ARBEJDSDOKUMENT FRA KOMMISSIONENS TJENESTEGRENE RESUMÉ AF RAPPORTEN OM KONSEKVENSANALYSEN Revision af securitiseringsrammen Ledsagedokument til Forslag til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning om ændring af Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2017/2402 af 12. december 2017 om en generel ramme for securitisering og om oprettelse af en specifik ramme for simpel, transparent og standardiseret securitisering og Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 575/2013 af 26. juni 2013 om tilsynsmæssige krav til kreditinstitutter for så vidt angår securitiseringseksponeringer

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EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Strasbourg, 17.6.2025
SWD(2025) 826 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Review of the Securitisation Framework
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL
amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 December 2017 laying down a general framework for securitisation and creating a
specific framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation and
Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for
credit institutions as regards requirements for securitisation exposures
{COM(2025) 825 final} - {COM(2025) 826 final} - {SEC(2025) 825 final} -
{SWD(2025) 825 final}
Offentligt
KOM (2025) 0825 - SWD-dokument
Europaudvalget 2025
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Need for action
Securitisation pools financial assets held by banks and financial institutions, such as loans,
mortgages, or credit card debt, and packages them into new products that investors can buy.
Investors then receive regular payments as the original debt is repaid, similar to receiving
interest from a loan. As a result, banks can free up capital and provide new loans to
households and businesses (i.e. corporates, SMEs), while transferring risk out of the banking
system.
During the Global Financial Crisis, poor industry standards in the US resulted in
securitisations of risky loans, which defaulted and impacted EU investors. As a result, the EU
adopted strict rules on securitisation, which aimed to strengthen investor protection,
transparency, trust, and the stability of the securitisation market. After five years with these
rules in play, a Commission evaluation showed that there has been an overcorrection. The
securitisation framework has been designed too strictly, hindering market development.
Although the market has not developed as expected, it has become more secure. Reviving the
securitisation market has been identified as an important initiative under the Savings and
Investment Union, which can help increase funding of the European economy.
The Commission's evaluation has shown that the objectives for the current Framework, set out
in the 2015 Impact Assessment, remain partially or wholly unmet. The Framework has been
partially effective in removing investor stigma, and regulatory disadvantages for simple,
transparent and standardised securitisations. However, it has made it costly to buy and sell
securitised assets and has not made the process of securitisation sufficiently attractive due to
the high prudential requirements for banks and insurers.
Today, securitisation’s potential for risk diversification, providing additional lending to the
economy and capital market development is underexploited in the EU. This represents a
missed opportunity for funding Europe’s strategic priorities, meeting the financing needs of
the green, digital, and social transitions, defence spending, as well as deepening European
capital markets. In this context, the securitisation review is an important initiative under the
Savings and Investment Union (SIU).
What is this initiative expected to achieve?
This initiative seeks to mitigate the undue barriers to securitisation issuance and investment,
specifically:
• To reduce undue operational costs for issuers and investors, balancing with adequate
standards of transparency, investor protection and supervision.
• To adjust the prudential framework for banks and insurers, to better account for actual
risks and remove undue prudential costs when issuing and investing in securitisations,
while at the same time safeguarding financial stability.
This initiative does not set a specific target for the size or growth of the market, nor does it
seek to favour certain sectors or incentivise market development in a particular manner.
Rather, it focuses on removing undue barriers, resulting in a more risk-sensitive and better
calibrated “enabling framework” for greater lending to the real economy.
Besides regulatory measures, other factors impact market developments. These include
competition from other instruments like covered bonds, as well as monetary policy where in
the past years easy access to central bank liquidity made it less attractive for banks to issue
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securitisations. In addition, industry initiatives will be important to lower costs through
standardised issuances and economies of scale.
Possible solutions
Policy options were identified in three key areas, based on input from a broad range of
stakeholders: the European Supervisory Authorities, the Single Supervisory Mechanism,
market participants, academics, NGOs and Member States. Options to (i) reduce high
operational costs, (ii) reduce undue prudential barriers for banks to issue and invest in
securitisation, and (iii) remove undue prudential costs for insurers to invest in the EU
securitisation market, result in a “bundle” of preferred options which, taken together, could
best achieve the stated objectives.
To reduce high operational costs, both a targeted and broader set of measures are considered.
Option 1.1 involves simplifying and removing certain due diligence and transparency
requirements that are deemed redundant or overly prescriptive (e.g., streamlining certain
verification requirements for repeat transactions and disclosure templates). Under Option 1.2,
mandatory securitisation-specific due diligence requirements would be fully removed for
regulated investors, and transparency requirements would become principles-based.
To address the prudential framework for banks to issue more and invest in securitisation,
two sets of options are considered: targeted changes (Option 2.1) and a radical overhaul
(Option 2.2) of the existing prudential framework for banks. Option 2.1 involves targeted
adjustments to the Capital Requirements Regulation, to ensure the capital treatment of
securitisation for banks is more risk sensitive, as well as to broaden the eligibility of
securitisations for banks’ liquidity buffers. Option 2.1 would also make supervisors’
assessment of transactions’ eligibility for capital relief under the Significant Risk Transfer
Framework faster and more coherent. Option 2.2 would entail a fundamental revision of the
prudential framework for banks, including the introduction of new formulae for calculating
securitisations’ capital treatment, a significant relaxation of the requirements for
securitisations to be eligible for inclusion in banks’ liquidity buffers, and the removal of
complex requirements for supervisors assessing transactions for capital relief. Unlike Option
2.1, Option 2.2 would involve material divergences from the international Basel standards.
To remove disincentives for insurers to invest in the EU securitisation market, three options
are presented, all of which propose to reduce capital requirements. Under Option 3.1, non-
STS capital requirements would be decreased to reduce the gap with STS capital requirements
and remove the excessive level of prudence embedded in the current framework. Under
Option 3.2, capital requirements for senior and non-senior tranches of non-STS securitisations
would be differentiated, thereby removing the prudential disincentives to invest in this market
segment. Option 3.3 reduces capital requirements for all securitisations (STS and non-STS),
ensuring that capital requirements focus on default risk factors only.
Impacts of the preferred options
Based on the comparison of effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence, the detailed analysis
selected options 1.1, 2.1, and 3.2 as the preferred bundle.
In addressing high operational costs for issuers and investors, the radical changes to the non-
prudential framework under Option 1.2 would yield higher benefits with regard to burden
reduction, however, this would be accompanied by greater risk to market integrity. Option 1.1
presents a more balanced outcome between reducing undue operational due diligence and
disclosure costs, while maintaining high levels of market transparency, investor protection
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and supervisory oversight. Overall, the changes proposed to the due diligence and
transparency requirements are estimated to result in EUR 310 million of cost savings per year
for the EU securitisation market.
Regarding the prudential rules for banks, Option 2.1 is the preferred option to address
miscalibrations in an efficient and targeted way. Option 2.2 could lead to riskier capital
positions and impact banks’ liquidity buffers, Option 2.1 would stimulate banks’ participation
in the securitisation market without jeopardising financial stability or deviating significantly
from international standards.
Option 3.2 appears to be the most effective in removing undue prudential disincentives for
insurers to participate in the securitisation market. It would remove undue prudential obstacles
to investments in non-STS securitisations by addressing the current, excessively stringent,
prudential treatment, while removing undue incentives for insurers to invest in the riskiest
tranches and avoiding undue deterioration of policyholder protection. Capital relief stemming
from Option 3.2 would be close to EUR 6 billion (vs. EUR 4 bn for Option 3.1 and EUR 7 bn
for Option 3.3).
The preferred bundle presents an opportunity for the EU to reduce burden and compliance
costs for issuers and investors, to revitalise the securitisation market and enhance the
competitiveness of the EU financial system. Financial institutions across the EU will face
more straightforward transparency and due diligence regimes and greater risk-sensitivity with
regards to the actual risk of the securitisation investment.