COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2025 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Albania Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2025 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union

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    EUROPEAN
    COMMISSION
    Strasbourg, 8.7.2025
    SWD(2025) 928 final
    COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
    2025 Rule of Law Report
    Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Albania
    Accompanying the document
    Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
    European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
    2025 Rule of Law Report
    The rule of law situation in the European Union
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    1
    ABSTRACT
    Albania continued implementing the judicial reform strengthening judicial independence and
    prosecutorial autonomy. The vetting process of all judges and prosecutors was finalised in first
    instance, further strengthening accountability. Challenges remain regarding timely and
    qualitative evaluations, and appointments of non-magistrate members to the High Judicial
    Council and the High Prosecutorial Council. The High Justice Inspector is operational, but the
    high number of magistrate-inspector vacancies affects its effective operation. While the
    resilience of the judiciary improved, attempts of undue influence on the judicial system by
    public officials or politicians aggravated. Sufficient budget was allocated for the modern
    integrated electronic case management system, but full operability is foreseen only for 2030.
    Shortcomings remain regarding the quality of justice including in access to justice, judicial
    training, financial and human resources. Challenges regarding the length of proceedings and
    backlog increased, while decisive measures to increase efficiency are yet to be implemented.
    The Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2024-2030 has been adopted. The legal framework to fight
    corruption is broadly in place, but legislation on prevention of corruption needs to be
    completed. The Special Anti-Corruption Structure (SPAK) further consolidated its positive
    results in fighting high-level corruption and made tangible progress towards a solid track record
    in the fight against corruption. The institutional framework for prevention continues to have a
    limited impact and coordination with law enforcement remained weak. The state police remains
    vulnerable to corruption. Shortcomings remain with transparency and how effectively the High
    Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest checks
    declarations of assets and interests.
    The independence of the Audio-Visual Regulatory Authority remains an issue of concern.
    Concerns as regards the independence of the public broadcaster have increased. High
    concentration of media ownership continues to negatively impact media independence. Media
    market penetration by high profile business groups with political links also remain a serious
    concern. Shortcomings in terms of fair allocation of state advertising and other state resources
    as well as the right to access to information remain. Verbal and physical attacks, smear
    campaigns and strategic lawsuits against public participation targeting journalists are a
    continued cause for concern and self-regulation remains weak.
    Challenges regarding the quality of the legislative process, including limited effectiveness of
    public consultations, remain. Shortcomings exist regarding the work, methodology and impact
    of the ad hoc parliamentary committee on deepening reforms for good governance, rule of law
    and anti-corruption. The Constitutional Court continues to function effectively, while there are
    concerns about the Parliament’s ongoing failure to comply with some of its rulings, and legal
    uncertainty regarding the precise duration of the mandate of its members. The mandates of the
    Ombudsperson and the Commissioner against Discrimination still need to be renewed, and
    some obstacles to their effective working remain. Civil society organisations remain overall
    free to operate, but challenges remain including on registration requirements and limited public
    funding.
    2
    I. JUSTICE SYSTEM1
    Independence
    The level of perceived judicial independence in Albania continues to be average among
    both the general public and companies. Overall, 47% of the general population and 40% of
    companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly or very good’
    in 20252
    . The perceived judicial independence among the general public has slightly increased
    in comparison with 2024 (46%), while among companies it decreased in comparison with 2024
    (45%).
    Albania continued implementing the judicial reform, strengthening judicial
    independence and prosecutorial autonomy. A revised Cross-Sector Justice Strategy 2024-
    2030 was adopted3
    . The implementation of the judicial reform continued. The aim of this
    reform is to promote integrity and professionalism across the judiciary, including through the
    vetting process, reduced political influence throughout the appointment process, and by
    contributing to more merit-based career system. The interinstitutional coordination between
    the Councils and other justice institutions has not improved. A more effective steering
    mechanism and coordination of all justice institutions needs to be ensured during the
    implementation of the justice reform strategy. This relates to the need to intensify exchanges4
    ,
    ensure the systematic follow up to joint meetings of the High Judicial Council and the High
    Prosecutorial Council by way of operational conclusions, consultations with stakeholders, or
    coordination of measures and standards regarding the quality of justice5
    .
    The vetting process of all judges and prosecutors was finalised in first instance, further
    strengthening accountability, while gaps to maintaining the high standards set during the
    vetting process remain. The vetting bodies have finalised the vetting in first instance in
    November 2024. The overall outcome of decisions in first instance, and where applicable on
    appeal, resulted in 282 dismissals and terminations (56 % of cases); 350 confirmations in office
    (44% of cases); and 4 suspension decisions, with the obligation to undergo training (0.49% of
    cases). 110 appeals remain pending6
    . The Appeal Chamber increased the pace of appeals,
    including through the appointment of four additional staff, and is currently on track towards
    finalising of the vetting on appeal before the end of the constitutional deadline of June 2026.
    The vetting bodies referred 19 vetting cases to prosecution in September 2024. Effective
    judicial follow up remains to be observed7
    . To maintain accountability of the judicial system
    after the vetting process, the High Prosecutorial Council, the High Judicial Council, the High
    Justice Inspector, and the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts
    of Interest must update their internal procedures, and ensure they have enough staff and
    1
    An overview of the institutional framework for all four pillars can be found here.
    2
    Flash Eurobarometer 554 and 555 (2025); Flash Eurobarometer 540 and 541 (2024). The level of perceived
    judicial independence is categorised as follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial
    independence as fairly good and very good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high
    (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%).
    3
    Albanian Government (2024b), Decision No. 787 on the approval of the Justice Strategy.
    4
    In June 2025, the first joint meeting took place with two other scheduled for July and September 2025.
    5
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 8.
    6
    International Monitoring Operation (2025).
    7
    Albanian Government (2025d), pp. 3-4. Thus far, in three cases the district prosecutors’ offices decided not
    to initiate criminal proceedings; three referrals are in the preliminary verification process and in 13 cases
    criminal proceedings have been registered and investigation is ongoing.
    3
    resources to keep carrying out integrity and proficiency checks in line with the vetting
    standards8
    .
    Previously identified shortcomings in the appointments of non-magistrate members to
    the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council remain. The Parliament
    appointed three non-magistrate members of the High Judicial Council and three non-magistrate
    members of the High Prosecutorial Council in September 20249
    . The process had been delayed
    and remained heavily influenced by the Parliament due to frequent use of disqualifications and
    recourse to drawing of lots, without due regard to the highest qualifications of the candidates10
    .
    As reported previously, shortcomings persist in practice and in the legal framework on the
    appointment procedure of non-magistrate members, who are not subject to the same standards
    for background checks and asset verification as magistrate members, affecting the transparency
    and meritocracy of the process11
    .
    Challenges in conducting timely and qualitative evaluations, appointments, promotions,
    and transfers of magistrates remained, and the Councils lack important operating rules.
    Both the High Judicial Council (HJC) and the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC) continue to
    face challenges in ensuring timely and qualitative evaluations of magistrates’ performance.
    They have accumulated a large backlog of evaluations, which delays merit-based
    appointments, promotions and transfers12
    . Since July 2024, the HPC finalised 21 evaluations,
    and the HJC completed 11 evaluations based on the legal framework in force13
    . The HJC
    finalised 32 appointments, 3 promotions, 16 temporary transfers and 2 lateral transfers of
    judges. The HPC finalised 23 appointments, 4 promotions, and 5 transfers of prosecutors14
    .
    There was no significant development from HJC and HPC in strengthening the transparency
    of promotions and transfers15
    . The HJC lacks the necessary internal operating rules to carry out
    its functions effectively, and those of the HPC need revising. Both Councils lack internal rules
    of procedure on conflicts of interest of their members, resulting in potential conflicts of interest
    not being addressed16
    .
    The High Justice Inspector is operational, but the high number of magistrate-inspector
    vacancies affects its effective operation. While the inherited backlog was cleared in 2023,
    1 363 cases from that year were carried over to 2024. In 2024, the High Justice Inspector (HJI)
    8
    Albanian Government (2025a), p. 2. Some preparatory work has started to strengthen institutional capacities,
    including the addition of three councillors in the HPC budget for 2026-2028, and Albania states its intention
    to prepare a study outlining the relevant vetting standards.
    9
    Albanian Government (2025d), p. 8.
    10
    2024 Enlargement Report, Albania p. 28. The Parliament failed to reach the required two thirds majority and
    resorted to drawing of lots. Though in line with Law No. 115/2016 on Governance Institutions of the Justice
    System governing the selection process (Articles 35 (13)-(14) and Article 58 (2)), the use of lots does not
    observe the merit-based ranking to the detriment of the meritocracy of the process.
    11
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, pp. 4-5; Albanian Government (2025a), p. 3. Given that the existing
    constitutional and legal mechanisms, which have been repeatedly used to unblock procedural deadlocks,
    specifically the drawing of lots, do not ensure the selection of the most highly qualified candidates and thus
    do not guarantee a merit-based selection process, Albania stated the intention to change the legislation in
    force.
    12
    2024 Enlargement Report, Albania, p. 28.
    13
    Albanian Government (2025d), pp. 16-17. Albanian Government (2025a), p. 5.
    14
    Albanian Government (2025d), p. 13.
    15
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 4; Albanian Government (2025a), p. 6. The HJC states its intention to
    strengthen transparency on promotions and transfers.
    16
    2024 Enlargement Report, Albania, p. 28; Albanian Government (2025a), p. 7. The HPC states the intention
    to work on draft amendments to the internal regulation, including the by-laws regarding the conflict of
    interest.
    4
    registered 1 491 new cases and processed 1 374 cases. 1 480 cases were carried over to 202517
    .
    Only 9 out of 20 inspectors are currently in office. The selection of four non-magistrate
    inspectors is ongoing18
    . There are still challenges in making the inspector position attractive
    for magistrates19
    and legal changes are needed to increase its appeal. The recruitment procedure
    for the secondment of six magistrates to the HJI has been unsuccessful20
    . In terms of operations,
    the HJI initiated requests for disciplinary proceedings against 15 magistrates including six
    judges and nine prosecutors in 2024 and completed six thematic inspections21
    . After review
    from the High Judicial Council, two requests for disciplinary proceedings have been accepted,
    one has been rejected, one has been suspended, one has been terminated without a final
    decision, and one is still under consideration. After review from the High Prosecutorial
    Council, one request has been accepted, but with a change of measure, two requests concerning
    the same prosecutor have been partially accepted with a change of measure, two have been
    rejected, one has been terminated without a final decision, two have been suspended pending
    the Appeal Chamber’s decision, and one is still under consideration22
    .
    The random allocation of cases is applied in courts, although its overall efficiency remains
    to be improved, and it is only limitedly applied in the prosecution service. Although rules
    on random allocation of cases remained in place, due to continued delays in filling judicial
    vacancies in several courts, the random allocation of cases is still not applied consistently23
    .
    There have been some developments with the random allocation of cases for prosecutors,
    which started to be applied in practice at prosecution offices of first instance24
    .
    While the resilience of the judiciary has improved, attempts by public officials or
    politicians to exert undue interference and pressure on the judicial system raise serious
    concerns. During the reporting period, seven magistrates have been placed under protection,
    including one judge and six prosecutors. The Special Prosecutor’s Office launched one criminal
    investigation concerning attempted pressure against a magistrate in a case concerning a
    Member of Parliament25
    . The investigation and arrest of an elected official, confirmed in
    February 2025 by the Special Structure Against Organised Crime and Corruption (SPAK)26
    Court, triggered unprecedented public reactions by the executive and legislative branches,
    including attempts to put pressure on SPAK and judicial institutions. This raises serious
    concerns27
    . SPAK published two letters of complaint to the Ministry of Interior and the State
    Police for failure to reinforce security and ensure the safety of SPAK personnel during a protest
    outside SPAK premises. The governing institutions of the judiciary issued public statements28
    ,
    denouncing political pressure on the judiciary.
    17
    High Justice Inspector (2025), p. 11.
    18
    Albanian Government (2025d), p. 9.
    19
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 5.
    20
    Albanian Government (2025d), p. 9.
    21
    High Justice Inspector (2025), p. 4.
    22
    High Justice Inspector (2025), pp. 4, 23-29. Albanian Government (2025a), p. 10.
    23
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 5.
    24
    Albanian Government (2025d), p. 14.
    25
    Albanian Government (2025d), pp. 19-21. Albanian Government (2025a), p. 15.
    26
    Specialised bodies in charge of investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating corruption cases were established
    in 2016. These are the Special Anti-Corruption Structure (SPAK), comprising the Special Prosecution Office
    (SPO) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime courts
    (SPAK Courts, both of first instance and appeal).
    27
    SPAK (2025a).
    28
    High Judicial Council (2025b); Panorama.com.al (2025).
    5
    Quality
    Implementation of the new judicial map was finalised but access to justice continues to
    be hampered by shortcomings, including in electronic communication tools,
    infrastructure and legal aid. The implementation of the judicial map adopted in July 2022 to
    optimise resources and increase efficiency29
    was finalised. An electronic communication tool
    between the Tirana District Court and lawyers has been successfully piloted30
    . However, the
    lack of funding to expand the electronic communication tools and electronic access to all
    courts’ files, especially the Court of Appeal, is limiting access to justice. While the Government
    allocated the necessary premises to the Court of Appeal, the court infrastructure remained
    overall poor31
    . The number of cases involving primary legal aid decreased from 7 008 in 2023
    to 6 220 in 2024, while the number of cases involving secondary legal aid increased from 773
    in 2023, to 904 in 2024.32
    However, civil society organisations report insufficient access and
    limited quality of legal aid representation33
    .
    Sufficient budget has been allocated for the implementation of a modern integrated
    electronic case management system in courts and prosecution offices, but full operability
    is foreseen only for 2030. Some progress was made with the allocation of state budget for the
    court component and the establishment of operations is foreseen for 2027, while the project to
    fully enable the system is expected to run until 203034
    . This timeline is too long and risks being
    detrimental to the overall quality of justice. Despite efforts to improve cooperation,
    coordination among the actors remained limited, impacting the pace and joint approach toward
    an integrated system.
    Shortcomings remain regarding the overall quality of judicial training. Amendments to
    the legal framework on judicial training remain necessary to strengthen the capacity of the
    School of Magistrates35
    . Some positive actions have been taken to increase the skills of
    magistrates in the second year of training and to review relevant curricula of the first and second
    years36
    . However, a comprehensive review of the initial and continuous training curricula
    remains necessary to increase their relevance and quality. The fact that magistrates who have
    resigned during vetting and are subject to a prohibition to hold high level judiciary positions
    are free to take up positions of training staff at the School of Magistrates continues to constitute
    a major shortcoming. The admission exam continues to present shortcomings in terms of
    quality and has not been significantly revised37
    .
    Shortage of financial and human resources, including magistrates, continues to negatively
    affect the quality of justice. Although the filling of judicial vacancies continued, with 32
    29
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 7.
    30
    Albanian Government (2025d), p. 23.
    31
    Albanian Government (2025c), Council of Ministers approved on 20 March 2025 the transfer of a state-
    owned property from the General Directorate of Taxation to the High Judicial Council. The property, located
    in Tirana, will serve as premises for the Appeal Court.
    31
    2024 Enlargement Report, Albania, p. 31; People’s Advocate of Albania (2023), p. 68. The new judicial map
    reorganised the appeal courts into a single appeal court of general jurisdiction, which has caused a number of
    issues including the lack of infrastructure.
    32
    Albanian Government (2025b)..
    33
    Country visit Albania, Civil society organisations.
    34
    Albanian Government (2025d), p. 23.
    35
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 8.
    36
    Albanian Government (2025d), pp. 25-26.
    37
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, pp.7-8.
    6
    judges and 23 prosecutors appointed as of July 2024, significant shortage persists, notably at
    appeal level. As of December 2024, 221 prosecutors out of 341 (65%) and 272 judges out of
    408 (67%) were effectively employed38
    . In the Court of Appeal, two judges have been
    appointed, bringing the number of judges in office to 28 out of 7839
    . An additional source of
    concern are the quotas decided by the High Judicial Council (HJC) and the High Prosecutorial
    Council (HPC) for the School of Magistrates (SoM) for the academic year 2025-2026, as they
    are largely insufficient to ensure that, in the medium term, vacancies will be gradually filled40
    .
    Increasing the number and quality of candidate magistrates and legal assistants admitted to the
    SoM is essential. Except for the High Court, all courts of general and specialised jurisdiction,
    at all levels, continued to function with acting chairs, as positions of permanent chairs have not
    been filled by the HJC despite the legal basis being in place41
    . Legal advisors’ positions remain
    limited. Legal changes are still necessary to provide a separate admission exam for magistrates
    and legal advisors, as well as a career progression path for the latter42
    . Out of 242 additional
    total staff requested by the justice institutions in 2024, only 133 additional employees were
    approved by the Parliament43
    . A comprehensive human resources plan, including planning per
    each category of additional staff, is missing. While the Government has continued to increase
    investments in the justice system over the past years, the allocations remain below the amounts
    needed by justice institutions44
    . Albania’s expenditure on justice as a whole remains
    significantly low45
    .
    The High Court addressed some problems of consistency and reasoning in the case law.
    The High Court continued to unify the case law through regularly identifying issues for
    unification, issuing internal guidance and disseminating key decisions monthly46
    . However,
    problems of consistency of the case law remain47
    . With the publication of court rulings of the
    SPAK first instance court48
    , court rulings were made publicly available in a timely manner.
    Courts encounter serious challenges in timely reasoning of decisions.
    Efficiency
    Challenges regarding the length of proceedings and the large backlog have further
    increased, while decisive measures to increase efficiency are yet to be implemented. The
    clearance rate remained well below 100% in 2023 and was particularly low in second instance
    38
    Albanian Government (2025d), pp. 27-28; Albanian Government (2025a), p. 17.
    39
    Albanian Government (2025d), p. 28.
    40
    Country visit Albania, HJC and HPC; Albanian Government (2025d), p. 25. The number of quotas for
    candidates to the School of Magistrates in 2025-2026 is 10 for judges, 12 for prosecutors, six for legal advisors
    and zero for legal assistants. The quotas for the preceding cohort were 20 for judges, 25 for prosecutors and
    15 for legal assistants (which were in turn lower than in the previous years).
    41
    Country visit Albania. According to the HJC, it does not have a legal basis to proceed with appointments of
    Court Chairs. HPC did not identify the same problem and performs appointments of heads of Prosecution
    offices based on the legal basis in force.
    42
    Law No. 115/2016 on Governance Institutions of the Justice System, Articles 244 (4) and 274.
    43
    Albanian Government (2025d), p. 31. Additional staff includes legal assistants for the appeal Court, judicial
    secretaries, and support staff (IT, drivers etc).
    44
    Albanian Government (2025d), p. 31. Out of 71,331,485 ALL requested, 48,330,988 ALL budget was
    approved.
    45
    CEPEJ (2024), Dashboard Western Balkans – 2023 Data Collection. In 2023, Albania spent about EUR 73.7
    million as its implemented Judicial System budget, reflecting a 69,3% increase from 2022 (the budget
    allocated was about EUR 74.23 million). This amounts to EUR 26,7 spent per inhabitant.
    46
    Albanian Government (2025a), p. 19.
    47
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 9.
    48
    Albanian Government (2025d), p. 34.
    7
    where it ranged between 43% and 63% for different types of cases (compared to between 87%
    and 94% for first instance cases)49
    . In comparison with 2022, disposition time further increased
    in 2023 for all categories of cases in first and second instance, in particular for second instance
    criminal cases50
    . The reasons indicated by courts for this negative trend include judicial
    vacancies as well as vacancies of legal assistants and secretaries, their insufficient continuous
    training, and the lack of further specialisation of judges. However, an exception was the
    decrease of disposition time by 38,6% for administrative cases in second instance, driven by
    the increased number of resolved cases resulting from an increased number of judges in the
    Administrative Court of Appeal. At the same time, the disposition time in second instance
    administrative cases remains very high overall51
    . The High Judicial Council (HJC) has not yet
    adopted a comprehensive roadmap on efficiency. Concerns over the alignment with European
    standards of the amendments proposed in May 2024 as part of the strategy on backlog reduction
    by the HJC have so far not been resolved52
    . Alternative dispute resolution remains underused
    in practice53
    .
    II. ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK
    The perception among experts, citizens and business executives is that the level of
    corruption in the public sector remained high. In the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index by
    Transparency International, Albania scores 42/100 and ranks 80th globally54
    . Nonetheless, this
    perception marks the best score for Albania over the past five years, confirming the positive
    impact of the implementation of the justice reform. The 2025 Special Eurobarometer on
    Corruption shows that 86% of respondents consider corruption widespread in their country (EU
    average 69%) and 45% of respondents feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives
    (EU average 30%). As regards businesses, 85% of companies consider that corruption is
    widespread (EU average 65%) and 63% consider that corruption is a problem when doing
    business (EU average 35%). Furthermore, 56% of respondents find that there are enough
    successful prosecutions to deter people from corrupt practices (EU average 30%), while 51%
    49
    CEPEJ (2024), p. 16. The clearance rate in 2023 in first instance was 87% for civil and commercial litigious
    cases, 91% for administrative cases and 94% for the sum of severe and misdemeanour and/or minor criminal
    cases. In second instance cases, the clearance rate in 2023 was 46% for administrative cases and 63% for the
    sum of severe and misdemeanour and/or minor criminal cases. For civil and commercial litigious cases in
    second instance, data is not available for 2023.
    50
    CEPEJ (2024), pp. 2, 16-20. In first instance, in 2023, the disposition time increased in comparison with 2022
    by 22,6% for civil and commercial litigious cases, 28,2% for administrative cases, and 12,5% for criminal
    cases. In second instance, in 2023 disposition time increased in comparison with 2022 by 66,7% in criminal
    cases. For civil and commercial cases in second instance, data for 2023 is not available.
    51
    CEPEJ (2024), pp. 2, 16, 19; Albanian Government (2025d), p. 34. The disposition time for second instance
    administrative cases decreased from 8 680 days to 5 326 days. In contrast, the disposition time ranges from
    124 days to 462 days for all other types of cases (except civil and commercial litigious cases in second
    instance, for which data is not available for 2023).
    52
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 9. “In May 2024 the High Judicial Council presented the strategy on
    backlog reduction, which entails important amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code, the Civil Procedure
    Code, Administrative Law, and the law on the organisation of the judiciary. However, consistency of these
    legal initiatives with the general principles of justice reform and European standards is yet to be fully
    ensured.” A comprehensive roadmap on efficiency, including but not limited to measures to reduce backlog,
    remains necessary.
    53
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, pp. 8-9.
    54
    Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2024 (2025). The level of perceived corruption is
    categorized as follows: low (above 79); relatively low (between 79-60), relatively high (between 59-50), high
    (scores below 50).
    8
    of companies believe that people and businesses caught for bribing a senior official are
    appropriately punished (EU average 33%)55
    .
    The Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2024-2030 has been adopted. The new anti-corruption
    strategy adopted in December 2024 by the Government56
    focuses on high-risk areas for
    corruption (such as property, public procurement, health, education, customs, and taxation),
    with an emphasis on youth integrity education and addressing relevant previous
    recommendations57
    . The anti-corruption strategy incorporated measures to enhance monitoring
    and institutional coordination mechanisms. However, further strengthening of institutional
    capacities, planning, coordination and monitoring mechanisms remain needed.
    Although a comprehensive legal framework to fight corruption exists, certain gaps
    remain. The Code of Criminal Procedure lacks provisions granting competence to Special
    Courts for Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime over matters related to the execution of their
    judgments58
    . In May 2025, the Government sent the draft law on the asset recovery office to
    the Parliament for adoption59
    . Albania is not yet a signatory party to the OECD Anti-Bribery
    Convention60
    .
    SPAK further consolidated its positive results in fighting high-level corruption, while
    some shortages remain in terms of staff and infrastructure. The Special Anti-Corruption
    Structure (SPAK)61
    and the anti-corruption and organised crime courts (SPAK courts) have
    delivered positive results in the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases,
    including those involving politicians and high-level officials, as well as the protection of EU
    financial interests62
    . SPAK shows sound strategic vision and independence in contributing to
    the fight against high-level corruption, despite increased political pressure, organised crime
    groups and media. SPAK enjoys a high level of public trust. SPAK’s access to state databases
    was expanded63
    . SPAK actions continued towards establishing its case-management system64
    ,
    consolidating its analytical capacity in the fight against organised criminal networks65
    , and
    developing an action plan to reduce its backlog. The continuously increasing SPAK workload,
    and the insufficient staff and infrastructure still need to be addressed66
    . The number of referrals
    55
    Data from Special Eurobarometer 561 (2025) and Flash Eurobarometer 558 (2025).
    56
    Albanian Government (2024a).
    57
    Albanian Government (2025d)pp. 40-41. GRECO (2025).
    58
    2023 Screening report Albania, Cluster 1 – Fundamentals, p. 48.
    59
    Albania reported to have established an asset recovery office within the Albanian State Police by a Minister’s
    order, however, its full functioning remains to be developed.
    60
    OECD (2024); Albanian Government (2025a), p. 20. Albania states its intention to ratify the Convention by
    2027, according to the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2030.
    61
    Special Prosecution Office (SPO) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
    62
    Albanian Government (2025d), pp. 49-50. Specialised bodies in charge of investigating, prosecuting and
    adjudicating corruption cases were established in 2016. These are the Special Anti-Corruption Structure
    (SPAK), comprising the Special Prosecution Office (SPO) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
    and the Anti Corruption and Organised Crime courts (SPAK Courts, both of first instance and appeal). The
    General Prosecution Office (GPO) is competent to investigate cases of petty corruption.
    63
    Albanian Government (2025d), p. 55.
    64
    The system is expected to be operational in 2025.
    65
    Including complex investigations, joint operations, also with international cooperation.
    66
    Country visit Albania, SPAK; SPAK (2025b). The legal definition of high-level corruption sets a low
    threshold; as a result, SPAK receives a workload of cases which is too high compared to its current capacity
    and resources. SPAK courts indicate a shortage of administrative staff, lack of an effective case management
    system, and continuously increasing workload: the total number of new cases increased, with 2775 new cases
    in 2023, compared to 2059 new cases in 2022.
    9
    to SPAK from other authorities has decreased further and remains low67
    . Other structures for
    repression of corruption continued to encounter challenges in the detection and effective
    investigation of corruption68
    .
    Tangible progress was made by SPAK towards a solid track record in the fight against
    corruption, notably at high level, and the use of financial investigations and asset
    confiscations has improved. From 1 January to 31 December 2024, the Special Court of
    Appeal for Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK appeal court) delivered 24 final
    adjudications, with 106 persons convicted in final rulings in corruption cases, including 13
    convictions in high level cases (including former Minister, former President of the
    Constitutional Court, former city mayors and other officials)69
    . SPAK’s human, technical and
    financial capacity for financial investigations and asset confiscations has improved70
    , and the
    level of total asset seizures and confiscations remained stable71
    . The seizure of assets for
    corruption related crimes declined, while confiscation of assets for corruption-related crimes
    improved72
    . Albania reported to have established an asset recovery office within Albanian State
    Police, but its full functioning remains to be demonstrated. The systematic use of special
    investigative measures has improved, although the gap between seizures and confiscations
    persists73
    .
    Although some organisational steps have been taken, the institutional framework for
    corruption prevention remains largely ineffective and coordination with law enforcement
    needs further strengthening. The General Directorate on Anti-Corruption (GDAC) has been
    transferred from the Ministry of Justice to the Minister of State for Public Administration and
    Corruption in June 202474
    . The GDAC underwent a re-organisation of capacities dealing with
    administrative investigation and risk assessment and to place greater emphasis on prevention,
    although it also remains responsible for centralised administrative investigations.
    Shortcomings persist as regards GDAC’s capacities to effectively oversee the implementation
    and assessment of preventive measures, along with thorough risk assessments. Some efforts
    have been made, particularly in high-risk areas for corruption, but effective implementation is
    67
    Albanian Government (2025d), pp. 52-53. During 2024, according to SPAK, there were 6 related referrals
    from law enforcement agencies during 2024, namely 5 from Albanian State Police and 1 from the High
    Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest (HIDAACI).
    68
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 11. Notably, the General Prosecution Office (GPO), Albanian State
    Police (ASP) and customs police.
    69
    Albanian Government (2025f). Other subjects include: two ex-Secretary-Generals, an ex-judge, an ex-
    member of Special Appeals Chamber and four ex-judicial police officers. The SPAK first instance court
    convicted 93 persons in cases of corruption, including one former mayor for unlawful actions in the procedure
    to issue a construction permit and abuse of public funds. Regarding high level corruption, during the period
    January 2024 – September 2024, seven criminal proceedings were sent to trial including 10 high-level
    officials. By 30 September 2024, six additional investigations in high level corruption cases were launched
    with respect to 14 individuals. In November 2024, the SPAK appeal court pronounced its final decision
    regarding the “Elbasan Incinerator case” with a harsher conviction than the first instance judgement for the
    former Minister and a former member of the Parliament; see more Albaniantimes.al (2024).
    70
    Albanian Government (2025d), pp. 65-66. The appointment of the Deputy Director of NBI allowed for the
    launch of the procedure to hire Judicial Police Services officers, as envisaged by the SPAK Law.
    71
    Agency for Managing Seized and Confiscated Assets (2025). In 2024, seized assets were valued at EUR 22
    million, while confiscated assets were valued at EUR 10 million, compared to 21 and 11 million respectively
    reported in 2023.
    72
    Agency for Managing Seized and Confiscated Assets (2025). The value of seized assets for corruption related
    crimes dropped from EUR 6 million to EUR 277 287, while confiscation of assets for corruption related
    crimes increased from EUR 273 000 to EUR 869 000 in 2024.
    73
    Albanian Government (2025d), pp. 65-67.
    74
    Council of Ministers (2024).
    10
    yet to be demonstrated75
    . Coordination between institutions in charge of corruption prevention
    and relevant law enforcement structures remains weak and the number of referrals further
    decreased. The State Audit Institution (ALSAI) has a stronger track record on judicial referrals
    and cooperation with criminal prosecution bodies. In 2024, ALSAI referred 13 cases with
    criminal elements to prosecution. Additionally, 35 referrals on issues that require further
    investigation were shared with prosecutorial bodies upon request76
    .
    Despite some anti-corruption efforts including the revision of the Law on the Police, the
    state police is still highly vulnerable to corruption. The Law on the Police has been revised,
    including a number of structural changes77
    . The Police Oversight Agency stepped up its
    activities. In 2024, the Agency received 1 704 citizen complaints regarding the State Police
    staff conduct directly and 3 334 through a dedicated police line. It launched 63 inspections, up
    from 51 in 2023, and recommended disciplinary investigations for 283 employees, 60% more
    than in 2023. The Disciplinary Investigation Commission imposed disciplinary measures on
    43 police officers. The Agency also referred 463 law enforcement employees to criminal
    prosecution (35% more than in 2023), largely for “abuse of duty” and “passive corruption”78
    .
    With a view to ensuring the integrity of the police personnel, last year 62 individuals underwent
    periodic and transitional evaluation, with 46 decisions of confirmation, and dismissal from duty
    in one case79
    . In March 2025, an internal operation led by the SPAK and the State Police, in
    collaboration with the Police Oversight Agency, resulted in the arrest of three police officers,
    due to their alleged involvement with criminal groups80
    .
    Shortcomings remain in terms of effectiveness of verifications of declarations of assets
    and interests by the HIDAACI, including high-risk profiling. Declarations of assets and
    interests continued to be verified by High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets
    and Conflicts of Interest (HIDAACI), but they remain unpublished, with access possible upon
    request which constitutes a shortcoming81
    . In 2024, HIDAACI performed full verifications on
    211 candidates to judicial authorities and 35 officers from the State Police, the Republican
    Guard and Police Surveillance Agency. HIDAACI has approved and conducted full/periodic
    controls for 817 subjects in 2024, imposed 101 fines and referred 23 criminal or other cases to
    law enforcement agencies, including one to SPAK. There was no progress regarding the
    effectiveness of verifications and further actions seem to be needed as to verify assets
    potentially concealed through private entities or proxies82
    .
    Some steps have been taken towards a reform of the conflict-of-interest and
    whistleblowers’ legislation, although legislation on prevention of corruption remained
    complex and incomplete. The regulation of revolving doors, conflicts of interests, lobbying
    and political party financing remained incomplete. The composition of the Ethics Commission
    75
    2024 Rule of Law report, Albania, p. 12.
    76
    State Audit Institution (2025), p. 27.
    77
    GRECO (2025), p. 23.
    78
    Police Oversight Agency (2025).
    79
    Albanian Government (2025d), pp. 60-61.
    80
    Balkanweb.com (2025). The operation was based on evidence obtained from the encrypted "SkyECC" app,
    which indicated connections of these officials with criminal networks, primarily in the trafficking of narcotics.
    81
    Only persons authenticated through an e-portal may file the requests for access, which must be authorised by
    HIDAACI. Albanian Government (2025d), pp. 76-77.
    82
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania; Country visit Albania, updates received from HIDAACI.
    11
    has been revised to exclude political members83
    . While some preliminary steps were taken
    towards strengthening the efficiency of the corruption prevention network, by advancing work
    on alignment of the law on the conflict of interest with European standards, further work is still
    needed as to fully align the laws on whistleblower protection, lobbying, donations and political
    party financing with European standards. The number of whistleblowers’ reports continued to
    be low. During 2024, HIDAACI reviewed six new whistleblower reports and two requests for
    protection against retaliation84
    , and in two cases an administrative fine was imposed85
    .
    Although efforts on repression and prevention have increased, corruption remains
    prevalent in many areas, including in high-risk areas for corruption. Limited transparency
    in public procurement procedures, especially for public-private partnerships, remain a source
    of concern86
    . Specialisation in investigation and prosecuting corruption in procurement is
    weak. The misuse of state funding during electoral campaigns remains an area of concern,
    despite the initiatives undertaken by the Central Electoral Commission to monitor and sanction
    violations including corruption, in relation to the legislative elections of 11 May 202587
    . In
    response to a parliamentary recommendation, SPAK adopted a strategy to combat electoral
    crime, including the establishment of investigative teams in collaboration with the Central
    Electoral Commission, the State Police, and other law enforcement agencies to prevent and
    investigate electoral crimes88
    . Corruption risks persist notably in health, education and within
    the police, as well as at the State Cadastre Agency, which are considered high-risk areas for
    corruption. Dedicated risk assessment plans are being developed by the Government in the area
    of public procurement and for the State Cadastre Agency89
    , which need to be supported by
    consolidation and digitalisation of cadastral data. Internal checks and inspection mechanisms
    in the public administration remain ineffective90
    .
    III. MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM
    The independence of the Audio-Visual Regulatory Authority (AMA) remains an issue of
    concern, due to the bi-partisan formula for election of board members and their political
    affiliation. The 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) considers this to be an area of low risk
    referring in particular to the risk of political and corporate influence in the appointment
    procedures of AMA Board members, the political affiliations of the Chair and Board members
    and shortcomings in enforcement of the Broadcasting Code on media outlets which largely air
    83
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 14; GRECO (2025), pp. 4, 8, 23. The second Compliance Report by
    GRECO for the 5th
    evaluation round on Albania notes that the following recommendations remain partially
    addressed: new law on conflicts of interest which is in preparation, the effective functioning of the Ethics
    Commission, the monitoring mechanisms for the contacts of persons entrusted with top executive functions
    with lobbyists, and abstentions of (deputy) minister(s) from taking part in Council of Minister’s decisions
    due to potential conflict of interest. In general, GRECO noted that 18 out of 24 recommendations have been
    satisfactorily addressed, five have been partially addressed, and one remains unimplemented.
    84
    Albanian Government (2025d), pp. 91-92.
    85
    HIDAACI (2025). At the conclusion of the administrative investigations for the period 2016 – 2024, in 13
    cases, action was taken issuing an administrative fine, out of which 2 were issued during the reporting period.
    86
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, pp. 14-15.
    87
    The Central Election Commission (CEC) has taken several initiatives to ensure election integrity, including
    establishing an Inter-Agency Coordination Protocol, a Live Reporting and Monitoring Module, and a social
    media monitoring platform to track public officials' online activities. Additionally, the CEC has upgraded its
    Electronic Financing Reporting Platform (PERF) to improve monitoring and reporting of electoral financing,
    with 96 monitors covering all regions in Albania.
    88
    Albaniantimes.al (2025).
    89
    Albanian Government (2025d), p. 98.
    90
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 15.
    12
    pre-recorded political content by the government or political parties91
    . Self-regulation in the
    media sector remains weak and is hindered by limited resources, a polarised media landscape
    and ongoing use of inflammatory rhetoric in the public debate92
    .
    Concerns with regard to the independence of the public broadcaster have increased.
    Procedural irregularities in the election process of a new Director-General in January 2025
    further undermine the principles of merit-based selection and independence of the Albanian
    Public Broadcaster Albanian Radio Television (RTSH)93
    . The fact that the Steering Council
    decided to disqualify candidates before the hearing phase and disregarded the secret ballot
    procedure, breached the provisions in force94
    and violated the principles of transparency and
    fairness95
    . Following these irregularities, the Parliament discharged the entire Steering
    Council of RTSH, in apparent contradiction of applicable legislation which only allows
    individual disqualification of Steering Council members subject to due process guarantees96
    .
    MPM 2025 has further increased the risk score, within the medium - high risk band, relating
    to the independence of public service media, following the above-mentioned irregularities in
    the selection process, but also lack of fair representation of political actors and viewpoints,
    and political interference in staff changes97
    .
    High concentration continues to negatively impact media independence and media
    market penetration by high profile business groups with political links remain a serious
    concern. There is high concentration in the audiovisual and print market, as well as insufficient
    legal or self-regulatory safeguards against arbitrary interventions on the editorial line of media
    outlets, exacerbated by political pressures98
    . High-profile business groups have increased their
    economic penetration in the media market. Their strong links to political interests are a serious
    concern. Limited legal safeguards exist against concentration of media ownership and
    monopolies and there is a lack of legal safeguards regarding cross-media ownership
    concentration99
    . The high concentration in the Albanian media environment continued to pose
    a major concern to media independence as also highlighted in MPM 2025, which further
    increased its score for market plurality in Albania to very high risk100
    . There was some limited
    improvement on media ownership transparency. In 2024, AMA started publishing on its
    website summarised information regarding ownership structures and beneficial owners of
    licenced audiovisual media101
    . MPM 2025 maintains its high-risk score for transparency of
    media ownership102
    .
    Shortcomings in terms of fair allocation of state advertising and other state resources
    remain. The provisions on clear and transparent distribution of public sector advertising in line
    with international standards are still lacking and circumvention of the standard public
    procurement rules in the advertising procurement procedure has not been addressed103
    . MPM
    91
    MPM (2025), Albania, p. 16; 2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 15.
    92
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 16.
    93
    Country visit Albania.
    94
    Law 97/2013 on Audiovisual Media, Articles 102 and 104; RTSH Statute, Article 11.
    95
    MPM (2025), Albania, p. 28.
    96
    Articles 97 and 100 of Law No. 97/2013 on Audiovisual Media.
    97
    MPM (2025), Albania, pp. 27-28.
    98
    MPM (2025), Albania, p. 18.
    99
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, pp. 16-17.
    100
    MPM (2025), Albania, p. 18.
    101
    Audio-Visual Regulatory Authority of Albania (2024).
    102
    MPM (2025), Albania, p. 19.
    103
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 16-17.
    13
    2025 highlights the fact that Albanian legislation does not provide fair and transparent rules for
    the distribution of indirect subsidies or state advertising to media outlets104
    . MPM 2025
    therefore has further increased the risk indicator to medium-high risk105
    . Albania has taken an
    initial step towards a transparent audience measurement system, which is key to ensuring
    accountability in public advertising106
    .
    Shortcomings persist with respect to the right to access to information. Public authorities
    continue the practice of withholding information based on generic references to “public
    interest”, which has still not been clearly defined, thus giving public institutions significant
    discretion to legally restrict or deny access to information, based on large volume of
    information requests, copyright issues, and confidentiality clauses on public contracts. This
    affects journalists in a disproportionate manner, as they file the majority of information
    requests. In 2024, the Commissioner for the Right to Information and Personal Data Protection
    received 365 complaints from journalists concerning the refusal to provide information and
    official documents. Of these, 283 cases were resolved by granting the requested information
    during the administrative review process107
    . MPM 2025 further increased the risk level related
    to the protection of the right to information to medium - high risk108
    . Albania has ratified the
    Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents109
    .
    Verbal and physical attacks, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against public
    participation (SLAPP) targeting journalists are a continued cause for concern.
    Defamation remains a criminal offence, and the legal framework does not provide for
    safeguards regarding SLAPPs110
    . The civil law provisions on fraudulent or inaccurate
    publications are still not aligned with European standards and continue to be used to launch
    SLAPPs against journalists111
    . Journalists have limited access to legal assistance and limited
    support from media outlets. There is still a lack of systemic monitoring and reporting on
    judicial cases involving journalists. In 2024, the Safe Journalists Network reported 45 incidents
    of threats, pressures and attacks on journalists and media organisations, the majority being
    verbal attacks, anti-media discourse and online harassment, nearly double the amount recorded
    in 2022 and 2023 respectively. In 2025, 19 incidents were reported112
    . Cases of intimidation
    and threats against journalists, including by high state officials and police officers,113
    as well
    as online harassment and smear campaigns, particularly targeting women journalists, remain a
    104
    MPM (2025), Albania, p. 27.
    105
    MPM (2025), Albania, p. 27.
    106
    Country visit Albania, AMA. In 2024, AMA organised two roundtables with key stakeholders and industry
    actors, who decided to establish the Joint Industry Committee, representing some audiovisual media service
    providers. The body consists of nine members and will be coordinating the actions necessary to implement
    an audience measurement. The entity is pending registration as a non-profit organisation.
    107
    Information and Data Protection Commissioner’s Office (2025), written input. The total number in 2024 was
    939 complaints concerning the refusal to provide information and official documents and continued with the
    administrative review of 86 cases carried over from 2023. Out of all cases, 623 cases were resolved by
    granting the requested information during the administrative review process.
    108
    MPM (2025), Albania, p. 14.
    109
    The Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents (CETS No. 205), also known as
    the Tromsø Convention, entered into force on 1 December 2020.
    110
    SCiDEV and BIRN Albania (2025), p. 57. Media organisations reported 45 lawsuits registered until October
    2024 as a clear indication of the use of legal mechanisms to pressure and deter journalists.
    111
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 19; Country visit Albania.
    112
    Safe Journalists Network (2024, 2025). The 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that “Safe Journalists Network
    has reported 18 cases of attacks against journalists in 2022 and 24 cases in 2023”.
    113
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 19.
    14
    concern114
    . Contact persons for the safety of journalists have been appointed in the General
    Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Interior and the State Police, and the latter has drafted a
    Protocol115
    . The use of force, including by law enforcement authorities, in particular in the
    context of demonstrations, continues to be of concern116
    . The Council of Europe Platform to
    promote the protection of journalism and the safety of journalists has published five alerts since
    July 2024, relating to threats, a smear campaign and physical attacks targeting journalists and
    the criminal prosecution of journalists117
    . The Media Freedom Rapid Response project reports
    42 alerts since July 2024, consisting of 8 ‘physical assaults’, 32 ‘verbal attacks’, 1 ‘attack to
    property’, 3 ‘legal incidents’ and 12 ‘interference’118
    . Limited job security and poor working
    conditions for journalists combined with self-censorship, pressure from political actors and
    media owners119
    continue to pose serious challenges for media. For these reasons, MPM 2025
    further increased the risk indicator in the area to medium to high risk120
    . A structured dialogue
    between Albanian institutions and media actors was conducted between January-June 2025,
    with the aim of discussing key legislative and regulatory reforms to enhance freedom of
    expression, including media freedom121
    .
    IV. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES
    Challenges remain regarding the quality of the legislative process, including effectiveness
    of public consultations. In practice, the implementation of public consultation rules and
    safeguards is more procedural than genuinely effective122
    . Shortcomings identified in last
    year’s Rule of Law Report persist, including the lack of timely publication for stakeholders,
    limited follow up to consultations and the frequent use by the Government of normative acts
    having the force of law for amending the state budget123
    . Furthermore, in several cases draft
    laws proposed by Members of Parliament have been substantially amended to take into account
    the opinion of ministries without consulting non-government stakeholders124
    . This practice
    negatively impacts the quality and transparency of the legislative process.
    Shortcomings exist regarding the work, methodology and impact of the ad hoc
    parliamentary committee on deepening reforms for good governance, rule of law and
    anti-corruption. The committee was established in May 2024, without a cross-party
    consensus, aiming amongst others to review legislation, institutional architecture and policies
    114
    Notably cases of online harassment and smear campaigns, and cases particularly targeting women journalists;
    SCiDEV and BIRN Albania (2025).
    115
    The State Police has drafted and carried out public consultations on the Protocol for Protection of Journalists
    and Handling Cases of Attacks, specifically addressing the safety issues of women journalists. In November
    2024, the General Prosecutor issued a circular on priority investigation of cases of attacks against journalists
    and increased engagement with journalists to improve safety measures.
    116
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 19.
    117
    Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists – Albania. As
    regards the case of criminal prosecution, on 14 August 2024, the State Police announced criminal prosecution
    against journalists over reports on the Pogradec police.
    118
    European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Media Freedom Rapid Response – Albania.
    119
    Country visit Albania, civil society organisations from media sector; SCiDEV and BIRN Albania (2025), pp.
    81-83. According to civil society organisations surveys, working conditions and safety of journalists in
    Albania have deteriorated over the past year.
    120
    MPM (2025), Albania, pp. 12-13.
    121
    Albanian Government (2025a), p. 41.
    122
    SIGMA (2024), p. 22. SIGMA noted positively that the numbers of legal acts consulted and number of
    participants in the consultation increased, but a number of shortcomings remain.
    123
    Country visit Albania, civil society organisations; 2024 Rule of law Report, Albania, pp. 20-21.
    124
    Albanian Parliament (2025). There were 14 initiatives proposed by MPs that were examined and consulted
    by the Parliamentary Committees in charge.
    15
    in three areas (anti-corruption, good governance, and the rule of law – which includes a justice
    pillar). The aim is for this committee to develop an analytical document and a National Action
    Plan, including proposed measures within the remit of the committee. While a number of
    institutions participated in the process, most justice institutions decided to engage with the
    committee only formally, in writing, citing concerns about the process and constitutional issues
    such as their independence and established reporting obligations to the Parliament.
    Shortcomings exist concerning the work, transparency, inclusiveness, as well as the
    Committee’s methodology. At the same time, close attention must be paid to a potential
    duplication of work already conducted in the context of accession negotiations125
    . It is
    important that the work of the ad hoc committee is inclusive, transparent and consistent with
    the positive results of the 2016 justice reform, guaranteeing the independence of justice
    institutions.
    Political polarisation continued to impact the parliamentary work. During the 2024
    autumn session, clashes between the ruling majority and a part of the opposition continued in
    Parliament, causing disruptions to its work. During the same period, the opposition party called
    for several protests and ‘civil disobedience measures’ which at times turned violent126
    . In
    October 2024, following a request by the majority, the Parliament’s Ethics Secretariat decided
    to suspend 23 opposition members of Parliament, for allegedly committing violent acts during
    the plenary session127
    . This led to further disruptions, including frictions between opposition
    Members of Parliament and the Republican Guard, after guards prevented some opposition
    Members of Parliament, who had been sanctioned, from entering Parliament128
    .
    The Constitutional Court continued to function effectively, while Parliament’s ongoing
    failure to comply with some of its rulings and the legal uncertainty over the duration of
    its members’ mandates are a concern. The Court continued to function effectively and
    resolved its backlog129
    . During the reporting period, Parliament implemented the ruling of the
    Court regarding the right of citizens residing abroad to take part in elections130
    . However,
    Parliament failed to implement the remaining rulings of the Constitutional Court131
    . In an
    opinion on the matter, the Venice Commission called upon Parliament to respect and
    implement the Court’s decisions and confirmed that the decisions of the Constitutional Court
    are compulsory for all state bodies, including the Parliament132
    . The implementation of the
    Constitutional Court decision that declared some amendments to the Law on Inquiry
    Committees unconstitutional is still pending133
    . Parliament had six months to implement the
    125
    Country visit Albania: as also reported by stakeholders.
    126
    A2news.com (2024).
    127
    The Administrative Court subsequently reduced the 60-day suspensions for 3 Democratic Party MPs to 10
    days, and the 40-day suspensions for 20 other opposition MPs to 5 days. In compliance with this decision,
    the MPs returned to Parliament on 7 November.
    128
    Shqiptarja.com (2024).
    129
    Constitutional Court (2025).
    130
    Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania (2022a).
    131
    Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania (2022b,c,d). Constitutional Court rulings with effect on
    legislation not yet implemented by Parliament include those on the disposition of the Civil Procedure Code,
    on mandatory insurance in public transport, on the criminal code provisions adopted during the pandemic,
    and two rulings requesting Parliament to refer to it a case regarding the incompatibility of a mandate of a
    member of Parliament due to alleged conflict of interest (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania
    (2023a,b).
    132
    Venice Commission (2024), para. 57.
    133
    On 9 July 2024, the Constitutional Court found some of the amendments to the Law on Inquiry Committees
    unconstitutional, as they infringe on the right of a parliamentary minority to establish committees of inquiry
    and fail to guarantee the effective oversight of the parliamentary work by the minority groups.
    16
    ruling, and while discussions have started in Parliament, the deadline was not met134
    , although
    Albania stated its commitment to enact the legal changes needed135
    . In December 2024, the
    Constitutional Court issued a decision on the end of mandate of one of its judges, who is at the
    same time the President of the Court, confirming its exclusive competence to adjudicate such
    cases136
    . Legal uncertainty remains regarding the end of the mandate of two members of the
    Constitutional Court, due to diverging interpretations of the applicable provisions by
    Parliament and the High Court. For one of the cases, the President of the Republic, in his role
    as appointing authority made a formal request to the Constitutional Court to provide clarity on
    how to reconcile two constitutional principles regarding the calculation of mandates.
    On 1 January 2025, Albania had 25 leading judgments of the European Court of Human
    Rights pending implementation, an increase of 1 compared to the previous year137. On 1
    January 2025, Albania’s rate of leading judgments from the past 10 years that had been
    implemented was at 25% (compared to 4% in 2024, 75% remained pending), and the average
    time that the judgments had been pending implementation was 4 years and 3 months (compared
    to 3 years and 11 months in 2024)138
    . The oldest leading judgment, pending implementation
    for 11 years, concerns the failure to implement domestic decisions by the public
    administration139
    . As regards the respect of payment deadlines, on 31 December 2024 there
    were 17 cases in total awaiting confirmation of payments (compared to 22 in 2023)140
    . On 16
    June 2025, the number of leading judgments pending implementation had increased to 28141
    .
    The mandates of the Ombudsperson and the Commissioner against Discrimination still
    need to be renewed, and some obstacles to their effective working remain. The
    Commissioner against Discrimination and the Ombudsperson continued to enjoy a stable level
    of public trust and awareness about their competences. However, the fact that Parliament failed
    to appoint the Ombudsperson and the Commissioner against Discrimination, whose mandates
    expired in 2022 and 2023, respectively, risks to seriously weaken the legitimacy of these
    independent institutions142
    . To guarantee that its annual report is published before Parliament
    has debated on it, the Ombudsperson drafted legal amendments that are currently under public
    consultation143
    . The largest number of complaints received by the Ombudsperson in 2024
    concerned the limitation of personal freedom (295 complaints, 16% overall)144
    . The
    implementation rate of the recommendations issued by the Ombudsperson remains overall
    134
    Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania (2024a). The 2024 Rule of Law Report provides an overview
    of the legal amendments to the Law on Inquiry Committees, p. 21.
    135
    Albanian Government (2025a). Albania explained that with regard to the implementation of Decision no.
    54/2024 of the Constitutional Court, the Assembly has the intention to draft a new legal initiative “On some
    additions and amendments to Law no. 8891, dated 02.05.2002, ‘On the organization and functioning of the
    investigative committees of the Assembly’, as amended, however progress was affected by the conduct of
    general parliamentary elections.
    136
    Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania (2024).
    137
    For an explanation of the supervision process, see the website of the Council of Europe.
    138
    All figures calculated by the European Implementation Network (EIN) and based on the number of cases that
    are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2025. EIN (2025), written input, p. 1.
    139
    Judgment of the ECtHR, 40430/08, Memishaj v. Albania, pending implementation since 2014.
    140
    Council of Europe (2025), p. 156.
    141
    Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC).
    142
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 23.
    143
    Country visit Albania; Justice Freedom and Security Subcommittee, Ombudsperson.
    144
    Country visit Albania, Ombudsperson. Respectively followed by the Property rights (214 cases / 12%), the
    Judicial and Prosecutorial Procedure (213 cases / 12%) and Children's rights (212 cases / 12%).
    17
    low145
    . Both institutions continued to report shortcomings in human resources that have not
    been addressed by Parliament146
    .
    Less than half of the companies surveyed in Albania express high levels of confidence in
    the effectiveness of investment protection. 40% of companies are very or fairly confident
    that investments are protected by law and courts147
    . The main reason among companies for
    their lack of confidence is the difficulty to obtain a fair compensation or to protect property
    when something goes wrong148
    . 26% perceive the level of independence of the public
    procurement review body (Public Procurement Committee) as very or fairly good149
    . 38%
    perceive the level of independence of the national competition authority (Albanian Competition
    Authority) as very or fairly good150
    .
    Civil society organisations remain overall free to operate, but challenges remain,
    including on registration requirements and limited public funding. The civic space remains
    “narrowed” due to concerns about the state of press freedom and restrictions to the right to
    peaceful assembly151
    . In early 2025, civil society have denounced an unprecedented campaign
    of disinformation, defamation, and politically driven public attacks against civil society in the
    country152
    . The main governmental strategic document to support civil society expired in 2023
    while the preparation of a new strategic framework is still pending. Previously reported
    challenges linked to registration procedures, particularly the non-operation of the Electronic
    Register of Non-Profit Organisations, access to funding, conducive tax environment and the
    functioning of the National Council for Civil Society (NCCS) persist153
    . New instructions on
    VAT exemption aim to address the main concerns, but effective implementation remains to be
    demonstrated154
    . Criticism of the law on volunteerism continues, particularly due to its limited
    ability to support participation in voluntary activities155
    , while a new draft law is being
    prepared156
    .
    145
    The overall implementation rate was 21% in 2024, according to the Ombudsperson.
    146
    Country visit Albania, Ombudsperson; Commissioner against discrimination.
    147
    Flash Eurobarometer 555 (2025).
    148
    Flash Eurobarometer 555 (2025). 15% and 29% of the surveyed investors respectively perceive the frequent
    changes in legislation or concerns about quality of law-making process and the quality, efficiency or
    independence of justice as a reason for the lack of confidence in investment protection.
    149
    Flash Eurobarometer 555 (2025).
    150
    Flash Eurobarometer 555 (2025).
    151
    CIVICUS (2025). Rating given on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed
    and closed.
    152
    Resourcecentre.al (2025).
    153
    2024 Rule of Law Report, Albania, p. 24. The NCCS has so far failed to deliver on its broad mandate and its
    internal organisation does not allow it to exercise its prerogatives. In 2023, Albania indicated plans to review
    the legal framework in 2024 with a view to changing provisions related to its composition and functioning,
    but no clear results have been reported so far. According to the Government, some activities by the NCCS
    took place during 2024, for example meetings and consultations with civil society representatives.
    154
    Minister of Finance (2025).
    155
    Country visit Albania, civil society organisations.
    156
    Country visit Albania. See also: European Movement Albania (2024).
    18
    Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order*
    * The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2025 Rule of Law report
    can be found at https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2025-rule-law-report-targeted-
    stakeholder-consultation_en.
    A2news.com (2024), Opposition protest, State Police: 10 officers injured (Protesta e opozitës, Policia
    e Shtetit: Janë dëmtuar 10 efektivë), https://a2news.com/shqiperia/kronike/protesta-e-opozites-policia-
    e-shtetit-jane-demtuar-10-efektive-i1129756.
    Agency for Managing Seized and Confiscated Assets (2025). written contribution for the 2025 Rule of
    Law Report.
    Albanian Government (2024a), Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2030 (Strategjisë Ndërsektoriale
    kundër Korrupsionit 2024–2030), https://www.qbz.gov.al/eli/fz/2024/225/9f19ef0c-97b3-43c9-aa8f-
    e2181147b789.
    Albanian Government (2024b), Decision No. 787 on the approval of the Justice Strategy (Vendim-
    nr.787, date 18.12.2024 Per miratimin e Strategjise Ndersektoriale te Drejtesise 2024-2030),
    https://www.drejtesia.gov.al/baza-ligjore-3/.
    Albanian Government (2025a), additional written contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.
    Albanian Government (2025b), Analysis from February 2025 of the 2024 performance of the free legal
    aid directorate at the Ministry of Justice (Analiza e Performancës Vjetore 2024),
    https://ndihmajuridike.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Analiza-e-Performanc%C3%ABs-Vjetore-
    2024.pdf.
    Albanian Government (2025c), written contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.
    Albanian Government (2025d), written input for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.
    Albanian Parliament (2025e), Report on public and civil society participation in the decision-making
    processes of the Parliament for 2024 (Raport “Për Pjesëmarrjen e Publikut dhe të Shoqërisë Civile në
    Procesin Vendimmarrës të Kuvendit për Vitin 2024”), https://konsultimipublik.al/konsultime/1.
    Albanian Government (2025f), written input, Justice Freedom and Security Sub-committee, Annex 4.
    Albaniantimes.al (2024), Former Environment Minister sent to prison for role in incinerator affair,
    https://albaniantimes.al/lefter-koka-sentenced-elbasan-case/.
    Albaniantimes.al (2025), SPAK implements strategy to investigate and prevent electoral crimes in
    2025, https://albaniantimes.al/spak-implements-strategy-to-investigate-and-prevent-electoral-crimes-
    in-2025/.
    Audio-Visual Regulatory Authority (2024), Decision No. 40 of 25 April 2024 on requirements and
    procedures for reviewing changes regarding the ownership structure and the transparency of ownership-
    related data, https://ama.gov.al//baza-e-te-dhenave-struktura-pronesore-e-oshma.
    Balkanweb.com (2025), No operation of SPAK, police are effective and police are not trafficked and
    drugs, nor are they subject to disiplinor (Pas operacionit të SPAK, policia pezullon 3 efektivët e policisë
    të përfshirë në trafikun e drogës, nis dhe hetim disiplinor), https://www.balkanweb.com/pas-
    operacionit-te-spak-policia-pezullon-3-efektivet-e-policise-te-perfshire-ne-trafikun-e-droges-nis-dhe-
    hetim-disiplinor/#gsc.tab=0
    19
    Centre for Media Pluralism and Freedom (2025), Media Pluralism Monitor, Country report for Albania.
    CEPEJ (2024), Dashboard Western Balkans – 2023 Data Collection,
    https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/towards-a-better-evaluation-of-the-results-of-judicial-reforms-in-
    the-western-balkans-dashboard-western-balkans-.
    CIVICUS (2025), Albania, https://monitor.civicus.org/country/albania/.
    Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania (2022a), Decision V-38/22 of 9 December 2022,
    https://www.gjk.gov.al/web/Vendime_perfundimtare_100_1.php.
    Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania (2022b), Decision V-30/22 of 2 November 2022,
    https://www.gjk.gov.al/web/Vendime_perfundimtare_100_1.php.
    Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania (2022c), Decision V-37/22 of 1 December 2022,
    https://www.gjk.gov.al/web/Vendime_perfundimtare_100_1.php.
    Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania (2022d), Decision V-39/22 of 15 December 2022,
    https://www.gjk.gov.al/web/Vendime_perfundimtare_100_1.php.
    Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania (2023a), Decision V-1/23 of 23 January 2023,
    https://www.gjk.gov.al/include_php/previewdoc.php?id_kerkesa_vendimi=3633&nr_vendim=1.
    Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania (2023b), Decision V-2/23 of 23 January 2023,
    https://www.gjk.gov.al/include_php/previewdoc.php?id_kerkesa_vendimi=3634&nr_vendim=1.
    Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania (2024), Decision V-84/24 of 23 December 2024,
    https://www.gjk.gov.al/include_php/previewdoc.php?id_kerkesa_vendimi=4533&nr_vendim=1.
    Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania (2024a), Press release of 9 July 2024,
    https://www.gjk.gov.al/web/NJOFTIM_VENDIMMARRJEJE_3430_1-94.php. Reference 2
    Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania (2025), Annual Report 2024,
    https://www.gjykatakushtetuese.gov.al/wp-
    content/uploads/2025/02/AnnualReport2024_ConstitutionalCourt.pdf.
    Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2025), Supervision of the execution of judgments and
    decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, 18th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers,
    https://rm.coe.int/gbr-2001-18e-rapport-annuel-2024/1680b4d77d.Council of Europe (2025), Baseline
    Evaluation Report on the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on access to official
    documents, https://rm.coe.int/baseline-evaluation-report-albania/1680b4ad1a.
    Council of Europe (2025), Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists –
    Albania, https://fom.coe.int/en/pays/detail/11709474.
    Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2024), Opinion on the implementation by Parliament of
    Constitutional Court decisions (CDL-AD(2024)040).
    Council of Ministers (2024), Decision No. 436 of 26 June 2024.
    European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Media Freedom Rapid Response – Albania. Minister
    of Finance (2025), Instruction No. 6 of 24 February 2025, modifying Instruction No. 6 of 30 January
    2015 “On the Value Added Tax in the republic of Albania”.
    European Commission (2023), 2023 Screening report Albania, Cluster 1 – Fundamentals.
    20
    European Commission (2024), 2024 Communication on EU Enlargement policy, Albania Report.
    European Commission (2024), 2024 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation
    in Albania.
    European Implementation Network (EIN) (2025), written input for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.
    European Movement Albania (2024), Working Group for Chapter 23 – The Law on Volunteering in
    Albania: A priority for the development of an enabling environment for civil society, https://em-
    al.org/en/working-group-for-chapter-23-the-law-on-volunteering-in-albania-a-priority-for-the-
    development-of-an-enabling-environment-for-civil-society-09-july-2024/.
    GRECO (2025), Second Compliance Report by GRECO for the 5th evaluation round on Albania.
    HIDAACI (2025), written contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.
    High Judicial Council (2025a), Annual Report of 23 April 2025 on the State of the Judicial System and
    the Activities of the High Judicial Council [in 2024] (Vendim Nr. 232, Datë 23.04.2025 për
    Miratimin e “Raport mbi Gjendjen e Sistemit Gjyqësor dhe Veprimtarinë e Këshillit të Lartë
    Gjyqësor për Vitin 2024”), https://klgj.al/media/5thpqzn0/vendim-nr-232-dat%C3%AB-23-04-
    2025.pdf.
    High Judicial Council (2025b), Statement of 12 February 2025 (Deklaratë për shtyp, datë 12.02.2025),
    https://klgj.al/njoftimepershtyp/deklarate-per-shtyp-date-12-02-2025/.
    High Justice Inspector (2025), Report of 30 May 2025 on the work of the Office of the High Inspector
    of Justice for the period 01.01.2024 – 31.12.2024, https://ild.al/en/2025/05/30/for-the-work-of-the-
    office-of-the-high-inspector-of-justice-for-the-period-01-01-2024-31-12-2024/.
    International Monitoring Operation (2025), written contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.
    Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), Albania report.
    Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2024), Convention on Combating Bribery
    of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Ratification Status as of August 2024
    https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf.
    Panorama.com.al (2025), Statements against SPAK, HPC reacts: The independence and professional
    integrity of prosecutors must be respected (Deklaratat ndaj SPAK, reagon KLP: Të respektohet
    pavarësia dhe integriteti profesional i prokurorëve), https://www.panorama.com.al/deklaratat-ndaj-
    spak-reagon-klp-te-respektohet-pavaresia-dhe-integriteti-profesional-i-prokuroreve/.
    People’s Advocate of Albania (2023), Annual Report 2023,
    https://avokatipopullit.gov.al/media/manager/website/reports/FINAL-
    RAPORTI%20VJETOR%202023%20Anglisht%20-June%2028.pdf
    Reporter.al (2025), Institutions do not denounce corruption and organized crime (Institucionet nuk
    denoncojnë korrupsionin dhe krimin e organizuar), https://www.reporter.al/2025/02/06/institucionet-
    nuk-denoncojne-korrupsionin-dhe-krimin-e-organizuar/.
    Resourcecentre.al (2025), Public Call to EU Institutions and Member States,
    https://resourcecentre.al/2025/03/04/public-call-to-eu-institutions-and-member-states.
    Safe Journalists Network (2024, 2025), Incidents database, (regional centre: Tirana, year: 2024, 2025),
    https://safejournalists.net/incidents/?lang=en&keyword=&country=&gender=&type_of_incident=&in
    21
    cident_means=&incident_year=&who_was_attacked=&were_authorities_informed=&by_whom=&p
    erpetrator=&judiciary_status=&type_of_violation=&ja_reaction=&ja_was_informed=&page=1.
    Safe Journalists Network (2025), Incidents database,
    https://safejournalists.net/incidents/?lang=en&keyword=&country=&gender=&type_of_incident=&in
    cident_means=&incident_year=&who_was_attacked=&were_authorities_informed=&by_whom=&p
    erpetrator=&judiciary_status=&type_of_violation=&ja_reaction=&ja_was_informed=&page=1.
    SCiDEV and BIRN Albania (February 2025), Annual Report Tracking Albania’s Progress on Media
    Freedom towards EU Standards, https://scidevcenter.org/2025/02/24/annual-report-tracking-albanias-
    progress-on-media-freedom-towards-eu-standards/.
    Shqiptarja.com (2024), The DP repeats the scenario: Clashes and flames in the Parliament (PD përsërit
    skenarin, Përplasje e flakë në Kuvend), https://shqiptarja.com/lajm/kuvendi-sot-seance-plenare-pd-me-
    24-deputete-te-perjashtuar-dje-paralajmeroi-bllokim-bardhi-sdo-lejojme-normalitet?r=kh1.
    SIGMA (2024), Public administration in Albania 2024,
    https://www.sigmaweb.org/en/publications/public-administration-in-albania-2024_5577d117-
    en.html.
    SPAK (2025a), Letter to Minister of the Interior of 14 February 2025.
    SPAK (2025b), written contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.
    State Audit Institution (2025)*, 2024 Activity Report,
    https://parlament.al/dokumentacioni/aktet/45a2144d-7c36-41b2-86e8-7bab492600c1 (* as of June
    2024, the Report remains to be formally approved by Parliament).
    State Police of the Republic of Albania (2024), Order 1399 of 21 October 2024.
    Transparency International (2025), Corruption Perceptions Index 2024.
    22
    Annex II: Country visit to Albania
    The Commission services held virtual and hybrid meetings in February 2025 with:
    • Albanian Association of Journalists
    • Albanian Disability Rights Foundation
    • Albanian Helsinki Committee
    • Albanian Legal and Territorial Research Institute (ALTRI Centre)
    • Audiovisual Media Authority (AMA)
    • Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) Albania
    • Center for the Study of Democracy and Governance (CSDG)
    • Center Science and Innovation for Development (SCiDEV)
    • Centre for European Development and Integration
    • Constitutional Court
    • CSSP – Berlin Center for Integrative Mediation
    • European Movement in Albania (EMA)
    • Gender Alliance for Development Centre
    • General Prosecutor’s Office
    • High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interest
    (HIDAACI)
    • High Judicial Council
    • High Justice Inspector (HJI)
    • High Prosecutorial Council
    • Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM Albania)
    • Institute of Policy and Legal Studies (IPLS)
    • Media and Information Agency
    • Ministry of Justice
    • Ministry of State for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption
    • National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
    • Office of State Minister and Chief Negotiator for Media Dialogue
    • Ombudsperson/People’s Advocate
    • Partners Albania for Change and Development
    • SafeJournalists Network Albania
    • School of Magistrates
    • Special Prosecution Office (SPO)
    * The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:
    • Amnesty International
    • Araminta
    • Civil Liberties Union for Europe
    • Civil Society Europe
    • European Civic Forum
    • European Partnership for Democracy
    • European Youth Forum,
    23
    • International Commission of Jurists
    • International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
    • JEF Europe
    • Philea – Philanthropy Europe Association.
    • Transparency International