Tekster vedtaget af Forsamlingen under 2. session 2024

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2024 ORDINARY SESSION
Second part
15 – 19 April 2024
TEXTS ADOPTED
BY THE ASSEMBLY
Provisional versions
Offentligt
ERD Alm.del - Bilag 7
Europarådet 2023-24
Table of contents
Opinions
Opinion 302 (2024) Application by Kosovo* for membership of the Council of Europe
(Doc. 15958)
* Throughout this text, all reference to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population shall be
understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice
to the status of Kosovo.
Opinion 303 (2024) Draft Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights,
Democracy and the Rule of Law (Doc. 15971)
Recommendations
Recommendation 2271 (2024) Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine (Doc. 15932)
Recommendation 2272 (2024) Mainstreaming the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable
environment with the Reykjavik process (Doc. 15955)
Recommendation 2273 (2024) Towards Council of Europe strategies for healthy seas and oceans to
counter the climate crisis (Doc. 15956)
Recommendation 2274 (2024) The protection of children against online violence (Doc. 15954)
Resolutions
Resolution 2537 (2024) Relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a
democracy (Doc. 15946)
Resolution 2538 (2024) Promoting the revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums
(Doc. 15940)
Resolution 2539 (2024) Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine (Doc. 15932)
Resolution 2540 (2024) Alexei Navalny's death and the need to counter Vladimir Putin's totalitarian
regime and its war on democracy (Doc. 15966)
Resolution 2541 (2024) The arbitrary detention of Vladimir Kara-Murza and the systematic
persecution of anti-war protesters in the Russian Federation and Belarus
(Doc. 15967)
Resolution 2542 (2024) Sanctions against persons on the "Kara-Murza list" (Doc. 15939)
Resolution 2543 (2024) Freedom of expression and assembly of LGBTI people in Europe
(Doc. 15953)
Resolution 2544 (2024) The honouring of obligations and commitments by Albania (Doc. 15950)
Resolution 2545 (2024) Mainstreaming the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable
environment with the Reykjavik process (Doc. 15955)
Resolution 2546 (2024) Towards Council of Europe strategies for healthy seas and oceans to
counter the climate crisis (Doc. 15956)
Resolution 2547 (2024) The protection of children against online violence (Doc. 15954)
Opinions
302 and 303
Opinion 302 (2024)1
Provisional version
Application by Kosovo* for membership of the Council of
Europe
Parliamentary Assembly
1. Kosovo applied for membership of the Council of Europe on 12 May 2022 with a letter signed by
Ms Donika Gërvalla-Schwarz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora. On 24 April
2023, the Committee of Ministers transmitted the letter to the Parliamentary Assembly for consultation, in
pursuance of Statutory Resolution (51) 30 A adopted on 3 May 1951. The decision on the transmission
clarifies that it is “without prejudice to the Committee of Ministers’ future consideration of this application to
accede to the Council of Europe”.
2. Having taken note of the eminent lawyers’ report, the Assembly acknowledges that Kosovo’s legal
framework is broadly in line with Council of Europe standards and that its Constitution is a very progressive
instrument, incorporating the key provisions of the Ahtisaari Plan and providing for the direct applicability of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and its Protocols, the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157), the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (CETS No. 210, “Istanbul Convention”) as well
as some United Nations human rights instruments.
3. The Assembly acknowledges the progress made by Kosovo in the areas of human rights, democracy
and the rule of law and commends the advancements made by the current government, including as regards
the fight against corruption and a civil partnership for same-sex couples (“Civil Code”).
4. The Council of Europe, in synergy with the international community, has supported the strengthening of
standards in Kosovo through a wide range of activities including legal advice, co-operation and specific
solutions which have enabled Council of Europe monitoring mechanisms to regularly assess the situation in
specific areas of human rights law. Kosovo joined the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) in 2013
and the Venice Commission the following year. Since 2016, a delegation of the Assembly of Kosovo has
participated in the work of the Parliamentary Assembly. The Association of Kosovo Municipalities participates
in the work of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities.
5. The Assembly believes that Kosovo’s aspirations to join the Council of Europe should be met with a
positive response. Membership would lead to the strengthening of human rights standards by ensuring access
to the European Court of Human Rights to all those who are under Kosovo’s jurisdiction. It would also enable
the Council of Europe to have greater oversight of domestic developments and to deploy all the instruments at
its disposal to contribute to consolidating democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, membership of the
Council of Europe would represent a milestone in the process of Kosovo’s European integration.
1. Assembly debate on 16 April 2024 (10th sitting) (see Doc. 15958, Doc. 15957, report of the Committee on Political
Affairs and Democracy, rapporteur: Ms Dora Bakoyannis; Doc. 15964, opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, rapporteur: Ms Azadeh Rojhan; and Doc. 15965, opinion of the Committee on Equality and Non-
Discrimination, rapporteur: Ms Béatrice Fresko-Rolfo). Text adopted by the Assembly on 16 April 2024 (10th sitting).
* Throughout this text, all reference to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population shall be understood
in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice to the status of Kosovo.
https://pace.coe.int
6. Kosovo’s membership of the Council of Europe would be the culmination of a dialogue which has
developed over a span of two decades but should in no way be seen as the end of a process. On the
contrary, membership should catalyse momentum for Kosovo to continue to make progress in strengthening
human rights, democracy and the rule of law and address outstanding challenges and matters of concern.
7. Amongst such issues are a gap between the normative framework and its effective implementation; the
need to improve the protection of the rights of non-majority communities and to foster a climate and public
discourse which is conducive to trust, reconciliation and inclusion; focusing on language, education and youth
policies to ensure that Kosovo’s multi-ethnic society is cohesive rather than fragmented along ethnic or
language cleavages; ensuring full compliance with the rule of law irrespective of political considerations;
promoting interinstitutional respect; and strengthening the quality and efficiency of the judiciary.
8. Since Kosovo applied for membership of the Council of Europe, the security situation in Kosovo’s
northern municipalities has considerably deteriorated in parallel with a stall of the normalisation of relations
with Serbia and in the dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade facilitated by the EU Special Representative
Mr Miroslav Lajčák. Many events have contributed to a serious escalation of tensions, including: land
expropriations; the decision to enforce the use of Kosovo car licence plates; violent demonstrations; the mass
resignation of Kosovo Serbs from the police, the judiciary and public offices; local elections which gave results
deprived of democratic legitimacy; the use by the Kosovo authorities of the special police for ordinary police
tasks; and the enforcement of the decision to introduce the euro for financial transactions to the exclusion of
other currencies, later postponed.
9. On 24 September 2023, a major security incident in Banjska resulted in the death of a Kosovo police
officer and three Serb assailants. The gravity of this attack, its consequences and the attackers’ connections
with Belgrade abundantly showed that the risk of open violence in Kosovo is all too real and that security
depends on the protection of the rights of the Serb community, the de-escalation of tensions and the
normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
10. Against this background, the Assembly welcomes as a major breakthrough the implementation, on
14 March 2024, of the judgment of the Constitutional Court in the case of the Visoki Dečani monastery, which
had been awaiting execution since 2016. Its implementation is a tangible sign of the commitment of the
government to act in full accordance with the rule of law, irrespective of political considerations. The Assembly
and the Committee of Ministers should continue to follow this matter with a view to ensuring that the judgment
is fully implemented.
11. The Assembly considers the establishment of the Association of Serb majority municipalities an
important step and a way to enhance the democratic participation and empowerment of Kosovo Serbs and
ensure the protection of their rights. The Assembly considers that the establishment of the Association should
feature in the Committee of Ministers’ future consideration of Kosovo’s application to accede to the Council of
Europe, as a post-accession commitment for Kosovo.
12. Furthermore, the Assembly expects that expropriations are conducted in the strictest respect of the law
and that any future legislation in this area is fully in compliance with the Ahtisaari Plan, including with regard to
the protection of the properties of the Serbian Orthodox Church. In this context, the Assembly recommends
that the draft Law on Expropriation of Immovable Property which has been submitted to the Assembly of
Kosovo be amended accordingly, at the earliest possible date.
13. Against this background, the Assembly welcomes the commitment made in a letter dated 3 March 2024
by Mr Albin Kurti, Prime Minister of Kosovo, to sign and ratify an extensive list of Council of Europe
conventions, including:
13.1. at the time of accession: the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ETS No. 5);
13.2. within one year of accession:
– the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 2) and
its Protocols Nos. 1 and 6 (ETS Nos. 10 and 162)
– the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157)
– the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ETS No. 148)
– the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and
domestic violence (CETS No. 210)
– the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Being (CETS No. 197)
Opinion 302 (2024)
2
– the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (ETS No. 126)
– the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS No. 90)
– the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No. 196)
– the Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS No.
190)
– the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the
Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No. 198)
– the European Charter of Local Self-Government (ETS No. 122);
13.3. within two years of accession:
– the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights (ETS No. 160)
– the European Convention on Nationality (ETS No. 166)
– the European Social Charter (revised) (ETS No. 163)
– the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 174)
– the Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 191)
– the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial
Communities or Authorities (ETS No. 106) and its protocols
– the European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments (ETS No. 70)
– the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes (ETS No. 116)
– the European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes against
Humanity and War Crimes (ETS No. 82)
– the Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters (ETS No. 182);
13.4. as well as:
– the Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in related to State
Succession (CETS No. 200)
– the Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185) and its Additional Protocol (ETS No. 189)
– the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (ETS No. 93)
– the European Cultural Convention (ETS No. 18)
– the European Convention on the Recognition of University Qualifications (ETS No. 32)
– the Convention on the Academic Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in
the European Region (ETS No. 165)
– the European Convention on the Equivalence of Diplomas leading to Admission to Universities
(ETS No. 15)
– the Convention on the Elaboration of a European Pharmacopoeia (ETS No. 50).
14. Furthermore, the Assembly takes note of and welcomes the following commitments undertaken by the
Kosovo authorities:
14.1. as regards the functioning of democratic institutions and the respect of the rule of law:
14.1.1. fully respect the independence of the judiciary including by refraining from undue
criticism undermining trust in the judiciary;
14.1.2. continue to improve the quality and effectiveness of the judiciary;
14.1.3. continue to fight against corruption and organised crime;
Opinion 302 (2024)
3
14.1.4. ensure that expropriations are conducted in the strictest respect of the law and that any
future legislation in this area is fully in compliance with the Ahtisaari Plan, including with regard
to the protection of the properties of the Serbian Orthodox Church; amend accordingly the draft
Law on Expropriation of Immovable Property, which has been submitted to the Assembly of
Kosovo, at the earliest possible date;
14.1.5. take all measures to de-escalate tensions in the north of Kosovo and refrain from
decisions which may affect the rights and living conditions of the Serb community and lead to a
further deterioration of the security situation;
14.1.6. take urgent measures to promote the reintegration of Kosovo Serbs in the police force,
the judiciary and the prosecution in the north of Kosovo;
14.1.7. refrain from using special police in the north of Kosovo for ordinary police tasks, ensure
that they are deployed only in case of necessity, and step up co-operation with KFOR (Kosovo
Force) and EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo);
14.2. as regards human rights and protection of non-majority communities:
14.2.1. ensure the effective implementation of the legal framework for the protection of national
minorities;
14.2.2. take substantial and tangible steps with a view to implementing all articles of the
Brussels and of the Ohrid Agreements which includes establishing the Association of Serb
majority municipalities as soon as possible;
14.2.3. address urgently the absence of a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach on
minority matters and rights; such an approach needs to be developed and implemented in co-
operation with those concerned and in ways which reflect the specific needs of different
communities;
14.2.4. allocate sufficient resources to effectively implement the legislation on the use of
languages and ensure the legal entrenchment, independence and provision of adequate
resources for the Office of the Language Commissioner;
14.2.5. step up measures to support the socio-economic integration and political participation
of persons belonging to non-majority communities;
14.2.6. take visible and meaningful measures to promote reconciliation between Kosovo’s
communities, including in political discourse; adopt concrete strategies for inter-community
dialogue and for reconciliation-oriented spaces and activities, in particular in education, in order
to pave the way for inclusive societal development and trust;
14.2.7. promote teaching of non-majority languages in schools;
14.2.8. ensure the effective access to good quality primary and secondary education and
textbooks for all children, including children with disabilities, children belonging to non-majority
communities and children from disadvantaged groups;
14.3. as regards international relations:
14.3.1. continue to engage in the EU-facilitated dialogue and honour the commitments and
obligations undertaken under its aegis;
14.3.2. put genuine efforts into the process of normalisation of relations with Serbia;
14.3.3. settle international disputes in a peaceful manner and promote good neighbourly
relations in the region.
15. The Assembly also recommends that Kosovo signs and ratifies the following Council of Europe
Conventions and Partial Agreements:
– Protocols 1, 4, 7, 12, 13 and 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights
– the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual
Abuse (CETS No. 201)
– the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 173)
– The enlarged partial agreement setting up the Council of Europe international cooperation group on
drugs and addictions (Pompidou Group)
Opinion 302 (2024)
4
– the enlarged partial Agreement on the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian
Federation against Ukraine.
16. The Assembly invites Kosovo to:
16.1. fully participate in the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money
Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) and to thereafter implement its
recommendations without delay;
16.2. amend the composition of the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council in line with the recommendations of
the Venice Commission in its Opinion CDL-AD(2023)043 adopted on 15-16 December 2023;
16.3. refer the new draft law on expropriations to the Venice Commission, for an opinion;
16.4. ensure self-restraint of politicians, who should refrain from criticising decisions of the judiciary;
16.5. improve respect for administrative procedures, in particular for expropriations and public
appointments and consider introducing an administrative complaint procedure;
16.6. launch procedural reforms to tackle the excessive length of judicial proceedings and consider
creating a specific remedy for excessive length of proceedings;
16.7. reduce excessive recourse to pre-charge and pre-trial detention for unduly lengthy periods of
time and without proper reasons;
16.8. promote the use of de-escalatory policing techniques, especially by police deployed in the north
of Kosovo;
16.9. improve language training and education to meet the constitutional requirements for bilingualism
in actual practice, especially in the police force and the justice system;
16.10. foster awareness among police officers, prosecutors and judges of hate crimes and strengthen
their ability to treat victims of such crimes with sensitivity; improve the response of these actors in the
judicial system to the issue of domestic violence.
17. The Assembly reasserts the importance of protecting the human rights of all, including the rights of
persons from non-majority communities, women’s rights, the rights of LGBTI persons and the rights of
persons with disabilities. It calls on the authorities of Kosovo to:
17.1. ensure the legal recognition of civil partnerships for same-sex couples;
17.2. step up efforts to combat discrimination on any grounds;
17.3. promote gender equality;
17.4. prevent and combat gender-based violence, and prosecute and punish perpetrators of this
violence;
17.5. prevent and combat hate speech.
18. In light of the above, the Assembly considers that Kosovo is able and willing to:
18.1. fulfil the provisions of Article 3 of the Council of Europe Statute which stipulates that “[e]very
member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by
all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms”;
18.2. collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council of Europe as
specified in Chapter I of the Statute, thereby fulfilling the conditions for accession to the Council of
Europe as laid down in Article 4 of the Statute.
19. The Assembly, therefore, recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
19.1. invite Kosovo to become a member of the Council of Europe with the name “Kosovo”;
19.2. allocate 3 seats to Kosovo in the Parliamentary Assembly.
20. While supporting Kosovo’s membership of the Council of Europe, the Assembly is aware of the
unprecedented circumstances of this application, as a number of Council of Europe member States do not
recognise Kosovo as a State. Diplomacy, dialogue and compromise are necessary to ensure that the
Opinion 302 (2024)
5
prospective admission of Kosovo does not create a fracture in the unity of Council of Europe member States,
thus undermining the spirit of the Reykjavik Summit. The Assembly, therefore, invites the Committee of
Ministers to ensure that:
20.1. Kosovo’s membership of the Council of Europe is without prejudice to individual member States’
positions as regards the statehood of Kosovo;
20.2. member States, irrespective of the position they may express in relation to Kosovo’s
membership application, respect the decision made by the Committee of Ministers and collaborate
sincerely and effectively in its implementation, ensuring the smooth functioning of Council of Europe’s
institutions, bodies and mechanisms;
20.3. once Kosovo is admitted as a member State for the purposes of the Council of Europe Statute,
the Organisation discontinues its status-neutral policy.
21. Likewise, the Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers to spare no diplomatic and political effort to
ensure that Kosovo’s membership is not only beneficial to Kosovo and all those who are under its jurisdiction
but is also a factor of stability, democratic security and peace in the Western Balkans and Europe.
22. With a view to ensuring compliance with commitments and obligations and monitoring the
implementation of its recommendations, the Assembly decides, pursuant to its Resolution 1115 (1997), to
open the monitoring procedure for Kosovo as from its accession to the Council of Europe.
Opinion 302 (2024)
6
Opinion 303 (2024)1
Provisional version
Draft Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human
Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly considers that artificial intelligence (AI) brings both opportunities and
challenges. The position of the Assembly in this field has always highlighted the importance of striking the
right balance between mitigating the risks and making full use of the advantages that AI can offer in promoting
a better life for all.
2. The Assembly recalls its previous work on AI. In 2020, it adopted a set of resolutions and
recommendations examining the opportunities and risks of AI for democracy, human rights and the rule of
law. These included Resolutions 2341 (2020) “Need for democratic governance of artificial intelligence”,
2342 (2020) “Justice by algorithm – The role of artificial intelligence in policing and criminal justice systems”,
2343 (2020) “Preventing discrimination caused by the use of artificial intelligence”, 2344 (2020) “The brain-
computer interface: new rights or new threats to fundamental freedoms?”, 2345 (2020) “Artificial intelligence
and labour markets: friend or foe?”, 2346 (2020) “Legal aspects of ‘autonomous’ vehicles”, its related
recommendations as well as Recommendation 2185 (2020) “Artificial intelligence in health care: medical,
legal and ethical challenges ahead”. The Assembly endorsed a set of key ethical principles that should be
respected when developing and implementing AI applications. These principles, which were further elaborated
in a common appendix to all these reports, are:
2.1. transparency, including accessibility and explicability;
2.2. justice and fairness, including non-discrimination;
2.3. human responsibility for decisions, including liability and availability of remedies;
2.4. safety and security;
2.5. privacy and data protection.
3. The Assembly strongly believes that legal regulation is necessary in order to avoid or mitigate the
potential risks to democracy, human rights and the rule of law arising from the use of AI. In this context, the
Council of Europe, as a leading international standard-setting organisation in the field of democracy, human
rights and the rule of law, should play a pioneering role. While supporting the work of the Council of Europe
Ad hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence (CAHAI) at the time, Assembly called on the Committee of
Ministers to decide upon the preparation of a legally binding instrument governing artificial intelligence,
possibly in the form of a convention open also to non-member States that should be based on a
comprehensive approach, deal with the whole life cycle of AI-based systems, be addressed to all stakeholders
and include mechanisms to ensure its implementation. The Assembly therefore warmly welcomes the
finalisation of the draft Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the
Rule of Law by the Council of Europe Committee on Artificial Intelligence (CAI).
1. Assembly debate on 18 April 2024 (13th sitting) (see Doc. 15971, report of Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, rapporteur: Ms Thórhildur Sunna Ævarsdóttir). Text adopted by the Assembly on 18 April 2024 (13th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
4. The Assembly has always considered that private actors should fall within the scope of such a legally
binding instrument. In its Resolution 2341 (2020), it expressed the view that the instrument should contain
provisions to limit the risks of the use of AI-based technologies by State and private actors to exercise control
over people, and that the activity of private actors should be subject to democratic oversight.
5. The Framework Convention, once adopted, will become the first ever international treaty on AI. It is
based on the Council of Europe’s standards on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, which are also
shared by the non-member States that participated in the negotiations. This is an example of the Council of
Europe’s leadership in developing standards in emerging areas, including the digital sphere, in line with the
Reykjavik Declaration adopted by the Heads of State and Government in May 2023. Part of the Framework
Convention’s added value will be its global reach, since it will bring together States from all over the world
wishing to address the global challenges posed by AI with a human rights-based approach. The Assembly
therefore understands that the drafting process has had to accommodate diverse legal and political traditions
and systems, with the result that the draft text often contains very general and abstract provisions, allowing for
a certain level of flexibility in its implementation. Its “framework” nature also means that it will need to be
supplemented by other binding or non-binding instruments concerning the use of AI in specific sectors or
developing certain provisions of the convention further. The Assembly is ready to contribute to the preparation
of such instruments.
6. The Assembly is satisfied that most of the key ethical principles endorsed in its 2020 reports are
reflected in different provisions of the draft Framework Convention, although some of these principles could
have been formulated as positive individual rights rather than general principles (for instance, privacy, equality
and non-discrimination). Furthermore, it could have been made even clearer that each individual government
should be obliged to inform its citizens of the use of AI systems in administrative processes leading to binding
legal decisions. Another significant added value of this draft Framework Convention is that it is intended to
protect not only human rights but also democratic processes and the rule of law in the context of AI. AI
technologies have a potential to disrupt the functioning of democratic institutions and processes, for instance
through interference in electoral processes, disinformation and manipulation of public opinion. They can also
have an impact on the functioning of the rule of law, including the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary and access to justice. In this regard, the Assembly considers that the interpretation of “democratic
institutions and processes” and “the rule of law” within the meaning of the draft Framework Convention should
be guided by the relevant standards developed over the years by Council of Europe bodies such as the
European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice
Commission), as well as by the Reykjavik Principles for Democracy. The drafters however missed the
opportunity to cover more specifically the positive uses of AI for democratic processes, for instance improving
government accountability and facilitating democratic action and participation.
7. The Assembly regrets that the draft Framework Convention does not cover to an equal extent public
and private actors. Rather, it introduces a system where each Party will be able to determine in a declaration
how it intends to address the risks and impacts arising from the use of AI by private actors. This is far from
ideal for legal certainty and predictability of the obligations imposed by the Framework Convention and is not
in line with the positions previously expressed by the Assembly, the Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights and the CAHAI. It also goes against the principle that States have positive obligations to
protect individuals against human rights abuses by private actors, in accordance with the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and
relevant recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Many AI systems are
developed and deployed by private entities, and introducing a differentiated approach for the private sector
creates a significant loophole.
8. The Assembly therefore strongly calls on all member States of the Council of Europe, when ratifying the
Framework Convention and submitting their declarations under Article 3.1 (b), to recognise the full applicability
of the principles and obligations set forth therein (Chapters II to VI) to activities of private actors, and to report
accordingly to the future Conference of the Parties under Article 24. It further invites the Conference of the
Parties to fully use its powers and conduct a proper review of how all Parties comply with Article 3.1 (b). The
Assembly believes that a dynamic interpretation of this provision by the follow-up mechanism set up by the
Framework Convention will foster advances over time, through reporting requirements and peer pressure,
including with respect to non-member States that may choose not to apply the Framework Convention
obligations to private actors.
Opinion 303 (2024)
2
9. Having considered some of the proposals by different stakeholders, and taking due account of the
overall structure and the transversal character of the agreed text, the Assembly proposes the following
amendments to the draft Framework Convention:
9.1. replace Article 3.2 with the following text: “Each Party may restrict the application of the
provisions of this Convention if activities within the lifecycle of artificial intelligence systems are
necessary to protect its national security or national defence interests and if such activities are
conducted in a manner consistent with applicable international law, including international human rights
law obligations, and with respect for its democratic institutions and processes.”;
9.2. delete Article 3.4;
9.3. in Article 5.1, after “effectiveness of democratic institutions and processes, including” add the
following words: “free and fair elections,”;
9.4. in Chapter III, add the following article: “Every Party shall adopt or maintain measures to
preserve health and the environment in the context of activities within the lifecycle of artificial
intelligence systems, in line with applicable international and domestic law.”;
9.5. in Article 14.2 (c) or in the explanatory report, add a reference to “judicial authorities” or “judicial
review”;
9.6. in Article 15.1, add a reference to “human review”;
9.7. in Articles 16.1, 16.2 (a), (e) and 16.3, after the words “the rule of law” add the following words:
“and the preservation of the environment”;
9.8. replace Article 16.4 with the following text: “Each Party shall take such legislative or other
measures as may be required to put in place mechanisms for a moratorium or ban or limitations in
respect of certain uses of artificial intelligence systems where such uses are considered incompatible
with the respect of human rights, the functioning of democracy or the rule of law.”;
9.9. in Chapter VI, add the following article: “Each Party shall take appropriate measures to ensure
protection of whistleblowers in relation to the activities within the lifecycle of artificial intelligence
systems which could adversely impact human rights, democracy and the rule of law.”;
9.10. at the end of Article 26.2, add the following sentence: “The functions and powers of such
mechanisms shall include investigative powers, the power to act upon complaints, periodic reporting,
promotion, public awareness and consultation on the effective implementation of this Convention.”;
9.11. in Chapter VII, after Article 26, add the following article: “Parliamentary involvement”: “1.
National parliaments shall be invited to participate in the follow-up and review of the measures taken for
the implementation of this Convention. 2. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe shall
be invited to regularly take stock of the implementation of this Convention.”
10. The Assembly wishes to participate in the future Conference of the Parties set up by the Framework
Convention and engage in the co-operation and exchange of information envisaged under Article 25.
11. The Assembly invites its Sub-Committee on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights to raise awareness
of the Framework Convention once adopted, including by promoting its ratification or accession by member
States, observer States, and States whose parliaments enjoy observer or partner for democracy status with
the Assembly.
12. Finally, the Assembly will continue to work on AI-related issues, through new reports on emerging
topics and by following closely and contributing where necessary to the standard-setting activities of the CAI
and other relevant Council of Europe inter-governmental bodies.
Opinion 303 (2024)
3
Recommendations
2271 to 2274
Recommendation 2271 (2024)1
Provisional version
Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly draws the Committee of Ministers’ attention to its Resolution 2539 (2024)
“Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine” which makes a resolute call for using confiscated Russian State
assets to compensate damages, injury and losses caused by the aggression of the Russian Federation and
for supporting the reconstruction of Ukraine.
2. The Assembly refers to its Resolution 2516 (2023) “Ensuring a just peace in Ukraine and lasting
security in Europe”, which called for establishing “a comprehensive compensation mechanism, including an
international commission for the examination of claims for damages recorded in the Register of Damage, and
a compensation fund to pay out on decisions on compensation for damage awarded by the commission, in
particular by confiscating and otherwise using the Russian Federation’s assets to pay for damage caused by
the war in Ukraine”. It also refers to its Resolution 2482 (2023) “Legal and human rights aspects of the
Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”, which called on Council of Europe member States to set
up an international compensation mechanism; highlighted the reasons why the Council of Europe should have
a leading role in setting up and managing it; and detailed some of its key prospective features.
3. The Assembly recalls the decisions of the Committee of Ministers of 15 September 2022 and
24 February 2023 to welcome all efforts to secure full reparations for the damages caused by violations by the
Russian Federation of international law in Ukraine. It also underscores that, in its Resolution CM/Res(2023)3
establishing the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the
Russian Federation against Ukraine, adopted on 12 May 2023, the Committee of Ministers agreed “to
continue working, in co-operation with Ukraine and relevant international organisations and bodies, towards
the establishment by a separate international instrument of a future international compensation mechanism,
which may include a claims commission and a compensation fund, of which the work of the Register,
including its digital platform with all data about claims and evidence recorded therein is intended to constitute
an integral part”.
4. In light of the above, the Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers to:
4.1. proceed towards the establishment of an international compensation mechanism, under the
auspices of the Council of Europe, to comprehensively address the damages incurred by natural and
legal persons concerned, as well as the State of Ukraine due to the unlawful actions of the Russian
Federation in its invasion of Ukraine;
4.2. establish an international trust fund, where all seized Russian State assets will be deposited,
ensuring transparency, accountability, and equity in the disbursement of funds that should be used for
compensation to Ukraine and natural or legal persons affected by the Russian aggression in Ukraine as
well as to aid Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction efforts;
4.3. endorse the establishment of an international commission of claims for the damages recorded in
the Register, under the auspices of the Council of Europe;
1. Assembly debate on 16 April 2024 (10th sitting) (see Doc. 15932, report of the Committee on Political Affairs and
Democracy, rapporteur: Mr Lulzim Basha; and Doc. 15941, opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights,
rapporteur: Mr Davor Ivo Stier). Text adopted by the Assembly on 16 April 2024 (10th sitting).
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4.4. consider including, in the scope of the future international compensation mechanism, once
established, the damage caused by the Russian Federation’s internationally wrongful acts committed in
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and the temporarily occupied territories of
the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts before 24 February 2022, in so far as they were caused by the
aggression against Ukraine started in 2014, in particular in relation to breaches of international law
confirmed by international adjudicative bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights.
Recommendation 2271 (2024)
2
Recommendation 2272 (2024)1
Provisional version
Mainstreaming the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and
sustainable environment with the Reykjavik process
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its Resolution 2545 (2024) “Mainstreaming the human right to a
safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment with the Reykjavik process”.
2. The Assembly maintains that the recognition of the right to a healthy environment must be based on a
human rights approach. In this regard, it reaffirms its Recommendation 2211 (2021) “Anchoring the right to a
healthy environment: need for enhanced action by the Council of Europe”, in which it proposed
complementary tools to achieve this.
3. The Assembly notes that the Council of Europe already offers a convention ecosystem covering many
aspects of the right to a healthy environment. It sees this as an opportunity to capitalise on existing standards.
4. The Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
4.1. actively support the work of the Intersecretariat Task Force on the Environment established
following the 4th Council of Europe Summit, and carefully consider its proposals when drawing up a
strategy and an action plan;
4.2. give utmost priority to implementing the encouragement made in Reykjavik to set up an ad hoc
intergovernmental committee to organise, co-ordinate and run the implementation of the strategy and
the action plan;
4.3. devote the normative part of the strategy to the formal recognition of the right to a healthy
environment at the level of the Council of Europe, by developing a binding legal instrument as soon as
possible;
4.4. in so doing, focus on the rapid implementation of Recommendation 2211 (2021), including
devising a specific, autonomous instrument covering substantive rights and procedural matters relating
to the environment that capitalises fully on the standards which have already been drawn up;
4.5. ensure that the draft convention superseding and replacing the Convention on the Protection of
the Environment through Criminal Law (ETS No. 172), currently being prepared within the Council of
Europe, incorporates the notion of ecocide as a criminal offense and establishes an effective monitoring
mechanism;
4.6. give the ad hoc intergovernmental committee a multidisciplinary role, enabling it to act as an
interface between the Council of Europe and civil society in its broadest sense and to carry out activities
aimed at environmental monitoring and governance as soon as it has been set up;
4.7. highlight the committee’s added value in dealings with the Organisation’s other bodies, with
which effective and focused partnerships may be established to drive forward change in environmental
monitoring and governance;
1. Assembly debate on 18 April 2024 (12th sitting) (see Doc. 15955, report of Committee on Social Affairs, Health and
Sustainable Development, rapporteur: Mr Simon Moutquin). Text adopted by the Assembly on 18 April 2024 (12th sitting).
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4.8. set up a rapporteur group on environmental affairs at Committee of Ministers level to ensure
unity and co-ordination in decision making.
Recommendation 2272 (2024)
2
Recommendation 2273 (2024)1
Provisional version
Towards Council of Europe strategies for healthy seas and
oceans to counter the climate crisis
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its Resolution 2546 (2024) “Towards Council of Europe
strategies for healthy seas and oceans to counter the climate crisis” and underscores the strategic goal to
make the link between human rights and the environment a visible priority of the Council of Europe through
the Reykjavik process. The Council of Europe has undertaken to come up with its own response to the triple
planetary crisis by initiating the Reykjavik process and recognising, at political level, the right to a healthy,
clean and sustainable environment at the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government. A healthy
environment can never be possible without healthy seas and oceans. The Council of Europe must contribute
to networking between like-minded partners and provide a forum for civil society and young people.
2. The Assembly welcomes the intention to strengthen the tools of the Council of Europe for
environmental protection as part of the Reykjavik process, ensuring their sustainability through the provision of
stable resources. The member States should consolidate the Council of Europe capacity in this field and
underpin it with adequate long-term funding in follow-up to decisions of the Reykjavik Summit. The Council of
Europe should join forces with other international organisations, notably the European Union, in the realisation
of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and, in particular, SDG 14 which is aimed at
conserving and sustainably using the oceans, seas and marine resources for responding in a holistic manner
to a host of direct and indirect threats including plastic and other marine pollution, ocean warming,
eutrophication, acidification and the collapse of fisheries and biodiversity.
3. The Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
3.1. take into account the need to ensure comprehensive, efficient and effective protection of oceans
and seas when preparing strategic documents (such as the Strategy on the Environment and its related
Action Plan) and in other relevant work such as co-operation and technical assistance activities,
including with neighbouring countries;
3.2. in the development of the Council of Europe’s work on the environment, keep to the forefront the
human rights perspective, including the right to a healthy environment, taking into account the needs of
all the different stakeholders in society including future generations;
3.3. take advantage of the Council of Europe observer status to the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) to raise awareness on the human rights perspective;
3.4. ensure close co-operation with civil society actors, NGOs working to protect the seas and save
lives at sea, and relevant international organisations such as the IMO.
1. Assembly debate on 18 April 2024 (12th sitting) (see Doc. 15956, report of Committee on Social Affairs, Health and
Sustainable Development, rapporteur: Ms Yuliia Ovchynnykova). Text adopted by the Assembly on 18 April 2024
(12th sitting).
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Recommendation 2274 (2024)1
Provisional version
The protection of children against online violence
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its Resolution 2547 (2024) “The protection of children against
online violence”. It invites the Committee of Ministers to take into due consideration, in its work, the dangers
posed by the internet to children, who are more exposed to violence and new forms of violence in the online
environment, in particular by:
1.1. considering and incorporating the best interests of the child in the Framework Convention on
Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, including the protection of
children’s human rights from the dangers of artificial intelligence;
1.2. taking online violence into account in its feasibility study on age-appropriate comprehensive
sexuality education;
1.3. strengthening international co-operation with relevant organisations, including the European
Commission and relevant European Union agencies such as Europol and the European Union Agency
for Fundamental Rights, and Interpol, with a view to focusing attention on the protection of children’s
human rights and the best interests of the child.
2. The Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers to strengthen co-operation with digital industry
stakeholders in order to find adaptable and sustainable solutions to protect children from online violence,
including by:
2.1. as a first step, assessing the reliability of age verification tools, depending on the content and
the age of child users;
2.2. providing children and parents with tools to raise awareness of the dangers of the internet;
2.3. making online tools available to enable easy reporting of incidents of online violence, and
providing help and support, particularly psychological care, for child victims.
1. Assembly debate on 19 April 2024 (14th sitting) (see Doc. 15954, report of Committee on Social Affairs, Health and
Sustainable Development, rapporteur: Mr Joseph O'Reilly). Text adopted by the Assembly on 19 April 2024 (14th sitting).
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Resolutions
2537 to 2547
Resolution 2537 (2024)1
Provisional version
Relationship between the parliamentary majority and the
opposition in a democracy
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The promotion and consolidation of pluralist democracy are amongst the main objectives of the Council
of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly. The member States of the Council of Europe shall endeavour to
develop common standards and practices aimed at promoting a free and pluralist parliamentary democracy
and the means for their implementation in national parliaments.
2. In all national parliaments, there are provisions acknowledging the role of the opposition or the
parliamentary minority in their dimension as political groups or individual parliamentarians not supporting the
government.
3. The best way of ensuring that the opposition discharges its responsibilities is to extend and precisely
define its rights. However, in only a few Council of Europe member States do the laws or constitution explicitly
mention the role of the opposition. Some constitutions recognise the opposition only in outline, leaving much
of the detail to be determined by ordinary legislation, statutory law or parliamentary rules of procedure, or by
convention, custom and tradition.
4. While there are considerable differences in the political and institutional cultures and components of
European States, it is however possible to identify certain general principles which govern the relationship
between the parliamentary majority and its opposition and reflect the common European constitutional
heritage.
5. One major objective in parliamentary democracies is to create a situation where there is a shared
commitment to the essentials of democracy by the majority and minority and a common desire to make “their”
parliament work properly for the public good. There is still a long way to go before this objective is reached in
the wider Europe. A strengthened position of opposition in parliaments would be beneficial for the system of
checks and balances in democracies.
6. More than any other forum, parliament is the place where democracy manifests itself, and in our
societies there is hardly any debate that radically challenges the actual principle of representative democracy.
Parliament is the institution that embodies society in the diversity of its composition and opinions and which
relays and channels this diversity in the political process. Its vocation is to regulate tensions and maintain
equilibrium between the competing claims of diversity and uniformity, individuality and collectivity, in order to
enhance social cohesion and solidarity.
7. A democratic parliamentary system presumes an ethic of self-restraint on the part of the majority, with
respect for the rights and interests of the minority. Not all possible advantages should be taken, nor are they
taken in mature parliamentary systems. In parliaments where such a political culture exists, often with
“unwritten” parliamentary conventions, the need for legal guarantees for the opposition and minority is less. In
new democracies, without such democratic traditions, the need for formal rules protecting the opposition may
often be stronger.
1. Assembly debate on 15 April 2024 (9th sitting) (see Doc. 15946, report of Committee on Political Affairs and
Democracy, rapporteur: Ms Elvira Kovács). Text adopted by the Assembly on 15 April 2024 (9th sitting).
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8. Opposition rights are considered as an institutionalised power possessed by the opposition in
parliament that encompasses and goes beyond rights of individual legislators to speak and vote against
government bills. Enshrining and clearly defining rights and guarantees in law is an effective tool for the
functioning of the parliamentary opposition. Institutional procedures, recognition, legitimisation and
institutionalisation of the parliamentary opposition are integral to the idea of constitutional democracy itself and
integral part of the political culture.
9. The legitimisation of the parliamentary opposition in the constitution, laws as well as rules of procedure,
provides, on the one hand, legal guarantees within government-opposition relations to limit the political
influence of the parliamentary majority on the minority. On the other hand, by placing the opposition on an
equal footing with the majority, it requires them to be jointly legally responsible for the exercise of power.
10. Effective opposition can help the government to avoid mistakes – or swiftly correct them – thereby
improving governance outcomes. So, the existence of an effective parliamentary opposition able to scrutinise
the policy of a governing majority is a visible symbol of the salvation of State political order and parliament
itself.
11. The Parameters on the Relationship between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in a
Democracy: a checklist (“Checklist”) is the result of a long and careful work carried out by the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) which took its origin in Resolution 1601 (2008)
“Procedural guidelines on the rights and responsibilities of the opposition in a democratic parliament” of the
Assembly. The Venice Commission concluded that it is important to explore the ways and means by which the
role of the parliamentary opposition can be formally better regulated and protected and that it is a worthy
attempt to introduce soft regulations in an area which is essential for the proper functioning of parliamentary
democracy. The use of the Checklist should be widely promoted amongst national parliaments, and the
Assembly should contribute to this effort, directly and through its political groups.
12. In light of these considerations, the Assembly:
12.1. welcomes the elaboration of the Venice Commission Checklist on Parameters on the
Relationship between the Parliamentary Majority and the Opposition in a Democracy: a Checklist, and
endorses the Checklist as adopted;
12.2. disseminates and recommends the Checklist to the parliaments of the Council of Europe
member and observer States, as well as to the parliaments enjoying observer or partner for democracy
status with the Assembly;
12.3. encourages member States to ensure that their democratic mechanisms are given political
legitimacy through integrity, as trust in parliaments shapes both the stability and quality of democracy;
only together can parliamentary majority and opposition create inclusive, prosperous and sustainable
societies;
12.4. invites the parliaments of the member States of the Council of Europe to promote the Checklist
and to take it into account when revising the relevant national rules or developing best practices;
12.5. encourages the parliaments of the member States of the Council of Europe to enter into
dialogue about how to improve the existing national rules on the relationship between the parliamentary
majority and the opposition in a democracy;
13. As regards its own activities, the Assembly resolves to take into account the Checklist in its monitoring
work. It also resolves to play a greater role in promoting the Checklist by:
13.1. inviting its political groups to revise their statutory rules and rules of procedure, including
provisions specifying the procedure and requirements for, and consequences of, switches in political
affiliation as well as the suspension, expulsion or resignation of members;
13.2. encouraging its political groups to enhance discussions on how to improve the relationship
between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy;
13.3. holding debates on how to develop the legal, including the soft law, environment and the best
practices determining the relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a
democracy;
13.4. stepping up interparliamentary co-operation activities addressing the improvement of the
relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition in a democracy;
13.5. continuing to review, in co-operation with the Venice Commission, the Checklist and the issues
raised in it, with a view to developing it further if required.
Resolution 2537 (2024)
2
Resolution 2538 (2024)1
Provisional version
Promoting the revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly refers to its Resolution 2251 (2019) “Updating guidelines to ensure fair
referendums in Council of Europe member States” in which, taking note that the process of revision of the
guidelines had already started, it asked the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice
Commission) to take into account the increasing use of referendums, the rise of digital media and the
changed nature of political campaigning.
2. Through this text, the Assembly wished to provide an input to the work of the Venice Commission,
having taken note that, in recent years, the process and/or the fairness of the outcome in a number of national
referendums had been questioned and that, in other cases, important innovations had been introduced, the
knowledge of which could benefit legislators in all member States.
3. The Venice Commission emphasised the need for referendums to respect the rule of law and, in
particular, to comply with the legal system as a whole, especially with the procedural rules on constitutional
revision. It also warned against the use of referendums to bypass important constitutional safeguards, such as
the requirement for a qualified majority in parliament. As regards the substance of the proposed changes, the
Venice Commission was concerned that most of these referendums were aimed at concentrating powers and
reducing democratic control by parliament. On that basis, the Venice Commission initiated the process of
revision of the Code of Good Practice on Referendums and in June 2022 it adopted the Revised Code of
Good Practice on Referendums (“Revised Code”).
4. The Revised Code responds to the Assembly’s concerns and takes into account developments with
respect to a number of referendums which have been held by Council of Europe member States in recent
years.
5. The Revised Code declares that it “does not intend to determine whether and under which
circumstances recourse to referendums is desirable as such. The answer to this question varies according to
the nature of the constitutional system and tradition. It belongs to national constitutional law to establish
whether referendums are at all foreseen, what their scope is, and what procedure must be followed to hold
them. However, a number of guarantees are necessary to ensure that they genuinely express the wishes of
the electorate and do not go against international standards in the field of human rights, democracy and the
rule of law.”
6. The Revised Code includes the Guidelines on the Holding of Referendums as well as an Explanatory
Memorandum, which refers, when necessary, to the various items of the Guidelines in order to elaborate on
their content and background. The Guidelines contain the Principles of Europe’s electoral heritage, the
conditions for implementing these principles, and specific rules.
7. The present resolution is intended to elaborate on those aspects of the guidelines that are specific to
referendums. Accordingly, it does not comment on the principles and general rules applicable to both
elections and referendums.
1. Assembly debate on 15 April 2024 (9th sitting) (see Doc. 15940, report of Committee on Political Affairs and
Democracy, rapporteur: Ms Isabel Meirelles). Text adopted by the Assembly on 15 April 2024 (9th sitting).
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8. The Revised Code applies to referendums at the different levels of the State structure (national,
regional, local). However, it is mainly focused on national referendums. Its general rules are to be adapted to
the reality of local and regional referendums, in conformity with national constitutional traditions.
9. In light of these considerations, the Assembly:
9.1. welcomes the elaboration of the Revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums and endorses
it as adopted;
9.2. decides to disseminate the Revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums and recommends it
to the parliaments of the Council of Europe member and observer States, as well as to the parliaments
enjoying observer or partner for democracy status with the Assembly;
9.3. invites parliaments and other relevant bodies of Council of Europe member States to promote
the Revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums and to take it into account when revising the
relevant national rules or developing best practices;
9.4. encourages parliaments and other relevant bodies of Council of Europe member States to enter
into dialogue as to how to improve the existing national rules on referendums;
9.5. invites parliaments of Council of Europe member States to update their rules on referendums on
the basis of the Revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums;
9.6. invites parliaments of the Council of Europe member States to develop best practices which
would improve the legal and institutional environment for referendums;
9.7. invites the political groups in the Assembly to promote the Revised Code of Good Practice on
Referendums.
10. As regards its own activities, the Assembly resolves to play a greater role in promoting the Revised
Code of Good Practice on Referendums by:
10.1. encouraging its political groups to enhance discussions on how to improve the legal framework
for referendums;
10.2. holding debates on how to develop the legal, including the soft law, environment and best
practices relating to referendums;
10.3. stepping up interparliamentary co-operation activities addressing the improvement of the legal
framework for referendums;
10.4. creating a Parliamentary Assembly Network of Election Observers, notably to promote the
Revised Code of Good Practice on Referendums and other Council of Europe standards in electoral
matters, in line with the proposal to reinforce electoral activities endorsed by the Assembly in January
2024;
10.5. continuing to review, in co-operation with the Venice Commission, the Revised Code of Good
Practice on Referendums and the issues raised in it, with a view to developing it further if required.
Resolution 2538 (2024)
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Resolution 2539 (2024)1
Provisional version
Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly reiterates its deep concern at the extensive devastation and acute
suffering inflicted upon Ukraine and its people by the Russian Federation with its illegal war of aggression
which started in 2014, and escalated into a large-scale invasion in February 2022, resulting in severe human
and material losses, grave violations of human rights, and numerous war crimes.
2. The Council of Europe has led the way in expressing its solidarity with Ukraine and its people,
condemning the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and excluding the Russian
Federation from its membership because of its serious violation of international law and statutory obligations.
The Council of Europe has also shown leadership in setting up the Register of Damage Caused by the
Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, as a first step towards establishing a comprehensive
system of accountability of the Russian Federation for its wrongful acts. Consistent with its steadfast resolve
and its focus on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, the Council of Europe should play a significant
role in supporting the reconstruction efforts in Ukraine, by recommending the seizure of Russian State assets
and their use in support of the reconstruction of Ukraine. This course of action would pursue a threefold
objective: strengthening Ukraine; ensuring the accountability of the Russian Federation; and deterring against
any other future aggression.
3. The Assembly believes that it is crucial for the international community, working in concert, to address
this challenge and ensure that the victims of the aggression, Ukraine and its citizens, receive the reparations
they are owed, and that there is a path towards justice. As already called for by the Assembly in its Resolution
2516 (2023) “Ensuring a just peace in Ukraine and lasting security in Europe”, this shall involve establishing “a
comprehensive compensation mechanism, including an international commission for the examination of
claims for damages recorded in the Register of Damage, and a compensation fund to pay out on decisions on
compensation for damage awarded by the commission, in particular by confiscating and otherwise using the
Russian Federation’s assets to pay for damage caused by the war in Ukraine”.
4. The documented damages to Ukraine's infrastructure and economy caused by the Russian
Federation's aggression had reached US$416 billion in June 2023. The plight of those who have had to flee
Ukraine because of the war – an estimated 6.2 million people – is particularly concerning, as a humanitarian
emergency in itself and also because it creates a ripple effect across borders, impacting neighbouring
countries and straining resources on a larger scale. In addition, it has been estimated that approximately 17.6
million individuals in Ukraine needed humanitarian assistance in 2023, with 5.1 million people being internally
displaced.
5. The Assembly acknowledges that the non-participation by the Russian Federation in international
dispute settlements hinders the traditional legal channels for securing reparations. It affirms, however, the
obligation of the aggressor State, the Russian Federation, to provide full compensation for the damage, loss,
and injury caused by its internationally wrongful acts, including the destruction of infrastructure, loss of life,
economic hardships, and other adverse effects, in accordance with the principles of international law. In this
1. Assembly debate on 16 April 2024 (10th sitting) (see Doc. 15932, report of the Committee on Political Affairs and
Democracy, rapporteur: Mr Lulzim Basha; and Doc. 15941, opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights,
rapporteur: Mr Davor Ivo Stier). Text adopted by the Assembly on 16 April 2024 (10th sitting).
See also Recommendation 2271 (2024).
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respect, the Assembly recalls the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
the 2005 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, and
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-11/5 of 14 November 2022 “Furtherance of
remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine”, which recognises the need for the establishment of an
international mechanism for reparation.
6. The Assembly notes that several countries holding Russian sovereign assets have frozen
approximately US$300 billion in Russian State assets. The frozen Russian State financial assets must be
made available for the reconstruction of Ukraine. States holding these assets should co-operate and transfer
them to an international compensation mechanism. Under international law, States possess the authority to
enact countermeasures against a State that has seriously breached international law. Now is the time for
Council of Europe member States to move from sanctions to countermeasures. The Assembly further notes
that countermeasures are intended to induce the offending State to cease its unlawful behaviour or to comply
with its obligations arising from that conduct, such as paying compensation for damages caused. The
Assembly emphasises that the legitimacy of the recommended countermeasures remains unassailable within
the framework of sovereign immunity.
7. The Assembly acknowledges the long-standing influence of certain Russian individuals, also referred to
as oligarchs, in both domestic and international politics, shaped by their control over key industries and
substantial assets abroad. This enabled them to influence various stakeholders in the European countries.
Since the beginning of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, a number of enterprises
owned by these individuals have been co-operating with the Russian military-industrial complex. Given this
fact, the European Union, G7 countries and Australia introduced the “Russian Elites, Proxies & Oligarchs
Task Force” (“REPO Task Force”) in March 2022. The Assembly believes that the member States have to
work on a similar mechanism to be able to address this issue.
8. The Assembly recognises the endeavours of the member States in imposing sanctions on Russian
individuals and enterprises who collaborate with the Russian military-industrial complex, particularly those in
heavy industries that facilitate the production of various types of lethal weaponry. The Assembly believes that
the member States should devise mechanisms for monitoring potential violations of the sanction regime,
freezing such assets, and subsequently transferring them to the international fund for the reconstruction of
Ukraine, all while upholding the principles of international law and respecting private property rights.
9. The Assembly believes that creating, under the auspices of the Council of Europe, an international
compensation fund as well as a compensation mechanism, as a separate international instrument mandated
to examine and adjudicate claims and/or pay compensation for damage, loss or injury caused by the Russian
Federation’s internationally wrongful acts in or against Ukraine, would provide a structured way to assess and
compensate for the damages suffered by various stakeholders because of Russian Federation’s illegal
invasion of Ukraine. This compensation mechanism should cover a range of losses, including but not limited
to infrastructure damage, environmental impacts, economic losses incurred by companies and investors, and
the costs associated with hosting and supporting those who have been displaced by the aggression, in
Ukraine and outside.
10. The Assembly acknowledges that Russian politicians, propagandists, oligarchs and other war
collaborators have amassed significant wealth through their close ties to Vladimir Putin’s regime, and have
been trying to influence the internal politics of the European countries, which makes them accomplices in the
Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine. To ensure the personal liability of a particular individual,
measures such as freezing and confiscating the assets and their allocation to the reconstruction of Ukraine
should be applied. Bearing in mind that certain countries have already introduced new legislation or amended
the existing one, and in adherence to principles of private property and international law, the member States
are encouraged to develop legislation and legal mechanisms to confiscate these assets.
11. As the already established Register of Damage undertakes the laborious process of recording
Ukrainian losses in preparation for an international claims process, countries that have frozen Russian assets
should transfer those assets to an international compensation fund. An international commission for the
examination of claims for the damages recorded in the register should be created to effectively address the
claims process.
12. In light of these considerations, the Assembly:
12.1. calls on Council of Europe member States and eligible non-member States to join the Register
of Damage if they have not yet done so;
Resolution 2539 (2024)
2
12.2. calls for the establishment of an international compensation mechanism under the auspices of
the Council of Europe to comprehensively address the damages incurred by natural and legal persons
affected, including the State of Ukraine, due to the unlawful actions of the Russian Federation with its
invasion of Ukraine;
12.3. urges Council of Europe member and non-member States holding Russian State assets to
actively co-operate in the prompt transfer of these assets to the established international compensation
mechanism, supports the efforts of the European Union and the United States and calls upon them and
the G7 to act without delay in taking all necessary steps to ensure that all Russian Federation assets in
their custody are made available for the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine;
12.4. urges that the reconstruction of Ukraine is needed right away without waiting for the end of the
aggression, therefore calling for the creation of an international trust fund with a clear deadline for the
implementation of this mechanism, where all Russian State assets held by Council of Europe member
and non-member States will be deposited, ensuring transparency, accountability, and equity in the
disbursement of funds that should be used for compensation to Ukraine and natural and legal persons
affected by the Russian aggression in Ukraine;
12.5. calls for the establishment of an impartial and effective international claims commission,
operating under recognised judicial norms, to adjudicate claims presented by Ukraine, affected entities,
as well as natural and legal persons seeking reparation for damages caused by the Russian
Federation's aggression;
12.6. stresses the utmost importance of adhering to established international legal standards and
principles in the transfer and management of frozen Russian assets, ensuring fairness and
proportionality, and safeguarding the rights of all affected parties as guaranteed by the European
Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and/or other international human rights law instruments;
12.7. supports the recourse to countermeasures, as outlined within the framework of international law,
to induce compliance by the Russian Federation with its international legal obligations and
responsibilities;
12.8. invites States concerned about breaches of erga omnes obligations to actively participate in the
compensation mechanism, contributing to efforts aimed at halting breaches and ensuring just
reparations for affected natural and legal persons, as well as the State of Ukraine;
12.9. encourages collaborative efforts among member States, international organisations, and all
relevant stakeholders to expedite the process of reconstruction and to ensure comprehensive
compensation for the multifaceted damages caused by the war of aggression of the Russian
Federation, including by considering other complementary or alternative proposals such as the
confiscation of private assets following a criminal conviction for sanctions violations, introducing windfall
taxes on the interest or profits derived from frozen Russian State assets, or using these assets as
collateral for loans to Ukraine;
12.10. calls on member States, international organisations and all relevant stakeholders to continue
working on expanding the list of the sanctioned individuals and companies who are directly or indirectly
affiliated with the Russian defence industry, particularly in metallurgical and other types of heavy
industry, and those who are contributing to the development of Russian military-industrial complex;
12.11. calls for a unified and resolute front against aggression, emphasising the shared responsibility of
the international community in upholding global norms, preventing violations of international law, and
promoting lasting peace and stability.
Resolution 2539 (2024)
3
Resolution 2540 (2024)1
Provisional version
Alexei Navalny's death and the need to counter Vladimir Putin's
totalitarian regime and its war on democracy
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly pays tribute to the courage and sacrifice of Alexei Navalny, a leading
Russian opposition politician, civil society activist, anti-corruption campaigner and political prisoner
persecuted, and ultimately killed, by the Russian State for his opposition to Vladimir Putin’s regime. The
Assembly expresses its heartfelt condolences to the family, associates and supporters of Mr Navalny.
2. Vladimir Putin has been in power in the Russian Federation as President or Prime Minister without
interruption since 2000, and the amendments to the Russian Constitution adopted in July 2020 and
recognised as illegitimate by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)
and the Assembly allow him to remain in office until 2036. Since coming to power, Vladimir Putin has been
constructing a regime whose aim is to wage a war against democracy and redraw the European and global
order established after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Occupation of Transnistria, invasion of
Georgia in 2008, the war in Ukraine since 2014, the illegal annexation and occupation of territories, the
destruction of freedom of expression inside the Russian Federation, the disinformation war around the world,
the persecution and assassination of its political opponents inside and outside the Russian Federation and the
creation of a system of legislation that criminalises political views are just a few but not all of the features of
Vladimir Putin’s regime. The unlawful imprisonment and, as a result, the death of Alexei Navalny is a
continuation of the policy of Vladimir Putin's regime and its war against democracy.
3. On 16 February 2024, Mr Navalny died in a remote Siberian maximum security prison camp, FKU IK-3,
where he was serving a manifestly arbitrary prison sentence. The official cause of his death was “sudden
death syndrome”. Mr Navalny’s family was prevented from gaining rapid and timely access to his body or
having an independent autopsy carried out. Allegations emerged that Mr Navalny had been ill-treated by
prison staff the day before his death. Three days after Mr Navalny’s death, the deputy director of the Russian
prison service, Valery Boyarinev, was promoted to the rank of colonel general. Several days later, Roman
Vidyukov, the chief investigator in cases against Mr Navalny and his Anti-Corruption Foundation, was
promoted to deputy head of the State Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation. On 18 March 2022,
Vladimir Putin claimed that he had agreed to swap the opposition leader in a prisoner exchange days before
he died – a claim that Mr Navalny’s family strongly rejects.
4. During the three years of his unlawful imprisonment, imposed in blatant disregard of the Russian
Federation’s obligations under Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 18, 34 and 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ETS No. 5), under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and under the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Mr Navalny was subjected to
systemic torture and other forms of ill-treatment, such as the denial of sleep, repeated placement in isolation
cell in inhuman and degrading conditions, and lack of access to proper medical care.
1. Assembly debate on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting) (see Doc. 15966, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, rapporteur: Mr Emanuelis Zingeris). Text adopted by the Assembly on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
5. The Assembly considers that the Russian State bears full responsibility for the killing of Alexei Navalny,
who was subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of the judgments and interim
measures of the European Court of Human Rights, and who had moreover survived an assassination attempt
with a chemical weapon, perpetrated in 2020 by a squad of FSB (the Russian Federation’s Federal Security
Service) assassins.
6. Mr Navalny has become the latest critic of Vladimir Putin to die at the hands of, or with at the least the
tacit approval of, the Russian apparatus of oppression. For the past two decades, individuals who have
opposed Vladimir Putin’s iron grip on the Russian Federation have been killed, usually with the involvement of
the Russian secret services or persons acting at their behest. The list of the regime’s victims includes, among
others, journalists Anna Politkovskaya, Natalia Estemirova, Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova;
Sergei Magnitsky – a lawyer murdered for exposing large scale corruption among the highest echelons of the
Russian Government; Alexander Litvinenko – a former FSB officer who defected to the United Kingdom; and
Boris Nemtsov – a deputy Prime Minister who challenged Vladimir Putin’s rule and whose circumstances of
death remain unclear, as noted by the Assembly in its Resolution 2297 (2019). Hundreds more innocent
human rights defenders and opposition figures remain imprisoned on trumped-up charges and can be
considered political prisoners as defined by Resolution 1900 (2012), including Vladimir Kara-Murza, Ilya
Yashin and Oleg Orlov. An independent journalist who covered the trial of Mr Navalny and recorded his final
court appearance on 15 February 2024, Antonina Favorskaya, was arbitrarily detained on charges of
“extremism” and faces a lengthy prison sentence. The human rights organisation OVD-Info reports that there
are now over 1 000 political prisoners in the Russian Federation.
7. The Assembly deplores that acts of torture such as those to which Mr Navalny was exposed are
systemically applied against political prisoners in the Russian Federation, Ukrainian political prisoners illegally
detained in Russian prisons since 2014 and Ukrainian prisoners of war, as stated in its Resolution 2528
(2024). According to the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, the majority of
Ukrainians in Russian captivity have been subjected to torture, rape, threats of sexual violence, deprivation of
food and sleep and other forms of ill-treatment.
8. The Assembly recalls that the obligation to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent acts of torture, as enshrined in Article 2(1) of the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, is unconditional and that no exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
9. Some of the persons directly responsible for and participating in the persecution and torture of Alexei
Navalny are well known. A detailed list can be found via this link: “Navalny list”. It includes prison staff, police
officers, prosecutors and judges involved in their respective roles in the gross abuse of the Russian justice
system for the purpose of punishing Mr Navalny for his political activism and creating a chilling effect within
Russian society.
10. On 13 October 2023 and in the following days, an open attack on Alexei Navalny's lawyers began:
Alexei Lipster, Vadim Kobzev and Igor Sergunin were detained on remand in Moscow. Olga Mikhailova
(senior lawyer of Alexei Navalny) and Alexander Fedulov, who were abroad at the time, were subject to an
arrest warrant. Criminal cases on trumped-up charges have been initiated against them and some of their
offices were searched, in manifest breach of legal professional privilege, establishing an even more hostile
environment for providing an effective legal defence in the Russian Federation.
11. The persons on this list should be included in the sanctions lists naming individuals, which are or may
be established under existing and future Magnitsky-type sanctions laws.
12. Under Vladimir Putin’s rule, the Russian Federation has become a de facto dictatorship. Not only has it
stifled democratic opposition inside the Russian Federation: it has also failed to respect the democratic
choices of neighbouring States and their political independence. By invading Georgia in 2008, unlawfully
annexing the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the City of Sevastopol, and violently occupying parts of the
Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in 2014, interfering in foreign electoral processes and, finally, by launching its
full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 and threatening those assisting Ukraine’s self-
defence with nuclear war, the regime of Vladimir Putin has fully committed to war on democracy. By doing so,
it seeks to re-establish the former Soviet sphere of influence and take revenge on States which rejected its
totalitarianism in favour of democracy and human rights.
13. Vladimir Putin’s regime has committed to the neo-imperialistic ideology of Russkiy Mir (the “Russian
world”), which the Kremlin has turned into a tool for promoting war. This ideology is being used to destroy the
remnants of democracy, to militarise Russian society and to justify external aggression to expand the Russian
Resolution 2540 (2024)
2
Federation’s borders to include all territories once under Russian domination, including Ukraine. The hierarchy
of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, including Patriarch Kirill, has been championing
the Russkiy Mir ideology, declaring the war against Ukraine and the “satanic” West as a “holy war of all
Russians”, urging Orthodox believers to sacrifice themselves for their country. The Assembly is appalled by
such an abuse of religion and the distortion of the Christian Orthodox tradition by Vladimir Putin's regime and
its proxies in the Moscow Patriarchate hierarchy. The Assembly condemns such rhetoric and emphasises that
incitement to commit the crime of aggression, genocide and war crimes is a crime in itself. The Assembly calls
on all States to treat Patriarch Kirill and the Russian Orthodox hierarchy as an ideological extension of
Vladimir Putin’s regime complicit in war crimes and crimes against humanity conducted in the name of the
Russian Federation and the Russkiy Mir ideology.
14. On 17 March 2024, Vladimir Putin was declared the winner of the so-called presidential election, which
from the outset was not free and fair, with no genuine opponent to Vladimir Putin even being permitted to run.
Moreover, polling stations for this election were opened in sovereign Ukrainian territory temporarily occupied
by the Russian Federation and in the Moldovan Administrative-Territorial Units of the Left Bank of the
Dniester, in gross violation of the United Nations Charter and the principle of sovereignty, political
independence and territorial integrity of all States.
15. In line with its Resolution 2519 (2023), the Assembly does not recognise the legitimacy of Vladimir
Putin as the President of the Russian Federation and reiterates its call on Council of Europe member and
observer States and the European Union to cease all contact with him, except for humanitarian purposes and
in the pursuit of peace. The Assembly recalls that the abolition of presidential term limits for the benefit of
Vladimir Putin violates not only the Russian Constitution but also well-established international legal
principles.
16. The Assembly considers that the Russian Federation has gradually transformed into a State which
today bars the existence of any political opposition. By means of fascist-style propaganda, it has introduced a
cult of personality around the figure of Vladimir Putin. Through the abuse of the criminal justice system, the
regime has suppressed any political and media pluralism; civil society can no longer exist except
underground; and the regime is enforcing mass conformity, including through the indoctrination of children. It
presents to its people a dangerous vision of a Russia which rallies around imperialistic conquest, going as far
as to threaten its perceived enemies with nuclear annihilation. All these phenomena, combined with an
omnipresent security apparatus, mass surveillance of society and brutal repression against peaceful protests,
have turned the Russian Federation into what the Assembly considers a totalitarian State, whose modus
operandi resembles that of a criminal organisation.
17. As the Russian Federation is a federation only formally, the regime of Vladimir Putin has also declared
war on its own people. In particular, indigenous peoples, national and ethnic minorities in the Russian
Federation are forcibly russified and subjected to repression and discrimination, in violation of the Russian
Federation’s obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. In particular, the Assembly notes the disproportionately high losses suffered by military units
composed of soldiers conscripted from national, ethnic and indigenous populations. The Assembly considers
this to be a deliberate campaign, aimed at eliminating national and ethnic diversity within the Russian
Federation.
18. The Assembly strongly condemns the Russia Federation’s practice of including political opponents of
the regime on lists of terrorists and extremists: opposition politicians, cultural figures, journalists and civil
activists, leading to further misuse of the Interpol system. Vladimir Putin's order to the Russian FSB to take
decisive measures against the “enemies of the country” both inside and outside of it is also of great concern.
In practice, this could lead to a wave of politically motivated assassinations and murders on the territory of
Council of Europe member States.
19. Urgent and co-ordinated measures are the only means to counter Vladimir Putin’s totalitarian regime
and its war on democracy. Ukraine must immediately receive the weapons and ammunition that it needs to
effectively defend itself and to succeed in repelling the Russian invaders.
20. The Assembly further considers that sanctions against the Russian Federation must be reinforced to
hinder its economy from continuing to finance its illegal war of aggression. The Assembly welcomes the
proposal by Ms Yuliya Navalnaya to apply the tools developed for fighting organised crime against the
enablers of Vladimir Putin’s criminal regime, namely to conduct investigations into their financial machinations,
search for their associates, lawyers and financiers in Council of Europe member States and beyond, in order
to prevent the regime from hiding behind corporate veils and a network of shell companies.
Resolution 2540 (2024)
3
21. The Assembly deplores the fact that despite the imposition of an unprecedented sanctions regime,
some of the Russian Federation’s trading partners continue to enable it to gain access to western
technologies and capital, allowing it to manufacture cruise missiles and drones that are used indiscriminately
to attack Ukrainian cities, residential areas, hospitals and critical infrastructures. By way of example, the
Assembly is concerned about the sharp increase in the import of microchips by Kazakhstan accompanied by
a similar rise of exports of microchips from Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation. It is equally alarmed by the
large quantities of crude oil being exported from the Russian Federation to India and then sold onwards to the
West.
22. The Assembly further condemns States that continue to support the Russian disinformation campaign,
in particular by justifying its manifestly unlawful war of aggression on Ukraine, spread at various international
fora, including the United Nations General Assembly and Human Rights Council, in particular Belarus, Iran,
Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, as well as others, thus undermining democracy worldwide.
23. At the same time, the Assembly welcomes reports that banks in Armenia, Kazakhstan and Hong Kong
have begun refusing payments from Russian companies for electronics delivered to the Russian Federation. It
encourages all States and financial institutions to closely monitor all transactions with Russian entities to
ensure the effectiveness of the sanctioning mechanism.
24. The Assembly welcomes the approval on 12 March 2024 of a new European Union Directive to
strengthen the enforcement of European Union sanctions across member States by criminalising the violation
and circumvention of sanctions. It also welcomes the recent inclusion of dozens of individuals involved in the
persecution of Alexei Navalny in the list of human rights violators sanctioned under the European Union
human rights sanctions regime, proposed now to be renamed after Alexei Navalny.
25. The Assembly considers that further restrictions are necessary to prevent the Russian economy from
sustaining the war against Ukraine. In particular, the Assembly notes that the Russian crude oil price cap
sanctions have had limited effect. Lack of sufficient control and deterrence mechanisms has permitted the
Russian Federation to mitigate the effects of the sanctions, in particular by using a fleet of “shadow” tankers
and because the price cap on Russian crude oil is still set at a too high a level.
26. The Assembly therefore:
26.1. urges the Russian Federation to:
26.1.1. allow an independent and transparent international investigation into Alexei Navalny’s
death, including through an international commission of inquiry, which could be established by
United Nations bodies or other international organisations;
26.1.2. cease persecuting family members, associates and supporters of Alexei Navalny in the
Russian Federation and abroad;
26.1.3. release all prisoners currently detained in the Russian Federation for the purpose of
silencing them and deterring other critics of the regime from protesting or speaking out;
26.2. calls on the European Union and all States having Magnitsky-type targeted sanctions laws to
include in their sanctions lists the persons directly responsible for, and participating in, the persecution,
ill-treatment and death of Alexei Navalny and invites all States that have not yet adopted such laws to
do so without further delay;
26.3. calls on all States to ensure that the Russian Federation is held accountable for its systemic use
of torture and other forms of ill-treatment to which Mr Navalny and thousands of other prisoners in the
Russian Federation, including Ukrainian prisoners of war, have been subjected, by having recourse to
the dispute settlement mechanism stipulated in Article 30 (1) of the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
26.4. calls on all States to put pressure on the Russian Federation to allow independent international
bodies to monitor the reported political prisoners' state of health and conditions of detention, pending
their release or re-examination of their cases;
26.5. encourages member and observer States of the Council of Europe to pursue prisoner
exchanges in order to obtain the release of political prisoners in the Russian Federation and Belarus,
prioritising Vladimir Kara-Murza and others who have serious health conditions (noting in particular the
potential role of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America);
Resolution 2540 (2024)
4
26.6. reiterates its call to set up an international mechanism to compensate the victims of the Russian
aggression against Ukraine, to which frozen Russian assets should be promptly transferred, and to set
up a special international tribunal to investigate and prosecute the political and military leadership of the
Russian Federation for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.
26.7. calls on the European Union and the G7 group to further strengthen the sanctions regime
against the Russian Federation, a State sponsor of terrorism, in particular by:
26.7.1. significantly strengthening the sanctions regime by lowering the oil and gas price cap,
considering that the revenue from oil and gas exports is still a significant source of income for
the Russian State budget;
26.7.2. imposing secondary sanctions on States, natural and legal persons that knowingly
enable the Russian Federation to evade the full effects of sanctions imposed on its economy,
including by exporting technology, munitions, dual-use goods for military use, and other
resources used by the Russian Federation to sustain its illegal war of aggression against
Ukraine;
26.7.3. setting up a Register of States, natural and legal persons aiding and abetting the
Russian Federation in evading sanctions, including by enabling it to obtain dual-use goods for
military use;
26.7.4. enforcing the existing mandatory “oil spill insurance” requirements for all tankers
passing through their waters to promote compliance with the price cap sanctions and protect the
environment from oil spills by ageing and insufficiently insured tankers;
26.7.5. cutting off any services provided to the Russian oil and gas industry in order to restrict
its future liquefied natural gas production and increase the costs of oil extraction in the Russian
Federation;
26.7.6. imposing sanctions on the Moscow Exchange as well as Rosatom – a State-owned
nuclear energy monopoly that has taken control of Europe’s largest nuclear plant in Ukraine’s
Zaporizhzhia region, using this as a tool of blackmail against Europe by raising the threat of
nuclear disaster;
26.7.7. emphasising that under international humanitarian law, the Russian oil refineries could
be considered legitimate targets of military attacks;
26.8. calls on the United States of America – a Council of Europe observer State – to ensure that the
Senate’s foreign aid bill, which includes military aid for Ukraine, is put to a vote without further delay or
otherwise to authorise the delivery of the necessary military and other aid for Ukraine as soon as
possible;
26.9. encourages the Council of Europe member and observer States to share amongst themselves
all intelligence pertaining to the Russian Federation’s interference in electoral processes, including its
disinformation campaigns, in order to identify and prevent further such practices;
26.10. calls on the Council of Europe member and observer States and the European Union to
strengthen the effects of Resolution 2519 (2023) by formally recognising Vladimir Putin’s illegitimacy as
President of the Russian Federation;
26.11. calls on the Council of Europe member States who are not members of the European Union to
align themselves with sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation and its allies under the European
Union human rights sanctions regime;
26.12. calls on the Council of Europe member and observer States, the European Union and the United
Nations to draw attention to the numerous violations of human rights and the rights of peoples to the
detriment of the colonised indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation;
26.13. calls on all States to apply to Vladimir Putin’s regime the existing anti-money laundering
legislation aimed at combating organised crime and the financing of terrorism, to identify any private or
legal persons that can be classified as enablers and impose harsh penalties thereon, including the
confiscation of assets; and in particular to adopt, where lacking, and apply legislation permitting non-
conviction based confiscation of illegal assets, with a reversal of the burden of proof, as recommended
by the Assembly in Resolution 2218 (2018);
Resolution 2540 (2024)
5
26.14. encourages the Council of Europe member and observer States and the European Union to
recognise that the Russian Orthodox Church is in fact being used as an instrument of Russian influence
and propaganda by the Kremlin regime and has nothing to do with the freedom of religion and the
freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights;
26.15. calls on the Council of Europe member and observer States and the European Union to
strengthen the sanctioning mechanism against Aleksandr Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus, which has
allowed the Russian Federation to use its territory for the offensive against Kyiv in 2022 and which
continues to support the war of aggression against Ukraine.
27. The Assembly expresses its solidarity and commitment to pursue dialogue with Russian and Belarusian
democratic forces which share the values of the Council of Europe and recognise the rules-based
international order, including the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In this regard,
the Assembly recalls its decision – set out in its Resolution 2530 (2023) “A democratic future for Belarus” – to
set up a General Rapporteur for a Democratic Belarus and to allow a representative delegation of Belarusian
democratic forces to take an active role in some of its work.
28. The Assembly states, to reinforce European Parliament Resolution of 29 February 2024 on the murder
of Alexei Navalny and the need for EU action in support of political prisoners and oppressed civil society in
Russia (2024/2579(RSP)), that decolonisation of the Russian Federation is a necessary condition for the
establishment of democracy in the Russian Federation.
29. Likewise, the Assembly welcomes the initiative, taken by the President of the Assembly and endorsed
by the Bureau of the Assembly in October 2023 to set up a Contact platform for dialogue with Russian
democratic forces and calls for setting up a General Rapporteur on the Russian democratic forces.
Resolution 2540 (2024)
6
Resolution 2541 (2024)1
Provisional version
The arbitrary detention of Vladimir Kara-Murza and the
systematic persecution of anti-war protesters in the Russian
Federation and Belarus
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly is appalled by the arbitrary detention of Vladimir Kara-Murza and the
systematic persecution of anti-war protesters in the Russian Federation and Belarus.
2. In regard to the Russian Federation, the Assembly recalls that judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights concerning events prior to February 2022 already demonstrated a severe repression of the
freedoms of speech, assembly, and association, and the right to liberty.
3. Beginning in March 2022, the Russian Federation rapidly adopted a series of draconian amendments to
the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences, to silence criticism of its illegal, brutal, full-scale
war of aggression against Ukraine. These legislative amendments are not consistent with international human
rights standards and have effectively criminalised all forms of dissent against the war and against the actions
of the Russian military. These actions form a part of Vladimir Putin’s systemic war on democracy.
4. One of the first victims of this repression was historian, politician, and winner of the 2022 Václav Havel
Human Rights Prize, Vladimir Kara-Murza. Mr Kara-Murza was arrested and detained on 12 April 2022. He
was subsequently charged with spreading “deliberate false information” about the actions of the Russian
military in Ukraine, “organising the activities of an undesirable organisation”, and high treason. On 17 April
2023 Mr Kara-Murza was sentenced to 25 years in prison.
5. Mr Kara-Murza barely survived two previous poisoning attacks linked to the Russian authorities which
have had lasting negative effects on his health. As a result of his pre-trial detention, Mr Kara-Murza’s
polyneuropathy, caused by these poisoning attacks, has deteriorated significantly. For the last six months,
Mr Kara-Murza has been held in complete isolation of solitary confinement in a cell, first in a strict-regime
prison colony and then in a Siberian “special-regime” prison colony, the harshest grade in the Russian
Federation’s penitentiary system. Since September 2023 he has not been receiving medical treatment and his
polyneuropathy is slowly deteriorating.
6. There have been countless other examples of politically motivated prosecutions in the Russian
Federation against individuals who speak out against the war. The most minor acts of peaceful speech or
protest can now incur hefty fines, detention, and lengthy prison sentences. There has been a significant rise in
the number of political prisoners, as defined by Resolution 1900 (2012). In Resolution 2446 (2022) the
Assembly stated that there were 478 political prisoners in the Russian Federation. The human rights
organisation OVD-Info reports that there are now over 1 000. The organisation reports that almost 20 000
people have been detained for their anti-war stance in the Russian Federation and the occupied territory of
Crimea since February 2022.
1. Assembly debate on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting) (see Doc. 15967, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, rapporteur: Ms Thórhildur Sunna Ævarsdóttir). Text adopted by the Assembly on 17 April 2024
(11th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
7. Meanwhile, the Assembly notes that the anti-war movement in the Russian Federation has not been
eradicated. Instead, it has gone underground. Russians who oppose the war have adapted their activities to
the current situation, so that they can continue some forms of anti-war dissent, without exposing themselves
to immediate arrest and indefinite imprisonment.
8. The Assembly reiterates that the persecution of individuals with an anti-war stance gives rise to multiple
violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5), to which the Russian Federation was
still bound until 16 September 2022, and to breaches of other international human rights treaties to which the
Russian Federation is party, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
9. There has similarly been a widespread repression of anti-war protesters in Belarus. Credible reports
suggest that, against a backdrop of generalised political repression in the country, more than 1 600 people
have been detained for their anti-war stance. Most of these detentions occurred in the immediate aftermath of
the full-scale invasion, when anti-war protests were brutally dispersed. Subsequently, even the smallest
expressions of sentiments against the war have been met with prosecution, often through the application of
legislation on “extremism”, the terms of which violate international human rights standards.
10. Many Belarusians have taken a stand through actions such as disseminating information about military
movements or infrastructure, damaging railway tracks to prevent movement of military equipment and
personnel, or sabotaging military installations. These actions have been met with a manifestly
disproportionate reaction, through prosecutions under terrorism charges.
11. The Assembly is shocked by the numerous credible reports of torture being inflicted upon individuals
with an anti-war stance in Belarus, alongside other repressive measures such as months in punishment cells
(without any blankets, clothes, books, or amenities), refusals of access to medicine, and other forms of ill-
treatment. The use of incommunicado detention, whereby political prisoners are completely cut off from the
outside world, has become particularly common. This is an incredibly cruel and inhumane practice, punishing
not only the prisoner but their loved ones too.
12. The Assembly draws a distinction between on the one hand the Governments of the Russian
Federation and Belarus and on the other, the people of these two countries. In this respect, it expresses its
solidarity with the many Russians and Belarusians who speak out against the war of aggression, recognising
that they do so in a context of severe repression and that they risk serious personal consequences.
13. The Assembly therefore calls on the Russian Federation and Belarus to:
13.1. cease the threats, intimidation and prosecution of individuals who have been targeted due to
their anti-war stance, and ensure the immediate release of those who are in detention;
13.2. pending their release, ensure that the conditions of detention of all such prisoners are compliant
with international human rights law (including access to adequate medical care, and contact with their
lawyers, families and others);
13.3. ensure that prisoners are not subjected to torture or ill-treatment, that any such allegations are
investigated promptly and effectively and that perpetrators are prosecuted;
13.4. reverse the measures taken against media and civil society organisations which have been
subjected to closure, liquidation, website blocking, or registration as “foreign agents” or “undesirable
organisations” as a result of perceived anti-war activities;
13.5. repeal the laws enacted with the purpose of repressing anti-war sentiment;
13.6. implement relevant recommendations and decisions issued by international organisations of
which they are member States, such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, and human rights treaty bodies which are competent to deal with individual
communications against them.
14. Furthermore, the Assembly calls on the Russian Federation to:
14.1. adopt without delay effective general measures to address the structural and systemic problems
identified by the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe with regard to freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the
right to liberty in the Russian Federation, including by repealing or amending relevant legislation, such
as the laws on “foreign agents”, “undesirable organisations” and those designed to censor discussion
about the war in Ukraine;
Resolution 2541 (2024)
2
14.2. in accordance with the decision of the Committee of Ministers in the Navalnyy and Ofitserov
group at its 1492nd DH meeting held in March 2024, ensure the release of all prisoners currently
detained in the Russian Federation in abuse of power and for the purpose of silencing them and
deterring other critics of the regime from protesting or speaking out;
14.3. co-operate with the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), as long as the Russian Federation remains a Party to the
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (ETS No. 126), thereby allowing for the monitoring of the reported political prisoners’ state
of health, conditions of detention pending their release and allegations of torture and ill-treatment.
15. The Assembly further recalls that the Russian Federation refuses to pay just satisfaction awarded by
the European Court of Human Rights for both individual and interstate cases. The Assembly resolves to
explore other possible avenues to secure the payment of such awards, calling on member and observer
States, as well as the European Union, to do the same.
16. Noting the need to provide the Russian and Belarusian anti-war movements with greater recognition
and support, the Assembly calls on member and observer States of the Council of Europe to:
16.1. publicly highlight the continuation and ongoing work of the Russian and Belarusian anti-war
movements;
16.2. implement programmes of international solidarity with the Russian and Belarusian anti-war
movements, including by organising events, promoting media coverage, academic research,
conferences and roundtables, and supporting artistic endeavours;
16.3. explore further steps to provide information to the Russian population by cutting through the
Kremlin’s information blockade, including by providing:
16.3.1. a welcoming environment for independent Russian news outlets, including their
registration as legal entities and the facilitation of their ongoing work;
16.3.2. any necessary financial support to independent Russian news outlets;
16.3.3. facilitation of the entry and stay of independent Russian journalists and social media
influencers;
16.3.4. financial and other support to Russian anti-war social media influencers;
16.3.5. free and stable VPNs (Virtual private networks) for the Russian population;
16.4. support Russian and Belarusian civil society organisations located abroad in their efforts to
legally and financially support anti-war protesters within the Russian Federation and Belarus;
16.5. prevent businesses from refusing to supply goods and services to independent Russian and
Belarusian civil society organisations supporting anti-war causes or the defence of human rights, by
enforcing relevant national laws and regulations and/or strengthening them as necessary;
16.6. prevent the application of international sanctions to independent Russian and Belarusian civil
society organisations supporting anti-war causes or the defence of human rights, including financial and
banking sanctions.
17. Alarmed by the dire conditions of imprisonment of Vladimir Kara-Murza and other individuals detained
for their anti-war stance, the Assembly calls on:
17.1. member and observer States of the Council of Europe to deploy diplomatic efforts to secure the
release of political prisoners in the Russian Federation and Belarus who have opposed the war of
aggression against Ukraine, prioritising Vladimir Kara-Murza and others who have serious health
conditions;
17.2. member and observer States of the Council of Europe to pursue prisoner exchanges in order to
obtain the release of political prisoners in the Russian Federation and Belarus who have opposed the
war of aggression against Ukraine, prioritising Vladimir Kara-Murza and others who have serious health
conditions (noting in particular the potential role of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United
States of America);
17.3. the United States of America to recognise Mr Kara-Murza as a “wrongfully detained person”
under the Levinson Act, with a view to intensifying the activities of the Government of the United States
to secure Mr Kara-Murza’s release.
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18. The Assembly calls on member and observer States of the Council of Europe to intensify their efforts to
hold the Russian Federation and Belarus to account at the United Nations, including by:
18.1. promoting the adoption of a resolution of the Human Rights Council and releasing a joint
statement, calling for the release of anti-war protesters in the Russian Federation and Belarus, an end
to the political persecution of anti-war protesters in the Russian Federation and Belarus, and
condemning the failure of the Russian Federation and Belarus to implement rulings of international
bodies relating to the repression of anti-war protesters, including judgments and decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights (in respect of the Russian Federation), the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, and the United Nations treaty bodies;
18.2. calling for a country visit to the Russian Federation and Belarus of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Special
Rapporteurs on human rights in the Russian Federation and Belarus, and other relevant bodies, to visit
prisons and meet with anti-war protesters subject to political persecution, prioritising those with serious
health conditions, including Vladimir Kara-Murza.
19. Noting the highly precarious situation of Russians and Belarusians with an anti-war stance who are
trying to flee their oppressive regimes, and recalling Resolution 2446 (2022) and Resolution 2499 (2023), the
Assembly calls on member and observer States of the Council of Europe to:
19.1. support persons fleeing the Russian Federation and Belarus by facilitating their legal entry and
stay, freedom of movement, safety and security, access to education, culture, financial services and
pursuit of economic activities. This should include appropriate measures relating to emergency entry,
emergency passports, visas, temporary and long-term residence permits, socio-economic assistance,
and (when appropriate) refugee status;
19.2. examine the creation of separate international frameworks or networks for those fleeing the
Russian Federation and Belarus, to deal with the issues of entry and stay of persons;
19.3. refuse extradition requests for Belarusian and Russian nationals, which could be considered to
be politically motivated;
19.4. refrain from deporting back to their home countries Russian and Belarusian nationals who have
demonstrated an anti-war stance concerning the aggression against Ukraine and who would thus be at
genuine risk of political persecution or conscription to the Russian military;
19.5. take measures to address the refusal of the Belarusian authorities to issue passports in their
consulates abroad (as well as prepare for the possibility of the Russian Federation doing so), through
the recognition of de facto statelessness, and the issuing of travel documents to allow Belarusian (and if
necessary, Russian) individuals at risk of political persecution or conscription to remain in European
States after the expiration of their passports;
19.6. take measures to protect Russians and Belarusians who have fled their States from
transnational repression carried out by their governments, as highlighted in Resolution 2509 (2023).
20. The Assembly further calls on member and observer States of the Council of Europe to introduce
restrictive measures (in particular, sanctions under their “Magnitsky laws”) against individuals involved in the
political persecution of Russians and Belarusians because of their anti-war stance.
21. Noting the harm caused to Russian and Belarusian independent civil society by the application of
domestic and international sanctions, the Assembly calls on private businesses:
21.1. to continue to provide goods and services to independent Russian and Belarusian civil society
organisations that support anti-war causes or the defence of human rights;
21.2. to refuse to comply with the orders of the Russian and Belarusian Governments to block
websites, social media accounts or other online resources of independent Russian and Belarusian civil
society organisations that support anti-war causes or the defence of human rights.
22. The Assembly invites the European Court of Human Rights to continue examining pending and future
cases against the Russian Federation in respect of alleged violations of the Convention committed until
16 September 2022, in particular and as a matter of priority those brought by applicants who have been
persecuted for their anti-war stance.
23. The Assembly reiterates its call on Interpol to be particularly vigilant when dealing with requests for Red
Notices from the Russian National Central Bureau that may be politically motivated, taking into account
Resolution 2315 (2019) “Interpol reform and extradition proceedings: building trust by fighting abuse”.
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24. The Assembly finally resolves to continue to exchange views with the Russian and Belarusian political
anti-war movement and other opposition forces through its platforms for dialogue with the Russian and
Belarusian democratic forces.
Resolution 2541 (2024)
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Resolution 2542 (2024)1
Provisional version
Sanctions against persons on the "Kara-Murza list"
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly pays tribute to Russian political prisoner Vladimir Kara-Murza, an
opposition politician, journalist, documentary filmmaker, historian and writer.
2. In April 2023, Mr Kara-Murza was sentenced to 25 years in prison for criticising the Russian war of
aggression against Ukraine. He is subjected to particularly harsh prison conditions, which are putting his life
and health at serious risk, particularly given the long-term effects of two earlier poisonings that came close to
killing him.
3. Vladimir Kara-Murza was handed down a particularly long prison sentence, compared to those meted
out to other critics of the Russian war of aggression, most of whom have been sentenced to 5 to 10 years in
prison. Mr Kara-Murza’s supporters consider the particularly harsh sentence as retaliation for his long-
standing vocal support for “Magnitsky laws” on targeted sanctions against human rights violators.
4. “Magnitsky laws” such as those adopted by the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, numerous
central and eastern European countries and not least by the European Union allow for imposing targeted
sanctions against perpetrators of serious human rights violations who enjoy impunity in their own country,
including police and State security officials. Vladimir Putin has made the elimination of “Magnitsky sanctions”
against his supporters one of his foreign policy priorities.
5. The persons directly responsible for and participating in the persecution and ill-treatment of Vladimir
Kara-Murza are well known. A detailed list can be found via this link “Kara-Murza list”. It includes prison staff,
police officers, prosecutors and judges involved, in their respective roles, in the gross abuse of the Russian
justice system for the purpose of silencing Mr Kara-Murza.
6. These persons should be included in sanctions lists naming individuals, established under the existing
and future Magnitsky-type sanctions laws.
7. The life of Vladimir Kara-Murza is threatened by the solitary confinement to which he is arbitrarily
subjected, despite his weakened state of health following two poisonings which he narrowly survived.
8. The tragic and sudden death in prison in February 2024 of Alexei Navalny, an outspoken Kremlin critic
and anti-corruption activist, who had similarly been subject to and narrowly survived poisoning by a nerve
agent, highlights the urgency of ensuring the release of Vladimir Kara-Murza from prison and of holding to
account on a personal and individual basis all those involved in his persecution.
9. As a dual citizen of the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom, Mr Kara-Murza could be included
in any exchange of Russian spies held by Western States against political prisoners and other persons,
including citizens of foreign States that are being held hostage by the Russian Federation.
10. The Assembly, therefore:
10.1. invites all States that have not yet adopted Magnitsky-type targeted sanctions laws to do so
without further delay;
1. Assembly debate on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting) (see Doc. 15939, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, rapporteur: Mr Eerik-Niiles Kross). Text adopted by the Assembly on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
10.2. calls on the European Union and all States having laws on targeted sanctions to include in their
sanctions lists the persons directly responsible for the persecution and ill-treatment of Vladimir Kara-
Murza and the persecution, ill-treatment and death of Alexei Navalny, and those participating in them;
10.3. urges all States negotiating exchanges of prisoners with the Russian Federation to include
Vladimir Kara-Murza in any such exchange;
10.4. calls on the authorities of the Russian Federation to release Vladimir Kara-Murza without delay,
while immediately rectifying his current conditions of detention until such release so as not to further
jeopardise his health and his life
Resolution 2542 (2024)
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Resolution 2543 (2024)1
Provisional version
Freedom of expression and assembly of LGBTI people in
Europe
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are fundamental human rights for all.
Everyone must be able to enjoy these human rights equally and in safety, and the European Convention on
Human Rights (ETS No. 5) guarantees these rights. The Reykjavik Principles for Democracy, adopted in May
2023 by the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe at the 4th Summit, reaffirm the
commitment of the member States to protecting freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.
2. Undeniable progress has been made in the advancement of rights and in preventing and tackling
violence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people over the
past two decades. More and more European cities are holding Pride marches. However, there have also been
attacks on the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly of LGBTI persons in many member States of
the Council of Europe. LGBTI events have been cancelled, stopped from taking place or have not been
authorised, contrary to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which provides that concerns as
to the maintaining of public order cannot justify banning peaceful public LGBTI events or imposing
disproportionate restrictions on them.
3. Bans on LGBTI events, crackdowns on events by law enforcement authorities, non-existent or
inadequate protection against attacks on gatherings, harassment, intimidation, physical attacks, online
attacks, threats, the adoption of “anti-LGBTI propaganda” laws and censorship are all attacks on the freedom
of expression and freedom of assembly of LGBTI persons. Attacks or obstacles intended to deny LGBTI
persons these rights contribute to their stigmatisation and invisibilisation and make them more vulnerable to
human rights violations. The visibility of LGBTI persons and movements must be protected, as it is an
affirmation of the identity and existence of LGBTI persons in the public space. The Parliamentary Assembly
expresses its serious concern for LGBTI persons living in the Russian Federation where the so-called “LGBTI
international movement” has been designated as extremist by the country's Supreme Court, resulting in the
criminalisation of a wide range of activities related to the exercise of freedom of association, assembly, and
expression. It is imperative to safeguard the rights of LGBTI persons amidst such oppressive measures.
4. Anti-LGBTI hate speech is often used for political ends, targeting not only part of the population, which
is potentially endangered as a result, but also human rights defenders, politicians, and others who recognise
and support the equal enjoyment of human rights by LGBTI persons. The Assembly asserts that there is no
such thing as so-called “LGBTI ideology” and that the rights of LGBTI persons are the same as those of all
other people. It roundly condemns all bias-motivated speech on grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity
and sex characteristics. Such hate speech fuels other bias-motivated crimes against LGBTI persons. It points
out that political leaders have a duty to prevent and combat hate speech, whatever the motivation behind it.
The creation within the Assembly of the Parliamentary Platform for the rights of LGBTI persons in Europe in
2022 demonstrates this commitment.
1. Assembly debate on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting) (see Doc. 15953, report of the Committee on Equality and Non-
Discrimination, rapporteur: Mr Christophe Lacroix). Text adopted by the Assembly on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting).
https://pace.coe.int
5. Fully guaranteeing freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is not just vital in any democratic
society, but also a human rights obligation. The Assembly regrets that equality before the law, particularly for
LGBTI persons, has not yet been fully achieved throughout Europe. It is especially concerned at the rising
number of attacks on transgender people. It calls for transgender people’s rights to be respected and for their
protection in all circumstances and strongly condemns hate speech and transphobic violence against them.
6. The Assembly reiterates its call to the member States in Resolution 2417 (2022) “Combating rising hate
against LGBTI people in Europe” to tackle hatred and discrimination against LGBTI persons with renewed
energy and urgency. It also emphasises the importance of implementing Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of
the Committee of Ministers to member States on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual
orientation or gender identity.
7. In light of these considerations, the Assembly calls on the member and observer States of the Council
of Europe, and States whose parliaments enjoy observer or partner for democracy status with the Assembly
to:
7.1. ensure that judgments of the European Court of Human Rights relating to the rights of LGBTI
persons are implemented;
7.2. refrain from adopting constitutional amendments contrary to the rights of LGBTI persons and to
repeal any provision of this kind already in force;
7.3. ensure that laws against hate and discrimination are enforced, to amend them if they do not yet
include provisions concerning discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender
expression and sex characteristics, and to step up efforts to prevent and tackle intersectional
discrimination;
7.4. repeal “anti-LGBTI propaganda” laws if they have been enacted and implemented, and to allow
all persons to access information about different types of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender
expression and sex characteristics;
7.5. work towards annulling all declarations and charters contrary to LGBTI rights adopted at local
and regional levels, where applicable;
7.6. support the visibility of LGBTI persons in the public space;
7.7. support the holding of Pride marches and other demonstrations supporting LGBTI persons’
effective enjoyment of human rights, to protect them if necessary, to take adequate measures to
facilitate access to gatherings and contain counter-demonstrators, and publicly condemn all illegal
interference with the exercise of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly by LGBTI persons or
human rights organisations that support LGBTI rights;
7.8. investigate, prosecute and where appropriate punish perpetrators of bias-motivated violence
against LGBTI persons;
7.9. effectively combat strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs);
7.10. implement Recommendation CM/Rec(2022)16 of the Committee of Ministers to member States
on combating hate speech and General Policy Recommendation No. 17 of the European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) on preventing and combating intolerance and discrimination
against LGBTI persons;
7.11. establish the consultation of LGBTI organisations in legislative processes, especially in areas
that may impact the human rights of LGBTI persons.
8. With regard to preventing violence, prejudice and discrimination against LGBTI persons, the Assembly
calls on the member and observer States of the Council of Europe, and States whose parliaments enjoy
observer or partner for democracy status with the Assembly to:
8.1. outlaw conversion practices, if they have not already done so, and to utilise existing domestic
violence legislation to prosecute the perpetrators of conversion practices, where possible;
8.2. invest in gender equality education and to train teachers on these issues;
8.3. support programmes of sex and emotional education inclusive of LGBTI identities which are
tailored to the ages of pupils in schools;
8.4. train law enforcement officers to protect specific groups, including LGBTI persons, during
demonstrations and public events;
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8.5. run awareness campaigns on LGBTI rights and diversity;
8.6. guarantee legal recognition of gender identity;
8.7. recognise, if this is not already the case, the right to marriage for same-sex couples.
9. The Assembly welcomes the creation of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on Sexual
Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression and Sex Characteristics (ADI-SOGIESC) and calls on the
member States to appoint a member to it and to support its work.
10. The Assembly urges member States to recognise fears of persecution on grounds of sexual orientation,
gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics as grounds for granting asylum, to be supportive of
asylum applications made by LGBTI persons who have been forced to flee their country for these reasons and
to ensure their access to humanitarian and entry visas to grant access to their territories.
11. The Assembly also asks political parties to commit to tackling hate, whatever the basis for it, to oppose
anti-LGBTI hate speech and disinformation, and to adhere to the principles and rules of the Charter of
European political parties for a non-racist and inclusive society. It expresses support for LGBTI rights
defenders and civil society organisations working to protect the rights of LGBTI persons.
12. Lastly, the Assembly calls on the member States to give political and financial backing to the mandate
of the United Nations Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity, and to support the implementation of his recommendations.
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Resolution 2544 (2024)1
Provisional version
The honouring of obligations and commitments by Albania
Parliamentary Assembly
1. Albania joined the Council of Europe on 13 July 1995. Upon its accession, it undertook to honour the
obligations incumbent on all member States under Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS No.
1) with regard to pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In addition, it undertook to honour a
number of specific commitments listed in Opinion 189 (1995) “Application by Albania for membership of the
Council of Europe”, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 29 June 1995. In conformity with the
monitoring procedure, as established in Resolution 1115 (1997), the Assembly has regularly assessed
Albania’s progress with regard to the honouring of its obligations and commitments.
2. The previous report on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Albania was debated by the
Assembly on 2 October 2014 and led to the adoption of Resolution 2019 (2014). The Assembly welcomes that
many of the recommendations and concerns outlined in Resolution 2019 (2014) were addressed, and that
Albania has made considerable and tangible progress in honouring its membership obligations and accession
commitments to the Council of Europe. At the same time, the Assembly is cognisant that a number of
unresolved issues and concerns remain that the country should strive to address.
3. The Assembly welcomes that the protracted systemic political crisis that has plagued the country for
years has recently started to subside, although its root causes have not yet been resolved. Nevertheless, the
Assembly remains concerned about the polarised political environment which is the Achilles heel of the
democratic consolidation of the country. Constant vigilance in this respect is necessary and all political forces
should continue to work incessantly to create a political environment that is truly conducive to democratic
interaction and governance.
4. The Assembly welcomes the adoption, in 2020, of a new legal framework for elections that was based
on an inclusive process and broad consensus between the political stakeholders. However, it is concerned
about the frequent changes to the electoral framework which reflect a tendency to play with the rules instead
of by the rules. The Assembly reiterates that stability of electoral legislation is essential to ensure the trust of
the stakeholders and wider public in the electoral process and the outcome of the elections. Therefore, while
calling on all political stakeholders to address, well before next elections take place, the shortcomings and
deficiencies identified during past elections, the Assembly urges them to move away from using constant
changes to the Electoral Code as a mechanism to alter the balance of power or alternative to normal political
interaction in the framework of the parliament. With regard to the electoral framework, the Assembly calls
upon the Albanian authorities and Parliament, based on a broad consensus between all political forces, to:
4.1. adopt, and consistently implement, legislation to address the abuse of administrative resources
and vote buying that have marred previous elections in the country;
4.2. adopt the necessary legislation to ensure that the legal framework for party and campaign
financing is fully in line with international standards;
4.3. agree on the demarcation of the new electoral districts, as foreseen by the 2020 Electoral Code,
based on an inclusive process that fully adheres to international standards;
1. Assembly debate on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting) (see Doc. 15950, report of the Committee on the Honouring of
Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), co-rapporteur:
Mr Ionuț-Marian Stroe). Text adopted by the Assembly on 17 April 2024 (11th sitting).
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4.4. adopt, as a matter of priority and well before new elections take place, the required legislation to
allow out-of-country voting for the sizable Albanian diaspora, in line with the judgment of the
Constitutional Court of Albania.
5. The Assembly is concerned that the political polarisation in the country, compounded by inter and intra
party antics, is undermining the system of checks and balances and limiting parliamentary oversight. In this
context, it regrets that the parliament has not been able to find the required two-third majority to appoint a new
Ombudsperson and a new Commissioner for the Protection from Discrimination, whose terms of offices have
ended, and has resorted to using anti-blocking mechanisms lowering the required majority for other
appointments, including for the election of the President of the Republic. The Assembly calls upon the
opposition and ruling majority to ensure the proper functioning of the system of checks and balances,
including an efficient and effective parliamentary oversight over the executive, and to respect each other’s
rightful role and place in the governance of the country. In addition, the Assembly urges the ruling majority and
opposition to appoint, on the basis of a broad consensus, a new Ombudsperson and Commissioner for the
Protection from Discrimination, which is essential for the democratic legitimacy of these important institutions.
6. The Assembly welcomes the successful completion of the territorial and administrative reform which
has considerably reduced the number of municipalities and has strengthened the efficacity of local self-
government and the provision of services to their citizens. It notes that adjustments to the territorial
administrative map, both to strengthen the efficiency of local self-government and to address some of
undesired effects of the reform, are being considered by the different political forces in Albania. It is important
that any changes to the number of municipalities or the municipal borderlines should be based on a broad
consensus between the different stakeholders, while respecting the logic of the reform to create strong and
effective local government providing services that are close to the citizens.
7. In this context, the Assembly is concerned that the territorial and administrative reform has had a direct
impact on the enjoyment of minority rights in Albania. A number of municipalities where minorities formed the
local majority have been merged into larger municipalities where these minorities no longer form a majority, or
even a sizable segment, of the population. This is compounded by the fact that key minority rights, such as
the right to education in minority languages and the right to use minority languages in local government
affairs, are only granted at the local level when the minority population in question exceeds 20% of the
population in the municipality. This threshold is excessive and is only met in a very limited number of
municipalities with sizable minority populations. This should be remedied, in close consultation with the
minorities concerned, including in the context of the consideration of possible adjustments to the
administrative territorial map.
8. The Assembly takes note of the findings in the report on Albania of the Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities of the Council of Europe, adopted on 22 September 2021, including with regard to the allocation of
functions and responsibilities between central and local governments as well as the financial autonomy of
municipalities. It calls upon the Albanian authorities to fully address the concerns and recommendations
contained in this report.
9. The reform of the judiciary, with a view to assuring its genuine independence and the efficient
administration of justice, has been a long-standing priority for the Assembly within the monitoring procedure
for Albania. The Assembly therefore welcomes the considerable and tangible progress that has been made in
this regard by the Albanian authorities. The Assembly in particular welcomes the constitutional amendments
of 2016 that allowed, in line with recommendations of the European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission), for the complete reorganisation of the High and Constitutional Courts and the
establishment of a High Council of Justice and a High Prosecutorial Council, as well as specialised judicial
institutions to fight the endemic corruption in the country.
10. The constitutional amendments also allowed for the vetting, under international supervision, of all
judges and prosecutors in Albania. While being aware of the considerable, albeit temporary, impact of this
vetting procedure on the functioning of key judicial institutions in Albania, the Assembly considers the vetting
procedure to be a success. The very high number of judges and prosecutors that did not pass the vetting
procedure, more than 60% of all positions vetted, underscores both the importance and the necessity of this
vetting process.
11. The Assembly welcomes the establishment of a new judicial map, in close consultation with the Council
of Europe and European Union, with a view to increasing the quality and efficiency of the justice system and
to address the considerable backlog of cases that are before the courts. The judicial map will be evaluated
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every five years on the basis of recommendations by the High Council of Justice, which should allay and
address any possible concerns with regard to the access of citizens to the justice system as a result of this
reform.
12. While welcoming the marked and tangible progress made, the Assembly urges the authorities to make
all necessary efforts to fully eradicate internal and external interference in the judiciary and to address the still
too low clearance rate of cases before the courts.
13. Marked progress has been made with regard to the fight against the still widespread and systemic
corruption in Albania, and the persistent concerns of intertwinement of organised crime with economic and
political interests in the country. A Specialised Structure for Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK,
comprising of the Special Prosecution Office (SPO), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and two
Specialised Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Courts) is now fully operational and starts to produce
concrete results, including with regard to cases of high-level corruption. It is important that these tangible
results become a non-reversable trend, and that the anti-corruption structures have all the resources they
need, to send a clear signal at all levels of society that there is no impunity for corrupt behaviour.
14. Emphasising that SPAK was established to investigate and adjudicate high-level cases of corruption
and organised crime, the Assembly considers that the monetary threshold for cases to fall in an obligatory
manner within SPAKs mandate – currently around € 500 – is too low and risks inundating SPAK with cases
and therefore limit its capacity to fight high-level corruption. It strongly recommends to the authorities to raise
this monetary threshold.
15. The Assembly takes note of the compliance report by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)
for Albania in the framework of its fifth evaluation round on preventing corruption and promoting integrity in
central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies. While welcoming the progress
noted by GRECO, it regrets that only 5 of the 24 recommendations made in GRECO’s evaluation report have
been satisfactorily addressed, while 13 recommendations have only been implemented partially and 6 not at
all. The Assembly urges the authorities to fully implement the recommendations made by GRECO as a matter
of priority and in particular to:
15.1. address GRECO’s misgivings about the Ethics Committee set up to oversee the implementation
of, and adherence to, the Ministerial Code of Ethics, by removing members of the government from this
committee;
15.2. ensure in law and practice that the Prime Minister is accountable to the Ministerial Code of
Ethics;
15.3. ensure that all ministries appoint the integrity coordinators tasked with ensuring compliance with
the integrity plans developed by each ministry in consultation with the different stakeholders including
civil society;
15.4. ensure that regulations adopted to safeguard the transparency of the interactions of the
ministers and persons with top executive functions with lobbyists cover all forms of contact, including by
electronic means, and not only physical meetings.
16. With regard to the execution of judgments by the European Court of Human Rights (the “Court”), the
Assembly welcomes the decision by the Committee of Ministers to close its supervision of the execution of the
set of cases in Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania, indicating a successful resolution of the cases
regarding the restitution of properties expropriated by the communist regime that ruled Albania from 1944 to
1992, which had been an important concern of the Assembly. Nevertheless, the number of cases against
Albania before the European Court of Human Rights and under supervision by the Committee of Ministers is
still too high and additional and consistent efforts are needed to ensure prompt execution of the judgments of
the Court, especially with regard to the execution of domestic court judgments and the excessive length of
proceedings. The Assembly highlights the importance of respecting the protection of property and calls upon
the Albanian authorities to ensure the enforcement of final judicial decisions issued by domestic courts on this
matter thus avoiding the need for new cases to be brought before the Court.
17. The Assembly deeply regrets that, despite the overall progress in honouring its obligations and
commitments, the media environment has continued to deteriorate in Albania. This backsliding is of serious
concern as a free and pluralist media environment is an essential requirement for a well-functioning
democracy. The Assembly therefore calls upon the Albanian authorities to:
17.1. refrain from using threats and harsh rhetoric against journalists that affects their physical safety
and their capacity to report;
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17.2. fully decriminalise defamation, in line with international standards, and cap the disproportionately
high fines and excessive amounts of compensation which may be awarded for defamation, which have
a chilling effect on journalists and incite self-censorship;
17.3. enact proper legislation to counter the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation
(SLAPPs) against journalists, media outlets and civil society organisations.
18. The Assembly pays tribute to the diverse multicultural Albanian society and its historic tradition of
interreligious dialogue and tolerance. While recognising that national minorities are – with some exceptions –
well integrated in the Albanian society, the Assembly has some concerns with regard to the adequacy of the
legal framework for the protection of minority rights. While the adoption of the 2017 Law on the Protection of
National Minorities was a major and welcome step forward, the Assembly notes that three essential by-laws
that are required to implement the provisions of this law, have still not been adopted. The by-laws that are still
lacking concern key aspects for the enjoyment of minority rights including the right to self-identification, the
right to education in minority languages and their use in communication with authorities, and the procedure for
the recognition of national minorities. In relation to the protection of national minority rights the Assembly
urges the authorities to:
18.1. adopt without further delay, and in close consultation with the Council of Europe Advisory
Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the three by-laws to
the 2017 Law on the Protection of Minorities governing the right to self-identification, the right to
education in minority languages and their use in communication with authorities, and the procedure for
the recognition of national minorities;
18.2. lower considerably, and flexibly interpret, the requirement that a national minority needs to
amount to more than 20% of the local population before minority rights and services are legally
guaranteed at the municipality level.
19. With regard to the situation of LGBTI+ rights, the Assembly welcomes the adoption of the amendments
to the Labour Code that prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender. At the same
time, it notes that Albania still does not allow for the registration of same sex partnerships, contrary to
European standards, or allow people to change their name and gender in the civil registry, which prevents
these persons from exercising their civil rights. It calls upon the authorities to address these two issues as a
matter of priority.
20. The Assembly regrets that Albania has not joined the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages (ETS No. 148). Given the extended presence of minority languages in Albania, it calls upon the
authorities to sign and ratify it as a matter of priority.
21. The Assembly welcomes the clearly expressed political will by the Albanian authorities, as well as all
political forces in the country, to address, as a matter of priority and in close co-operation with the Assembly
and the relevant Council of Europe bodies, the concerns and recommendations made in this resolution and
the accompanying report of the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member
States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee). The Assembly therefore resolves to close the
monitoring procedure in respect of Albania and engage in a post-monitoring dialogue with Albania in line with
Resolution 2018 (2014) with the objective of addressing the remaining concerns outlined in this resolution.
22. At the same time, should no tangible and concrete progress have been made in addressing the
Assembly’s concerns and recommendations with regard to the fight against corruption, the protection of
minorities, and media freedom and freedom of expression, as expressed in paragraphs 15, 17 and 18 of this
resolution, the Assembly expects its Monitoring Committee to consider, already in its first report under the
post-monitoring dialogue, whether Albania should be returned to the full monitoring procedure.
Resolution 2544 (2024)
4
Resolution 2545 (2024)1
Provisional version
Mainstreaming the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and
sustainable environment with the Reykjavik process
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly stresses that the challenge of climate change constitutes the greatest
existential emergency for humankind and that this emergency is mainly due to the lack of long-lasting
structural action.
2. The Assembly notes with dismay that the Council of Europe is now the only regional human rights
system which has not yet formally recognised the right to a healthy environment.
3. For decades, however, the Assembly has been urging the Council of Europe member States to take
this step. In particular, it reaffirms its Recommendation 2211 (2021) “Anchoring the right to a healthy
environment: need for enhanced action by the Council of Europe”.
4. The Assembly notes that at the 4th Council of Europe Summit, held in Reykjavik on 16 and 17 May
2023, the Heads of State and Government recognised the urgency of additional efforts to protect the
environment, as well as to counter the impact of the “triple planetary crisis of pollution, climate change and
loss of biodiversity” and its effects on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. An Intersecretariat Task
Force on the Environment was established in January 2024 and has carried out a stocktaking survey of
existing activities, planned activities and proposals for new activities. It also proposed elements for the
development of a first Council of Europe strategy on the environment.
5. The Assembly also notes that in 2024, the Committee of Ministers will have to follow up work on the
feasibility of instruments on human rights and the environment and the draft convention superseding and
replacing the Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law (ETS No. 172).
6. Mindful of the strategic importance of this moment, almost one year on from the 4th Summit and three
years after Recommendation 2211 (2021), the Assembly wishes to update its expectations and contribute to
the implementation of the Reykjavik process through concrete and realistic proposals.
7. The post-Reykjavik environment Strategy will be implemented by and for the young generations and
must be supported by civil society. The course must therefore be firmly fixed for the future and the bar set high
as the Council of Europe and its member States will be held accountable for decades to come. The Assembly
considers that the requirements in terms of accountability must be extremely strict: transparency, ethics,
accessibility, responsibility, efficiency, and reliability must be the watchwords of all the measures deployed.
8. The Assembly underlines the need for the future strategy to have a clear goal in terms of setting
standards at European level and encourages decision makers to focus on drawing up a legal binding
instrument recognising an autonomous right to a healthy environment within the Council of Europe.
1. Assembly debate on 18 April 2024 (12th sitting) (see Doc. 15955, report of Committee on Social Affairs, Health and
Sustainable Development, rapporteur: Mr Simon Moutquin). Text adopted by the Assembly on 18 April 2024 (12th sitting).
See also Recommendation 2272 (2024).
https://pace.coe.int
9. The Assembly reiterates that the nature, content and implications of the right to a healthy environment
have been widely documented for decades and have been the subject of a wealth of scientific, normative and
judicial material.
10. The Assembly welcomes the fact that almost all Council of Europe member States recognise the right
to a healthy environment in one form or another in their national legislation and that some systems have
already adopted an eco-centric view of this right.
11. In terms of governance, ecological transition will not take place without the buy-in of citizens because of
its far-reaching impact on lifestyles. In the Assembly’s view, this means that the future strategy must introduce
concrete and ambitious measures to promote social acceptance of environmental policies, ensuring
meaningful and fully-fledged citizen participation at national level.
12. In addition to compliance with environmental standards and policies, the Assembly encourages
measures aimed at strengthening the resilience of the most vulnerable populations and ensuring their
inclusion without discrimination in the transition to a sustainable future.
13. The Assembly believes that greater responsiveness can be achieved through the development of
specialised environmental teams in all branches of governance. This approach should also be encouraged in
the allocation of budgets to courts. For national parliaments to be involved in such developments and
environmental policies in general entails that they too should have specialised bodies.
14. In the light of these considerations, the Assembly calls on the Council of Europe member States to:
14.1. continue to reflect continuously at national level on the nature, content and implications of the
right to a healthy environment so that, in the near future, this right will be recognised in law as an
autonomous human right in each member State;
14.2. step up their efforts to promote, in all governance bodies, the legitimacy and added value of the
Council of Europe playing a leading role in drawing up a binding legal instrument recognising an
autonomous right to a healthy environment;
14.3. engage in innovative projects to transform environmental governance and in particular to:
14.3.1. encourage the introduction of effective citizen participation mechanisms at national
level, such as citizens’ assemblies on climate, to promote social acceptance of environmental
policies;
14.3.2. provide a framework, structure and support for local initiatives targeting the populations
most vulnerable to environmental problems, such as programmes designed to mobilise young
people from working-class backgrounds;
14.3.3. support the creation of specialised environmental teams in all branches of governance.
Resolution 2545 (2024)
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Resolution 2546 (2024)1
Provisional version
Towards Council of Europe strategies for healthy seas and
oceans to counter the climate crisis
Parliamentary Assembly
1. Our planet’s seas and oceans are complex ecosystems that are vital for sustaining biodiversity and the
livelihood of humans, as well as for regulating the global climate. According to the United Nations, oceans and
seas provide 50% of the oxygen needed for life, absorb a quarter of all carbon dioxide emissions and capture
90% of the excess heat generated by those emissions. They are not only the lungs of the planet but also its
largest carbon sink and play a crucial role in tackling climate change. Representing 71% of the world’s
surface, they are essential to life and the economy, in particular transport. However, just like terrestrial
landscapes, seas and oceans suffer from the triple crisis of pollution, loss of biodiversity and climate change.
2. Healthy seas and oceans can be our allies in mitigating the triple crisis and the associated threats of
social, economic and political nature. As seas and oceans are at the crossroads of human and environmental
vulnerabilities, preserving their health is in the direct interest of humankind. In this context, the Parliamentary
Assembly underscores the responsibility of member States of the Council of Europe in the realisation of the
United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and, in particular, SDG 14: conserve and
sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development. The Council of Europe
should contribute to bringing the human dimension of maritime activities to the fore and ensure that European
standards apply more broadly in order to raise the level of protection of human rights.
3. Following the Reykjavik Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe (on 16
and 17 May 2023), political recognition of the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment paves the
way to better protection and the full exercise of the human rights of current and future generations. The
Assembly therefore highlights the duty and challenge of fully acknowledging the need to work on climate
resilience, to repair harm and to preserve the maritime heritage for future generations as part of the Reykjavik
process. Addressing the condition of seas and oceans from a human rights perspective implies a more
adequate consideration of major problem areas linked to the fishing industry, exploitation of the mineral
resources in the seabed (in particular deep-sea mining), protection of coastal populations, plastic waste and
chemical pollution, proliferation of ships flying “flags of convenience” and unsafe reuse or dismantling of ships.
4. The Assembly recalls its Recommendation 1888 (2009) “Towards a new ocean governance” which
called for novel approaches to managing oceans and seas. It welcomes the historic agreement which led to
the adoption of the Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction Treaty (also known as BBNJ or High
Seas Treaty) concluded on 4 March 2023 under the auspices of the United Nations. This agreement covers
international waters whose protection was previously fragmented and not included in the understanding of the
territorial or internal waters of a State in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS, “Montego Bay Convention”). The new treaty fundamentally changes the governance arrangements
both inside and outside territorial waters. The high seas are now regarded as a “global public good” which
covers a little over half of the surface of the globe, or 64% of the oceans.
1. Assembly debate on 18 April 2024 (12th sitting) (see Doc. 15956, report of Committee on Social Affairs, Health and
Sustainable Development, rapporteur: Ms Yuliia Ovchynnykova). Text adopted by the Assembly on 18 April 2024
(12th sitting).
See also Recommendation 2273 (2024).
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5. The Assembly notes that the preservation of biodiversity of seas and oceans is one of the objectives of
the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (ETS No. 104, “Bern
Convention”) and considers that this convention provides a good basis to contribute to better protection of
seas and oceans around Europe. The activities of the Standing Committee of the Bern Convention should be
further strengthened to protect marine ecosystems effectively and safeguard the rights of future generations.
6. The Assembly, therefore, calls on the Council of Europe member and non-member States to:
6.1. support the implementation of major international treaties governing the protection of marine life:
6.1.1. the UNCLOS which is the main component of the legal framework applying to the seas
and oceans;
6.1.2. the Agreement on Port State Measures to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing;
6.1.3. the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, of 1972 (“London Dumping Convention”);
6.1.4. the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973 to
prevent pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes;
6.1.5. the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and the European Union
Habitats directive on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, of 1992,
which protect the seabed and marine species amongst other;
6.2. sign and ratify the UN High Seas Treaty so that it can reach 60 ratifications and enter into force
in 2025;
6.3. support the Bern Convention and stabilise the resources allocated to its implementation;
6.4. consolidate the link between human rights and the environment, including the seas and oceans
dimension, through the Reykjavik Process, and work towards agreeing a comprehensive Council of
Europe strategy in this field;
6.5. incorporate the seas and oceans dimension in their national mitigation, adaptation and resilience
policies to tackle the climate crisis and ensure adequate involvement of the population whose livelihood
directly depends on the health of seas and oceans, notably with regard to fishing activities and
exploitation of coastlines;
6.6. ensure the rights enshrined in the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) and provide
intelligible information to the public;
6.7. raise public awareness on the issues of overfishing and illegal fishing and expand public
participation in decision making aimed at addressing these problems;
6.8. ensure a broad, democratic and transparent mandate of the UN international legally binding
instrument to put an end to plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, in order to address
the entire life cycle of plastic waste and not only their release into oceans and seas, to be completed by
the end of 2024,;
6.9. provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for those responsible for any marine
pollution, including the possibility of prison sentences in case of deliberate pollution;
6.10. strengthen their legal arsenal and capacity to introduce a new offence that would make it
possible to criminally prosecute those who harm the health of seas and oceans;
6.11. contribute to the work of the International Maritime Organisation with a view to bringing the
human dimension of maritime activities to the fore, promoting the application of key European human
rights standards so that each sector of global maritime activity would meet a high level of protection of
human rights;
6.12. promote the codification of the term “ecocide” at national, regional, European and international
levels;
6.13. ask national parliaments to provide awareness raising for their parliamentarians on the issue of
the right to a healthy environment in general and in relation to marine environment and maritime law;
6.14. support Black sea mine clearance initiatives and activities.
Resolution 2546 (2024)
2
7. The Assembly invites member States to consider “An Environmental Compact for Ukraine – A Green
Future: Recommendations for Accountability and Recovery” proposed by the High-level Working Group on the
Environmental Consequences of the War concerning the environmental damage affecting the Black Sea. The
Assembly encourages Ukraine to co-ordinate activities with allied States that abut the Black Sea in order to:
7.1. collect and analyse information on mines and unexploded ordnance in the Black Sea, water
pollution levels and other effects of war on animal and sea life and on biodiversity;
7.2. establish a standing body to report regularly on the environmental impact of the war and transmit
this information to the Black Sea Commission and to other relevant international institutions together
with recommendations to address this damage and prevent further harm.
8. With regard to good governance of marine resources, the Assembly invites member States to create
networks of marine protected areas (MPAs) across Europe’s seas, in order to:
8.1. better identify the elements of biodiversity in MPAs and build a comprehensive inventory of
marine resources with a view to optimising their conservation;
8.2. improve understanding of how marine systems are interconnected for ensuring better
designation and planning of MPAs at regional level;
8.3. improve reporting mechanisms, data flows and knowledge sharing across Europe regarding
marine areas with protected species and habitats, as well as the experience in management regimes
designed to protect marine life and observations of how marine life reacts to pressures;
8.4. measure and assess the extent to which MPAs and their networks are achieving their intended
purpose.
9. Lastly, the Assembly invites European Union member States to protect and restore 30% of the
European Union’s marine areas by 2030 by expanding MPAs with the goal of stopping trawling in those areas
and calls on the non-European Union countries to draw on those measures to improve their domestic
legislation.
Resolution 2546 (2024)
3
Resolution 2547 (2024)1
Provisional version
The protection of children against online violence
Parliamentary Assembly
1. The Parliamentary Assembly stresses the urgent need to protect children from violence in the digital
environment, especially in view of growing dangers on the internet and new forms of online violence.
2. Children are increasingly exposed to various forms of online violence, sometimes from an early age.
The physical and psychological repercussions are often devastating. Increased use of the internet and digital
tools, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic and lockdowns, has led to children being overexposed to
age-inappropriate content and behaviour. Smartphones have undoubtedly opened up a new avenue for
personal development online, but they are also a potential source of violence.
3. Creating a safe environment and minimising the risk of harm are essential to protect children online.
Mindful of the difficulty of reconciling the protection of children and their freedom of expression and other
competing rights, the Assembly reiterates that the best interests of the child must prevail in the development
and implementation of any measure or policy.
4. The Assembly therefore calls on member States to establish a comprehensive legal framework that
protects children in the digital environment by applying an integrated and balanced approach to reduce
exposure to harm online while not infringing on children’s opportunities to benefit from the internet. In
particular, it asks the member States to take the following steps to protect children:
4.1. as a minimum standard, impose effective age verification obligations on websites, particularly on
sites providing goods and content which are not intended for children, and which would incur similar
obligations in the offline world;
4.2. involve and raise awareness of parents and caregivers, who often lack the knowledge and
support to detect online exploitation, abuse, violence and exposure of children to pornography, and
empower them to deal with it with the backing of civil society and families' organisations;
4.3. take specific measures to protect young children from premature exposure to the digital
environment given their vulnerability to, inter alia, violent, sexual or pornographic content and the
limited benefits of digital tools with respect to their particular physical, physiological, social and
stimulation needs;
4.4. in order to prevent child sexual abuse material and punish perpetrators, set up hash databases
supplemented with the due cybersecurity measures with a view to expediting actions to identify and
locate children subjected to sexual exploitation or abuse; remove or restrict access to such content;
apprehend perpetrators; and provide child victims with the necessary psychological support and
rehabilitative care;
4.5. implement school-based educational programmes and outdoor activities, in particular to promote
peer-to-peer interactions and parental involvement;
1. Assembly debate on 19 April 2024 (14th sitting) (see Doc. 15954, report of Committee on Social Affairs, Health and
Sustainable Development, rapporteur: Mr Joseph O'Reilly). Text adopted by the Assembly on 19 April 2024 (14th sitting).
See also Recommendation 2274 (2024).
https://pace.coe.int
4.6. in such programmes, provide children and young people with training on assertiveness,
empathy, problem solving, emotion management and help seeking;
4.7. implement comprehensive sexuality education that covers the issues of online dating and
relationships in depth and aims to counter portrayals of violence in sexual relationships and
homophobic bullying and raise awareness about the fight against the oversexualisation of children;
4.8. run information and awareness-raising campaigns on harmful deepfakes, including those of a
pornographic nature; ban deepfakes and ensure their removal from digital platforms.
5. The Assembly recommends that member States work closely with stakeholders in the technology
industry in order to:
5.1. improve the development of policies and regulatory frameworks and facilitate their appropriation
and implementation by the technology industry;
5.2. increase the accountability and responsibility of stakeholders in the technology industry to
protect child users, including by requiring them to provide assistance to law enforcement authorities in
terms of technical support and equipment to facilitate the identification of perpetrators of crimes against
children and the collection of evidence required for criminal proceedings;
5.3. develop and implement policies that address cyberbullying, harassment and incitement to hatred
and violence in the digital environment, including clear information on unacceptable behaviour,
reporting mechanisms and the importance of support for children affected by such conduct;
5.4. integrate safety and privacy in the design and by default, while taking into account children’s
right to protection from violence online, as guiding principles for the features and functionalities of
products and services intended for or used by children.
6. In line of the latest edition of the European Day on the Protection of Children against Sexual
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse on 18 November 2023, the Assembly is convinced of the importance of
learning from victims and survivors of childhood sexual violence in order to develop effective policies based on
real-life experiences. It recommends that member States listen to victims of childhood online violence, taking
all necessary precautions, when drawing up measures and policies to prevent, protect against and combat
online violence.
7. The Assembly notes the importance of international and cross-border co-operation in protecting
children from online violence and calls for as many countries as possible around the world to accede to the
relevant treaties and effective mechanisms that already exist. In this respect, it calls for:
7.1. observer States and St ates whose parliaments enjoy observer or partner for democracy status
with the Assembly to accede to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No. 201, Lanzarote Convention);
7.2. member and observer States of the Council of Europe, and States whose parliaments enjoy
observer or partner for democracy status with the Assembly that have not yet done so to accede to the
Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185, Budapest Convention);
7.3. Council of Europe member States that have not yet done so to join Interpol and its International
Child Sexual Exploitation Database to exchange information on child sexual abuse cases.
8. The Assembly commends the Committee of the Parties to the Convention on the Protection of Children
against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (Lanzarote Committee) for its work on the second monitoring
round (2017-2022) on the implementation of the Lanzarote Convention, focusing on the protection of children
against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse facilitated by information and communication technologies
(ICTs) and addressing the challenges raised by child self-generated sexual images and/or videos. It invites
the States Parties to the Lanzarote Convention to pursue their work on children and emerging technologies, in
particular artificial intelligence and the virtual world, in greater depth, taking into consideration new risks for
children, including those linked to deepfakes of a sexual or pornographic nature.
9. The Assembly is determined to further examine the issue of “violent pornography”, including
pornography available online, taking into account the specific problem of children being exposed to such
content.
Resolution 2547 (2024)
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