KOM (2025) 0194 - svar på spm. 1 om non-papers eller positionspapirer

Udenrigsministeriet
Asiatisk Plads 2, 1448 København K Tlf.: +45 3392 0000 Fax: +45 32 54 05 33
E-mail: um@um.dk Web: UM.dk 1/1
Medlemmerne af Folketingets Europaudvalg Dato
06-06-2025
Bilag
2
Sag/ID Nr.
25/01477
Enhed
EUKOOR
SVAR PÅ UDVALGSSPØRGSMÅL
Til underretning for Folketingets Europaudvalg vedlægges Udenrigsministeriets
besvarelse af spørgsmål 1 ad KOM (2025) 0194 af 4. juni 2025 vedrørende non-
papers eller positionspapirer.
Marie Bjerre
Offentligt
KOM (2025) 0194 - endeligt svar på spørgsmål 1
Europaudvalget 2025


Udenrigsministeriet
Asiatisk Plads 2, 1448 København K Tlf.: +45 3392 0000 Fax: +45 32 54 05 33
E-mail: um@um.dk Web: UM.dk 1/1
Folketingets Europaudvalg Dato
6. juni 2025
Bilag
1
Sag
25/23329
Enhed
HANPOL
EUU KOM (2025) 0194 – endeligt svar på spørgsmål 1 fra
Europaudvalget stillet den 4. juni 2025 til udenrigsministeren.
Spørgsmål
Vil ministeren oplyse, om regeringen er initiativtager til eller underskriver på nogle
non-papers eller positionspapirer, som vedrører elementer i EU-sagen og vil
ministeren oversende disse til udvalget, evt. i fortrolig form?
Svar
Med henvisning til mit brev til Folketingets Europaudvalg af den 29. august 2024,
hvori der redegøres for regeringens praksis om at dele non-papirer og
positionspapirer med Europaudvalget på baggrund af en konkret vurdering, kan jeg
oplyse, at der ikke vurderes at være non-papirer eller positionspapirer specifikt om
forhandling om frihandelsaftaler med Golfstaterne, men at emnet blev omtalt i
dansk non-papir om handelspolitiske prioriteter ”An open, robust and strategic EU
trade policy: Danish trade policy priorities for a new European Commission 2024-
29”, som blev oversendt til Udvalget den 17. juni 2024. Non-papiret vedlægges.
Med venlig hilsen
Lars Løkke Rasmussen
Offentligt
KOM (2025) 0194 - endeligt svar på spørgsmål 1
Europaudvalget 2025


Copenhagen, May 2024
An open, robust and strategic EU trade policy:
Danish trade policy priorities for a new European Commission 2024-29
Against the backdrop of geopolitical challenges, intensified strategic competition and signs of economic
fragmentation, there is a need to adapt the EU’s common trade policy to the new geopolitical reality.
The EU’s fundamental commitment to open markets and the international rules-based trading system
with a reformed WTO at its core should be maintained. But trade policy has to be more strategic, ro-
bust and effective to contribute to the EU’s open strategic autonomy.
Denmark encourages the Commission to pursue the adaptations of EU trade policy highlighted below
and further detailed in the Annex. We look forward to working with the Commission on these issues in
the next institutional cycle.
 Aligning trade policy and economic security
Trade policy plays a key role in enhancing the EU’s resilience, economic security and geopolitical rele-
vance. While remaining fundamentally committed to open markets and stable global supply chains, the
EU must also strengthen enforcement and, where appropriate, be prepared to use all relevant measures
in a proportionate manner to defend its economic interests and ensure a level playing field.
 Strengthening and expanding the EU’s network of trade agreements
An ambitious and assertive bilateral trade agenda is needed, with a renewed focus on advancing and
concluding trade negotiations with relevant partners, including in the Global South.
 Applying a more realistic and targeted approach to trade negotiations
The EU should apply a country-specific approach to trade negotiations and be open to recalibrating the
level of ambition where needed to ensure conclusion, and to exploring alternatives to traditional FTAs
targeted to specific trading partners.
 Promoting effective FTA architecture and ratification processes
Ways to simplify and expedite internal ratification procedures and processes should be considered with
a view to facilitating conclusion of trade agreements while respecting the division of competences
established in the Treaties.
 Supporting a strong WTO fit for purpose
To safeguard the international rules-based trading system with WTO at its core, the EU should step up
efforts to build alliances with like-minded partners to ensure an ambitious and proactive reform agenda.
 Improving coherence between EU legislative measures and trade policy
The EU should improve its understanding of external trade and supply chain effects of legislative
measures and reciprocity requirements in sector-specific legislation. Thorough impact assessments,
taking into account also political issues and the likely impact on third parties and on EU trade and other
external relations, should always be carried out when designing new legislation.
Offentligt
KOM (2025) 0194 - endeligt svar på spørgsmål 1
Europaudvalget 2025
2
ANNEX – Danish priorities for the EU’s common trade policy:
 Aligning trade policy and economic security
An open, robust and strategic trade policy – in tandem with strong industrial policy – can and should
contribute to progress across all three pillars of the EU economic security strategy: Protect, promote,
partnership. In particular, efforts to diversify and strengthen critical supply chains, ensure access to re-
sources – including raw materials, technologies and data required for the green and digital transitions –
and expand global economic and strategic partnerships are key contributors to economic security.
To effectively address EU economic security, the right tools must be in place. But the need for further
action must be assessed on the basis of thorough analysis. New tools should only be developed where
there is a documented need and where existing instruments and approaches cannot satisfactorily do the
job. To ensure optimal implementation, closer coordination inside branches of the Commission will be
crucial and is therefore encouraged.
With regard to countering unfair trade practices and economic coercion, the EU should strengthen en-
forcement and be ready to defend its economic interests and ensure a level-playing-field and balanced
market access opportunities. Where necessary and in compliance with WTO rules, defensive instru-
ments must be applied in a proportionate manner.
The EU should de-risk, not de-couple. While we need to address economic security issues, we should
continue to promote free trade. We need to strike a balance, ensuring that our economies can continue
to grow to the benefit of our citizens and the long-term robustness of our societies.
 Strengthening and expanding the EU’s network of trade agreements
Considering the geopolitical urgency of supply chain security and enhanced cooperation with key part-
ners, including in the Global South, an ambitious and assertive bilateral agenda should be at the center
of EU trade policy.
Special emphasis should be given to finalizing agreements with Mercosur and Mexico, which are long
overdue, as well as concluding negotiations with Australia, India and Indonesia. Given the economic
and political importance of the Indo-Pacific region, intensifying trade negotiations with Thailand, the
Philippines and Malaysia are also important – in their own right and as stepping stones towards a re-
gional EU-ASEAN trade agreement – and should be pursued with a view to swift conclusion of ambi-
tious trade agreements. In parallel, the potential for cooperation with the CPTPP and benefits of possi-
ble EU accession should be explored. China is indispensable in the global economy, and the EU should
continue pursuing a stable and fair trading relationship while de-risking without decoupling.
The US remains our closest partner and ally, and it will be essential to maintain and, where possible,
strengthen the transatlantic economic partnership. The EU should actively look for opportunities to
give new impetus and ambition to cooperation with the US and development of a transatlantic market-
place as trusted partners. The TTC has proven to be a valuable platform for coordination on shared
challenges, and should be continued.
The EU also needs to strengthen mutually beneficial trade and investment cooperation with African
partners, keeping in mind that individual African countries have individual interests, needs and asks.
3
The regional Economic Partnership Agreements should remain the primary vehicle but must, in a spirit
of equal partnership, be complemented by and integrated with other EU instruments and policies
aimed at mobilizing private investment and promoting employment and a conducive business climate.
Not least the Global Gateway initiative. Focus should also be on aiding implementation of the
AfCFTA. Where regional arrangements are not feasible, negotiations with individual countries should
be considered; the recent EPA with Kenya is as a good example.
In the same vein, bilateral trade negotiations with individual Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) mem-
bers, most notably the United Arab Emirates, may be considered if current efforts to relaunch negotia-
tions for an ambitious and balanced regional trade agreement with the GCC are not successful.
Closer to home, supporting the Ukrainian economy by deepening trade and investment cooperation
within the framework of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA is critical and should be complemented by continued
efforts to ensure that Russia does not benefit from its illegal aggression or disrupt European markets,
for instance through raising tariffs on imports from Russia.
 Applying a more realistic and targeted approach to trade negotiations
The EU should apply a pragmatic and country-specific approach when it comes to agreeing new nego-
tiation mandates as well as recalibrating the level of ambition in ongoing trade negotiations, where
needed to ensure a successful conclusion, while respecting EU red lines and an overall balance in com-
mitments. This may, for instance, be the case for the current negotiations with India.
Specifically, as regards trade and sustainability (TSD), it is becoming clear that the EU’s requests and
standards can at times constitute an obstacle to concluding trade negotiations. Here too, the EU should
search for tailor-made solutions, ensuring high ambition but also realism as to what can be achieved,
and, as a general rule, without turning to mirror clauses.
Across trading partners, the EU should be ready to offer a variety of WTO-compatible trade and eco-
nomic cooperation formats targeted to the specific trading partner and taking into account the EU’s
interests in individual negotiations. Where feasible, the ambition should be FTAs but other types of ar-
rangements may also be relevant. There are already a number of models in use that may be built upon.
This includes dialogue-based formats such as the Trade and Technology Councils with the US and In-
dia, investment facilitation agreements with African countries, digital partnerships on data governance
and cross-border data flows as well as sector-specific agreements like the raw material partnerships. As
regards the latter, the partnerships should be reviewed at an early stage to determine their concrete
added-value in terms of actual new access to critical raw materials.
 Promoting effective FTA architecture and ratification processes
Maintaining momentum in expanding the network of trade agreements is urgently needed, especially in
light of geopolitical challenges. But all too often, EU trade negotiations and ratification processes are
overly lengthy and difficult to conclude. This risks undermining the EU’s credibility as a negotiating
partner. The failure to conclude agreements will only result in a loss of influence and play into the
hands of our competitors. While delays can often be attributed to external factors or conditions in part-
ner countries, there is a need to review whether the EU’s internal procedures and processes can be sim-
plified and expedited while respecting the current division of competence established in the Treaties.
4
An important step would be for trade parts of association agreements to be carved out, as a general
rule, as separate FTAs to be approved by QMV in the Council without national ratification demands.
The Chile Interim Free Trade Agreement, falling within exclusive EU competence, serves as a relevant
template in line with Treaty-based division of competencies.
 Supporting a strong WTO fit for purpose
At a time when rules-based cooperation is under pressure, the EU must stand up for the multilateral
trading system with the WTO at its core. The EU should strengthen its efforts to build alliances with
like-minded partners, including developing countries, to pursue an ambitions and proactive reform
agenda and ensure a strong WTO fit for purpose and with an updated rule-book of relevance to the
modern global economy.
Priorities should include restoration of an effective dispute settlement system preserving core features
of the existing system, and reforms to the WTO rule-book, including a renewed focus on industrial
subsidies, digital trade and data flows, and trade in environmental goods and services. We should be
ready to engage proactively, pragmatically and constructively in all WTO negotiation streams, including
those where the EU displays defensive interests, e.g. possible market liberalization efforts in the agricul-
tural sector, if it may facilitate progress in other areas. Where multilateral negotiations are not feasible,
open plurilaterals should be pursued with a view to subsequent inclusion in the WTO framework (An-
nex 4).
The WTO is also an important platform for partnerships with the Global South on promoting eco-
nomic and sustainable development through trade and investment. A special focus of the EU should be
on supporting the ability of developing countries, and LDCs in particular, to reap the benefits of inter-
national trade and underpinning their integration in the global economy.
 Improving coherence between EU legislative measures and trade policy
Global trading partners are increasingly accusing the EU of introducing sustainability standards in new
regulation with a protectionist purpose. Recent legislation on CBAM and deforestation-free products
are examples of EU measures, which aim to set the EU – and the world – on a path to green transition,
but have been questioned by partners. Potentially, this can hamper the EU’s ability to conclude trade
agreements and build strategic alliances, and it underlines the need to better understand external trade
and supply chain effects of EU legislative measures, not least as regards reciprocity requirements in sec-
tor-specific legislation. We should carefully assess and consider the potential political implications and
ways to overcome unintended consequences.
Going forward, all new EU regulation should be subject to a thorough impact assessment to gauge at
early stages of the design phase the likely impact on third parties as well as EU trade and other external
relations (including questions about WTO compatibility) and identify possible mitigating measures.
This should go hand in hand with dynamic and targeted outreach to trading partners, in cooperation
with Member States where relevant, to avoid misunderstandings regarding the content and rationale be-
hind EU measures and policies. Furthermore, closer coordination and coherence across Commission
services through all stages of the legislative cycle will be required and is encouraged.