COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2025 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2025 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union

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COMMISSION
Strasbourg, 8.7.2025
SWD(2025) 921 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
2025 Rule of Law Report
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland
Accompanying the document
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
2025 Rule of Law Report
The rule of law situation in the European Union
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1
ABSTRACT
Significant efforts have been made in Poland towards the implementation of the Action Plan
on the Rule of Law to address long-standing concerns regarding judicial independence. A law
is being prepared to address the situation of judges appointed at the request of the National
Council for the Judiciary in its post-2017 composition, on which the Government committed
to reconsult the Venice Commission. Plans to amend the structure of the Supreme Court have
been proposed to strengthen its independence, including the dismantling of the Chamber of
Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs. Acts amending the Law on the National Council for
the Judiciary and the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal were adopted by the Parliament to
address the relevant serious concerns but have not yet entered into force due to their referral to
the Constitutional Tribunal by the President of the Republic. Further significant steps have
been made towards separating the office of the Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor
General, while a law to that end is yet to be adopted. The level of perceived judicial
independence in Poland continues to be very low although it has slightly increased among
companies, while the efficiency of courts remains stable.
The Polish Government is working to strengthen the legislative framework against corruption
and to improve coordination among investigating entities. There is no comprehensive anti-
corruption strategy in place. Laws combatting corruption are enforced in practice, with large-
scale corruption cases involving public officials and politicians being investigated. The EPPO
is now fully operational to investigate and prosecute crimes affecting the financial interests of
the Union. There have been no further steps to address the broad immunities of top executives
and impunity clauses or to introduce lobbying rules. Weaknesses remain regarding political
party financing, but the authorities are starting to address the issue. The new whistleblower
protection law entered into force and limited steps have been taken towards establishing an
electronic asset declaration and verification system. Significant corruption risks have been
identified in public procurement, with potential impacts on investments and business activities.
A planned media law reform is to address concerns regarding the impartiality and independence
of the media regulator as well as the independence and pluralism of public service media more
broadly. Meanwhile, some further efforts have been made to strengthen the process of granting
operating licences and to ensure the independent governance and editorial independence of
public service media, though challenges remain in safeguarding media pluralism and,
particularly in situations involving foreign investment in media ownership. Politically biased
media content has decreased, and state advertising expenditure is more evenly distributed. The
Government is working on a new state-funded model aimed at replacing the licence fee system.
The legal framework for access to public information remains stable, though stakeholders
report certain challenges with its implementation. The number of strategic lawsuits against
public participation (SLAPPs) has decreased and the Government continues to address
challenges affecting the safety of journalists and the protection of journalistic sources and
confidential communications.
Poland strengthened the rules governing consultations to improve the quality of legislation.
Further steps have been taken to improve the framework in which civil society operates. Efforts
are under way to address instances of abuse of power by public officials. The Ombudsperson
continues to fulfil a key role in the system of checks and balances.
2
RECOMMENDATIONS
Overall, concerning the recommendations in the 2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland has made:
• Significant progress on separating the office of the Minister of Justice from that of the
Prosecutor General and to ensure the functional independence of the prosecution service
from the Government.
• Limited progress on standardising the online system for asset declarations of public
officials and Members of Parliament and no progress on introducing lobbying rules.
• Some progress on ensuring independent and effective investigations and prosecutions,
address the broad scope of immunities for top executives and remove previously introduced
impunity clauses in legislation in order to enable a robust track record of high-level
corruption cases.
• Some further progress on ensuring that fair, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures,
are adhered to for the granting of operating licences to media outlets.
• Some further progress on ensuring an effective legislative framework for the independent
governance and editorial independence of public service media, taking into account
European standards on public service media.
• Some further progress on improving the framework in which civil society operates.
On this basis, and considering other developments that took place in the period of reference,
and in addition to recalling the obligation to comply with the rule of law related rulings of the
Court of Justice of the EU and the rule of law related infringement procedures referred to in
the country chapter as well as recalling the relevant commitments made under the Recovery
and Resilience Plan, it is recommended to Poland to:
• Continue to advance on the implementation of the Action Plan on the Rule of Law,
including as regards the National Council for the Judiciary and the Constitutional Tribunal.
• Take forward the reform to separate the function of the Minister of Justice from that of the
Prosecutor-General and to ensure functional independence of the prosecution service from
the Government.
• Introduce rules on lobbying and a standardised online system for asset declarations of
public officials and members of Parliament while ensuring effective verification.
• Continue efforts to ensure independent and effective corruption investigations and
prosecutions, address the broad scope of immunities for top executives and remove
impunity clauses to enable a robust track record of high-level corruption cases.
• Take forward reforms to ensure that fair, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures
are adhered to for the granting of operating licences to media outlets.
• Take forward reforms to ensure an effective legislative framework for the independent
governance and editorial independence of public service media, taking into account
European standards on public service media.
• Continue ongoing efforts to improve the framework in which civil society operates, taking
into account European standards on civil society organisations.
3
I. JUSTICE SYSTEM1
Independence
The level of perceived judicial independence in Poland continues to be very low among
both the general public and companies. Overall, 26% of the general population and 24% of
companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly or very good’
in 20252
. The perceived judicial independence among the general public has slightly decreased
in comparison with 2024 (28%) and 2021 (29%). The perceived judicial independence among
companies has slightly increased in comparison with 2024 (22%) and has increased in
comparison with 2021 (18%).
Significant efforts have been made to implement the Action Plan on the Rule of Law and
Poland is delivering on its commitments to consult the Venice Commission on new
legislation. Poland consulted, in line with the Action Plan3
, the Venice Commission on
legislative proposals concerning the prosecution system, the National Council for the Judiciary,
and the Constitutional Tribunal4
. Poland pledged to take account of the recommendations made
by the Venice Commission and to reconsult it as necessary5
. A draft law was proposed to ensure
the implementation of European Court of Human Rights’ (‘ECtHR’) rulings, providing, among
others, for better coordination between public authorities6
. Amendments were adopted to
implement a ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU (the Court of Justice) on judicial
secondments in criminal courts in Poland7
. The amendments include changes to the institution
of delegation in the ordinary and military courts. The Government is also working on two draft
laws which would remove provisions from a 2019 law on the judiciary, found by the Court of
Justice to be in violation of EU law, and on a law restoring judicial self-government in the
functioning of courts and changing the structure of ordinary disciplinary courts8
. The President
of the Republic referred three acts to the Constitutional Tribunal: the Act of 12 July 2024
amending the Law on the National Council for the Judiciary and the two Acts of 13 September
2024 on the Constitutional Tribunal.
Further steps have been taken to address the situation of judges appointed at the request
of the National Council for the Judiciary in its post-2017 composition. In February 2025,
the Codification Committee for the Courts and Prosecution Systems (the Codification
1
An overview of the institutional framework for all four pillars can be found here.
2
Figures 51 and 53, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard and Figures 49 and 51, 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. The
level of perceived judicial independence is categorised as follows: very low (below 30% of respondents
perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-
59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%).
3
2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, pp. 3-4.
4
See Venice Commission (2024), (2024a) and (2024b).
5
This concerns notably the draft law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the draft law on the restoration of
the right to an independent and impartial court established by law as presented in February 2025.
6
Polish Government (2025), written input, p. 25; cf. draft law UD177 inscribed in the legislative work schedule
of the Council of Minister. See Pillar IV, p. 21.
7
The Law of 6 March 2025 amending the law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation and the law on the Military
Courts Organisation. See CJEU judgment of 16 November 2021 in joined cases C-748/19 to C-754/19. The
law would provide criteria allowing the secondment of a judge and its revocation by the Minister of Justice.
The National Council for the Judiciary asked to veto the law or refer it to the Constitutional Tribunal. See
NCJ (2025a) and (2025b). The President of the Republic signed the law on 16 April 2025.
8
Polish Government (2025), written input, pp. 6-7; the draft law of 21 January 2025 amending the law on
ordinary courts organisation (rendered public on 21 March 2025) and the draft law of 13 May 2025 on the
restoration of the right to an independent and impartial court established by law by regulating the effects of
resolutions of the National Council of the Judiciary adopted in 2018-2025.
4
Committee) prepared, for the Government’s consideration, two proposals on the status of
judges appointed at the request of the National Council for the Judiciary (NCJ) in its post-2017
composition. On that basis, and to follow up on its commitments in the Action Plan, in April
2025, the Ministry of Justice proposed for the Government’s consideration a draft law9
. The
draft law provides for the removal of 1 600 judges10
while keeping most of them in office on
the basis of a classification. Those judges considered as appointed in an irregular procedure,
shall be classified as belonging either to the group of around 1 200 judges who, prior to their
current appointment, obtained a judicial post via regular procedures, or to the group of around
360 ordinary judges and 80 Supreme Court judges who obtained judicial status only upon the
request of the NCJ in its current composition. The judges concerned would be able to legally
challenge their classification. In principle11
, it would not be possible to contest rulings issued
by these judges. The Venice Commission had recalled12
that any arrangement chosen by Poland
to address the situation of judges appointed in a deficient procedure would need to comply with
the following parameters: (a) address the status of all judges appointed in a deficient procedure;
(b) the assessment of the effects of the deficient appointment procedure should not be
conducted by a government-controlled body (and if it is not conducted by a judicial body, some
form of judicial review should be available); (c) the assessment should be conducted on the
basis of pre-established criteria and procedures (including elements of fair trial); (d) the
assessment and the consequences following from that assessment should be in line with the
principle of proportionality, requiring some form of individual assessment. The Venice
Commission considers that some form of assessment by reference to groups (‘cohorts’) of
appointments including, where necessary, individual circumstances of appointment or
promotion, would be needed; and (e) the mechanism should allow a fairly rapid settlement of
the issue. Given the complexity of the matter and its potential impact on the functioning of the
justice system, the Polish authorities reconsulted the Venice Commission on the draft law
proposed by the Ministry of Justice and committed to take its opinion into account13
.
Ordinary court judges are protected from unjustified disciplinary proceedings and are
more involved in decision-making regarding the courts where they adjudicate. As
announced in the Action Plan on the Rule of Law, the Minister of Justice continues to appoint
ad hoc disciplinary officers to terminate undue disciplinary proceedings against judges14
and
launch new disciplinary proceedings. The Main Disciplinary Officer for Ordinary Court Judges
and his Deputy were dismissed from office15
. The Minister of Justice dismissed presidents of
9
According to the draft, judges who had already been appointed in a regular procedure in the past prior to
assuming their current post would have the resolution giving rise to their appointment ex lege invalidated by
law and would be ex lege delegated for two years to continue in their current post (except Supreme Court and
Supreme Administrative Court judges), pending a new competition before a reformed NCJ.
10
13% of the overall number of judges in Poland. Judges appointed for the first time by the NCJ in its post-
2017 composition (in the same deficient procedure) following the training provided by the National School
of Judiciary would remain in office.
11
The only exception envisaged concerns rulings issued in proceedings in which a party contested the regularity
of the composition of the court, and it would be possible exclusively at the request of such a party.
12
Venice Commission (2024c), requested by Poland on 10 July 2024. The opinion was based on four abstract
questions posed by the Minister of Justice who had not provided any draft legislative text.
13
Ministry of Justice (2025i).
14
So far, the Minister of Justice issued 24 ordinances appointing such officer which took over 95 proceedings
concerning 63 judges. Ad hoc officers joined 66 proceedings initiated by the main Disciplinary Officer and
his two Deputies. 35 disciplinary proceedings were discontinued, 5 indictments were withdrawn, and 26 new
disciplinary cases were initiated. See: Polish Government (2025), written input, p. 8.
15
The dismissals were motivated by deficiencies in carrying out duties of disciplinary officers and supervising
court as their presidents and as regards the Deputy Officer, in view of the support provided to candidates
running for the office of NCJ judge-member in 2022; Ministry of Justice (2025c) and (2025d).
5
ordinary courts appointed without the involvement of judicial self-government bodies16
. The
Constitutional Tribunal found such dismissals to be unconstitutional because provisions on
which they are based do not require a binding opinion of the National Council for the
Judiciary17
.
Plans for amending the structure of the Supreme Court are being prepared with a view
to strengthen its independence. A draft law was proposed by the Ministry of Justice in April
202518
that would dismantle the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs and
provide for a number of important changes. The draft law would also remove the competence
of the President of the Republic to designate an ‘acting First President of the Supreme Court’
and to decide on the overall number of Supreme Court judges without a prior request of the
College of the Supreme Court, thereby limiting the potential influence over the judiciary. The
President of Poland appointed a new President of the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and
Public Affairs and a new President of the Civil Chamber, who are both judges found to have
been appointed in violation of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 6(1) ECHR requirements19
. The
office of President of the Labour Chamber remains vacant. The First President of the Supreme
Court is subject to several disciplinary proceedings and a criminal investigation20
. The 2025
budget of the Supreme Court was reduced, which led to a reduction of clerical staff21
.
Legislation addressing the lack of independence of the National Council for the Judiciary
and the serious concerns related to the Constitutional Tribunal have not yet entered into
force. Three acts amending the law on the NCJ22
and establishing the Constitutional Tribunal23
were adopted by Parliament to follow up on their commitments in the Action Plan and restore
the independence of these two bodies. The Venice Commission, while welcoming the overall
aim of the legislative proposals, recommended more moderate means than declaring all
judgments that involve irregularly appointed judges invalid, such as the possibility to reopen
proceedings24
. Similar opinions were issued by other stakeholders calling to reflect more on
16
See e.g. the Ministry of Justice (2025a) and (2025b).
17
Ruling of 16 October 2024 in K 2/24; also criticised by the Supreme Court (2025), written input, p. 4 and
“Sędziowie RP” (2025), written input, pp. 19-23.
18
Ministry of Justice (2025i).
19
On 26 February 2025, the President of the Republic appointed as President of the Chamber of Extraordinary
Control and Public Affairs a judge who sat in the bench contested by the ECtHR in its judgment 8 November
2021, Dolińska - Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland, 49868/19; Supreme Court (2025a). On 27 September 2024,
the President of the Republic appointed as President of the Civil Chamber a judge who sat in the bench
contested by the ECtHR in its judgment of 3 February 2022, Advance Pharma Sp. Z O.O v. Poland, 1469/2l;
Supreme Court (2024a). The CJEU found that benches composed of judges appointed in circumstances
analysed by the ECtHR in the aforementioned rulings to not comply with the requirements of Articles 19(1)
TEU and 267 TFEU; CJEU, judgment of 7 November 2024 in case C-326/23 and of 21 December 2023 in
case C-718/21.
20
Supreme Court (2025), written input, p. 4; the criminal investigation was opened in view of the First
President’s refusal to convene, at request of its members, the Tribunal of State (cf. National Prosecution
(2024)). The First President of the Supreme Court delivered several statements contesting actions announced
by the Government to implement its Action Plan. See e.g. Supreme Court (2025), (2024c), (2024d).
21
Supreme Court (2025), written input, p. 3; also Supreme Court (2024e).
22
On the content of the law and its aspects which prima facie do not comply with the opinion of the Venice
Commission thereon, and other opinions of stakeholders, see the 2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, pp. 7-8.
23
See 2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, pp. 9-10.
24
Venice Commission (2024c). The Opinion recommended the authorities to reconsider the ex lege invalidation
of judgments and orders involving irregularly appointed judges, providing for a more tailored approach
through envisaging the possibility to have proceedings reopened.
6
the approach being taken25
. The Supreme Court and the National Council for the Judiciary
considered the two drafts to violate the Polish constitution26
. The President of the Republic
referred the amendments to the law on the NCJ and those related to the Constitutional Tribunal
to the Constitutional Tribunal for its review, where they remain pending. Considering the views
of stakeholders, the Government is working on a revised proposal on which it committed to
reconsult the Venice Commission.
Pending new legislation, serious concerns related to the Constitutional Tribunal remain.
Since March 2024, the Government refuses to publish in the Official Journal any judgments
issued by the Constitutional Tribunal, on the grounds that the Constitutional Tribunal is not a
legitimate constitutional body27
. The Sejm ceased appointing judges to vacant posts in the
Constitutional Tribunal28
considering it to no longer perform constitutional functions29
, while
in February 2025, the President of the Republic appointed a new Vice-President of the
Constitutional Tribunal30
. In March 2025, the Advocate General in his opinion proposed to the
Court of Justice to uphold the Commission’s infringement action and declare that Poland has
failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law in view of the Constitutional Tribunal and its case-
law31
. The new President of the Constitutional Tribunal stated that this would be a grave
violation of the Constitutional Tribunal’s competences and expressed concerns about Poland’s
support of the Commission’s infringement action, on the grounds that EU law cannot limit the
Constitutional Tribunal’s competences32
. He also asked the prosecutor’s office to open an
investigation33
and requested the Deputy Disciplinary Officer for Judges in office since 2018
to initiate disciplinary proceedings against judges who refuse to apply the Constitutional
Tribunal’s rulings34
. With the exception of the President of the Republic, representatives of the
executive and legislative powers are no longer initiating cases, participating in hearings or
providing written contributions before the Constitutional Tribunal35
. The Constitutional
Tribunal also ruled on the constitutionality of EU Treaty provisions36
.
25
OSCE-ODIHR (2024b), National Chamber of Legal Councillors (2024), Ombudsperson (2024) and National
Bar Council (2024) – all of which supported the aim of the laws but considered important to reflect on the
approach towards the ex lege invalidation of all rulings issued in an irregular composition. 7 NGOs (2025),
written input, pp. 42-43.
26
Opinion of the National Council for the Judiciary of 2 July 2024 SPS-WP.020.87.4.2024 and of the Supreme
Court of 19 April 2024 BSA III.021.8.2024.
27
See Government resolution n° 162 of 18 December 2022.
28
As of the date of publication of the report, there are overall 11 judges of the Constitutional Tribunal.
29
Pursuant to the Resolution of 6 March 2024 of the Sejm, cf. the 2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 9.
30
On 7 December 2024, the President of the Republic appointed a new Tribunal President. The Tribunal
declined to inform whether the Tribunal judges appointed to already occupied posts had participated in the
selection procedure of candidates (cf. Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (2025)).
31
Opinion of 11 March 2025 in case C-448/23; on the infringement procedure see 2023 Rule of Law Report,
Poland, p. 9.
32
Constitutional Tribunal (2025a).
33
Allegedly committed by i.a. the Prime Minister, Marshals of the Parliament and certain judges and
prosecutors, while requesting that the investigation be conducted by a prosecutor of his own choosing; cf.
Constitutional Tribunal (2025b) and (2025c)
34
Constitutional Tribunal (2025d).
35
This follows the resolution of the Sejm of 6 March 2024 and of the Council of Ministers of 18 December
2024 (see above).
36
Ruling of 10 June 2025 in case K 10/24, where the Constitutional Tribunal asserted the unconstitutionality of
Article 191(1) read in connection with Article 192 let. c of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, “interpreted in such a way that the unanimity requirement of the Council is limited to measures whose
primary intended result—arising from their purpose or content—is to significantly affect the Republic of
Poland’s choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply”.
7
The National Council for the Judiciary continues to operate despite serious concerns as
to its independence. Since July 2024, the NCJ adopted over 140 resolutions requesting judicial
appointments to the President of the Republic. The Minister of Justice continues not to publish
vacant posts in ordinary courts, citing a need to avoid a deterioration of legal certainty in the
justice system37
. According to the Supreme Court, this has a negative impact on the efficiency
of the ordinary judiciary38
. An Ad Hoc Disciplinary Officer opened disciplinary proceedings
against 18 judges-members of the NCJ on grounds of their participation in a body that does not
meet constitutional requirements39
. The NCJ has criticised decisions of the Government40
and
has appointed a special Committee to examine and monitor what it considers to be a political
harassment of judges and assistant judges41
. The annual budget of the NCJ was decreased42
.
Significant progress has been made on the recommendation to separate the office of the
Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor General and to ensure the functional
independence of the prosecution service from the Government43. The Government tabled
in July 202444
a draft law separating the function of the Prosecutor General and the Minister of
Justice. The Venice Commission welcomed it, while noting shortcomings as regards notably
the procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General45
and recalling that the law
is only a first step in an overall reform of the prosecution system. In December 2024, the
Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers adopted the draft law, taking into account the
recommendations made by the Venice Commission46
. The National Prosecution reviewed
criminal investigations carried out in the period 2016-2023, revealing significant irregularities
in most of the cases it investigated47
. The criminal investigation against Supreme Court judges
for the content of their judicial decisions, opened in 2020, was discontinued48
. The Prosecutor
General instructed prosecutors to request the recusal of judges of the Supreme Court appointed
at the request of the NCJ in its post-2017 composition49
. One of the Deputy Prosecutors-
General appointed by the previous Prosecutor General was suspended, following a criminal
37
See the 2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 7.
38
Supreme Court (2025), written input, p. 3.
39
Ministry of Justice (2025c). These proceedings were criticised by the First President of the Supreme Court
and by the Council itself; Supreme Court (2025) and National Council for the Judiciary (2025a).
40
I.a. as regards legislation aimed at implementing CJEU case-law.
41
National Council for the Judiciary (2025c) and (2025d).
42
The decrease of the government is of ca. 15.2% in comparison to the 2024 annual budget (reduction from ca.
PLN 24.94 million to PLN 21.16 million). On 10 May 2025, the Constitutional Tribunal considered the
decrease unconstitutional (case K 2/25).
43
The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to ‘[c]ontinue efforts to separate the function of the
Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor-General and to ensure functional independence of the
prosecution service from the Government’.
44
Draft law UD95; the draft law tabled on 14 July 2024; Polish Government, written input, p. 8.
45
Venice Commission (2024). The Opinion welcomes the proposed aim of the reform. It identifies a number of
issues, in particular regarding the procedures for the appointment and accountability of the Prosecutor
General, as well as the composition and powers of the National Prosecution Council.
46
Permanent Committee of the Council of Ministers (2024). The draft law removes MPs and Senators from the
list of entities allowed to propose candidates to the office of Prosecutor General.
47
National Prosecution (2025). The partial audit covered 200 out of a total of 600 cases. 51 cases were initiated
against independent judges, prosecutors, and opposition supporters. 37 cases were found to have been
conducted without significant issues. The remaining 112 cases presented serious reservations that should lead
to criminal and disciplinary liability. The report concluded that “the Prosecutor's Office from 2016 to 2023
failed to adequately perform its responsibilities.” The President of the Constitutional Tribunal (who was
National Prosecutor at the time), called the report defamatory (Constitutional Tribunal (2025e)).
48
National Prosecution (2024a). On the investigation see the 2021 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 8 fn. 52.
49
National Prosecution (2024b).
8
investigation he had reportedly opened in violation of the applicable legislation50
. The
secondment of prosecutors, perceived as a form of disciplinary sanction, ceased. Overall,
significant progress has been made to separate the office of the Minister of Justice from that of
the Prosecutor General and to ensure the functional independence of the prosecution service
from the Government.
Quality
The Government engaged in efforts to boost digitalisation of ordinary courts. The
Ministry of Justice is developing a tool to digitalise access to justice in ordinary courts and is
setting-up a Digital Consumer and Competition Protection Court51
. The Ministry also adopted
a “Digital Court” strategic programme setting out steps to be taken by 2029 to optimise the
effectiveness of the justice system and make it fit for the digital age. The real impact will have
to be assessed over time52
.
Efficiency
The overall performance of ordinary and administrative courts remains relatively stable.
As regards ordinary courts, the estimated time needed to resolve civil, commercial,
administrative, and other cases continued to decrease (from 100 days in 2022 to 97 days in
2023), and the opposite trend as regards litigious civil and commercial cases in first instance
courts started to reverse (a decrease from 362 in 2022 to 360 in 2023). The rate of solving civil,
commercial, administrative, and other cases also started to improve. As regards administrative
courts, the rate of resolving administrative cases in first instance significantly improved (from
98% in 2022 to 108% in 2023) and the number of pending administrative cases in first instance
decreased53
.
II. ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK
The perception among citizens, experts and business executives is that the level of
corruption in the public sector remains relatively high. In the 2024 Corruption Perceptions
Index by Transparency International, Poland scores 53/100 and ranks 20th
in the European
Union and 53rd
globally54
. This perception has been relatively stable over the past five years55
.
The 2025 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 55% of respondents consider
corruption widespread in their country (EU average 69) and 47% of respondents feel personally
affected by corruption in their daily lives (EU average 30). As regards businesses, 41% of
companies consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 63) and 19% consider that
corruption is a problem when doing business (EU average 35). Furthermore, 46% of
respondents find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from corrupt
50
The case concerned the initiation, without following the prescribed procedure, of a criminal investigation at
the request of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal who considers that a number of high-ranking
officials committed a coup d’etat (see above). National Prosecution (2025a).
51
Ministry of Justice (2025d). The tool is expected to become fully operational in designated courts by mid-
2026; 7 NGOs (2025), written input, p. 17. See also CCBE (2025), written input, p. 159.
52
Prawo.pl (2025a).
53
Figures 4, 5, 9, 11 and 14, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard.
54
The level of perceived corruption is categorised as follows: low (above 79); relatively low (between 79-60),
relatively high (between 59-50), high (below 50).
55
In 2020, the score was 56, while, in 2024, the score is 53. The score significantly increases/decreases when
it changes more than five points; improves/deteriorates (between 4-5 points) and is relatively stable (from 1-
3 points) in the last five years.
9
practices (EU average 36), while 21% of companies believe that people and businesses caught
for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 33)56
.
The Polish Government is working to strengthen the legislative framework against
corruption. The Government is working to increase the independence of anti-corruption
institutions to address risks of politicisation57
. The draft reform separating the positions of
Prosecutor General and Minister of Justice was approved by the Cabinet Standing Committee
on 5 December 202458
. In December 2024, the Council of Ministers adopted a draft law59
on
an ‘anti-corruption shield’ to protect the state’s economic interests60
. It would provide for
binding coordination procedures for the police, the Internal Security Agency and the Military
Service61
, and it also aims to dissolve the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, which in the past
had given rise to concerns about its independence from the executive62
. Amended rules for the
coordination of prosecution services63
entered into force and a draft legislative act was
introduced for Poland’s accession to enhanced cooperation with the European Public
Prosecutor Office (EPPO)64
. Following the confirmation by the European Commission of
Poland’s participation in the EPPO65
, the Council of the EU appointed the European Prosecutor
from Poland66
and the EPPO’s College appointed 8 delegated European prosecutors67
. The
EPPO is fully operational since January 2025 to investigate and prosecute crimes affecting the
Union’s financial interests committed after 1 June 2021, which is expected to facilitate
Poland’s response to fraud and corruption68
. Investigative authorities, such as the police and
the National Revenue Administration69
, were provided with new guidelines70
.
A new Central Office for Combatting Corruption is to be established within the police
with a country-wide competence to detect, analyse, prevent and investigate corruption.
The draft bill on the Anti-Corruption Shield71
aims at transferring the Central Anti-Corruption
Bureau’s resources and competences, including on corruption to the police, the Internal
Security Agency (ABW) and the National Revenue Administration (KAS). Of the Bureau’s
approximately 1300 full-time officers and 200 civilian employees, a total of 950 officers and
56
Data from Special Eurobarometer 561 (2025) and Flash Eurobarometer 557 (2025).
57
Polish Government (2023). 2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 18, and earlier reports.
58
Draft Act amending the Public Prosecutor’s Office Act (UD95), 15 July 2024. Polish Government (2025),
written input, p. 1. See also pillar I.
59
Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2024). Act on the coordination of anti-corruption activities and the
liquidation of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, UD46. Batory Foundation (2024).
60
I.e. behaviour causing a significant damage to public finance, state-owned enterprises or local governments
exceeding approx. EUR 50 000 (Art. 115(7) Criminal Code). Polish Government (2025), written input, p. 13.
61
Guidelines of the Prime Minister (20 March 2024) already implement the Shield; the bill would make them
binding.
62
2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 16. Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024), p. 11: the Bureau is closely linked to
the former government lacking independence. Country visit Poland, Batory Foundation/ Helsinki Foundation,
suggesting an ex-ante impact assessment and inclusion into a larger, strategic anti-corruption policy approach
for the far-reaching reform.
63
Regulation of the Minister for Justice (7 January 2025) on Rules of Procedure for the internal office of general
organisation units of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
64
To implement Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017.
65
See 2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 13.
66
Decision of 12 December 2024; Council of the EU (2024).
67
Decision of 16 December 2024; EPPO (2024).
68
European Commission Decision 2024/807 of 29 February 2024. This step is welcomed by the Association of
Judges and Prosecutors Iustitia, Themis and Lex Super Omnia (2025).
69
Poland’s tax authority.
70
Polish Government (2025), written input, p. 12.
71
Act on the coordination of anti-corruption activities and the liquidation of the Central Anti-Corruption
Bureau, UD46.
10
all civilian employees are envisaged to be transferred to the police. The new Central Bureau
for Combating Corruption will recruit in addition approximately 300 officers and civilian
employees from other police units. The KAS will gain 150 full-time positions and the ABW
200 positions. The budget of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau is planned to be distributed
proportionally to the three entities (73% to police, 15% to ABW, 11% to KAS)72
. The
institutional changes envisaged in the legislative proposal adopted by the Council of Ministers
is now to be sent to the Sejm as the next procedural step before Presidential signature.
Large-scale cases of corruption involving public officials and politicians are being
investigated, whereas further efforts are being made to ensure independent and effective
investigations and prosecutions with a view to enabling a robust track record of high-
level corruption cases73. The National Prosecutor’s Office published a review report of cases
of public interest concluded by the prosecution service between 2016 and 202374
, including
recommendations to address identified irregularities75
. Large-scale corruption cases involving
public officials and politicians are being investigated76
. The autonomy and cooperation among
relevant anti-corruption entities, as well as the access to relevant registries, are considered
sufficient for the effectiveness of investigations and prosecutions. The Supreme Audit Office
reports that its operations and audit controls have improved77
. The Parliament commission set
up to investigate the activities of high-level public officials, including members of Parliament,
issued several corruption-related notifications to the National Prosecutor’s Office and regional
prosecution offices, which led to the detention of several high-level officials78
. The
effectiveness of combatting foreign bribery in practice, although still low, has slightly
improved79
. The Ministry of Justice is working on an amendment of the Act on the liability of
collective entities for criminal offences to remove the rule according to which private
companies can be held criminally liable for foreign bribery only after a final instance court
sentence convicting the natural person(s) involved in the case, or after the termination of the
proceedings for other reasons80
. Against this background, there has been some further progress
on this part of the recommendation.
There has been no progress yet on the recommendation to address the broad immunities
of top executives and to remove impunity clauses in legislation81. Immunities cause concern
as they act as an obstacle to criminal accountability for corruption committed by top executives
72
Country visit Poland, Ministry of Justice.
73
The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to “[c]ontinue efforts to ensure independent and
effective investigations and prosecutions, […] in order to enable a robust track record of high-level corruption
cases.”
74
2024 Rule of Law Report, p. 15: The aim is to address risks of a selective application of the law and disparity
in the treatment of corruption cases for political purposes.
75
National Prosecutor’s Office (2025), review of 200 cases, selected by regional prosecutors and reported by
the public, finding significant irregularities in 163 cases. Recommendations include to commence or reopen
proceedings, to implement disciplinary or criminal liability against prosecutors. More case review will be
presented in a second report.
76
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2025c) and National Prosecution Office (2025c). On the visa scandal, Polish
Government (2025), written input, p. 14. On the university diplomas bribery scheme, Central Anti-Corruption
Bureau (2025b).
77
Country visit Poland, Supreme Audit Office.
78
For the bribe-for-visa case, facilitating the illegal entry into Poland and the Schengen area of over 12 000
immigrants, see Polish Government (2025), written input, p. 14; Notes from Poland (2025).
79
Polish Government (2025), written input, p. 13, reporting two new investigations. OECD (2024), para. 65.
80
2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 17.
81
The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to “[a]ddress the broad scope of immunities for top
executives and remove previously introduced impunity clauses in legislation in order to enable a robust track
record of high-level corruption cases”.
11
outside their official capacity82
. Previously introduced impunity clauses83
are still in force84
,
yet their use is monitored by the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau. In 2024, they have been
applied in 9 proceedings (compared to 10 in 2023)85
. Such exemptions from criminal
responsibility increase the risk of corruption and abuse of political or administrative power,
given the lack of deterrence and the perception of impunity. Overall, there has been no progress
yet on the recommendation, neither on immunities nor on impunity clauses.
There is no anti-corruption strategy in place. Poland’s last anti-corruption strategy and
action plan covered the period from 2018-2020. While, as illustrated above, steps to combat
corruption have been taken or are planned by the Government, a new strategic, holistic
Government approach to corruption is not yet in place86
. As previously reported, the Supreme
Audit Office recommended in its December 2022 report to prepare and adopt such an anti-
corruption programme87
.
There has been no progress to strengthen integrity rules since no rules on lobbying have
been introduced88. No steps have been taken to oblige persons in top executive functions to
fully disclose their contacts with interest representatives in a meaningful and timely manner89
.
There is no information yet on whether the Ministry of Interior’s preparatory work of previous
years will provide a basis for future work90
. Challenges also persist as to the effectiveness of
existing lobby registers, with continuing low registration rates, de-registrations and insufficient
oversight and enforcement in practice91
. In the Sejm, only 6 out of the 14 registered lobbyists
have reported lobbying the Parliament in 202492
. Therefore, there has been no progress on the
recommendation.
82
2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 19. GRECO (2023), paras. 54-63; (2019) paras. 82-91, reiterating its
recommendation for an in-depth reform of top executives’ immunities to facilitate corruption prosecution,
including by introducing objective criteria for transparent immunity lifting procedures.
83
Exemptions from criminal responsibility (‘impunity clauses’) exist in Art. 305(6) Criminal Code; Law of
December 2022 on the abandonment of prosecution relating to the organisation of the presidential elections;
April 2022 amendments to Art. 483(1) of the Commercial Company Code Act, abolishing liability of
management and supervisory boards for actions to the detriment of the company. Art. 76 of the Law on special
support instruments in connection with the spread of SARS-COV-2 virus, adopted in April 2020.
84
A bill amending Art. 229(6) Criminal Code on suspects cooperating with the police in return for more lenient
sanctions is planned for 2025, but not considered an impunity clause under this recommendation.
85
Country visit, Poland, National Prosecutor’s Office.
86
Country visit, Poland, Batory Foundation/Helsinki Foundation. OECD (2024), p. 4: lack of a strategy and
disinterest, questioning Poland’s commitment. GRECO (2025), para. 59, finding a ‘globally unsatisfactory’
compliance level with recommendations for MPs, prosecutors and judges (8 out of 22), and insufficient
compliance for government top executives.
87
Supreme Audit Office (2022b) and (2022a).
88
The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to “[s]trengthen the existing integrity rules by
introducing lobbying rules […].”
89
Internal guidelines exist only for some ministries since 2006.
90
Law of 7 July 2005 on Lobbying defines lobbying, establishes a public register and determines sanctions.
The 2018-2020 Anti-Corruption Programme had envisaged a revision of the lobbying law, Council of
Ministers Resolution No. 207, 19 December 2017 (M.P. z 2018 r. item 12).
91
There is a lobby register for the Government, with only 600 entries, one for the lower chamber of Parliament
(Sejm – with an even lower number of entries) and one for the higher chamber of Parliament (Senate). The
Chancellery of the Prime Minister did not report any meetings with lobbyists in 2024; in the Ministry of
Interior and Administration in 2024 one lobbying notification was processed, yet no meeting with lobbyists
took place according to the Ministry. See also GRECO (2025), paras. 34-36, noting that the scope and
enforcement of the rules appearing to apply to top executive functions remain unclear in practice.
92
Country visit Poland, Senate Ethics Committee.
12
There has been limited progress as regards a standardised online system for asset
declarations93. The legislative proposal introduced in November 2023 to broaden asset
declaration rules is yet to be adopted94
. As most declarations are still filled out by hand and in
a variety of formats95
, stakeholders have called for a comprehensive reform of the conflict of
interest and asset declaration system96
. The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, with the support
of the Internal Security Agency and the Military Counterintelligence Service, is still submit to
the Minister of Interior a draft legal act to regulate the unification, digitisation and control of
asset declarations97
. Meanwhile, to address the low level of digitalisation of politicians’ asset
declarations98
, the Bureau, in cooperation with the Ministry of Digital Affairs and the Central
Information Technology Center, is working on a user-friendly IT system for the electronic
submission of asset declarations. The Bureau checks the completeness of Senators’ – mostly
non-digitalised – asset declarations, while verification tasks remain with the tax authority99
.
Checks conducted by the Bureau also focused on asset declarations submitted by municipal
officials and employees100
. Overall, limited progress has been made to have a standardised
online system for asset declarations of public officials and Members of Parliament.
The new law on whistleblower protection is in force101
. Stakeholders welcomed the law as
a first significant step, calling however for a broader material scope102
. A dedicated
whistleblower department was established at the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights
to receive whistleblower reports, including on corruption linked to potential breaches of
fundamental freedoms, and additional staff was hired. Its budgetary resources were also
increased but are deemed insufficient to effectively examine the high number of reports
received (approximately 7 000 in 2024)103
. The Office refers whistleblower disclosures to the
competent authorities. According to prosecutors, such disclosures are an important source of
information to detect crimes, including corruption, and an effective whistleblower protection
system is instrumental in the fight against corruption104
.
Weaknesses remain in practice in political party financing, but the authorities are
starting to address the issue. Challenges persist in the practical application of the 2022
legislation on financing of political parties105
. Publication levels of party finances are not
standardised and still vary significantly. Some good practices exist, where filter functionalities
are embedded on parties’ websites, facilitating the search for specific party finance data106
. The
National Election Commission has found irregularities in several party financial reports and
93
The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended to “[s]trengthen the existing integrity rules by introducing […]
a standardised online system for asset declarations of public officials and Members of Parliament.”
94
The Bill amending the Act on Restrictions on the Conduct of Business by Persons Performing Public
Functions would extend the scope to cover high-level officials and spouses’ property.
95
At least 16 different forms are in use; provisions are scattered among several legislative acts. 2024 Rule of
Law Report Poland, p. 22.
96
Country visit, Poland, Batory Foundation/ Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights.
97
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2025) to develop a central, integrated, electronic system.
98
GRECO (2019), recommendations x and xi, paras. 72 and 78.
99
Country visit Poland, Senate Ethics Committee.
100
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2024).
101
Act of 14 June 2024 (UC101), implementing Directive (EU)2019/1937, enforced largely since September.
102
Polish Institute on Human Rights and Business (2024), p. 33, recommending covering breaches of all laws
and internal regulations (Codes of Conducts, by-laws).
103
Contributing also to legislative proposals and extraordinary tasks (e.g. Ukraine refugee immigration).
104
Country visit Poland, National Prosecutor’s Office.
105
2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 23. Arts. 25, 27 of the Act require parties to publish up-to-date
information in the donations and the contracts register. Stakeholders stress the need to test data reliability.
106
See 2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 17. Parties’ data is published in pdf format or as embedded tables.
13
rejected one report entirely for breaches of the Electoral Code on grounds of acceptance of
unlawful financial benefits107
. Poland is now also engaging with the OSCE/ODIHR, which
raised concern on undue influence over the use of state resources and public media and issued
recommendations108
. The parliamentary bill of 29 February 2024, which aims to address
previously identified systemic transparency challenges relating to clientelist networks around
state-owned enterprises (SOE)109
, has passed the Sejm’s first reading and the leading Sub-
Committee on 20 November 2024110
. The Supreme Audit Office expressed the need for audit
controls of SOEs111
, which had been found to circumvent campaign finance rules by exceeding
spending limits and undermining the separation of the state and parties and raising questions
as to conflicts of interest112
.
Public procurement remains an area highly vulnerable to corruption. Businesses’ attitudes
towards corruption in the EU show that 12% of companies in Poland (EU average 25%) think
that corruption has prevented them from winning a public tender or a public procurement
contract in practice in the last three years113
. The Single Market and Competitiveness
Scoreboard on access to public procurement in Poland reports a high 54% of single bids for
2023 (EU average 29%). However, 58% of companies perceive the level of independence of
the public procurement review body (National Board of Appeal) as very or fairly good114
.
Following several delays, legislative amendments to the Act on Public Finances have been
proposed in March 2025, which stakeholders welcome, indicating however risks of reduced
transparency due to high thresholds that would not cover many local government tenders115
.
Public procurement data, including on large-scale investments, is publicly available, but
corruption risk monitoring is still difficult due to scattered data116
. The Central Anti-Corruption
Bureau’s investigations of suspected irregularities relating to EU structural funds, corruption
and abuse of public officials’ powers in the National Centre for Research and Development117
led to pre-trial investigations and several arrests118
. Investigations into alleged bid-rigging and
embezzlements pertaining to the Justice Fund, which provides post-penitentiary assistance and
support to crime victims, have led to several arrests, pre-trial detention and an arrest warrant
for a high-level official, with an estimated damage of more than EUR 50 million (PLN 224
million)119
. Stakeholders still consider public procurement as the main corruption risk sector,
with potential impacts on investments and business activities.
107
Arts. 144(1)(3)(e), 132(5) Electoral Code. National Electoral Commission Resolution, 18 November 2024.
See also Sejm (2024), Final report of the Committee of Inquiry to investigate the postal voting for the election
of the President in 2020 and vote to submit notifications to the prosecution service for alleged crimes that led
to charges against a former high-level official on for exceeding his powers.
108
OSCE/ODIHR (2024c); see also (2024a), p. 1: the lack of requirements for reporting prior to election day, and
unregulated third-party campaigning, combined with insufficient campaign finance regulation for the
referendum, negatively affected transparency and accountability of political party and campaign finance.
109
See 2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 24.
110
By increased transparency requirements and a ban of SOE executives’ payments to politicians. Sejm Deputies'
bill on corporate governance in companies with State Treasury shareholding, Paper no. 261.
111
Country visit Poland, Supreme Audit Office.
112
OSCE/ODIHR (2024a), pp. 1-3. The National Election Commission is the oversight body.
113
Flash Eurobarometer 557 (2025). This is 13 percentage points below the EU average.
114
Figure 59, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard.
115
With approx. 60% below the threshold, country visit, Poland, Batory Foundation. Draft Act Amending the
Criminal Code and the Public Finance Act (UD 197).
116
Country visit Poland, Batory Foundation/ Helsinki Foundation.
117
The Centre is an executive agency of the Ministry of the Science and Higher Education.
118
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2023). The Supreme Audit Office’s control found large scale irregularities
confirming corruption risks, see Supreme Audit Office (2023); Science Business (2023).
119
Estimates provided by Ministry of Justice. National Prosecutor Office (2024). European Parliament, (2024).
14
III. MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM
The Government plans to address persisting concerns regarding the impartiality and
independence of the media regulator with a new media law reform. The media regulator –
the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) – continues to face criticism for its perceived
partisan stance, raising concerns among stakeholders as to the regulator’s impartiality and
independence120
. The Government plans to introduce stricter eligibility and experience
requirements for the regulator’s members to address concerns related to the appointment
procedures as part of the media law reform implementing the European Media Freedom Act
(EMFA)121
. However, some stakeholders consider the proposed changes insufficient,
advocating for a more comprehensive reform of the appointment process, including more
robust safeguards122
. Moreover, some stakeholders have raised concerns as to the regulator’s
discretion in imposing fines on broadcasters for content deemed unlawful and as regards the
Chair’s prerogatives under the current rules123
, questioning the adequacy of the current
safeguards124
. The Polish authorities plan to introduce collegiality into the decision-making
process regarding fines, by requiring decisions of the media regulator’s Chair to be preceded
by a resolution of the KRRiT125
. The media regulator pointed out that its budget only partially
covers its needs related to its human resources and constitutional functions, raising concerns
about the sufficiency of available funding126
. The Government intends to evaluate the
regulator’s financial needs as part of the media law reform127
.
There has been some further progress to ensure adherence to fair, transparent and non-
discriminatory procedures when granting operating licences to media outlets128. Whilst
no new negative decisions regarding the granting or renewing of licences have been reported
since the 2024 Rule of Law report129
, stakeholders continue to raise concern about gaps in the
120
International Press Institute and Media & Journalism Research Center (2025), p. 4.
121
Ministry of Culture and National Heritage (2024), p. 15, as confirmed during the country visit Poland,
Ministry of Culture. The concept of new law highlights the importance of Council’s members specialised
knowledge in media, economics, and law, while stressing the need for independence from political affiliations
and influence. The concept of draft law inclines changing one-third of the KRRiT members every two years.
122
7 NGOs and Reporters Without Borders (2025), written inputs, pp. 31-32 and 15 respectively.
123
The 1992 Broadcasting Act, Article 53. According to this provision, fines are imposed by the Chair of the
National Broadcasting Council – not by the entire Council collegially. For instance, one of the alerts on the
Mapping Media Freedom monitoring report registers the case of the media regulator sanctioning for airing a
documentary about alleged wrongdoing linked to Catholic priest and media owner Tadeusz Rydzyk. This fine
against TVP follows a similar case in November 2024, when KRRiT fined TVN, Poland’s largest private
broadcaster, for another critical report on Rydzyk.
124
7 NGOs (2025), written input, pp. 30, 32. Article 18 of the 1992 Broadcasting Act stipulates, inter alia, that
“programmes may not promote actions contrary to the law, to the Polish raison d'état and attitudes and views
contrary to morality and social good (...)’ and should respect the religious beliefs of the audience, ‘and in
particular the Christian system of values”. Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), p. 16.
125
Ministry of Culture and National Heritage (2024), p. 10, as confirmed during the country visit Poland,
Ministry of Culture and National Heritage. Under the current provisions, imposing sanctions is a prerogative
of the Chair, which may be appealed to a court.
126
Country visit Poland, National Broadcasting Council.
127
Country visit Poland, Ministry of Culture and National Heritage.
128
The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended Poland to: “[p]ursue efforts to ensure that fair, transparent and
non-discriminatory procedures, are adhered to for the granting of operating licences to media outlets ensure
that fair, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures are adhered to for the granting of operating licences
to media outlets”.
129
Country visit Poland, Ministry of Culture and National Heritage; Wirtualna Polska (2024). However, in
September 2024, a Warsaw court in Poland has determined that the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT)
mishandled the renewal of TVN24's licence, deeming it a "serious violation of the law". The court also found
15
safeguards of the licencing process and the slow pace of decisions130
. The Mapping Media
Freedom monitoring report has noted a new alert regarding delays in licences renewals131
. As
part of the announced reform to implement the EMFA and following a public consultation over
the concept of law, the Government plans to introduce a revamped licensing system which
would streamline the process and ensure timely decision-making, with a provision keeping the
issuance of licences within a clearly defined timeframe132
. Therefore, some further progress
has been made on the recommendation to ensure fair, transparent and non-discriminatory
procedures for granting operating licences to media outlets.
Pending new rules to strengthen the independence of the management of public
broadcasters’ management bodies, there has been a decrease in politically biased media
content in public service media. The current management of the major public service media
(i.e. Polish Television, Polish Radio and Polish Press Agency) is composed of temporary
liquidators133
, appointed to oversee public broadcasting entities during the state of liquidation.
However, pending the media law reform announced by the Government, standards are assessed
by some stakeholders as not sufficient to protect their independence134
, which amplifies the
vulnerability of public service media. In addition, while there has been a notable decrease in
polarising and biased content in public service media, some stakeholders have reported that
certain bias in reporting political content occasionally persists while impartiality in news
programmes has not been achieved135
, as highlighted also by the Media Pluralism Monitor
2025136
.
There has been some further progress to ensure an effective legislative framework for the
independent governance and editorial independence of public service media137
.
Stakeholders have questioned the independence of the National Media Council (RMN), in
charge of appointing public broadcasters’ management board members, due to the lack of
proper safeguards in the nomination and dismissal of its members, making it vulnerable to
undue influence138
. As part of the reform to implement the EMFA, the Government is preparing
a draft law that would dissolve the National Media Council to ensure more coherence in the
that the handling of TVN7's licence was improper. As a consequence, KRRiT's Chair, Swirski, was fined
PLN 60 000 for failing to extend TVN Style's concession; referring to the decision on renewed lincences
issued in June 2024, whereas the re-concession process lasted 11 months.
130
Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), p. 27.
131
Mapping Media Freedom (2024) Platform issued on 17 October 2024 alert noting that the media regulator
postponed decisions on TVN and Agora broadcasting licences.
132
Country visit Poland, Ministry of Culture and National Heritage.
133
The appointment of liquidators followed the decision of the Minister of Culture and National Heritage as the
body exercising the ownership rights of the State Treasury over the public service media to dismiss the
management bodies of public service media on the basis of the Commercial Companies Code and the
liquidation state.
134
The decision to liquidate PSM was taken in December 2023 in accordance with the Code of Commercial
Companies and the Act on the Principles of Managing State Property. The liquidators may be subject to
dismissal at any time and without a clearly defined cause, given their accountability to the Polish state, as
represented by the Minister of Culture and National Heritage; Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2025), p.
811.
135
Country visit Poland, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and Stefan Batory Foundation.
136
7 NGOs (2025), written input, p. 34, as confirmed during the country visit Poland by Fundacja Batorego. In
addition, as reported by Demagog (2024), a large portion of airtime is still allocated to representatives of the
ruling coalition. Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), p. 28.
137
The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended to: “[p]ursue efforts to ensure an effective legislative framework
for the independent governance and editorial independence of public service media, taking into account
European standards on public service media”.
138
International Press Institute and Media & Journalism Research Center (2025), pp. 13-14.
16
media regulation landscape and re-entrust the media regulator with the function of appointing
public broadcasters’ management board members139
. Moreover, the draft law would include
guarantees for the independence of public service media and rules for appointing the governing
bodies of public broadcasting companies to ensure their editorial and managerial
independence140
. The Government also plans to reform and strengthen the competences of the
programme councils of public service media, and to ensure the separation of editorial and
management departments141
. Overall, some further progress has been made on the
recommendation.
Public broadcasters are facing operational instability due to the temporary suspension of
licence fee funds, but a new state-funded model is expected. The media regulator
temporarily suspended the allocation of public funds collected through the licence fee system
in 2024, impacting the operational stability of Poland’s major public broadcasters142
. These
licence fee funds were held in a court deposit account for part of the year, as a result of the
ongoing liquidation of Poland’s major public service media143
. Public broadcasters have
initiated proceedings against the media regulator’s decision to suspend the allocation of
funds144
, leading to payments in some cases145
. Nevertheless, the licence fee system is not
considered fully efficient, and state funding is used to offset losses incurred from licence fee
collection146
. As a result, more households stopped paying their licence fees147
. As part of the
forthcoming media law reform to implement the EMFA, the Government plans to replace the
licence fee system with an annual budget equivalent to a minimum 0.09% of Poland’s GDP for
public service media148
.
Certain challenges persist in safeguarding media pluralism and editorial independence,
particularly in situations involving foreign investment in media ownership. The Media
Pluralism Monitor (MPM) 2025 notes the medium-high risk of market plurality with the
indicators of high risk of plurality of media providers as well as editorial independence from
commercial and owners influence149
. In particular, it reports challenges in balancing state
intervention and protection of national security in cases of some media ownership changes,
such as takeovers or mergers involving foreign capital. In December 2024, Poland added
private broadcasters TVN and Polsat to its list of strategic companies, requiring Government
approval for their sale or change of ownership150
. The Government has argued that this measure
was essential to safeguard media critical to the state’s information security and to ensure the
139
The provisions on the National Media Council were declared as inconsistent with the Constitution since they
deprived the National Broadcasting Council of the powers necessary for that body to carry out its function of
“upholding freedom of expression, the right to information and the public interest in broadcasting” (Judgment
of the Constitutional Tribunal of 13 December 2016, case no. K 13/16).
140
Polish Government, written input, p. 19 as confirmed during the country visit by the Ministry of Culture.
141
Ministry of Culture and National Heritage (2024), p. 27.
142
Except for the licence fee funds released by the National Broadcasting Council to the local PSM following
the September 2024 floods in Southern and Western Poland (October 2024 instalment).
143
Namely of Polish Television, Polish Radio and Polish Press Agency.
144
Country visit Poland, Ministry of Culture and National Heritage.
145
Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), pp. 15-16.
146
Country visit Poland, Ministry of Culture and National Heritage. Public service media are funded through a
mix of licence fees, advertising, and direct government funding. International Press Institute & Media &
Journalism Research Center (2025), p. 15.
147
International Press Institute & Media & Journalism Research Center (2025), p. 15.
148
Ministry of Culture and National Heritage (2024), p. 45, as confirmed during the country visit Poland by the
Ministry of Culture and National Heritage.
149
Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), p. 19.
150
Council of Ministers (2024b).
17
sector’s independence and stability amid potential external threats151
. The Government further
stated that this measure was a temporary solution, pending the implementation of the EMFA.
Yet, some stakeholders have expressed concerns over the potential constraints on media
pluralism152
and on the balance between state intervention and protection of national
security153
.
State advertising expenditure has become more evenly spread across multiple media
platforms. Currently, there are no established procedures for the allocation of public funds for
state advertising154
, and the MPM 2025 reports little transparency. Nevertheless, there are
reports of some progress since the 2024 Rule of Law Report with a more even distribution of
state advertising expenditure across media outlets155
. The Government intends, as part of the
upcoming media law reform, to address the various aspects of state advertising, including
transparency, and to address the process of controlling the process of allocating public funds
for state advertising156
.
The situation regarding transparency of media ownership improved, while the
Government is working on a media ownership database. As part of the market plurality, the
MPM 2025 notes that transparency of media ownership reached a medium-low risk level, a
decrease compared to the 2024 Rule of Law Report. However, some stakeholders have noted
the issue of fragmentation of ownership data157
. In addition, some issues have been reported
related to the lack of transparency in local media ownership, with stakeholders highlighting
uneven level playing field between privately owned local media and those publicly owned by
local government authorities158
. The Government is working on a media ownership database
as part of the media law reform to implement the EMFA.
The legal framework for access to public information remains stable, though stakeholders
report certain challenges with its implementation. This is particularly due to delays in
appellate proceedings following refusals or absence of responses to information requests159
.
Additionally, authorities may rely on several exceptions which, according to stakeholders,
results in inconsistent and restrictive interpretations160
. As highlighted by the MPM, journalists
continue to encounter challenges in obtaining public information such as being denied access
by press officers at state institutions and experiencing prolonged accreditation procedures161
.
The number of SLAPPs has decreased, while the Government continues to work on
legislation to address additional challenges affecting the safety of journalists. The number
of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) initiated by national public
authorities decreased compared to the 2024 Rule of Law Report162
and state-owned companies
have dropped some lawsuits. However, some new cases have emerged, launched primarily by
151
Prawo.pl (2024).
152
European Civic Forum (2025), p. 16.
153
Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), p. 20.
154
Country visit Poland, Ministry of Culture and National Heritage.
155
Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), p. 28; Country visit Poland, Chamber of Press Publishers.
156
Country visit Poland, Ministry of Culture and National Heritage.
157
Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), pp. 18-19.
158
Demagog (2024a), Portal Samorządowy (2025).
159
Country visit Poland, Watchdog Polska.
160
7 NGOs (2025), written input, pp. 31, 37.
161
Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), p. 6.
162
7 NGOs (2025), written input, p. 37, as confirmed during the Country visit with the Helsinki Foundation for
Human Rights.
18
private entities, individuals and local governments163
. In the reporting period, the Council of
Europe Platform to Promote the Protection of Journalism and the Safety of Journalists has
recorded four new alerts concerning Poland. Two of the created alerts concern harassment and
intimidation of journalists, respectively, an incident of a journalist denied access to crisis
management meetings, and threats against an investigative journalist. The other two alerts
concern defamation and insult laws and practice, and journalists fearing a loss of editorial
independence as a TV channel reconstructs164
. Moreover, the Mapping Media Freedom
monitoring report has noted twenty-one new alerts: nine relating to incidents of interference,
eight relating to verbal attacks and four classified as lawsuits and fines165
. At the same time,
self-regulatory measures and trade unions are lacking within the journalistic community166
. In
January 2025, the Government published a draft law to implement the anti-SLAPP Directive167
.
The use of defamation and insult laws against journalists has been reported to pose
additional risks. The Safety of Journalists Platform reports a systemic issue with journalists
lacking adequate protection under the current defamation and insult laws168
. According to some
stakeholders, the current law on defamation creates additional risks of SLAPPs being used
against journalists169
. As part of the law implementing the anti-SLAPP Directive, the
Government intends to limit the severity of the penalty for the offence of defamation170
. While
stakeholders view the Government’s engagement as positive, they consider that this measure
would not entirely eliminate the risk of defamation being used as a potential basis for SLAPPs
against journalists171
.
The Government is working on new rules to protect journalistic sources and confidential
communications. Some stakeholders deem the existing rules for the protection of journalistic
sources and confidential communications insufficient172
. The Government intends to address
these issues in the upcoming media law reform and sees the need to launch inter-ministerial
dialogue to find appropriate solutions to address these issues173
. Building on this momentum,
in December 2024 the Polish authorities amended three regulations related to operational
control carried out by special services174
. Under the new rules, requests for operational control
addressed to the prosecutor’s office and courts must be better substantiated and the courts must
justify not only refusals, but also authorisations of operational control. However, some
stakeholders have called for more comprehensive rules on surveillance175
.
163
7 NGOs (2025), written input, p. 37; ENHRI (2025), written input, p. 16.
164
Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists (2025).
165
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2025).
166
Country visit Poland, Journalists’ Society (Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie); Media Pluralism Monitor (2025),
p. 7.
167
Ministry of Justice (2025g).
168
Safety of Journalists Platform (2024). Defamation (as per Article 212 of the Criminal Code) and insult (under
Article 216) are considered criminal offenses, carrying penalties such as fines or community service. When
defamation or insult occurs through the media, imprisonment remains a possible punishment.
169
Safety of Journalists Platform (2024).
170
Prawo.pl (2025c).
171
Gazeta Prawna (2025).
172
7 NGOs (2025), written input, p. 36. For instance, in practical terms: Judicial review is limited to cases where
journalists sources are presented as evidence in criminal proceedings, rendering this protection limited. The
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found in the case Pietrzak v. Poland, Bychawska-Siniarska and
Others v. Poland (June 2024) that the Polish national legislation fails to offer adequate safeguards against
excessive surveillance and unwarranted interference with individuals' privacy.
173
Country visit Poland, Ministry of Culture.
174
Council of Ministers (2024c).
175
Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), p. 37.
19
IV. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES
Poland strengthened the rules governing consultations to improve the quality of
legislation. In line with its commitments under the Recovery and Resilience Plan176
, Poland
amended177
the rules of procedure of the Sejm, the Senate and the Council of Ministers to
introduce a mandatory impact assessment and public consultation for draft laws. While the
long-term effects of these reforms will need to be assessed178
, stakeholders179
consider that the
new rules provide them with sufficient time to present their views on draft legislation180
.
On 1 January 2025, Poland had 52 leading judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights pending implementation, an increase of 6 compared to the previous year181. At that
time, Poland’s rate of leading judgments from the past 10 years that had been implemented was
at 49% (unchanged from 2024; 51% remained pending), and the average time that the
judgments had been pending implementation was 5 years and 5 months (unchanged from
2024)182
. The oldest leading judgment, pending implementation for almost 20 years, concerns
excessive length of proceedings before administrative bodies and courts and absence of an
effective remedy183
. As regards the respect of payment deadlines, on 31 December 2024 there
were 26 cases in total awaiting confirmation of payments (compared to 18 in 2023)184
. On 16
June 2025, the number of leading judgments pending implementation had increased to 54185
.
Upon request of the Polish authorities, the European Court of Human Rights postponed, from
23 November 2024 to 23 November 2025, the examination of cases raising similar problems
as in those identified in the pilot judgment in the Wałęsa v. Poland case, pending resolution of
the systemic problems and adoption of general measures to remedy them186
. It also suspended
until that same date the processing of applications submitted in the context of the reorganisation
of the judicial system in Poland in the years 2016-2023187
. As mentioned above, in line with
its commitments under the Action Plan on the Rule of Law, Poland is preparing a draft law on
the implementation of rulings of the European Court of Human Rights188
, which has not yet
been tabled to Parliament.
Efforts are made to address instances of abuse of power by public officials. Two out of the
three investigative committees established by the Sejm finalised their works and reported on
the scope of criminal liability of public officials that should be followed up by the prosecution
176
2024 Rule of Law Report, Poland, p. 29.
177
The new rules of procedures of the Sejm entered into force on 1 November 2024, and those of the Council of
Ministers on 20 August 2024; Polish Government (2025), written input, p. 23.
178
According to stakeholders, for the time being the impact of the change is limited with consultations on some
60-75% of draft laws proposed in May-December 2024, and better justification for reducing consultation
below 21 days would be desirable; 7 NGOs (2025), written input, pp. 40-41.
179
In the period November-December 2024, all draft laws proposed by Sejm members were subject to public
consultation (23); in one case a 30-days consultation period was shortened to 14 days. Before, no public
consultations were held. 7 NGOs (2025), written input, p. 4; Polish Government (2025), written input, p. 23.
180
Country visit to Poland, Ombudsperson. According to the Ombudsperson’s office, while the Ombudsperson
is provided with adequate time to present views on draft legislation tabled, its recommendations are not
reflected in the legislation adopted.
181
For an explanation of the supervision process, see the Council of Europe (2025).
182
All figures calculated by the European Implementation Network (EIN) and based on the number of cases that
are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2025. EIN (2025), written input, p. 7.
183
Judgment of the ECtHR, 51837/99, Beller v. Poland, pending implementation since 2005.
184
Council of Europe (2025), p. 157.
185
Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC).
186
ECtHR judgment of 23 November 2023, Wałęsa v. Poland, 50849/21.
187
ECtHR (2024).
188
Draft law UD177 of 23 December 2024; Polish Government (2025), written input, p. 25. See Pilar I, p. 3.
20
service189
. Before they concluded their work, the Constitutional Tribunal considered two of the
investigative committees to be unconstitutional on grounds of their broad mandate and the
limited timeframe for their analysis190
. The President of the Republic vetoed the law abolishing
the State Committee for the examination of Russian influence on the internal security of Poland
between 2007 and 2022, which had already ceased its operations in practice191
. Law
enforcement agencies followed up on the findings of the Supreme Audit Office192
. Legal
professions are functioning well and enjoy a high degree of independence193
, notably as regards
the protection of professional secrecy, the disclosure of which, when requested by prosecutors,
is in principle refused by courts194
.
The Ombudsperson continues to fulfil a key role in the system of checks and balances.
The Ombudsperson enjoys an ‘A’ status by the UN Global Alliance of National Human Rights
Institutions (GANHRI)195
. His annual budget was increased. Nevertheless, the Ombudsperson
still considers it suboptimal in view of all the tasks linked to his mandate196
. The Ombudsperson
remains committed to promoting a vibrant and pluralistic civic space, where civil society and
rights’ defenders can do their work freely197
.
Less than half of the companies surveyed in Poland express high levels of confidence in
the effectiveness of investment protection. 39% of companies are very or fairly confident
that investments are protected by law and courts. The main reasons among companies for their
lack of confidence are the frequent changes in legislation or the quality of the law-making
process (36%). 73% perceive the level of independence of the national competition authority
(Office of Competition and Consumer Protection) as very or fairly good198
. The Government
intends to reduce the administrative burden for business and society, focusing on deregulation
of commercial and administrative law, creating a task force and, concomitantly, to adopt a draft
law to that effect199
. The Supreme Audit Office considers it important to improve public
support for business in Poland to optimise the business environment in line with the guidelines
contained in government strategies200
. A number of judicial mechanisms are in place at the
level of the Supreme Administrative Court to ensure the implementation of administrative court
judgments, which include the possibility to quash administrative decisions for continued non-
189
This concerns the investigative committee to examine possible breaches of law by the organisers of the
“postal” Presidential elections in 2020 and the investigative committee to examine alleged irregularities in
the issuance of Polish visas to foreigners. The investigative committee for the use of “Pegasus” software
continues its activities.
190
Rulings of 6 November 2024 (case U 2/24) and of 10 September 2024 (case U 4/24). The rulings have not
been published (see Pillar I).
191
President of the Republic (2024d) who decided to veto the law abolishing the State Committee on 16 August
2024. For the lack of operability of the State Committee see 2024 Rule of Law Report Poland pp. 31-32.
192
Country visit to Poland (2025), Supreme Audit Office.
193
Country visit to Poland (2025), National Bar Council and National Chamber of Legal Councillors. CCBE
(2025), written input, p. 156.
194
According to data presented by the National Bar Council in the context of the country visit to Poland.
195
Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (2023).
196
ENNHRI (2025), written input, p. 3.
197
Ombudsperson (2024), (2025a).
198
Figures 54, 55 and 60, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard. 35% of the surveyed investors perceive the quality,
efficiency or independence of justice as a reason for the lack of confidence in investment protection.
199
Council of Ministers (2025a), (2025b), Prawo.pl (2025b).
200
Supreme Audit Office (2024).
21
compliance with the court’s instructions. However, these mechanisms do not include
disciplinary actions against the responsible officials or direct enforcement measures201
.
Some further progress has been made to improve the framework in which civil society
operates202
. In March 2025, the assessment of the civic space in Poland was updated from
‘obstructed’ to ‘narrowed’203
. The Public Benefit Committee of the Council of Ministers
organised special working groups with civil society organisations on matters pertaining to their
functioning and intends to reflect their input in future legislation204
. Based on the work of the
groups, a draft amendment to the Act on Public Benefit Activities and Volunteering was
prepared and submitted to the Council of Ministers for consideration. Stakeholders underlined
that the engagement with civil society and the improvements to their financing system are still
at an early stage, but that the direction is overall good205
. A new government program has been
launched for small and medium-sized non-governmental organisations in small towns, with a
budget of PLN 70 million for 2025. Steps have also been taken to increase the protection
against hate crime and hate speech. The Government set up a special Committee to examine
alleged attacks against civil society organisations and rights defenders in the past and to come
up with recommendations to strengthen the enabling environment for civil society206
. At the
same time, civil society organisations reported that measures adopted by the Government,
while not addressed specifically to NGOs, adversely affected their functioning207
. Overall,
some further progress has been made to improve the framework in which civil society operates.
201
EU Justice Scoreboard 2025, Figure 49. The information provided reflects exclusively the existing
mechanisms in the highest administrative court instance.
202
The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to ‘[c]ontinue the on-going process to improve the
framework in which civil society operates, taking into account European standards on civil society
organisations’.
203
Rating given by CIVICUS. Ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed,
repressed and closed. Until 2024, the civic space was considered obstructed.
204
Working Group for Simplifying Law as regards the NGOs, Working Group for Activism and Volunteering,
and Working Group for Civic Participation and Dialogue. Polish Government (2025), written input, p. 27,
the Council of Ministers (2025), NGO.pl (2025).
205
7 NGOs (2025), written input, pp. 45-48.
206
Ministry of Justice (2025f).
207
The Polish authorities introduced a ban at the Polish-Belarussian border prohibiting entities unauthorised by
the State bodies from operating at that border. The Polish authorities justify their actions and restrictions at
the border on grounds of national security. Statements made by MPs or members of the Government against
NGOs active in the field of environment and migration, gave rise to increasing negative rhetoric against civil
society organisations working on those issues. 7 NGOs (2025), written input, pp. 46-47. Helsinki Foundation
of Human Rights (2025a), Watchdog Polska (2025), written input, p. 18. Country visit Poland (2025),
Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights and Batory Foundation.
22
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order*
* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2025 Rule of Law report
can be found at https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2025-rule-law-report-targeted-
stakeholder-consultation_en.
Batory Foundation, (2024), Position on the government's bill on the coordination of anti-corruption
activities and liquidation of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (Oświadczenie Fundacji im. Stefana
Batorego w sprawie rządowego projektu ustaw o koordynacji działań antykorupcyjnych oraz likwidacji
Centralnego Biura Antykorupcyjnego), https://www.batory.org.pl/oswiadczenie/stanowisko-fundacji-
im-stefana-batorego-ws-rzadowego-projektu-ustawy-o-koordynacji-dzialan-antykorupcyjnych-oraz-
likwidacji-centralnego-biura-antykorupcyjnego/.
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024), Transformation Index (BTI) – Country report: Poland, https://bti-
project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2024_POL.pdf.
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2025), Media Pluralism Monitor 2025, Country report
for Poland, https://cmpf.eui.eu/projects/media-pluralism-monitor/
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2025a), Asset declarations – work on a new bill,
https://www.cba.gov.pl/en/news/1325,Asset-declarations-work-on-a-new-bill.html.
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2024), Information on the results of activities of the Central Anti-
Corruption Bureau in 2023, https://www.cba.gov.pl/download/1/7450/informacjaza2023r.pdf .
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2025b), More people facing charges,
https://www.cba.gov.pl/en/news/1351,More-people-facing-charges.html.
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2025c), News section, https://www.cba.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci. Central
Anti-Corruption Bureau (2023), CBA audit at the National Cnetre for Research and Development (…),
https://www.cba.gov.pl/pl/kontrole/4979,Kontrola-CBA-w-Narodowym-Centrum-Badan-i-
Rozwoju.html?search=738317815.
Chancellery of the Prime Minister(2024), Draft law on coordination of anti-corruption activities and on
liquidation of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau of 6 December 2024 (…),
https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/projekt-ustawy-o-koordynacji-dzialan-antykorupcyjnych-oraz-
likwidacji-centralnego-biura-antykorupcyjnego.
Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2025), Rule of Law Report, Poland,
https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/rolreport2025-main/45330.
Constitutional Tribunal, judgment of [date], Case K 10/24, https://trybunal.gov.pl/postepowanie-i-
orzeczenia/wokanda/art/ksztaltowanie-przez-unie-europejska-i-jej-organy-kompetencji-do-wyboru-
przez-panstwo-czlonkowskiego-zrodla-energii-i-ogolnej-struktury-zaopatrzenia-rzeczypospolitej-
polskiej-w-energie-2.
Constitutional Tribunal (2025a), Statement of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal as regards
the infringement case C-448/23, https://trybunal.gov.pl/wiadomosci/uroczystosci-spotkania-
wyklady/art/pismo-prezesa-tk-bogdana-swieczkowskiego-do-premiera-donalda-tuska-w-sprawie-
stanowiska-polskiego-rzadu-w-postepowaniu-przed-tsue.
Constitutional Tribunal (2025b), Notification of a reasonable suspicion of a criminal offence having
been committed,
https://trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/uroczystosci_spotkania_wizyty/2025/2025_02_24/NOTIFIC
ATION_of_31_January_2025_translated_from_Pol._into_Eng_.pdf.
23
Constitutional Tribunal (2025c), Letter of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal to the Prosecutor-
General (…), https://trybunal.gov.pl/wiadomosci/uroczystosci-spotkania-wyklady/art/pismo-prezesa-
trybunalu-konstytucyjnego-do-prokuratora-generalnego-z-26-lutego-2025-r.
Constitutional Tribunal (2025d), Signalisation letter of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal to
the Deputy Disciplinary Officer for Ordinary Court Judges (…),
https://trybunal.gov.pl/wiadomosci/uroczystosci-spotkania-wyklady/art/pismo-sygnalizacyjne-
prezesa-tk-bogdana-swieczkowskiego-do-zastepca-rzecznika-dyscyplinarnego-sedziow-sadow-
powszechnych.
Constitutional Tribunal (2025e), Declaration of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal of 16
January 2025 (Oświadczenie Prezesa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego),
https://trybunal.gov.pl/wiadomosci/uroczystosci-spotkania-wyklady/art/oswiadczenie-prezesa-
trybunalu-konstytucyjnego-z-16-stycznia-2025-r.
Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2025), Supervision of the execution of judgments and
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, 18th
Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers,
https://rm.coe.int/gbr-2001-18e-rapport-annuel-2024/1680b4d77d.
Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2024), opinion of 24 June 2024 no. CDL-AD(2024)018.
Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2024a), opinion of 14 October 2024 nos. CDL-AD(2024)029
and CDL-AD(2024)034.
Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2024b), opinion of 11 December no. 2024 CDL-AD(2024)035.
Council of Europe: Venice Commission and the Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of Law
(2024c), opinion on European standards regulating the status of judges CDL-AD(2024)02.
Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists (2025),
Poland, https://fom.coe.int/en/accueil .
Council of Ministers (2024a), Resolution No. 162 of 18 December 2024 on the counteracting the
negative effects of the constitutional crisis as regards the judiciary (Uchwała Rady Ministrów z dn. 18
grudnia 2024 r. w sprawie przeciwdziałania negatywnym skutkom kryzysu konstytucyjnego w obszarze
sądownictwa), https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WMP20240001068/O/M20241068.pdf.
Council of Ministers (2024b) Regulation of 18 December 2024 on the list of entities subject to
protection and their competent control authorities, Journal of Laws 2024 item 1892.
Council of Ministers (2024c), Amendments to the regulation of the President of the Council of Ministers
as regards the operational control carried out by special forces (Nowelizacja rozporządzeń Prezesa Rady
Ministrów dot. Kontroli Operacyjnej realizowanej przez służby specjalne)
https://www.gov.pl/web/sluzby-specjalne/nowelizacja-rozporzadzen-prezesa-rady-ministrow-dot-
kontroli-operacyjnej-realizowanej-przez-sluzby-specjalne.
Council of Ministers (2025), Working Groups at Public Benefit Committee
https://www.gov.pl/web/pozytek/grupy-robocze.
Council of Ministers (2025a), Draft law amending certain laws in order to deregulate commercial and
administrative law and to improve the principles of commercial law-making (Projekt ustawy o zmianie
niektórych ustaw w celu deregulacji prawa gospodarczego i administracyjnego oraz doskonalenia
zasad opracowywania prawa gospodarczego),https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/projekt-ustawy-o-
zmianie-niektorych-ustaw-w-celu-deregulacji-prawa-gospodarczego-i-administracyjnego-oraz-
doskonalenia-zasad-opracowywania-prawa-gospodarczego.
24
Council of Mnisters (2025b), Economy without unnecessary barriers – speeding up the deregulation
process (Gospodarka bez zbędnych barier – deregulacja
przyspiesza),https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/gospodarka-bez-zbednych-barier--deregulacja-
przyspiesza.
Council of the EU (2024), European Public Prosecutor’s Office: the Council appoints European
prosecutors from Poland and Sweden (Prokuratura Europejska: Rada powołuje prokuratorów
europejskich z Polski i Szwecji) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/press/press-
releases/2024/12/12/eu-public-prosecutor-s-office-eppo-council-appoints-european-prosecutors-for-
poland-and-sweden/pdf/.
Demagog (2024), Who is the media inviting? KO dominance in TVP (Kogo zapraszają media? W TVP
dominacja KO), https://demagog.org.pl/analizy_i_raporty/czysta-woda-bez-kobiet-i-z-dominacja-
koalicji-obywatelskiej-kogo-zapraszaja-programy-publicystyczne.
Demagog (2024a), Local journalists support ban on local government media. It's ruining the market
(Lokalni dziennikarze za zakazem mediów samorządowych. „To psucie rynku”),
https://demagog.org.pl/analizy_i_raporty/lokalni-dziennikarze-za-zakazem-mediow-samorzadowych-
to-psucie-rynku/.
DoRzeczy.pl (2025), The 2025 budget. The President makes a move (Budżet na 2025 rok. Jest ruch
prezydenta), https://dorzeczy.pl/ekonomia/678891/budzet-na-2025-rok-prezydent-duda-zwrocil-sie-
do-trybunalu.html.
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2025), Media Freedom Rapid Response – Poland,
https://www.mfrr.eu/.
European Civic Forum (2025), written input for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.
European Court of Human Rights (2024), “Rule-of-law” cases against Poland are adjourned for an
additional year (ECHR 269(2024)), https://www.echr.coe.int/w/-rule-of-law-cases-against-poland-
adjourned.
European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 1 February 2005, Beller v. Poland, 51837/99.
European Implementation Network (EIN) (2025), written input for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.
European Parliament (2024), Parliamentary question E-003079/2024, Actions of Viktor Orbán’s
government in granting asylum to Marcin Romanowski, former Polish Deputy Minister of Justice, who
faces prosecution on corruption charges, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2024-
003079_EN.html.
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) (2024), College Decision of 16 December 2024,
https://www.gov.pl/attachment/d1da4170-50b3-4f81-8f25-c944ed01d722.
Gazeta Prawna (2025), A renewed call for the repeal of criminal liability for defamation (Ponowny apel
o zniesienie odpowiedzialności karnej za zniesławienie),
https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/kraj/artykuly/9722075,ponowny-apel-o-zniesienie-
odpowiedzialnosci-karnej-za-znieslawienie.html.
GRECO (2023), Fifth Evaluation Round, Second Compliance Report - Poland, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-
evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680abff3b.
GRECO (2019), Fifth Evaluation Round, Evaluation Report – Poland, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-
evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/168092005c.
25
GRECO (2025), Fourth Evaluation Round, Third Interim Compliance Report, including Follow-up to
the ad hoc (rule 34) report – Poland, https://rm.coe.int/grecorc4-2024-9-final-eng-3rd-interim-inc-rule-
34-poland-public/1680b35908.
Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights (2025), Correspondence with the Bureau of the Constitutional
Tribunal , https://hfhr.pl/upload/2025/03/mw_odpowiedz_tk.pdf.
Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights (2025a), Opinion of the HFHR on the regulation of the Council
of Ministers as regards the limitation of the right to international protection (Opinia HFPC o
rozporządzeniu Rady Ministrów w sprawie ograniczenia prawa do ochrony międzynarodowej),
https://hfhr.pl/aktualnosci/rozporzadzenie-zawieszajace-prawo-do-ochrony-miedzynarodowej.
International Press Institute and Media & Journalism Research Center (2025), Media Capture
Monitoring Report: Poland. Measuring Compliance with the European Media Freedom Act,
https://journalismresearch.org/2025/01/ipi-and-mjrc-publish-media-capture-monitoring-report-on-
poland/.
Mapping Media Freedom (2024), Head of KRRiT postpones decisions on TVN and Agora broadcasting
licences, https://www.mappingmediafreedom.org/.
Ministry of Culture and National Heritage (2024), European Media Freedom Act - Concept of
Implementation into the Polish Legal Order. Report from public consultations (Prezentujemy raport z
konsultacji społecznych założeń do ustawy medialnej), https://www.gov.pl/web/kultura/prezentujemy-
raport-z-konsultacji-spolecznych-zalozen-do-ustawy-medialnej.
Ministry of Justice (2025a), press release of 8 April 2025:
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/wszczecie-procedury-odwolania-prezesa-i-wiceprezes-sadu-
rejonowego-w-jastrzebiu-zdroju.
Ministry of Justice (2025b), press release of 7 April 2025:
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/wszczecie-procedury-odwolania-prezesa-sadu-rejonowego-
we-wloclawku.
Ministry of Justice (2025c), press release of 4 April 2025:
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/przemyslaw-radzik-odwolany-z-funkcji-zastepcy-rzecznika-
dyscyplinarnego-sedziow.
Ministry of Justice (2025d), press release of 7 April 2025: https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/co-
zmieni-sie-w-sadownictwie-program-cyfrowy-sad.
Ministry of Justice (2025e), press release of 19 March 2025:
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/program-cyfrowy-sad-zmieni-wymiar-sprawiedliwosci.
Ministry of Justice (2025f), press release of 7 April 2025:
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/komisja-zbada-naduzycia-poprzedniej-wladzy-wobec-
aktywistow.
Ministry of Justice (2025g), Register of draft legal acts, Projekty aktów prawnych - Ministerstwo
Sprawiedliwości - Portal Gov.pl.
Ministry of Justice (2025h), press release of 25 April 2025:
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/minister-sprawiedliwosci-odwoluje-sedziego-piotra-schaba-
z-funkcji-rzecznika-dyscyplinarnego.
26
Ministry of Justice (2025i), press release of 24 April 2025:
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/projekt-ustawy-o-przywroceniu-ladu-konstytucyjnego-w-
sadownictwie.
Ministry of Justice (2024), Funds allocated in the Justice Fund outside calls for proposals and
competitions in 2019–2023 (Środki przyznane w Funduszu Sprawiedliwości poza naborami i
konkursami w latach 2019–2023), https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/FS-raport-przyznanych-
srodkow.
National Bar Council (2024), Opinion on the MPs’ draft law – implementing the Law on the
Constitutional Tribunal,
https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki10ka.nsf/0/B387763708BB389BC1258B2600481F7A/%24File/254-
009.pdf
National Chamber of Legal Councillors (2024), Opinions on the MPs’ draft law on the Constitutional
Tribunal and on the draft law implementing the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal,
https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki10ka.nsf/0/D861FE8A99ADB0D0C1258B010039E4B1/%24File/253-
001.pdf;
https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki10ka.nsf/0/D39AF37966EBEDD4C1258B01003A0CA0/%24File/254-
004.pdf
National Council for the Judiciary (2025a), Statement of 8 April 2025:
https://www.krs.pl/pl/dzialalnosc/posiedzenia/2860-stanowisko-krajowej-rady-sadownictwa-z-dnia-8-
kwietnia-2025-r.html.
National Council for the Judiciary (2025b), Opinion of 11 October 2024:
https://krs.pl/pl/dzialalnosc/opinie-stanowiska-uchwaly/2672-opinia-krajowej-rady-sadownictwa-z-
dnia-11-pazdziernika-2024-r-w-przedmiocie-projektu-ustawy-o-zmianie-ustawy-prawo-o-ustroju-
sadow-powszechnych-oraz-ustawy-prawo-o-ustroju-sadow-wojskowych.html.
National Council for the Judiciary (2025c), Summary of the session of 4-7 March 2025:
https://krs.pl/pl/dzialalnosc/posiedzenia/2820-komunikat-po-posiedzeniu-krajowej-rady-sadownictwa-
w-dniach-4-7-marca-2025-r.html.
National Council for the Judiciary (2025d), Summary of the session of 18-21 March 2025:
https://krs.pl/pl/dzialalnosc/posiedzenia/2834-komunikat-po-posiedzeniu-krajowej-rady-sadownictwa-
w-dniach-18-21-marca-2025-r.html.
National Electoral Commission (2024), Resolution No. 389/2024,
https://pkw.gov.pl/uploaded_files/1732093619_ewp-124-prawo-i-sprawiedliwosc.pdf.
National Prosecution (2024), Press release of 6 September 2024: https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-
krajowa/informacja-o-wszczeciu-sledztwa-w-zwiazku-z-niezwolaniem-posiedzenia-trybunalu-stanu.
National Prosecution (2024a), Press release of 7 November 2024: https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-
krajowa/umorzenie-sledztwa-w-sprawie-niedopelnienia-obowiazkow-przez-sedziow-sadu-
najwyzszego.
National Prosecution (2024b), Press release of 13 November 2024:
https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-krajowa/wytyczne-prokuratora-generalnego-w-sprawie-
czynnosci-podejmowanych-przez-prokuratorow-wystepujacych-przed-sadem-najwyzszym.
National Prosecution (2025), Press release of 14 January 2025: https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-
krajowa/raport-czesciowy-zespolu-prokuratorow-do-zbadania-spraw-pozostajacych-w-
zainteresowaniu-opinii-publicznej.
27
National Prosecution (2025a), Press release of 11 February 2025:
https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-krajowa/wszczecie-sledztwa-zpg.
National Prosecution (2025b), Press release of 7 March 2025: https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-
krajowa/wytyczne-prokuratora-generalnego-w-zakresie-prowadzenia-postepowan-o-przestepstwa-
motywowane-uprzedzeniami.
National Prosecution Office (2025c), News section, https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-
krajowa/aktualnosci.
National Prosecutor Office (2024), Funds allocated by the Justice Fund outside calls for proposals and
competitions in 2019-2023 (Środki przyznane w Funduszy Sprawiedliwości poza naborami i
konkursami w latach 2019-2023 – interactywna mapa), https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/FS-
raport-przyznanych-srodkow.
National Prosecutor’s Office (2025), Interim report of prosecutors to investigate cases of public interest
(Raport częściowy zespołu prokuratorów do zbadania spraw pozostających w zainteresowaniu opinii
publicznej), https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-krajowa/raport-czesciowy-zespolu-prokuratorow-
do-zbadania-spraw-pozostajacych-w-zainteresowaniu-opinii-publicznej.
NGO.pl – Portal Organizacji Pozarządowych (2025), Working Group for Civic Participation and
Dialogue. Summary of its first months’ work (Grupa robocza do spraw partycypacji I dialogu
obywatelskiego. Podsumowanie pierwszych miesięcy prac), https://publicystyka.ngo.pl/grupa-robocza-
do-spraw-partycypacji-i-dialogu-obywatelskiego-podsumowanie-pierwszych-miesiecy-prac-tau.
Notes from Poland (2025), Poland detains officials accused of corruptly helping 12,500 immigrants
obtain visas, https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/04/09/poland-detains-officials-accused-of-corruptly-
helping-12500-immigrants-obtain-visas/.
OECD (2024), Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 – Two Year Follow-Up Report ),
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-anti-bribery-convention-phase-4-two-year-follow-up-
report-on-poland_83945426-
en.html#:~:text=This%20Phase%204%20Two%2DYear,International%20Business%20Transactions
%20and%20the.
Official Journal (2024), Resolution of the Supreme Court of 3 September 2024,
https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20240001883/O/D20241883.pdf.
Ombudsperson (2024), Remarks of the Ombudsperson as regards the the Local Government Charters
of Family Rights. Announcements of amendments in the already adopted Charters and repeal of certain
other Charters (Uwagi RPO dot. Samorządowych Kart Praw Rodzin. Zapowiedzi zmian w uchwałach i
uchylenie kolejnych), https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-samorzadowa-karta-praw-rodzin-
watpliwosci-odpowiedzi.
Ombudsperson (2025), Another judgment of the ECtHR on the lack of legal recognition of same-sex
partnerships in Poland (Kolejny wyrok ETPC ws. braku prawnego uznania w Polsce związków
jednopłciowych), https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/etpc-polska-kolejny-wyrok-brak-uznania-
zwiazkow-jednoplciowych.
Ombudsperson (2025a), Ombudsperson on the draft law amending the Law on the granting of
protection to foreigners in the territory of the Polish Republic. Opinion transmitted to the President of
the Republic (RPO o projekcie nowelizacji ustawy o udzielaniu cudzoziemcom ochrony na terytorium
RP. Opinia przekazana Prezydentowi RP), https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-cudzoziemcy-
ochrona-miedzynarodowa-projekt-opinia-prezydent.
28
Ombudsperson (2024), Laws on the Constitutinal Tribunal. The opinion of ODIHR confirms a part of
reservations of the Ombudsperson (Ustawy dotyczące Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Opinia ODIHR
potwierdza część zastrzeżeń RPO), https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-ustawy-dotyczace-tk-
uzupelniajace-uwagi-sejm
OSCE/ODIHR (2024a), Parliamentary Elections, 15 October 2023: Final Report,
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/8/565423_1.pdf.
OSCE/ODIHR (2024b), opinion-Nr.: JUD-POL/502/2024,
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/b/575707.pdf.
OSCE/ODIHR (2024c), ODIHR discusses election observation findings and recommendations on 2023
parliamentary elections in Poland, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/poland/576387.
OSCE/ODIHR (2023d), Parliamentary Elections: Final Report,
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/8/565423_1.pdf.
Permanent Committee of the Council of Ministers (2024), press release of 6 December 2024,
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/komitet-staly-rady-ministrow-przyjal-projekt-rozdzielajacy-
funkcje-prokuratora-generalnego-i-szefa-ms.
Polish Government (2023), Coalition Agreement, https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/koalicja-
15padziernika-program
Polish Institute on Human Rights and Business (2024), Basic analysis of the current situation in Poland
regarding access to remedies in cases of corporate abuse (…), https://pihrb.org/wp-
content/uploads/2024/12/PHIRB_RS_1_2024_Analiza-barier_web_final-1-1.pdf.
Portal Samorządowy (2025), Ministry of Culture and National Heritage: new regulations would allow
local governments to publish bulletins without advertisements (MKiDN: nowe przepisy dopuszczałyby
wydawanie przez samorządy biuletynów bez reklam),
https://samorzad.pap.pl/kategoria/aktualnosci/mkidn-nowe-przepisy-dopuszczalyby-wydawanie-
przez-samorzady-biuletynow-bez.
Prawo.pl (2024), TVN and Polsat as strategic companies? Tusk's plan is not so simple legally (TVN i
Polsat jako spółki strategiczne? Plan Tuska nie taki prosty prawnie), https://www.prawo.pl/biznes/tvn-
i-polsat-jako-spolki-strategiczne-prawnicy-maja-watpliwosci,530512.html.
Prawo.pl (2025), A section of „neo-judges” was created at the Regional Court in Warsaw (Powstała
„sekcja neo-sędziów” w Sądzie Okręgowym w Warszawie), https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-
sady/sekcja-neo-sedziow-w-sadzie-okregowym-w-warszawie,531397.html.
Prawo.pl (2025a), Digitalisation in courts going beyond Swiss-Franc loans cases (…),
https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/cyfryzacja-sadow-jakie-plany-ms,532071.html.
Prawo.pl (2025b), Draft law on the deregulation finally adopted by the government (Projekt ustawy
deregulacyjnej wreszcie przyjęty przez rząd), https://www.prawo.pl/biznes/co-zawiera-rzadowa-
ustawa-deregulacyjna,531919.html.
Prawo.pl (2025c), Suppressing criticism by prosecuting defamation is more difficult, but penalties are
to remain (Tłumienie krytyki przez ściganie zniesławienia trudniejsze, ale kary mają zostać),
https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/znieslawienie-a-zmiany-w-procedurze-cywilnej,531261.html.
29
President of the Republic (2024a), press release of 2 August 2024:
https://www.prezydent.pl/prawo/wnioski-do-tk/nowela-ustawy-o-krs-skierowana-do-trybunalu-
konstytucyjnego,89868.
President of the Republic (2024b), press release of 7 October 2024:
https://www.prezydent.pl/prawo/wnioski-do-tk/dwa-wnioski-do-tk-w-trybie-kontroli-
prewencyjnej,92504.
President of the Republic (2024c), press release of 9 December 2024:
https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/nominacje/prezydent-powolal-bogdana-swieczkowskiego-na-
prezesa-tk,95276.
President of the Republic (2024d), press release of 16 August 2024:
https://www.prezydent.pl/prawo/zawetowane/weto-do-ustawy-o-uchyleniu-ustawy-o-panstwowej-
komisji-ds-badania-rosyjskich-wplywow,90267.
President of the Republic (2025), press release of 10 March 2024:
https://www.prezydent.pl/prawo/zawetowane/prezydenckie-weto-do-tzw-ustawy-
incydentalnej,98576.
President of the Republic (2025a), press release of 21 February 2025:
https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/nominacje/prezydent-powolal-wiceprezesa-tk,97718.
President of the Republic (2025b), press release of 17 January 2025:
https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/prezydent-budzet,96257.
Rzeczpospolita (2023), Two candidates to the post of the Vice-President of the Constitutional Tribunal
selected (Wybrano dwóch kandydatów na wiceprezesa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego),
https://www.rp.pl/sady-i-trybunaly/art38765721-wybrano-dwoch-kandydatow-na-wiceprezesa-
trybunalu-konstytucyjnego.
Rzeczpospolita (2025), Constitutional Tribunal replies to the opinion of the CJEU Advocate General.
“Grave violation of exclusive competences” (Trybunał Konstytucyjny odpowiada na opinię rzecznika
TSUE. „Rażące wkroczenie w wyłączne kompetencje”), https://www.rp.pl/sady-i-
trybunaly/art41908791-trybunal-konstytucyjny-odpowiada-na-opinie-rzecznika-tsue-razace-
wkroczenie-w-wylaczne-kompetencje.
Science Business (2023), Audit uncovers ‘corruption mechanisms’ at Polish research funding agency,
https://sciencebusiness.net/news/international-news/audit-uncovers-corruption-mechanisms-polish-
research-funding-agency.
Sejm (2023), Committee of Inquiry to investigate the legality, correctness and purposefulness of
actions taken to prepare and conduct the election of the President of the Republic of Poland in 2020
in the form of postal voting (SKGK),
https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm10.nsf/agent.xsp?symbol=KOMISJASL&NrKadencji=10&KodKom=S
KGK.
Supreme Audit Office (2024), Effects of the functioning of the system of business environment
institutions (Efekty działalności systemu instytucji otoczenia biznesu of 27 August 2024
(KGP.430.2.2024)): https://www.nik.gov.pl/najnowsze-informacje-o-wynikach-kontroli/instytucje-
otoczenia-biznesu.html.
Supreme Audit Office (2023), NCBR – Billions spent with no effect for innovations, 16 November
2023 https://www.nik.gov.pl/en/news/ncbr-billions-spent-with-no-effect-for-innovations.html.
30
Supreme Audit Office (2022a), Post-audit presentation of the audit Implementation of the Government
Anti-Corruption Programme for 2018-2020 (Wystąpienie Pokontrolne – Realizacja Rządowego
Programu Przeciwdziałania Korupcji n alata 2018-2020), https://www.nik.gov.pl/kontrole/wyniki-
kontroli-nik/pobierz,kap~p_21_007_202109201211591632132719~id5~01,typ,kj.pdf.
Supreme Audit Office (2022b), Implementation of the Government Programme Counteracting
Corruption for the Years 2018-2020 (…), https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,27014,vp,29814.pdf.
Supreme Court (2024a), press release of 27 September 2024:
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=1028-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2024.
Supreme Court (2024b), press release of 3 September 2024:
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=1017-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2024.
Supreme Court (2024c), press release of 12 September 2024:
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=1024-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2024.
Supreme Court (2024d), press release of 23 December 2024:
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=1047-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2024.
Supreme court (2024e), press release of 22 November 2024:
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=1040-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2024.
Supreme Court (2025), press release of 5 April 2025:
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=1070-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2025.
Supreme Court (2025a), press release of 27 February 2025:
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=1059-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2025.
Wirtualna Polska (2024), High fine for Świrski. KRRiT chief punished by court (Wysoka grzywna dla
Świrskiego. Szef KRRiT ukarany przez sąd), https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/swirski-ukarany-przez-sad-
razaca-bezczynnosc-7074551057144320a.
31
Annex II: Country visit to Poland
The Commission services held virtual meetings in March 2025 with:
• Association of Judges ‘Sędziowie RP’
• Association of Judges ‘Themis’ (Stowarzyszenie Sędziów Polskich Themis)
• Association of Judges and Prosecutors ‘Iustitia’ (Stowarzyszenie Sędziów Polskich
Iustitia)
• Association of Polish Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich)
• Association of Prosecutors ‘Lex Super Omnia’ (Stowarzyszenie Prorkuratorów Lex
Super Omnia)
• Batory Foundation (Fundacja Batorego)
• Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne)
• Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (Helsinska Fundacja Praw Człowieka)
• Ministry of Culture and National Heritage (Ministerstwo Kultury i Dziedzictwa
Narodowego)
• Ministry of Justice (Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości)
• National Bar Council (Naczelna Rada Adwokacka)
• National Chamber of Legal Councillors (Krajowa Izba Radców Prawnych)
• National Council for the Judiciary (Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa)
• National Media Council (Rada Mediów Narodowych)
• National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i
Telewizji)
• Office of the Minister of European Affairs (Urząd Ministra ds. Europejskich)
• Ombudsperson’s Office (Biuro Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich)
• Polish Media Association (Stowarzyszenie Polskich Mediów)
• Prosecutor General’s Office (Prokuratura Generalna)
• Society of Journalists (Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie)
• Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny)
• Supreme Audit Office (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli)
• Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy)
• Watchdog Polska
* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:
• Amnesty International
• Araminta
• Civil Liberties Union for Europe
• Civil Society Europe
• European Civic Forum
• European Partnership for Democracy
• European Youth Forum,
• International Commission of Jurists
• International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
32
• JEF Europe
• Philea – Philanthropy Europe Association.
• Transparency International