Tekster vedtaget af Forsamlingen under 3. session 2024

F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex | Tel: + 33 3 88 41 2000 |
2024 ORDINARY SESSION
Third part
24 – 28 June 2024
TEXTS ADOPTED
BY THE ASSEMBLY
Provisional versions
Offentligt
ERD Alm.del - Bilag 10
Europarådet 2023-24
Table of contents
Recommendations
Recommendation 2279 (2024) Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s aggression
against Ukraine (Doc. 15998)
Recommendation 2280 (2024) Countering the erasure of cultural identity in war and peace (Doc. 16003)
Recommendation 2281 (2024) Reparation and reconciliation processes to overcome past conflicts and
build a common peaceful future – the question of just and equal redress
(Doc. 15933)
Resolutions
Resolution 2551 (2024) Modification of various provisions of the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure
(Doc. 15996)
Resolution 2552 (2024) Strengthening democracy through participatory and deliberative processes
(Doc. 16001)
Resolution 2553 (2024) Strengthening a youth perspective in the work of the Parliamentary
Assembly (Doc. 15871)
Resolution 2554 (2024) Protecting women human rights defenders in Europe (Doc. 15993)
Resolution 2555 (2024) Ensuring human rights-compliant asylum procedures (Doc. 15997)
Resolution 2556 (2024) Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s aggression
against Ukraine (Doc. 15998)
Resolution 2557 (2024) The role of sanctions in countering the Russian Federation’s war of
aggression against Ukraine (Doc. 16000)
Resolution 2558 (2024) Countering the erasure of cultural identity in war and peace (Doc. 16003)
Resolution 2559 (2024) Reparation and reconciliation processes to overcome past conflicts and
build a common peaceful future – the question of just and equal redress
(Doc. 15933)
Resolution 2560 (2024) The honouring of obligations and commitments by Armenia (Doc. 15994)
Resolution 2561 (2024) Challenges to democracy in Georgia (Doc. 16018)
Resolution 2562 (2024) An urgent call to Europe and its partners: envisioning immediate and long-
term policy solutions in support of the displaced people of Ukraine
(Doc. 16002)
Resolution 2563 (2024) Call for Varosha’s return to its lawful inhabitants (Doc. 16004)
Resolution 2564 (2024) Post-conflict time: defusing ticking time bombs for a safe return of
displaced populations (Doc. 15995)
Resolution 2565 (2024) Safeguarding human rights for future generations (Doc. 15999)
Recommendations
2279 to 2281
Recommendation 2279 (2024)1
Provisional version
Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s
aggression against Ukraine
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly draws the Committee of Ministers’ attention to its Resolution 2556 (2024)
“Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”, which stresses
again the need to ensure a comprehensive system of accountability for all violations of international law and
international crimes, including the crime of aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide,
allegedly committed in the context and as a result of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine.
2. The Assembly refers to its Resolutions 2436 (2022) “The Russian Federation’s aggression against
Ukraine: ensuring accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law and other international
crimes”, 2482 (2023) “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s aggression against
Ukraine”, 2516 (2023) “Ensuring a just peace in Ukraine and lasting security in Europe” and 2539 (2024)
“Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine”. It also recalls its Recommendations 2231 (2022) “The Russian
Federation’s aggression against Ukraine: ensuring accountability for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and other international crimes” and 2271 (2024) “Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine”.
3. In the light of the resolutions and recommendations mentioned above, the Assembly calls on the
Committee of Ministers to:
3.1. continue mobilising the Council of Europe and all its political and legal instruments to support
Ukraine and ensure a comprehensive system of accountability for the aggression of the Russian
Federation against Ukraine and all its legal and human rights consequences;
3.2. ensure that the Council of Europe continues to provide expert and technical support for the
establishment and operation of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, including
through the Secretary General’s participation and contributions to the consultations within the Core
Group on a possible draft agreement between the Council of Europe and the Government of Ukraine
on the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, including its
Statute, and on a possible draft enlarged partial agreement governing the modalities of support to such
a tribunal, its financing and other administrative matters;
3.3. take into account the outcome of these consultations and any proposals that may be made by
the Secretary General, and work towards the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of
aggression against Ukraine as soon as possible, including as appropriate through an agreement
between the Council of Europe and the Government of Ukraine and a draft enlarged partial agreement,
having due regard to the considerations and features set out in Resolution 2556 (2024);
1. Discussion par l’Assemblée le 26 juin 2024 (19e et 20e séances) (voir Doc. 15998, rapport de la commission des
questions juridiques et des droits de l'homme, rapporteur: M. Davor Ivo Stier). Texte adopté par l’Assemblée le 26 juin
2024 (20e séance).
https://pace.coe.int
3.4. proceed towards the establishment of an international compensation mechanism for all the
damage caused by the Russian aggression, including an international claims commission and a
compensation fund, in co-operation with all relevant international partners and Ukraine, ensuring a
leading role for the Council of Europe and taking into account the work of the Register of Damage
Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
Recommendation 2279 (2024)
2
Recommendation 2280 (2024)1
Provisional version
Countering the erasure of cultural identity in war and peace
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its Resolution 2558 (2024) “Countering the erasure of cultural
identity in war and peace” and underlines that the right to take part in cultural life and the right of access to
and enjoyment of both tangible and intangible cultural heritage, are pivotal to the system of human rights and
fundamental to individual and collective cultural identity.
2. The Assembly welcomes the decision to establish the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Register of
Damage caused by the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine as a first step towards an
international compensation mechanism. Within this framework, it is crucial to accurately record damages to
cultural heritage and cultural infrastructure in Ukraine and to establish comprehensive lists of looted objects
and artefacts that were taken from museums and archaeological sites, including from Crimea since 2014. The
Assembly urges members States parties to the Enlarged Partial Agreement to take adequate measures in this
respect.
3. The Council of Europe Action Plan for Ukraine “Resilience, Recovery and Reconstruction” (2023-2026)
provides the necessary framework to accompany the process of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine. The
Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers to consider in this context the proposals for action to counter
the erasure of cultural identity that are outlined in its Resolution 2558 (2024), and to integrate in the Action
Plan targeted actions in the area of education, promotion of democratic culture, history education and support
for cultural heritage, vitality and exchanges.
4. Referring to the commitment enshrined in the Reykjavik Declaration to strengthen co-operation with
Belarusian human rights defenders, democratic forces, free media and independent civil society, the
Assembly underlines the importance of developing projects to assist the diaspora from Belarus to preserve
their identity and language through projects supporting cultural vitality and cultural exchange. It asks that the
Committee of Ministers secure appropriate resources to this aim either through the ordinary budget or via
targeted extra-budgetary contributions.
5. Finally, the Assembly considers that the international legal framework concerning the protection of
cultural heritage in armed conflict should be enhanced. In this respect, the Assembly recommends that the
Committee of Ministers initiates a collaborative process with the United Nations, the European Union and
other relevant organisations, to develop legal and policy responses to new forms of cultural erasure, taking
into account existing Council of Europe conventions and other international treaties, seeking in particular to:
5.1. enhance and consolidate the recognition of cultural cleansing or erasure, deliberate or
systematic destruction of cultural heritage and looting of cultural property as human rights violations,
crimes against humanity and/or war crimes for the purposes of their prosecution and counteracting
such illegal acts, and to determine the role that a policy of cultural erasure has as one of the inherent
elements of the intent to destroy a national or any other protected group when committing genocide;
5.2. establish more robust pre-emptive protective mechanisms for both tangible and intangible
cultural heritage;
1. Assembly debate on 26 June 2024 (19th and 20th sittings) (see Doc. 16003, report of the Committee on Culture,
Science, Education and Media, rapporteur: Ms Yevheniia Kravchuk). Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 June 2024
(20th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
5.3. provide for deterring sanctions and reparations for military destruction which is not demonstrated
to be justified by an “imperative military necessity”, and for other violations against cultural heritage.
Recommendation 2280 (2024)
2
Recommendation 2281 (2024)1
Provisional version
Reparation and reconciliation processes to overcome past
conflicts and build a common peaceful future – the question of
just and equal redress
Parliamentary Assembly
1. Referring to its Resolution 2559 (2024) “Reparation and reconciliation processes to overcome past
conflicts and build a common peaceful future – the question of just and equal redress”, the Parliamentary
Assembly regrets the great suffering caused by conflicts and lack of adequate effective mechanisms for
providing redress. The Assembly considers that part of an improved upstream policy of conflict prevention
involves adequately addressing past harms.
2. Recalling that truth-seeking initiatives, justice, reparations, recognition and guarantees of non-repetition
are crucial to lasting peace and reconciliation, the Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers to develop
improved mechanisms to this end.
3. The Assembly firmly believes that there is a strong case for increased action by the Council of Europe,
through a mediated process under the auspices of the Organisation, to help to address the conflicts of the
past, to promote reconciliation and reparation in relation to conflicts between Council of Europe member
States, and to ensure a durable peace for the future.
4. The Assembly considers that a mediated solution could help to look contextually and holistically at
resolving highly complex matters between States in order to find achievable, enforceable and implementable
solutions for the benefit of victims and of lasting peace. Such a mechanism should include the perspective
and needs of victims in order to find a just and meaningful solution and should ensure adequate mechanisms
for implementing and distributing any awards amongst victims, having regard to both collective and individual
interests.
5. The Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers undertake work to establish a mediation
process under the auspices of the Council of Europe which should include the following elements:
5.1. A system should be established to enable member States to submit disputes as to reparations
and remedies to mediation.
5.2. The mediation mechanism should avoid duplication of or conflict with any other existing
processes and should not be used to bypass or undermine such processes, including in the framework
of the United Nations, as well as the procedures before, and the implementation of judgments of, the
European Court of Human Rights.
5.3. The Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly or the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe should be able to initiate this mediation process in the absence of consent by both
parties. In the case of the Assembly this could be through a Recommendation.
1. Assembly debate on 26 June 2024 (20th sitting) (see Doc. 15933, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, rapporteur: Lord Richard Keen; Doc. 16019, opinion of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy,
rapporteur: Mr George Loucaides). Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 June 2024 (20th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
5.4. The process should apply to matters within the geographic and temporal limits of the Council of
Europe. It should only apply to conflicts between States who were not members of the Council of
Europe at the relevant time with their express consent. Moreover, for reasons of enforceability, it should
not apply to States who are no longer members of the Council of Europe.
5.5. This system should be available for interstate disputes relating to post-conflict situations or other
disputes that could risk escalating into tensions.
5.6. This process should also be available for identifying a package of reparations and remedies in
relation to interstate cases before the European Court of Human Rights, where a given case could
benefit from a broader toolkit for proposing solutions that are better adapted to addressing the
complexities of post-conflict situations and the needs of victims.
5.7. The approach should be victim-centred, involving consultation with victims and other affected
groups as well as with the States concerned.
5.8. There should be an obligation on member States to engage with a mediation process in good
faith. As a matter of propriety, policy and principle, member States should be co-operating with the
Council of Europe to resolve issues that impact on the human rights of individuals. This is implicit in the
general obligation of States to collaborate sincerely and effectively and to co-operate in good faith, as
well as in the specific obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5). In
particular, the nature of collective enforcement under the Convention implies an obligation of co-
operation between States. There should thus be potential repercussions for a State that is considered
not to have engaged with the process in good faith.
5.9. There should be a duty on States to co-operate sincerely with the results of mediation and there
should be potential consequences for unreasonable failure to do so.
5.10. Much of this can be achieved using the existing legal tools at the disposal of the Council of
Europe, such as the Statute, the European Convention on Human rights, and ways of working under
those founding instruments, in addition to political and diplomatic pressure using tools at the disposal of
the Council of Europe. In a serious case of non-compliance, use of the Complementary joint procedure
could be considered, as well as potential suspension where a breach would constitute a serious
violation of Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (namely a serious violation of the principles
of the rule of law, human rights and sincere and effective collaboration in the realisation of the aims of
the Organisation).
5.11. The Council of Europe should develop an improved toolkit and standards for reparation and
reconciliation in order to find solutions that are best adapted to addressing the complexities of a post-
conflict situation. Such a toolkit should be non-exhaustive, adaptable to new situations, should avoid a
one-size-fits-all approach and should instead offer a number of ideas for potential use in mediated
solutions.
Recommendation 2281 (2024)
2
Resolutions
2551 to 2565
Resolution 2551 (2024)1
Provisional version
Modification of various provisions of the Assembly’s Rules of
Procedure
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly recalls that its actions and decisions shall be based on clear, consistent
and effective parliamentary rules and procedures. It recalls that it has regularly amended its rules in recent
years in order to accommodate changes in parliamentary practice, clarify the rules and procedures where
their application or interpretation have raised difficulties or to address specific problems. It therefore intends to
take due account of proposals submitted by its members, national delegations, political groups and
committees, and make the necessary adjustments in its Rules of Procedure.
2. Having regard to the above considerations, the Assembly decides to amend its Rules of Procedure as
follows:
2.1. with regard to the procedure for examining amendments in plenary sitting:
2.1.1. modify Rule 34.7.a by adding the following sentence after the first sentence:
“The President chairing a sitting shall strictly interpret Rule 34.7.a on the consideration
of oral amendments.”;
2.1.2. modify Rule 34.9 by adding the following sentence after the first sentence:
“If a committee has not been able to take a position on amendments to its report that
have been tabled, the floor shall be given to the rapporteur.”;
2.1.3. in order to strengthen the competence of committees when taking a position on
amendments tabled, amend the first sentence of Rule 34.11 as follows:
“Following a proposal presented by the chairperson of the committee seized for report,
amendments which have been unanimously approved by the committee shall be
declared as adopted by the Assembly, unless ten or more members of the Assembly
object.”;
2.2. with regard to the speaking time in plenary sitting:
2.2.1. as regards the speaking time of rapporteurs, in the complementary texts “Additional
provisions relating to Assembly debates”, modify paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 of “iv. Speaking
time” as follows:
“2. Rapporteurs shall have a total of ten minutes, of which, indicatively, seven minutes
for the presentation of the report and three minutes for the reply at the end of the
debate. The co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee shall have five minutes each
to present their report and five minutes to reply, to be shared between them.
1. Assembly debate on 24 June 2024 (16th sitting) (see Doc. 15996, report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure,
Immunities and Institutional Affairs, rapporteur: Ms Ingjerd Schie Schou). Text adopted by the Assembly on 24 June 2024
(16th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
Rapporteurs may, after the first round of speakers on behalf of the political groups,
request the floor to reply; this speaking time shall be deducted from the time of reply at
the end of the debate.
3. Rapporteurs for opinion shall have the same speaking time to present the opinion as
the speakers registered for the debate concerned. Rapporteurs of the Bureau ad hoc
committees on the observation of elections shall have five minutes to present the
report.”;
2.2.2. as regards current affairs debates, in order to harmonise speaking time for statements
with that laid down in other provisions, amend Rule 53.4, as follows:
“A current affairs debate may not exceed one and a half hours. It shall be opened by a
member chosen by the Bureau, who shall have a total of ten minutes, of which,
indicatively, seven minutes for the introduction of the debate and three minutes for the
reply at the end of the debate.”;
2.2.3. as regards questions of procedure, in order to harmonise the speaking time with that
laid down in other provisions, in Rule 35.7 replace the words “not more than two minutes” by
“not more than 30 seconds”
2.3. with regard to the notification of substitutes, replace Rule 40.1 with the following sub-paragraph:
“Only those representatives or, in their absence, the substitutes duly designated by the national
delegation not later than 24 hours before the debate concerned, who have signed the register of
attendance, shall be entitled to vote.”;
2.4. with regard to the threshold for the formation of a political group:
2.4.1. in Rule 19.2, replace the words “28 members”, by the words “26 members”;
2.4.2. in Rule 19.4, after the words “in Rule 19.2.”, add the words “on the date of 30 June, or
which has less than 20 members for a period of three successive months”;
2.4.3. in Rule 19.7, after the words “as a reference date”, add the words “to verify that the
conditions stipulated in Rule 19.2 are met, as well as”
2.5. with regard to the content of text proposals and written declarations tabled by members, replace
the last sentence of Rule 25.2 and the second sentence of Rule 56.2 with the following sentence:
“They shall also address areas falling within the Council of Europe’s sphere of competence and
shall not contain racist, xenophobic or intolerant language or words and expressions whose
meaning bears an affront to human dignity.”;
2.6. with regard to the possibility for several members to table a written question to the Committee of
Ministers:
2.6.1. in Rule 61.1, replace the first sentence with the following sentence:
“Representatives and substitutes or several representatives and/or substitutes may at
any time address to the Committee of Ministers, or to its Chairperson-in-office, written
questions bearing on matters within the competence of the Committee of Ministers.”;
2.6.2. in Rule 61.2, replace the sentence “Representatives and substitutes may also submit
written questions.” with the following sentence:
“Representatives and substitutes or several representatives and/or substitutes may
also submit written questions.”;
2.7. with regard to the bureaux of committees, in Rule 46.3, add the following words at the end of the
second sentence: “only if the candidature respects the agreement reached”, and a new sentence at the
end of the paragraph as follows: “If it proves impossible to reach an agreement by consensus, the
agreement should be obtained amongst the political groups at a qualified majority of two thirds.”;
Resolution 2551 (2024)
2
2.8. in order to clarify the committee decisions subjected to quorum requirements, after Rule 47 add
the following new sub-paragraph:
“47.4. A committee with 81 or 85 seats may adopt a motion for a recommendation or resolution
with no less than 20 members voting in favour of the motion; a committee with less seats shall
adopt motions for recommendation or resolution with the requisite quorum as defined in Rule
47.3. Declarations by committees shall be adopted with the requisite quorum as defined in Rule
47.3.”;
2.9. with regard to references to committees, at the end of Rule 26.3, add the following sentence: “If
a draft report adopted by a committee proposes any amendments to the European Convention on
Human Rights, the Bureau requests an opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
on this draft report.”;
2.10. with regard to reports prepared under the urgent procedure, the first sentence of Rule 50.4
should be amended by adding, after the word “rapporteur”, the words “, except when prepared under
the urgent procedure”.
3. By adopting Resolution 2492 (2023), the Assembly demonstrated its clear intention to reaffirm its strong
commitment to developing co-operation with neighbouring regions as a means of consolidating democratic
transformations and promoting stability, good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law.
Therefore, the Assembly needs to fully implement its earlier decisions taken by Resolution 2492 (2023) by
adapting its Rules 17 and 64, as well as its “Guidelines for questions to guest speakers” in the complementary
texts, accordingly, as follows:
3.1. after Rule 17.3, insert the following new sub-paragraph:
“17.4. The chairpersons of partner for democracy delegations or, in their absence, a member of
the delegation duly designated, shall be invited to attend meetings of the Standing Committee
without the right to vote.”;
3.2. at the end of Rule 64.6, add the following sentence:
“Their names shall be published on the website and in the Assembly list after the list of members
for each committee, under the heading ‘partners for democracy’.”;
3.3. after Rule 64.6, insert the following new sub-paragraphs:
“64.7. On a proposal by the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, the Bureau may
decide to grant some additional rights to partner for democracy delegations which have shown
outstanding results in achieving the goals of the partnership and participate fully in the work of
the Assembly. The decision of the Bureau shall be ratified by the Assembly at the beginning of a
new session (in January) and shall be valid for the duration of the session (one year), with the
possibility or not of extension at each following session depending on the results and according
to the same procedure. Such additional rights for the delegations and their members may
include:
64.7.1. the right to table motions for recommendation and resolution, subject to co-signature by
a member of the Assembly, with both names appearing as authors of the motion;
64.7.2. the right to table amendments, subject to co-signature by a member of the Assembly,
with both names appearing as authors of the amendment;
64.7.3. the right to request current affairs debates and to be chosen to open such debates. If
such a request is made by an individual member of a partner for democracy delegation, it should
be subject to co-signature by a member of the Assembly, with both names appearing as authors
of the request, and to having the support of 19 more members of the Assembly. If a request is
made by a partner for democracy delegation, it should be supported by a political group, a
national delegation or a committee, as provided by Rule 53.2;
64.7.4. the right to table written declarations, subject to co-signature by a member of the
Assembly, with both names appearing as authors of the written declaration;
64.7.5. the right to be appointed as rapporteur for information reports which do not contain a
draft resolution and/or recommendation.”;
Resolution 2551 (2024)
3
3.4. in the complementary texts relating to Assembly debates, in “vi. Guidelines for questions to
guest speakers”, amend the first sentences of paragraphs 7 and 8, as follows:
“7. Representatives and substitutes and members of partner for democracy delegations may put
written questions to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe for oral answer.”
“8. Representatives or substitutes and members of partner for democracy delegations may put
spontaneous questions to guest speakers when this is provided for in the agenda of the part-
session or authorised by the President of the Assembly during a sitting.”
4. The Assembly decides to adjust the terms of reference of certain committees, in the complementary
texts, as follows:
4.1. under “B. Specific terms of reference of Assembly Committees I. Committee on Political Affairs
and Democracy (AS/Pol)”:
4.1.1. at the end of paragraph 6, add the following words:
“and in the European Centre for Global Interdependence and Solidarity (North-South
Centre).”
4.1.2. after paragraph 6, add the following new paragraph:
“7. The committee shall represent the Assembly in, and follow the work of, the relevant
expert committees of the Council of Europe.”
4.2. under “B. Specific terms of reference of Assembly Committees VII. Committee on Rules of
Procedure, Immunities and Institutional Affairs (AS/Pro)”, add the following new paragraph 7:
“7. The committee shall represent the Assembly in, and follow the work of, the relevant expert
committees of the Council of Europe.”.
5. The Assembly decides to amend certain provisions relating to the functioning of the Monitoring
Committee:
5.1. with regard to the duration of the terms of reference of periodic review reports by the Monitoring
Committee, at the end of Rule 26.4 add the following sentence:
“References to the Monitoring Committee for periodic review as defined in paragraph 8 of the
Terms of reference of the Assembly Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and
Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) shall lapse in
three years.”;
5.2. with regard to access to the meeting of the Monitoring Committee, replace Rule 48.8 with the
following:
“Secretaries of political groups may attend the meetings of committees of the Assembly, except
for those of the Committee on the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights.
Secretaries of national delegations may attend the meetings of committees of the Assembly,
except for those of the Committee on the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human
Rights and of the Monitoring Committee.”;
5.3. with regard to the appointment of co-rapporteurs by the Monitoring Committee, at the end of
paragraph 11.1 of Resolution 1115 (1997) (modified), add the following sentence: “– no co-rapporteurs
shall be a chairperson of a friendship group in his/her national parliament of the state being monitored.”.
6. Finally, the Assembly decided to amend the following complementary texts:
6.1. in the “Additional provisions relating to Assembly debates”, “ii. List of speakers”, replace
paragraphs 2 and 3 with the following paragraph:
“2. As soon as the draft agenda of the part-session has been published, and up to the closing
date, names of members of the Assembly may be entered online via the Pace‑apps platform, or
in the event of malfunctioning of the application sent by e‑mail (Table.Office@coe.int), by
secretaries of national delegations or secretaries of political groups to the Table Office of the
Parliamentary Assembly. Names may not be entered on the list of speakers for a debate under
urgent procedure or a current affairs debate until a specific request is placed on the draft
agenda”;
Resolution 2551 (2024)
4
6.2. with regard to the «Modalities for the election procedure of judges to the European Court of
Human Rights and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights», paragraph 3 and 4, delete
the words “on the ballot paper”.
7. The Assembly also calls the committees to review the terms of reference of their networks, alliances or
other bodies to allow the members of partner for democracy delegations to be included in their composition.
8. The Assembly decides that the amendments to the Rules of Procedure set out in this Resolution shall
enter into force upon their adoption.
Resolution 2551 (2024)
5
Resolution 2552 (2024)1
Provisional version
Strengthening democracy through participatory and
deliberative processes
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly believes that participatory and deliberative democracy processes can
contribute to revitalising and strengthening democracy, by harnessing citizens’ collective wisdom and giving
them the capacity to directly influence decisions that affect their lives.
2. Democracy is intrinsically interdependent with human rights and the rule of law. It is thus the only
political model compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights (ETS No. 5). Regrettably however,
democracy is backsliding in Europe and worldwide. This erosion of democratic standards manifests itself in
the weakening of the separation and balance of powers, with parliaments being sidelined and the
independence of judiciary decreasing, to the advantage of a greater role for the executive. Civic space is
shrinking due to restrictions to the freedoms of assembly and association, and freedom of media is declining.
3. Democratic backsliding, in turn, fuels the mistrust of citizens towards public authorities and their
disillusion with traditional political parties, thus contributing to the downwards trends in electoral turnouts that
are becoming a common feature among European countries, undermining the foundations of representative
democracy. Against this background, political discourse has become populist, divisive and aggressive, paving
the way for the rise of extremist parties, and in some instances leading to hate speech and physical violence.
Malignant actors interfere with democratic processes to widen polarisation and provoke destabilisation.
4. At the same time, European societies are facing unprecedented challenges of global magnitude.
Geopolitical rifts, frozen and armed conflicts, financial and economic shocks, widening inequalities, issues
related to immigration and national identity, the environmental and climate crises, the digital revolution and the
rise of artificial intelligence are all contributing to an increased and diffused sense of uncertainty among
Europeans.
5. Innovative methods need to be explored in order to safeguard democracy and ensure that democratic
backsliding is countered and reversed. Participatory and deliberative democracy processes can contribute to
rekindling citizens’ trust in public authorities and strengthening their political engagement, including their
participation in decision-making processes, in complementarity with representative institutions. Citizens should
be given an active role in the political debate, beyond and more frequently than in the context of elections, and
all segments of society should be involved, including those who are all too often under-represented.
6. The Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe have confirmed in their Reykjavik
Declaration “United around our values” the resolve of member States to counter democratic backsliding, by
adopting the Reykjavik Principles for Democracy and committing to delivering on them. The very first Principle
indicates that member States will “actively enable and encourage democratic participation at national, regional
and local levels through free and fair elections. As appropriate, forms of participatory democracy, including
deliberative democracy, may be encouraged”.
1. Assembly debate on 25 June 2024 (17th sitting) (see Doc. 16001, report of the Committee on Political Affairs and
Democracy, rapporteur: Mr George Papandreou). Text adopted by the Assembly on 25 June 2024 (17th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
7. Different levels of citizens’ engagement can be envisioned, from simple information sessions and
consultations, to focus groups, participatory platforms, and ultimately the establishment of deliberative bodies,
such as citizens’ assemblies. These processes are not mutually exclusive, and can be adopted in combination
with one another. They allow citizens to express their needs, submit their ideas and even co-participate in the
decision- and policy-making process. Social media, artificial intelligence and digital tools, if used properly and
transparently, can further boost the potential of participatory and deliberative democracy.
8. The Assembly has already called for the adoption of participatory and deliberative democracy
processes by Council of Europe member States, through Resolution 1746 (2010) “Democracy in Europe:
crisis and perspectives”, Resolution 2397 (2021) and Recommendation 2212 (2021) “More participatory
democracy to tackle climate change”, and Resolution 2437 (2022) “Safeguarding and promoting genuine
democracy in Europe”, and it reiterates the considerations and recommendations contained therein.
9. Furthermore, the Assembly recalls that the Council of Europe is actively contributing to the
development of standards related to participatory and deliberative democracy, and to their promotion through
technical co-operation activities at national, regional and local levels. In particular, the Committee of Ministers
adopted Recommendation CM/Rec(2023)6 on deliberative democracy, the first international standard in this
field, which invites member States to consider deliberative processes and suggests the principles of
deliberative democracy that should be applied when implementing them. Welcoming these efforts, the
Assembly calls on member and observer States of the Council of Europe to:
9.1. adopt participatory and deliberative democracy processes at national, regional and local levels,
in accordance with Recommendation CM/Rec(2023)6 and ensuring the respect of the following
principles in their design and implementation:
9.1.1. “availability of a legal framework;
9.1.2. clarity of mandate and design;
9.1.3. fair representation;
9.1.4. enabled and informed participation;
9.1.5. competent facilitation;
9.1.6. accountability;
9.1.7. oversight and good governance;
9.1.8. evaluation and learning”;
9.2. participate actively in the work of the Steering Committee on Democracy, including for what
concerns the development of parameters to facilitate the application and implementation of the
Reykjavik Principles for Democracy, and the drafting of an implementation review report on
Recommendation CM/Rec(2023)6 and/or a handbook collecting best practices;
9.3. take advantage of the expertise of the Council of Europe in the area of the relevant technical co-
operation for the practical implementation of participatory and deliberative democracy processes,
stepping up with financial resources if needed.
10. In addition, the Assembly invites the member and observer States of the Council of Europe as well as
States whose parliaments enjoy observer or partner for democracy status or hold another status with the
Assembly to consider the following measures:
10.1. promote the use of participatory and deliberative democracy processes at all levels by creating
an enabling environment, in particular by ensuring that adequate financial and human resources are
available and sufficient time is foreseen for their proper design, implementation, follow-up and
evaluation;
10.2. encourage the experimentation of innovative participatory and deliberative methodologies within
the relevant legislation, regulations, and budget allocations, including the necessary mechanisms for
monitoring, evaluation and elaboration of lessons learned;
10.3. ensure that social media, digital platforms and artificial intelligence tools to facilitate participatory
and deliberative democracy processes are employed in a manner that is respectful of the principles of
human rights, democracy and the rule of law, is inclusive, transparent and safe from unwanted
interferences and cyberattacks, and is not manipulated through algorithms or biased by mis- and dis-
Resolution 2552 (2024)
2
information that could affect the final results, also taking into account the provisions contained in the
Council of Europe Framework Convention on artificial intelligence and human rights, democracy, and
the rule of law;
10.4. foresee the establishment of permanent multilevel schools on participatory democracy, inspired
by the ones already created by the Council of Europe, to ensure that civil servants and facilitators
involved in participatory and deliberative democracy processes can access specialised training
opportunities and are provided with a platform for the exchange of best practices and lessons learned;
10.5. ensure that the opinions or recommendations produced through participatory and deliberative
democracy processes are duly taken into account by the decision makers, that they are openly
debated, and that clear explanations are provided in case they are not followed;
10.6. institutionalise participatory and deliberative democracy processes at all levels, adopting the
necessary legislation or regulations and allocating the appropriate financial and human resources, in
order to create permanent and fully legitimate citizens’ bodies that can operate side by side with
executive and legislative ones;
10.7. explore the possibility of collaborating at a transnational level in order to pilot and implement
multi-country or cross-border participatory and deliberative democracy exercises.
11. Citizens should be properly equipped and prepared to be actively engaged through participatory and
deliberative democracy processes. The Assembly therefore invites member and observer States to design
and include elements of education for democratic citizenship and human rights education in the curricula for
formal education at pre-primary, primary and secondary school levels, as well as in general and vocational
education and higher education institutions, to ensure that all Europeans are aware of their rights and duties
as citizens, and to strengthen participatory culture among them, in line with the provisions of the Council of
Europe Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education and following the
guidance of the Reference Framework of Competences for Democratic Culture.
Resolution 2552 (2024)
3
Resolution 2553 (2024)1
Provisional version
Strengthening a youth perspective in the work of the
Parliamentary Assembly
Parliamentary Assembly
1. Taking on board the views, expectations and concerns of the youth is an essential precondition to
ensure the good functioning of democracy and its capacity to pursue, with a long-term perspective, the public
good. Young people bring dynamism, a fresh impetus and new ideas to a full range of policy issues, that is
key to addressing today’s challenges and contributes to effective, inclusive and sustainable policy making.
2. Regrettably, young people are under-represented in parliaments and do not engage sufficiently with
traditional politics due, inter alia, to legislative and other barriers, prejudices and a lack of opportunities. This
reinforces their disenchantment with political life, undermines the representativeness of elected institutions
and raises questions about intergenerational justice. It also affects the effectiveness and future sustainability
of democracy as a governance system, as young people are the ones who will be the most affected by the
decisions taken today on longer-term issues such as climate change, environmental protection and deepening
inequalities.
3. The Parliamentary Assembly firmly believes that increasing youth participation in political platforms and
decision making can lead to more resilient democracies and help tackle democratic backsliding and increase
the political engagement of young people and their legislative representation. It strongly welcomes, therefore,
the stance taken by the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe during their 4th Summit that
a youth perspective should be included in all the Council of Europe intergovernmental and other deliberations.
4. The Assembly recalls that the Council of Europe is a pioneer, promoter and innovator in youth
participation, notably with the establishment of the European Youth Centres based in Strasbourg and
Budapest, and the European Youth Foundation and the co-management system which gives an equal voice
to young Europeans, represented by the Advisory Council on Youth (CCJ), and to the representatives of
public authorities responsible for youth issues, in the formulation of the Organisation’s youth policies and
programmes.
5. The Assembly highlights the achievements of the 50 years of existence of the Council of Europe youth
sector and the individual and collective contributions that young people and their organisations continue to
make in uniting the continent and supporting democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the member
States of the Council of Europe. It also commends the campaign “Democracy here. Democracy now.”, which
aims at revitalising democracy by strengthening mutual trust between young people and democratic
institutions.
6. The Assembly also notes that, since 2014, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the
Council of Europe has implemented an initiative aimed at rejuvenating political life by inviting young people to
take part in its sessions as youth delegates, to have their say in the debates and to exchange with Congress
members on the issues on the agenda.
1. Assembly debate on 25 June 2024 (17th sitting) (see Doc. 15871, report of the Committee on Political Affairs and
Democracy, rapporteur: Mr Anastasios Chatzivasileiou; and Doc. 15872, opinion of the Committee on Culture, Science,
Education and Media, rapporteur: Ms Yevheniia Kravchuk). Text adopted by the Assembly on 25 June 2024 (17th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
7. Furthermore, the Assembly takes positive note of the initiatives taken by the Inter-Parliamentary Union
(IPU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly to
discuss the challenges of young people and their interests, to boost the participation of young people in
parliaments and to ensure that young members of parliament play a full part in their work. It notes with
satisfaction that the platforms put in place by these international parliaments, which regroup their youngest
members, greatly contribute to including a youth perspective in their decision making and to keeping youth
issues high on their agenda.
8. In the light of these considerations, the Assembly resolves to establish a mechanism aimed at ensuring
that a youth perspective is systematically taken into account in its deliberations. Such a PACE-Youth
Participation Mechanism would rely on the participation of members of the Assembly and young Europeans,
represented by the CCJ and other structures of the Council of Europe youth sector. The mechanism would
function as follows:
8.1. each of the Assembly’s general committees (with the exception of the Committee on the Election
of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights) should appoint from amongst its full members or
alternates a Youth Rapporteur, who shall be responsible for raising a youth perspective in the debates
on the reports under preparation in the committee, and for this purpose liaise with CCJ members and
other structures of the Council of Europe youth sector working on specific files. The mandate of Youth
Rapporteur should not exceed two years, renewable once;
8.2. when appointing the Youth Rapporteur, in addition to the criteria of competence and availability,
fair representation of political groups (based on the d’Hondt system), gender-balanced representation,
and geographical and national balance, committees should also give due regard to the age of the
candidates, with a view to ensuring that young members of the Assembly are given appropriate visibility
in its work. Upon their appointment, the Youth Rapporteurs should declare their interests;
8.3. during plenary debates, the Youth Rapporteur of the committee which is seized for report shall
have the right to take the floor after the representatives of the political groups;
8.4. on an annual basis, the Assembly’s Youth Rapporteurs shall hold a meeting with the CCJ to
discuss the Assembly’s reports under preparation, identify new issues for debate and envisage joint
initiatives and co-operation activities (annual session of the PACE-Youth Participation Mechanism). The
discussions may cover any substantive issues and should not be limited to youth policies;
8.5. on an annual basis, the Bureau of the Assembly should be invited to hold a strategic exchange
of views with the Joint Bureaux of the CCJ and the European Steering Committee for Youth (CDEJ)
with the participation of the Youth Rapporteurs from each committee;
8.6. once a year, the Assembly should hold a debate on a specific theme agreed during the above-
mentioned strategic exchange of views, with the participation of the members of the CCJ;
8.7. the PACE-Youth Participation Mechanism would operate within the framework of an increased
interaction between the Assembly and the youth sector: whenever possible, members of the CCJ, other
structures of the Council of Europe youth sector and youth organisations should be invited to contribute
to the preparation of reports, by participating in hearings and exchanges, and presenting contributions
at committee level. This should include a yearly exchange on current priorities and issues for future
work in each committee, for example at the beginning of the year. At the same time, the participation of
the Assembly’s Youth Rapporteurs and other Assembly representatives in the Council of Europe’s
youth sector meetings and activities should be encouraged.
9. The Assembly calls on its Bureau to take the necessary measures to ensure that the Assembly’s Rules
of Procedure and complementary texts are amended to take into account paragraph 8 and its sub-paragraphs
10. Being aware that strengthening a youth perspective in political decision making requires a wide range
of measures and the involvement of many actors, the Assembly invites national delegations to:
10.1. ensure and increase the presence of young parliamentarians amongst their members;
10.2. reserve a certain number of seats for young parliamentarians and take measures to encourage
their active participation in the work of the Assembly;
10.3. consider reserving a “youth seat” for a member of their national parliament who is also a
representative of a youth organisation.
Resolution 2553 (2024)
2
11. The Assembly invites its political groups to consider ways to increase youth participation in their work,
including by:
11.1. regularly inviting youth representatives to participate in their meetings and supporting and
facilitating their participation;
11.2. giving young members greater visibility and opportunities to actively participate in the work of the
Assembly;
11.3. actively calling on their correspondent national political parties to undertake institutional reforms
to increase youth representation, in particular young women, including by devising new recruitment
strategies, allocating funding to young candidates and actively supporting them in running for election,
and empowering party youth groups.
12. With the objective of strengthening a youth perspective in political decision making at national level, the
Assembly calls on the national parliaments of Council of Europe member States to create the conditions for
the widest possible participation of young people, in particular young women, in political decision making, and
to this effect to:
12.1. remove legislative barriers which prevent young people from running for office, including by
aligning the voting age and the age for running for office;
12.2. step up co-operation with national youth councils and youth organisations and networks,
including by co-organising meetings to hold thematic discussions on topical issues, thus enabling youth
to share their ideas, perspectives and solutions;
12.3. set up, if they have not yet done so, participatory mechanisms to allow mainstreaming of a youth
perspective in parliament’s work;
12.4. set up an informal network of young parliamentarians.
13. The Assembly supports the introduction of youth quotas by political parties and encourages them to
carry out a feasibility study to this aim.
14. The Assembly refers to Resolution 2378 (2021) “Strengthening the role of young people in the
prevention and resolution of conflicts”. It acknowledges the challenge that young people and young
parliamentarians must face in countries where they suffer from the devastating consequences of a war and in
frozen conflict regions. It also recognises that they must be given a stronger role in promoting dialogue and
mutual understanding, and will thus seek to provide all of the Assembly’s young parliamentarians with greater
opportunities to work together and contribute to the Assembly efforts towards conflict prevention and
resolution.
Resolution 2553 (2024)
3
Resolution 2554 (2024)1
Provisional version
Protecting women human rights defenders in Europe
Parliamentary Assembly
1. Women human rights defenders in all their diversity play a crucial role in promoting and protecting
human rights, including women’s rights and the rights of LGBTI persons, and in furthering gender equality.
They are individuals or groups who act, in a peaceful and legal way, to promote and protect human rights.
They are activists, members of non-governmental organisations, health workers, private sector actors,
researchers, lawyers, students, teachers, artists, trade unionists, bloggers, civil servants, or journalists. They
are an inspiration for societal change.
2. In a context of shrinking civic space, women human rights defenders often lack recognition and their
contribution is minimised, a situation which is not helped by the extreme diversity of their status and areas of
work. The Parliamentary Assembly recognises their important work, including that of young women human
rights defenders, and calls for them to be given more support.
3. Women human rights defenders face multiple challenges and risks; they are often threatened and
attacked for what they do, for the ideas they promote and for who they are or who they are perceived to be. In
particular, they receive specific threats made against their person, both on and offline, aiming to silence them.
In particular, targeted online hate campaigns have been organised against activists who denounce patriarchal
systems and cultures. Women human rights defenders are often victims of intersecting forms of
discrimination. Transgender women human rights defenders and those with a disability or with a minority
background are particularly at risk. The Assembly strongly condemns the attacks perpetrated against women
human rights defenders in all their diversity, and calls for an end to impunity for their perpetrators.
4. The rise in populism and misogyny has a negative impact on the work of women human rights
defenders in Europe. Anti-gender movements see them as a threat because they challenge the so-called
“traditional vision” of women in society. Considering these challenges and obstacles, it is essential to combat
misinformation about women’s rights and women human rights defenders and to ensure their digital safety.
The Assembly recalls the responsibility of States to provide an enabling environment for women human rights
defenders and to ensure their protection in line with their undertakings under international treaties.
5. The Assembly recalls the 1999 United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and the 2008
European Union guidelines for human rights defenders and stresses the importance of their implementation. It
also recalls the Committee of Ministers’ Declaration of 6 February 2008 on Council of Europe action to
improve the protection of human rights defenders and promote their activities of and its Recommendation
CM/Rec(2018)11 to member States on the need to strengthen the protection and promotion of civil society
space in Europe.
6. The Assembly reaffirms its support for all human rights defenders and recalls its Resolution 2095
(2016) and Recommendation 2085 (2016) “Strengthening the protection and role of human rights defenders in
Council of Europe member States”, its Resolution 2225 (2018) “Protecting human rights defenders in Council
of Europe member States” and its Resolution 2439 (2022) “Access to abortion in Europe: stopping anti-choice
harassment”. It reaffirms its support for the mandate of the Assembly’s General Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights defenders and whistleblowers. The Assembly provides an international platform for human rights
1. Assembly debate on 25 June 2024 (18th sitting) (see Doc. 15993, report of the Committee on Equality and Non-
Discrimination, rapporteur: Ms Petra Bayr). Text adopted by the Assembly on 25 June 2024 (18th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
defenders, and its newly-created Vigdís Prize for Women’s Empowerment, launched in May 2023, will provide
a further opportunity to raise awareness about the work of women human rights defenders to empower
women in their countries and fields of activity.
7. In the light of these considerations, the Assembly calls on Council of Europe member States to:
7.1. sign, ratify and implement the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating
violence against women and domestic violence (CETS No. 210, “Istanbul Convention”);
7.2. implement the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders;
7.3. ensure the implementation of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights related to
the situation of all human rights defenders;
7.4. repeal laws, policies and practices that affect women human rights defenders, in all their
diversity, and unduly restrict their activities;
7.5. revise criminal codes in order to include discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation,
gender identity and expression and sex characteristics, taking into account the intersectional
dimension, if it is not yet the case;
7.6. investigate and prosecute perpetrators – including members of police forces – of attacks and
threats against women human rights defenders, online and offline, including publication of private
information with malicious intent (“doxing”) and specifically gendered attacks; and collect gender-
disaggregated data on these attacks;
7.7. ensure that criminal proceedings related to gender-specific crimes are victim-friendly and
respect victims’ rights;
7.8. protect women human rights defenders from acts of intimidation and legal and administrative
harassment;
7.9. foster the trust of civil society in public institutions, condemn smear campaigns against women
human rights defenders and counter distortion and misinformation about their work;
7.10. publicly recognise the role and contribution of women human rights defenders, in all their
diversity, and guarantee their protection, ensuring a secure and enabling environment in which to carry
out their activities;
7.11. provide predictable funding for the work of women human rights defenders, ensure transparency
in the allocation of funding and allow them to access funds from international or private sources;
7.12. support the participation of women human rights defenders in legislative processes, in policy
and decision making on matters concerning them at an early stage of planning, and when it comes to
the evaluation and possible adaptations of policies and programmes;
7.13. introduce, if not yet the case, assessment of the impact of draft laws on gender equality and
anti-discrimination;
7.14. ensure that national human rights action plans include specific provisions on women human
rights defenders;
7.15. support programmes to ensure the safety of women human rights defenders at risk, including
early warning mechanisms, foresee flexible funding for their activities, and facilitate the granting of visas
for women human rights defenders at risk;
7.16. raise awareness and train diplomatic and consular staff on the protection of human rights
defenders;
7.17. recognise the impact that attacks and threats can have on the mental health of human rights
defenders and support recovery programmes;
7.18. provide training for police officers, prosecutors and judges on gender equality and on the role,
work and legitimacy of women human rights defenders;
7.19. launch awareness-raising campaigns on the roles and contributions of women human rights
defenders.
8. The Assembly calls on Council of Europe member States to strengthen equality bodies as important
allies of women human rights defenders by securing high standards and sufficient funding.
Resolution 2554 (2024)
2
9. The Assembly calls on Council of Europe member States that are Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court to consider proposing an amendment to the Statute in order to include the crime
of “gender apartheid”, which is the institutionalisation of gender-based discrimination and exclusion of women
and girls from all spheres of society.
10. The Assembly calls on Council of Europe member States which are member States of the European
Union to support the inclusion of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights.
11. Noting that women human rights defenders working on the protection of sexual and reproductive health
and rights have faced numerous challenges and threats in past years, the Assembly calls on Council of
Europe member States to respect and ensure women’s autonomy and decision-making capacity when it
comes to reproductive health and rights and, if necessary, to provide clear guidelines to doctors, pharmacists
and patients in this regard, and to provide age adequate comprehensive and inclusive sex education.
12. Considering that women human rights defenders often struggle to protect human rights and
environmental rights that are infringed by private enterprises, the Assembly invites Council of Europe member
States to support the preparation of a binding United Nations treaty on business and human rights in order to
hold actors of the private sector accountable.
13. Inclusive feminist foreign, development, and peace policies can provide an enabling framework for
supporting women human rights defenders. The Assembly therefore invites Council of Europe member States
to consider adopting such policies.
14. Considering that culture can be an instrument of change, the Assembly invites its member States to
earmark funding dedicated to women artists, in all their diversity, working on the promotion of human rights,
women’s rights and rights of LGBTI persons.
15. The Assembly encourages national parliaments to demonstrate their support for women human rights
defenders through practical action such as introducing new policies, including on equal treatment, anti-
discrimination, sexual and reproductive health and rights, sexual orientation, gender expression and identity
and sex characteristics, empowerment of women and gender-based violence, and organising parliamentary
events with their participation in order to establish and maintain dialogue.
Resolution 2554 (2024)
3
Resolution 2555 (2024)1
Provisional version
Ensuring human rights-compliant asylum procedures
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly recalls and aligns with the position of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) whereby the refugee definition is declaratory which means that a
person is a refugee as soon as s/he fulfils the criteria contained in the definition and that principles foreseen
by international refugee law should apply in all situations.
2. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, “the Convention”) and Article 4 of
its Protocol No. 4 (ETS No. 46) commit member States to making sure that they will not expose, positively or
negatively, anyone falling under their jurisdiction to a risk of torture, or inhumane or degrading treatment. Only
through a fair and effective individual examination of an asylum application can such obligation be met, taking
into account specific vulnerabilities faced by persons belonging to certain groups such as women, ethnic,
religious and national minorities, LGBTI people, victims of violence, and victims of human trafficking. In case
of appeal, the remedy must be accompanied by the automatic suspensive effect of expulsion measures
should the applicant complain of a risk under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention. These safeguards are required
for the appeal to be considered effective and in compliance with Article 13 of the Convention, as well as with
the consistent case law of the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”).
3. The Assembly expresses its profound concern at the gradual erosion of the right to seek asylum as a
reaction to the growing number of asylum applications in Europe, as well as to the instrumentalisation and
exaggeration of the phenomenon of incoming migration, orchestrated for political purposes domestically or by
certain external regimes as a means of exerting pressure on European countries for other purposes. It warns
against this trend which, on the one hand, infringes on international human rights and European law and
which thus eventually weakens the core principles of the rule of law and, on the other hand, leads to chaos
and human suffering.
4. The Assembly reiterates the concerns already expressed in Resolution 2404 (2021) “Instrumentalised
migration pressure on the borders of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland with Belarus” in which it condemned “the
growing tendency to restrict the right to seek asylum of persons crossing a border irregularly and any practice
by member States of refoulements of migrants and asylum seekers to third countries, where international
protection needs may not be guaranteed”.
5. The Assembly recalls the reply by the Committee of Ministers to Recommendation 2161 (2019)
“Pushback policies and practice in Council of Europe member States”, in which the Committee of Ministers
noted that “the right to seek asylum must be respected”, in particular, “the right to an individual and fair
examination” of asylum applications by the competent authorities” (Doc. 15088).
6. The Assembly highlights that asylum seekers may not be able to avail themselves of their right to seek
asylum because of restriction or even blocking of access, disproportionally strict eligibility criteria or wide
derogation rules, insufficient capacities and resources to process cases or dire reception conditions. It
underlines that policies of deterrence have neither demonstrated their efficiency in enhancing domestic
security nor strengthened the protection of civil liberties. Therefore, the Assembly calls on member States to
avoid resorting to such policies.
1. Assembly debate on 25 June 2024 (18th sitting) (see Doc. 15997, report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees
and Displaced Persons, rapporteur: Ms Stephanie Krisper). Text adopted by the Assembly on 25 June 2024 (18th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
7. The Assembly notes that asylum seekers belonging to with vulnerable groups, particularly women,
ethnic, religious and national minorities, LGBTI people, victims of violence and victims of human trafficking,
are disproportionately affected by human rights violations at all stages of the asylum process, both by the
action and inaction of relevant State representatives. The Assembly calls on member States to develop
policies in accordance with their human rights obligations that take account of specific vulnerabilities of the
aforementioned persons.
8. The Assembly encourages member States to design accelerated procedures only if in full compliance
with human rights standards, making use of already existing procedures such as the prima facie procedure.
The Assembly reiterates the imperative that accelerated procedures do not result in lowering procedural
safeguards, in accordance with the Court’s case law. It recalls the commitments by the Committee of
Ministers to ensure access to justice for asylum seekers, pursuant to Resolution No. 1 on access to justice for
migrants and asylum seekers and to the Guidelines on human rights protection in the context of accelerated
asylum procedures.
9. The Assembly reiterates that access to legal aid must be guaranteed. It encourages national
parliaments to guarantee the professional independence of legal aid providers and ensure their high
competence in line with the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the
efficiency and the effectiveness of legal aid schemes in the areas of civil and administrative law (CM(2021)36-
add2final).
10. The Assembly recalls its Resolution 2461 (2022) and Recommendation 2238 (2022) “Safe third
countries for asylum seekers”, and welcomes the reply of the Committee of Ministers (Doc. 15874) informing
the Assembly of its readiness to evaluate the need for and feasibility of updating Recommendation Rec(97)22
to member States containing guidelines on the application of the safe third country concept. The Assembly is
therefore looking forward to the results of this evaluation and updated guidelines on the safe third country
concept.
11. The Assembly calls on national parliaments to review the alignment of national legislation with the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights and with the above-mentioned documents adopted by the
Committee of Ministers.
12. The Assembly calls on parliaments and governments of member States to significantly increase the
availability of the resources necessary for the processing of asylum claims in a fast, fair and effective manner
especially at the border, including through proper access to legal aid and effective remedy.
13. The Assembly notes the adoption of the European Union Pact on Migration and Asylum. It recalls its
Resolution 2416 (2022) “European Union Pact on Migration and Asylum: a human rights perspective” and the
remaining validity of the recommendations. In particular, the Assembly:
13.1. reiterates its deep concerns at the prospect of detention and de facto detention being
systematised especially in the context of the newly established border procedures. It expresses its
uncompromising opposition to the detention of children, whatever their age, and recalls that asylum
seekers are not immigration detainees;
13.2. stresses the importance of frontloading human, infrastructural and technical resources to ensure
that member States can deliver on their international human rights obligations to ensure effective
access to the territory of asylum and to a fair and swift asylum procedure for all individuals across the
European Union territory;
13.3. welcomes the initiative of establishing human rights border monitoring mechanisms and
underlines that these mechanisms should be effective, independent, and work in co-ordination with the
Council of Europe’s monitoring bodies notably those referred to in paragraph 14.2, and with the
UNHCR. These mechanisms should also take into consideration the Principles on the Protection and
Promotion of the Ombudsman Institution (“the Venice Principles”) adopted by the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) in 2019, and be in line with the
recommendations of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on “Establishing national
independent mechanisms to monitor fundamental rights compliance at EU external borders” published
in 2022;
13.4. welcomes the adoption of the Council Regulation (EU) 2022/922 of 9 June 2022 on the
establishment and operation of an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the
Schengen acquis, at European Union external and internal borders; and recommends that the
Schengen evaluators are trained on the identification of people in need of international protection in line
with Council of Europe standards and recommendations;
Resolution 2555 (2024)
2
13.5. encourages the European Commission to ensure that the allocation of the European Union
funding be conditioned on specific fundamental rights clauses. In particular, the Assembly underlines
the importance of imposing such conditions in accessing European Union funding during preliminary,
mid-term and reviewing evaluation. It recommends that such conditions involve criteria assessing the
respect for effective access to procedural safeguards during asylum procedures as part of the “enabling
conditions” pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
June 2021 laying down common provisions.
14. The Assembly notes that the adoption of the European Union Pact will lead to a two-year period for
evaluation of the situation in European Union member States with respect to the implementation of the new
legislation in place. It also notes that the Pact entails components which involve external co-operation
elements which will have an impact on non-European Union member States, many of which are members or
partners of the Council of Europe.
15. With a view to ensuring coherence in the concrete materialisation of effective human rights safeguards
forming guidance for the approach of member States of the Council of Europe, including European Union
member States, the Assembly:
15.1. encourages the European Commission and European Union member States to make explicit
reference to the Council of Europe’s relevant standards and documents, including country reports and
relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights, both in their gap analyses and in the follow-
up and assessment documents produced in the framework of the European Union Pact;
15.2. stresses that particular attention should be paid to the preventive mechanisms and monitoring
tools falling under the remit of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human
Beings, the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence and
the Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data (ETS No. 108);
15.3. calls on the above-mentioned monitoring bodies to pay specific attention to vulnerable persons
with a migration background, including persons in need of international protection, as part of their
monitoring activities;
15.4. invites the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Migration and Refugees (SRSG)
to facilitate intergovernmental discussions, for instance through the Network of Focal Points on
Migration, to design operational guidelines allowing for the concrete implementation of the European
Union Pact according to Council of Europe standards, including with regard to aspects involving non-
European Union member States such as external co-operation on asylum and the use of the safe
country concept during asylum procedures.
16. The Assembly is convinced that the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on
Human Rights will strengthen the regional approach to human rights. In this prospect, the Assembly takes
note of the already fruitful co-operation between the European Union and the Council of Europe in the field of
asylum and:
16.1. welcomes the reference made to the “Venice Principles” to guide the mandatory national
monitoring mechanism to be established as part of the Screening Regulation;
16.2. invites member States of the Council of Europe represented in the management board of the
European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) to promote operational guidelines with a view to ensuring
coherence in the approach to and application of asylum procedures at European Union and Council of
Europe levels;
16.3. invites the SRSG to contribute to enhancing such coherence as representative of the Council of
Europe at the EUAA Consultative Forum.
Resolution 2555 (2024)
3
Resolution 2556 (2024)1
Provisional version
Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s
aggression against Ukraine
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly reiterates its strongest condemnation of the Russian Federation’s ongoing
illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. Its full-scale invasion launched more than two years
ago is a flagrant continuous breach of the United Nations Charter and constitutes an act of aggression also
according to the United Nations General Assembly. The Assembly has already determined that this war,
which in fact started in 2014 with the occupation and attempted illegal annexation of Crimea, is in itself a crime
of aggression under international law which entails the individual criminal responsibility of the Russian
Federation’s political and military leadership.
2. The Assembly further reiterates its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders and its non-recognition of the attempted illegal
annexation by the Russian Federation of any parts of the Ukrainian’s territory, including the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and
Zaporizhzhia oblasts of Ukraine. This attempted annexation clearly violates the principle of international law
according to which no territorial acquisition resulting from the use of force shall be recognised as legal. The
fact that the Russian presidential election of 17 March 2024 was also held in the illegally occupied territories of
Ukraine, through the forced imposition of Russian law, is another example of the blatant disregard that the
Russian authorities have for the political independence and political rights of Ukraine and its people as well as
for the most basic principles of international humanitarian law, including the obligations for an occupying
power that arise under the Fourth Geneva Convention, which the Russian Federation has been bound by for
decades.
3. The Assembly is appalled by the continuous, numerous reports of atrocities, violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law committed by Russian military forces and proxies in Ukraine, in the course
of hostilities or in the temporarily occupied areas. These include indiscriminate attacks against civilians and
humanitarian and medical personnel, as well as against civilian objects such as medical facilities, schools,
electric power plants, other critical infrastructure, cultural and religious heritage; the illegal abduction,
detention, enforced disappearance, torture, ill-treatment and extrajudicial killings of Ukrainian citizens; the
torture, ill-treatment and summary executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war; the unlawful transfer or
deportation of Ukrainian children; all forms of conflict-related sexual violence; the use of chemical weapons
and cluster bombs; attacks causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment; looting;
forced “passportisation” and conscription of Ukrainian citizens.
4. Many of these violations amount to specific war crimes under the Geneva Conventions, Protocol
Additional I to the Geneva Conventions and the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Others, such
as torture and ill-treatment, appear to be carried out in a systematic and widespread manner and may
therefore also qualify as crimes against humanity. Most of these atrocities at the same time violate multiple
1. Assembly debate on 26 June 2024 (19th and 20th sittings) (see Doc. 15998, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, rapporteur: Mr Davor Ivo Stier). Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 June 2024 (20th sitting).
See also Recommendation 2279 (2024).
https://pace.coe.int
international human rights treaties ratified by the Russian Federation, which continue to apply in times of war.
All these acts have caused death, destruction, environmental damage and massive displacement of
population within and outside Ukraine.
5. In line with its previous resolutions, notably its Resolution 2482 (2023) “Legal and human rights aspects
of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”, the Assembly considers that the Russian official and
public media rhetoric used to justify the unlawful aggression may constitute direct and public incitement to
genocide or reveal a genocidal intent to destroy the Ukrainian national group as such or at least part of it,
within the meaning of the 1948 Genocide Convention. This rhetoric, which often comes from the highest level
of the Russian State authorities but also from religious leaders supporting the aggression within the Russian
Orthodox Church hierarchy, uses narratives such as the denial of Ukrainian identity or the “denazification” or
‘de-Satanization” of Ukrainians. The genocidal intent can also be inferred from the patterns of atrocities
observed against Ukrainians, such as killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting
conditions of life that are calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction and the forcible and co-
ordinated transfers of children to another group. This constitutes a growing body of evidence that the Russian
Federation’s attempts to commit genocide against the Ukrainians or at least publicly incites to it, as part of the
propaganda displayed to justify its war of aggression. These actions do not only entail State responsibility and
individual criminal responsibility for the Russian Federation and its State officials, but also trigger for all States
Parties to the Genocide Convention an obligation to prevent genocide, in accordance with their means and
their capacity to influence those suspected of preparing or committing genocide.
6. As regards the role of the Wagner Group and its participation in the war, the Assembly notes that its
status under international humanitarian law has long been disputed. Following the failed mutiny of June 2023
and the suspicious deaths of its leaders Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin in a plane crash two months
after, the current existence and structure of the group have evolved, with some of its fighters being
incorporated into the Russian armed forces or recruited by other Russian private military and security
companies or paramilitary groups. In any event, the Wagner Group continues to operate in various forms and
its members who committed or continue to commit war crimes and other atrocities in Ukraine should be
prosecuted and held to account before Ukrainian courts or the ICC. The Russian Federation bears full
international responsibility for their actions, in view of the acknowledged links and financial and operational
support extended to the group during its participation in the war, including the use of pardoned convicts as
fighters and co-ordination on the ground with the regular forces. The Russian Federation cannot claim
plausible deniability to escape international responsibility for the Wagner Group’s actions.
7. The Assembly welcomes the fact that several national parliaments, as well as the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Parliament,
have qualified the Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation or called for its designation as such, in line with its
position laid down in Resolution 2506 (2023) “Political consequences of the Russian Federation’s war of
aggression against Ukraine”. Given that some of its crimes appear to have been committed with the purpose
to provoke terror among the civilian population in Ukraine, its actions fall within some of the definitions of
terrorism in existing international texts, in addition to their qualification as war crimes. This would confirm the
Russian Federation’s status as a State sponsor of terrorism and have a deterrent effect on those States,
particularly outside Europe, and private entities, that would be tempted to co-operate with the Wagner Group
or its successors.
8. More than one year after the 4th Council of Europe Summit (16 and 17 May 2023) and the Reykjavik
Declaration adopted by its Heads of State and Government, the Assembly stresses once again the need to
ensure a comprehensive system of accountability for all violations of international law and international crimes
arising out of the Russian aggression, in order to achieve a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. There cannot
be peace without accountability, as implied by the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1), which in its
preamble underlines “the pursuit of peace based upon justice and international co-operation”. The Assembly
therefore welcomes and supports all the initiatives and steps taken so far within the Council of Europe
towards accountability, which are designed not only to help deliver justice and reparations to Ukraine and its
people, but also to fight against impunity, re-establish respect for the rule of law and prevent further attacks on
the international legal order. It further welcomes other initiatives taken outside the Organisation, such as the
ministerial conference on “Restoring Justice for Ukraine” held in The Hague on 2 April 2024 and the First
Peace Summit for Ukraine held in Bürgenstock (Switzerland) on 15-16 June 2024. Any peace process should
be based on the principles of a just and lasting peace as outlined in President Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula,
which the Assembly and the Heads of State and Government have already expressed support to.
9. The Assembly commends the efforts and ongoing investigations carried out by the existing international
and domestic accountability mechanisms competent to deal with some of the international crimes and
violations of human rights committed in the context of the aggression, including the Ukrainian authorities and
Resolution 2556 (2024)
2
Prosecutor General’s Office, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, the Joint Investigation Team (JIT), the
International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (ICPA), the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine established by the United Nations Human Rights Council, the
OSCE Moscow Mechanism, and third States’ authorities acting on the basis of the principle of universal
jurisdiction.
10. The Assembly notes however that there is still no appropriate accountability mechanism to deal with the
supreme international crime, that is the crime of aggression committed by the Russian Federation’s political
and military leadership against Ukraine, which enabled all other crimes and caused immeasurable suffering
even beyond the violation of international humanitarian law. More than two years after the full-scale invasion
and the first call by the Assembly, in April 2022, to set up a special international criminal tribunal for the crime
of aggression against Ukraine, consultations among member States and other interested States and partners
are still ongoing within the Core Group.
11. The Assembly notes with great satisfaction that participants in these consultations have expressed an
interest in the idea of establishing a special tribunal by an agreement between the Council of Europe and
Ukraine, which could be supported by an enlarged partial agreement open to non-member States and other
international organisations. The Assembly considers that this is the best feasible option, in terms of legal basis
and political legitimacy. It would clearly fall within the mandate of the Council of Europe, as reflected in its
Statute and in accordance with the priorities set out at the Reykjavik Summit. By creating such a tribunal, the
Council of Europe would ensure justice for a crime that was and is still being committed against one of its
member States by a former member State. However, it should not be understood as a merely European
response to a European problem. The Council of Europe would place itself at the service of the international
community as a whole, in order to uphold the international legal order and the prohibition of aggression. The
special tribunal should therefore have features that would make it as international as possible and encourage
cross-regional support, taking into account the need to maximise its international legitimacy and to minimise
any possible legal challenges, in particular with regard to the possible reliance of key suspects on personal
immunities.
12. The Assembly stresses again that the Russian Federation must bear the legal consequences of all of
its internationally wrongful acts committed in or against Ukraine, including by making reparation for the injuries
and losses caused by such acts to Ukraine and its citizens. The Assembly recalls in this regard its previous
resolutions on this subject, notably its Resolution 2539 (2024) “Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine”, as
well as the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-11/5 of 14 November 2022 “Furtherance
of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine”, which recognises the need for the establishment of
an international mechanism for reparation. It commends the setting up of the Register of Damage Caused by
the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in May 2023 and welcomes the opening of the
process of submission of claims on 2 April 2024. It reiterates that the Register is intended to constitute the first
component of a comprehensive international compensation mechanism.
13. In light of these considerations, as regards the special tribunal for the crime of aggression against
Ukraine, the Assembly:
13.1. welcomes the decision of the Committee of Ministers of 30 April 2024 which gives a mandate to
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to prepare any necessary documents for the Core
Group on a possible draft agreement between the Council of Europe and the Government of Ukraine
on the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression of the Russian Federation against
Ukraine, including its Statute, and on a possible draft enlarged partial agreement governing the
modalities of support to such a tribunal, its financing and other administrative matters;
13.2. notes that this decision was taken by an overwhelming majority, which expresses a clear
political will in favour of a leading role of the Council of Europe in this process, in line with the
Assembly’s own recommendations;
13.3. calls on the Core Group to come to an agreement on the model and legal form chosen for the
special tribunal as soon as possible, taking into account the need to maintain the current momentum
and in view of possible political developments;
13.4. calls on all member States to support this process and participate in the final agreement
reached, including in the possible enlarged partial agreement;
13.5. calls on other States, including observer States and States whose parliament enjoy observer or
partner for democracy status with the Assembly, the European Union as well as any other potentially
interested regional organisations including the Organisation of American States and the African Union,
to support this process and the creation of a special tribunal;
Resolution 2556 (2024)
3
13.6. calls on the United Nations General Assembly to support this process, by adopting a resolution
that would endorse the special tribunal, once established, in line with its previously expressed position
that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine constitutes an act of aggression and that accountability for the
most serious crimes committed needs to be ensured;
13.7. calls on the States participating in the ICPA and the JIT, as well as all member States, to
foresee co-operation agreements that allow them to share the evidence collected on the crime of
aggression with the future special tribunal;
13.8. expresses its gratitude to the Netherlands for its offer to host the special tribunal on its territory;
13.9. considers that the special tribunal should in any event have the following features:
13.9.1. its jurisdiction should be limited to the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine
and should extend ratione temporis to such aggression starting in February 2014;
13.9.2. its jurisdiction should include the role and complicity of the leaders of Belarus;
13.9.3. its statute should contain a definition of the crime of aggression fully in line with
Article 8 bis of the ICC Statute, which reflects customary international law;
13.9.4. personal immunities of key suspects shall not apply before the special tribunal; its
statute should leave the issue of personal immunities to the interpretation of the judges of the
special tribunal, having regard to the practice of other international criminal tribunals and the
precedents in international law;
13.9.5. functional immunities shall not apply before the special tribunal;
13.9.6. its statute should contain a list of fair trial rights of the accused, in line with international
human rights law;
13.9.7. its statute could foresee the possibility of in absentia proceedings before the trial stage,
for instance hearings for the confirmation of charges in the absence of the suspect;
13.9.8. its role should be complementary to the ICC’s jurisdiction and its statute should
regulate the co-operation and sharing of evidence between the special tribunal and the ICC;
13.9.9. its statute should contain rules regarding co-operation with participating and other
States, which could be complemented with specific co-operation agreements.
14. With regard to other international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes,
the Assembly:
14.1. calls on all member States, as well as observer States and States whose parliament enjoy
observer or partner for democracy status with the Assembly, to support the investigations by the Office
of the Prosecutor of the ICC on any of these crimes committed in Ukraine, by sharing any evidence in
their possession and making available expertise, including forensic expertise and on all States Parties
to the ICC Statute to provide, in a sustainable manner, adequate human and financial resources to the
Court;
14.2. welcomes the arrest warrants issued by the ICC in respect of Vladimir Putin, Maria Alekseyevna
Lvova-Belova, Sergei Ivanovich Kobylash, Viktor Nikolayevich Sokolov, Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu
and Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov in the context of the situation in Ukraine and calls on all member
States and other States to enforce these warrants should any of these suspects come within their
jurisdiction;
14.3. strongly condemns the attempts of the Russian authorities to prosecute the ICC Judges and
Prosecutor involved in the issuing of these warrants, as a flagrant interference with the judicial
independence and mandate of the ICC;
14.4. invites the Prosecutor of the ICC to consider examining the reported allegations of genocide
against Ukrainians, generally in respect of the situation in Ukraine and more specifically regarding the
transfer of Ukrainian children;
14.5. invites the Prosecutor of the ICC to consider examining the individual criminal responsibility of
members of the Wagner Group who participated in the commission of international crimes in Ukraine
and in different countries in Africa which fall within the jurisdiction of the Court;
Resolution 2556 (2024)
4
14.6. encourages all member States as well as other States to continue giving assistance to the
Ukrainian authorities and Prosecutor General’s Office, including through capacity building, expertise
and resources, with a view to strengthening their capacities to investigate and prosecute these crimes,
in line with international human rights law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5);
14.7. calls on the Ukrainian authorities to continue to comply with their obligations under international
humanitarian law and to continue to conduct thorough investigations on all allegations of war crimes
and violations of international humanitarian law, irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator;
14.8. calls on the Ukrainian authorities to respect the right to a fair trial and other rights under the
European Convention on Human Rights for all individuals charged with war crimes and other crimes
related to the aggression, while noting that Ukraine continues to derogate from certain rights under the
European Convention on Human Rights by virtue of Article 15 and the application of martial law;
14.9. calls on Ukraine and other member States to ratify the ICC Statute, including the Kampala
amendments on the crime of aggression;
14.10. calls on all member States to join or co-operate with the JIT set up by Ukraine and several
European Union member States under the auspices of Eurojust;
14.11. encourages all member observer States to make use of Council of Europe and other
international instruments on mutual legal assistance in relation to the crimes committed in Ukraine, and
to sign and ratify the new “Ljubljana-The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the
Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes and
Other International Crimes” opened for signature on 14 February 2024;
14.12. invites the United Nations Human Rights Council to consider establishing an independent
international commission of inquiry to investigate alleged violations of international human rights law
and international humanitarian law committed by members of the Wagner Group and affiliated entities
in Ukraine and concerned countries in Africa, establish the facts, collect, consolidate and analyse
evidence of such violations and preserve evidence, including in view of co-operation in any legal
proceedings;
14.13. calls on member States and observer States to consider bringing new proceedings under the
Genocide Convention (on the basis of Article IX) against the Russian Federation before the
International Court of Justice, for concrete allegations of genocide committed in Ukraine, including
incitement to genocide and attempt to commit genocide;
14.14. calls on member and observer States that have not yet done so, as well as the European Union,
to consider designating the Wagner Group, other similar Russian paramilitary groups and those entities
that finance them as terrorist organisations and applying to them their anti-terrorist legislation and
measures, without prejudice to the consideration of their crimes as possible war crimes and other
international crimes;
14.15. referring, in particular, to the resolutions of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and NATO (North
Atlantic Treaty Organization) Parliamentary Assembly, calls on member States, as well as other States,
to consider the possibility of designating the Russian Federation, which implements the genocidal
theory and practice of ruscism, as a State sponsor of terrorism.
15. Finally, with regards to compensation for the damage caused by the aggression, the Assembly,
recalling its Resolutions 2434 (2022), 2482 (2023) and 2539 (2024):
15.1. calls on Council of Europe member States and eligible non-member States to join the Register
of Damage if they have not yet done so;
15.2. reiterates its call for the establishment of an international compensation mechanism to address
the damage caused to all natural and legal persons affected, as well as the State of Ukraine, by the
Russian Federation’s internationally wrongful acts arising out of its aggression against Ukraine. Such
an international compensation mechanism should:
15.2.1. include an independent international claims commission mandated to examine and
adjudicate claims, including those registered by the Register of Damage;
15.2.2. include an international compensation fund, from which compensation awards would
be paid to successful claimants;
15.2.3. be established by a separate international instrument, open to all like-minded States
and relevant international organisations, including the United Nations and the European Union;
Resolution 2556 (2024)
5
15.2.4. be established in concertation with the Register of Damage, which participates in and
facilitates the work aimed at the establishment of such a mechanism and which should be
transferred to the mechanism in accordance with its Statute;
15.2.5. be in principle established under the auspices of the Council of Europe, given that the
Register of Damage is a Council of Europe enlarged partial agreement and that the Organisation
is playing a leading role in this area, while not excluding other options should they ensure more
cross-regional support;
15.2.6. cover the damage caused by the aggression since February 2014, in particular in
relation to breaches of international law confirmed by international courts and adjudicative
bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights;
15.2.7. cover the damage caused by private military and security companies or paramilitary
groups and proxies which have participated in the aggression on behalf of the Russian
Federation, including in particular the Wagner Group in all its forms;
15.3. considers that the seizure and repurposing of Russian State assets, currently frozen by Council
of Europe member States and non-member States, would constitute lawful countermeasures under
international law against the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, which constitutes a
manifest breach of an erga omnes obligation. Such countermeasures would be intended to induce
compliance by the Russian Federation with its international legal obligations, including its obligation of
cessation of the aggression and making reparation to Ukraine; in view of the enormous damage caused
by the Russian aggression, they would be proportionate as well as reversible in that the seized funds
can be offset against the claim in reparations owed to Ukraine;
15.4. welcomes the fact that some States, including recently the United States, have already adopted
legislation allowing for such measures for the benefit of Ukraine, on the basis of countermeasures;
15.5. urges member States and any other States to adopt similar measures at national level, with a
view to transferring these assets to a future international compensation fund whilst respecting the rights
of all affected third parties under the European Convention on Human Rights and other international
human rights law instruments;
15.6. reiterates its call on member States to also repurpose the frozen assets of Russian citizens
subject to targeted sanctions for their responsibilities in the war of aggression, as requested in
Resolution 2434 (2022);
15.7. calls on member States, the G7, the European Union and all relevant stakeholders to continue
working towards comprehensive compensation for all the damages caused by the war of aggression
and the overall process of support to Ukraine, including by applying other alternative or complementary
proposals that are being discussed or agreed upon, such as the confiscation of private assets following
a criminal conviction for sanctions violations, introducing windfall taxes on the interest or profits derived
from frozen Russian State assets, or using these assets as collateral for loans to Ukraine.
16. The Assembly calls on all member and observer States, as well as the European Union and the G7
Group, to set up a Register of entities assisting the Russian Federation in evading or circumventing restrictive
measures.
17. The Assembly finally reiterates all its previous resolutions addressed to the Russian Federation since
the launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and calls again on the Russian Federation to cease the
aggression and withdraw completely and unconditionally its occupation forces from the internationally
recognised territory of Ukraine. It urges the Russian Federation to abide by its obligations under the United
Nations Charter, the Genocide Convention, international humanitarian law and international human rights law,
particularly in the occupied territories of Ukraine, and to co-operate with all international investigative and
judicial bodies dealing with the consequences of the aggression. In this regard, the Assembly urges the
Russian Federation to comply with the recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the inter-
State case of Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), concerning multiple violations of the Convention beginning in
February 2014, and in particular with the obligation to ensure, as soon as possible, the safe return of the
relevant prisoners transferred from Crimea to penal facilities located on the territory of the Russian Federation.
Resolution 2556 (2024)
6
Resolution 2557 (2024)1
Provisional version
The role of sanctions in countering the Russian Federation’s
war of aggression against Ukraine
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, which started in 2014 and escalated into the
unprovoked full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, is a major breach of international law which
warranted the expulsion of the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe. Standing in solidarity with
Ukraine and its people, the Parliamentary Assembly reiterates its firm condemnation of the Russian
Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the uncountable wrongful acts and violations of
international law committed by the Russian Federation.
2. The Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine must be stopped, and all those
responsible must be held accountable for their crimes. The Assembly welcomes the progress made towards
the setting up of a comprehensive system of accountability which has ushered, as a first step, into the
establishment of a Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine,
under the aegis of the Council of Europe. The Assembly emphasises the need to ensure that the Register
also includes all damage caused to the temporarily occupied territories.
3. The Assembly calls for the swift completion of the system of accountability through the establishment of
a compensation mechanism and the setting up of a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the Russian
Federation’s political and military leadership for the crime of aggression. The international compensation
mechanism should be primarily aimed at compensating citizens, including those who have been forced to
relocate from the temporarily occupied territories. The Assembly calls for consultations to be started as soon
as possible on the draft Agreement between the Council of Europe and the Government of Ukraine on the
establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine,
including its Statute, and on a possible draft enlarged partial agreement governing the modalities of support to
such a Tribunal, its financing and other administrative matters.
4. The Assembly has already acknowledged that a wide range of legal, political and diplomatic measures
are necessary to stop the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Thus, it has taken a clear
stance in favour of sanctions against the Russian Federation and key figures of Vladimir Putin’s regime,
including in its Resolution 2506 (2023) “Political consequences of the Russian Federation's war of aggression
against Ukraine”, Resolution 2529 (2024) “Situation of the children of Ukraine”, and Resolution 2539 (2024)
“Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine”. The Assembly reiterates the recommendations contained therein,
as well as in its Resolution 2252 (2019) “Sergei Magnitsky and beyond – fighting impunity by targeted
sanctions” and Resolution 2542 (2024) “Sanctions against persons on the ‘Kara-Murza list’”, in which it invites
all States that have not yet adopted Magnitsky-type targeted sanctions laws to do so without further delay.
The Assembly also reiterates its call on Council of Europe member States to declare the current Russian
regime as a terrorist one, as set out in Resolution 2463 (2022) “Further escalation in the Russian Federation's
aggression against Ukraine”.
1. Assembly debate on 26 June 2024 (19th and 20th sittings) (see Doc. 16000, report of the Committee on Political
Affairs and Democracy, rapporteur: Ms Yelyzaveta Yasko). Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 June 2024 (20th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
5. The Assembly recognises that the propaganda and disinformation spread by the Russian media serve
as a tool of warfare used both on the territory of the Russian Federation and abroad, especially in the so-
called global south countries. The channels used by the aggressor State to influence the outside world should
be sanctioned. In order to achieve this, sanctions should be imposed on individual propagandists who
promote the ideology of the “Russian World” and incite war and hatred against Ukraine.
6. Faced with the inability of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to resort to Article 41 of the
United Nations Charter given that the aggressor State Russia is a permanent member of the UNSC, a
coalition of States and the European Union have introduced and regularly updated an unprecedented range of
restrictive measures aimed at holding the Russian Federation’s authorities, elites and their accomplices
accountable for their wrongful acts, and to hamper the Russian Federation’s capacity to wage the war of
aggression against Ukraine by impacting its military and economic sectors. In addition, sanctions have been
imposed against Belarus, in response to its involvement in the Russian Federation’s war of aggression
against Ukraine, and against Iran in relation to the manufacture and supply of drones which are being used by
the Russian military in Ukraine. The imposition of sanctions contributes to the efforts to restore justice, bring
suffering to an end, and deter the aggressor State Russia from any temptation to further broaden its military
threat in Europe.
7. Among the most significant restrictive measures against the Russian Federation are the imposition of
an oil price cap and export control measures, as well as specific targeted sanctions against individuals and
companies directly involved in the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Thanks to these
sanctions, the Russian Federation has lost US$113 billion in revenues related to oil exports, which has
considerably reduced the inflow of foreign currencies. Sanctions have also strongly limited the Russian
Federation’s access to goods and technologies which are critical for its military industry.
8. Despite these results, the Assembly is concerned that the effectiveness of the sanction system is
weakened by gaps and loopholes, which are exploited by the Russian authorities and targeted individuals to
circumvent the restrictions. In order to bypass the oil price cap, for instance, the Russian authorities have
assembled a “shadow fleet” of old vessels, which operate under different flags and represent a serious
environmental hazard due to their poor maintenance and unsecure insurance coverage. The Russian
Federation’s volume of trade with countries such as China, Iran, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has sharply
increased, and so has it with some Council of Europe member States. Evidence shows that this increase is
due to the re-exportation of sensitive goods originating from sanction-imposing countries, despite the existing
ban.
9. The Assembly draws attention to the other critical sectors of the Russian Federation’s economy that
need to be targeted by sanctions. For instance, Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) is still making its way onto
the European market, representing around 15% of the total supply. In 2023 alone, the Russian Federation
earned US$99 billion from the supply of gas.
10. Special attention should be paid to the Russian steel slabs (semi-finished products for rolling into plate
or coil rolled), pig iron and iron ore products. For instance, in November and December 2023 alone, Russian
slabs entered the European Union at a price much lower than the market price (€450 per tonne instead of
€600 per tonne according to EUROFER). This is one of the core sectors of the Russian economy, which is
estimated to account for 3% of the country’s GDP, or approximately US$60 billion annually. This results in
price dumping, delaying the green transition and boosting the Russian Federation's economy, which funds its
war of aggression against Ukraine.
11. In light of these considerations, the Assembly believes that urgent and robust action is needed to
enhance the effectiveness of the sanction system, learning from the experience gathered so far. The
Assembly, therefore, calls on Council of Europe member and non-member States to consider the following
measures to reinforce and expand the range of sanctions imposed:
11.1. strengthen compliance with the oil price cap, by listing the vessels of the “shadow fleet”
assembled by the Russian Federation and its accomplices, banning them, and establishing a whitelist
of brokers authorised to provide information regarding transactions under the price cap;
11.2. ensure that other strategic sources of Russian income are also targeted, including liquefied
natural gas and pipeline gas, as well as agricultural, metallurgical and nuclear industries, by banning
both the direct import and the resale of related products;
Resolution 2557 (2024)
2
11.3. ban the export of critical raw materials, manufactured battlefield goods and dual-use items to the
Russian Federation, especially those that could contribute to the war effort, and impede the access to
their transportation hubs, services and financial assistance to all carriers transporting these goods to
the Russian Federation;
11.4. ban all Russian and Belarusian banks from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT) international payment messaging system, and urge banks to cease
operations in the Russian Federation;
11.5. enlarge the list of sanctioned individuals, also to include the persons directly responsible for and
participating in the persecution and ill-treatment of Vladimir Kara-Murza, the persecution, ill-treatment
and death of Alexei Navalny, the deportation, forcible transfer and unjustifiable delay in repatriation of
Ukrainian children, and the destruction of Ukrainian cities and towns, such as Mariupol, Bakhmut,
Avdiivka, and Marinka;
11.6. ensure that the Russian companies in the military and defence sectors, especially those
producing weapons, as well as their owners and managers, are targeted by sanctions;
11.7. consider the available legal grounds to also target family members of sanctioned individuals;
11.8. strengthen and enlarge the ban on media outlets broadcasting Russian propaganda, ensuring
that the prohibition is enforced and that appropriate penalties are in place in case of failure to comply.
12. The Danish Straits mostly lie within Danish territorial waters and represent a point of passage for
roughly one third of Russian oil exports. According to international law, Denmark cannot impede the transit of
foreign vessels through the Danish Straits, unless they appear to be in violation of environmental rules. At the
same time, the European Union sanctions also apply to the territorial waters of its member States. The
Assembly therefore invites the Danish authorities, in co-operation with other States and relevant international
actors, to convene a reflection group to consider the measures that Denmark can apply, in compliance with
international law, to prevent vessels from exploiting freedom of navigation in the Danish Straits to circumvent
the system of international sanctions.
13. Welcoming the decision taken on 8 May 2024 by the European Council to use windfall profits from
Russian central bank frozen assets to support Ukraine’s recovery and military defence, the Assembly
reiterates its call to explore all available legal options to confiscate frozen Russian assets and the interests
accruing thereon, and commit them to compensating Ukrainian citizens, rebuilding destroyed cities and
regions, and reconstructing Ukraine.
14. The effectiveness of the sanctions regime should also be improved by increasing the number of
participating countries, enhancing their co-ordination and reducing legal gaps and loopholes. To this effect,
the Assembly invites Council of Europe member and non-member States to:
14.1. join the coalition of countries that are imposing restrictive measures on the Russian Federation,
if they have not done so yet;
14.2. expand and simplify export control measures, in particular by establishing a co-ordinating
mechanism for multilateral export controls, by establishing more robust tracking and verification
systems to prevent sanctioned goods and materials from entering global markets through indirect
channels, and by strengthening the collection, accessibility and exchange of relevant customs and
banking data;
14.3. bolster corporate responsibility, by:
14.3.1. establishing corporate responsibility codes impeding trading with the Russian
Federation, directly or via third countries, in strategic sectors critical to its war effort;
14.3.2. providing clearer guidance on the sanctions regime to the private sector, especially in
relation to the “No Russia clause” imposed on European Union exporters;
14.3.3. introducing due diligence systems to track the complete route of their exports;
14.3.4. introducing criminal liability for corporate managers of companies involved in sanctions
violation and circumvention;
14.3.5. enhancing the effectiveness of inspections and investigations;
14.4. tackle sanctions circumvention facilitated by companies’ subsidiaries operating in third countries,
by holding accountable parent companies globally;
Resolution 2557 (2024)
3
14.5. set up and publish a register of individuals and companies operating under their jurisdiction
which support the Russian Federation's effort in its war of aggression against Ukraine;
14.6. set up and publish a register of individuals and companies operating under their jurisdiction
which are involved in sanctions violation and circumvention;
14.7. enlarge and diversify the adoption of secondary sanctions to target countries, entities and
individuals contributing to sanctions violation and circumvention;
14.8. withhold financial assistance and all kinds of aid to those countries, entities and individuals who
support the Russian Federation in its war of aggression against Ukraine;
14.9. consider mirroring the same range and nature of restrictive measures to the closest allies of the
Russian Federation, such as Belarus, Iran, North Korea, and their elites;
14.10. improve multilateral co-operation in order to ensure the harmonisation of relevant national
legislations, the elimination of legal loopholes facilitating sanctions circumvention, the continuous
exchange of information and best practices, and the conduct of joint inspections and investigations;
14.11. reinforce the financial, human and technical capacities of the national authorities responsible for
the enforcement of sanctions, so that they have enough means to properly and efficiently conduct their
tasks;
14.12. enhance penalties which are applied for sanction circumvention;
14.13. raise public awareness through a communication strategy that explains the importance of
sanctions to European citizens and clarifies their goal, which ultimately is to minimise the economic
power of the aggressor State Russia and therefore to reduce its capabilities to wage its war of
aggression and to commit war crimes;
14.14. provide support to those independent media outlets that are actively countering the Russian
propaganda efforts.
15. In order to eliminate safe havens and ensure a more homogeneous legal framework for what concerns
the criminalisation of sanctions violation and avoidance, the Assembly urges European Union member States
to expedite the incorporation in their national legislation of the provisions contained in Directive (EU)
2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the definition of criminal
offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673.
16. In addition, applicants to European Union membership should ensure that their domestic legislation is
aligned with the provisions contained in Directives 2024/1226 and 2018/1673, and in general with decisions
taken under the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Assembly urges the European
Union to consider this alignment a necessary condition to proceed with membership negotiation procedures.
17. In December 2022, the European Commission decided to appoint an International Special Envoy for
the Implementation of European Union Sanctions, to ensure a continuous dialogue with third countries to
avoid sanctions circumvention or violation. The Assembly invites the European Union to strengthen these
diplomatic efforts, especially with third countries which are not yet imposing restrictive measures on the
Russian Federation, by identifying possible incentives for them to do so.
18. As regards sport sanctions, the Assembly regrets the decision taken by the International Olympic
Committee to allow Russian and Belarusian athletes to participate in the Paris 2024 Olympic Games as
individual neutral athletes, contrary to its call to fully ban their participation, expressed in Resolution 2507
(2023) “War of aggression against Ukraine – Participation of Russian and Belarusian athletes in the Paris
2024 Olympics and Paralympics?”.
19. The Assembly welcomes and encourages the initiatives that the Council of Europe is undertaking on
the matter of sanctions, including through the work of the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International
Law (CAHDI) and the monitoring activities of the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money
Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), as well as the Council of Europe –
European Union Technical Support Instrument project on “Effective Implementation of the Sanctions Regime
and enhanced cross-border cooperation in EU Member States”.
Resolution 2557 (2024)
4
Resolution 2558 (2024)1
Provisional version
Countering the erasure of cultural identity in war and peace
Parliamentary Assembly
1. Following the occupation of Crimea and parts of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine by the Russian
Federation in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, conventional military targeting has
been accompanied by a systematic, state-driven policy of Russification of the occupied areas, historical
imperialistic and neo-colonial revisionism, and denial of a distinct cultural Ukrainian identity to those under
occupation. This denial is based in particular on putting into question the existence of the Ukrainian language,
culture and history, and on a portrayal of Ukraine and Ukrainians as a lower cast, ethnicity and race. It is
carried out through: removal of archives; confiscation or replacement of history textbooks; indoctrination,
including through militarisation of education; impeded access to education in native, including indigenous,
languages; de-contextualisation of artefacts through relocation or changing narratives around them; narrowing
the diversity of commemorative practices; looting; destruction of cultural objects and heritage sites; intentional
refusals to preserve cultural heritage in order to showcase certain layers of history and erode others; distortive
and ethnically-biased restoration of cultural objects; and neo-imperial renaming of geographical sites.
2. For its part, the Belarusian Government has been implementing a consistent policy of Russification
since 1994. This policy has taken on a clearly punitive character since 2020, when peaceful mass protests
took place against the disputed results of the presidential election. Censorship is implemented through
blacklists of politically undesirable writers, artists, photographers, actors, musicians, tour guides and museum
workers. More than 200 non-governmental organisations related to the cultural sphere of Belarus have been
forced to cease their activities and close.
3. Furthermore, the Russian Federation pursues a Russification policy towards numerous indigenous
peoples in the country, progressively erasing their cultural identities by restricting the use of their languages,
especially in the education system, reducing the domains of their cultural expressions, distorting their history
and depriving them of their historical memory, as well as by capturing and prosecuting ethnic minority
activists.
4. The Parliamentary Assembly holds that the Russian Federation is using cultural cleansing as a weapon
of war within its broader campaign of extreme violence, in order to deny the existence of a different cultural
identity and erase its historical roots, values, heritage, literature, traditions and language. Such cultural
erasure, and the deliberate and systematic destruction or looting of cultural property, amount to war crimes
and crimes against humanity, and also reveal, together with the official rhetoric of the Russian Federation to
justify its war of aggression, a specific genocidal intent to destroy the Ukrainian national group or at least part
of it, notably through the destruction of Ukrainian identity and culture. It is part of the campaign of genocide
being pursued by the Russian Federation against the Ukrainian people in blatant violation of treaty and
customary international law.
5. The Assembly recalls that the right of access to culture and enjoyment of one’s own cultural heritage
forms part of international human rights law. It strongly condemns the deliberate destruction of cultural
heritage occurring today in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, 1
1. Assembly debate on 26 June 2024 (19th and 20th sittings) (see Doc. 16003, report of the Committee on Culture,
Science, Education and Media, rapporteur: Ms Yevheniia Kravchuk). Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 June 2024
(20th sitting).
See also Recommendation 2280 (2024).
https://pace.coe.int
062 cultural heritage sites have been either destroyed or damaged during the aggression. This unnecessary,
unjustified and arbitrary military destruction of cultural heritage is not just an assault on built fabric, but also on
what it means for the Ukrainian people and for their well-defined historical European cultural identity, in
accordance with the principles of the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural
Heritage for Society (CETS No. 199, “Faro Convention”).
6. A legal response to these threats to cultural heritage, destruction of collective and individual identity and
affront to human dignity can be found in an effective implementation of relevant treaty and customary
international law, including the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict (1954) and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(1949) and their respective Protocols, and human rights instruments governing the enjoyment of cultural rights
and expression of cultural identities. However, the international legal framework concerning cultural heritage in
armed conflict remains fragmented and has significant gaps, particularly in relation to new types of warfare
and to the safeguarding of cultural heritage after conflicts. The return of cultural heritage and restoration of
damaged heritage objects are also matters of concern. In addition, loopholes in international law and
differences in the way different legal orders recognise and implement the principle of universal jurisdiction
over international crimes make it difficult to bring perpetrators to justice before international or national courts.
This further leads to difficulties in providing full reparations for destroyed, looted and irreversibly damaged
objects of cultural property, and in many instances restitution for such losses or the return of objects remains a
difficult challenge. Practical steps are needed to remove these obstacles to judicial remedies.
7. While the Ukrainian situation and the tragic disrespect of Ukrainian cultural heritage and identity by the
Russian Federation are an extreme example of this form of barbarianism and call for specific responses, the
Assembly is also deeply concerned by the frequent severe threats to both tangible and intangible cultural
heritage and to cultural identities of populations, faced in other contexts and locations and triggered by war or
by tensions among communities in post-war periods.
8. Recalling its Resolution 2057 (2015) “Cultural heritage in crisis and post-crisis situations”, the Assembly
emphasises that corrosive and coercive policies of cultural erasure require in response a holistic policy action
across the fields of culture, education, heritage management, mass media, criminal accountability,
reparations, remembrance, transitional justice and reconciliation. Remedial action is necessary but there is
also a need to work more on prevention as a way to put an end to the ongoing destructive acts against
cultural heritage. A human rights approach, with a key role for education, should be embedded in this holistic
strategy. Local populations should be involved in this sensitive policy making, since local knowledge, attention
to local perspectives and community participation are crucial in countering the erasure of cultural identity,
restoring cultural heritage and objects as part of the collective memory, and promoting cultural resilience
during and after the war.
9. On this basis, the Assembly recommends that member States of the Council of Europe:
9.1. sign and ratify the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage
for Society (CETS No. 199, 2005, “Faro Convention”) and the Council of Europe Convention on
Offences relating to Cultural Property (CETS No. 221, 2017, “Nicosia Convention”), if they have not yet
done so;
9.2. co-operate with the United Nations, the European Union and other relevant organisations, to
undertake a review of the Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict (1954) and of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War (1949) and their protocols, in particular to:
9.2.1. establish more robust pre-emptive protective mechanisms for both tangible and
intangible cultural heritage of all groups and communities, in times of war and in post-conflict
situations;
9.2.2. reinforce sanctions for arbitrary military destruction which is not justified by an
“imperative military necessity”, an exception which should be subject to strict interpretation and
be convincingly proved by the perpetrators;
9.2.3. expand their regulatory scope to address less obvious violations against cultural
heritage such as cultural cleansing and cultural erasure;
9.2.4. provide for full reparations, based on international law on State responsibility, in
particular through restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition of damages to and destruction of tangible and intangible heritage
Resolution 2558 (2024)
2
9.3. strengthen their domestic legal frameworks to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, the crime of aggression and serious human rights violations and, in particular:
9.3.1. review their legislation to enable swift and effective universal jurisdiction over all
international crimes;
9.3.2. strengthen existing domestic war crimes units or establish such units, and ensure that
they have designated teams specialised in cultural heritage crimes;
9.3.3. ensure that cultural erasure, deliberate, indiscriminate and systematic destruction of
cultural heritage, looting and unlawful transfer of cultural property are effectively prosecuted as
war crimes, crimes against humanity, or human rights violations, holding perpetrators and their
military and political commanders accountable before national courts;
9.3.4. provide training on heritage crimes for criminal investigators, prosecutors and
specialists who collect evidence;
9.3.5. consider not only action aimed at a criminal justice response to illegal acts against
cultural heritage and identity, but also more holistic approaches aimed at ensuring full effective
reparations, including collective reparations aimed at communities and victim groups, as
provided for in international law;
9.4. reinforce their ability to combat illegal trafficking of cultural property and abusive expropriation of
artefacts and, in particular:
9.4.1. provide for deterrent sanctions against all those who operate or facilitate the illicit
transfer or trade of artefacts, conduct or organise illegal excavations, or use artefacts for their
own purposes (exhibitions, auctions, academic publications), and ensure that the authorities and
complicit public institutions (cultural, academic or others) of the States responsible for these
acts, are also held accountable;
9.4.2. develop training for military personnel, police, custom officers and criminal justice
professionals, especially within domestic war crimes units, to facilitate the prevention,
investigation and prosecution of violations affecting cultural heritage;
9.4.3. raise awareness in the art market of the ICOM (International Council of Museums) Red
Lists of Cultural Objects at Risk, and of the specific ICOM Emergency Red List of Cultural
Objects at Risk for Ukraine;
9.5. use their political leverage at international level and develop co-operation in particular with the
Committee of Ministers and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe
and with relevant international organisations, human rights groups and cultural institutions, with an aim
to:
9.5.1. promote human rights and peace education, and multi-perspectivity in history teaching,
which should provide learners with the keys of mutual understanding and recognition, foster
pluralism and overcome denials that fuel hatred;
9.5.2. promote effective protection of endangered cultural identities, cultural heritage and
cultural rights,
9.5.3. organise international events on the preservation and restoration of cultural heritage
sites damaged or threatened as a consequence of an armed conflict;
9.5.4. raise awareness of how propaganda and imperial and neo-imperial practices, notably
the ideology of the “Russian World” (“Russkiy mir”), can lay out the basis for violations of
international law, including those against cultural heritage;
9.5.5. raise awareness of the Russian Federation targeted indoctrination and militarisation of
Ukrainian children in occupied territories.
10. The Assembly urges member States to mutualise resources and co-ordinate their efforts, to provide
Ukraine with the support it may need to implement a holistic strategy in response to the Russian Federation’s
coercive policies aimed at erasing cultural identity, including the following actions in relation to:
10.1. remedial strategies,
10.1.1. gather, record, document and preserve evidence of crimes committed by the Russian
Federation against tangible and intangible cultural heritage in Ukraine, also with a view to
assessing damages and seeking reparations;
Resolution 2558 (2024)
3
10.1.2. assist in digitalising objects of cultural heritage and property, in order to transform and
store them in digital formats on various on-line platforms and databases, permitting public
unimpeded access to these;
10.1.3. build institutional capacity to ensure the best use of funding provided by outside
agencies and donors, enhance heritage management, and carry out sound reconstruction
processes;
10.1.4. develop adaptation programmes for Ukrainian child victims of deportation to the
Russian Federation or of cultural cleansing policies in territories under Russian control, carefully
considering their age, gender, regional background and the duration and level of indoctrination
which they have been subjected to;
10.1.5. develop transitional justice, with due consideration for truth seeking, reparation and
guarantees of non-repetition;
10.2. post-conflict reconstruction, recovery and peace building:
10.2.1. develop specific projects for cultural heritage, support for cultural vitality and cultural
exchanges by providing support and resources for artists, writers, musicians, and other cultural
professionals and funding initiatives, grants, and residency programmes;
10.2.2. develop remembrance, reconciliation and educational policies that encourage
democratic citizenship and civic engagement;
10.2.3. raise awareness among local populations of the importance of cultural heritage and
cultural rights, create spaces of dialogue with them and associate them properly in policy
implementation.
Resolution 2558 (2024)
4
Resolution 2559 (2024)1
Provisional version
Reparation and reconciliation processes to overcome past
conflicts and build a common peaceful future – the question of
just and equal redress
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly regrets the sad reality that wars and violent conflicts cause great human
suffering as well as the destruction of property, homes and the environment.
2. The Assembly emphasises that negotiations and processes seeking to address the damage caused by
conflict and move towards reconciliation are crucial for lasting peace through relevant tools under international
law, which may vary depending on the context, and may include truth-seeking initiatives, justice, reparations,
recognition and guarantees of non-repetition. However, often such processes do not lead to adequate results
due to a lack of an acceptable, achievable, enforceable and implementable package towards reconciliation
and redress following a conflict. This can create a feeling of injustice which can, in turn, perpetuate conflict or
even lead to a resumption of hostilities.
3. The Assembly recalls the terms of the preamble to the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1)
which stipulates that the States parties are “convinced that the pursuit of peace based upon justice and
international co-operation is vital for the preservation of human society and civilisation”. The Organisation is
thus well-placed to promote solutions to foster justice, co-operation and peace in Europe.
4. The Assembly notes that notwithstanding the existing tools at the disposal of the Council of Europe to
facilitate finding solutions to post-conflict disputes – including through political discourse within the Assembly
and within the Committee of Ministers, and through the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights –
problems persist. Such tools often do not provide an adequate, enforceable and timely response to the
challenges of disputes between member States, particularly following a conflict situation.
5. The Assembly reiterates the important role that courts can play in finding just solutions, whilst regretting
that often courts lack jurisdiction, for example due to the doctrine of State immunity; are unable to fully
address the overall complexity of the problem, for example due to their remit or limits of the available
remedies; or their judgments are not enforced. Even the European Court of Human Rights is a limited tool in
achieving reconciliation and reparation following a conflict, given that its remit is restricted to specific human
rights violations, given the limited range of remedies available to it, and given the difficulties in enforcing, in
particular, just satisfaction judgments in interstate cases. There is thus a strong case for a more effective and
more adaptive mechanism for resolving interstate disputes following a conflict between Council of Europe
member States, and for improving the enforcement of any awards.
6. The Assembly recognises that the topic of reparation and reconciliation in post-conflict situations can be
a highly sensitive matter requiring careful political as well as legal expertise, in order to find solutions that are
fair, respect the principles of the rule of law, justice and human rights, promote truth and reconciliation, and
safeguard peace. Any approach needs to be firmly based on the principle of State responsibility, under
1. Assembly debate on 26 June 2024 (20th sitting) (see Doc. 15933, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, rapporteur: Lord Richard Keen; Doc. 16019, opinion of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy,
rapporteur: Mr George Loucaides). Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 June 2024 (20th sitting).
See also Recommendation 2281 (2024).
https://pace.coe.int
international law. The Assembly also insists that it is particularly important that victims and other affected
groups, as well as State actors, are involved in the process of finding adequate solutions that best respond to
the needs of those affected. The Assembly underlines the importance of striving to find an acceptable,
achievable, enforceable and implementable package that is well-adapted to the context of a particular
situation.
7. The Assembly firmly believes that there is therefore a strong case for more action by the Council of
Europe, through a mediated process under the auspices of the Organisation, to help to address the conflicts
of the past, and to promote reconciliation and reparation in relation to conflicts between Council of Europe
member States. It is only by addressing these issues that we can move forward towards peaceful co-
operation for the future and thus establish better upstream tools to prevent future conflicts. Such an initiative
by the Council of Europe would help to fill a lacuna in the rules-based international order, to make the most of
the Organisation’s unique role and to promote regional peace.
8. The Assembly considers that a mediated solution could help to look holistically at resolving highly
complex matters between States by involving a neutral third party in finding solutions. In particular, a mediated
solution might stand a better chance of securing greater buy-in from States and victims and thus a greater
chance of enforcement. A mediator could be chosen from a panel of international mediators or conciliators,
perhaps from former Secretaries General of the United Nations or of the Council of Europe, or judges of
international renown. Mediated solutions must be achievable, enforceable and implementable.
9. The Assembly considers that a mediation process under the auspices of the Council of Europe should
include the following elements:
9.1. A system should be established to enable member States to submit disputes as to reparations
and remedies to mediation.
9.2. The mediation mechanism should avoid duplication of or conflict with any other existing
processes and should not be used to bypass or undermine such processes, including in the framework
of the United Nations, as well as the procedures before, and the implementation of judgments of, the
European Court of Human Rights.
9.3. The Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly or the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe should be able to initiate this mediation process in the absence of consent by both
parties. In the case of the Assembly this could be through a Recommendation.
9.4. The process should apply to matters within the geographic and temporal limits of the Council of
Europe. It should only apply to conflicts between States who were not members of the Council of
Europe at the relevant time with their express consent. Moreover, for reasons of enforceability, it should
not apply to States who are no longer members of the Council of Europe.
9.5. This system should be available for interstate disputes relating to post-conflict situations or other
disputes that could risk escalating into tensions.
9.6. This process should also be available for identifying a package of reparations and remedies in
relation to interstate cases before the European Court of Human Rights, where a given case could
benefit from a broader toolkit for proposing solutions that are better adapted to addressing the
complexities of post-conflict situations and the needs of victims.
9.7. The approach should be victim-centred, involving consultation with victims and other affected
groups as well as with the States concerned.
9.8. There should be an obligation on member States to engage with a mediation process in good
faith. As a matter of propriety, policy and principle, member States should be co-operating with the
Council of Europe to resolve issues that impact on the human rights of individuals. This is implicit in the
general obligation of States to collaborate sincerely and effectively and to co-operate in good faith, as
well as in the specific obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5). In
particular, the nature of collective enforcement under the Convention implies an obligation of co-
operation between States. There should thus be potential repercussions for a State that is considered
not to have engaged with the process in good faith.
9.9. There should be a duty on States to co-operate sincerely with the results of mediation and there
should be potential consequences for unreasonable failure to do so.
9.10. Much of this can be achieved using the existing legal tools at the disposal of the Council of
Europe, such as the Statute, the European Convention on Human rights, and ways of working under
those founding instruments, in addition to political and diplomatic pressure using tools at the disposal of
Resolution 2559 (2024)
2
the Council of Europe. In a serious case of non-compliance, use of the Complementary joint procedure
could be considered, as well as potential suspension where a breach would constitute a serious
violation of Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (namely a serious violation of the principles
of the rule of law, human rights and sincere and effective collaboration in the realisation of the aims of
the Organisation).
9.11. The Council of Europe should develop an improved toolkit and standards for reparation and
reconciliation in order to find solutions that are best adapted to addressing the complexities of a post-
conflict situation. Such a toolkit should be non-exhaustive, adaptable to new situations, should avoid a
one-size-fits-all approach and should instead offer a number of ideas for potential use in mediated
solutions.
10. The Assembly strongly calls on member States to:
10.1. accept the compulsory jurisdiction of relevant international tribunals such as the International
Court of Justice in order to facilitate the peaceful resolution of disputes between member States;
10.2. ratify the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (ETS No. 23), as a
useful tool for the settlement of disputes, whether through recourse to the International Court of Justice,
the use of conciliation, or recourse to arbitration;
10.3. undertake all necessary actions to establish a functional system of mediation to help resolve
disputes between member States by peaceful and democratic means, in full respect for human rights,
the rule of law and with the involvement of those affected by a conflict situation, including victim groups.
Resolution 2559 (2024)
3
Resolution 2560 (2024)1
Provisional version
The honouring of obligations and commitments by Armenia
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly commends Armenia for its continuous commitment to democratic
development in spite of the considerable security challenges it is facing. Confronted with a complex
international environment and challenges to the stability of the country, Armenia has been pursuing an
ambitious reform agenda.
2. The Assembly has been following the developments in the country since the adoption of its Resolution
2427 (2022) “The functioning of democratic institutions in Armenia”. It refers to the Information Note (AS/
Mon(2023)05rev) on the situation in the Lachin corridor and on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan
examined by the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the
Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) in March 2023 which called for immediate action and the cessation
of the unlawful and illegitimate obstruction of the Lachin corridor, and to its Resolution 2508 (2023) “Ensuring
free and safe access through the Lachin Corridor” in which it stressed that “the current situation is not
sustainable and may well lead to the Armenian population being forced to leave their homes and
communities”.
3. In September 2023, the Azerbaijani army entered the part of Nagorno-Karabakh remaining under the
protection of Russian peacekeeping troops. Fearing the consequences, the vast majority of the population of
the region fled to Armenia in a matter of days. The Assembly recalls its Resolution 2517 (2023) and
Recommendation 2260 (2023) “The humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabakh”, in which it strongly
regretted that almost the entire Armenian population of the region – more than 100 600 persons – had left its
ancestral homeland and fled to Armenia, and called on Azerbaijan to release all detained representatives of
Nagorno-Karabakh and all Armenian prisoners of war currently held in Azerbaijan. The Assembly also takes
note of the “Observations on the Human Rights Situation of People affected by the Conflict between Armenia
and Azerbaijan over the Karabakh region” issued in January 2024 by Dunja Mijatović, the then Council of
Europe Commissioner of Human Rights, in which she concluded that the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh
“found themselves abandoned without any reliable security or protection guarantees by any party and that for
them at that moment leaving home was the only reasonable option available”.
4. The fate of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh has provoked extremely strong reactions in
Armenia. Some protests organised by opposition parties calling for the resignation of Mr Pashinyan’s
government turned violent as protesters tried to storm the government buildings. The Assembly expresses its
relief that clashes with the police forces during these events brought no casualties, in sharp contrast with the
10 deaths that had occurred in March 2008, as deplored in Resolution 1837 (2011) which called, inter alia, for
the introduction of measures to avoid similar situations in the future.
5. The authorities of Armenia have remained engaged in the negotiations of a peace treaty with
Azerbaijan, in accordance with their commitment to settle international disputes by peaceful means.
Concerning the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Assembly expresses full
support for the peace process based on the principles of mutual recognition of territorial integrity, respect of
sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and the non-use of force. The Assembly also welcomes the start of
1. Assembly debate on 26 June 2024 (20th sitting) (see Doc. 15994, report of the Committee on the Honouring of
Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), co-rapporteurs:
Mr Kimmo Kiljunen and Ms Boriana Åberg). Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 June 2024 (20th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
border delimitation based on the Alma Ata Declaration of 1991, anticipating that the process will continue
along the entire border. The Assembly commends the approach taken to unblocking regional communications
based on the principles of respect of sovereignty, national jurisdiction, equality and reciprocity. In this context,
the Assembly welcomes the initiative of the Armenian Government, entitled “The Crossroads of Peace”, which
could contribute to peace and stability in the region.
6. The Assembly commands the ratification by Armenia of Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all
circumstances (ETS No. 187), including for crimes committed in times of war and imminent threat of war.
7. The Assembly also welcomes the ratification by Armenia of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
8. With regard to the long-standing concerns relating to elections in Armenia, the Assembly commends
the authorities for the inclusiveness and transparency of the legislative process that has led to the reform of
the Electoral Code. It notes with satisfaction that the amendments to the Electoral Code and related legislation
are in accordance with many of the recommendations of the European Commission for Democracy through
Law (Venice Commission) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR), while regretting that some of these recommendations
still remain unaddressed.
9. The Assembly welcomes the holding of the elections to the Yerevan city council in September 2023,
which in spite of being held in a period of extreme tension around the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, met
democratic standards as acknowledged by Recommendation 501 (2023) of the Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. While the strengthening of the electoral legal framework and
the reinforcement of the safeguards to eliminate the possibility of election fraud were welcomed by the
Congress, the authorities were further invited to, inter alia, implement existing legislation and regulations
related to the misuse of public resources, strengthen oversight and control mechanisms with regard to political
party and campaign financing, and strengthen the participation of women.
10. The 2023 elections in Yerevan have been the third consecutive elections, after the 2018 and 2021
national elections, which have been assessed by the international community, and accepted as such by
national stakeholders, as being free of the irregularities that had tainted many earlier elections. In
consequence, the Assembly considers that the objective to hold genuinely democratic elections which win the
confidence of the Armenian people has to a large extent been achieved.
11. However, in order to further improve the electoral process in Armenia, the Assembly:
11.1. invites Armenia to implement the outstanding recommendations regarding the electoral
framework, maintaining throughout this process the inclusiveness and transparency of the reform
process;
11.2. draws the particular attention of the authorities to the need for implementation of the regulation
on the misuse of public resources and the financing of political parties.
12. The Assembly regrets that the improvement in the electoral framework has not led to a better co-
operation and mutual respect between the ruling majority and the opposition. All electoral observation
missions have reported the excessive polarisation and the stigmatisation of political opponents from all sides.
Mutual tolerance and acknowledgement of the legitimacy of political opponents are necessary elements of
democratic societies and cement the legitimacy of democratic institutions.
13. The Assembly considers that in the context of deep polarisation, it is essential to protect the
independence of collegial bodies representing public interest from undue political pressure. In this regard, the
Assembly refers to its Resolution 2537 (2024) “Relationship between the parliamentary majority and the
opposition in a democracy” and the Venice Commission Checklist on “Parameters on the Relationship
between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in a Democracy”. The appointment procedure to top
positions outside the government or to independent collegial bodies and agencies should be depoliticised and,
to the maximum extent possible, based on a cross-party consensus. Mechanisms in place should reduce the
dominance of the parliamentary majority within such collective bodies or limit the relevance of the affiliation of
the officeholders with the governing party or coalition. In this regard, the Assembly expresses its concerns
regarding the potential detrimental effects of the possibility for a party to appoint candidates single-handedly.
Resolution 2560 (2024)
2
14. As a consequence, the Assembly:
14.1. encourages all political stakeholders to enter into dialogue about how to improve the existing
rules on the relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition;
14.2. calls on the opposition to refrain from boycotting the work of the National Assembly and recalls
that an organised boycott of the work of parliament by the opposition is permissible only in rare and
extreme circumstances where legitimacy of parliament is questioned;
14.3. calls on the majority in parliament to exert self-restraint in the use of qualified majority decision
and recalls that when the ruling coalition or party enjoys a large majority, it bears therewith a great
responsibility to observe and safeguard the principles governing the smooth operation of democratic
institutions, including the rights of the opposition;
14.4. invites the political parties represented in the National Assembly to find cross-party consensus
for the appointments which require a two-third majority, taking into account the Venice Commission
Checklist on “Parameters on the Relationship between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in
a Democracy”; and to introduce soft regulations or review the rules of the National Assembly in a
consensual manner when necessary.
15. The Assembly commends the reforms aimed at safeguarding the independence of the judiciary and
notes with satisfaction the openness of the Armenian authorities to a genuine dialogue with the Council of
Europe and their continued effort to improve the system of judicial governance in line with European
standards.
16. The Assembly regrets the still widespread perception that disciplinary procedures are being abused
against judges in order to intimidate them or influence their decisions. It welcomes the Minister of Justice’s
request for a Venice Commission’s opinion on a concept paper concerning reform of the Ethics and
Disciplinary Commission of the General Assembly of Judges, which illustrates the political will to co-operate
with Council of Europe bodies on this matter.
17. With a view to strengthening the independence of judges, the Assembly:
17.1. encourages the Armenian authorities to pursue the reform of the Ethics and Disciplinary
Commission of the General Assembly of Judges; on the basis of the joint Opinion prepared by the
Venice Commission and the Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of
Europe;
17.2. calls on the Armenian authorities to ensure the political neutrality of the Supreme Judicial
Council and to consider introducing restrictions for politicians to become the Supreme Judicial Council
members;
17.3. hopes that once the reform of the Ethics and Disciplinary Commission of the General Assembly
of Judges is completed and has proved its efficiency, the power of the Ministry of Justice to initiate
disciplinary proceedings will cease.
18. The Assembly commends the real determination showed by the authorities to fight the problem of
systemic corruption, evidenced by the creation of two specialised anti-corruption bodies and specialised anti-
corruption courts, the reform of the Police, the introduction of integrity checks for judges, prosecutors and
persons holding autonomous positions in investigative bodies. The Assembly notes that the draft
constitutional and legislative measures are currently under discussion in parliament and encourages the
authorities to pursue these efforts.
19. With regard to freedom of information, the Assembly welcomes the decision to present a new draft law
“On Freedom of Information and Public Information” and the consideration given to public consultations on
that draft; it encourages the authorities to pursue a comprehensive reform in the field of media, including a
review of the 2020 law “On audiovisual media” in order to ensure alignment with Council of Europe standards
on freedom of expression.
20. The Assembly welcomes the abolition of the criminalisation of defamation, in accordance with
Resolution 2427 (2022), but expresses its concerns regarding the allegations of the selective use of the
Criminal Code provisions on hate speech to target bloggers and activists opposing the ruling party. The
Assembly reiterates its call for a uniform and restrictive application of the legislation on penalties for insult and
defamation by the relevant authorities, to ensure that it is not used in an arbitrary manner against individuals
and the media.
Resolution 2560 (2024)
3
21. The Assembly acknowledges the progress made by Armenia towards compliance with its obligations
and commitments, in particular in the field of electoral law. It decides to pursue its monitoring procedure and
will attach particular importance to the implementation of reforms regarding the justice system, and in the
fields of media and freedom of expression. In particular, it will follow the implementation of the co-operation
programmes related to the themes contained in the Council of Europe Action Plan for Armenia 2023-2026.
22. The Assembly invites the authorities of Armenia to translate this resolution and the explanatory
memorandum into the national language and to make this translation public.
Resolution 2560 (2024)
4
Resolution 2561 (2024)1
Provisional version
Challenges to democracy in Georgia
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly expresses its deep concern about the recent developments in Georgia
that raise serious doubts about the country’s commitment to international democratic norms and Euro-Atlantic
integration, and about its willingness to honour its membership obligations and accession commitments to the
Council of Europe.
2. The Assembly takes note of and expresses its full support for the urgent Opinion of the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on the Law on transparency of foreign
influence, and considers that this law, as well as the manner in which it was adopted by the Georgian
Parliament, are incompatible with European democratic and human rights standards, as reflected in the
obligations and commitments of Georgia to the Council of Europe. The Assembly is of the view that this law
has nothing to do with financial transparency of non-commercial entities, including civil society organisations
and media – for which a comprehensive legal framework already exists in Georgia – nor with preventing
nefarious covert foreign interference, rather, it allows undue political control by the authorities over civil society
and the media. The law should therefore be repealed in its entirety without any delay.
3. The Assembly is deeply concerned about the excessive and disproportional use of force by the police
and the violent attacks and intimidation campaigns against demonstrators, civil society activists, journalists,
and members of parliament, which amount to a crackdown on legitimate displays of disagreement and
dissent. It is also concerned that these attacks and acts of intimidation are not sufficiently investigated and
condemned by the authorities and that this could lead to a climate of impunity for such acts. The Assembly
stresses that such actions have no place in a democratic society. It is now urgent that all reports of excessive
use of force, violent attacks and intimidation campaigns be fully and transparently investigated by the
appropriate authorities and that perpetrators be to brought to justice. The authorities should without delay take
every necessary measure and precaution to uphold and protect the safety of all protesters, civil society
activists, journalists, and members of parliament, irrespective of their opinion on this law.
4. In that context the Assembly reiterates its concerns expressed in Resolution 2438 (2022) as regards
the Georgian Law on Administrative Offences, which is fundamentally flawed and allows for an overbroad
application of administrative detention and excessively high fines, and which is vulnerable to abuse. The
number of persons arrested or issued with – high – fines under this law during the recent demonstrations is
consequently to be deplored.
5. The Assembly is concerned moreover that the controversial adoption of the Law on transparency of
foreign influence is not an isolated event, but the culmination of a series of developments that clearly indicate
a democratic backsliding by the country. This trend needs to be reversed. The Assembly urges the Georgian
authorities to recommit in clear terms to the country’s democratic consolidation and further European
integration, and to honour Georgia’s membership obligations and accession commitments to the Council of
Europe, not only in words but also by concrete and tangible actions.
1. Assembly debate on 27 June 2024 (21st sitting) (see Doc. 16018, report of the Committee on the Honouring of
Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), co-rapporteur:
Mr Claude Kern and Ms Edite Estrela). Text adopted by the Assembly on 27 June 2024 (21st sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
6. The adoption of the Law on transparency of foreign influence cannot be seen in isolation from the
upcoming parliamentary elections in Georgia that will take place on 26 October 2024. The Assembly fears this
law is bound to have an adverse effect on the conduct of these elections and on the trust of the stakeholders
and public in their outcome, which could affect the legitimacy of the elections. This is especially the case as
the adoption of this law, despite the widespread opposition against it within the Georgian society, has
inevitably turned the upcoming elections into a de facto referendum on Georgia’s democratic trajectory and
foreign alignment, considerably raising the stakes in these elections and adding to polarisation and tensions in
the pre-electoral climate.
7. The Assembly underscores furthermore its concern about the recent adoption – despite
recommendations by the Venice Commission to the contrary – of amendments to the legal framework for
elections in Georgia that change the manner in which the chairperson and the non-partisan members of the
Central Election Commission (CEC) are elected, and that abolished the position of a vice president of the
CEC appointed by the opposition. These changes will make it possible for the ruling majority, by itself, to
select and appoint the chairperson and non-partisan members of the CEC, which would, in effect, give it a
majority of members on the CEC. The concerns of the Assembly are compounded by last minute
amendments to the Electoral Code, adopted in a hasty manner without consultation with the stakeholders,
which altered the legally required majorities for decision making by the CEC. Combined with the changes to
the election process of the chairperson and non-partisan CEC members, these amendments would potentially
give the ruling majority control over all CEC decisions.
8. It is clear that these changes to the Electoral Code will have a major impact on the perception and trust
of the stakeholders in the impartiality and fairness of the election administration. This, in turn, will impact the
manner in which the legitimacy and fairness of the elections, and their results, will be perceived and accepted
by the stakeholders and the Georgian public at large.
9. Against this backdrop, the Assembly is concerned about the real possibility that – as a result of the Law
on transparency of foreign influence – respected civil society organisations, with a long-standing and
extensive experience in election observation, might no longer be able to observe the elections. Their
exclusion as election observers would, in the eyes of the Assembly, be entirely unacceptable and certainly
counterproductive.
10. The Assembly expresses furthermore its strong apprehension as regards the current draft laws on the
“protection of family values and minors”, which are incompatible with international human rights standards,
and in particular the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5). The presentation of these
controversial draft laws on such emotionally charged issues during a pre-electoral period is regrettable. In that
context the Assembly expresses its deep concern about the political manipulation of LGBTI-phobia in the run-
up to elections. It calls upon the authorities to take full account of the concerns and recommendations
contained in the Venice Commission Opinion on these laws.
11. The Assembly would like to pay tribute to the commitment of Georgian citizens to the country’s
democratic development and further Euro-Atlantic integration, which they have continued to demonstrate
during the recent developments, despite the hostile and repressive political climate. The hopes and
aspirations of the Georgian citizens for a democratic future firmly anchored within the European family cannot
be put aside: they must be recognised and respected.
12. The Assembly expresses its strong hope for Georgia’s democratic consolidation and further Euro-
Atlantic integration. It reiterates its commitment to co-operation and a constructive and open dialogue with the
authorities, as well as with all other political forces and sectors of Georgia’s society, to reverse the recent
backsliding and to uphold the honouring of Georgia’s membership obligations and commitments to the
Council of Europe.
13. The Assembly is aware of and concerned about already existing, or initiatives to adopt, similar
problematic legislation in other member States that would allow for political control by the authorities over civil
society and the media. The Assembly urges all member States to remain mindful of their membership
obligations and refrain from adopting legislation that run counter to the democratic and human rights
standards of the Council of Europe.
14. The Assembly invites its Monitoring Committee to continue to closely follow the ongoing developments
in Georgia, including with regard to the upcoming parliamentary elections and their outcome, and report back
to it immediately if the developments so warrant.
Resolution 2561 (2024)
2
Resolution 2562 (2024)1
Provisional version
An urgent call to Europe and its partners: envisioning
immediate and long-term policy solutions in support of the
displaced people of Ukraine
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly is appalled by the continuing full-scale war of aggression by the Russian
Federation against Ukraine, and deeply saddened by its devastating consequences. The mass killings,
destruction, abductions, and constant terror, which the people of Ukraine are subjected to, must stop
immediately. History has demonstrated many times that no State or empire can last when it imposes its
powers through the means of military coercion. Council of Europe member States should stay united in
expressing their resolute condemnation of the Russian dictatorial regime’s aggressive stand against its
neighbours and Europe, as a whole.
2. Since the start of the high-intensity military aggression by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022,
millions of Ukrainians have left their homes, seeking refuge. By the end of February 2024, two years later,
more than 5,9 million Ukrainian citizens have moved to Europe, and more than 500 000 have moved outside
Europe, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition to that, in
Ukraine, there are about 5 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
3. The Assembly underscores that keeping a human-centred approach in policy making in times of crisis
is crucial. Bearing in mind the importance of finding the right balance between protecting civilians affected by
the war and enhancing the capacity of the State to defend itself, when its existence is under threat,
appropriate consideration should be given to the effect of measures taken on Ukraine’s population, overall.
The lives and dignity of millions of people depend on that.
4. The Assembly underscores the need to provide adequate protection to help the people of Ukraine to
come through the pain and suffering, the challenges that forced them to leave their homes, local communities,
and the country. States should do their utmost to assist Ukraine to support its people, wherever they are:
inside Ukraine, fighting to protect the integrity of their country, or abroad, in Europe or elsewhere. In particular,
more needs to be done to free those who are held in captivity or who have been deported to the occupying
State.
5. The Assembly praises the Council of Europe member States that took immediate actions to protect the
people who fled the deadly attacks by the Russian Federation. It welcomes the solidarity demonstrated by the
European Union member States, which enabled the presence on their territory of about 4,5 million people at
the end of February 2024, based on the European Union Temporary Protection Directive 2001/55/EC.
However, given that the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues, millions of
Ukrainians are still unable to return home. The Assembly calls upon European Union member States,
therefore, to enable the prolongation of the duration of the initially agreed temporary protection, or the opening
of new avenues for allowing a regular and legally certain presence of peoples of Ukraine on their territory with
access to rights available for asylum seekers. The non-European Union Council of Europe member States are
encouraged to implement similar measures.
1. Assembly debate on 27 June 2024 (21st sitting) (see Doc. 16002, report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees
and Displaced Persons, rapporteur: Ms Lise Selnes). Text adopted by the Assembly on 27 June 2024 (21st sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
6. The Assembly will follow closely the developments in Ukraine with a view to assisting specific groups of
people, step by step. The current resolution sets the scene for future targeted actions specific to each group:
the internally displaced persons, the persons who fled the war of aggression and are now under temporary
protection in Europe, and those who were forcibly displaced or deported to the Russian Federation and
Belarus, including the prisoners of war.
7. Regarding the internally displaced persons in Ukraine, the Assembly notes that not everyone could or
was willing to leave the country seeking safety. Many stayed in Ukraine to defend their country and support
their loved ones at the front, sometimes by paying the highest price.
8. The Assembly should act resolutely to contribute to the protection of IDPs in Ukraine. It calls for the
rapid provision of sufficient humanitarian support to ensure that the IDPs in Ukraine are safe and protected.
The Assembly welcomes the European Union’s contribution to humanitarian support to Ukraine. It notes that
on 20 March 2024, the European Commission has paid the first €4,5 billion of support under the European
Union’s new Ukraine Facility. This payment will ensure that Ukraine can continue paying salaries, pensions,
and providing basic public services, so that the country can focus its effort on winning the war.
9. The Assembly deplores the challenges faced by the internally displaced children, who are further
traumatised by the constant bombing by the Russian Federation. Specific protection measures must be put in
place for them, as mentioned in its Resolution 2529 (2024) and Recommendation 2265 (2024) “Situation of
the children of Ukraine” and its Resolution 2448 (2022) “Humanitarian consequences and internal and
external displacement in connection with the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine”.
10. The Assembly calls upon member States’ parliaments to enhance their political support to meet the
objectives of the humanitarian response plan for Ukraine, with a specific emphasis on the needs of internally
displaced children and their families. It has been estimated that a total sum of about US$5 billion is needed to
support war-affected communities in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees and their host communities in the region
throughout 2024.
11. The implementation of Ukraine’s state policy on internal displacement for the period until 2025 should
be given the necessary funding and operational support. Adequately protected shelters must be available and
made known to the IDPs, who are not always familiar with their new residence areas inside Ukraine. The
priorities should include free legal aid for accessing identity documents and civil status documents to enable
displaced persons to gain access to their rights, to support, and to services. In addition, support to volunteers
and to humanitarian organisations, including civil society organisations and other local groups working in
Ukraine, must be enhanced so that they can continue assisting IDPs.
12. The Assembly welcomes the Declaration adopted by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of
the Council of Europe on 26 March 2024, in which it “calls on European cities and regions to continue
mobilising and providing large-scale financial, security and humanitarian assistance to their Ukrainian
counterparts, and invites them to explore possibilities to establish direct, multi-faceted partnerships with
Ukrainian cities and regions, ideally with a long-term vision, and to work to remove any bureaucratic obstacles
to this assistance”. Member States should continue providing support for IDPs in Ukraine through co-
operation programmes set up by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities and local democracy
initiatives, such as the Intercultural cities programme of the Council of Europe.
13. Long-term support programmes for IDPs who are living in Ukraine should include financial assistance to
enable access to housing, including social housing, as well as loans for rebuilding private housing, and other
support for durable housing solutions, including through the sustainable reintegration into the rental market.
IDPs and returnees should be supported in having their housing, land and property rights restored. Moreover,
those IDPs wishing to start businesses in their new location need financial support, including microfinancing or
low interest rates credit lines. Long-term support should also encompass mental health and psychosocial
support services given the trauma the Ukrainian people have suffered. Long-term support programmes should
give specific attention to the most vulnerable among the displaced and war-affected people, notably older
persons or persons with disabilities. The Assembly welcomes Ukraine’s accession, in July 2023, to the
Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), which enables the CEB to provide grant funds for emergency
assistance and the long-term integration of Ukrainian refugees in host communities, as well as specific actions
for IDPs in Ukraine.
14. The Assembly highlights the importance of intensified efforts to help Ukraine defend itself and maintain
and re-build its society, with the aim of increasing its strength and resilience for present and future challenges.
Investing in Ukraine’s resilience now amounts to investing into making Europe as a whole stronger, with a
Resolution 2562 (2024)
2
better protected Western border, following the decisions of the European Union to grant Ukraine candidate
status for accession. The measures stipulated in Assembly Resolution 2539 (2024) and Recommendation
2271 (2024) “Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine” provide an excellent blueprint for action.
15. As regards the externally displaced persons under temporary protection in Europe, the Assembly
welcomes the European Union’s decision to activate the Temporary Protection Directive 2001/55/EC for
Ukraine. It supports the proposals to either prolong the validity of the directive, which is due to expire in March
2025, or to identify a longer-term residency solution for Ukraine’s citizens currently living on territory of the
European Union, while ensuring and safeguarding the capacity of Ukraine to continue to defend itself and to
rebuild its society, counting on the participation of its citizens including those now out of the country.
16. The Assembly reaffirms the rights of all individuals including the temporary protection beneficiaries to
apply for asylum at any point as protected under international and European Union laws and affirmed by the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
17. To this end, European Union member States may consider granting the Ukrainians under temporary
protection the right to permanent residency in the host country after a three-year period of residence,
regardless of age, gender, disability, religion, or other circumstances. The Assembly welcomes the decisions
in this direction taken under the national legal systems by some non-European Union Council of Europe
member States. As regards Ukrainians who have changed their country of asylum, States could similarly grant
a permanent residency in the new host country, after reaching a three-year period of residence, provided that
such term is considered sufficient for integration into a new place of residence by the host country.
18. The future of the Ukrainian population which has sought safety in other European countries should be
considered from the long-term perspective of future membership of the country in the European Union.
Granting long-term residence for these future European Union citizens would allow them to integrate faster
and be better able to contribute to strengthening the European Union as a whole, especially in the face of the
geopolitical challenges of our continent today following the Russian aggression.
19. As regards access to the labour market, the Assembly reiterates its call for policy planning aimed at
creating job opportunities for newly arriving persons, in accordance with the Assembly Resolution 2502 (2023)
“Integration of migrants and refugees: benefits for all parties involved”. Council of Europe member States are
encouraged to step up efforts to ensure suitable opportunities and to recognise qualifications obtained in
Ukraine, providing where necessary continued education to enhance qualifications in accordance with the
legislation of the host country.
20. The Assembly welcomes the measures to facilitate access to employment and social security schemes
open under the Temporary Protection Directive 2001/55/EC (Article 12), which stipulates that “the general law
in force in the Member States applicable to remuneration, access to social security systems relating to
employed or self-employed activities and other conditions of employment shall apply”.
21. The Assembly calls upon member States to ensure adequate protection for people with disabilities who
had to leave Ukraine and are now under temporary protection in Europe. Mutual recognition of disability
status, of the disability degree, and of medical and disability certificates, is essential. States should also
enable access to adequate social protection and rehabilitation programmes for those in need of support.
22. The Assembly highlights the importance of creating opportunities for the displaced people of Ukraine to
preserve and promote their cultural heritage. Bearing in mind the Assembly’s work on “Countering the erasure
of cultural identity in war and peace”, it recommends that member States hosting temporarily displaced
persons from Ukraine:
22.1. facilitate their access to their own heritage, encouraging cultural exchange programmes,
partnerships, joint artistic collaborations and the organisation of cultural festivals and exhibitions;
22.2. provide support and resources for artists, writers, musicians, and other cultural professionals by
funding initiatives, grants, and residency programmes;
22.3. promote the Ukrainian language, by supporting independent publishers and translations of
Ukrainian literature, and by setting up dedicated bookshelves in libraries.
23. As regards in particular support for Ukraine’s children living abroad, States could do more to better
regulate, in the host countries, the residence, movement, and protection of the rights of the children of
Ukraine. Special attention should be paid to children without parents and children who have moved with
guardians or caregivers, to ensure their rights to access education, medical care, and social support
Resolution 2562 (2024)
3
according to their age and life circumstances. In that regard, the Assembly calls upon member States to
implement the decisions agreed upon in Resolution 2529 (2024) and Recommendation 2265 (2024) “Situation
of the children of Ukraine”.
24. States should give immediate priority to ensuring the teaching of the Ukrainian language for Ukrainian
children in educational institutions, given the role played by language in supporting national identity. States
should enhance the capacity of their education systems to allow for the integration of Ukrainian pupils and
students into the European education system, enabling the mutual recognition of qualifications and diplomas.
Co-operation must be enhanced to ensure recognition of the results obtained in the Ukrainian education
system in European countries, at an equivalent level. In case of discrepancies in educational programs,
States could provide additional courses to reach a comparable level thereby enabling the recognition of
education obtained in Ukraine.
25. States can foster technical co-operation between experts from the Council of Europe member States in
order to finetune policies and practices for the protection of the rights of children of Ukraine residing on their
territory, including by taking part in the work of the Council of Europe Consultation Group on the Children of
Ukraine. The Consultation Group was established following up the Reykjavík Declaration “United around our
values” adopted at the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe on 16-17 May
2023.
26. Moreover, as regards support for Ukraine’s elderly people living abroad, the Assembly notes that many
elderly people had to flee Ukraine and are now living abroad, in a situation of extreme vulnerability. While
recognising the additional demands this places on the social security systems of host countries, the Assembly
considers that States can identify the means to support vulnerable elderly Ukrainians, as recommended by
the European Union Temporary Protection Directive 2001/55/EC (article 13), which stipulates that “The
Member States shall make provision for persons enjoying temporary protection to receive necessary
assistance in terms of social welfare and means of subsistence, if they do not have sufficient resources, as
well as for medical care. … the assistance necessary for medical care shall include at least emergency care
and essential treatment of illness.”
27. Granting Ukrainian pensioners the status of a pensioner in the host country with the provision of the
necessary social welfare support, albeit temporarily, would allow for dignified living for those who suffer severe
hardship, having lost all their livelihoods and having no time, energy or resources to recover and rebuild their
lives from scratch.
28. Helping Ukraine’s older generation would also facilitate the transmission of culture and identity to the
younger generation. Without such efforts, the younger Ukrainians now living outside the country may lose
their ties with their home, weakening the future of Ukraine after the war has ended. More should be done,
therefore, to promote the inter-generational solidarity to help Ukraine stand strong for the years to come.
29. With regard to mirroring EU actions in the non-EU Council of Europe member States, the Assembly
notes the efforts to welcome the externally displaced persons in those non-European Union Council of Europe
member States which provided immediate protection and temporary shelter for hundreds of thousands of
Ukrainians, despite the challenges that many of these countries face in terms of emergency housing capacity
or relief support. The Assembly welcomes the participation of non-European Union member States in the
continued relief work and refugee resettlement schemes, finding appropriate solutions for millions of Ukrainian
people displaced beyond the European Union.
30. With regard to facilitating return and resettlement, the Assembly recommends that specific actions be
taken to prepare a return to Ukraine after the war, as referred to in the European Union Temporary Protection
Directive 2001/55/EC (Article 21), which states that the “Member States shall take the measures necessary to
make possible the voluntary return of persons enjoying temporary protection or whose temporary protection
has ended. The Member States shall ensure that the provisions governing voluntary return of persons
enjoying temporary protection facilitate their return with respect for human dignity”.
31. The Assembly notes that the return of displaced persons to their homes cannot happen overnight and
may require years of preparation, which should start already now. Return will certainly involve the provision of
financial assistance for resettlement, and the question of resettlement and re-integration allowances over a
given period will need to be settled.
Resolution 2562 (2024)
4
32. The Assembly recommends initiating programmes to help the Ukrainian diaspora support or maintain
connections with Ukraine in host countries by establishing Ukrainian cultural centres, promoting language
learning, culture, history, and fostering co-operation within the Ukrainian community to enable future returns.
The provisions of the Assembly Resolution 2388 (2021) and Recommendation 2207 (2021) “For a European
policy on diasporas” can guide these efforts.
33. The Assembly is highly concerned about the fate of the Ukrainians who are now on the territory of the
Russian Federation and Belarus, as a result of forcible displacement or deportation. It reiterates its call to take
urgent measures to liberate these persons, as stressed in its Resolution 2495 (2023) and Recommendation
2253 (2023) “Deportations and forcible transfers of Ukrainian children and other civilians to the Russian
Federation or to temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories: create conditions for their safe return, stop these
crimes and punish the perpetrators”. The Assembly calls once more on the Russian Federation to release
immediately all persons taken by force to the Russian Federation or elsewhere.
34. The Assembly takes note of the Committee of Ministers’ reply to Recommendation 2253 (2023),
highlighting the importance of the work of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the
need to ensure co-operation with the relevant United Nations bodies, notably the Committee on the Rights of
the Child. It is also important to involve the United Nations Human Rights Council and seek answers regarding
the whereabouts of the missing Ukrainian persons, including those who have been forcibly displaced.
35. As regards the forcibly displaced children of Ukraine, the Assembly notes that the children of Ukraine
have suffered incredible hardship since the beginning of the Russian Federation’s aggression. Specific
measures must be put in place to help children retained in the Russian Federation to be reunited with their
family in Ukraine or elsewhere in Europe, as underscored by the Assembly in its Resolution 2529 (2024) and
Recommendation 2265 (2024) “Situation of the children of Ukraine”. Children without parental care must be
returned to Ukraine or, with Ukraine’s agreement, to another Council of Europe member State. The return of
children without parental care needs to be based on the best interests of these children, assessed on an
individual basis.
36. In its Resolution 2529 (2024), the Assembly reiterated its call on the Russian Federation and Belarus to
“provide the Ukrainian authorities or a third party (a State or an international organisation) with comprehensive
and reliable information about the number and the whereabouts of Ukrainian children in this situation, their
names and surnames, their origin and the destination of the deportation, in order to ensure their safe return to
Ukraine”; and to “provide representatives of the relevant United Nations bodies and other international
humanitarian intervention and human rights protection organisations, such as the United Nations Children’s
Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights) and other competent United Nations agencies, and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with unhindered, immediate and safe access to the
children”.
37. The Assembly underscores the need to enhance co-operation between various parties and
mechanisms to help return forcibly displaced children. Third-party interventions can offer guarantees of
impartiality and effectiveness. It is crucial to have access to the territories of the Russian Federation, Belarus,
and occupied territories of Ukraine, to speed up the process of identification, location and repatriation of
deported and forcibly transferred Ukrainian children.
38. The Assembly stands ready to continuing its role as a facilitator in communicating with different
international actors and organisations that operate for an effective search for children, based on access to
information about their identity and the conditions of their deportation or forcible transfer. The Assembly
would, therefore, support the possible creation of a parliamentary network on the situation of the children of
Ukraine, which would help strengthen co-operation for protecting the rights of these children.
39. As regards the Ukrainian prisoners of war, the Assembly should address this issue and the efforts
deployed to negotiate their release as a matter of urgency. The bogus trials opened by the occupying forces
of the Russian Federation against Ukrainian prisoners of war should be halted, as they are unlawful under
international humanitarian and human rights law, not meeting the minimum international standards of fairness.
The Assembly calls for the immediate release and return to Ukraine of the 33 Ukrainian soldiers sentenced to
long term sentences in penal colony after unlawful trials on 8 February 2024 by the so-called “supreme court”
of the “Luhansk People’s Republic” in Russian-occupied Luhansk.
40. The Assembly calls upon the Russian Federation to refrain from taking measures that run counter to
the Geneva Conventions I-IV and their Additional Protocols. The Assembly strongly supports measures taken
to allow for the exchange of prisoners of war to prevent further violence. The killings by the Russian
Federation’s military of unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war in Avdiivka and the village of Vesele
Resolution 2562 (2024)
5
demonstrated the most cruel and inhuman behaviour by the Russian Federation’s army and its sub-contracted
military groups: such blatant disregard by the Russian Federation of the international humanitarian law should
not be overlooked by the international community.
41. Following the Assembly members’ Written Declaration No. 778 (Doc. 15790) of 27 June 2023, “Call on
the International Committee of the Red Cross and the international community to demand that the Russian
Federation fully complies with the international humanitarian law concerning the Ukrainian prisoners of war”,
the Assembly reminds the Russian Federation that the rules and customs of war agreed upon in the codified
international humanitarian law must be respected by all to ensure that atrocities committed in times of war in
the past are not reproduced.
42. The Assembly calls upon all parties to the conflict to take measures to establish the whereabouts of the
missing persons. Helping families find their loved ones, or start their process of grieving, if their loved ones
perished in the war, is essential for the future reconciliation. More needs to be done to assist families in that
process. Humanitarian organisations should be allowed to provide adequate support on this issue.
43. Finally, the Assembly reiterates its readiness to assist Ukraine in creating all the conditions necessary
for the displaced people of Ukraine to feel safe and to help them return home in future to re-build Ukraine, so
that it can stand strong in its European vocation and in defending the values shared by all the Council of
Europe member States.
Resolution 2562 (2024)
6
Resolution 2563 (2024)1
Provisional version
Call for Varosha’s return to its lawful inhabitants
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The summer of 2024 marks the sad 50th anniversary of the most dramatic episode in Cyprus’ modern
history – the coup d’état promoted by the military dictatorship in Greece aiming at achieving “Enosis” of
Cyprus with Greece and the invasion by Türkiye which intervened under the pretext of Article IV of the Treaty
of Guarantee of 1960. This crisis followed the intercommunal strife of 1963-1964, which led to the
displacement of Cypriots from their homes, following which the United Nations decided to deploy a
peacekeeping force (UNFICYP), which is still present on the island today. The Turkish military intervention of
July-August 1974 resulted in thousands of victims, and a significant portion of the population having to flee
their homes, leaving everything behind. The scars of these tragic events are still very present in the memories
and public conscience of Cypriots. One of the most shocking traces of those events is the ghost town of
Varosha, a fenced-off area of the city of Famagusta which has been closed and uninhabited for 50 years.
2. The Parliamentary Assembly recalls that Cyprus, which had been part of the British Empire, was
established in 1960 as an independent State ensuring equal rights and equal responsibility to all its citizens,
both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and with guarantees of Greece, Türkiye and the United Kingdom.
3. The Assembly deplores that, almost 50 years later, the Cyprus problem is still unresolved, and the
island remains divided. The continuing frozen conflict harms the vital interests of all Cypriot citizens and may
lead to dangerous escalation. Furthermore, it constitutes a potentially destabilising factor for the Eastern
Mediterranean.
4. The Assembly refers to its previous resolutions on the Cyprus issue, in particular Resolution 1362
(2004), Resolution 1376 (2004) and Resolution 1628 (2008), and reiterates its strong commitment to reaching
a fair, lasting and comprehensive solution for a peaceful and united Cyprus which would guarantee the
legitimate rights of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, in full compliance with the values and principles
of the Council of Europe.
5. The Assembly fully supports the continued efforts by the United Nations Secretary General aimed at
reviving the political process with a view to reaching a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus issue, and
welcomes the appointment of María Angela Holguin Cuéllar as Secretary General’s Personal Envoy on
Cyprus for the purpose of exploring whether common ground exists or not between the two sides, and hopes
that her efforts will be able to promote the re-opening of negotiations between the two Cypriot communities.
6. The Assembly calls upon all parties involved to contribute to the swift resumption of the political
process, and to refrain from any unilateral steps or public statements that could undermine the prospects for it.
In this context, it considers that the statements made by the leaders of Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot
community promoting a “two-state solution” for Cyprus, thus pushing towards an effective partition of the
island, ignore and contradict a settlement of a united Cyprus in a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation in
accordance with commonly agreed parameters laid down by the relevant United Nations documents.
1. Assembly debate on 27 June 2024 (22nd sitting) (see Doc. 16004, report of the Committee on Political Affairs and
Democracy, rapporteur: Mr Piero Fassino). Text adopted by the Assembly on 27 June 2024 (22nd sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
7. In the same vein, the Assembly regrets the announcements made by the President of Türkiye, and
practical moves taken by the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community since October 2020, with a view to
reopening access to the fenced-off area of Varosha. It considers the gradual opening of the fenced-off area as
an unacceptable change of the status of Varosha as defined by the relevant UN Security Council resolutions,
and thus a grave violation of these resolutions that undermines the prospects of reaching a comprehensive
settlement of the Cyprus issue.
8. Taking into account the highly symbolic importance of Varosha for the Greek Cypriot community, the
Assembly believes that returning Varosha to its lawful inhabitants, either in the framework of the
implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 550 and 789 placing it under the UN control, or as part of
a package of reciprocal confidence-building measures, would constitute a strong positive contribution towards
reaching a comprehensive settlement.
9. The Assembly welcomes, and stands ready to support, all initiatives aimed at building trust between the
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, such as direct dialogue and practical bi-communal co-
operation projects at the level of municipalities, political parties, religious leaders, academia, civil society
organisations, youth, etc.
10. The Assembly particularly praises both municipalities of Famagusta/Gazimağusa for establishing
constructive and future-oriented dialogue and encourages them to develop common bi-communal projects
aimed at preparing Famagusta, including Varosha, for a common future following the eventual solution of the
Cyprus issue. It calls upon the political leadership of both communities to facilitate and support such projects.
11. It also welcomes the direct dialogue between representatives of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
political parties under the auspices of the Embassy of the Slovak Republic, and encourages all political forces
from both sides to make actively use of this opportunity to build mutual understanding and dispel mistrust.
12. The Assembly takes note that the European Court of Human Rights recognises the Immovable
Property Commission (IPC) set up by Türkiye in the northern Cyprus following the Court judgement in the
Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey case, as Türkiye's effective domestic remedy for claims relating to properties left by
Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus when they fled to the South in 1974. It underlines this possibility for those
Greek Cypriots who so wish to apply for pecuniary compensation, exchange or restitution of their properties
abandoned in 1974.
13. The Assembly notes that according to the official information provided by the IPC, so far it has received
7 596 applications and concluded 1 775 cases. At the same time, the Assembly notes that, in most cases
processed to date, the IPC has ruled for compensation in accordance with claims of the applicants, requesting
restitution in only 3.5% of the cases. In addition, it notes that, to date, no cases relating to Varosha have been
completed.
14. Moreover, the Assembly understands that, for most Greek Cypriots lawful inhabitants of Varosha,
applying to IPC, and even obtaining through it the right to return to their homes, which would remain under a
de facto control of the Turkish Cypriot authorities, is not politically acceptable or practicable.
15. The Assembly calls upon all parties involved to resume in good faith the political process leading to the
settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis a bi-zonal bi-communal federation with a single international
legal personality, a single sovereignty and a single citizenship composed of two constituent States with
political equality, as described in pertinent UN Security Council resolutions, and endowed with full powers in
matters of assigned competence.
16. The Assembly urges Türkiye and the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community to abandon their
stance in favour of a “two-state” solution for Cyprus and to recommit to the political process leading to a
comprehensive settlement of Cyprus issue on the basis of internationally agreed parameters.
17. The Assembly further urges the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community to reverse all steps taken
on Varosha since October 2020, to refrain from any further unilateral actions in relation to Varosha that are not
in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and to implement as a matter of priority UN
Security Council Resolutions 550 and 789 by placing the fenced-off area of Varosha under the UN control.
18. In addition, the Assembly calls upon all parties involved to devise and implement a package of
reciprocal confidence-building measures in accordance with international law, aiming at overcoming isolation
of Turkish Cypriots, and promoting co-operation, for the benefit of both communities, and reunification of the
island.
Resolution 2563 (2024)
2
19. The Assembly calls upon the leaders of both communities to resume their meetings and dialogue on
practical issues for the benefit of all Cypriots, and to re-engage in a political process under the auspices and
with the good services of the UN Secretary-General.
20. The Assembly values the participation of representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in its
debates and in the work of its committees, and undertakes to give full effect to Resolution 1376 (2004). It
encourages them to use more actively this opportunity to contribute to the European political debate, and to
engage in a meaningful dialogue with their Greek Cypriot compatriot counterparts with a view to building
mutual trust and preparing the ground for the resumption of direct talks between the two communities, under
the auspices of the United Nations, with the aim of reaching a fair, lasting and comprehensive solution for a
peaceful and united Cyprus.
21. The Assembly appreciates the role played by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and
pays tribute to the soldiers and civilians who lost their lives in service to provide peace and security to the
Cypriots.
22. The Assembly calls upon Greece, Türkiye and the United Kingdom, as guarantor powers, and upon all
the members of the UN Security Council, to co-operate for a solution of the Cyprus problem in accordance
with the pertinent UN Security Council Resolutions.
23. The Assembly reiterates its commitment to a united Cyprus and resolves to continue contributing,
through the activities of its competent committees, to reaching a solution of the Cyprus problem which is
shared by both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and which is in accordance with the pertinent UN
Security Council resolutions.
Resolution 2563 (2024)
3
Resolution 2564 (2024)1
Provisional version
Post-conflict time: defusing ticking time bombs for a safe
return of displaced populations
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly is appalled by the Russian Federation’s ongoing war of aggression
against Ukraine, the latest in a series of dreadful wars which have scarred Europe since the 20th century. This
tragedy reminds us the fragility of peace on our continent and the importance of never ceasing in our efforts to
protect and consolidate our democratic societies.
2. Deploring the brutal violence and destruction of the war against Ukraine, and recalling Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, the Assembly reiterates the legitimate right of its member States to defend their
territorial integrity against ongoing or imminent aggression with all their might and all the means at their
disposal, and calls on the international community to uphold its efforts to support Ukraine in every way
possible.
3. All conflicts have immediate devastating consequences on civilians and on territories, not least through
the widespread use of explosive weapons, especially cluster munitions. They also bring the long-term
consequences of the explosive remnants of war, particularly landmines and unexploded ordnance. The use of
explosive weapons in populated areas often results in the displacement of people within and across borders,
and later impedes their voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return.
4. Explosive ordnance has long-term effects on civilians, including physical, psychosocial and mental-
health damage. Civilians are too often the collateral victims of conflicts and, post conflict, of landmines and
explosive remnants of war. Among them are migrants on their migration routes, with women and children
being particularly exposed and paying a heavy price.
5. The Assembly recalls the “Memorandum on the human rights consequences of the war in Ukraine”
issued by the former Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, in July 2022, in which she regretted
that, despite some areas having been marked off by warning signage, injuries of civilians through explosive
remnants of war were said to occur on a daily basis.
6. Beyond the human toll, the use of explosive weapons has devastating effects on civilian infrastructure
and services. Their use destroys infrastructure, such as roads, schools, healthcare facilities, housing and
other civilian objects and has devastating effects on the functioning of essential services, such as drinking
water, sanitation, food, gas and electricity supply systems.
7. Moreover, the use of explosive weapons has a catastrophic impact on agriculture and the environment
as a whole. The components of explosive weapons and their remnants contaminate soils, subsoils and water
sources. They spread beyond populated areas, poisoning flora and fauna, and have a significant impact on
entire ecosystems, which may take years, if not decades, to remedy.
1. Assembly debate on 27 June 2024 (22nd sitting) (see Doc. 15995, report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees
and Displaced Persons, rapporteur: Mr Domagoj Hajduković). Text adopted by the Assembly on 27 June 2024
(22nd sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
8. Considering these multiple and cumulative factors, it is clear that landmines and unexploded ordnance
have both immediate and long-term effects on the displacement of populations, raising also the crucial issue
of a voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return to homelands.
9. The Assembly welcomes the treaties and customary international humanitarian law dealing with
disarmament and ban of arms and weapons, as well as those dealing with the repatriation of forcibly
displaced populations. It also welcomes the domestic laws issued by member States aimed inter alia at
clearing their territories of landmines and unexploded ordnance.
10. Welcoming the start of the border delimitation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, based on the
1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, the Assembly recalls the absolute necessity to “negotiate a process of
delimitation and demarcation of the border and examine the possibility of creating a demilitarised zone” as
underlined in Resolution 2391 (2021) “Humanitarian consequences of the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”.
11. The Assembly welcomes the establishment of the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of
the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which has started receiving claims for damage, loss or injury caused
since 24 February 2022.
12. The Assembly notes with satisfaction that victims of landmines and unexploded ordnance will thereby
be able to submit claims to the Register, including claims related to violations of personal integrity (such as the
death of an immediate family member or serious personal injury) and loss of property, income and livelihood,
including claims related to the inability to use agricultural land contaminated by landmines and other
explosives. The Assembly also appreciates that “demining and clearance of unexploded ordnance” is an
approved category for the submission of claims for compensation by the State of Ukraine (including its
regional and local authorities, State-owned or controlled entities) for expenses related to the removal of
landmines and unexploded ordnance, as well as other related categories, such as environmental damage and
depletion or damage of natural resources.
13. The Assembly hails the good practices put in place by several member States to remove landmines
and unexploded ordnance, and the related policies aimed inter alia at informing populations on how to
recognise and react to the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance. These can serve as examples
for other States grappling with the presence of such remnants of war.
14. The Assembly draws the attention of member States to the Council of Europe’s expertise on issues of
human rights of displaced populations and migrants, and particularly the reports, country visits and
recommendations of the Commissioner for Human Rights and of the Special Representative of the Secretary
General on Migration and Refugees.
15. Conscious of the existing barriers for ensuring a voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of
populations, the Assembly calls on member States to enact appropriate legislation and develop clear
guidelines aimed at ensuring that both rural and urban territories are cleared of explosive remnants of war,
and more specifically to:
15.1. consider ratifying anti-personnel landmines and anti-cluster munitions conventions when not yet
done so, inter alia:
15.1.1. the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects
and all its additional protocols (I to V) (Geneva Convention, 1980);
15.1.2. the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction (Ottawa Convention, 1977);
15.1.3. the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention, 2008);
15.2. adopt and fully implement legislation prohibiting investments in the cluster munitions and anti-
personnel landmines industries;
15.3. adopt and effectively implement legislation that prohibits under any circumstances the use,
development, production, stockpiling or transfer of anti-personnel mines and of cluster munitions, and
that obliges the safe and verified destruction of existing stocks of such ordnance.
Resolution 2564 (2024)
2
16. In the same spirit, the Assembly calls on member States to develop or improve actions aimed at
clearing territories of landmines and unexploded ordnance, and more specifically to:
16.1. develop further humanitarian demining operations, including international co-operation in
demining coalitions, and further assist States in need, in particular, today, Ukraine;
16.2. develop awareness-raising campaigns aimed at informing civilians, including displaced persons
prior to return, about the dangers of landmines and unexploded ordnance, with a particular focus on
women, children and workers especially exposed to such ordnance;
16.3. develop guidelines on how civilians can recognise and react to explosive remnants of war, such
as landmines and unexploded ordnance;
16.4. train the authorities and in particular law enforcement officials on how to react and protect
civilians in the presence of explosive remnants of war.
17. The Assembly calls on member States to support civilians who are victims of landmines and
unexploded ordnance, through the development – and provision to States in need such as Ukraine – of
specialised emergency medical care, rehabilitation, psychological and psychosocial support.
18. The Assembly calls on member States to facilitate the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return
and reintegration of forcibly displaced persons by:
18.1. providing sufficient assistance aimed at covering the basic needs of these persons, such as
housing, food, water, sanitation, and medical care;
18.2. reconstructing civilian infrastructure, including the rehabilitation of schools, as well as the
provision of construction tools, household items and agricultural tools, seeds and fertilizer; and
18.3. boosting job markets through incentives, especially through the recognition of qualifications
acquired abroad, and through educational and skills training programmes.
19. The Assembly underlines that ensuring the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of forcibly
displaced populations requires the consultation and involvement of the displaced persons themselves on the
conditions of their repatriation, for example by facilitating visits to the area prior to a definitive return in order to
reassure them about the safety and material conditions in place.
20. To foster voluntary returns, the Assembly suggests the establishment of agreements involving –
depending on each situation – governments of the countries of refuge and of origin, representatives from the
displaced population, civil society, and international organisations such as the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees under its international durable solutions mandate for refugees and other
displaced persons.
21. In order to avoid such forced displacements in the first place, the Assembly calls on member States to
ensure that their armed forces, and those of their allies, never deploy explosive weapons in populated areas,
unless sufficient mitigation measures can be taken to reduce the consequences of such use on civilian lives
and infrastructure in line with the recommendations of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
22. The Assembly further encourages member States to raise awareness through the endorsement,
dissemination, and implementation of the 2022 Dublin Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of
Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated
Areas.
23. The Assembly observes with great concern the increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also known
as combat drones, for indiscriminate attacks against civilian populations. It calls on member States to consider
implementing rules on the responsible use of combat drones, in particular when they are loaded with
munitions with wide-area effects.
24. Recalling the Reykjavik Declaration adopted during the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government
of the Council of Europe held on 16-17 May 2023, the Assembly recalls the need to ensure human rights
linked to the protection of the environment. The Assembly therefore calls on member States to mainstream a
constant consideration of the environmental dimension in their mine and weapons policy development and in
particular to:
24.1. join and fully implement the 1976 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques;
Resolution 2564 (2024)
3
24.2. develop environmentally-oriented demining policies covering land and sea territories and
comprising both military and humanitarian demining operations, if need be in co-operation with
international institutions or consortiums, such as United Nations agencies or private structures, and with
a particular focus, today, on the recovery and rebuilding of Ukraine.
Resolution 2564 (2024)
4
Resolution 2565 (2024)1
Provisional version
Safeguarding human rights for future generations
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly emphasises that a sustainable world not only means meeting the needs
of the present generation: it must also guarantee that future generations can likewise meet their needs. This is
nothing less than respecting intergenerational equity and is all the more an absolute imperative in the face of
the climate change challenge of today.
2. Protecting the planet for future generations also means repairing the environmental damage already
caused.
3. The Assembly stresses moreover that while the climate crisis has rightly been identified as the biggest
existential emergency facing humankind, we must not overlook other significant risks to the rights of future
generations, such as growing socio-economic inequalities, public health emergencies, wars and conflicts, and
rapid technological advances.
4. Recalling its previous work on artificial intelligence, as set out in Opinion 303 (2024), the Assembly
notes that the unprecedented pace of technological progress will likely become one of the key factors
impacting the lives of future generations. To this end, it welcomes the adoption of the Council of Europe
Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. The
Assembly reiterates its readiness to contribute to the preparation of additional binding and non-binding
instruments that will ensure that technological advancement is accompanied by respect for human rights,
democracy and the rule of law.
5. The Assembly notes that numerous constitutional texts now contain references to future generations
and that the notions of future generations and intergenerational equity are ever more frequently used before
national and international courts in environmental litigation.
6. The Assembly welcomes the fact that the Final Declaration of the Reykjavik Summit has recognised the
scale of the task ahead and that the Heads of State and Government of Council of Europe member States
committed therein to meeting the current and future challenges, raising up to the expectations of future
generations and making the environment and the intergenerational solidarity a visible priority for the
Organisation.
7. The Assembly notes with grave concern that human activity is threatening the extinction of one million
species of plants and animals, leading to an irreversible loss of biodiversity and collapse of the ecosystem. To
this end, the Assembly welcomes the adoption by the Standing Committee of the Council of Europe’s
Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (ETS No. 104, “Bern Convention”)
of its Strategic Plan for the period to 2030, which sets out goals for halting the declines in biodiversity,
recovering wildlife and habitats, improving the lives of people and contributing to the health of the planet. The
Assembly recalls that States are under a continuous international legal obligation to prevent activities on their
territory causing significant harm or damage to the environment of another State or areas beyond national
control.
1. Assembly debate on 28 June 2024 (23rd sitting) (see Doc. 15999, report of the Committee on Social Affairs, Health
and Sustainable Development, rapporteur: Mr Pedro Cegonho; and Doc. 16016, opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, rapporteur: Ms Gala Veldhoen). Text adopted by the Assembly on 28 June 2024 (23rd sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
8. In the light of these considerations, the Assembly invites Council of Europe member States to seize and
build upon this strategic moment in the Organisation’s life, and to strongly promote both at national level and
in international forums:
8.1. their political will to uphold, protect and develop the civil, political, economic, social and cultural
rights – both at the individual and the collective level – of our future generations, based on the
fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination found in human rights law;
8.2. their political will to advance rapidly and with determination on the existing environmental
standards and practices, from a less anthropocentric perspective and taking into account recent legal
developments in environmental matters, in particular the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights in climate cases;
8.3. the swift signature and ratification of the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial
Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, encouraging them to maximise the
potential of recognising the full applicability of the principles and obligations set forth therein (Chapters
II to VI) to activities of private actors.
Resolution 2565 (2024)
2