Henstilling med henblik på RÅDETS HENSTILLING om tilladelse til Polen til at afvige fra de maksimale vækstrater i nettoudgifterne som fastsat af Rådet i henhold til forordning (EU) 2024/1263 (Aktivering af den nationale undtagelsesklausul)

EN EN
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.6.2025
COM(2025) 611 final
Recommendation for a
COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
Allowing Poland to deviate from the maximum growth rates of net expenditure as set by
the Council under Regulation (EU) 2024/1263
(Activation of the national escape clause)
Offentligt
KOM (2025) 0611 - Henstilling
Europaudvalget 2025
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Recommendation for a
COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
Allowing Poland to deviate from the maximum growth rates of net expenditure as set by
the Council under Regulation (EU) 2024/1263
(Activation of the national escape clause)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular
Article 121 thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, and in particular Article 26 thereof,
Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary
surveillance1
, together with the amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up
and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure2
, and the
amended Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of
the Member States3
are the core elements of the reformed EU economic governance
framework. The framework aims at ensuring public debt sustainability, and sustainable
and inclusive growth through reforms and investments. It promotes national ownership
and has a medium-term focus, combined with an effective and coherent enforcement
of the rules.
(2) The maximum growth rates of net expenditure as set in a Council recommendation in
accordance with Articles 17(1) or 19 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 are the single
operational reference for the annual fiscal surveillance of each Member State and are
at the centre of the new economic governance framework. The maximum growth rates
of net expenditure as set by that Council Recommendation establishes a budgetary
constraint for four or five years, which is based on an adjustment period of four years
that can be, in the case of an extension, extended by an additional period of up to three
years.
(3) The framework provides for flexibility in the application of the rules in the event of
exceptional circumstances outside the control of Member States that have a major
1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the
effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj).
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of
the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L, 209, 2.8.1997, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1997/1467/2024-04-
30).
3 Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the
Member States (OJ L, 306, 23.11.2011, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/85/2024-04-30).
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impact on the public finances, in accordance with Article 26 of Regulation (EU)
2024/1263. In the latter case, following a request from a Member State and on
a recommendation by the Commission based on its analysis, the Council may within
four weeks of the Commission recommendation adopt a recommendation allowing
a Member State to deviate from its maximum growth rates of net expenditure as set by
the Council, where (i) exceptional circumstances outside the control of the Member
State, (ii) have a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned,
and (iii) provided that such deviation does not endanger fiscal sustainability over the
medium term. The Council is to specify a time limit for such deviation.
(4) The Heads of State or Government, meeting in Versailles on 10-11 March 2022,
committed to bolster European defence capabilities in light of Russia’s military
aggression against Ukraine. These aims were reiterated in the Strategic Compass for
Security and Defence. In its Conclusions on European defence of 6 March 2025, the
European Council welcomed the intention of the Commission to recommend the
activation, in a coordinated manner, of the national escape clause under the Stability
and Growth Pact as an immediate measure.
(5) In its Communication of 19 March 20254
, the Commission has invited all Member
States to make use of the flexibility provided by the national escape clause in a
coordinated manner with a view to maximising the impact on the EU’s defence
capabilities. This flexibility aims at facilitating the transition to higher levels of
defence spending on a permanent basis. That Communication describes that the
activation of the national escape clause would allow Member States to deviate from
the maximum growth rates of net expenditure as set by the Council when endorsing
the medium-term fiscal-structural plans or when establishing the corrective paths
under the excessive deficit procedure, to the extent that this deviation is justified by an
increase in defence spending relative to the reference year, and that the annual excess
through 2028 will not exceed 1.5% of GDP. Increases beyond that amount would be
subject to the normal assessments of compliance. Such a maximum is necessary to
ensure that fiscal sustainability is not endangered, while allowing all Member States to
benefit from the flexibility as they move towards a higher level of defence
expenditure. The exact amounts will be determined when outturn data become
available, to ensure that the additional flexibility is used only for its intended purpose.
(6) The Council recommendation of 21 January 20255
endorsed the net expenditure path
of Poland. In addition, the Council recommendation of 14 January 20256
established a
corrective path for Poland.
(7) On 30 April 2025, Poland submitted a request to the Council and the Commission, to
activate the national escape clause.
(8) In its request, Poland sets out that, in a context of heightened geopolitical tensions,
Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine and its threat to European
security constitutes an existential challenge for the Union, which requires a significant
4 Commission Communication (C (2025) 2000 final) of 19 March 2025.
5
Council Recommendation of 21 January 2025 endorsing the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan of
Poland (OJ C, C/2025/642, 10.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/642/oj).
6
Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive deficit in Poland,
C/2025/5037. Available at: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/96fe1eac-28f3-489c-
989c-a48a0c49cab4_en?filename=ecofin_5037_pl.pdf.
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increase of defence spending. This situation is an exceptional circumstance outside the
control of each Member State.
(9) In its request, Poland reports data on total defence expenditure (Table 1). In addition to
this, Poland envisages total defence expenditure to amount to at least 3% of GDP (in
cash terms) as required by national law for the years to come. Therefore, the increase
in defence expenditure has a major impact on the public finances of Poland.
Table 1: Total defence spending in Poland
Source: a: Eurostat; b: Information provided to the Council and the Commission by Poland.
(10) Poland estimates that the increase in total defence expenditure as a ratio to GDP from
2021 to 2025 will be in the order of 1.3 percentage points and therefore contribute to
deteriorating the government balance and increasing government debt.
(11) All else being equal, an increase in expenditure over the period covered by the national
escape clause will lead to higher government debt and a higher deficit by the end of
that period. Indicative projections run by the Commission and assuming, by 2028, a
linear uptake of the full increase in government expenditure allowed by this
recommendation suggest that the deficit-to-GDP ratio and debt-to-GDP ratio in 2028
would be 1.2 pps. and 2.4 pps. higher, respectively, than if net expenditure grew in
line with the path set by Council Recommendation C/2025/642. This would likely
require an additional fiscal adjustment after the period of activation of the national
escape clause in order to meet the requirements of the fiscal framework, including to
ensure that the debt ratio is put or remains on a plausibly downward path, or stays at
prudent levels below 60% of GDP over the medium term and that the deficit stays or is
brought below 3% of GDP and maintained below the reference value over the medium
term. Poland acknowledges that, going forward, structurally higher defence
expenditure may require policies to preserve fiscal sustainability and compliance with
the fiscal rules over the medium term.
(12) General government defence expenditure data are compiled and released by the
national statistical authorities and Eurostat according to the International Classification
of the Functions of Government (COFOG)7
in the framework of the European System
of National Accounts (ESA2010)8
. These data are appropriate to assess the impact of
defence spending on government deficit, debt and net expenditure, and related
concepts. Eurostat, in close cooperation with the national statistical authorities, will
establish a data collection process. The starting point should be COFOG defence
categories, while also considering the NATO definition and retaining the possibility to
address anomalies that might be attributable to differences in the respective annual
7 Manual on sources and methods for the compilation of COFOG statistics — Classification of the Functions
of Government (COFOG) — 2019 edition.
8 Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 174, 26.6.2013, p. 1).
2021 a 2022 a 2023 a 2024 b 2025 b
General government total
defence expenditure
(% of GDP)
1.6 1.6 2.0 2.7 2.9
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reporting systems. The data collection process needs to be aligned with EDP reporting
deadlines.
(13) Moreover, for some of the contracts for military equipment signed during the period of
activation of the national escape clause, delivery may occur at a later stage, therefore
impacting public finances only after the period of activation of the clause. To cater for
this eventuality, the flexibility granted under the national escape clause should also
apply to defence expenditure linked to such later delivery, provided that the
corresponding contracts were signed during the period of activation of the clause and
that this delayed defence spending remains within the overall cap mentioned above.
(14) The expenditure financed by loans provided by the new instrument for Security Action
for Europe (SAFE)9
for the reinforcement of European defence industry, would
automatically benefit from the above flexibility. To this end, Member States would
report to Eurostat all defence-related expenditures made under the SAFE Instrument
under the categories “defence products” and “other products for defence purpose” as
defined in the proposal for a Regulation establishing the SAFE Instrument.
(15) This recommendation does not modify the definitions of government deficit, debt and
net expenditure, and related concepts. Data based on these concepts are to be compiled
and reported by Poland in accordance with Regulations (EU) 2024/1263, No 479/2009
and No 549/2013.
HEREBY RECOMMENDS:
1. During the period 2025-2028, Poland is allowed to deviate from and exceed the
maximum growth rates of net expenditure as set by Council Recommendation
C/2025/642.10
to the extent that the net expenditure in excess of these maximum
growth rates is not more than:
(i) the increase in defence expenditure in percent of GDP since 2021;
(ii) provided that the deviation in excess of the maximum growth rates of net
expenditure does not exceed 1.5 percent of GDP.
2. In the years after 2028, Poland may still deviate from and exceed the maximum
growth rates of net expenditure as set by a Council Recommendation in accordance
with Articles 17 or 19 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, to the extent that the net
expenditure in excess of these maximum growth rates is related to deliveries of
military equipment contracted before end-2028 and remains within the overall cap
mentioned above.
9
Council Regulation (EU) 2025/… establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the
Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument.
10
Council Recommendation of 21 January 2025 endorsing the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan of
Poland (OJ C, C/2025/642, 10.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/642/oj).
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3. In accordance with Article 22(7) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, the deviations from
the maximum growth rates of net expenditure as set by the Council that are allowed by
this Recommendation will not be recorded as debits in the control account of Poland.
4. In order to ensure correct recording of the additional expenditure Poland is to include
actual and planned data on total defence expenditure (COFOG division 02) and
defence investment (COFOG division 02 P.51) and any expenditure financed to be by
SAFE loans that are not covered in COFOG-02:
(a) for years T-4, T-3, T-2 and T-1 (with year T being the current year) in the reporting
to the Commission (Eurostat) in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No
479/2009;
(b) for years 2021 through year T (current year), in national medium-term fiscal
structural plans and in annual progress reports in accordance with Articles 11(1)
and 15, and 21(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263;
(c) for years T (current year) and T+1 in draft budgetary plans in accordance with
Regulation (EU) No 472/2013.
This recommendation is addressed to Poland.
Done at Brussels,
For the Council
The President