REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD OPINION Review of the Securitisation framework

EUROPEAN COMMISSION
11.4.2025
SEC(2025) 825
REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD OPINION
{COM(2025) 825-826}
{SWD(2025) 825-826}
Review of the Securitisation framework
Offentligt
KOM (2025) 0825 - SEK-dokument
Europaudvalget 2025
________________________________
This opinion concerns a draft impact assessment which may differ from the final version.
Commission européenne/Europese Commissie, 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË - Tel. +32 22991111
regulatory-scrutiny-board@ec.europa.eu
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD
Brussels,
RSB
Opinion
Title: Impact assessment / Review of the Securitisation framework
Overall opinion: POSITIVE WITH RESERVATIONS
(A) Policy context
Securitisation involves pooling various types of contractual debt, such as mortgages, auto
loans, or credit card debt, and selling their related cash flows to third-party investors as
securities.
This review of the securitisation framework comprises an evaluation and a back-to-back
impact assessment
(B) Key issues
The Board notes the additional information provided and commitments to make
changes to the report.
However, the report still contains significant shortcomings. The Board gives a
positive opinion with reservations because it expects DG FISMA to rectify the
following aspects:
(1) The report does not sufficiently substantiate the problem and its drivers. It does
not clearly identify the evidence driving the conclusion that over-restrictive
prudential, due diligence and transparency requirements act as a barrier to the
development of the market.
(2) The report does not adequately define the key elements for each of the assessed
options. It is unclear what is supposed to change in the prudential framework
and due diligence and transparency rules. The report does not therefore clearly
bring out the choices and trade-offs made when developing the options.
(3) The report does not adequately assess and compare the combined impacts of the
options in terms of how they could affect the stability of the financial system. The
report is also not sufficiently clear on whether the different options presented
imply different risk levels for the financial system.
2
(C) What to improve
(1) The problem analysis should better explain and demonstrate whether the current
regulatory requirements go beyond what is strictly necessary to ensure the stability of
financial markets. The main body of the report should summarise the key findings of the
evaluation to illustrate and underpin the existence and magnitude of the problem, e.g.
which concrete transparency requirements provide information which is not used by the
investors for decision making. The analysis of external factors should also be better
substantiated.
(2) The report should place the problem of unduly high operational costs in a broader
market context and analyse how it might have effected the overall growth of the
securitisation market in past years.
(3) The baseline should more precisely identify the expected evolution of the
securitisation market and the related impact on the wider economy in the absence of any
change to the current framework.
(4) The report should outline the specific changes proposed in each option. For example,
in streamlining the disclosure templates for public transactions by reducing the mandatory
data fields, the report should be clear about which type of data fields should be eliminated
and why they are not seen as necessary. The report needs to outline precisely what the
prudential options entail. It should clearly define, explain and justify credible variations
to key option variables such as (p) factor, risk weight floor or the reasoning behind the
percentage choice (25%, 40%, or 75%) in risk factor decrease.
(5) The report should discuss whether there are other combinations of options considered.
The report should provide a clearer explanation for considering or discarding certain
options, including a deeper analysis of options that reduce further regulatory requirements
if this has no negative impact on financial stability, and why options that may not be in
line with international agreements were considered .
(6) The report should better assess the impacts of lowered requirements on the risks to
the stability of the financial system, based on modelling where appropriate. It should better
explain and substantiate to what extent the simplification may or may not increase
financial stability risks. On prudential options, the report should provide a substantiated
comparative analysis of financial stability risks. In addition, when comparing the options,
the report should clarify how different values (pluses and minuses) are assigned for
different comparison criteria and aggregated into a combined score.
(7) The report should analyse and take into account the combined impact of the options
on financial system stability.
(8) The report should include monitoring indicators that could help assess and measure
to what extent the achievement of the objectives is due to the intervention. For example,
while the proposed monitoring system will capture increase in number of securitisations,
it would benefit from including stakeholder representative data indicating to what extent
this is due to reduced operational costs and prudential barriers.
Some more technical comments have been sent directly to DG FISMA.
3
(D) Conclusion
DG FISMA must revise the report in accordance with the Board’s findings before
launching the interservice consultation.
Full title Review of the Securitisation framework
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 (Securitisation
Regulation) and Regulation (EU) 2013/575 (Capital
Requirements Regulation)
Reference number PLAN/2024/1808
Submitted to RSB on 12 March 2025
Date of RSB meeting 9 April 2025
Electronically signed on 11/04/2025 12:30 (UTC+02) in accordance with Article 11 of Commission Decision (EU) 2021/2121