COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2025 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Serbia Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2025 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union

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COMMISSION
Strasbourg, 8.7.2025
SWD(2025) 931 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
2025 Rule of Law Report
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Serbia
Accompanying the document
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
2025 Rule of Law Report
The rule of law situation in the European Union
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ABSTRACT
Serbia continued the implementation of the constitutional reform to strengthen judicial
independence. Political pressure on the judiciary and the prosecution services remained
high, with little or no follow-up by the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils, the
Government or Parliament. The transparency of the High Judicial Council needs to be
further strengthened. Challenges remain to fill the considerable number of vacant judge
and prosecutor positions, and the Constitutional Court annulled for the first time an
appointment procedure in line with the new appeal procedure. An IT solution for the new
prosecutorial case management system was finalised and is being implemented, while a
new uniform and centralised case management system for courts is still lacking. On
efficiency the overall picture continues to be positive for civil, commercial, and criminal
cases, while serious challenges in the handling of administrative cases and constitutional
complaints remain.
The National Anti-Corruption Strategy for the period of 2024-2028 was adopted in July
2024. Following the canopy collapse at Novi Sad railway station in November 2024,
which prompted widespread public protests, authorities launched investigations into
alleged corruption linked to the tragic incident which are yet to be completed. The
Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime still has shortcomings, such as the insufficient
regulation of its role and mandate in the legal framework. This risks inconsistent action
in corruption investigations of the different specialised bodies. Establishing a robust track
record of investigations, indictments, and final convictions in high-level corruption cases,
including the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets, remains a challenge. The Anti-
Corruption Council remained active in exposing and analysing cases of systemic
corruption with limited follow-up by other institutions. The verification of asset
declarations and conflict of interests continue to present weaknesses. The limited scope
of the Law on lobbying undermines its effectiveness in practice and the Law on financing
of political activities has several weaknesses. Challenges exist for whistleblowers
exposing corruption. Exemptions to the Law on public procurement continued to be
widely used to circumvent its application, and oversight mechanisms are insufficient.
Serbia adopted new media legislation in June 2025 to align further with the EU acquis
and European standards. Serious concerns remain on the independence of the Regulatory
Authority for Electronic Media (REM), and the delay and shortcomings in the selection
procedure of a new REM Council undermine public trust in the process. The Press
Council continues to effectively monitor print media’s compliance with the Serbian
Journalists’ Code of Ethics. Issues of editorial autonomy and pluralism of public service
media have become an increasing concern. Measures to increase transparency in
ownership structures and public funding of the media sector have only been partially
implemented. Journalists continue to face either frequent refusals by public bodies to
disclose information of public importance or no response at all. The safety of journalists
has become a source of increasing concern.
Parliament’s effectiveness and oversight function continued to be hampered by the low
frequency of sessions and the lack of genuine political debate. The process of public
consultations still needs further strengthening. The fact that four vacant positions at the
Constitutional Court remained unfilled is a concern. The three independent bodies
working in the area of fundamental rights keep facing resource constraints and the
follow-up to their recommendations remains inconsistent. Civil society organisations
face increasing pressure. The impact of the Strategy and the Action Plan for creating a
stimulating environment for the development of civil society has yet to be demonstrated.
2
I. JUSTICE SYSTEM1
Independence
The level of perceived judicial independence in Serbia continues to be low among
both the general public and companies. Overall, 30% of the general population and
36% of companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly
or very good’ in 20252
. The perceived judicial independence among the general public
has decreased in comparison with 2024 (36%), while among companies it has slightly
increased in comparison with 2024 (34%)3
.
The implementation of the constitutional reform to strengthen judicial
independence continued. The adoption of the by-laws implementing the constitutional
amendments is almost completed, with thirty-six out of thirty-seven planned by-laws
adopted4
. Only one by-law on the Rules of Court remains to be adopted5
. The draft
amendments to the Law on the Judicial Academy6
are yet to consider the
recommendations of the December 2024 Venice Commission opinion, notably as regards
the protection of the Academy from possible undue influence, in particular by removing
the ex officio membership of the Minister of Justice in the Academy’s management
board, and its recommendation to entrust the exclusive responsibility for entry into the
judicial and prosecutorial professions to the Academy. The latter is important to ensure
adequate pre-service training and a uniform examination process for all candidates7
.
Political pressure on the judiciary and the prosecution services remained high, with
little or no follow-up by the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils, the
Government or Parliament. Government and public officials at the highest level,
including the President, and members of Parliament continued to make undue public
comments on ongoing investigations and court proceedings, including as regards the
work of individual prosecutors and judges. These comments included criticism of judicial
decisions and threats with removal addressed to judges and prosecutors8
. While the
associations of judges and prosecutors defended judges and prosecutors in some of these
instances9
, the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council have so far
remained largely passive. In 2024, five new requests for protection from undue influence
were submitted to the High Judicial Council and ten requests were submitted to the High
1
An overview of the institutional framework for all four pillars can be found here.
2
Flash Eurobarometer 554 and 555 (2025). The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised
as follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very
good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above
75%).
3
Flash Eurobarometer 554 and 555 (2025); Flash Eurobarometer 540 and 541 (2024).
4
The details of the implementing laws were to be specified through the adoption of 37 by-laws by May
2024.
5
The outstanding by-law needs to be jointly adopted by the High Judicial Council and the Ministry of
Justice. Serbian Government (2025), written input, p. 99.
6
The Government decided not to amend the Law on Seats and Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts.
7
Venice Commission (2024), p. 10.
8
On 22 March 2025, following the release from detention of protestors arrested for throwing eggs at
SNS officials at a protest in Nis, the President stated that policemen and prosecutors who do not want to
protect law and order will be exchanged. In response, over 500 prosecutors and judges signed a public
statement denouncing the President’s comments and the ‘enslavement and humiliation of the judiciary’.
N1 (2025b); Insajder (2025).
9
Judges Association of Serbia (2025); Association of Prosecutors of Serbia (2025).
3
Prosecutorial Council, which found undue influence had been exerted in certain cases10
.
Additionally, the Government and the Parliament have so far not acted in cases of undue
public comments by their respective members, although such comments appear to be in
contradiction with their code of conduct.
There are concerns with regard to prosecutorial autonomy, and the effectiveness
and confidentiality of criminal investigations are hampered by shortcomings in law
and practice. The launch of major initiatives by the prosecution, including an anti-
corruption operation11
and the search of the offices of four NGOs12
, which both took
place in February, followed public statements made by high level public officials. This
raised concerns with regard to prosecutorial autonomy, including by numerous
stakeholders13
. Furthermore, public comments made by officials continue to raise
concerns about leakage of information by institutions involved in criminal proceedings,
since some of these comments contained information from ongoing cases which was not
in the public domain14
. Several shortcomings in law and practice contribute to the risk of
information leaks and hamper the effectiveness of investigations. In particular, the legal
framework mandates the Security Information Agency to initiate criminal proceedings
for certain types of offences with international elements and the Criminal Procedure
Code provides that, in addition to the police, special investigative measures are carried
out by the Security Information Agency and the Military Security Agency15
. However, in
practice, the police cannot intercept communications without the support of the Security
Intelligence Agency16
. In addition, the police still lacks sufficient operational autonomy
from the Ministry of Interior17
.
The transparency of the High Judicial Council needs to be further strengthened.
While the rules of procedure of the High Judicial Council stipulate that its sessions are
audio-visually recorded and that the recording is to be made public within 24 hours after
the holding of the session18
, the sessions are currently not recorded due to the lack of
technical capabilities19
. Conversely, sessions of the High Prosecutorial Council are
recorded and livestreamed20
. While the launch of websites for both Councils in 2024
10
The High Judicial Council found two cases of undue influence. The High Prosecutorial Council found
five cases of undue influence and communicated this via one general press statement. High
Prosecutorial Council (2025) . No other cases of undue influence were found.
11
153 individuals were arrested in February 2025 as part of anti-corruption operations. For further details
see pillar II.
12
In February 2025, at the initiative of the Special Anti-Corruption Department of the Higher Public
Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade, four civil society organisation premises were searched by police. For
further details see pillar IV.
13
Country visit Serbia.
14
In a TV broadcast on 9 March, the President directly referenced information obtained during the
investigation. CRTA (2025).
15
Article 12 of the Law on the Security Intelligence Agency provides for certain competences with regard
to criminal offences. The Criminal Procedure Code foresees the execution of all special evidentiary
actions also for the Security Information Agency and Military Security Agency in Articles. 168, 173,
176, 180 and 185
16
Country visit Serbia.
17
Stakeholders shared concerns that as a result the police is prone to follow instructions from their
hierarchy even though the law foresees the prosecution in the lead of investigations. Several
stakeholders therefore proposed to establish a “prosecutorial police” within the specialised prosecution
services. Country visit Serbia.
18
Article 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the High Judicial Council.
19
Serbian Government (2025), written input, p. 98.
20
During the country visit, the High Judicial Council expressed its intention to follow the same process as
the High Prosecutorial Council and livestream its sessions. Country visit Serbia.
4
increased transparency, some challenges remain on access to information and to ensure
the systematic publication of documents21
.
Challenges remain to fill the considerable number of vacant positions for judges
and prosecutors and the Constitutional Court annulled for the first time an
appointment procedure in line with the new appeal procedure. As of May 2025, out
of 899 positions for prosecutors, 139 were vacant. The election of basic public
prosecutors was delayed several times because of lack of quorum of the High
Prosecutorial Council due to the absence of the Minister of Justice and some of the lay
members22
. In February 2025, the Council elected 51 basic public prosecutors at its
fourth attempt. In September 2024, the Constitutional Court annulled for the first time an
appointment procedure for prosecutors for the Belgrade Higher Prosecution Office based
on the finding that the High Prosecutorial Council had breached the rules regarding the
testing of the candidates. Until this point in time, the Constitutional Court had dismissed
all appeals in the new procedure against appointment decisions for judges and
prosecutors through inadmissibility decisions23
. As of May 2025, out of 3 117 positions
for judges, 394 were vacant. To date, the Constitutional Court has dismissed 27 of the 33
appeals filed in 2024 through inadmissibility decisions. From January to May 2025, the
High Judicial Council passed decisions on the appointment of 90 judges and announced a
public competition to fill judge vacancies in 93 courts24
.
Quality
An IT solution for the new prosecutorial case management system was finalised and
is being implemented, while a new uniform and centralised case management
system for courts is still lacking. Development of the IT solution for the new case
management system for prosecution offices (SAPO) was finalised in 2024. Its
implementation began in 2025 with a staggered approach across prosecution offices
aiming for completion at the end of 202525
. The new uniform and centralised case
management system for courts is still stalled due to a contractual dispute26
. While
implementation of the ICT strategy is ongoing, it suffers from a lack of coordination and
monitoring mechanisms which the Government plans to rectify with the formal adoption
of a new strategy. While the number of cases for which legal aid has been granted has
slightly increased between 2022-2023, there are shortcomings regarding the capacity of
local self-government entities dealing with these requests and the lack of awareness of
citizens about the existence of legal aid27
.
The implementation of the Human Resources Strategy is delayed, and shortcomings
remain regarding the quality of judicial training. Due to the delay in the
implementation of the Human Resources Strategy, the Ministry of Justice plans to amend
21
Centre for Judicial Research (2025).
22
Sessions of the High Prosecutorial Council to elect new prosecutors were therefore postponed on 24
December 2024, 24 January and 28 January 2025.
23
The Constitutional Court found the assessment of the candidates included a special test for prosecutors
for cybercrime, which was outside the scope of the selection procedure. Country Visit Serbia,
Constitutional Court.
24
Serbian Government (2025a), pp. 2f.; Serbian Government (2025), written input, pp. 100 f.
25
Country visit Serbia.
26
2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 5. The Ministry of Justice explained that alternatives are currently
being explored. Country visit Serbia.
27
The number of cases for which legal aid has been grated rose from 0.06 per inhabitant in 2022 to 0.10
in 2023. CEPEJ (2024), p. 29; ENNHRI (2024), p. 10; 2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 42.
5
it and the accompanying Action Plan in the course of 202528
. There is still room for
improvement as regards the Judicial Academy’s capacity, internal expertise, transparency
of the initial testing process and the quality of the mentoring system29
. Serbia is yet to
introduce a system of quality control to improve the quality of judicial training.
Efficiency
The overall picture continues to be positive for civil, commercial, and criminal
cases, while serious challenges remain in the handling of administrative cases and
constitutional complaints. For civil and commercial cases, the clearance rate in 2023
fell for first instance cases and the disposition time improved, while for second instance
cases the clearance rate improved and the disposition time increased30
. For criminal cases
the situation remained stable overall with a slight decrease in the clearance rate for first
and second instance cases, and stable indicators on the disposition time31
. However, the
negative development on administrative cases continued and remains a challenge. Their
clearance rate fell from 39% in 2022 to 35% in 2023 and the disposition time increased
from 1 528 days in 2022 to 2 095 days in 2023. The number of pending first instance
administrative cases also increased by 45.8% in 202332
. As of May 2025, a total of
43 711 cases were pending before the Constitutional Court, of which 99% are
constitutional complaints33
.
II. ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK
The perception among experts, citizens and business executives is that the level of
corruption in the public sector remained high. In the 2024 Corruption Perceptions
Index by Transparency International, Serbia scores 35/100 and ranks 105th
globally34
.
This perception has remained relatively stable over the past five years, while it is the
lowest score recorded for Serbia35
. The 2025 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption
shows that 85% of respondents consider corruption widespread in their country (EU
average 69%) and 31% of respondents feel personally affected by corruption in their
daily lives (EU average 30%). As regards businesses, 84% of companies consider that
corruption is widespread (EU average 63%) and 53% consider that corruption is a
problem when doing business (EU average 35%). Furthermore, 26% of respondents find
that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from corrupt practices (EU
28
Serbian Government (2025), written input, p. 116.
29
2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 30.
30
While the clearance rate fell from 178% to 140%, for first instance cases and the disposition time
slightly improved from 299 days to 278 days between 2022 and 2023, for second instance cases the
clearance rate improved from 94 % in 2022 to 97% in 2023, while the disposition time increased from
326 to 351 days. CEPEJ (2024), pp. 17-21.
31
For first instance criminal cases the clearance rate fell from 106% in 2022 to 103% in 2023 and for
second instance cases from 100% in 2022 to 99% in 2023. Disposition time changed from 220 to 219
days in first instance between 2022 and 2023 and from 34 to 36 days in second instance. CEPEJ (2024),
pp. 17-21.
32
CEPEJ (2024), p. 18.
33
Constitutional Court (2025), written input received after the country visit.
34
Transparency International (2025). The level of perceived corruption is categorised as follows: low (the
perception among experts and business executives of public sector corruption scores above 79);
relatively low (scores between 79-60), relatively high (scores between 59-50), high (scores below 50).
35
In 2020, the score was 38, while in 2024 the score decreased to 35. The score significantly
increases/decreases when it changes more than five points; improves/deteriorates (changes between 4-5
points); is relatively stable (changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years.
6
average 36%), while 47% of companies believe that people and businesses caught for
bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 33%)36
.
The National Anti-Corruption Strategy for the period of 2024-2028 was adopted in
July 2024. Following the adoption of a National Anti-Corruption Strategy in July 2024,
an accompanying action plan (2024-2025) was adopted in December37
. The new Strategy
includes measures recommended by the Commission, namely to counter corruption in
sectors vulnerable to corruption, including health, taxes, customs, education, local self-
government, privatisation, public procurement and police and features both prevention
and repression objectives38
. However, the activities included in the Action Plan are to
some extent narrower in terms of addressing the corruption problems and challenges
identified in the Strategy and does not comprehensively address the GRECO
recommendations of the 4th
and 5th
evaluation rounds39
. While the Agency for the
Prevention of Corruption is tasked with monitoring its implementation40
, adequate
coordination mechanisms, budgetary means, as well as an effective monitoring and
evaluation system to track progress and impact should be put in place for its effective
implementation. The legal framework to fight corruption remains broadly in place and
most forms of corruption are criminalised41
. Illicit enrichment is still not criminalised.
Serbia is not a signatory party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention42
.
Following the canopy collapse at Novi Sad railway station, which prompted
widespread public protests, authorities launched investigations into alleged
corruption linked to the tragic incident which are yet to be completed. The tragic
incident, in which 16 people were killed in November 2024, prompted widespread public
protests over corruption and the perceived lack of accountability and transparency in
Government infrastructure and construction projects. In December, the Higher
Prosecutor’s Office in Novi Sad filed indictments against 13 public officials43
on charges
for endangering public safety, including the former Minister of Construction, Transport
and Infrastructure, who subsequently resigned from his post. Parallel investigations into
related corruption crimes caused risks of uncoordinated proceedings at the outset, due to
the divided competences between the four specialised Anti-Corruption Departments and
the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime44
. Initially, both the Higher
Prosecution Office in Novi Sad and the Higher Prosecution Office in Belgrade started
36
Data from Special Eurobarometer 561 (2025) and Flash Eurobarometer 558 (2025).
37
Serbian Government (2024a,b).
38
2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 8.
39
Serbia states its intention to address all GRECO recommendations of the 4th
and 5th
evaluation rounds
in the Action Plan for 2026-2028. Serbian Government (2025a), p. 5.
40
Serbian Government (2025), written input, p. 157.
41
2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 8.
42
OECD (2024).
43
Amongst whom the acting director of Serbian Railways Infrastructure at the time of the incident, the
acting assistant construction minister, and the general director of Serbian Railways Infrastructure at the
time when Novi Sad station was being rebuilt. Other indictees are representatives of constriction design
companies, construction contractors, and technical and expert supervisors who are charged with a
criminal offence against public safety. BIRN (2024).
44
Serbia has for specialised Anti-Corruption Departments within the Higher Prosecution Offices in
Belgrade, Novi Sad, Nis and Kraljevo competent for corruption cases not exceeding a value of RSD
200 million and a Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime which is the main body in charge for
corruption cases exceeding this value (Art. 3 of the Law on the Organisation and Competence of State
Authorities in the Suppression of Organised Crime, Terrorism and Corruption). Stakeholders during the
country visit underlined that the divided competences lead to challenges with regard to coordination
and consistency of corruption related offences in Serbia. Country visit Serbia.
7
separate corruption related investigations45
, which were later transferred by the Supreme
Public Prosecutor to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime. The transfer
allowed for investigations by one prosecutorial entity and this investigation is still
ongoing46
. In March 2025, the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) also
launched an investigation related to the reconstruction of the railway station47
.
Shortcomings in law and practice remain for the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised
Crime, which has jurisdiction over high-level corruption cases. The role and mandate
of the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime regarding the overall coordination of
corruption related investigations, including by the special departments of the Higher
Public Prosecutors’ offices, is insufficiently regulated in the law. This risks hindering
consistency of action in corruption investigations of the different specialised bodies,
resulting in a lack of effectiveness in practice. Moreover, insufficient transparency in the
prosecution service and weak oversight of dismissed corruption cases and delays
continued to affect public trust and accountability48
. Staff shortages at the Prosecutor’s
Office for Organised Crime persist, with only 19 of 25 posts being currently filled49
. The
High Prosecutorial Council annulled a public competition50
for the selection of new
public prosecutors in November51
. Insufficient human resources are limiting the capacity
of the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime to process and investigate complex
organised crime and high-level corruption cases. While two financial forensic experts
were hired in the Special Departments for Suppression of Corruption in the Higher
Public Prosecution Office in Belgrade and Novi Sad, positions in Kraljevo and Niš
remain vacant52
. The specialised organised crime unit in the police investigating high-
level corruption offences lacks sufficient staff53
.
Investigations launched in the context of a new anti-corruption operation raise
concerns over the systematic fight against corruption free from political
interference. In February 2025, 153 individuals were arrested as part of anti-corruption
operations, while certain arrests related to long-standing cases without any recent
developments54
. Among those detained were state officials, directors of public
enterprises, representatives of local governments and directors of health centres55
.
Overall, challenges remain in establishing a robust track record of investigations,
indictments and final convictions in high-level corruption cases, including the seizure
45
N1 (2025a).
46
Country visit Serbia.
47
Serbian Monitor (2025).
48
2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, pp. 9-10.
49
Country visit Serbia. Of the 19 public prosecutors, nine have been elected to their position, whilst ten
are temporality assigned. The total number of posts is insufficient considering that Serbia has a
prosecution-led pre-investigation and investigation system. Moreover, the current premises of the
Public Prosecutor’s Office are not sufficient to accommodate new staff.
50
Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 99/23 of 10 November 2023.
51
During the country visit, the High Prosecutorial Council explained that the decision to annul the
competition was due to missing security checks of the selected candidates in contravention of the Law
on organisation and competence of state authorities in suppression of organised crime, terrorism and
corruption.
52
Serbian Government (2025), written input, p. 176.
53
2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 34.
54
In a TV interview on 10 February President Vucic stated that the fight against corruption will happen
soon. RTV Pink Official (2025). Three days later the arrests of the new anti-corruption campaign
started. See also Transparency Serbia (2025).
55
Ministry of Interior (2025).
8
and confiscation of criminal assets56
. In this context, stakeholders highlighted as a
remaining concern the reluctance on the side of the prosecution and the police to pursue
investigations against corruption suspects close to political and economic power57
.
The verification and enforcement of asset declarations and conflict of interests
continue to present weaknesses. The Law on prevention of corruption, which prescribes
the duty for public officials to file asset declarations and to report conflicts of interest,
still needs to be amended to broaden the definition of public official in line with GRECO
recommendations58
. The advance publishing of the annual verification plan by the
Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, informing which category of public officials
will be subject to substantive checks in the respective year, risks limiting its effectiveness
in practice. The human and technical resources of the Agency for the Prevention of
Corruption are still too limited to carry out its corruption prevention tasks in a
comprehensive and effective manner. This is also demonstrated by the fact that,
according to the annual verification plan for 2024, the Agency carries out substantive
checks for the asset-declarations of around 290 public officials representing less than 1%
of all asset-declarations in the public sector59
. Sanctions for non-compliance are
uncommon and are predominantly for misdemeanour offences60
.
The Anti-Corruption Council remained active in exposing and analysing cases of
systemic corruption, with limited follow-up by other institutions. The Government
does not systematically consult the Anti-Corruption Council on draft legislation, and it
does not follow up on the reports and recommendations produced by the Council. The
Council continues to carry out its work in exposing and analysing cases of systemic
corruption. However, it still lacks financial and human resources and no steps were taken
to address the significant number of vacancies61
. Limited action is taken by the
prosecution offices to investigate cases exposed by the Council62
.
The limited scope of the Law on lobbying undermines its effectiveness in practice
and the Law on financing of political activities has several weaknesses. While it is
positive that lobbying is regulated by law, its scope is still limited to formal, written
contacts between interest representatives and persons in top executive functions and
excludes any other forms of interaction. Furthermore, neither the lobbying records nor
the required annual activity report from lobbyists are made public. GRECO
56
2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, pp. 9 and 47. 2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 9.
57
Country visit Serbia.
58
The current definition of the term “public official” does not include certain individuals with potentially
high-influence, such as advisors to the president, prime minister and heads of cabinets. See also
GRECO (2022), pp. 4,21; 2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, pp. 11 and 13.
59
Fewer than 20 people currently work in the asset declaration department, of which only five conduct
deep verifications. According to the national register, around 30 000 public officials exist in Serbia.
Country visit Serbia, Agency for Prevention of Corruption.
60
In 2024, the Agency only reported one criminal offence to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Country visit
Serbia, Agency for Prevention of Corruption.
61
Presently the Council has six members out of 11. While the Rules of Procedure of the Council entail
safeguards aimed at promoting its independence, such as that appointments by the Government must be
based on proposals of candidates by the Anti-Corruption Council, two members were appointed in 2017
without proposal by the Council. Against this background, the Anti-Corruption Council has expressed
concern that adoption of new Rules of procedure, as foreseen by the anti-corruption action plan 2024-
2025, could effectively undermine its independence. Country visit Serbia.
62
Limited action is taken by the prosecution offices to investigate corruption cases. The Council cited the
long-pending issue of police autonomy from the Ministry of the Interior, which undermines the
authority of the prosecution. Country visit Serbia, Anti-Corruption Council.
9
recommended to address both points63
. Amendments to the Law on financing of political
activities are yet to be adopted to address outstanding ODIHR recommendations, such as
the absence of a campaign expenditure limit, lack of rules on campaigning by third
parties, and the effectiveness of the oversight mechanism64
.
Challenges exist for whistleblowers exposing corruption. Serbia has a dedicated Law
on the protection of whistleblowers in place, which is yet to be aligned with the EU
acquis. In particular, the law does not include all types of disclosures and persons, such
as former employees, and it does not explicitly protect whistleblowers if their disclosure
is not grounded65
. Furthermore, there is room for improvement to strengthen support
mechanisms for whistleblowers including the provision of legal aid. In practice,
challenges remain with regard to oversight and the enforcement of whistleblowers’
protection against any form of retaliation. Oversight duties are shared between several
ministries with no overall supervision mechanism of the effective follow-up of
whistleblower reports. Consequently, enforcement is lacking in practice, including in
prominent cases66
.
Exemptions to the Law on public procurement continued to be widely used, thereby
circumventing its application, and oversight mechanisms are insufficient. While the
Law on public procurement provides for basic principles in the public procurement
system, in 2023, the value of procurement exempted from application of the law nearly
reached the value of concluded public procurement contracts that were carried out
through regular proceedings, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the law67
.
Challenges persist in ensuring that exemptions from the Law on public procurement are
in line with the EU acquis, in particular in the context of intergovernmental agreements68
.
The oversight of public procurement procedures presents weaknesses which risks
allowing violations to go unchecked and can lead to impunity69
. Although the Criminal
Code provides for a specific offense for abuse in public procurement70
, convictions are
rare. The State Audit Institution found irregularities in 21.2% of the total value of public
procurement contracts inspected in 202471
. Other areas of particular risk to corruption
include State-owned enterprises, concessions, bankruptcy proceedings and public-private
partnerships and the health sector72
.
III. MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM
Serbia adopted new media legislation in June 2025 to align further with the EU
acquis and European standards. The amendments to the Law on Electronic Media and
the Law on Public Information and Media continue the legislative alignment which was
initiated in 2023 when the laws were first amended. The drafting process lacked
transparent and inclusive consultations and did not respect the legal obligation of holding
63
GRECO (2022), pp. 18 f., paras 64-68. Serbia plans to amend the Law on lobbying by the end of 2025.
Serbian Government (2025), written input, p. 154.
64
OSCE/ODIHR (2024), pp. 15 ff.; Venice Commission, OSCE/ODIHR (2022), pp. 22 ff.
65
2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, pp. 13-14.
66
Transparency International (2024), pp. 47-48.
67
Transparency Serbia (2024).
68
2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 43.
69
Transparency Serbia (2024).
70
Article 228 Criminal Code.
71
In 105 of the audited entities, it was determined that the procurement of goods, services and works was
not carried out in accordance with the aforementioned law in 923 cases, corresponding to an amount of
108.22 billion dinars. State Audit Institution (2025), p. 25.
72
See Anti-Corruption Council (2025).
10
a public debate73
. Following the provisions of 2023 that allow state-owned companies to
be media owners74
, additional safeguards to protect media pluralism and editorial
independence have been introduced and will need to be monitored in practice.
Meanwhile, TV channels seen as critical of the authorities were removed in April 2025
from a cable offer following the purchase of such cable by Telekom Srbija whose
majority stakeholder is the state75
.
Serious concerns remain on the independence of the Regulatory Authority for
Electronic Media (REM), and the delay and shortcomings in the selection procedure
of a new REM Council undermine public trust in the process. In 2024, REM issued
five measures, namely: two reprimands, one warning and two temporary bans on
broadcasting advertising messages, while sanctions were not imposed on broadcasters
frequently violating rules, such as reality shows prone to violence76
. In November 2024,
the parliamentary committee for culture and information – not yet the Parliament in
plenary – gave consent to the new statute of the REM Council which contains provisions
on the secrecy of certain documents adopted by the Council, thus hindering
transparency77
. REM published the full report on media monitoring 14 months after the
2023 parliamentary elections78
. The competition for the allocation of the fifth frequency
for national broadcasting, launched in 2022, has still not been finalised without justified
reason for the delay79
. REM has also not been effective in countering foreign information
manipulation and interference, notably in the context of Russia’s war of aggression
against Ukraine80
. On the contrary, in October 2024 REM awarded a cable license to RT
Balkans which has since then launched its TV programme in Serbian language, broadcast
via the majority state-owned Telekom cable operator. The Parliament has not elected a
new REM Council by the deadline of 4 November 2024 as per the Law on Electronic
Media and, as a result, Serbia has been without the decision-making body of the media
regulator since. The Committee for Culture and Information of the Parliament published
the call for nominations of REM Council members only on 25 November. Following a
number of reported irregularities that remained unaddressed by the Committee, 7 out of
18 candidates withdrew their candidacies on 28 January 2025, leaving 5 out of 9
categories of authorised proponents81
with no or only one candidate. On 28 April,
following a two-week student blockade of the public broadcaster RTS, the Committee
73
The Serbian authorities conducted a 48-hour consultation of media associations at the end of the
process.
74
Reversing the previous prohibition in Serbian legislation.
75
Total TV cable which serves the diaspora. Media Freedom Rapid Response (2025).
76
2025 Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) p. 17.
77
Parliament of Serbia (2024).
78
REM (2025). The report notes that the ruling party election list was by far the most represented in all
categories of analysed election content on all commercial media service providers with national
coverage.
79
According to REM, the procedure was interrupted and will continue after the decision of the
Administrative Court on the lawsuit against the decision on the award of four national licenses. This,
however, would not prevent a fifth license from being allocated.
80
Russia Today’s (RT) international channel in the English language was not banned by REM and is still
broadcast in Serbia on cable TV.
81
The Law on electronic media defines nine categories of “authorised proponents” which should each
propose two candidates for members of the REM Council: 1) the Protector of Citizens, the Equality
Commissioner, the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection;
2) universities; 3) associations of electronic media publishers; 4) associations of journalists; 5)
associations of film, performing and theatre artists and associations of composers; 6) associations with
the aim to achieve freedom of expression, 7) associations with the aim to protect children, 8) national
councils of national minorities; 9) churches and religious communities.
11
decided to annul the procedure, and published on 8 May a new call for candidates which
ran until 23 May. The review of candidacies is ongoing. The overall delay and the
unaddressed shortcomings in the former procedure raise doubts on the commitment to
safeguard the nomination process against political influence and to thus increase REM’s
independence. Public trust is thus undermined.
The Press Council continues to effectively monitor print media’s compliance with
the Serbian Journalists’ Code of Ethics. In 2024, the Press Council received 88
complaints (125 in 2023) and found in almost all cases that several points of the Code of
Ethics were violated82
. Some media outlets that violated the Code of Ethics continued to
receive public co-financing, while the Law on Public Information and Media prescribes
the extent to which the respective media outlets adhere to ethical standards as one of the
criteria for receiving co-funding83
.
Issues of editorial autonomy and pluralism of public service media have become an
increasing concern. The Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) 2025 found that the
‘independence of public service media’ indicator worsened in 2024 and considered it a
high-risk area (70%)84
. Amendments to the Law on Public Broadcasting Services were
adopted in June 2025 to make the public broadcasters more institutionally and
functionally independent85
. It remains to be seen whether the amount of the public
broadcasting service fee set in this law is sufficient to cover the needs of the public
broadcasters and that the latter no longer need to rely on complementary State funding,
which would prevent full financial independence. Concerns remain over issues of
editorial autonomy, limited pluralism and biased reporting in favour of the government86
,
as demonstrated by aggregated data. Stakeholders report that in 2024, the ruling majority
was covered in 94% of airtime in the central RTS news broadcasts, compared with 6%
for opposition parties. Both public broadcasters have been criticised by some of their
employees, as well as by civil society and media associations87
, for their lack of reporting
of the student protests following the tragic incident at the Novi Sad railway station88
.
Measures to increase transparency in ownership structures and public funding of
the media sector have only been partially implemented. Political and economic
influence on the media remains a source of concern. The MPM 2025 considered the
‘political independence of media’ indicator a very high-risk (92%)89
. Due to a large
number of registered media combined with a limited advertising market, especially at
local level, media often strongly depend on public co-funding. Despite the 2023 law,
which had improved the transparency provisions of such calls by laying down binding
82
6 complaints were resolved through mediation, 15 complaints were rejected because they did not meet
the formal requirement and the Press Council decided in only 4 cases that the Code of Journalism was
not violated. Press Council (2024).
83
For example, the City of Vranje awarded the majority of its public co-financing to Vranjska Plus and
Radio Television Vranje which repeatedly violated the Journalists’ Code of Ethics in 2024. NUNS
(2025).
84
Compared with a medium risk of 63% in 2023. 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, pp. 26 and 31.
85
A general act will need to be adopted within six months of adoption of the law to regulate further the
procedure of election, scope of work, and termination of the new position within RTS of the
Commissioner for the Protection of the Rights of Listeners, Viewers and Readers.
86
2024 Enlargement, Report, Serbia, p. 39.
87
Country visit Serbia, media associations.
88
In March and April 2025, students blocked RTS and RTV main buildings, demanding the public
broadcasters to adapt their editorial policy in line with public interest.
89
2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 27.
12
criteria to comply with the Code of Ethics, as monitored by the Press Council, the calls
published in 2024 significantly reduced public funding in a few municipalities. The
remaining public funding is awarded through less transparent processes, such as the
procurement of information services and advertising90
. The Ministry of Information and
Telecommunication increased the 2025 budget for public co-financing of media content
at the national level by 27%91
. In January 2025, Serbia established a Unified Information
System on public co-financing of media, as required by the Law on Public Information
and Media. Media associations expressed criticism over its functioning as well as over
the changes introduced in the by-laws on public co-financing92
. As regards other sources
of public funding, including advertising, the objective of the media strategy93
to present
them in the media register in a transparent, comprehensive and user-friendly manner
remains to be fully implemented. Legal provisions on supervisory inspections of the
media register have yet to start being implemented94
. Similarly, the media sector
privatisation process and measures to make public procurement in the media sector more
transparent, as planned by the media strategy, remain to be completed95
.
Journalists continue to face either frequent refusals by public bodies to disclose
information of public importance or no response at all. Serbia has signed but not
ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents96
. The fact
that the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance cannot directly enforce the
execution of its decisions by coercive action remains one of the main obstacles to the
exercise of free access to information97
. In 2024, the rate of execution of the
Commissioner’s decisions was 77.98% (74 .8% in 2023)98
. According to the 2024
Commissioner’s report, the percentage of unexecuted Commissioner’s decisions on
complaints by journalists is higher than for other complainants (31.94% of their requests
go unanswered), and the authorities often refuse to disclose information on the
unjustified ground that the requests come from journalists.
The safety of journalists has become a source of increasing concern. Cases of threats,
intimidation, hate speech and physical violence against journalists, including female
journalists, continue to be registered. Journalists at the local level are particularly
vulnerable to such attacks. The MPM 2025 found that the ‘journalistic profession,
standards and protection’ indicator worsened in 2024 and considered it a high-risk area
(68%)99
. Recurrent statements by high-level officials on the daily and investigative work
of journalists have a chilling effect on freedom of expression100
. Journalists have faced
increasing pressure and attacks in the context of student and citizen protests taking place
90
2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 39.
91
New calls were also launched in self-government units by the deadline of March 2025 and, for some,
after that deadline.
92
Country visit Serbia, media associations.
93
Adopted by the Government on 30 January 2020.
94
The 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) also found that “there is no effective legal instrument that
would force the media registers to update their databases more often, nor that would compel the media
to send their reports and information to the competent authorities. Also, these registers fail to reveal
ultimate ownership for each media, since many owners are listed as subsidiary companies”, p. 21.
95
2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 17.
96
The Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents (CETS No. 205), also known as
the Tromsø Convention, entered into force on 1 December 2020.
97
2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 18.
98
Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data protection (2025).
99
Compared with 61% in 2023. 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, pp. 12 and 15.
100
2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 38.
13
since the tragic incident in Novi Sad101
. Civil society reported in December 2024 and
March 2025 that the Serbian authorities used spyware to unlawfully target journalists,
environmental activists and other individuals102
. Human rights defenders that were
reportedly targeted by spyware attacks did not file a formal complaint due to the lack of
trust in the process103
. Several foreign journalists, including from EU Member States,
were denied entry to Serbia prior to protests that took place on 15 March 2025. Since
July 2024, the Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and
safety of journalists reports 20 alerts104
. The Media Freedom Rapid Response project
reports 113 alerts since July 2024, consisting of 23 ‘physical assaults’, 25 ‘attack to
property’, 73 ‘verbal attacks’, 8 ‘legal incidents’, and 23 ‘interferences’105
. Serbian
journalists’ associations recorded a slight decrease in the total number of registered
attacks in 2024 (166, compared with 182 in 2023); however, just in the first three months
of 2025, there were already 90 registered attacks and pressures, some of which took place
in the presence of the police106
. In addition, few of the reported cases result in final
convictions107
. Death threats and attacks against property of journalists and media
associations in Novi Sad were noted in February 2025. Several media associations
suspended their membership of the Standing Working Group for the Safety of Journalists
reportedly due to the inefficiency of the competent authorities in processing attacks
against journalists or to general criticism of the authorities’ failure to meet basic
democratic standards and rule of law principles. No progress has been made in the
prosecution of the three murders of journalists of 1994, 1999 and 2001, one of which has
in the meantime reached the statute of limitation108
. Cases of strategic lawsuits against
public participation (SLAPPs) increasingly hinder the work of investigative media and
civil society organisations. Serbia still needs to align with the EU acquis, including by
covering the early dismissal of manifestly unfounded claims and remedies against
abusive court proceedings109
. In this regard, courts have not followed consistently the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights110
.
IV. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES
Parliament’s effectiveness and oversight function continued to be hampered by the
low frequency of sessions and the lack of genuine political debate. Since its
constitutive session of 6 February 2024, nine plenary sessions were held. During these
101
A columnist was detained in April 2024 for his statement allegedly “causing panic and disorder”: Safe
Journalists Network (2025). For further information see pillar IV.
102
Amnesty International (2024 and 2025).
103
Country visit Serbia, civil society organisations. One case was formally reported to the Supreme Public
Prosecution Office and is at a pre-investigation stage.
104
Including five with a state reply. The alerts consist in nine attacks on ‘physical safety and integrity of
journalists’, two ‘detention and imprisonment of journalists’, and six ‘harassment and intimidation of
journalists’. Three other alerts relate to instances when journalists reporting on protests were denied
entry to Serbia in March 2025; Serbian media denigrated in a manipulated video broadcast on three TV
stations with national coverage in July 2024, leading to numerous death threats; and the lack of
adequate protection under defamation and insult laws and the need to adopt effective legal safeguards
against SLAPPs. In accordance with data at the disposal of the Supreme Public Prosecution Office, in
2024 and 2025 until 31 May 2025, 96 cases brought by prosecution services resulted in 1 conviction, 1
other sanction and 21 rejections while 73 cases are ongoing.
105
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Media Freedom Rapid Response – Serbia.
106
Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia (2024).
107
Country visit Serbia, media associations.
108
As referred to in Chapter 23 interim benchmark. Council of the European Union (2024), p. 28.
109
2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 38.
110
Country visit Serbia, media associations.
14
sessions the lack of genuine political debate that would focus on the subject-matters of
the legislative proposals continued. Some plenary sessions were called with a short notice
of only 24 hours, despite rules limiting this to in exceptional circumstances111
. This
resulted in limited possibilities for Members of Parliament to propose changes to the
agenda or table amendments to the adopted laws or proposed bills, which were nearly all
tabled by the Government. In addition, public scrutiny and involvement in the legislative
process were limited. The practice of amalgamating large numbers of, often unrelated,
agenda and legislative items into a single item on the agenda also continued, making
detailed scrutiny and debate difficult. In November 2024, 68 items, including the 2025
budget, were dealt with as one discussion point and adopted without any debate.
Parliamentary oversight of the executive is weak. Only two sessions with questions to the
Prime Minister and the Government, which should take place monthly when Parliament
is in session112
, were held in 2024, none in 2025. Moreover, debates in the Parliament are
marked by tensions with reports of derogatory language and occasional incidents,
disruptions, including violence, and boycotts113
. The rules of procedure and the Code of
Conduct to penalise offences by parliamentarians are not systematically applied114
.
The exercise of presidential powers is intensively debated in the public discourse.
Against the background that the Constitution foresees relatively limited presidential
powers, mainly the right to propose a Prime Minister, express state unity, represent the
country at home and abroad and to promulgate the laws of the Parliament115
, the actual
exercise of presidential powers is intensively debated in the public discourse. In this
context civil society and other stakeholders expressed concerns that the political debate
and the decision-making is in practice steered by the President in a way which is not
foreseen by the Constitution116
.
The process of public consultations still needs further strengthening. The percentage
of public consultations on draft laws has increased slightly from 52.9% in 2023 to 58.3%
in 2024117
. In the same period the percentage of public consultations on by-laws for
which public consultations is mandatory has slightly decreased from 31% in 2023 to
29.7% in 2024118
. While public consultations in these areas need to be strengthened, they
were conducted for all draft policy planning documents in 2024. Despite the legal
obligation to provide information on the results of public consultations119
, reports on the
results of public consultations are not systematically published. Civil society
organisations continued to report that the time given for public consultations is not
sufficient, and that their comments on draft laws of public interest were rarely taken into
account120
. There is still no central body in charge of the quality control of public
consultations.
111
Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, Article 86(1).
112
Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, Article 205.
113
Most recently, on 4 March several MPs were injured following a parliamentary session which was
seriously disrupted by opposition members throwing smoke grenades and flares. The Guardian (2025);
The European External Action Service (2025); 2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 24.
114
Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 4.
115
Constitution of Serbia, Articles 101, 109, 110 and 111. See also Venice Commission, OSCE/ODIHR
(2022), para 152.
116
Country visit Serbia. Freedom House (2024). See also Venice Commission, OSCE/ODIHR (2022), para
152.
117
Laws that ratify international agreements are not included in the calculation.
118
Statistics provided by Serbian Government (2025a), p. 22.
119
Law on the planning system.
120
2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 25.
15
Over half of the companies surveyed in Serbia express confidence in the
effectiveness of investment protection. 57% of companies are very or fairly confident
that investments are protected by law and courts121
. 32% perceive the level of
independence of the public procurement review body (Republic Commission for
Protection of Rights in Public Procurement Procedures) as very or fairly good122
. 33%
perceive the level of independence of the national competition authority (Commission for
Protection of Competition) as very or fairly good123
.
The fact that four positions at the Constitutional Court remain vacant is a concern.
The High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the President have still
not made their nominations to the respective appointment bodies for the four positions
which have been vacant for a considerable amount of time124
. The High Judicial and
Prosecutorial Council plan to adopt a joint Rulebook on the nomination procedure before
proceeding with their nominations125
. The efficiency of the Constitutional Court is
already negatively impacted by the vacant positions. Moreover, seven of the remaining
eleven judges are due to retire at the end of the year126
, which would lead to the
Constitutional Court losing its quorum127
. No steps were taken to introduce a qualified
majority with an anti-deadlock mechanism for the election of some of the judges of the
Constitutional Court by Parliament, as recommended by the Venice Commission128
.
On 1 January 2025, Serbia had 20 leading judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights pending implementation, an increase of 6 compared to the previous
year129. At that time, Serbia’s rate of leading judgments from the past 10 years that had
been implemented was at 62% (compared to 73% in 2024; 38% remaining pending), and
the average time that the judgments had been pending implementation was 5 years and 7
months (compared to 7 years in 2024)130
. The oldest group of leading judgments,
pending implementation for 17 years, concern instances where the applicants’ right to a
fair trial was violated due to excessive length civil, family-related and commercial
judicial proceedings131
. As regards the respect of payment deadlines, on 31 December
2024 there were 16 cases in total awaiting confirmation of payments (compared to 52 in
2023)132
. On 16 June 2025, the number of leading judgments pending implementation
had increased to 21133
.
121
Flash Eurobarometer 555 (2025). Only 15% and 17% of the surveyed investors respectively perceive
the frequent changes in legislation or concerns about the quality of the law-making process and the
quality, efficiency or independence of justice as a reason for the lack of confidence in investment
protection.
122
Flash Eurobarometer 555 (2025).
123
Flash Eurobarometer 555 (2025).
124
Two positions are vacant since 2019, one since 2022 and another one since 2023.
125
Country visit Serbia.
126
Country visit Serbia, Constitutional Court.
127
According to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court the prescribed quorum of 8 judges and the
requirement of 8 positive votes for a plenary decision are not reduced in case of vacancies.
128
Venice Commission (2023), p. 3.
129
For an explanation of the supervision process, see the website of the Council of Europe.
130
All figures calculated by the European Implementation Network (EIN) and based on the number of
cases that are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2025. EIN (2025), written
input, p. 2.
131
Judgment of the ECtHR, 3150/05, Jevremonic v. Serbia, pending implementation since 2007.
132
Council of Europe (2025), p. 157.
133
Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC).
16
The three independent bodies working in the area of fundamental rights keep facing
resource constraints and the follow-up to their recommendations remains
inconsistent. The Ombudsperson is the national human rights institution (NHRI)
accredited with A-Status134
. Some recruitments have taken place in the offices of the
Ombudsperson, the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal
Data Protection, and the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality, but the number of
filled posts is still below their staffing plans135
. Staff turnover in the Office of the
Ombudsperson continues to hamper its efficiency136
. There continues to be no systematic
follow-up on the recommendations of the independent bodies137
. Stakeholders considered
that the independent bodies needed to be more vocal in denouncing violations of
fundamental rights, for example, they considered that there was little public reaction by
the Ombudsperson to human rights violations during the protests following the tragic
incident at the Novi Sad railway station138
.
Civil society organisations face increasing pressure and attacks. The space for civil
society is rated as ‘obstructed’139
. Organisations and individuals that criticise the
authorities are under increasing pressure140
, in particular those monitoring alleged
electoral irregularities and environmental damage, or protesting against lithium mining or
the glorification of war criminals. The student and citizens protests which started after
the canopy collapse at Novi Sad turned into nation wide mobilisations demanding
accountability and a more effective fight against corruption141
. Verbal attacks and smear
campaigns against CSOs advocating for the rule of law have intensified since the start of
the protests and there were constant attempts by high-level officials to delegitimise these
protests142
. Campaigns were also waged by tabloids, including in the form of disclosure
of CSOs’ activists’ personal data143
. While freedom of assembly was ensured and the
aforementioned protests were allowed to take place, several violent incidents against
demonstrators occurred, and the Prime Minister announced his resignation on 28 January
2025 after one student in Novi Sad got severely injured. Only some of the perpetrators of
these violent incidents have so far been prosecuted. In January 2025, several foreign civil
134
Accreditation by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI).
135
For the Ombudsman: 67 staff as of December 2024 compared with 106 in the Action Plan for Chapter
23 (revised in 2020). This is the main document in which Serbia sets out how it will reach the Interim
Benchmarks for this chapter. For the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal
Data Protection: 121 staff as of February 2025, compared with 129 in the Action Plan for Chapter 23.
For the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality: 44 staff as of December 2024 compared with 60
in the Action Plan for Chapter 23. For a staff increase the independent bodies would need first the
consent of the Ministry of Finance, before seeking the approval by the Parliament. According to the
information provided by the Parliament, there are currently no pending requests.
136
2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 36.
137
Annual reports are submitted to the Parliament by 15 March of each year, which then adopts
conclusions on them. The 2022, 2023 and 2024 annual reports were discussed, after several years of
delay, in a plenary session of the Parliament on 16 June 2025. Parliamentary discussions tend to remain
general and do not focus on key recommendations.
138
Country visit Serbia, civil society organisations.
139
CIVICUS (2025a,b). Rating by CIVICUS; ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open,
narrowed, obstructed, repressed and closed. In addition, in March 2025, Serbia was added to the
CIVICUS Monitor watchlist “as authorities severely clamp down on civic space and incite violence
against tens of thousands of people protesting against government corruption.”
140
2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 25. See also pillar III on Media Pluralism and Media Freedom
regarding SLAPPs targeting civil society organisations and media.
141
Pro government protests and rallies also took place.
142
The protests were often portrayed as a foreign backed “coloured revolution” undermining the
legitimacy of the issues raised by the students and citizens. European Western Balkans (2025).
143
2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 25.
17
society activists, including from EU Member States, were detained and expelled from
Serbia. Some were subsequently banned from entering the country due to representing a
“security risk”. In addition, some EU citizens legally residing in Serbia had their
residence status removed after expressing support for the protests and were asked to
leave the country at short notice. On 25 and 26 February 2025, the police searched the
offices of four CSOs at the request of the Special Anti-Corruption Department of the
Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade. In this context, 29 civil society
organisations announced in February 2025 their withdrawal from working groups
organised by the Government and ministries. On 29 April 2025, the European Court of
Human Rights issued an interim measure in the case concerning the alleged use of a
sonic weapon for crowd control by the authorities at demonstrations in Belgrade on 15
March and indicated to the Government that it should prevent any use of sound devices
for crowd control (other than for communication purposes)144
.
The impact of the Strategy and the Action Plan for creating a stimulating
environment for the development of civil society has yet to be demonstrated. While
the implementation of the 2022-2030 Strategy and the Action Plan 2025-2026 for
creating a stimulating environment for the development of civil society has continued, its
impact has still to be demonstrated. Civil society organisations froze their membership in
the Council for cooperation and development of civil society in January 2025. This was
due to the Council’s lack of institutional reaction to increasing attacks on civil society
organisations and human rights defenders145
. The transparency and fairness of public
funding to civil society remains to be improved. Key challenges include the lack of
transparent criteria for approving support to civil society organisations and for selecting
independent experts in evaluation commissions, and insufficient transparency in the
reporting on spent funds146
.
144
While observing 15 minutes silence, loud sounds and airwaves disrupted the demonstration. Up to
4 000 people reported their experiences of the incident, alleging they experienced fear, panic, shock and
various physical symptoms. Some allegedly sustained physical injuries due to the panic. The Court
noted that the use of such weapons for crowd control was unlawful in Serbia, and the potentially serious
health effects that could be caused to a large number of persons. It reiterated that the decision did not
mean it had taken any position as to whether use of such weapons had occurred on 15 March 2025:
European Court of Human Rights (30 April 2025). Concerns were also expressed by the co-rapporteurs
on Serbia of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: Council of Europe (2025b).
145
Country visit Serbia, civil society organisations.
146
2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 25.
18
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order*
* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2025 Rule of Law
report can be found at https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2025-rule-law-report-targeted-
stakeholder-consultation_en .
Amnesty International (2024), Serbian authorities using spyware to hack activists and
journalists, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/12/serbia-authorities-using-spyware-
and-cellebrite-forensic-extraction-tools-to-hack-journalists-and-activists/.
Amnesty International (2025), Serbia: BIRN journalists targeted with Pegasus spyware,
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spyware/.
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srbije/.
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disaster/ .
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from-the-investigation-against-crta/.
Centre for Judicial Research (CEPRIS) (2025), Report on Publicity of work of the High Judicial
Council and High Prosecutorial Council (Izveštaj o javnosti rada Visokog saveta sudstva i
Visokog saveta tužilaštva), https://www.cepris.org/istrazivanja-i-analize/izvestaj-o-javnosti-rada-
visokog-saveta-sudstva-i-visokog-saveta-tuzilastva-2023-2024/.
Centre for Media Pluralism and Freedom (2025), Media Pluralism Monitor, Country report for
Serbia.
CEPEJ (2024), Dashboard Western Balkans – 2023 Data Collection,
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in-the-western-balkans-dashboard-western-balkans-.
CIVICUS (2025), https://monitor.civicus.org/country/serbia/.
CIVICUS (2025a), March Watchlist 2025, https://monitor.civicus.org/watchlist-march-2025/.
Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data protection (2025), Annual
Report for 2024 (Извештај о раду поверeника за информације од јавног значаја и заштиту
података о личности за 2024. Годину),
19
https://www.poverenik.rs/images/stories/dokumentacija-
nova/izvestajiPoverenika/2024/Godi%C5%A1nji_izve%C5%A1taj_2024.pdf.
Constitutional Court (2025), Written input from the Constitutional Court in the context of the
country visit to Serbia.
Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2025), Supervision of the execution of judgments
and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, 18th
Annual Report of the Committee of
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journalists - Europe Press Freedom Report, https://rm.coe.int/prems-013425-gbr-2519-annual-
report-2025-correction-cartooning/1680b48f7b.
Council of Europe (20 March 2025b), PACE monitoring co-rapporteurs express concern about
the escalation of tensions in Serbia, https://pace.coe.int/news/9806/pace-monitoring-co-
rapporteurs-express-concern-about-the-escalation-of-tensions-in-serbia-.
Council of Europe: Venice Commission & OSCE/ODIHR (2022), Joint Opinion of the Venice
Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR on the constitutional and legal framework governing the
functioning of democratic institutions in Serbia - Electoral law and electoral administration
(CDL-AD(2022)046) .
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opinions on Judiciary (CDL-PI(2023)005).
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Academy and draft amendments to the Law on Judges and the Law on the Public Prosecutor’s
Office (CDL-AD(2024)036).
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Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, AD 20/16,
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10777-2024-INIT/en/pdf.
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2025), Mapping Media Freedom,
https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/mapping-media-freedom/.
European Commission (2024), 2024 Communication on EU Enlargement policy, Serbia Report.
European Commission (2024), 2024 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law
situation in Serbia.
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17 July 2007, Jevremovic v. Serbia, 3150/05.
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sonic-weapon case, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre-press#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-8218363-
11546489%22]}.
European Implementation Network on Enlargement Countries (2025), Written contribution for
the 2025 Rule of Law Report.
20
European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI) (2024), Written
contribution for the 2024 Rule of Law Report.
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the narrative of a “colour revolution”, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2025/02/20/in-the-
midst-of-mass-protests-serbian-officials-are-recycling-the-narrative-of-a-colour-revolution/
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high-profile-cases-but-no-support-of-the-institutions/.
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agencies, https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/serbia.
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content/uploads/2025/05/Saopstenje-Visokog-saveta-tuzilastva-090525.pdf.
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Independent Journalists Association of Serbia (NUNS) (2025), Municipality of Sjenica Must
Launch Calls for All Types of Media, and Vranje Should Reconsider Its Funding Decision,
https://en.nuns.rs/ijas-the-municipality-of-sjenica-must-launch-calls-for-all-types-of-media-and-
vranje-should-reconsider-its-funding-decision/.
Insajder.net (2025), The number of judges and prosecutors who responded to Aleksandar Vučić's
statement is growing, so far more than 500 signatories. (Raste broj sudija i tužilaca koji su
reagovali na izjavu Aleksandra Vučića, do sada više od 500 potpisnika),
https://www.insajder.net/prenosimo/za-dan-gotovo-udvostrucen-broj-sudija-i-tuzilaca-koji-su-
reagovali-na-izjavu-aleksandra-vucica-preko-380-potpisnika.
Judges Association of Serbia (2025), Public Statement of 9 February 2025,
https://www.sudije.rs/Item/Details/1034 .
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2025), Media Freedom Rapid Response –
Serbia.
Media Freedom Rapid Response (2024), Mapping Media Freedom – Monitoring Report 2024,
https://www.ecpmf.eu/mfrr-monitoring-report-2024/.
Media Freedom Rapid Response (2025), Report: Media Freedom Crisis in Serbia Demands
Urgent Action, https://www.mfrr.eu/serbia-media-freedom-in-a-state-of-emergency-new-report
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operations in February, https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/244507/153-individuals-arrested-in-
anti-corruption-operations-in-february.php.
21
N1 (2025b), Judges and prosecutors responded to Vučić: The president wrote a new page in
humiliating the judiciary (Sudije i tužioci odgovorili Vučiću: Predsednik ispisao novu stranicu u
ponižavanju pravosuđa), https://n1info-rs.translate.goog/vesti/sudije-tuzioci-odgovor-
vucicu/?_x_tr_sl=sr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp.
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fountain of wishes has opened, and the President of Serbia is there too (Komlen Nikolić
(Udruženje tužilaca): Otvorila se fontana želja, tu je i predsednik Srbije),
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анализа програма пружалаца медијских услуга током изборне кампање за републичке,
покрајинске и локалне изборе),
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2028_017_lat%20(1).pdf.
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Serbian Government (2024b), Action plan for the period 2024-2025 for the Implementation of
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actors, strengths and weaknesses in the Western Balkans and Turkiye’s national integrity
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URCES_-_public_procurement.pdf
.
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Annex II: Country visit to Serbia
The Commission services held hybrid meetings in March 2025 with:
• A11 Initiative
• Agency for the Prevention of Corruption
• Anti-Corruption Council
• Appellate Court
• Appellate Public Prosecution Office
• Astra
• Association of independent electronic media (ANEM)
• Asylum Protection Center
• ATINA
• Autonomous Women’s Center
• Basic Public Prosecution Office
• Belgrade Centre for Human Rights
• BIRN
• BIRODI
• CEPRIS
• Child Rights Centre
• Civic Initiatives
• Commissioner for Personal Data Protection and Access to Information of Public
Importance
• Constitutional Court
• CRTA
• High Judicial Council
• High Prosecutorial Council
• Higher Court
• Higher Public Prosecution Office
• Humanitarian Law Foundation
• Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia
• Judges Association of Serbia
• KRIK
• Lawyers’ Association of Serbia
• Ministry of European Integration
• Ministry of Interior
• Ministry of Justice
• MODS
• Ombudsman
• Partners Serbia
• Police specialised department for corruption
• Press Council
• Prosecutor Association of Serbia
• Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM)
• Share
• Special Public Prosecution Office for Organized Crime
24
• Supreme Court
• Supreme Public Prosecution Office
• Transparency Serbia
• 29
• UNS
• YUCOM
* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal
meetings:
• Amnesty International
• Araminta
• Civil Liberties Union for Europe
• Civil Society Europe
• European Civic Forum
• European Partnership for Democracy
• European Youth Forum,
• International Commission of Jurists
• International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
• JEF Europe
• Philea – Philanthropy Europe Association.
• Transparency International