, equity, active citizenship
and enhances creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship in all sectors and levels of
education and training.
The Union of Skills sets the framework for EU cooperation in education and skills policies
and supports the development of EU’s human capital to strengthen EU competitiveness. It
aims to deliver higher levels of basic skills, providing individuals with strong foundations
for further development and offer lifelong learning opportunities for upskilling and
reskilling. It also seeks to attract and retain the skills and talents needed in the European
economy, ensuring that the region remains competitive on a global scale and facilitate
recruitment by businesses. The European Education Area (EEA) lays the foundation to
skills formation throughout life and supports cooperation and peer learning between
countries. It promotes high quality education and training for all, mutually and
automatically recognising learning outcomes across borders, and supporting the mobility
of learners of all ages. It provides a framework with six fundamental strategic
dimensions which will be fully addressed through cross-synergies by design between the
future instruments of the cluster. The Digital Education Action Plan, part of the EEA,
supports the development of digital education across EU Member States and the equipment
of people with digital skills and competences for the digital transformation. The Union of
Skills is “an overarching strategy, focusing on investment, adult and lifelong learning,
135
vocational education and training, skill retention and recognition and enhancing skills
intelligence.”
Youth and solidarity: The EU supports the participation of young people in civic and
democratic life, connects young people across the European Union, and beyond, to foster
solidarity, voluntary engagement and intercultural understanding and supports youth
empowerment through quality, innovation and the recognition of youth work. The EU also
fosters cooperation between organisations in this area. The EU Youth Strategy258
is the
policy framework in the field of youth for 2019–2027, structured around the pillars of
Engage, Connect, and Empower aiming to foster youth participation in democratic life,
social and civic engagement and ensuring that all young people have the necessary
resources to take part in society.
Sport: The EU fosters cooperation to strengthen safety, sustainability, integrity and values
of sport and enhance participation in sport and health-enhancing physical activities. In the
realm of sport, the EU Work Plan for Sport259
(2024-2027) outlines a strategic approach
that recognizes the role of sports in social cohesion, promoting well-being, building
inclusive communities, strengthening cultural ties, and enhancing solidarity among people.
The work plan prioritises integrity, sustainability, and social inclusion within sporting
contexts, encouraging cross-border cooperation and the sharing of best practices.
The EU's policies in youth and sport focus on promoting inclusivity, participation, and
development through strategic initiatives that aim to empower young people and enhance
the role of sports in social cohesion. In the realm of sport, the EU Work Plan for
Sport260
(2024-2027) outlines a strategic approach that recognizes the role of sports in
social cohesion, promoting well-being, building inclusive communities, strengthening
cultural ties, and enhancing solidarity among people. The work plan prioritises integrity,
sustainability, and social inclusion within sporting contexts, encouraging cross-border
cooperation and the sharing of best practices.
3. EU funding programmes and schemes 2021-2027 and their legal bases
Under the current MFF, the key legislative and policy initiatives mentioned above are
supported mainly by the following EU funding programmes which are covered by this IA.
1. Fundamental rights, EU values, democracy, justice, culture, civic and media spaces
Funding
instrument
Legal basis Content
Citizens,
Equality, Rights
and Values
programme
(CERV)
Articles 16(2),
19(2),21(2),
24, 167, 168
TFEU
CERV seeks to promote and protect rights and values within
the EU as enshrined in the Treaties, the Charter and the
applicable international human rights conventions to sustain
open, rights-based, democratic, equal and inclusive societies
based on the rule of law.
Justice
Programme
Article 81(1)
and (2) and
Article 82(1)
TFEU
The Justice programme endeavours to create an area of
freedom, security and justice, supporting judicial
cooperation, the rule of law and fundamental rights and a
well-functioning independent judicial system.
Creative
Europe
programme
Art. 167(5),
173(3) TFUE
The Creative Europe programme supports the cultural,
creative and audiovisual sectors. It aims to safeguard
European cultural and linguistic diversity and heritage and
136
to increase the competitiveness and the economic potential
of the CCS, particularly of the audiovisual and media
sectors.
Multimedia
Actions
Art. 58
Financial
Regulation
The Multimedia Actions is a prerogative line of the
Commission aiming to strengthen news reporting on EU
affairs from European perspectives
The Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme is the dedicated
thematic EU instrument which specifically seeks to promote and protect rights and values
within the EU as enshrined in the Treaties, the Charter and the applicable international
human rights conventions to sustain open, rights-based, democratic, equal and inclusive
societies based on the rule of law. The programme supports civil society organisations
working at European, national, regional and local levels because civil society plays a key
role in upholding the common values on which the EU is founded. Established261
for the
period 2021-2027 as a merge of the previous Rights, Equality and Citizenship (REC)262
and Europe for Citizens (EfC)263
programmes, the CERV programme has a budget of over
1.5 billion EUR over 7 years. The programme has four strands: (i) Union values; (ii)
Equality, rights and gender equality; (iii) Citizens’ engagement and democratic
participation; (iv) Daphne – to fight against gender-based violence and violence against
children and other vulnerable groups, including LGBTIQ people. It is implemented in
direct management under the overall responsibility of the Directorate-General for Justice
and Consumers (DG JUST) of the European Commission.
The Justice programme264
supports the further development of an area of justice based
on EU’s values and the rule of law. Under the current MFF, the programme has a budget
of around 0.3 billion EUR and covers three specific objectives: 1. facilitate and support
judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, and promote the rule of law, the
independence and impartiality of the judiciary – including by supporting the efforts to
improve the effectiveness of national justice systems – and the effective enforcement of
decisions; 2. support and promote judicial training, with a view to fostering a common
legal, judicial and rule-of-law culture, and the consistent and effective implementation of
relevant EU legal instruments; 3. facilitate effective and non-discriminatory access to
justice and effective redress, including by electronic means (e-justice), by promoting
efficient civil and criminal procedures and by promoting and supporting the rights of all
victims of crime, along with the procedural rights of suspects and accused persons in
criminal proceedings. The justice programme mainly supports activities for the judiciary
and judicial staff by their representative bodies, public authorities and training bodies. It is
also open to academic/research institutes and civil-society organisations that contribute to
the development of an EU area of justice. The programme is implemented in direct
management under the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers
(DG JUST) of the European Commission.
Creative Europe is the EU programme dedicated to supporting the culture and media
sectors, with the objective of enhancing competitiveness, notably the audiovisual industry,
and strengthening cultural and linguistic diversity. Cultural and media sectors represent
a significant industrial ecosystem and face common challenges stemming from the digital
transformation and intense global competition. At the same time, Creative Europe operates
within the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, where culture is a supporting
competence whilst the EU has a single market focus on audiovisual and media. With an
envelope of over EUR 2.6 billion, the Programme is divided into three strands: the Culture
strand (33% of budget), which covers all CCS apart from audiovisual and media, in
137
particular architecture, archives, libraries and museums, artistic crafts, tangible and
intangible cultural heritage, design (including fashion design), festivals, music, literature,
performing arts (including theatre and dance), books and publishing, radio, and visual arts;
the MEDIA strand, which covers the audiovisual and gaming sectors (58% of budget); and
the Cross-Sectoral strand (9%), which covers actions across all CCS (with a focus on media
freedom and news media). DG EAC and CNECT co-manage the programme.
The Multimedia Actions line is a prerogative line of the Commission aiming to strengthen
news reporting on EU affairs from European perspectives. It is managed directly by
CNECT, with a budgetary allocation of an indicative amount of EUR 145 Mio over the
MFF 2021-2027.
2. Skills and key competences for quality life and jobs
Funding
instrument
Legal basis Content
Erasmus+ Articles
165(4) and
166(4) TFEU
Erasmus+ provides learning mobility opportunities abroad
for people of all ages in formal, informal and non-formal
education settings and invests in cooperation and policy
development in the fields of education and training, youth
and sport
European
Solidarity
Corps
Articles
165(4),
166(4) and
214(5) TFEU
The European Solidarity Corps gives young people the
opportunity to take part in projects that benefit communities
facing unmet societal challenges, either abroad or in their
own country, through volunteering or by setting up their own
solidarity projects.
Erasmus+265
is the European Union programme for education and training266
, youth and
sport. It provides learning mobility opportunities abroad for people of all ages and invests
in cooperation and policy development in the fields of education and training, youth and
sport. The general objective of Erasmus+ is to support, through lifelong learning, the
educational, professional and personal development of people in education, training, youth
and sport, in Europe and beyond. The total financial envelope allocated to Erasmus+ 2021-
2027 was set indicatively at more than EUR 26.5 billion, with an additional indicative
envelope of EUR 2.2 billion allocated from External Cooperation Instruments (IPA III and
NDICI-Global Europe). The programme is implemented under direct and indirect
management (around 80% of the budget is implemented under indirect management
through Erasmus+ National Agencies).
The European Solidarity Corps267
is an EU programme that gives young people the
opportunity to take part in projects that benefit communities facing unmet societal
challenges, either abroad or in their own country. By supporting vulnerable communities
and individuals, young people can learn and contribute to building a more inclusive society
through their volunteering activities. It has an envelope of over EUR 1 billion.
Other EU funding programmes partially linked to the policy areas object of this IA:
Digital Europe
Programme
Articles 172,
173(3) TFEU
Digital Europe programme supports projects in key capacity
areas and ensures a wide use of digital technologies across
the economy and society – including on aspects such as
digital heritage, media and data, and justice. Specific
Objective 4 (SO4) on advanced digital skills focuses on
138
developing a talent pool in the EU in advanced digital
technologies, addressing skills shortages.
Horizon
Europe
Articles
173(3),
182(1), 183,
paragraph 2
of 188 TFEU
Cluster 2 of Horizon Europe on Cluster 2: Culture,
Creativity and Inclusive society’ aims to strengthen
European democratic values, including rule of law and
fundamental rights, safeguarding cultural heritage, and
promoting socio-economic transformations that contribute
to inclusion and growth
European
Social Fund
(ESF)+
European
Regional
Development
Fund (ERDF)
Articles 149,
153(2)(a), 162,
175 TFEU
Articles 176,
177 and 178
TFEU
The European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) supports education
and skills with EUR 42 billion in 2021-27. This
encompasses upskilling and reskilling, including digital
skills and green initiatives.
The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
(including under its European Territorial Cooperation strand
– Interreg) supports education, skills development, and
training with EUR 8.8 billion in 2021-27. This includes
infrastructure, equipment and cooperation across borders to
facilitate equal access to quality and inclusive education.
The ESF+ and the ERDF provides a significant contribution
to the EU’s social policies, including structural reforms in
these areas, particularly in relation to supporting the strategy
on the Rights of the Child, gender-balanced labour market
participation, socio-economic integration of marginalised
communities (such as Roma people), as well as equal access
to quality services and modernising social protection
systems.
Resilience and
Recovery
Facility (RRF)
Article 175
TFEU
The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is transforming
European economies after the pandemic with a very
important focus on the social dimension, contributing to the
implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. In
total, Member States’ national recovery and resilience plans
allocate around 25% of their budget towards social
objectives (around EUR 163 billion of total funding).
The RRF supports both education and skills with around
EUR 72 billion.268
Member States’ national recovery and
resilience plans include reforms and investments ranging
from early education through general, vocational and higher
education to adult learning. In total, the education or training
of over 29 million people have been supported by the RRF
since its inception.269
The measures directly supporting media, and culture and
creative industries in Member States’ national recovery and
resilience plans amount to EUR 11.7 billion, representing
approximately 2% of the total Recovery and Resilience
Facility budget. In particular, the RRF has supported the
industrial and digital transformation of the audiovisual
industry. For example, it has contributed to boost national
production and attract overseas productions.
139
The RRF further supports reforms and investments in the
field of EU values, which correspond to challenges
identified by country-specific recommendations under the
European Semester. For instance, targeted measures are set
to benefit close to 300 000 persons with disabilities. The
recovery and resilience plans also include a broad range of
measures to promote the inclusion of disadvantaged groups,
such as Roma communities. Additionally, Member States
have put forth 136 measures that directly promote gender
equality270
. The RRF has also devoted considerable funding
for the digital transition of national justice systems.
Technical
Support
Instrument
(TSI)
Article 175
and Article
197(2) TFEU
The Technical Support Instrument (TSI) is the European
Commission’s key tool for supporting EU Member States in
designing and implementing growth-enhancing and
inclusive reforms.
From 2021 to 2025 TSI has funded 36 projects to support 20
Member States to implement 43 justice reforms aiming to
improve the quality and effectiveness of justice, from
leveraging technology to better manage case workflows, to
taking a data-driven approach to allocate caseload and
resources.
In the same period, TSI has funded 77 projects to support 27
Member States to implement 90 skills and education reforms
aiming to the development of basic skills, and attractiveness
and labour market relevance of education and VET systems.
The TSI has also assisted Member States in rolling out 56
reforms aimed at enhancing equality, including gender
equality.
Moreover, the TSI complements the RRF by supporting EU
Member States in the implementation of their recovery and
resilience plans related to digitalisation of justice, reduction
of backlogs and judicial map reform, as well reforms in early
childhood education and care and the digital readiness of
higher education among others.
InvestEU
programme
Articles 173,
paragraph 3
of 175 TFEU
The InvestEU programme, mobilising private and public
funds, provides guarantees and financing for culture and
creative SMEs in addition it blends funds with Creative
Europe MEDIA and the EIF through a dedicated investment
vehicle (i.e., MediaInvest) to support investments in the
audiovisual and gaming sectors. Under Social Infrastructure
and Skills Window, investment in skills, education, training,
and social infrastructure, including educational infrastructure
and student housing are supported, leveraging more than EUR
1 billion
ANNEX 8: RESULTS OF MID-TERM EVALUATIONS
1. Mid-term evaluations on citizenship, equality, rights, values, justice, media and culture
programmes
Citizenship, equality, rights, values, and justice: interim evaluations of the CERV and Justice
programmes
The interim evaluations271
of the CERV and 2021-2027 Justice programmes assess the performance
of the two programmes over the first three years of implementation. The results of the evaluations
also rely on the assessment of the respective preceding programmes272
.
Overall, the interim evaluation of the CERV programme shows that it is making good progress
towards its objectives273
. The new features274
of the CERV programme have produced efficiency
gains for the Commission and beneficiaries, by improving predictability, strengthening monitoring,
and reducing administrative and reporting burden.
The main benefits of the CERV programme are directly project related (i.e. the opportunity to
implement a desired approach) but there are also broader and societal benefits275
, including a
strong contribution to promoting gender equality276
. The CERV programme occupies a space
in the CSO funding landscape that would otherwise be vacant277
. Its comprehensive scope, pan-
EU coverage, focus on EU values, grants of a significant size, operating grants and re-granting
mechanisms, all make the CERV programme an essential source of funding for organisations
promoting EU values and fundamental rights. The programme’s ability to directly provide
independent sources of financing allows organisations to maintain autonomy and pursue their goals
without undue influence. The programme architecture fosters coherence and synergies between
different policy priorities and contributes to a more holistic approach to addressing societal challenges
and promoting EU values.
The interim evaluation of the CERV programme highlights that there is a clear need for the
programme to continue because the challenges it was set up to address persist and, in some cases,
have got worse, e.g. the increasing polarisation of society, the rise in populism and extremism, and
the threat to EU values. Also, the effects of having no CERV programme would likely impact the
already shrinking civic space in the EU. Respect for the rule of law, fundamental rights and
democratic dialogue, gender equality and disability rights would also be affected. Violence against
children, LGBTIQ people, extremism and radicalism would be likely to rise. The sense of being a
European citizen would weaken. Nevertheless, a funding gap on the strands for equality, rights
and gender equality, and for combating violence against women, children and other groups at
risk, is present and may limit the ability to fulfil the objectives of these CERV strands. The
CERV programme has been coherent with wider EU policies and priorities and complementary in
their objectives with other EU funding programmes. There is a clear need for the CERV
programme to continue because the challenges this programme was set up to address persist
and, in some cases, have got worse e.g. the increasing polarisation of society, the rise in populism
and extremism, and the threat to EU values.
The interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 justice programme highlights that the actions funded are
coherent with policies and priorities at EU and national levels, aligned with other EU funding
instruments and consistent with international commitments and objectives, such as the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs)278
. The streamlined architecture of the current programme allows for
greater impact and a more focused approach in key areas compared to the previous programme.
Specifically, the justice programme has successfully contributed to supporting the mutual
recognition of judicial decisions across Member States and enhancing cross-border
141
cooperation, creating a long-term impact by further developing a cohesive European area of justice
built on mutual trust and cooperation.
Direct funding to beneficiaries has led to immediate and tangible benefits for the target groups
involved. Notably, funding for EU networks such as the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN)
facilitates sustained collaboration, capacity building, and continuous high-quality engagement among
legal professionals across the EU. Furthermore, the programme’s continued emphasis on judicial
training significantly contributes to unifying and developing the legal landscape across the EU.
The programme plays a crucial role in fostering a shared legal culture by training thousands of
judges, lawyers, and court staff and supporting the implementation of the 2021-2024 strategy on
European judicial training279
. By facilitating exchanges of best practices, the programme strengthens
Member States' collaboration, ensuring a uniform, coherent, and consistent application of EU law
by judicial practitioners, thereby enhancing the integrity of EU legislation and legal coherence across
borders.
The current programme also builds upon progresses achieved in the previous programming period,
by further reducing barriers to justice and improving frameworks and protections for marginalised
individuals2803
. At the same time, the evaluation points to two main areas of improvement in terms
of design: first of all, evidence gathered through stakeholder consultations highlight the need to
expand the reach of the programme: in fact, higher education and public authorities reported higher
awareness of the programme compared to CSOs. This suggests that while the programme’s
communication activities are effective, they may not be reaching all sectors equally281
.
Moreover, some stakeholders suggested to better include correctional services and prison staff in the
target groups of the programme. Secondly, in terms of addressing new challenges, digitalisation of
justice has become a significant cross-cutting objective of the current justice programme, particularly
following the COVID-19 pandemic, which accelerated the use of digital technologies. This focus
facilitates easier access to legal information, modernises cross-border judicial cooperation
mechanisms, and supports broader EU digital transformation goals, making justice systems more
efficient and accessible. Investment in digitalisation enhances also fundamental rights within the
justice field, such as the presumption of innocence282
. Moreover, the increased use of digital tools
expands the programme’s reach efficiently. However, growing demands in digitalisation is
highlighting significant investment gaps at both EU and national levels. The justice programme
supports the development and maintenance of EU-level IT systems and platforms, but because of its
limited budget, the programme cannot meet all current and future needs.
Media sectors: Mid-term evaluations of MEDIA and Cross strands of Creative Europe and
multimedia actions
1. Audiovisual and video games sectors
The final evaluation of Creative Europe 2014-2020 and the mid-term evaluation of Creative Europe
2021-2027 has confirmed the relevance of continued support to the audiovisual sector and emerging
support to news media. The strands’ objectives are well aligned with the media policy agendas and
regulatory frameworks, notably the Audiovisual Media Services Directive and the European Media
Freedom Act
MEDIA has been effective in supporting: 1) the transnational circulation of European AV works
(relevant for both cultural diversity and competitiveness); 2) competitiveness of the industry
142
(including, crucially, cross-border cooperation between AV players); and 3) cultural and geographical
diversity (including audience development) fostering a level-playing field between participating
countries with different audiovisual capacities. These three objectives are naturally interlinked (e.g.
cross-border cooperations increase and diversify demand in different languages and markets).
As regards the transnational circulation of European non-national works, the evaluation
revealed that on average MEDIA supported EU films and series could be viewed by audiences in 9.5,
6.6 and 3.2 more EU countries across TV, cinema and VoD respectively, than an unsupported EU
film or series. MEDIA support was also associated with 125,410 more non-national cinema
admissions relative to unsupported films.283
Without MEDIA support, non-national admissions in the
EU would drop to 30% of the current level.
As regards competitiveness, the KPI on co-productions confirms the positive impact of MEDIA
funding on the competitiveness of production companies. The share of European co-productions in
all supported works has increased from 36% under the previous to 86% under the current programme,
and is estimated to be significantly higher than co-productions among unsupported works. Co-
productions increase competitiveness in various ways, in particular by increasing the addressable
audience abroad, bringing in new sources of financing (public and private), combining know-how
and capabilities. There is also evidence of distributors growing because of MEDIA support.284
Last
but not least, MediaInvest has demonstrably created leverage effect for additional funds. MediaInvest
is a dedicated blended equity investment platform dedicated to European audiovisual and gaming,
which aims to strengthen the financial strength of European players285
. It will for example help
European production companies retain and exploit their intellectual property, compete
internationally, and harness their creative autonomy286
. It is on track to achieve its objective of
leveraging up to €400 million between 2022-2027.
As regards cultural and linguistic MEDIA has supported many high-quality films and videogames
with international standing.287
Accounting for only 10% of all screens in the EU, by 2023 the network
of cinemas supported by MEDIA sold almost 40% of all tickets sold to non-national European films.
A strong positive development can also be observed in co-productions involving high and low
audiovisual capacity countries.288
MEDIA has been efficient in absorbing an increased budget of +66%, which has been fully
executed so far. Yet, the funding levels are low compared to the challenges at stake, limiting its
effectiveness. The administrative costs have been reduced by providing bigger grants, reducing the
number of contracts and payment to be administered289
.
The evaluation has identified a need to sharpen the EU intervention and address new challenges,
such as the platformisation brought about by giant global competitors and the shift of audiences
online. For example, in the critical streaming segment (which is driving all growth in the industry),
Europeans spend only 7% of their time on watching content from other EU countries, while they
spend 60% of their time on US works and 20% on works from other non-EU territories (e.g. UK and
Asia). Another key challenge is to ensure a fair access of European citizens, to quality European
content. 290
The evaluation confirmed that the need to improve synergies among Creative Europe funding strands
in support of copyright intensive industries. These industries share common challenges, from the
competition of global platforms, to attracting wider audiences in the digital age and responding to
consumer preferences, with special focus on digital native young people291
. The success of and
143
experience with MEDIA in reaching wider cross-border audiences through co-productions and pan-
European distribution is very relevant in this regard and could inspire other IP intensive sectors292
.
The EU AV sector is also lagging behind the US and other regions in innovation. Non-EU tech
players have a strong influence on what kind of EU content Europeans consume: e.g.
recommendations of streaming services have an above-average impact on consumers’ overall choices
regarding films and series, especially among younger generations.293
In this connection, the
evaluation confirmed that synergies with research and innovation programmes, could be further
exploited.
2. News media sectors
Support to news media was introduced in 2021. Given budgetary limitations, it has focused on
targeted cross-border collaborations among media organizations, actions promoting media freedom
and pluralism, and since 2022, media literacy activities. The evaluation confirms that the results are
very promising. Firstly, the programme has helped monitor and map media pluralism and ownership
across the Union294
. Secondly, media collaborations have contributed to addressing some of the
industrial challenges. Funding also strengthens democracy and societal resilience by supporting local
and regional journalism, investigative reporting, and public interest news, in particular in “media
deserts”. Finally, media literacy actions have helped citizens to navigate digital media in the context
of growing disinformation. In this initial stage, with a small annual budget of about EUR 15 mio, as
the news media actions are new, key performance indicators focus on quantitative results.295
Regulation (EU) 2021/818 (the Creative Europe Regulation)296
, which includes a closed list of actions
in its annex, has restricted the programme’s capacity to respond to emerging challenges such as threats
to media freedom and pluralism as well as disinformation.
While the actions are closely aligned with other EU policies and initiatives, barriers to exploiting
synergies with other programmes such as CERV persist. Overlaps are most prominent for media
literacy, between Erasmus+ and Creative Europe297
. The Multimedia Actions line focus on the
provision and access to content on EU affairs, with an annual average budget of EUR 20 million. The
evaluation of the Multimedia Actions line, covering the years between 2021 and 2023, confirms that
the actions were effective in strengthening news coverage on EU affairs from a European perspective.
The actions supported the production of a high volume of original content, with over 7,100 news
items annually, excluding translations and secondary output. They achieved a notable audience reach,
with an estimated 8.9 million weekly on-air viewers, and an average of over 31 million page views
in 2023 for digital content. Nevertheless, the evaluation showcased that the current funding levels
cannot address the wide range of issues and challenges evolving around the fast-changing landscape
of news media and evolving consumption patterns across the Union298
. It recommended a greater
focus on promotion, reflecting changes on how citizens access news.
3. Creative Europe Culture Strand
The Culture strand of Creative Europe covers all the cultural and creative sectors with the exception
of the audiovisual. They include inter alia, architecture, archives, libraries and museums, artistic
crafts, tangible and intangible cultural heritage, design (including fashion design), festivals, music,
literature, performing arts (including theatre and dance), books and publishing, radio, and visual arts
144
The evaluation confirms that the Culture strand is working and performing well, effectively
engaging with a high number of cultural and creative organisations. It offers them rich opportunities
to work transnationally, is strongly aligned with the evolving needs of the CCS, strengthen their
capacities, and successfully help all CCS reach new and wider cross-border audiences through co-
creations, co-productions and pan-European circulation, contributing in this way to foster a shared
area of cultural diversity for the peoples of Europe. The evaluation highlights that, in line with the
regulation establishing the programme, the Culture strand Creative Europe 2021-2027 has wider
ambitions than its predecessor in promoting societal resilience and enhancing social inclusion and
intercultural dialogue through culture, as well in contributing to the Union’s global strategy for
international relations through the many partnerships involving cultural and creative entities from
non-EU Member States. Finally, the evaluation concludes that growth in the supported CCS
organisations came from the additional skills developed through the implementation of projects and
the larger markets accessed at the transnational level, both of which indirectly helped organisations
to become more competitive. Despite such significant achievements, financial constraints and
oversubscription issues remain a challenge.
The Culture strand has been instrumental in helping the CCS address to a good extent key issues
identified in the regulation, such as the fragmentation of the market along national and linguistic lines
or the challenges connected with the dual transition. However, the overall sectors’ position relative
to international competition is still relatively weak some needs have become more acute in recent
years while others have appeared, namely the need to preserve artistic freedom, to recognise the
intrinsic value of culture and its contribution for the society, the surge of AI, take into account the
new international geopolitical landscape, and to improve working conditions in CCS. The evaluation
has identified a fourfold proportion of high-quality projects exceeding the available budget for
some key actions, such as cooperation projects, mobility and literary translations. The proven
strand’s lack of capacity to absorb demand represents a threat to its attractiveness to stakeholders
and therefore impact, due to the fierce competition for available funds. The Culture strand should
keep addressing accessibility challenges and continuing to expand its reach to cultural and creative
organisations with no prior experience at working at EU level. The evaluation values the
international opening of the Culture strand going beyond the EU, as an essential element for
promoting EU values, intercultural dialogue, raising awareness of EU democratic values but also
facilitating peer learning on key issues for culture and heritage. Finaly, despite the fact that the
regulation specifies clear actions to be developed, it also leaves enough leeway to adapt to new policy
priorities and the Culture strand has proved its flexibility and agility in responding to new challenges
or events, in particular the migration crisis, the upsurge of COVID-19, the Russian war of aggression
against Ukraine, etc.
2. Mid-term evaluations of Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps
Erasmus+
The final evaluation of the 2014-2020 Programme and the interim evaluation of the 2021-2027
Programme299
found that Erasmus+ performs strongly across key evaluation criteria and fulfils its
objectives effectively. Both Programme generations have proven successful in delivering a strong
European added value, playing a key role in the fields of education, training, youth and sport.
Despite the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Erasmus+ supported learning mobility
abroad of over 6.2 million participants in the 2014-2020 period and around 1.6 million in 2021-2023
helping to increase their skills and competences. Erasmus+ also funded over 136 000 distinct
145
organisations in the 2014-2020 Programme and more than 77 000 from 2021 to 2023, supporting their
cooperation and improving their practices.
Erasmus+ significantly surpasses what could be achieved by individual countries at national or
international levels. Its benefits stem from the opportunities it provides to personal, educational and
professional development of learners and staff, to cross-border cooperation of organisations and to
policy development in the fields of education and training, youth and sport, providing significant
benefits to those to take part in the programme compared to those who do not. Without Erasmus+,
the benefits deriving from the Programme for individuals and organisations would be drastically
reduced. Internationalisation of education, training, youth and sport sectors would be reduced to close
to zero in several countries, especially in the youth and sport sectors. Erasmus+ funds over half of
credit mobilities in the Member States, and in half of the EU countries over 90% of short mobility300
.
The programme is also responding to emerging needs related to new challenges posed by
technological developments, in particular the emergence of generative artificial intelligence and the
provision of skills to support EU competitiveness. Erasmus+ is investing in supporting the
development of skills needed to provide the EU single market and industrial sectors with the future-
proof skills needed to tackle the challenges of competitiveness, as highlighted in Draghi and Letta
reports. The funding of learning mobility - which is at the heart of the programme - appears key to
ensure that the younger generations are equipped with the right skills to face the challenges posed in
a rapidly evolving context. The Programme has also become more inclusive and has increased the
share of people with fewer opportunities amongst its participants, going from around 10% in the
2014-2020 period to around 16% in 2023301
.
Furthermore, the programme is also responding to emerging needs related to new challenges posed
by technological developments, in particular the emergence of generative artificial intelligence and
the provision of skills to support EU competitiveness. Erasmus+ is investing in supporting the
development of skills needed to provide the EU single market and industrial sectors with the future-
proof skills needed to tackle the challenges of competitiveness, as highlighted in Draghi and Letta
reports. The funding of learning mobility - which is at the heart of the programme - appears key to
ensure that the younger generations are equipped with the right skills to face the challenges posed in
a rapidly evolving context. The Programme has also become more inclusive and has increased the
share of people with fewer opportunities amongst its participants, going from around 10% in the
2014-2020 period to around 16% in 2023302
.
Despite the clear progress, the evaluation has identified some still existing barriers to the participation
of people with fewer opportunities. Erasmus+ should thus keep addressing accessibility challenges,
continuing to expand its reach to participants with fewer opportunities. Further clarifying definitions
of people with fewer opportunities and providing clearer guidance on the measures available to
support their participation would also enhance inclusivity.
Reviewing funding rules, simpler reporting procedures and streamlining across the various actions
and fields should be assessed to simplify access for small and newcomer organisations. The
evaluation also identified needs for simplifying alternative funding, facilitating transfer of funds
between instruments and breaking down barriers between different operational modes and funding
rules to build more synergies between Erasmus+ and other instruments and foster projects’ upscaling.
That should also be done via better dissemination of projects outcomes.
146
The evaluation shows the international added value of the programme, essential for promoting EU
values, intercultural learning, raising awareness of civic and active participation but also for
facilitating peer learning and bringing European expertise in the fields of education, training, youth
and sport to other regions. Erasmus+ could consider widening its cooperation with non-EU countries
not associated to the programme.
The Erasmus+ evaluation identified opportunities to improve coherence with the European Solidarity
Corps and to identify ways to address potential overlaps, improving overall efficiency and increasing
clarity for stakeholders.
European Solidarity Corps
The final evaluation of the 2018-2020 Programme and interim evaluation of the 2021-2027
Programme303
have found that the European Solidarity Corps performs well across the five evaluation
criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, coherence, EU added value). The European Solidarity
Corps addresses European society’s crucial needs, especially in fostering civic participation and
promoting inclusion and diversity. The programme fosters a sense of community, revitalising local
initiatives and promoting a broader global perspective. Participation contributes to improved
personal, professional and study skills and social and civic awareness. The programme has also
consistently met its targets on participants with fewer opportunities (30% in 2022 and 2023304
). The
evaluation’s outcomes confirm that the European Solidarity Corps plays an essential role and, in some
countries, is the only alternative for youth volunteering and solidarity. A number of areas for
improvement have been identified. Key recommendations suggest improving the identification of
people with fewer opportunities to facilitate their further inclusion in the programme, aligning
programme objectives and funding, addressing differences in the geographical distribution of results
and impacts, improving visa arrangements for non-EU nationals and improving IT and monitoring
tools, and clarifying the purpose of the humanitarian aid strand. Funding has generally proven very
limited given the programme’s ambitions and objectives. The programme complements EU
programmes like Erasmus+, but actual synergies are somewhat limited, suggesting a need for more
structured efforts.
A potential area of duplication highlighted by the evaluation concerns Erasmus+ Youth
Participation activities and Solidarity projects funded under the European Solidarity Corps, both
supporting youth-led initiatives run by informal groups of young people, fostering active citizenship
and sense of initiative. Solidarity projects have a stronger solidarity component, supporting mostly
bottom-up local solidarity activities with a view to addressing key challenges within the communities
the young people carrying the project live in. Nevertheless, the many common areas of action suggest
the need to reflect on potential overlaps and improve communication on the differences to potential
applicants. The support activities aiming at increasing the quality implementation of the two
programmes also emerge as examples for possible overlaps. Both activities are run by the same
National Agencies, active in the youth field, and fund very similar activities, reaching out to
target groups that are often the same. These activities represent opportunities for synergies
between the programmes, they could also be looked at to seek for some economy of scale and improve
efficiency.
Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps – Coherence with other EU policies and instruments
Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps (ESC) exhibit a high degree of external coherence with
key EU priorities, including education, skills development, inclusion, youth engagement, and
democratic participation. Evaluations of both the 2014–2020 and 2021–2027 programmes confirm
their complementarity with major EU instruments of the 2021-2027 programming period such as
147
ESF+, Horizon Europe, Interreg, and the RRF. This supports the programmes’ roles in building a
lifelong learning society, enhancing employability, and promoting civic values in line with EU
strategic frameworks like the European Education Area and the European Pillar of Social Rights.
Erasmus+ alignment with broader EU objectives – such as the European Education Area, the
European Skills Agenda, the Digital Education Action Plan, and the European Green Deal – makes
it well-positioned to drive systemic change. The expansion of its scope in 2021–2027 to include adult
education, sport staff mobility, and initiatives like DiscoverEU further enhanced its external
coherence. These new dimensions support skills formation, intercultural understanding, and social
inclusion, while expanding access to previously underserved groups. They also align with the broader
objectives of building a Union of Skills, fostering lifelong learning, and promoting fairness and
Flagship initiatives such as European Universities alliances, Centres of Vocational Excellence, and
Erasmus+ Teacher Academies which are already deeply embedded in the EU’s strategic education
and skills policy frameworks1
. These structures also contribute directly to building a resilient and
interconnected European Education Area and advancing international partnerships via the Global
Gateway. Their contribution is not only educational but also socio-political, fostering networks that
link education, innovation, and regional development. In practice, they have also generated valuable
spill-over effects in terms of curriculum modernisation, institutional reform, and cross-sectoral
cooperation, which are increasingly relevant for Member States' national reform efforts supported
under the European Semester.
The European Solidarity Corps complements Erasmus+ by offering volunteering and solidarity
experiences to young people outside of formal education and training frameworks.
Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps (even at a lesser extent) already benefit from deepening
synergies with other EU funding streams:
• Horizon Europe: Especially under Pillars I and III, links with Marie-Sklodowska-Curie
Actions and the European Institute of Innovation and Technology boost research mobility and
innovation ecosystems. Horizon Europe Missions are directly supported by the European
Solidarity Corps.
• ESF+: Supports inclusion and scale-up of Erasmus+ pilots. Germany’s transfer of EUR 57
million from ESF+ to fund inclusive mobility is a notable example.
• ERDF & Interreg: Complement skills and education infrastructure, particularly in smart
specialisation regions.
• RRF: Supports national education reforms; e.g. Italy dedicated EUR 150 million for school
mobility in disadvantaged areas.
These synergies allow for scaling successful pilot actions and integrating Erasmus+ and the Corps
results into wider employment and inclusion strategies at national level. Survey data confirm this
complementarity: 45% of organisations participating in multiple EU programmes saw a link to
Erasmus+, often as a continuation or upscaling of earlier efforts.
The coherence with EU funding, the European Semester and policy priorities – such as Cohesion
Policy, the RRF, the European Semester, and the European Pillar of Social Rights, connected to the
RRF and the European Semester, jointly shape education and inclusion initiatives, confirming strong
148
alignment with Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps objectives. In this, the Pillar’s principles
1, 3, 4, 11, 17, 20 correspond to the combination of Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps’
objectives on lifelong learning, equity, and civic engagement. Furthermore, the European Semester’s
country-cpecific recommendations (CSRs) reinforce national reforms in areas like upskilling,
inclusion, and digital education.
ANNEX 9: PROBLEMS, PROBLEM DRIVERS AND THEIR EVOLUTION
Table 1: Evolution of problems based on megatrends305
Megatrend Connections
1.Accelerating
technological
change and
hyperconnectivity
Education systems struggle to keep pace with fast-moving technological innovation
and students’ digital realities. Many lack the capacity to integrate AI, digital tools
and media literacy into teaching and learning at scale. Hyperconnectivity among
youth increases exposure to online manipulation, while educators are often under-
equipped. For the CCS, media and audiovisual, technology is transforming access,
production and distribution. In education and training, digital learning platforms
expand, while young people are hyperconnected among themselves and to global
trends. Technological changes are also reshaping justice systems and posing new
challenges to fundamental rights, EU values and democratic processes. Social media,
more than driving civic activism, are also means of exposure to disinformation and
echo chambers.
2.Changing
nature of work
As technology and demographic changes rapidly influence labour markets, there is a
continuous need for reskilling and upskilling. Education and training systems often
do not have the tools to rapidly adapt to the current changes, including the growth of
AI. Skills gaps in digital literacy, adaptability, civic engagement require a multi-
faceted approach, combining mobility, solidarity, but also training and professional
development opportunities for all.
3.Changing
security paradigm
Hybrid threats, such as disinformation and foreign information manipulation and
interference, entail new security challenges and require enhanced cross-border
cooperation. Schools and universities are increasingly exposed to these:
disinformation, radicalisation, and political interference. Yet education’s role in
building democratic resilience, societal cohesion, and cultural awareness is not
comprehensively supported. Also, Media, culture and civil society are at frontline to
strengthen societal resilience through media pluralism, media literacy, democratic
and civic participation, appreciation of our cultural diversity and common cultural
features, upholding of European values and mobilising communities. They also
contribute to the EU’s external soft power.
4. Diversification
of education,
training and
learning
Learning is no longer confined to formal settings. Digital, informal, and non-formal
learning pathways are expanding but often remain disconnected and under-
recognised. National systems alone struggle to ensure quality, equity and portability.
The education, training and learning are changing with the rise of digital platforms,
new demands, and informal and non-formal learning. While flexible and diverse
learning models can increase access and inclusion, they can also lead to fragmented
education experiences and unequal recognition of learning outcomes.
5.Widening
inequalities
Inequalities in access to quality education, digital tools, and cultural opportunities
are widening — especially among young people, marginalised groups including
Roma, and across territories. Without effective public intervention, including in
support for civil society, inequalities are likely to continue growing, being
exacerbated by ongoing trends such as technological disruption, climate change, and
migration. Inequality is holding economic growth back and can threaten democracy
and social cohesion. Young people are particularly affected by inequalities but also
mental health issues that affect social cohesion.
6.Growing
consumption
The rise of algorithm-driven content and low attention spans challenges traditional
educational formats and trust in knowledge. Media consumption habits fragment
learning experiences, and the authority of teachers is often undermined. Education
systems need support to adapt pedagogies, foster digital discernment, and promote
media literacy – best achieved through joint EU initiatives and teacher cooperation.
Also, growing consumption has transformed the media into a fast-paced, attention-
driven environment, undermining trust in journalism. In the audiovisual sector, it
150
exacerbates the power of major non-EU platforms, threatening the availability of and
access to a diversity of audiovisual and media content.
7.Increasing
influence of new
governing systems
As global and non-state actors shape narratives and policy spaces, the role of
education in developing civic awareness and critical agency becomes more urgent.
Yet national education reforms alone are insufficient to prepare young people for a
complex and interdependent world. New governing systems are often driven by non-
state actors, digital platforms, and the internationalisation of decision-making. Given
this, the role of civil society and other non-state actors is even more important in
protecting fundamental rights, shaping public decisions, and holding public
institutions accountable. Media, as a ‘watchdog’ of democracy, is fundamental in
informing, entertaining, and socialising. Education is essential through the
promotion of solidarity and critical thinking for the youth.
Table 2: Classification of policy-related problem drivers
Problem 1: Threats to democracy, fundamental rights and EU values, culture and cultural diversity,
and shrinking civic and media spaces
Problem drivers Outlook (new
vs recurrent)
Type of problem
(societal, market vs.
regulatory)
Examples of gaps (as shown
by evaluations and other data
sources).
Threats to EU values Recurrent /
Emerging
during the
course of this
MFF term with
new/enhanced
threats to
equality, respect
for fundamental
rights
Societal • 2024 OSCE ODIHR reports
found an increase in online
hate speech, violence and
death threats in specific
Member States (e.g.
Belgium, Germany and the
Netherlands), with many
online harassment cases
targeted at women.
• As revealed by a 2023
Special Eurobarometer 493,
discrimination in Europe
remains widespread, for
instance with 54% of
respondents agreeing with
this statement on the
grounds of sexual
orientation.
• Gender-based violence
remains a persistent and
widespread fundamental
rights abuse in the EU.
Evidence that Eurostat, FRA
and the EIGE published in
2024 shows that a third of
women in the EU have
151
experienced violence at
home, at work or in public
(cf. Eurostat, FRA and
EIGE 2024306
).
Challenges to the
rule of law and
judicial systems
Recurrent /
Emerging
during the
course of this
MFF term with
new, persistent
and systemic
threats to the
rule of law
across EU as
well as specific
challenges for
judicial systems.
Societal
Market
• The European
Commission’s 2024 rule of
law report, as well as recent
developments, highlight a
broad range of threats to EU
values across Member
States.
• Insights from the EU Justice
Scoreboard 2024 and Flash
Eurobarometer 540
highlight progress to deliver
effective national justice
systems in Member States,
but also the need for
continued improvement, for
instance in the uptake of
digitalisation and cross
border judicial cooperation.
Obstacles to
democratic
participation and
societal resilience
Recurrent
Emerging
during the
course of this
MFF term with
new challenges
linked, for
instance, to
foreign
information
manipulation
and interference
(FIMI)
Societal
• Decreasing electoral
turnout,
disengagement in
traditional political
frameworks
• Foreign information
manipulation and
interference
• According to the 3rd
EEAS
Report on Foreign
Information Manipulation
and Interference Threats
(2025), democratic
institutions and processes,
especially elections, have
been major FIMI targets in
2024. Among the electoral
events with most incidents
recorded are the 2024
European Elections, the
Moldovan Presidential
elections and EU accession
referendum, and the French
legislative elections.
• Based on data gathered
though Special
Eurobarometers 514 and
552, citizens’ participation
in political and social
activities remains limited.
Between 2021 and 2024,
152
there was a notable drop in
those who declared that they
voted in local, national or
European elections.
Pressures on
European media and
the information
landscape
Recurrent/
Emerging
during the
course of this
MFF term as the
integrity of the
information
landscape is
challenged, and
due to an
increased
presence of non-
EU platforms
and competitors
in the media and
audiovisual
fields.
Shortcoming of
public
intervention.
Societal
• Shifting and
evolving audience
habits
• Unequal access to
high-quality and
diverse European
media content
• The growth of
disinformation
• Media pluralism at
threat
• Insufficient levels of
digital and media
literacy
Market
• Competition with
non-EU online
platforms;
• Limited circulation
of media content
within the EU.
Regulatory
• Existing regulations
needed to streamline
and address
problems in the
audiovisual and
media markets
(AVMSD, EMFA),
whose
implementation
requires financial
support.
• According to Media
Pluralism Monitor Report,
23 out of 27 Member States
are in high or medium risk
to media pluralism.
• Europeans continue to
watch more content from
the US than from other EU
countries, as US films
capture 70% of the box
office, whilst US streamers
capture 80% of all
subscriptions.
• Only 25% of tickets for
European films are being
sold outside the film’s
country of origin, and
online the consumption of
content from EU Member
States is decreasing
(European Media Industry
Outlook).
• All EU news media
companies together
(newspapers, magazines,
TV, radio, podcasts) and in
all platforms (both online
and offline) capture less
advertising revenues than
online platforms (EUR 35
bn vs 41 bn in 2023)
(European Media Industry
Outlook).
• Misinformation and
disinformation are ranked
as the first threat in the
coming years (World
Economic Forum’s Global
risk perception survey,
2024). 68% of Europeans
believe they are exposed to
disinformation on a weekly
153
basis (European Media
Industry Outlook).
Obstacles to cultural
cooperation, and
preservation of
cultural heritage
Recurrent, but
made more
acute in
particular with
surge of AI,
increased
threats to artistic
freedom and
impact of
climate change
and geopolitical
context on
heritage
Societal and Market
• Limited
resources for
cross-border
cooperation at
national/regional
levels
• Fragmentation of
the CCS along
national and
linguistic lines
• Lack of awareness and
appreciation of cultural
diversity
• Limited access to
diverse cultural content
on digital platforms
• Limited mobility of
CCS professionals and
circulation of CCS
content
Obstacles to
innovation and
technological
dependencies
affecting democratic,
societal, cultural and
media players
Recurrent Market
• Limited access to
reskilling and
upskilling of
professionals
• Changing business
models and revenue
streams
• Low private
investment
• Dependencies on
non-EU companies
• In the EU, of the 800 top
R&D investors, only 7 are
media firms (European
Media Industry Outlook).
• Only 10% of audiovisual
professionals participate in
training programmes
regularly (European Media
Industry Outlook).
• In the news media sector,
the traditional revenue
streams are gradually
declining, and the increase
in digital revenues does not
offset this decrease (-9 bn
vs +1.9 bn between 2019-
23) (European Media
Industry Outlook).
• In the video games sector,
EU companies account for
just 13% of global
revenues, far behind their
US or East-Asian
counterparts (European
Media Industry Outlook).
Problem 2: Shortfall of skills and key competences for life and jobs
154
Problem drivers Outlook
(new vs
recurrent)
Type of
problem
(societal,
market,
regulator
y, etc.)
Examples of gaps (as shown by evaluations and
data sources).
Low and unequal
capacity to deliver high
quality, innovation,
inclusiveness and
insufficient
cooperation and
knowledge sharing
Recurrent Societal
and
economic
• 2022 results of the OECD’s PISA show that
in all three subjects tested, the mean score for
EU27 has steadily decreased over the past
decade. A substantial drop of 18 points was
recorded in mathematics (from 491.7 to
473.7) between 2018 and 2022, while the
decrease was smaller in reading (-12) (from
486 to 474.1) and science (-3.4) (from 487 to
483.7).
• According to Eurostat, in 2023 more than half
of EU enterprises that recruited or tried to
recruit ICT specialists had difficulties in
filling ICT vacancies.307
• Even though the rate of early school leaving
has improved at the EU level, decreasing by
1.8 percentage points in the period 2013-2024
and is on track to reach the 2030 EU level
target of less than 9%, the share of early
school leaving was 9.3% in 2024 on average
across EU countries, and still considerable
differences exist across and within countries,
with persisting inequalities among specific
groups and territories.308
• Nearly two thirds (65.3%) of recent medium-
level VET graduates in the EU has
experienced work-based learning as part of
their curriculum, comfortably exceeding the
2025 EU-level target of at least 60%.
However, work-based learning shows a high
dispersion across EU countries. Nearly all
graduates take part in work-based learning in
the Netherlands, Germany and Spain. Yet
very few experienced work-based learning as
part of their VET curriculum in Romania and
Czechia. There are EU countries covering the
full spectrum in between these two extremes
• Compared to the EU average, some regions
have a significantly lower share of tertiary-
level educated people. Over 80% of regions in
Italy, Romania, Czech Republic, Portugal,
155
and Bulgaria had tertiary education attainment
rates below 30% in 2022.309
• Support study to the final evaluation of
Erasmus+ 2014-2020 and the interim
evaluation of Erasmus+ 2021-2027 highlight
that 84% of public consultation respondents
agreed or strongly agreed that they would not
have been able to fund the cooperation
activities undertaken without Erasmus+. Most
beneficiary organisations interviewed for case
studies confirmed the inability to undertake
similar activities without Erasmus+ support.
• According to PISA 2022, the share of students
who report being frequently bullied ranges
from 13% to 29% .
Obstacles to cross-
border learning
mobility, including
insufficient
opportunities for all
Recurrent Societal
and
economic
• In 2022, the outbound mobility rate310
stood
at 10.9% at EU level,311
12 percentage points
lower than the target set for 2030. At the same
time, the latest estimates suggest that 5.1% of
medium-level VET learners had a mobility
experience abroad, 8 percentage point below
the 2030 target.
• Erasmus+ evaluation findings show that the
scale of Erasmus+ is much bigger than that of
other comparable schemes reviewed in the
fields of education, training, youth, and sport
with an involvement of 25 times more
participants per year compared to the
cumulative average of other similar
international funding programmes.
• In higher education, Eurostat statistics show
that 55% of those tertiary graduates having
spent abroad at least three months in 2022
benefited from Erasmus+.312
• Around 20% of Eurodesk 2022 survey
respondents indicated that they cannot afford
to go abroad unless through a fully funded
mobility activity. The ratio is even higher
(34%) for young people who are not engaged
in education, employment, or training
(NEETs).
Barriers to
transparency and
recognition of
Recurrent Societal
and
• Insufficient transparency and comparability
of qualifications in the EU arise from diverse
educational and training systems in Europe,
combined with an uneven implementation of
156
qualifications across
borders
economic,
regulatory
EU transparency tools (EQF, ESCO and
Europass) and a lack of digitalisation. This
results in overqualification, in particular of
third country migrants (34.9%).
• In the field of regulated professions,
individuals seeking to have their
qualifications recognized often face complex
administrative procedures, leading to
delays in recognition (28% reported excessive
documentation requirements, and 16% faced
significant delays).
Unexploited potential
of lifelong learning,
including non-formal
and informal
Recurrent Societal
and
economic
• The Education and Training Monitor 2024
highlights that the share of adults that have
taken part in training in the past 12 months
stands at 39.5 %, whereas the 2030 target is
60%.
• The digital skills gap in Europe is significant:
while 70% of young people (16-24) have at
least basic digital skills, this share decreases
to 37% among the older age group (55-74)313
.
A gap of 15314
percentage points exist
between rural and urban areas regarding basic
digital skills.
• The European Commission study “Youth
work in the EU” published in 2021 shows that
two thirds of youth workers declare the need
to have more available funding for non-formal
activities. All focus group participants voiced
need for structural and long-term funding, the
absence of which hinders long-term planning
and investment in non -formal learning.
Obstacles to societal
engagement, civic
education and
solidarity
Recurrent Societal • The European Parliament study on young
people’s participation in European democratic
processes (March 2023) highlights that young
people are turning away from traditional
politics and democratic structures while using
social media as their main access to public
debate. They participate less in institutional
politics than other age groups and less than the
cohorts of young people decades ago.
According to the EP Youth Survey 2024, a
significant majority (76%) of young people
believed they had been exposed to
disinformation and fake news in the seven
days prior to the survey.
157
• According to the European Commission
report “Learning about the EU: European
topics and school curricula across EU
Member States” from 2021, citizenship
education on the EU and its values remains
uneven.
• Young people’s belief in equal opportunities
has sharply declined, with a 16-percentage
point drop in the last decade, according to the
2022 Eurobarometer. Many feel marginalised
due to their socio-economic status, ethnic
origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability,
or political views, particularly those with
fewer opportunities or those living in rural or
remote areas, with close to 18 million young
people at risk of social exclusion in the EU.315
158
ANNEX 10: INTERVENTION LOGIC
1. Logical links between problem drivers and strategic objectives
10.1 Logical links between Problem 1 and General Objective 1
10.2 Logical links between Problem 2 and General Objective 2
10.3 Logical links between Problem 3 and General Objective 3
159
2. Logical links between specific objectives and areas of intervention and examples of how
success can be measured
The following tables provide illustrative examples, per policy area, on how success would look like
and possible ways to measure it.
General objective 1: Enhance and deepen the EU ability to financially contribute, provide added
value and promote fundamental rights and EU values, democracy, media and culture
Policy Areas of Intervention Illustrating success: examples of possible output
and/or result indicators
Rights and values SO 1.1. Contribute to upholding the rule of law, fundamental rights and
equality, reduce discrimination and empower civil society
Support to fundamental
rights, anti-
discrimination
measures and digital
rights protection
Substantial increase of awareness of rights and values,
measured by e.g.: (a) Increase of citizens’ awareness of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; or, (b) Increase
of citizens’ awareness of the General Data Protection
Regulation
Support to civil society
organisations, human
rights defenders and
whistleblowers
Enabling conditions for a vibrant civic space in Europe
are supported, as measured e.g. by: (a) Number of CSOs
reached by support and capacity building activities
160
Rights and values SO 1.2. Contribute to fighting against gender-based violence, violence against
children and other groups at risk
Ending violence against
women and girls and
other groups at risk
Substantial decrease of violence against women and girls
in Europe, as measured e.g. by: (a) Degree of
implementation of the gender equality strategy
Support to victims and
survivors of gender-
based violence
Victims of gender based violence are supported to
address the impacts of such violence, as measured e.g. by:
(a) Number of people reached by activities (by gender)
Rights and values SO 1.3. Contribute to enhancing democratic resilience and participation
Promote citizens
engagement and
participation
A substantially increased number of EU citizens believe
that they can meaningfully participate in democratic
processes, as measured e.g. by: (a) Citizens perception on
democratic participation (cf. “my voice counts” question
in standard Eurobarometers) (by gender)
Freedom of expression,
countering
disinformation and
promoting access to
public information
Substantially increased capacity of civic actors to identify
and counteract disinformation and other threats,
measured e.g. by: (a) Number of CSOs reached by
support and capacity building activities.
Media SO 1.4. Contribute to supporting news media, media independence and tackling
disinformation
Protect news media
outlets and journalists
& address risks to
media freedom and
pluralism
Improved media pluralism in Europe and protection of
news media outlets and journalists, measured e.g. by: (a)
Results of the Media Pluralism Monitor Report; (b)
Number of cases of media and journalists under threat
detected and assessed
Enhance the
production, distribution
and consumption of
professional journalistic
content
Increased production, distribution and consumption of
professional journalistic content; more citizens that
declare themselves well-informed on EU affairs,
measured e.g. by: (a) Number of professional journalistic
content pieces produced under support; (b) Number of
supported news media entities; (c) Number of projects
across borders; (d) Audience reach and engagement
Support the digital
transformation of news
organisations and
innovative practices
Increased digitalisation of news organisations and higher
use of innovative practices, measured e.g. by: (a) Number
of digital tools adopted; (b) Share of total production
from digital products (c) Number of innovative editorial
projects
Promote measures
aimed at monitoring
and safeguarding the
The EU capacity to detect, analyse and store sufficient
evidence about the most visible and important
disinformation campaigns on social media increases,
161
online information
space
measured e.g. by: (a) Number of disinformation cases
formally reported and assessed; (b) Number of fact-
checking initiatives supported/coordinated via EU
mechanisms
Promote digital and
media literacy activities
to empower EU citizens
to make well-informed
choices as regards
media consumption
More citizens declaring themselves able to interact with
media, measured e.g. by: (a) Number of supported
actions on digital and media literacy; (b) Number of
people targeted by supported actions
Media
SO 1.5. Support production, circulation, and access of EU audiovisual and
media content
Support to the creation
of audiovisual content
Improvements in the creation of audiovisual content,
measured e.g. by: (a) Number and share of coproductions
among supported works, including (i) the number of
coproductions involving a low-capacity country, and (ii)
led by a low-capacity country; (b) Number and share of
works supported for development that are released within
4 years after being given support
Support to circulation
of audiovisual content
Increased circulation of audiovisual content, measured
e.g. by: (a) Number of non-national EU countries where
a supported EU work is available on average, also
separately for (i) cinemas, (ii) on TV and (iii) streaming
Support to access to
audiovisual content
Increase access to audiovisual content, measured e.g. by:
(a) Number of total admission attributable to funded
projects; (b) Non-national views of supported EU works
in the EU, also separately for (i) cinemas, and (ii)
streaming
Level playing field,
geographic and
language diversity
Protection of the geographic and linguistic diversity of
the audiovisual content, measured e.g. by: (a) The
number of audiovisual works in lesser-used languages
developed, produced and distributed with the support of
the Programme and share of funding for these projects;
(b) Number and share of participants from lower capacity
countries in supported markets.
Support to video games Improvements in the creation, circulation and access to
video games content, measured e.g. by: (a) Number and
share of video games supported for development that are
released; (b) Critical reception of supported video games
(e.g., awards and aggregated reviews);
Support to cross-media
IP exploitation
Improvement in the cross-media IP exploitation,
measured e.g. by: (a) Number of supported adaptations of
the IP into different media formats (e.g., books to movies,
games to TV shows).
162
Culture SO 1.6. Increase in cross-border cultural cooperation, cultural participation
and accessibility, and circulation of diverse cultural works, while strengthening
cultural and creative sectors.
Support to the cross-
border cooperation and
creation of a diversity of
CCS content
Increase in the number of CCS international connections/
cooperations and artists international careers, measured
e.g. by: (a) Number of transnational
cooperations/partnerships supported; (b) Number of
artists and cultural professionals supported; (c) Results of
the mobility on the career of artists (co-productions,
exhibitions, collaborations,…)
Support to the cross-
border circulation of
CCS content
Higher visibility of European works; Increased
knowledge about non-national European works,
measured e.g. by: (a) Geographical reach of cultural and
creative content
Support to participation
and access of all to a
diversity of CCS
content and cultural
heritage
Cultural content and heritage are more accessible to a
diversity of target groups, including those who are
normally excluded or face barriers, measured e.g. by: (a)
Number of (and diversity of) visitors/number of people
reached onsite and online in culture and heritage projects;
(b) Number of partnerships created among heritage sites
thanks to EU support
Support to the capacity-
building and skills
development of CCS
professionals
Increased capacity of CCS organisations; Artists/CCS
professionals have higher skills in priority areas (i.e.
green/digital), measured e.g. by: (a) Number of capacity
building and skills development activities supported (by
sector/field); (b) Number of artists and cultural
professionals who have received a training/participated in
the capacity building activities
Strengthening the
international position of
CCS
Increased sense of belonging to a common cultural sphere
in third countries organisations, measured e.g. by: (a)
Number of third countries organisations involved in
supported projects; (b) Sustained cooperation with 3rd
countries organisations/artists
Rights and
values, media and
culture
SO 1.7. Spur cross-cutting innovation and promote sustainability of media,
cultural and societal entities
Support innovation in
technology
Improvements in the use of cross-cutting innovative tools
and technology, measured e.g. by: (a) Number of active
media company users of supported innovative tool at 3
and 5 years after project completion; (b) Share of
supported media innovation projects that scale beyond
pilot phase; (c) Number of patents obtained or, number of
users/beta testers
163
Upskilling and
reskilling of
professionals
Improvements in the upskilling and reskilling of
professionals, measured e.g. by: (a) Number and share of
participants who receive a training diploma/pass test; (b)
Number and share of participants who apply what they
learned on the job; (c) Low-Capacity Countries and
gender balance of participants
Foster access to finance Increase access to finance, measured e.g. by: (a) Change
in the number of financial institutions actively offering
tailored financing products for media and other creative
sector companies, over time
General objective 2: Enhance and deepen the EU ability to financially contribute, support and
provide added value to cross-border education and training, youth, sport and solidarity, contributing
to skills for life and jobs
Policy Areas of Intervention Examples of possible output and/or result indicators
(to give an illustration of how success may look like)
Education and
training, youth
and sport
SO 2.1. Support transnational cooperation in the area of education and skills
Education, youth and
sport
Increased quality, inclusion, sustainability, innovation,
excellence and internationalisation of education and
training, youth and sport participating organisations,
measured e.g. by: (a) Number of projects addressing
priorities on inclusion, digital and green; (b) Number of
projects producing/developing innovative measures to
increase the quality of education and training, youth and
sport activities; (c) Share of organisations benefitting
from their participation in transnational cooperation
activities
Education and
training, youth
and sport
SO 2.2. Support to transnational learning mobility and learning opportunities
Education, youth and
sport
Improved skills and competences for jobs and for life, of
participants and increased number of participants with
fewer opportunities, measured e.g. by: (a) Number of
participants in learning mobility and volunteering; (b)
Number of participants in STEM related activities; (c)
Number of participants with fewer opportunities; (d)
Share of participants that consider they have benefited
from their participation in learning mobility or
volunteering activities; (e) Share of participants declaring
that they have increased their key competences’
SO 2.3. Promote lifelong learning, improving skills and new competences.
164
Education and
training, youth
and sport
Education, youth and
sport
Improved skills and competences for jobs and for life, of
participants; Increased opportunities to engage in non
formal and informal learning and sport; Increased
capacity of youth work and youth organisations,
measured e.g. by: (a) Share of participants that consider
they have benefited from their participation in learning
mobility or volunteering activities; (b) Number of
participants in youth and sport activities; (c) Number of
adult learners; (d) Number of youth workers and youth
organisations declaring having benefitted from their
participation
Education and
training, youth
and sport
SO 2.4. Support policy experimentation and development accelerating
modernisation
Education, youth and
sport
Acceleration of reforms and modernisation at system’s
level, measured e.g. by:
(a) Number of public authorities at national, regional of
local level involved in funded projects; (b) Share of
funded projects that have impacted/inspired practices
transferred into policies and triggered modernisation of
systems at national level
Education and
training, youth
and sport
SO 2.5. Foster solidarity, civic education and engagement
Education, youth and
sport
Increased active participation, solidarity and European
sense of belonging among participants; Increase number
of activities addressing participation, measured e.g. by:
(a) Share of participants in activities directly fostering
solidarity and civic engagement; (b) Number of KA2
projects addressing the participation priority (c) Share of
participants that consider they have an increased
European sense of belonging after participating in
learning mobility or volunteering activities
ANNEX 11: OBJECTIVES-BASED MERGER. MODELLING OF INSTRUMENTS, SYNERGIES AND
COMPLEMENTARITIES.
This Annex offers a brief description of the two instruments, and provides examples on how the alignment
between the proposed financial architecture and the policy priorities would generate the desired synergies,
complementarities and results within each of the two.
11.1. A dedicated instrument for fundamental rights, EU values and democracy, media and culture.
Scope of financing. The new instrument will support the implementation of fundamental rights policy, the
rule of law, equality and EU values as well as a thriving civic space; will support a viable, competitive
and pluralistic media and audiovisual space; and safeguard and protect cultural and linguistic diversity
and heritage (i.e. General Objective 1). It will provide, ideally, for a single-entry point to all stakeholders
active in these policy fields, allowing for efficiency gains on aspects such as administrative burden and
economies of scale. The new instrument will continue to support current successful actions (as shown by
the evaluations) but also emerging policy areas requiring robust EU responses (e.g. democratic resilience,
support to news media, fight against disinformation, Culture Compass for Europe). It will empower
societal, cultural and media stakeholders across the board, boosting digital transformation and innovation
(e.g. AI), developing sectoral skills, and enhancing access to finance via blending instruments.
Implementation. The new instrument will allow for a more flexible allocation of budgetary resources,
addressing shortcomings of the current intervention logic316
, and articulate stronger synergies. It will align
implementation modes where relevant, work programmes, calls for proposals, monitoring and evaluation
frameworks317
. The new financial architecture will allow for a closer alignment with policy priorities, for
instance by streamlining and focusing the EU direct support to the culture, media and union values sectors,
in ways that increase added value as shown in Chapter 3. Direct EU funding to non-state actors, such as
civil society organisations and human rights defenders who work on the promotion of EU values and who
cannot rely on funding from their Member States, supports the implementation of EU policies on the
ground. Direct funding is equally necessary for the audiovisual stakeholders, which face transnational
competition, as well as for news media organisations and journalists, amidst a context of deteriorating
media pluralism. As shown by evaluations, such direct support to culture, media and civic stakeholders is
essential for maintaining efficiency and alignment with EU goals, thus constituting an efficient and
effective way to deliver EU policy objectives in this fields.
A successful implementation of the preferred option will require flexible design, upstream and
downstream coordination, and harmonized tools that foster synergies within and beyond the clusters and
enhance accessibility to funding for beneficiaries through simplified processes. It will also enhance
coordination, visibility, communication, and outreach across policy areas. For instance, the new
framework would foster connections between existing and new strategies on democracy, media and
culture. For example, this could include projects supporting civil society organisations’ journalistic
activities, especially at local level; involving CSOs in audiovisual screenings in isolated communities; the
support of film festivals focusing on fundamental rights. At the same time, it will retain a focus on each
of these policies and their visibility.
Table 11.1: Links between specific objectives and overall objective-based merger architecture
166
11.2 A dedicated instrument for Education and Training, Youth, Sport and Solidarity
Scope of financing. This funding instrument will work towards high quality lifelong learning, enhance
skills and key competences for all, in line with a swiftly changing society and labour market needs, while
promoting societal engagement and civic education, solidarity and social inclusion. (i.e. related to General
Objective 2). The new instrument will reinforce the Union’s contribution to labour market resilience and
competitiveness. It will scale up the impact of key skillsets by offering a more comprehensive approach
and a coherent landscape of formal, non-formal and informal opportunities for young people, aiming to
boost skills development, engagement, preparedness and social cohesion. Europe needs to ensure that
young people are equipped with a minimum proficiency level of basic and digital skills and foster the
advanced competencies and soft skills needed, across all stages of life. This investment is pivotal to ensure
a prosperous and competitive Europe but cannot be satisfied through formal education only. Volunteering
and other forms of non-formal and informal learning bring complementary value to formal education. The
instrument will contribute to systemic improvements in educational quality across the EU, strongly
supporting the key policy initiatives such as the Union of Skills, the European Education Area, the Digital
education action. It will link funding with innovative educational models, connect better with young
people, in line with the EU Youth Strategy 2019-2027318
.
The integrated nature of the future instrument Programme covering learning mobility, volunteering and
study opportunities, in different learning contexts, whether formal, non-formal or informal, and at all
stages of life will further reinforce its potential to boost skills and competences for life and jobs, support
competitiveness and enhance values, including solidarity, active citizenship and sense of belonging. In
terms of architecture, the European Solidarity Corps volunteering opportunities will be introduced under
the first key action of the Programme supporting learning opportunities for all, while keeping a strong
volunteering pillar.
167
Implementation. By unifying the intervention logic for these areas (mainly covered by Erasmus+ and the
European Solidarity Corps), the EU funding could not only better respond to policy priorities and
maximise delivery, but it could also be significantly streamlined and simplified, leading to greater
efficiency, economies of scale and reduced administrative burden. Currently, the two programmes operate
with similar processes duplicating each other in several areas such as the annual work programmes,
comitology, calls for proposals, monitoring and evaluation. By consolidating these into one programme,
the process could be significantly streamlined and simplified, leading to greater efficiency and reduced
administrative burden. In addition, by merging duplicative activities (such as communication, training of
National Agencies staff), a leaner landscape of funding opportunities could be offered to stakeholders. A
single programme would provide a more accessible funding mechanism for both young people and
organisations creating a single-entry point for them, to participate in EU initiatives in the field of youth
and engage in funding opportunities relevant for them. By promoting the European Solidarity Corps
opportunities under the Erasmus+ umbrella, their visibility and outreach could be significantly enhanced,
leveraging Erasmus+’s strong brand and larger communication networks and funding. While Erasmus+
for students is known by 49% of the young people surveyed in the recent Eurobarometer 545 on youth and
democracy, only 8% were aware of the European Solidarity Corps.
11.3 Synergies and complementarities
The following section provides two indicative examples of how the new configuration can foster and
cross-fertilise actions to support the new policy priorities covered in this impact assessment, through
synergies and complementarities319
. This needs to be seen in addition to current priorities that are covered
in the current MFF and mentioned in the objectives of the IA.
11.3.1 2024-2029 Political Guidelines: “Protecting our democracies and upholding our values”.
The following is an example of how Strategic objectives under merger 1 would contribute to the 2024-
2029 Political guidelines on “protecting our democracies and upholding our values”.
168
11.3.2 2024-2029 Political guidelines “Union of Skills”
The following is an example of how Strategic objectives under merger 2 would contribute to the 2024-
2029 Political guidelines on “the Union of Skills”.
169
Endnotes
1
Europe’s choice, Political guidelines for the next European Commission, 2024-2029, Ursula von der Leyen
2
Communication on The road to the next multiannual financial framework (COM/2025/46 final).
3
An overview of policies supported by EU funding in this cluster can be found in Annex 7.
4
Art. 2, TEU: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality,
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values
are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity
and equality between women and men prevail.”
5
See for instance the indicators on gender based violence, with data available in the Eurostat’s database on equality
and non-discrimination.
6
As also highlighted in the Report on “The future of European competitiveness” by Mario Draghi, Europe’s
economic growth, innovation capacity and prosperity rely on the future-proof skills of present and future
generations.
7
See Annex 7 for the legal context as well as a more detailed description of current programmes and funding
schemes
8
See interim evaluation of the CERV programme (SWD/2025/133 final).
9
Interim evaluation of the Erasmus+ Programme 2021-2027 and final evaluation of Erasmus+ Programme 2014-
2020 - forthcoming.
10
For instance, the Draghi report, the Letta report, the Niinistö report, but also the 2023 Strategic Foresight Report
and the Megatrends relevant for the future of Europe.
11
90.61% of respondents to the public consultation signalled that “protecting democracy and promote democratic
standards” is an important or even very important policy priority.
12
For instance, see the annual Reports on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The interim
evaluation of the CERV programme (SWD/2025/133 final) confirms that many CSOs rely heavily on EU support
due to limited national funding and increasing legal or political pressure in several Member States. CERV is very
often the only source of funding available to civil society organisations in the area it covers.
13
See Evaluation of the 2011-2020 European judicial training strategy (SWD(2019) 380) and annual reports on
European judicial training. In 2022, 24,208 justice professionals took part in training supported by the justice
programme (see justice programme performance statement) demonstrating the relevance of the programme in this
field.
14
Estimates suggest that annual GDP losses from discrimination alone range from EUR 30 million (sexual
orientation) to EUR 370 billion (gender employment gap), with total estimated losses from all grounds of
discrimination exceeding EUR 500 billion per year. See for instance Šimovičová, S., & Urbančíková, N. (2022).
The Impact of Social, Economic and Gender Inequality on Prosperity in the European Union Countries. Quality
Innovation Prosperity, 26(3), 66–87. https://doi.org/10.12776/qip.v26i3.1769.
15
2023 European Industry Media Outlook
16
Socio-economic background remains a strong predictor of education outcomes, with disadvantaged learners at
6.1 times higher risk of severe underachievement in basic skills when compared to their more advantaged peers, a
reported in the Education and training Monitor.
17
European Commission: Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, The twin challenge of
equity and excellence in basic skills in the EU – An EU comparative analysis of the PISA 2022 results, Publications
Office of the European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/881521
18
Top and trending skills interactive tool: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/visualisations/skills/
19
Eurobarometer survey, November 2023, data.europa.eu; see also Eurostat experimental statistics on online job
advertisement rate.
20
European Commission, Report from the European Commission to the Council on the implementation of the
Council Recommendation on promoting automatic mutual recognition of higher education and upper secondary
education and training qualifications and the outcomes of learning periods abroad (2023).
21
Young people, aged 15-29 years old ([ilc_peps01n] Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion by age and sex)
170
22
In 2024, 24,2% of all children less than 18 years old (19,5 million children) in the EU were at risk of poverty and
social exclusion. Source: Eurostat online data base (code: ilc_peps01n) [ilc_peps01n] Persons at risk of poverty or
social exclusion by age and sex.
23
2023 Flash Eurobarometer on mental health
24
As shown by the evaluation on Creative Europe (cfr. Annex 8, Section 2)
25
In the period 2021-2023, success rates under the CERV equality, rights and gender equality strand and the Daphne
strand were at 13% and 20%, respectively (see SWD/2025/133 final). For Media, the success rate remained below
30% for a number of actions, mainly under content creation support for development. In some actions, the success
rate is noticeable low (10% for news media, 6% for creative innovation labs in 2023). For the European Solidarity
Corps, only 1 out of 10 volunteering activities are being supported. For Erasmus+, as an example, the success rate
for Cooperation Partnerships actions, is below 20% and reaches 14% for cooperation partnerships in the field of
schools in 2023.
For the Creative Europe Culture Strand, as an example, the success rate for European Cooperation Projects reached
a low of 17% in 2023.
26
For instance, over the period 2021-2027, CERV and Creative Europe MEDIA could not launch joint calls, in
spite of their synergies, owing to differences regarding third countries participation on the basic legal acts.
27
Results of the stakeholders consultation indicate that ‘a recurring issue is the complexity and bureaucratic nature
of the application and reporting processes for EU funding programmes, particularly Erasmus+. Stakeholders
frequently describe these processes as "daunting" and "overly complex," which can discourage participation,
especially among smaller institutions and organizations with limited resources.’
28
For instance, structural inequalities and gender gaps in employment (10.0 p.p. in 2024), gender pay gap (12.0%
in 2023) and the gender pension gap (24.7% in 2024) - sources: Eurostat online data base, Gender employment gap
- Online data code: tesem060, Gender pay gap in unadjusted form – Online data code earn_gr_gpgr2, Gender
pension gap – ilc_pnp13
29
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025'.
30
Persistent stigmatisation and institutionalisation of children and adults with disabilities or LGBTIQ people put
these groups at increased risk of violence and exclusion (see Towards Integrated Child Protection Systems -
Challenges, promising practices and ways forward, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2025).
31
See a series of Commission communications including COM/2021/819 final.
32
See for example, Judit Bayer and Petra Bárd, ‘Hate speech and hate crime in the EU and the evaluation of online
content regulation approaches’, European Parliament, 2020. Data produced by the EU funded project ‘European
Observatory on Online Hate’, https://eooh.eu/
33
CSOs across the EU face increasing administrative burdens, restrictive laws, governmental interference, smear
campaigns, and exclusion from funding or public dialogue, especially at local level. See, for instance: 2024 Rule
of Law report; FRA, Civic Space; CIVICUS monitor.
34
See special Eurobarometer 487b and special Eurobarometer 552. The activities supported by the CERV
programme were expected to reach over 10 million people through awareness-raising campaigns between 2021–
2023 and supported more than 3,000 civil society organisations, including at grassroot level (see interim evaluation
of the CERV programme, SWD/2025/133 final).
23
88.55% of respondents to the public consultation signalled that “upholding and promoting the respect of
fundamental/human rights” is a very important or important policy priority, immediately followed by “combatting
gender-based violence, violence against children and other groups at risk” (85.46%). “Protect democracy and
promote democratic standards; promoting media independence and media pluralism; fight disinformation, equality
and non-discrimination; empowering citizens, strengthening democratic engagement and participation; as well as
combating racism and other forms of intolerance” are also in the top ten priorities for the respondents of the public
consultation.
36
See Stakeholder_contribution_on_rule_of_law_-_oecd.pdf (europa.eu)
171
37
The Commission’s annual report on judicial training in 2023 found that digital training is far underrepresented:
only 5,2% of all training activities focused on digitalisation and AI and 6,2% on IT-skills. Digitalisation of justice
also contributes to fundamental rights, helping to cement principles such as the presumption of innocence (see
Interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 justice, SWD/2025/134 final).
38
Reports from election observers confirm that divergences in electoral standards have a negative impact on the
equality of rights and opportunities of EU citizens in the electoral process. See
https://www.wahlbeobachtung.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/election-watch.eu-eam-ep-elections-2024-final-
report-300924.pdf.
39
https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s3232_fl550_eng?locale=en
40
81% of people in the EU believe that foreign interference is a serious problem (Flash Eurobarometer 528, 2023).
In 2023, the EEAS detected and encoded 750 cases of Foreign Information and Interference incidents. A report by
the European Digital Media Observatory’s Task Force analysing thirteen elections held in 2023, found widespread
disinformation during the election campaigns in all of them.
41
All EU news media companies together (newspapers, magazines, TV, radio, podcasts) and in all platforms (both
online and offline) capture less advertising revenues than online platforms (EUR 35 bn vs 41 bn in 2023) (European
Media Industry Outlook).
42
Only 25% of tickets for European films are being sold outside the film’s country of origin, and online the
consumption of content from EU Member States is decreasing (European Media Industry Outlook).
43
In 2023, 70% of the box office went to films based on novels, play or video games and only 30% original
screenplays (European Media Industry Outlook).
44
The Media Pluralism Monitor consistently highlights serious risks and threats to media pluralism, journalists and
media independence.
45
Media and journalists should be further protected against pressure and threats, building on the work already done,
for example to protect them against strategic lawsuits against public participation.
46
Misinformation and disinformation are ranked as the first threat in the coming years (World Economic Forum’s
Global risk perception survey, 2024). 68% of Europeans believe they are exposed to disinformation on a weekly
basis (European Media Industry Outlook).
47
European Parliament resolution of 21 November 2023 with recommendations to the Commission on an EU
framework for the social and professional situation of artists and workers in the cultural and creative sectors
(2023/2051(INL)).
48
In the video games sector, EU companies account for just 13% of global revenues, far behind their US or East-
Asian counterparts (European Media Industry Outlook).
49
In the EU, of the 800 top R&D investors, only 7 are media firms (European Media Industry Outlook).
50
Only 10% of audiovisual professionals participate in training programmes regularly (European Media Industry
Outlook).
51
In the news media sector, the traditional revenue streams are gradually declining, and the increase in digital
revenues does not offset this decrease (-9 bn vs +1.9 bn between 2019-23) (European Media Industry Outlook).
52
By 2030, at least 23% of graduates in higher education should have a learning mobility experience and at least
12% of learners in vocational education and training (VET) should benefit from learning mobility abroad, as per
the 2024 Council Recommendation “Europe on the Move - Learning opportunities for everyone” (C/2024/3364).
53
Support study to the final evaluation of Erasmus+ 2014-2020 and the interim evaluation of Erasmus+ 2021-2027.
In particular, 84% of public consultation respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they would not have been able
to fund the activities undertaken without Erasmus+. The vast majority of beneficiary organisations interviewed for
case studies confirmed the inability to undertake similar activities without Erasmus+ support.
54
The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat".
55
Question: to what extent do you consider that these actions for cooperation and mobility would bring about a
positive impact in the future?
56
As an example, the findings of the Erasmus+ evaluation show that, over the 2014-2020 and the 2021-2027
programming periods, Erasmus+ is unmatched in terms of scale and scope when compared to 19 national or
international schemes with similar objectives in the fields of education, training, youth, and sport, with an
172
involvement of a much higher number of participants per year compared to other similar international funding
programmes. In higher education, Erasmus+ is the primary funding tool for short-term (at least three months)
learning mobility across the programme countries. Based on Eurostat data, EU programmes like Erasmus+
supported around 2 out of 3 (65.6%) of the credit -mobile graduates from bachelor’s or equivalent at EU level,
including Serbia and Norway, in 2022. EU programmes are the only possibility to go abroad for a short period
during studies in countries like Cyprus and Ireland, where 100% of short mobility is financed by Erasmus+. This
share is higher than 90% in 11 countries according to data from Eurostat.
57
Erasmus Student Network (ESN), preliminary results of the XV ESN Survey, 2023.
58
Ibid.
59
Currently, the share of adults that have taken part in training in the past 12 months stands at 39.5 %, whereas the
2030 target is 60%. - cf. Education and Training Monitor 2024: Education and Training Monitor 2024
60
Study on Youth Work in the EU, European Commmission, 2021
61
European Parliament Study, ‘Young people's participation in European democratic processes - How to improve
and facilitate youth involvement’, 2023
62
European Commission: Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, Learning about the EU –
European topics and school curricula across EU Member States, Publications Office of the European Union,
2021, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/74975.
63
Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness, Sauli Niinistö, 2024.
64
To date, the option of transferring funds from ERDF/ESF+ to programmes under direct or indirect management,
introduced in the 2021-2027 programming period, has only seen one case registered under the Erasmus+
programme (transfer of EUR 57 million from ESF+) and very few additional cases under Horizon Europe.
65
Instruments like ESF+, ERDF, RRF, Marie-Sklodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA), Horizon Europe’s Cluster II on
Culture, Creativity and Inclusive Society, Digital Europe, IPA III, NDICI, InvestEU, which total higher overall
share of the EU budget on the policies of this cluster, and are thereby critically important to this cluster’
effectiveness.
66
Spread mainly between Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps.
67
The percentages refer to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat".
68
Mandatory Annual Work Programmes for Creative Europe and multiannual Work Programmes for the CERV
programme.
69
Lack of alignment in funding rules and criteria as well as the absence of a common operational framework is also
a barrier to mainstreaming horizontal provisions for equality and inclusion.
70
An evaluation of the Agency conducted in April 2019 showed that the EACEA was effective in the
implementation of its operational priorities and performed well in the execution of delegated functions with very
good results in meeting the main indicators describing the timeliness of its evaluation, contracting and payments
process. Also, the majority of funding in this cluster is implemented through 54 National Agencies, and integrated
reporting between Nas and EACEA has been developed and is working seamlessly.
71
‘Reflection is on-going on concrete measures to support a more systematic approach to Programme data collection
and analysis, to better address gaps identified in monitoring, and on how to better measure long-term impact’ SWD
on the mid-term review of Creative Europe.
72
Media invest pool resources from Creative Europe MEDIA, Invest EU and the EIF.
73
Such as multiannual work programmes, accreditations, a more extensive use of lump sums, larger grants, higher
cofinancing rates, a wider use of cascading grants supporting small organisations that would not have otherwise
been able to benefit from EU funding.
74
Among the five most important obstacles making the EU budget effective, the Open Public Consultation
highlighted, in decreasing order of importance, administrative burden for beneficiaries (82%), complex funding and
compliance rules (80%), lack of flexibility in funding (66%), limited reach to diverse target groups (66%), lack of
consistency and effectiveness to deliver on EU priorities (510%).
75
Erasmus+ interim evaluation underlines that although Erasmus+ is a well-known EU programme, further efforts
are needed to increase the visibility of the opportunities it offers. Outreach could be further improved by sharing
173
and better targeting information about the programme to reach out to new participants and organisations across all
sectors.
76
82% of respondents highlighting that “Administrative burden for beneficiaries” is an obstacle preventing the EU
budget from fully delivering on its objectives. Conversely, “simplifying access to funding” and “introduce more
flexibility” were the most frequently cited options to help the EU budget be more effective and efficient.
77
14 megatrends have been identified by the Commission’s Megatrends Hub.
78
Further evidence apply to policy areas under this cluster, such as the European Media Industry Outlook.
79
Almost 66% of respondents to the public consultation considered ” Protecting democracy and promoting
democratic standards” is an area where to a large extent, EU funding provides added value compared to funding at
national, local or regional level. An area where EU action is considered more impactful by younger Europeans is
the support to civil society organisations that promote EU values.
80
Including declining basic skills, underdeveloped digital skills, and other advanced and transversal skills necessary
for the twin transitions.
81
The underachievement rate has largely increased in mathematics and reading, and more moderately in science,
in most EU countries compared to the previous PISA 2018.
82
European Court of Auditors (2023): Special report 11/2023: EU support for the digitalization of schools.
83
See Second Report on the application of the General Data Protection Regulation,.
84
According to 60.32% of respondents to the public consultation, ”Upholding and promoting the respect of
fundamental/human rights” is an area where EU funding provides added value compared to funding at national,
local or regional level to a large extent.
85
According to the findings of the interim evaluation (SWD/2025/134 final), the 2021-2027 justice programme has
a key role in helping Member States to develop national tools to create the interfaces required between EU-wide
systems and national systems and it is therefore successfully contributing to a more level playing field in the areas
of interoperability of IT systems and digitalisation of justice.
86
According to the interim evaluation of the CERV programme (SWD/2025/133 final), there is a clear need for the
programme to continue because the challenges it was set up to address persist and, in some cases, have got worse
e.g. the increasing polarisation of society, the rise in populism and extremism, and the threat to EU values.
87
As created, inter alia, through EU legislation establishing social services under a European harmonised number
(2007/116/EC).
88
See interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme (SWD/2025/134 final).
89
Leveraging the networks’ outreach has improved the engagement with key target groups and allowed the
organisation of large-scale events at lower costs (see Interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme
(SWD/2025/134 final).
90
Action Plan on basic skills, COM(2025)88. While overall underachievement in basic skills is on the rise across
all EU countries, the spread between the best and worst performing countries is wide. Similarly, even though the
rate of early school leaving has improved at the EU level, decreasing by 2.3 percentage points in the period 2013-
2023, many learners leave education prematurely without an upper secondary qualification.
91
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Convention On The Rights Of Persons With
Disabilities (CRPD).
92
Fulfilment of the conditions set out in the AVMS Directive is a requirement for candidate countries to
participate in the MEDIA and CROSS strand of Creative Europe.
93
Solidarity and volunteering schemes differ across Member States: without dedicated EU action, some countries
would have no volunteering opportunities– notably in support of humanitarian aid operations.
94
According to 65% of respondents to the public consultation, ”Promoting a shared European identity” is an area
where EU funding provides added value compared to funding at national, local or regional level to a large extent.
95
Audiovisual Medi Services Directive (AVMSD), European Media Freedom Act (EMFA).
96
Audiovisual Media Services Directive and the European Media Freedom Act.
97
Civil Society Organisations, National Human Rights Institutes, equality bodies, ombuds institutions, other human
rights defenders, and Member State authorities from national, regional and local levels.
174
98
Discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, as
well as non-discrimination on the grounds provided for in Article 21 of the Charter.
99
Racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, anti-Muslim hatred, LGBTIQ-phobia, hatred against persons with disabilities
and older persons.
100
2024 Consumer survey informing the 2025 European Media Industry Outlook.
101
According to the 2024 Media Pluralism Monitor, risks to market plurality are “medium” or “high” in all EU
countries.
102
Production encompasses all phases of creation of audiovisual works, including development, for example.
103
SWD on the interim evaluation of Creative Europe states that ‘the synergies between the Culture and MEDIA
Strands could be better exploited, notably among copyright intensive industries which are the CCS most heavily
affected by the competition from the US platforms, changed consumption patterns and the AI revolution’, e.g. Music
tracks generating substantial revenues from their inclusion in video games, films or TV series. Media Industry
Outlook SWD, (to be published in July).
104
Nearly two thirds of respondents to the OPC mentioned support to the audiovisual and media sectors as an
“important” policy objective.
105
The importance of such actions is corroborated by the results of the public consultation supporting this impact
assessment where approximately 80% of respondents (summing up responses "very important" and "important")
see an added value in EU funding going to “Promote cultural and linguistic diversity” and “Promote and preserve
cultural heritage and European remembrance”. There is also wide support for “Ensure widespread access to culture
and cultural heritage” and “Support to mobility of artists and culture professionals”,from respectively 76% and
slightly under 57% of respondents (summing up responses "very important" and "important".
106
Media Industry Outlook SWD, (to be published in July 2025).
107
Ibid.
108
The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "Very important" or "Important".
109
The Council Recommendation “Europe on the Move - Learning opportunities for everyone” sets EU level targets
for mobility. EU action will be instrumental to support the achievement of these targets and ensure the elimination
of barriers to mobility fostering a seamless and inclusive transnational learning environment.
110
The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat".
111
SWD on the mid-term review of Creative Europe.
112
81% of respondents to the public consultation considered that “introducing more flexibility into resource
allocation to react to crisis and emerging needs” was mentioned by as something that could help the EU budget
become more effective and efficient”.
113
See Annex 8 for details on the results of the mid-term evaluations.
114
Ibid.
115
Aspects used for comparison included: the political context, IA problem drivers, legal basis,
competence/subsidiarity, third countries participation, implementation modes, governance, internal architecture,
target groups, branding, and funding.
116
The current programmes do not comprehensively address all key emerging policy areas set out in the Political
Guidelines as stated above.
117
As stated above, this would not include the Justice programme for the reasons explained under section 5.2
Discarded options.
118
For instance, during the negotiations by co-legislators, the voting rules for different legal basis would not be
compatible with other the legal basis of other programmes in this cluster.
119
Alternative combinations would offer differing degrees of synergies, depending on the nature of the mergers,
but not at par with the proposed options.
120
Citizens at large (through areas such as cross-border education and training, fundamental rights, access to media
and culture, solidarity activities, sport); children and young people (on aspects such as protection against violence);
professionals in sectors such as media, culture, education and training; sport, youth organisations, civil society
organisations and human rights defenders; media companies and other organisations active in the media sectors;
cultural and creative organisations; EU and national public authorities and candidate and third countries. Citizens
175
accounted by around half the responses, followed by academic/research institutions (16%), non-governmental
organisations (14%), companies and business associations (5.9%) and public authorities (5.4%).
121
Social impacts of the different options are mainly achieved by safeguarding and promoting EU values and
fundamental rights on one side and increasing cohesion in society on the other, increasing the educational, personal
and professional development of individuals as well as raising the level of skills, education and training and cultural
diversity and media offer.
122
European Commission (2019). “Erasmus+ higher education impact study”
123
A total of 241 million admissions in EU-27 cinemas is attributable to MEDIA (2014-2020). Without MEDIA support, EU
audiences of films from other EU countries would drop to 30% of what they are today (Interim evaluation of the Creative
Europe Programme 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 2014-2020)
124
Most participants to CERV-funded activities self-report higher level of awareness of rights as an EU citizen
(84%) than the general public. 82% of participants in Erasmus+ learning mobility activities declare that they feel
more European and 86% are more aware of European values.
125
The European Commission study “Learning about the EU: European topics and school curricula across EU Member States”
from 2021 points to the added value on participation of combining “learning styles” where formal teaching and learning is
enhanced by information, non-formal and experiential learning.
126
EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), 2025.
127
As recommended in the report “Safer Together, strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness”
by Sauli Niinistö
128
Support to news media has been introduced into the second Creative Europe (2021-2027) part of the Cross-sectoral strand,
in response to the growing political priority of strengthening democracy and the rule of law across the European Union
129
Examples of calls include Journalism Partnerships calls under Creative Europe, Pan-European and Digital
Reporting calls under Multimedia Actions, and capacity building to counter manifestly unfounded or abusive court
proceedings against journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation under the CERV
programme.
130
According to Media Pluralism Monitor Report, 23 out of 27 Member States are in high or medium risk to media pluralism.
131
Under status quo, news media is not covered, but it is addressed under Option 2 (See Table 11.1, Annex 11).
132
Economic impacts are mainly achieved through increased employability of citizens, quality of education and
training systems generating innovation and economic growth, the economic contribution of CCSs and media and
audiovisual industries, including through strengthening their competitiveness and SMEs’ capacity.
133
See annex 5 on the competitiveness check.
134
For example, MediaInvest remains underfunded, with an identified equity gap between EUR 399 to EUR 649
million per year.
135
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/pisa-2022-results-volume-i_53f23881-en.html
136
The future of European competitiveness: Report by Mario Draghi, September 2024
137
Over 50% of MEDIA supported EU films and series are international coproductions, rising to 86% under the
current programme, vs 12% of comparable unsupported EU films and series in the same period (Mid-term
evaluation of the Creative Europe 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 2014-2020).
138
The box office revenues of a film adapting pre-existing content (books) is around 50% higher than films with an
original screenplay, while TV dramas adapted from books attract 58% more viewers.
139
This IA is relevant for SMEs concerning the IP intensive industries, including news media, at an est. 30.000-
50.000 companies, and 84.000-140.000 employees (further analysis provided under Annex 6).
140
In the MEDIA strand of Creative Europe (2021-2027), 99% of the beneficiaries of the Programme are SMEs. In the Culture
strand, 80% of the beneficiaries are organisations of less than 49 employees (Interim evaluation of the Creative Europe
Programme 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 2014-2020).
141
1 592 SMEs participated in 1 631 KA2 adult education projects, and 2 148 SMEs in 2 166 KA2 VET projects
142
In the VET field, 61% of VET respondents of the public consultation agreed that Centres of Vocational Excellence highly
contribute to support excellence, creativity, and innovation at the level of organisations and policies.
143
Improved access to tailored financing helps mitigate key risks inherent to CCS (Further information on the InvestEU Culture
and Creative Portfolio Guarantee Product, https://www.eif.org/InvestEU/guarantee_products/index-portfolio-ccs). For
example, the current CCS GF was found effective in benefitting micro-businesses and small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) in the cultural and creative sectors, which often face difficulties in accessing affordable debt financing for their projects.
176
(Interim evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme
2014-2020).
144
For example, see Die Bedeutung studienbezogener Auslandsaufenthalte im Transformationsprozess der
deutschen Wirtschaft, DAAD-IW-Studie, 2025
145
Iriondo, I. (2020). Evaluation of the impact of Erasmus study mobility on salaries and employment of recent
graduates in Spain. Studies in higher education, DOI: 10.1080/03075079.2019.1582011
146
George Psacharopoulos & Harry Anthony Patrinos (2018) Returns to investment in education: a decennial
review of the global literature, Education Economics, 26:5, 445-458, DOI: 10.1080/09645292.2018.1484426
147
European Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, Employment and
social developments in Europe 2024, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024,
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/91555.
148
European Commission, above-mentioned Study to support the Commission impact assessment on Individual
Learning Accounts.
149
Iriondo, I. (2020). Evaluation of the impact of Erasmus study mobility on salaries and employment of recent graduates in
Spain. Studies in higher education, DOI: 10.1080/03075079.2019.1582011
150
Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a Council Recommendation ‘Europe on
the move’ – learning mobility opportunities for everyone, (SWD(2023) 719).
151
A rationalisation of resources for the supervision of the National Agencies is also expected in the relevant ministries (the
programmes have separate National Authorities).
152
Programmes that include mobility imply use for transport, which in turn leads to the emission of greenhouse
gases. However, strong incentives to use sustainable practices including transport are embedded in the design of
the programmes and the flows are negligible compared to the mobility fluxes in Europe and overall emissions.
Hence, an in-depth analysis of environmental impacts has not been considered relevant in this case.It is also worth
noting that both Erasmus+ and the Corps currently have a positive indirect effect by prioritising the green transition
in cooperation and volunteering activities, raising awareness about environmental sustainability especially among
young people and supporting behavioural changes linked to individual preferences, consumption habits and
lifestyles. In the case of Erasmus+, since 2021, more than 1billion € has been used to support cooperation projects
with climate objectives.
153
Based on a recent survey of companies in the creative and cultural sectors, only 30% have adopted a digital
transformation strategy and companies have indicated that investment in AI represents less than 1% of their total
investments.
154
The current Creative Europe MEDIA has responded to the digital shift by consistently encouraging innovation. Innovative
tools and business models have been funded, in particular harnessing artificial intelligence (Interim evaluation of the Creative
Europe Programme 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 2014-2020). In the context of Option
2, transversal actions bringing together culture, media and civil society players will allow for enhanced contribution to the
digital transformation through synergies.
155
Core impact, as fundamental rights and equality are policy objectives covered within this cluster.
156
As highlighted by its interim evaluation (SWD/2025/133 final), the CERV programme makes a strong
contribution to promoting gender equality, with every fourth euro of financing from grants having contributed
strongly and around half of the funded projects closely intertwined with the promotion of gender equality.
157
See results of interim evaluations in Annex 8.
158
Policies under this cluster contribute toward the following SDGs: 3. Healthy lives and well-being; 4. Quality
education; 5. Gender equality; 8. Decent work and economic growth 10. Reducing inequalities; 16. Peace, justice,
strong institutions; 17. Means of implementation.
159
See Tool #62 of Better Regulation. To obtain a policy ranking consistent with the information contained in the
impact matrix, the analysis applied a non-compensatory mathematical aggregation rule.
160
This result sums up the score of the indicators under each of the objectives (e.g. joint scores of the five indicators
under ‘improved cooperation’). For the tenth objective, “minimisation of risks”, Options 1 and 2 tied with the same
score.
161
For the remaining 9 criteria there was a tie between at least two options.
177
162
Ownership details: The software has been developed in the context of the European Commission’s Decision
Analysis Lab (Non free license).
163 Institutions, associations, NGO, companies (mostly micro and small-sized), self-employed people etc.
164
Under the Erasmus+ programme 2014-2020, 2 148 SMEs participated in VET cooperation projects, and 1 592
SMEs in adult education cooperation projects, only to mention these two sectors.
165
Measured through the EU Survey on Justice, Rights and Values (data 2021-2023) and the special Eurobarometer
SP552.
166
European Commission, Acting against discrimination
167
EIGE, Economic Benefits of Gender Equality in the European Union
168
See interim evaluation of the CERV programme (SWD/2025/133 final).
169
SWD on the final evaluation of Creative Europe 2014-2020 and the mid-term evaluation of Creative Europe
2021-2027, not yet published. Figures not available for the Culture strand in Creative Europe 2021-2027;
170
Number of people watching, visiting, listening and viewing cultural activity funded by the Creative Europe’s
Culture strand as reported by projects. This figure does not include the audience of European Capitals of Culture,
co-funded by the programme’s Culture strand (estimated at 2 million per Capital), the audience reached by the
recipients of the various Prizes funded by the strand or the readership of books translated by the strand, Ibid. Data
not available for Creative Europe 2021-2027
171
Ibid. Figures not available for the Culture strand in Creative Europe 2021-2027;
172
Ibid.
173
Ibid.
174
Ibid.
175
Knowledge base for the Sustainable Development Goals
176
Ownership details: The software has been developed in the context of the European Commission’s Decision
Analysis Lab (Non free license).
177
All methodological and mathematical details behind SMCE and the SOCRATES software can be found in:
Munda G. (2004) “Social multi-criteria evaluation (SMCE)”: methodological foundations and operational
consequences, European Journal of Operational Research Vol. 158, Issue 3: 662- 677. Munda, G. (2008) Social
Multi-Criteria Evaluation for a Sustainable Economy, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. Munda G. (2009) A conflict
analysis approach for illuminating sustainability distributional issues, European Journal of Operational Research,
Volume: 194, Issue: 1, Pages: 307-322.. Munda, G. (2012) Intensity of preference and related uncertainty in
non-compensatory aggregation rules. Theory and Decision 73, 649–669. Munda, G. (2022) Qualitative reasoning
or quantitative aggregation rules for impact assessment of policy options? A multiple criteria framework. Quality
and Quantity 56, 3259–3277. Munda, G., Azzini, I., Cerreta, M. and Ostlaender, N., SOCRATES Manual, EUR
31327 EN, Publications Office of the European UnioUnioo, Luxembourg, 2022, ISBN 978-92-76-59331-7,
doi:10.2760/015604, JRC131755. Azzini I. and Munda G. (2020) A New Approach for Identifying the Kemeny
Median Ranking, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 281, pp. 388-401. Azzini I. and Munda G.
(2025) Sensitivity and Robustness Analyses in Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation of Public Policies, Journal of
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, Vol. 32, issue 1, pp. 1-19.
178
See Tool #62 of Better Regulation. To obtain a policy ranking consistent with the information contained in the
impact matrix, the analysis applied a non-compensatory mathematical aggregation rule.
179
The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "Very important" or "Important".
180
The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "Very important" or "Important".
181
7 out of 10 tickets sold for non-national films in the EU is directly attributable to MEDIA support. Without
MEDIA support, non-national admissions in the EU would drop to 30% of the current level.
182
In the streaming segment, EU consumers spend only 9% of their time on watching content from other EU
countries, while they spend 61% of their time on US works and 20% on works from other non-EU territories (e.g.
UK and Asia) (Forthcoming Second Edition of the Media Industry Outlook).
183
The percentages refer to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat".
184
The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "Very important" or "Important".
185
The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "Very important" or "Important".
178
186
Annex 5 can be consulted for further analysis.
187
The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat".
188
The percentages refer to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat".
189
The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat".
190
The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat".
191
The percentage refers to respondents who selected either "To a large extent" or "Somewhat".
192
Given that the assessment is about funding to specific media sectors, the ‘Synthetic assessment’ section is by
definition a sectoral assessment, hence no separate assessment is needed under ‘Competitive position of the most
affected sectors’.
193
CNECT calculations based on Statista
194
Ibid
195
For example, Romanian public service television receives around EUR 22 per household in public funding,
while the same amount id EUR 158 for Danish public broadcasting. (CNECT calculations based on data from
European Audiovisual Observatory and Eurostat)
196
European Media Industry Outlook, forthcoming 2nd
edition.
197
Mid-term evaluation of the Creative Europe 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme
2014-2020.
198
European Media Industry Outlook, forthcoming 2nd
edition.
199
The State of the European Game Industry, and How to Unleash its Full Potential, 2024
200
European Media Industry Outlook, forthcoming 2nd
edition.
201
European Media Industry Outlook, forthcoming 2nd
edition.
202
As an illustration, one beneficiary, the Euranet Plus radio network, achieved substantial cost reductions
throughout the project implementation, with average costs per produced audio minute declining by 30% from 2021
to 2023, down to €48.87 per minute.
203
In a recent EU27 consumer survey on media consumption habits commissioned by DG CNECT, the fact that a
film or a series was part of a franchise or new season of an existing series was rated by young people to be among
the top three factors that attract them to films and series.
204
See the following study focusing on the UK market: ‘The book was better!’ – How literary adaptations contribute
to the wider creative industries | Frontier Economics
205
Ampere Analysis https://ampereanalysis.com/insight/feel-the-force-of-franchises-commissioners-bank-on-
superheroes-and-crime
206
Babylon Berlin author Volker Kutsche: “Nobody wants to be a Nazi”
207
How did The Witcher games affect the popularity of The Witcher books? - Literature Stack Exchange
208
EAO
209
https://variety.com/2023/tv/global/newen-artificial-intelligence-ai-french-soaps-producers-crew-1235760713/
210
See for example https://publikum.io/
211
European Audiovisual Observatory (2024). Made in Europe, Theatrical distribution of European films across
the globe 2014 - 2023
212
based on the analysis of International Showtimes
213
European Media Industry Outlook, forthcoming 2nd
edition.
214
Proven by the SMCE.
215
Limited number of other CCS SME directly funded by the Creative Europe programme’s Culture strand
216
idem.
218
Casas, Pablo and Christou, Tryfonas and García Rodríguez, Abián and Lazarou, Nicholas Joseph and Salotti,
Simone (2025): The ex-post macroeconomic evaluation of the 2014-2020 European Social Fund, Youth
Employment Initiative and REACT-EU labour market interventions
219
Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2024 - European Commission
220
Ibidem, p 276
221
Education and Training Monitor 2024
179
222
Ibidem
223
Idem.
224
Between 2021 and 2024, SMEs represented 3.4% of the organisations taking part in Erasmus+ projects. Source:
Erasmus+ Dashboard
225
Benchmarking: Compared to other sectors, education has traditionally lower measured innovation (few patents
or R&D spending), but its impact on innovation in all sectors is paramount. Investments here likely yield high
returns in innovation across the board, albeit with a time lag.
226
Evidence shows the negative economic impacts of discrimination on competitiveness, resulting in estimated EU-
wide annual GDP losses, due to discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief (EUR 234 million), sexual
orientation (EUR 30-98 million), disability (EUR 0.84 – EUR 1.42 billion) and age (EUR 289-364 billion). See
European Parliament: Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union and Ballegooij, W., Equality and the
fight against racism and xenophobia – Cost of non-Europe report, European Parliament,
2018, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/1791; “The state and effects of discrimination in the European Union The
state and effects of discrimination in the European Union | OECD”, 2024.
227
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/63274
228
Cultural and Creative Industries overview by DG for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs
(DG GROW)
229
Interim evaluation of the Creative Europe Programme 2021-2027 and final evaluation of the Creative Europe
Programme 2014-2020.
230
64.5% of recent medium-level VET graduates to have experienced work-based learning as part of their VET
programme in 2023.
231
Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE 2.1, Level 2).
232
Estimated number based on current beneficiaries of Creative Europe
233
The preferred option includes the mitigating measures listed in section 4.
234
The direct benefits for SMEs can also be cost savings.
235
See Annex 5, Competitiveness Check
236
Based on a survey of 25 thousand travellers: ‘Unpack ’25’ by Expedia
237
European judicial training strategy (2021–2024) | EUR-Lex.
238
EU Strategy on victims’ rights (2020-2025) - European Commission.
239
Rule of law - European Commission.
240
Anti-corruption: Stronger rules to fight corruption.
241
Commission presents a European internal security strategy - European Commission.
242
A Counter-Terrorism Agenda.
243
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT.
244
Equality and inclusion - European Commission (europa.eu).
245
Factsheet - Delivering on the EU strategy on the rights of the child
246
Combating hate speech and hate crime - European Commission (europa.eu).
247
Protecting democracy - European Commission (europa.eu).
248
Directive - EU - 2024/1385 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu).
249
Directive - 2023/970 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu).
250
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-european-
democracy/protecting-democracy_en#what-is-the-european-democracy-action-plan
251
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/reinforcing-democracy-and-integrity-elections-all-documents_en.
252
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/documents-defence-democracy_en .
253
Directive - 2023/970 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu).
254
Directive - EU - 2024/1069 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu).
255
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/citizenship-package_en.
256
Political guidelines 2024-2029, https://commission.europa.eu/priorities-2024-2029/democracy-and-our-
values_en
257
See A Culture Compass for Europe, a call for evidence.
180
258
OJ C 456, 18.12.2018, p. 1–22.
259
OJ C, C/2024/3527, 3.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3527/oj.
261
Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the
Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014.
262
Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014 of 14 April 2014 establishing the ‘Europe for Citizens’ programme for
the period 2014-2020.
263
Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing
a Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme for the period 2014 to 2020.
264
Regulation (EU) 2021/693 of the European Parliament and the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Justice
Programme and repealing regulation (EU) No 1382/2013.
265
Regulation (EU) 2021/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing
Erasmus+: the Union Programme for education and training, youth and sport and repealing Regulation (EU) No
1288/2013.
266
Higher education, Vocational Education and Training (VET), School education and Adult Education.
267
Regulation (EU) 2021/888 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing the
European Solidarity Corps Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) 2018/1475 and (EU) No 375/2014.
268
Figure as of 2 July 2025. Data are based on the pillar tagging methodology for the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and
correspond to the measures allocated to the policy area
‘adult learning’; ‘green skills and jobs’; ‘human capital in digitalisation’, ‘early childhood education and care’, as well as
‘general, vocational and higher education’ as primary or secondary policy areas.
269
Figure as of 2 July 2025. Source: Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard.
270
Recovery and resilience plans: supporting people across the EU, September 2024, available at:
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/recovery-and-resilience-plans-supporting-people-across-eu_en.
271
Interim evaluation of the CERV programme (SWD/2025/133 final), Interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice
programme (XX - forthcoming).
272
Ex post evaluation of the REC programme, second part (SWD/2025/133 final), Ex post evaluation of the EfC
programme (SWD/2025/133 final), Ex post evaluation of the 2014-2020 Justice programme, second part
(SWD/2025/134 final).
273
The very high ratio of quality projects is to the benefit of the fulfilment of policy objectives.
274
The CERV programme introduced lump-sum funding to further reduce the administrative burden. The
introduction of unit costs at Commission corporate level, however, appears to have added complexity, exacerbated
by the fact that these unit costs do not reflect the actual costs of activities and impose unrealistic limitations on
travel costs. Re-granting mechanisms have led to the CERV programme being more inclusive than its predecessors
by allowing the programme to reach smaller and grassroots organisations.
275
These include, for instance, the opportunity to test innovative approaches to address societal challenges, expand
project target groups and improve organisations’ capacities.
276
This is linked to financial contributions, with every fourth euro of financing from grants having contributed
strongly to gender equality. Around half of the CERV grants funded projects closely intertwined with the promotion
of gender equality. Nevertheless, the mid-term evaluation pointed to the need to pay more attention to
intersectionality in addressing gender and social inclusion issues.
277
The CERV programme provides clear added value. For many CSOs, it is their only possible source of funding
in this area. Between 2021 and 2023, the CERV programme reached 3 033 CSOs with support and capacity building
activities across all Member States.
278
See interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme (SWD/2025/134 final).
279
For instance, in 2022, 24 208 justice professionals took part in training supported by the Justice programme
(around 35.3% of all those who received EU (co-)funded training on EU law that year). See Justice programme
performance statement.
280
See interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme (SWD/2025/134 final)–.
181
281
See interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme– (SWD/2025/134 final).
282
See interim evaluation of the 2021-2027 Justice programme (SWD/2025/134 final).
283
Admissions for non-national European films in Europe and in largest 10 non-European markets: The targets of
71 million tickets in Europe and 85 million outside were each exceeded (95 and 88 million); SWD Interim
evaluation of the Creative Europe programme 2021-27.
284
Out of the group of beneficiaries who applied before and after COVID, 60% had grew their position in the
market of non-national EU films, and this includes 26% of beneficiaries who more than doubled their shares Source:
Programme monitoring data.
285
MEDIA supports MediaInvest through blending of funding with the Invest EU and EIF on a 1:1 basis.
286
As of 25th March 2025, 4 deals were signed under MediaInvest for an amount of EUR 95 Mio.
287
Films supported by MEDIA have received 95 nominations at the Academy Awards, as well as 333 nominations
at the Cannes and 183 and 170 awards at the Berlinale and European Film Awards respectively.
288
There has been a notable increase in the share of support for titles that involve collaboration between high and
low-capacity countries, from less than 5% in the previous programme to around 30% under the current one.
289
MEDIA the number of grants processed fell by 46% despite a budget envelope increase of over 65%.
290
Screen density varies dramatically across the EU, from 24 screens per million inhabitants in Romania to 102
screens per million inhabitants in Ireland. There are also big gaps within Member States, with rural or less populated
areas often lacking cinemas, thereby creating “cinema deserts”.
291
Media Industry Outlook (publication forthcoming).
292
Staff working document on the interim evaluation of the Creative Europe programme 2021-27 and final
evaluation of the Creative Europe programme 2014-2021, page 83.
293
Consumer survey on media consumption habits commissioned by DG CNECT (publication forthcoming).
294
A large majority projects on ‘Cross-Border Local’ and ‘Media Innovation Europe’of their funds focused on
countries where there are high risks to media plurality as identified by the Media Pluralism Monitor. 28% of their
funds were spent on medium risk countries and 72% on high-risk countries. The average subsidy per inhabitant was
3 times higher in high-risk countries.
295
The Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) mechanism tracks violations of press and media freedom and
includes safety training for journalists. In 2021, 1373 violations were verified and 346 requests for support received,
117 cases were treated.
296
Regulation (EU) 2021/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing the
Creative Europe Programme (2021 to 2027) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013 (Text with EEA
relevance), OJ L 189, 28.5.2021.
297
Erasmus+ supports activities that develop critical thinking as well as media and digital literacy in schools or
other educational settings.
298
Evaluation of the Multimedia Actions line CNECT/18/2023/Lot1.December 2024 (to be published soon).
299
To be published
300
Source: Eurostat data, code educ_uoe_mobc01.
301
European Commission: Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, Erasmus+ annual report 2023,
Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/833629
302
Ibid.
303
COM(2025) 144 final, SWD(2025) 75, 1.4.2025
304
European Commission: Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, European solidarity corps – Report
2021-2023, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/235753
305
Based on the 14 megatrends identified by the Commission’s Megatrends Hub
306
See joint press release One in three women in the EU have experienced violence by Eurostat, FRA and EIGE (2024).
307
Eurostat dataset on ICT specialists and ICT skills trainings in entreprises (online data codes: isoc_ske_itspen2,
isoc_ske_itrcrn2 and isoc_ske_ittn2)
308
Eurostat dataset on ‘Early leavers from education and training by sex and labour status’ (online data code: edat_lfse_14)
309
Eurostat dataset on ‘Population by educational attainment level, sex and NUTS 2 region (%)’ (online data code:
edat_lfse_04).
182
310
The outward graduate mobility of a country is the sum of all graduates originating from the country who obtained their
degree abroad (degree-mobile graduates) and graduates who obtained their degree in the country but spent a short period abroad
(credit-mobile graduates).
311
Education and Training Monitor, 2024
312
Eurostat dataset on «Credit mobility graduates» (online data code: educ_uoe_mobc01)
313
European Commission (2024). Digital Decade 2024 report.
314
Among all individuals (16-74), Eurostat online data: isoc_sk_dskl_i21
315
Young people, aged 15-29 years old ([ilc_peps01n] Persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion by age and sex)
316
During this MFF a joint call between Creative Europe and CERV could not be planned due to differences of
country participation in the legal basis
317
The design could also lead to cross-fertilisation of initiatives financed through financial support to third
parties/cascading grants, in the fields of culture, media and of rights and values.
318
The EU Youth Strategy 2019-2027 focuses on fostering the participation of young people in civic and democratic
life; connecting young people across the European Union and beyond to foster voluntary engagement, learning
mobility, solidarity and intercultural understanding; and supporting youth empowerment through quality,
innovation and the recognition of youth work.
319
Synergies are showcased to illustrate their potential. The usage of a synergy or complementarity under a certain
category is not exclusive. For example, supporting media literacy under this instrument can contribute to the
political objective of protecting democracies and upholding our values, but the policy would entail as well support
from Member States. Finally, the list of examples only refers to how the financing instruments contribute to the
policy priorities, and hence should be seen in context with other policy initiatives and the relevant legislative
framework (e.g. for example, in terms of the interrelation between media policies, regulatory frameworks and EU
financing, which is not in scope of this document).