COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Türkiye 2023 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2023 Communication on EU Enlargement policy

EN EN
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 8.11.2023
SWD(2023) 696 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Türkiye 2023 Report
Accompanying the document
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
2023 Communication on EU Enlargement policy
{COM(2023) 690 final} - {SWD(2023) 690 final} - {SWD(2023) 691 final} -
{SWD(2023) 692 final} - {SWD(2023) 693 final} - {SWD(2023) 694 final} -
{SWD(2023) 695 final} - {SWD(2023) 697 final} - {SWD(2023) 698 final} -
{SWD(2023) 699 final}
Offentligt
KOM (2023) 0690 - SWD-dokument
Europaudvalget 2023
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................................................3
1.1 Context................................................................................................................................................3
1.2. Summary of the report ......................................................................................................................4
2. Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process...........................................................................12
2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and Public Administration Reform ....................................12
2.1.1 Democracy ..............................................................................................................................12
2.1.2. Public administration reform....................................................................................................21
2.2. Rule of law and fundamental rights.................................................................................................23
Chapter 23: judiciary and fundamental rights....................................................................................23
Chapter 24: justice, freedom and security..........................................................................................44
2.3. Economic criteria .............................................................................................................................60
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy......................................................................60
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union ...........68
2.4. Public procurement, statistics, financial control .............................................................................71
Chapter 5: Public procurement...........................................................................................................71
Chapter 18: Statistics ..........................................................................................................................73
Chapter 32: Financial control..............................................................................................................75
3. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation...........................................................................78
4.Ability to assume the obligations of membership …………………………………………………………………….81
Cluster 2: Internal Market.......................................................................................................................81
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods..................................................................................................82
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers..................................................................................84
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services.................................................85
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital.................................................................................................86
Chapter 6: Company law.....................................................................................................................87
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law...................................................................................................88
Chapter 8: Competition policy............................................................................................................90
Chapter 9: Financial services...............................................................................................................91
Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection....................................................................................93
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth...................................................................................95
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media...................................................................................95
Chapter 16: Taxation...........................................................................................................................97
Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy.......................................................................................99
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment ......................................................................................100
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Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy ....................................................................................103
Chapter 25: Science and research.....................................................................................................104
Chapter 26: Education and culture...................................................................................................105
Chapter 29: Customs Union..............................................................................................................108
Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity..................................................................109
Chapter 14: Transport policy ............................................................................................................110
Chapter 15: Energy............................................................................................................................111
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks.............................................................................................113
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change .................................................................................114
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion....................................................................................117
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development...............................................................................117
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy.........................................................118
Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture.............................................................................................119
Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments..................................120
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions ..............................................................................122
Cluster 6: External relations..................................................................................................................123
Chapter 30: External relations ..........................................................................................................123
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy ............................................................................125
Annex I – Relations between the EU and Türkiye.................................................................................131
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 CONTEXT
Türkiye1
remains a key partner for the European Union and a candidate country. Türkiye has
been linked to the EU by an association agreement since 1964 and a Customs Union was
established in 1995. The European Council granted Türkiye the status of candidate country in
December 1999 and accession negotiations were opened in October 2005. Within the
framework of accession negotiations, 16 chapters have been opened and one has been
provisionally closed. Accession negotiations with Türkiye, however, remain at a standstill, in
line with the Council Conclusions of June 2018 as reiterated by the Council Conclusions of
December 2022. Türkiye continued to move away from the EU and did not reverse the
negative trend in relation to reform, despite its repeated statements of commitment to EU
accession. The EU’s serious concerns on the continued deterioration of democratic standards,
the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and respect for fundamental rights were not
addressed.
Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Türkiye in May 2023. The ruling
coalition retained its majority in the parliament and the incumbent President was re-elected.
The priorities of the new government include post-earthquake relief and reconstruction,
financial stability and a constitutional overhaul.
In February 2023, two powerful earthquakes and multiple aftershocks struck south-eastern
Türkiye. The devastating earthquakes caused the death of tens of thousands of people and
resulted in widespread destruction of public and private infrastructure, including schools and
healthcare facilities. The EU’s reaction was immediate and substantial emergency assistance
was provided both through humanitarian funding and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. In
March 2023, the European Commission and the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU
hosted, in coordination with the Turkish authorities, an international donors’ conference to
mobilise funds from the international community to support the early recovery, relief and
reconstruction of the affected areas. This conference raised more than EUR 6 billion. The
implementation of the assistance pledged by the European Commission has begun.
The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern
Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship
with Türkiye. The European Council in June 2022 reconfirmed its expectation that Türkiye
fully respects international law, contributes to the de-escalation of tensions in the interest of
regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and promotes good-neighbourly relations in a
sustainable way. The European Council in June 2023 invited the High Representative and the
Commission to submit a report to the European Council on the state of play of EU-Türkiye
relations, building on the instruments and options identified by the European Council and
with a view to proceeding in a strategic and forward-looking manner. The Foreign Affairs
Council discussed Türkiye in July 2023.
During the reporting period, Türkiye did not engage in any unauthorised drilling activities in
the Eastern Mediterranean. It continued to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and
repeatedly advocated a two-state solution in Cyprus, contrary to relevant UN Security
Council Resolutions.
1
In line with the request of the Republic of Türkiye regarding the use of the country's new official name in
English, this document uses the name “Türkiye” instead of “Turkey” in English. This administrative change is
limited to the nomenclature used in EU documents, does not have a retroactive effect, and entails no legal
consequences. This approach is without prejudice to the nomenclature used by Member States.
4
The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement continued to yield results and remained the key framework
for cooperation on migration. Türkiye sustained its remarkable efforts to host 3.6 million
refugees from Syria and other countries. The EU has mobilised close to EUR 10 billion to
support refugees and host communities since 2012. The Commission continued to implement
the additional package of EUR 3 billion covering 2021-2023, providing assistance in areas
such as basic needs, border management, education, healthcare, protection and socio-
economic support.
1.2. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT 2
There are serious deficiencies in the functioning of Türkiye’s democratic institutions.
Democratic backsliding continued during the reporting period. Structural deficiencies in the
presidential system remained in place.
Presidential and parliamentary elections took place on 14 May 2023. A second round of the
presidential election was held on 28 May. The elections were held under the new electoral
law adopted in March 2022. The elections offered voters a choice between genuine political
alternatives and voter participation remained high, but biased media coverage and the lack of
a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to the incumbent.
The constitutional architecture kept powers centralised at the level of the Presidency and does
not ensure a sound and effective separation of powers between the executive, the legislature
and the judiciary. The ineffective checks-and-balances mechanism means that the executive
branch is democratically accountable only through elections.
Political pluralism continued to be undermined by the targeting of opposition parties and
individual members of parliament. The government’s pressure on mayors from opposition
parties continued to weaken local democracy. Most regulatory authorities remain directly
linked to the Presidency. The recommendations by the Council of Europe’s Venice
Commission on the presidential system remain unaddressed.
The situation in the south-east region remained a cause for concern, particularly after the
earthquakes in February 2023. The Turkish government conducted security and military
operations in Iraq and Syria. Border areas faced a security risk with terrorist attacks by the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist group by the EU. The
government has a legitimate right and a responsibility to fight terrorism, but it is essential that
it does so in full compliance with the principles of the rule of law, human rights and
fundamental freedoms. Anti-terror measures need to be proportionate. There was no progress
in resuming a credible political peace process to resolve the Kurdish issue. Following the
earthquakes, the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) declared a period of unilateral truce,
during the run-up to the May elections, which was terminated in June. Turkish officials
linked the PKK-affiliated People’s Protection Units (YPG) to an attack in Istanbul in
November 2022, but the PKK denied involvement. The EU unambiguously condemned the
PKK’s attacks and expressed solidarity with the families of the victims. Türkiye continued to
carry out airstrikes against the PKK and affiliated groups in northern Syria and Iraq.
2
This report covers the period from June 2022 to June 2023. It is based on input from a variety of sources,
including contributions from the government of Türkiye, the EU Member States, European Parliament reports
and information from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of
comparative assessments and indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.
The report uses the following assessment scale to describe the state of play: early stage, some level of
preparation, moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made
during the reporting period, it uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some
progress, good progress and very good progress. Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used.
5
Serious backsliding regarding civil society issues continued. Civil society organisations faced
increased pressure and shrinking space to operate , limiting their freedoms of expression,
association and assembly. The implementation of the Law on preventing financing of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction placed further restrictions on civil society
organisations. However, despite increasing pressure from the authorities, civil society
continued to be vocal and to participate actively in civic life, including by providing support
to the people affected by the February 2023 earthquakes.
Civilian oversight of the security forces was not consolidated. The executive branch
maintained significant control over the security forces. The civilian component of the
Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) remained unchanged. The military judicial system’s
authority was curbed, with civilian higher courts reviewing appeals against military court
decisions. However, effective civilian oversight of the security forces remained incomplete
and lacking in effective accountability mechanisms. Strengthening parliamentary oversight of
security institutions is necessary.
Türkiye is in between some and moderate level of preparation in the field of public
administration reform. It made no progress in this area over the reporting period. There is
still a lack of political will to reform the public administration and public financial
management. The restructuring of the executive branch and the overhaul of the public
administration in line with the presidential system introduced in 2018 resulted in highly
centralised policymaking system. The level of accountability of the administration remains
insufficient. Its human resources management system needs to be reformed. Politicisation of
the public administration has continued. The share of women in managerial posts in the civil
service is still low.
Türkiye remains at an early stage of preparation in the area of judiciary. Serious backsliding
continued and, despite several judicial reform packages in recent years, the structural
deficiencies in the judicial system remained unaddressed. The continued refusal to implement
certain rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) remains a matter of concern.
There was no progress in eliminating undue influence and pressure by the executive on
judges and prosecutors, which negatively affects the independence, impartiality and quality
of the judiciary. Implementation of the 2021 Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) and the
2019 Judicial Reform Strategy (JRS) continued, but the activities foreseen in these
documents fell short of addressing the structural problems and issues identified in the
previous reports of the European Commission. The lack of objective, merit-based, uniform
and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and prosecutors remains a
source of concern.
Türkiye is at an early stage in the fight against corruption. There was no progress in the
reporting period. Outstanding deficiencies in key areas of the fight against corruption over the
last years remained unaddressed. A fully-fledged corruption prevention policy still remains to
be developed, including the relevant institutions, contrary to the United Nations Convention
against Corruption, to which Türkiye is party. Legislative gaps still remain in several fields of
the fight against corruption. The limitations of the legal framework and the institutional
architecture allowed undue influence on the investigation and prosecution phases of
corruption cases. The accountability and transparency of public institutions need to be
improved. The absence of an anti-corruption strategy and action plan indicates the lack of
will to fight decisively against corruption. The Council of Europe’s Group of States against
Corruption (GRECO) recommendations remained unimplemented. Overall, corruption
remains a problem.
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Türkiye has some level of preparation in the fight against organised crime and there was
some progress at operational level through participation in an increasing number of joint
operations with EU Member States and neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, it is important
for Türkiye to further increase its operational willingness to cooperate and exchange
information with EU law enforcement partners. The legal framework for the fight against
organised crime and police cooperation is only partially aligned with the EU acquis. The
completion of an international agreement between the EU and Türkiye on the exchange of
personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities responsible for fighting serious
crime and terrorism is still pending, considering also that the Turkish data protection
legislation is still not aligned with the EU acquis. The legal framework regulating the fight
against money laundering and terrorist financing needs to be improved in line with the
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Venice Commission on
the Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The deterioration of human and fundamental rights continued. The Turkish legal
framework includes general guarantees of respect for human and fundamental rights, but the
legislation and its implementation need to be brought into line with the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law. No
legislative amendments were adopted to eliminate the remaining elements of the 2016 state of
emergency laws.
Türkiye’s refusal to implement certain ECtHR rulings is a source of concern regarding the
judiciary’s adherence to international and European standards. Türkiye has not implemented
the July 2022 ruling of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, which
was issued in the framework of the infringement procedure launched by the Committee of
Ministers against Türkiye, that points to a drifting away from the standards of human rights
and fundamental freedoms that it has subscribed to as a member of the Council of Europe.
The implementation of the human rights action plan adopted in 2021 continued. However, it
did not address critical issues. The overall human rights situation did not improve.
On freedom of expression, the serious backsliding continued. Broad restrictions on the
activities of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and critical
voices continued to have a negative effect on the exercise of their freedoms. The
implementation of the criminal laws relating to national security and anti-terrorism continued
to contravene the ECHR and to diverge from ECtHR case law.
The May 2023 election campaign witnessed restrictions on freedom of expression, both
private and public media did not ensure editorial independence and impartiality in their
coverage of the campaign, detracting from the ability of voters to make an informed choice.
There was no progress in the area of freedom of assembly and association, where legislation
and its implementation are not in line with the Turkish Constitution, European standards or
the international conventions that Türkiye is party to. There were recurrent bans,
disproportionate use of force and interventions around peaceful demonstrations.
Demonstrators were subject to investigations, court cases and administrative fines on charges
of terrorism-related activities or of violating the Law on demonstrations and marches.
The rights of the most disadvantaged groups and people belonging to minorities need better
protection. Roma3
people are still largely excluded from formal employment and their living
conditions deteriorated severely. In January 2023, Türkiye adopted a new Roma strategy
3
In line with the terminology of European institutions the umbrella term ‘Roma’ is used here to refer to a
number of different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups.
7
covering the period 2023-2030 and an action plan covering the period 2023-2025. The
February 2023 earthquakes affected the Roma population disproportionately, and increased
the difficulties they faced in the affected areas in terms of living conditions, livelihood and
basic needs and health, especially for women and children. Gender-based violence,
discrimination and hate speech against minorities and against lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons are still a matter of serious concern.
On migration and asylum policy, Türkiye made some progress. The EU-Turkey Statement
remained the main framework for cooperation between the EU and Türkiye. Some progress
was made in further strengthening the capacity for surveillance and protection of the land
borders with Iran and Iraq. The Commission expects Türkiye to uphold its commitments
under the EU-Turkey statement, in line with the European Council conclusions of October
2021, including prevention of irregular migration from land and sea routes, and resuming
returns. The return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands under the EU-Turkey
Statement remained suspended. The full and effective implementation of the EU-Turkey
readmission agreement towards all EU Member States is pending. Political and technical
dialogue is ongoing on migration and security. The next EU-Türkiye high level dialogue on
migration is scheduled to take place on 23 November 2023. Overall, the number of illegal
border crossings between Türkiye and Greece remained significantly lower than it was prior
to the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement. In 2022, the number of irregular migrants
arriving increased on most routes by comparison with 2021. In the first half of 2023, the
number of irregular arrivals from Türkiye into the EU was lower than in the same period in
2022. Arrivals in Greece increased by 62%, while the sea route to Italy saw a substantial
decrease (down by 52%) and the number of arrivals in Cyprus via the Green Line went down
significantly by 42%. Türkiye has still not implemented the provisions relating to third-
country nationals in the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, which entered into force in
October 2017.
Türkiye continued to make significant efforts to host and meet the needs of one of the largest
refugee communities in the world. Out of the almost EUR 10 billion in EU support to
refugees allocated since 2011, some EUR 7 billion had been disbursed by September 2023.
Efficient integration measures are needed to address the prolonged presence of refugees in
the country. Access to public health for migrants and refugees should be improved. No
outstanding benchmarks under the visa liberalisation roadmap were fulfilled. Türkiye still
needs to further align its legislation with the EU acquis on visa policy.
Türkiye is an active and significant actor in the area of foreign policy, which constitutes an
important element in the context of the EU-Türkiye relationship. Nevertheless, Türkiye’s
unilateral foreign policy remained at odds with the EU’s priorities under the common foreign
and security policy (CFSP). Türkiye maintained a very low alignment rate of 10% with the
EU stance on foreign and security policy (as of August 2023), compared to 8% in 2022. Its
rhetoric in support to terrorist group Hamas following its attacks against Israel on 7 October
2023 is in complete disagreement with the EU approach.
Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye condemned the Russian
military aggression, including at the UN General Assembly, and engaged politically and
diplomatically, including by facilitating the export of Ukrainian grain and the exchange of
prisoners. The UN- and Türkiye-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative was terminated by
Russia in July 2023. Türkiye also sought to facilitate talks between Ukraine and Russia and to
work on de-escalation and bringing about a cease-fire. Nevertheless, Türkiye refrained from
aligning itself with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia. As of March 2023, Türkiye
has implemented a ban on exporting to Russia sanctioned goods originating from the EU, the
8
United States and the United Kingdom. This ban specifically targeted goods that were in
transit, stored in warehouses or located within free zones in Türkiye. However, the potential
transportation of dual-use and sensitive technology goods, as well as the unrestricted
movement of sanctioned goods from Türkiye to Russia still need to be addressed. Overall,
Türkiye significantly intensified its trade and economic ties with Russia, and the Turkish
economy became more dependent on Russia in crucial sectors, particularly in energy.
Türkiye intensified its ‘regional normalisation’ policy with the Arab states, with Armenia and
with Israel. Following the Hamas terrorist group’s attacks against Israel in October 2023,
Türkiye refrained from condemning and qualifying them as terrorism and strongly criticised
Israel’s response. Türkiye strongly condemned the loss of civilian lives on both sides and
proposed to act as a mediator between Israel and Hamas. Türkiye is currently re-evaluating
its ties with Israel. On the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), Türkiye’s position aligns with
the EU’s position supporting the two-state solution. Türkiye's rapprochement with the Syrian
regime, brokered by Russia, occurred in spite of the lack of a political resolution to the Syrian
conflict and is at odds with the EU’s policy. At the same time, Türkiye shared a common goal
with the EU to achieve a stable and prosperous Syria, primarily by implementing UNSCR
2254. Türkiye has a growing presence and geopolitical ambition in the South Caucasus and
Central Asia. It also continued its efforts to extend its relations with African, Latin American
and Asian countries. Türkiye’s pragmatic engagement on Afghanistan and its vocal position
on the developments in Sudan underscored its ambition to be a key player in the context of
major international crises.
Türkiye continued to seek involvement in the common security and defence policy (CSDP)
and EU defence initiatives while persisting in its exclusion of a Member State from all
possible cooperation with NATO. Türkiye remained actively involved in EU crisis
management missions and operations within the framework of the CSDP. In March 2023, the
Turkish National Assembly approved Finland’s NATO accession and during the NATO
summit in July 2023, the Turkish President pledged to promptly submit Sweden’s accession
protocol to the Turkish parliament for ratification. The president submitted the bill for
ratification to the Parliament on 23 October 2023.
Regarding good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation, Türkiye continued to
refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and repeatedly advocated a two-state solution in
Cyprus, contrary to relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. The EU remains fully
committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework,
in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions, in line with the principles on which the
EU is founded and the acquis. The EU has called, most recently in the European Council
conclusions of June 2023, for the speedy resumption of negotiations and expressed its
readiness to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process with all
appropriate means at its disposal. There were no unauthorised drilling activities by Türkiye in
the Eastern Mediterranean during the reporting period.
Relations between Türkiye and Greece deteriorated until early 2023. However, following the
devastating earthquakes in Türkiye in February 2023, there was a marked improvement in the
relations. As of February 2023, violations of Greek airspace diminished drastically, and no
flights over Greek inhabited areas were reported.
Pursuing dialogue in good faith and abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to
the EU interests and violate international law and the sovereign rights of EU Member States
is an essential requirement to ensure stable and secure environment in the Eastern
Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship
between the EU and Türkiye. Türkiye is expected to unequivocally commit itself to good
9
neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes, in
accordance with the United Nations Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the
International Court of Justice.
Regarding the economic criteria, the Turkish economy is well advanced but made no
progress over the reporting period. Serious concerns persist over the proper functioning of
Türkiye’s market economy. There was backsliding on important elements, such as the
conduct of monetary policy and the institutional and regulatory environments over most of
the reporting period. Since the May parliamentary and presidential elections, the authorities
have taken some steps to revert to more stability oriented macroeconomic policies. Although
economic growth remained robust in 2022, Türkiye moved further away from market-
oriented policies, which weakened its economic fundamentals and increased vulnerabilities
and risks. Inflation decreased somewhat but remained very high as monetary policy
prioritised exceptionally low interest rates, which remain deeply negative in real terms and
are sustained by a web of regulatory and prudential measures. After the presidential and
parliamentary elections in spring 2023, monetary policy has started to tighten, also signalling
a gradual simplification of the macroprudential framework. The current account deficit
increased to 5.4% of GDP in 2022, driven by a negative terms-of-trade shock and large
imports of non-monetary gold. The relatively good budget performance in recent years masks
an underlying trend of growing fiscal risks. The authorities’ commitment to fiscal discipline
wavered, as the fiscal stance turned pro-cyclical in 2023, with earthquake-related expenditure
pressure adding to pre-electoral budgetary largesse. However, the fiscal stance was tightened
after the elections and a revised budget, including sizeable tax increases, was adopted in July.
The institutional and regulatory environment lacks predictability and transparency, and
complicates the post-electoral economic policy normalisation. Market exit remains costly and
slow. However, Türkiye has made progress in digitalising government services to businesses.
Although the size of the informal economy has fallen in recent years, it still accounts for a
significant share of economic activity. State intervention in price-setting mechanisms persists.
The provision of State aid lacks proper implementation rules, enforcement and transparency.
The banking sector remained broadly stable but is facing financial stability challenges due to
the numerous overly complex and far-reaching macroprudential and regulatory measures.
The labour market strengthened further, although structural challenges remain significant, in
particular for youth and female employment. Regional labour market disparities declined and
reached one of the lowest levels in years. The recent net minimum wage increases were pro-
cyclical.
Türkiye has a good level of preparation and made limited progress in achieving the capacity
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Despite improved
vocational training, the mismatch between the education system and labour market needs
remains a concern. Expenditure on research and development continued to increase, albeit at
a very slow pace, and is still below the government’s target. Investment was relatively
subdued in 2022. There was progress in the diversification of energy supplies and the share of
energy generated from renewable sources increased significantly. However, the local content
requirement in the renewable energy generation sector is a discriminatory practice and a
cause for concern. Trade openness increased further, but integration with the EU continued
falling, although remaining high. Deviations from Türkiye’s obligations under the EU-Turkey
Customs Union continue to hinder bilateral trade.
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of public procurement, with significant gaps
remaining to align with the EU acquis. There was backsliding in the reporting period as
Türkiye increased the use of the negotiated procedure and of discriminatory domestic price
10
advantage practices, and continued to allow offsets that favour local content. Türkiye is
moderately prepared on statistics and made some progress, with work continuing to
harmonise its statistical methodology with EU standards. The Turkish Statistical Institute
(TurkStat) improved its compliance with the timeframes for publishing annual national
accounts and excessive deficit procedure notifications. It took further steps to improve
cooperation with other main data providers. However, Türkiye needs to increase the
credibility of TurkStat and public trust in official statistics. Türkiye has a good level of
preparation on financial control. It made no progress over the reporting period. The public
internal financial control policy paper was not updated. The purpose, authority and
responsibility of internal audit are undermined by the lack of a legal requirement to have
internal audit units in ministries.
Regarding its ability to assume the obligations of membership, Türkiye has pursued
alignment with the EU acquis on a rather ad hoc basis and to a limited degree.
The internal market cluster is key to the good functioning of the EU-Turkey Customs
Union and to integrating Türkiye into the EU’s internal market. Türkiye has achieved a good
level of preparation for the free movement of goods. However, technical barriers to trade and
requirements discriminating against EU products remained in place. Preparations in the areas
of freedom of movement for workers, the right of establishment and freedom to provide
services are at an early stage, and substantial efforts are still required to align with the
acquis. Türkiye is moderately prepared on free movement of capital, as limitations remain on
foreign ownership and on capital movement. Türkiye needs to continue to address
outstanding issues in its framework regulating the fight against money laundering and
terrorist financing.
Türkiye is well advanced in the area of company law but needs to make further progress in
aligning with the EU acquis. Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of
intellectual property law, notably in terms of legislative alignment, but it needs to improve
implementation and enforcement. Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of
competition policy. Backsliding was observed as serious concerns persist in relation to the
legislative framework, enforcement capacity and transparency in the field of State aid.
Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of financial services, however the
banking sector faced a challenging operating environment in the reporting period. Türkiye
has a good level of preparation on consumer and health protection, with limited progress
made, notably on strengthening its surveillance system for health (security) services. The
capacity of the healthcare system was seriously affected by the February 2023 earthquakes in
south-east Türkiye.
Within the cluster on competitiveness and inclusive growth, Türkiye has some level of
preparation in the area of digital transformation and media. Türkiye’s preparations in the
area of science and research are well advanced and Türkiye made good progress during the
reporting period, notably as a result of joining Horizon Europe and continued efforts to raise
awareness of, and capacity for the programme. Türkiye is moderately prepared on education
and culture, and continued to make some progress, notably through the continued
implementation of the national qualifications system and the increased participation in some
EU programmes. Access to education in south-east Türkiye was significantly impacted by
the February 2023 earthquakes.
On the economy-related chapters, backsliding continued on economic and monetary policy,
where Türkiye has some level of preparation. The Central Bank continued to loosen its
unorthodox monetary policy stance, which triggered multi-year high inflation and unhinged
inflation expectations. Until the parliamentary and presidential elections in May 2023, the
11
Central Bank was subject to significant political pressure to keep real interest rates deeply
negative. Far-reaching prudential and regulatory measures disrupted the functioning of
financial markets and increased risks. After the elections, the Central Bank has started to
tighten monetary policy and the new government took measures to limit the bulging fiscal
deficit. Türkiye is moderately prepared and made limited progress on enterprise and
industrial policy. Major challenges in relation to measures incompatible with EU industrial
policy principles remain unaddressed. Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of
social policy and employment. The labour market situation improved but concerns remain
over trade union rights and effective social dialogue, persistent levels of informal economic
activity and the gender gap in employment. The February 2023 earthquakes had a major
impact on the labour market in the affected regions.
Türkiye is moderately prepared on taxation. It made no progress during the reporting period
and still needs to enable tax information exchange with all EU Member States. Türkiye
maintains a good level of preparation for the customs union but made limited progress over
the reporting period. However, Türkiye’s deviations from its obligations under the EU-
Turkey Customs Union continued, contributing to a number of trade irritants.
Regarding the cluster on the Green Agenda and sustainable connectivity, Türkiye is
moderately prepared in transport policy. It made limited progress during the reporting period,
mainly linked to the update of the nationally determined contribution under the Paris
Agreement with a specific chapter on transport mitigation policies. Türkiye is moderately
prepared in the area of energy, and made limited progress overall. Efforts continued on
renewable energy deployment, reforms in the natural gas sector and legislative alignment on
nuclear safety. Türkiye continues to be an important transit country for the EU, but remains
reliant on Russia for fossil fuel imports and nuclear energy. Türkiye is well advanced on
trans-European networks and made no progress. The trans-Anatolian pipeline continues to
operate smoothly and transmit gas to the European section of the Southern Gas Corridor. The
construction of the flagship Halkali-Kapikule railway line connecting the EU border to
Istanbul continued.
Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of environment and climate change, and
made limited progress over the reporting period. On climate change, Türkiye submitted its
updated nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement. It faces critical
environmental and climate challenges, and needs more ambitious and better coordinated
environment and climate policies, strategic planning, substantial investment and stronger
administrative capacity.
On the cluster covering resources, agriculture and cohesion, Türkiye reached some level
of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development. Backsliding continued during
the reporting period, as its agricultural policy keeps moving away from the main principles
of the EU common agricultural policy and as Türkiye continued to restrict imports of
agricultural products from the EU. Türkiye is a major exporter of food products to the EU
and made limited progress in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy,
where it reached some level of preparation. Full implementation of the EU acquis in this area
requires significant further work. Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of fisheries and
aquaculture, and made some progress on fisheries governance, inspection and control.
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of regional policy and the coordination of
structural instruments, and continued to make some progress in accelerating the absorption
of IPA II funds and setting up the structures for IPA III funds. Türkiye has some level of
preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions but made no progress during the
reporting period.
12
In the external relations cluster, Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of external
relations and made no progress over the reporting period. Türkiye has some level of
preparation in the area of foreign, security and defence policy, and made no progress overall
in the reporting period. Türkiye is a significant actor in the area of foreign policy, which
constitutes an important element in the context of the EU-Türkiye relationship. Stepping up
efforts to ensure alignment with the EU's common foreign and security policy would be a
significant signal of Türkiye's commitment to the EU in the new geopolitical context.
2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS
2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
Democracy
The functioning of Türkiye’s democratic institutions continued to be severely hampered. The
structural shortcomings of the presidential system remained. Democratic backsliding and
political polarisation increased in the run-up to the presidential and parliamentary elections.
Following the earthquakes, which hit 11 provinces in February 2023, a state of emergency
was introduced in the affected provinces and expired in May 2023. Furthermore, even though
the nationwide state of emergency was lifted in July 2018, a number of legal provisions
granting extraordinary powers to government officials and maintaining a number of the
emergency’s restrictive elements remain in effect. Some of these provisions have been
extended for another 2 years, but most of the provisions related to the 2018 state of
emergency expired in July 2022.
The State of Emergency Inquiry Commission ruled on all the applications within the scope of
the 2018 Law on the establishment of the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency
Measures and completed its work in January 2023. Of the total number of applications
submitted to the Inquiry Commission (127 292), the Inquiry Commission accepted 17 960
cases and rejected 109 332.
Elections
Presidential and parliamentary elections took place on 14 May 2023. A second round to
determine the new President of the Republic was held on 28 May. According to the
preliminary conclusions of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(the ODIHR), which deployed an election observation mission, voters had a choice between
genuine political alternatives and voter participation was high. However, the incumbent-
biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to
the incumbent.
Parliamentary elections were held in Türkiye on 14 May 2023 to elect the 600 members of
the Grand National Assembly. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) of the
incumbent President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, led the People’s Alliance, which also included
the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Great Union Party (BBP) and the New Welfare
Party (YRP). The People’s Alliance retained its majority in the parliament with 322 members
of parliament. During the second round of the presidential elections on 28 May, President
Erdoğan was re-elected with 52.18% of the vote (the Republic People’s Party CHP
opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu received 47.82%). The elections took place in a
deeply polarised environment. The elections offered voters a choice between genuine
political alternatives and voter participation remained high, however, biased media coverage
and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage to the incumbent. In the
13
subdued yet competitive campaign, candidates were able to campaign freely. However,
harsher rhetoric, inflammatory and discriminatory language by both contestants, along with
the continued intimidation and harassment of supporters of some opposition parties
undermined the process. Election days were generally calm and well-administered. However,
instances of deficient implementation of certain procedures, particularly during the vote
count, were noted. The electoral campaign was held during the state of emergency in the 11
provinces affected by the earthquakes, where voting difficulties were widely reported.
OSCE/ODIHR deployed an election observation mission (EOM) with 28 long-term and 350
short-term observers, with additional embedded observers from the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe (PACE). Local NGOs and the political parties also deployed
thousands of volunteers to monitor the elections. The elections were held under the new
electoral law adopted in March 2022. The new law introduced significant changes, such as a
revised seat allocation system, changes to eligibility criteria for political parties and changes
to the method of appointing mid-level electoral councils. It positively addressed an ODIHR
recommendation to lower the parliamentary threshold from 10% to 7%. Most other ODIHR
recommendations (including those related to seat distribution, voter and candidate rights,
campaign financing and election dispute resolution) remain unaddressed. The Venice
Commission criticised several aspects of the amended law, such as the new system for
selecting the chairpersons and members of provincial and district election appeal boards with
a lottery rather than taking experience into account.
Any further amendments that Türkiye makes to its electoral framework, including its
legislation on political parties, need to be made in line with international standards, after
thorough consultation.
The 48 mayors displaced by government-appointed trustees following the 2019 local
elections in the south-east have not been reinstated and no action was taken to address the
relevant Venice Commission’s June 2020 opinion. This remains a source of serious concern
as it undermines local democracy and denies voters their preferred representation.
Parliament
The presidential system has largely weakened the national parliament’s legislative and
oversight functions. The President’s extensive powers allow him to take decisions across a
broad spectrum of policy areas, thereby limiting the parliament’s legislative function. The
parliament lacks the tools needed to hold the government to account. Targeting of the
political opposition continued. The closure case of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) is
still ongoing.
During the reporting period, the legislative function of the parliament was curtailed by the
extensive use of presidential decrees and presidential decisions. From January to December
2022, the parliament adopted 80 of the 749 proposed laws. By contrast, during the same
period, 273 presidential decrees issued under the state of emergency on a variety of policy
issues (including socioeconomic issues) were brought before parliamentary committees.
The parliament’s legislative and agenda-setting duties remained mainly under the control of
the ruling AKP-MHP alliance, which has a parliamentary majority. Opposition parties had a
very limited ability to influence parliamentary debates.
The fourth GRECO evaluation report of 2022 highlighted the points that the asset
declarations made by members of parliament are not verified for their accuracy, and that
there are no effective sanctions for violations of rules in this area. Moreover, the content of
14
these declarations is not made publicly available promptly after their submission to the
parliament.
Parliamentary oversight of the executive remained very weak. The parliament lacks the
necessary means to hold the government accountable. Members of parliament can submit
written questions to the Vice-President and ministers, but it is not foreseen by the law that
they can submit formal questions to the President. Ordinary presidential decrees are not
subject to parliamentary review. However, presidential decrees issued under the state of
emergency must be submitted to the parliament for approval. The supervision of public
expenditure by the parliament must be substantially strengthened.
Political pluralism continued to be undermined by the judiciary’s targeting of opposition
parties and of individual members of parliament (particularly from the People's Democratic
Party (the HDP)) for alleged terrorism offenses. The system of parliamentary immunity did
not provide sufficient legal protection for opposition parliamentarians to express their views
within the limits of free speech. Approximately 5 000 HDP members and officials are
currently imprisoned. One of the detained defendants in the Gezi trial was elected as a deputy
from the Workers’ Party of Türkiye (the TIP) in the May 2023 elections but was not released
from prison and was therefore not allowed to be sworn in as a member of parliament. By the
end of the 27th
legislative term (2018-2023), the total number of members of parliament
subject to the legislative immunity resolution and a request for the lifting of their immunity
was 206 (180 of them belonged to the parliamentary opposition). During the reporting period,
no deputies had their immunity revoked or were detained on terrorism-related charges. Two
former HDP co-chairs and several former HDP legislators are still in prison despite a
European Court of Human Rights ruling in their favour.
The HDP’s closure case on terrorism charges, including the banning from political life of 451
HDP members, remain pending before the Constitutional Court. In April 2023, the HDP
waived its right to oral defence, arguing that the case was politically motivated and that it
should be postponed until after the May 2023 elections. The General Assembly of the Court
recorded the party’s decision and sent the file to the Rapporteur. In January 2023, the
Constitutional Court suspended State funding for the HDP but reinstated it in March
following an appeal. In June 2023, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Treasury aid paid to
the HDP could not be legally blocked.
Despite the March 2022 lowering of the electoral threshold from 10% to 7%, the legal
framework for elections and political parties remains problematic. Türkiye has yet to
implement the outstanding recommendations of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights and of the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. The level
of participation of women in decision-making, politics and employment remained low by
international standards. Following the May 2023 elections, the percentage of women in the
parliament increased from 17.1% during the previous term to 20.1% (from 104 to 121 out of
600). This is the highest ever ratio of women’s representation in the parliament but women
are still under-represented.
Governance
The presidential system continues to be characterised by a lack of checks and balances, as
well as the politicisation of the public administration. Most regulatory authorities remain
directly linked to the Presidency. The recommendations by the Council of Europe’s Venice
Commission on the presidential system still need to be addressed. The government’s pressure
on mayors from opposition parties continued to weaken local democracy.
15
As highlighted by the Venice Commission's 2017 opinion and the European Commission's
previous country reports, the presidential system still lacks the necessary checks and balances
to prevent an undue concentration of power and to safeguard the independence of the
judiciary. The highly centralised presidential system continues to impair the legislative
branch of government, the judicial branch and the public administration.
The use of traditional instruments of oversight of the executive by the parliament, such as
a vote of confidence and the ability to ask the executive oral questions, has not been allowed
since the entry into force of the presidential system in 2018. The absence of effective checks
and balances and the parliament’s inability to effectively supervise the office of the President
mean that the latter’s political accountability is limited to election time. The public
administration, courts and security forces are under the heavy influence of the executive. The
Presidency exercises direct authority over all key institutions and regulatory bodies. The
public sector remained politicised, especially at senior management level.
The legal framework allowed regulatory authorities to be subject to excessive political
influence. The President has the authority to appoint the chiefs and board members of the vast
majority of the regulatory agencies. These regulatory bodies, notably in the media sector,
issued decisions that disproportionately target (including with heavy pecuniary fines) media
that are critical of the government.
The Ombudsman’s caseload continued to increase during the reporting period and a high
number of cases was adjudicated. However, the Ombudsman did not address politically
sensitive issues concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms.
As regards local self-governance, the government maintained its pressure on opposition
mayors, including through administrative and judicial investigations. In December 2022, the
metropolitan mayor of Istanbul was sentenced to a suspended prison sentence on charges of
insulting members of the Supreme Electoral Council. The mayor is also under administrative
investigation by the Ministry of Interior for allegedly ‘employing terrorists’ in the
municipality. In June 2023, a new case was opened against the mayor for alleged
involvement in rigging a public works tender in 2015. In May, during a rally in Erzurum, the
mayor was among those physically attacked, with the violence being condoned rather than
condemned by senior AKP officials.
In the south-east, local democracy remained severely constrained. Since the 2019 municipal
elections, 48 HDP mayors have been removed from office on terrorism-related accusations.
Governors continued to serve as trustees in place of the deposed mayors. Hundreds of elected
municipal officials have been detained on suspicion for ties to terrorism. These actions
violate citizens’ right to be governed by their elected representatives.
The legal framework governing the tutelary powers of the Ministry of Interior over locally
elected officials was not revised in accordance with Türkiye’s commitments under the
European Charter of Local Self-Government.
The municipal law provides for the engagement of local administrations with the public and
with civil society. Citizens’ assemblies, which seek to bring together professional and civil
society organisations and other local stakeholders, remained inactive in most provinces.
Civil society
Serious backsliding regarding the civil society environment continued. Civil society faced
continuous pressure from the authorities. Human rights organisations, which were closed
under the state of emergency, were not offered any legal remedy in relation to confiscations.
Human rights defender Osman Kavala and his co-defendants in the Gezi trial remained in
16
prison without parole, despite a ruling by the ECtHR.
The implementation of the Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction added further restrictions and pressure on civil society.
Despite all these negative developments, civil society continued to be vocal and to participate
actively in civic life, including by providing support to the people affected by the February
2023 earthquakes. Systematic and inclusive mechanisms for the effective consultation of
independent civil society organisations on new legislation and policies need to be put in
place.
A free, empowered and diverse civil society is a key component of any democratic system.
Civil society organisations in Türkiye continued to make crucial contributions in areas, such
as education, women’s rights, rights for LGBTIQ persons, rights of persons belonging to
minorities, rights of persons with disabilities, freedom of religion and belief, the environment,
anti-discrimination and support for refugees.
In the immediate aftermath of the February 2023 earthquakes, civil society faced pressure
from the authorities when delivering aid on the ground and was prevented from reporting on
the situation in the affected regions.
Human rights organisations and human rights defenders faced judicial and administrative
pressure, partly due to Türkiye’s broad definition of terrorism. In some cases, however, the
judiciary issued positive decisions, acquitting and releasing a number of human rights
defenders from prison. As regards the infringement procedure launched by the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe in February 2022, the ECtHR ruled in July 2022 that
Türkiye had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 46 (1) of the Convention. Türkiye’s
refusal to implement the ECtHR’s ruling in the Kavala case contravenes its obligations as a
long-standing member of the Council of Europe. The seven co-defendants of Osman Kavala
in the Gezi case, who were each sentenced in April 2022 to 18 years of imprisonment,
remained in prison. In the Büyükada case, the Court of Cassation annulled the terrorism-
related convictions of all the defendants in October 2022, ruling that they had been made with
‘inadequate investigation’. The case was referred back to the local court, which acquitted the
four human rights defenders in June 2023.
Some media outlets close to the government continued to portray human rights defenders as
terrorists and criminals, notably for accepting funds from international donors, including the
EU. The defamatory rhetoric used by high-level public officials to comment on court
proceedings of human rights defenders is a matter of serious concern and casts doubt on the
integrity of judicial proceedings and on the right to a fair trial.
Women’s organisations faced pressure in the form of defamation, detentions, investigations
and arrests. Women activists also faced detentions and police violence while exercising their
right to freedom of assembly. The closure case against the Tarlabaşı Community Centre in
Istanbul continued. The court cases against the executives of the Rosa Women’s Association
based in Diyarbakır continued. Concerning the closure case against ‘We Will Stop Femicides
Platform’ on the grounds of ‘conducting activities contrary to law and morality’, in
September 2023, the first instance court decided to reject it.
Stigmatisation, hate speech and discriminatory discourse targeting LGBTIQ civil society
organisations and persons remained very strong. Anti-LGBTIQ discourse was
instrumentalised by the governing coalition during the electoral campaign. Anti-LGBTIQ
rallies took place in a number of cities during the autumn of 2022, whereas pride marches
were banned and heavily repressed by the police.
17
The legal framework regulating the work of civil society organisations lacks clarity and
carries the risk of arbitrariness during implementation. It remained compulsory for all
associations to register their members in the Ministry of Interior’s information system. This
legal obligation is not in line with the OSCE/Council of Europe guidelines on freedom of
association.
The Law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continued
to be used by the authorities to disproportionally target independent rights-based
organisations, despite the Venice Commission’s and the UN Special Rapporteurs’
recommendations that the government should reconsider certain aspects of the legislation.
The Law should not be used to hinder civil society’s freedom of association and assembly,
including their fundraising activities.
The Law on collection of aid continued to impose burdensome requirements for permits that
discourage fundraising activities by civil society organisations and de facto limit civil society
activities. The distribution of public funds to civil society organisations remained
untransparent. Heavy taxation hampered the functioning and development of foundations and
associations. The status of ‘public benefit’ for associations and ‘tax exemption’ for
foundations are vaguely defined and are arbitrarily granted by the President. Foreign donors
providing financial support to civil society in Türkiye were often slandered and beneficiary
NGOs ran the risk of having their activities criminalised because they had received foreign
funds.
In August 2022, the Ministry of Interior’s Directorate General for Relations with Civil
Society published the draft civil society strategy document and action plan (2023-2027) for
consultation. Despite public consultations, strategy development lacked transparency and
clarity.
Open and transparent participatory and consultation mechanisms are needed for cooperation
between the authorities and civil society, for policymaking and for amending the legal
framework. Overall, the legal, financial and administrative environment needs to be more
conducive to developing civil society in Türkiye.
Civilian oversight of the security forces
In the reporting period, the executive branch continued to hold extensive authority over the
security forces. The civilian component of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ), which is
responsible for setting the military agenda and making such decisions as appointments,
promotions and dismissals of high-ranking military personnel, did not change. The scope of
the military judicial system was curbed. Civilian higher courts continued to review appeals
against the decisions of military courts. However, civilian oversight of the security forces
remained incomplete due to the lack of effective accountability mechanisms. Parliamentary
oversight of the security institutions needs to be strengthened. The legal framework for
overseeing military expenditure was not improved.
The culture of impunity continued to prevail within the security sector, where security
personnel benefited from de facto judicial and administrative protection in cases involving
alleged human rights violations and the disproportionate use of force. Military personnel and
high-ranking command officials still have special legal privileges when prosecuted.
Moreover, the investigation of alleged offences committed by security personnel requires
prior authorisation by either military or civilian superiors.
Situation in the east and south-east
18
The situation in the south-east remained worrying and was exacerbated by the earthquakes in
February 2023, which also affected part of the region. The Turkish government continued its
domestic and cross-border security and military operations in Iraq and Syria, including after
the earthquakes. The security situation remained precarious in border areas with terrorist
attacks led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which remains on the EU list of persons,
groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. The government retains a legitimate right to
fight terrorism, however, related activities should be in line with the rule of law, fundamental
rights and freedoms. There was no progress towards the resumption of a credible political
peace process to achieve a sustainable solution to the Kurdish issue. The Kurdistan
Communities Union (KCK) declared a unilateral truce in Türkiye after the earthquakes in
February and extended it until the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections in May.
The truce was terminated in June 2023.
In the aftermath of the November 2022 attack in Istanbul, which left 6 dead and 81 wounded,
Turkish officials rapidly arrested a Syrian national, as the alleged main perpetrator of the
attack, and attributed the attack to the PKK-linked People’s Protection Units (YPG), even
though the PKK denied its involvement. Türkiye launched a series of airstrikes in northern
Syria and Iraq against the PKK and affiliated groups.
In March 2023, the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) published a report on its visit to the
high-security prison on the island of Imralı, where the PKK’s leader Öcalan and three other
inmates are being held. The report stated that detention conditions had significantly improved
for Mr Öcalan and remained satisfactory for the three other inmates. However, the CPT
expressed serious concern that the prisoners’ contact with the outside world had been further
limited. During the reporting period, Mr Öcalan was not allowed to receive visits from his
family or his lawyers.
In Diyarbakir’s Sur municipality, after the state took possession of land from its owners for
public use, several court cases were launched by owners challenging the assessed value of
their expropriated property. The principle of participation by the local residents was ignored
in the planning of the area’s reconstruction. Serious violations of human rights by security
forces (including alleged instances of torture, ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests and procedural
rights violations) continued to be reported. There have also been reports of severe acts of
violence and other abuses committed by the security forces in the aftermath of the
earthquakes and during the state of emergency.
Eastern and south-eastern provincial governors often imposed blanket bans on meetings,
demonstrations and events in their provinces. The longest of these has been in force in Van
since 2016. The broad interpretation of terrorism, judicial and administrative pressure
imposed on journalists, political opponents, bar associations and human rights defenders
working on the Kurdish issue raised repeated concerns. Many associations, Kurdish-language
media outlets and cultural rights institutions remained closed.
The 15 Kurdish journalists and one media worker, who were detained in Diyarbakır in June
2022, were released in July 2023 under judicial control condition and the next trial session is
due in November. Over 100 people (including several journalists, lawyers, members of
political parties, artists and members of civil society) were detained in April 2023 in a
coordinated operation across 21 Turkish provinces on the grounds of alleged ‘membership in
a terrorist organisation’. Some lawyers and journalists were released, but a court case was
launched against 11 Kurdish journalists. The 2021 Constitutional Court judgment annulling a
provision of the emergency decree regarding the closure in 2016 of media outlets on the
grounds of ‘posing a threat to national security’ and annulling a provision that allowed the
19
seizure of properties of closed media outlets was not implemented. In January 2023, the
Diyarbakir Regional Court of Appeals upheld the prison sentence against journalist
Abdurrahman Gök for photographing the killing by the police of university student Kemal
Kurkut during the 2017 Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır. The local court had sentenced
Gök in June 2022 to more than one year in prison on the grounds of propagandising for a
terrorist organisation while acquitting him of ‘being a member of an illegal organisation’.
Hate crimes and hate speech against Kurds continued. The court case in relation to the hate
killing of HDP staff member Deniz Poyraz in Izmir was concluded in December 2022 and the
court sentenced the perpetrator to aggravated life imprisonment (i.e. the most severe penalty
under Turkish law) on the charge of ‘intentional killing’ as well as other minor offences.
Several attacks against HDP buildings and election offices have been reported, including
during the electoral campaign period.
In January 2023, an investigation was launched against the presidents of 12 bar associations
over their joint statement against Turkish military operations in northern Syria and Iraq and
calling for peace, on the grounds of ‘insulting the Turkish Nation, the State of the Republic of
Türkiye and its institutions’.
The March 2023 Kurdish Newroz celebrations took place amid a heavy police presence. The
Diyarbakir Bar association reported that law enforcement forces used excessive and
disproportionate force during the celebrations. The police detained 350 people, most of whom
were shortly released.
The Kobane trial of 108 members and executives of the HDP continued. During the April
2023 session the prosecutor of the case issued his final opinion and demanded aggravated life
sentences for 36 HDP executives (including the party’s former co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş)
and the re-arrest of 12 released defendants. The trial was adjourned to July 2023 and is still
ongoing. There were numerous new detentions and arrests of HDP members and mayors,
municipal council members and municipal executives on terrorism-related charges in the east
and south-east of Türkiye. Requests by the prosecution to the parliament to remove the
immunity of almost all HDP lawmakers are pending. The closure case against the HDP
continued in the Constitutional Court (see above under ‘the parliament’).
Former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş remained in prison despite two final ECtHR
judgments ruling in favour of his immediate release. In March 2023, the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe urged Türkiye to release Mr Demirtaş, in line with the
ECtHR judgments. The Constitutional Court’s ruling of June 2020 on the violation of
Mr Demirtaş’ right to liberty and security was not implemented. Former HDP MP and co-
chair Aysel Tuğluk, who was reportedly seriously ill, was released from prison in October
2022.
In October 2022, the ECtHR, in its ruling on the case of 13 imprisoned former HDP MPs,
found that several articles of the ECHR had been violated and stated that the arrests were
politically motivated. In July 2022, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Turkish State had
violated the rights of former HDP co-chair Figen Yüksekdağ to freedom of thought and
expression by stripping her of her parliamentary immunity in 2016, and ordered the State to
pay Yüksekdağ TRY 30 000 for non-pecuniary losses.
In June 2023, out of the 65 municipalities won by the HDP in the 2019 local elections, 48
remained ruled by State-appointed trustees and another 6 by AK party mayors. Since the first
trustee appointment in June 2019, 83 co-mayors have been detained, 39 mayors arrested and
6 HDP co-mayors remain in prison. The March 2022 Recommendations on Türkiye of the
20
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe need to be
implemented.
Court cases continued regarding government-funded construction projects on cultural,
historical and religious heritage sites, which were damaged in the 2015 and 2016 operations.
There were renewed tensions around several new mining projects, including in the Tunceli
Mountains, which is part of a national park and a sacred site for Alevis.
There was no comprehensive and consistent approach in place for missing persons, the
exhumation of mass graves or the independent investigation of all alleged cases of
extrajudicial killing by security and law enforcement officers. Most of the investigations of
cases of enforced disappearance from the 1990s have passed the 20-year statute of
limitations. Out of more than 1 400 cases of missing persons since then, only 16 court cases
have been launched and 14 of these ended in the acquittal of the alleged perpetrators.
Concerns remained about the continued justification of extraterritorial abductions and forced
returns under the pretext of combating terrorism and protecting national security. The village
guard system, a paramilitary force supporting the Turkish security forces, was maintained.
Some village guards were linked to widespread human rights violations and excessive use of
force, particularly against the Kurdish population. The village guard system is hindering the
return of displaced villagers and continues to impede progress towards a political resolution
of the Kurdish issue.
Refugees and internally displaced persons
Türkiye continues to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world. In August 2023,
according to official data, Türkiye was hosting 3 298 817 Syrian refugees with temporary
protection status, and some 91 711 Syrians with residence status. Around 1.7 million of these
were being hosted in the 11 provinces affected by the earthquakes.
According to official sources, 223 881 Syrians had been granted Turkish citizenship in
December 2022. 561 758 Syrian refugees had voluntarily returned to Syria from Türkiye
according to government data. In May 2023, according to the Presidency for Migration
Management, in addition to the Syrian refugees, Türkiye hosted 300 720 asylum-seekers
from other countries. In December 2022, 1 345 488 foreign nationals holding residence
permits were present in Türkiye, including humanitarian residence permit holders. The return
of irregular migrants from the Greek islands, which Türkiye unilaterally suspended on public
health grounds in March 2020, has not resumed. The EU has repeatedly called on Türkiye to
resume return operations in line with the commitments made under the EU-Turkey
Statement. Resettlement of Syrian refugees from Türkiye to EU Member States continued in
the reporting period totalling 39 648 by September 2023. Recurrent allegations of human
rights violations in the field of migration, particularly in removal centres, remain a concern.
Over the last year, media and civil society continued to report on policies and practices in
breach of human rights standards and Turkish legislation. Türkiye needs to further align its
practice in removal centres with European standards, in particular with regard to protection of
human rights (including access to legal counselling and interpreters) and protection of
vulnerable groups (in particular, children staying with their families) (see Chapter 24).
Public discontent with the presence of Syrian refugees increased, and became an important
electoral topic and a matter of constant debate. A large majority of refugees and asylum
seekers do not have effective access to the labour market, in particular to formal employment,
due to low employability (lower levels of education and skills), language barriers and limited
access to information and services.
21
Türkiye made sustained significant efforts to support refugees and ensure wider access to
healthcare and schooling, although restrictions to registration hampered access to these
services. By February 2023, over 846 000 refugee children had been enrolled in formal
education in Türkiye, which was about 104 000 more than the previous academic year. Over
720 000 of these were of Syrian origin. However, more than 400 000 school-aged refugee
children were still out of school and did not have any access to education opportunities.
Refugees (mainly Syrians under temporary protection) continued to benefit from free-of-
charge healthcare services provided in 190 migrant health centres funded by the EU through
its Facility for Refugees in Turkey and in Turkish hospitals. The EU supported the
employment of almost 4 000 healthcare workers to ensure that refugees and people under
subsidiary protection have access to healthcare services. Over 7 million primary health care
consultations were conducted in EU-supported primary level healthcare facilities in 2022.
The capacity of mental health and psychosocial support services, reproductive health
services, mobile health services and health literacy for the refugees have also improved.
Furthermore, the health infrastructure was also improved by the completion of the
construction of two new state hospitals in Dörtyol Hatay and Kilis, which were fully financed
by the EU and inaugurated during the reporting period.
There was no progress on the situation of internally displaced persons resulting from the
violence in the south-east in the 1990s and in more recent years.
After the February 2023 earthquakes, which affected an estimated 15 million people in 11
provinces, there were massive population relocations, both within the provinces and away
from them. An estimated 2.9 million people have moved away from the affected provinces.
Public administration reform
Türkiye is in between some and moderate level of preparation in the field of public
administration reform. It made no progress over the reporting period. The country still lacks
the political will to reform the public administration and public financial management. The
restructuring of the executive branch and overhaul of the public administration in line with
the presidential system introduced in 2017 resulted in very high levels of centralisation of the
policymaking system. The level of accountability of the administration remains insufficient.
Its human resources management system remains outdated and needs to be reformed. The
politicisation of all branches of the administration has continued. The share of women in
managerial posts in the civil service is still low. The public administration does not use
evidence-based methods or participatory mechanisms in policymaking.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ prepare and adopt an interinstitutional public administration reform document in line with
EU principles and values, and with the necessary political ownership and support;
→ introduce merit-based recruitments, appointments and promotions, notably to the senior
positions;
→ review the policymaking process to achieve inclusive and evidence-based methods of
preparing policy planning documents and legislative proposals.
Strategic framework for public administration reform
Türkiye still lacks both a comprehensive strategy for public administration reform and the
political will to reform. In 2022, the administration produced numerous policy planning and
sectoral policy documents on multiple aspects of public administration. In the absence of a
comprehensive strategy, these documents lack a sound budget forecast and a coherent
22
approach. An administrative unit with the legal mandate to design, coordinate and monitor
public administration reform and public policy documents has yet to be established. The unit
would need to coordinate with the Ministry of Finance and Treasury to ensure strategic
planning is consistent with fiscal planning and to efficiently tackle the issue of managerial
accountability.
Policy development and coordination
Türkiye continued the strong trend to centralise policymaking under the presidential system,
further preventing an inclusive, participatory and evidence-based policymaking process.
Policy coordination, policy planning and inter-agency cooperation among government
institutions needs to be improved. In the absence of well-functioning administrative controls
and parliamentary scrutiny, policy planning, monitoring and reporting of government
performance remains inadequate. The administration does not carry out regulatory impact
assessments or public consultations systematically.
Public financial management
Türkiye still lacks an overarching public financial management reform programme.
Parliamentary engagement and oversight over the budget remain weak. Numerous exceptions
introduced in the public procurement Law limit the transparency of tenders and public
expenditure. (see also Chapter 5 – Public procurement). Türkiye does not have in place an
independent oversight body to ensuring fiscal discipline. Given the lack of adequate ex post
monitoring and reporting, major public investment programmes lack transparency.
On external audit, the Turkish Court of Accounts (TCA) continued to carry out a range of ex
post controls. The TCA’s audit reports continued to provide substantive information for
parliamentary oversight and public scrutiny. However, shortcomings remain in the legal
framework of the Law on the Court of Accounts and in the associated process of
parliamentary scrutiny. There needs to be greater parliamentary and judicial follow-up to the
TCA’s audit reports.
There is limited parliamentary oversight of the budget, which resulted in a low degree of
budget transparency. The Turkish State Wealth Fund (TWF) lacks accountability and
transparency. The 2022 audit report was not published on the TWF website, which contains
limited information overall (see Chapter 32 - Financial control).
Following the February earthquakes, the parliament adopted a law creating a Disaster
Reconstruction Fund, governing the allocation of resources to restore infrastructure in areas
affected by various natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, fires and landslides in
regions classified as 'disaster zones'. However, the law lacked details on the decision-making
process, and on the transparency rules for managing the Fund, apart from an obligation to
report financial data to the public on a quarterly basis.
Public service and human resources management
The 1965 legal framework governing human resources management in the civil service is
outdated. The civil service legal framework fails to ensure the political neutrality of the civil
service. There is growing concern about the lack of merit-based recruitment and
appointments in the civil service. The appointment procedure for senior civil service posts
lacks competitive objective criteria, leaving appointments open to nepotism and political
interference. There is a set of uniform criteria for demotion, dismissals and disciplinary
measures, but there is a general lack of transparency in implementing the criteria. The civil
service remuneration system is not standardised across the institutions. The ethics committees
were ineffective against allegations of corruption and wrongdoings.
23
Accountability of the administration
Under the presidential system, accountability is centralised and held by the President. Given
that internal control and audit do not function effectively, the level of accountability of
agencies is weak and insufficient to protect citizens’ right to good administration.
Citizens’ right to access public information is regulated by the Law on the right to
information, which does not require proactive disclosure and provides broad exemptions. A
simplified online access system received millions of requests to access information. The
Board of Review of Access to Information is responsible for assessing appeals filed against a
refusal to provide access to public information. The backlog of cases continues to hamper
citizens’ rights to administrative justice and their right to seek compensation.
Strong concerns remain on the quality of the work of the Inquiry Commission on the State of
Emergency Measures, even though it has completed the examination of all cases. Strong
concerns remain as to whether cases were examined individually, whether the rights of
defence were upheld and whether the assessment procedure was in line with international
standards.
Service delivery to citizens and businesses
A thorough process is needed to simplify administrative procedures. However, in the
continuous absence of a law on general administrative procedures, which is necessary to give
citizens and businesses greater legal certainty, simplifying administrative procedures remains
problematic.
The government continued to develop user-focused administration at central and local
government level and expanded access to e-government services. Several public services are
accessible through e-government tools. A monitoring system needs to be set up to reduce the
barriers to access services for persons with disabilities.
2.2. RULE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
2.2.1. Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights
The EU’s founding values include the rule of law and respect for human rights. An effective
(independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against
corruption are of paramount importance, as is respect for fundamental rights in law and in
practice.
Türkiye remains at an early stage of applying the EU acquis and European standards in the
area of rule of law and fundamental rights. There was backsliding during the reporting
period.
Major issues identified in previous reports, such as the systemic lack of independence of the
judiciary and the urgent need to improve the human rights situation, remain unaddressed. The
2019 judicial reform strategy (JRS) and the 2021 human rights action plan (HRAP) tackle
some of the areas where reforms are needed but did not include concrete steps to remedy the
most acute problems.
Functioning of the judiciary
Türkiye remains at an early stage in this area. Serious backsliding continued and despite the
several judicial reform packages in recent years, the structural deficiencies in the judicial
system remained unaddressed. The continued refusal to implement certain rulings of the
24
ECtHR remains a matter of serious concern. Undue pressure by the authorities on judges and
prosecutors continued to have a negative effect on the independence and quality of the
judiciary. Implementation of the 2019 JRS and the 2021 HRAP continued, but the activities
foreseen in these documents fell short of addressing the structural problems and the issues
identified in the previous reports of the European Commission. The lack of objective, merit-
based, uniform and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and
prosecutors remains a source of concern. Several politically motivated cases against
opposition politicians were initiated during the reporting period.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not addressed. Türkiye needs to
adopt and implement measures to significantly improve the overall functioning of the
country’s judicial system.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ create a political and legal environment in line with European standards that allows the
judiciary to carry out its duties independently and impartially; strengthen judicial
responsibilities, with the executive and legislature fully respecting the separation of
powers; and ensure that lower courts respect judgments by the Constitutional Court,
whose decisions should abide by ECtHR jurisprudence;
→ amend the structure and process of selecting the members of the Council of Judges and
Prosecutors (HSK) so that the role and influence of the executive is limited; and introduce
safeguards against any interference by the HSK or high-level officials in judicial
proceedings;
→ provide effective guarantees against transfers of judges without their consent;
→ in accordance with the guarantee of judicial independence under the Constitution, limit
any suspension of judges from office to cases where there are well-founded suspicions of
serious misbehaviour; and take measures to remedy the damage caused by dismissals that
have taken place in breach of procedural rights;
→ revise the system of disciplinary proceedings so that it is based on objective criteria and
without any undue influence from the executive;
→ in relation to the administrative and judicial measures taken against individuals, ensure
that any allegation of wrongdoing or crime is subject to due process and based on
concrete evidence, and follows fully transparent procedures under the authority of an
independent judiciary;
→ ensure that all judicial proceedings respect fundamental rights (including procedural
rights), in particular the presumption of innocence, individual criminal responsibility,
legal certainty, the right to defence, the right to a fair trial, equality of arms and the right
to an effective appeal.
Strategic documents
Implementation of the 2021 HRAP and the 2019-2023 JRS continued. A new (seventh)
judicial reform package was adopted in April 2023. The government’s implementation report
for the JRS stated that, as of May 2023, 70% of the activities had been completed. However,
the actions included in the HRAP do not address Türkiye’s fundamental human rights
shortcomings. The 7th
judicial reform package failed to address many structural issues of
concern related to the judicial system indicated in the previous annual reports of the European
Commission. However, it did provide some positive steps regarding the increased sentences
25
for smuggling and the possibility of postponing the execution of a sentence for convicted
women due to a child’s sickness.
Management bodies
Concerns remain around the structure of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK), its
lack of independence from the executive and the appointment process for its members. In
accordance with the Constitution, the President appoints 4 out of 13 members and the
parliament elects 7 by qualified majority. The remaining 2 seats are allocated ex officio to the
Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister. None of the members are elected by their peers.
Due to its lack of independence, the HSK has been suspended from participating in the
European Network of Councils for the Judiciary since December 2016.
The budget allocated to the HSK increased to TRY 312 551 000 in 2023 (TRY 193 657 975
in 2022).
Independence and impartiality
Although the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence is enshrined in the
Constitution and other legislative provisions, there are strong concerns regarding political
influence on the judiciary. The HRAP included some actions to improve the independence of
the judiciary, but these actions have not been implemented.
High-level officials and representatives of the executive (including the President) continued
to comment publicly on ongoing judicial cases, thus undermining judicial independence.
They also publicly criticised the ECtHR and Constitutional Court case law. Lower courts at
times ignored or significantly delayed implementation of decisions reached by the
Constitutional Court. The non-implementation of the administrative courts’ decisions by the
administration also remains an issue of concern.
Individual applications to the Constitutional Court had limited effect, especially with regard
to politically motivated trials.
Accountability
The obligation for judges and prosecutors to declare their assets every 5 years is still
applicable. No information is available on the sanctions imposed if this procedure was not
followed. A credible and functioning verification system needs to be developed, including
appropriate follow-up for late or incorrect declarations of assets.
Professionalism and competence
The selection and recruitment of judges and prosecutors is conducted in a non-transparent
manner. The Ministry of Justice supervised the selection boards for new judges and
prosecutors, while the HSK had no role in the selection boards. The annual appraisal of
judges and prosecutors was done by the HSK. There was limited progress in setting objective,
merit-based, standardised and pre-established criteria for recruiting and promoting judges and
prosecutors.
Quality of justice
As of September 2023, Türkiye had 16 225 full-time judges (19.13 per 100 000 inhabitants)
and 7 601 full-time prosecutors (8.96 per 100 000 inhabitants). Out of 23 826 judges and
prosecutors, 8 871 are women. The final budget for the entire justice system increased to
TRY 51.2 billion in 2022 (while TRY 34.37 billion was initially approved) compared with
almost TRY 24 billion in 2021.
26
Pre-service training for candidate judges and prosecutors and in-service training continued to
be delivered by the Justice Academy. The Academy has scientific, administrative and
financial autonomy by law, but there are still concerns related to its independence because its
management is left to its president, who is appointed by the President of the Republic. The
Academy’s lack of independence affects its capacity to provide training programmes that
meet the requirements of openness, competence and impartiality. The European Judicial
Training Network (EJTN) therefore maintained the suspension of the Academy’s observer
status that was originally decided in 2017.
The quality of judicial decisions and indictments remains insufficient due to the lack of legal
reasoning and sufficient factual evidence to lead to convictions that often relate to alleged
offences supporting terrorism. The defence lawyers’ access to case files for a specific
catalogue of crimes is sometimes restricted until the indictment is issued. In some politically
sensitive cases, the indictments took months to be finalised.
Pre-trial detention continues to be frequently imposed, despite the fact that this is a measure
of last resort by European standards. Defendants were increasingly held in prisons or
detention centres far from the location of the alleged crime, appearing at their hearing via an
audiovisual system rather than in person. Frequent transfers of judges and prosecutors
continued to impair the quality of justice, as did the appointment of newly recruited and less
experienced judges and prosecutors to criminal courts.
Trial-monitoring organisations and lawyers reported that in politically sensitive cases judges
frequently barred journalists and observers and sometimes even the defendants’ lawyers from
the courtroom. In terrorism-related cases, the practice of providing evidence extracted
coercively from secret witnesses who cannot be cross-examined or from a single witness
without supporting evidence remained a major concern. Frequent use of the confidentiality of
decisions in political cases should be revised because it is often used to limit lawyers’ access
to their clients’ files, thus violating the right of defence.
In October 2022, the Council of State ruled in favour of the reinstatement of 178 judges and
prosecutors dismissed under the 2016 state of emergency decrees on the basis of alleged ties
to the Gülen movement, arguing that the acts attributed to them were insufficient to prove
their links to the movement. The Council of State also ordered the State to pay compensation
and damages to the judges and prosecutors. As of March 2023, 3 683 of the dismissals had
been finalised and 3 cases were ongoing. 845 dismissed/suspended judges and prosecutors
had been reinstated. As of March 2023, 343 judges and prosecutors who had filed a
complaint with the Council of State on the issue of their removal had been reinstated. This
decision followed an ECtHR ruling that the government had violated the ECHR by detaining
167 judges and prosecutors after the attempted coup in 2016.
Efficiency
The backlog of cases remained a problem. Large parts of the judiciary continued to be under
severe pressure to handle cases quickly. Delays in criminal cases, which are often postponed
for months, and delays in cases where the defendants were arrested pending trial violate the
defendants’ rights.
Regarding the backlog of cases in the high courts, at the end of 2022, 293 207 criminal and
64 126 administrative cases for the Court of Cassation were postponed to 2023, compared
with 296 907 and 76 455 respectively in 2021. 120 773 cases for the Council of State were
transferred from 2022 compared with 128 961 in 2021. As regards the regional courts of
appeals, in 2022, a total of 809 989 cases were transferred from 2021; the courts received
1 258 366 new cases and settled 1 146 065 cases. Individual applications to the Constitutional
27
Court continued to increase. In 2022, 109 779 applications were lodged and 73 036 were
concluded.
Fight against corruption
Türkiye is at an early stage in the fight against corruption. There was no progress in the
reporting period. Türkiye has not addressed outstanding deficiencies in key areas of the fight
against corruption in recent years. It has not taken preventive action and has not set up anti-
corruption bodies in line with the United Nations Convention against Corruption, to which
Türkiye is party. The legal framework and institutional architecture need to be improved to
limit undue political influence on the prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases. The
accountability and transparency of public institutions need to be improved. The absence of an
anti-corruption strategy and action plan indicated a lack of political will to fight decisively
against corruption. The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)
recommendations remained unimplemented. Overall, corruption remains a major issue. In the
coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ implement its international obligations in relation to the fight against corruption, in
particular the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the relevant Council of
Europe Conventions;
→ ensure effective follow-up of the recommendations issued by GRECO, including through
adopting the necessary legislation;
→ elaborate an anti-corruption strategy that reflects a clear political will and vision to
effectively address corruption, underpinned by a credible and realistic action plan.
Track record
The track record of investigations, prosecutions and convictions in corruption cases remained
poor, particularly in relation to high-level corruption cases involving politicians and public
officials. Sentences are lenient and do not have a deterrent effect. Cooperation between audit
and inspection units with prosecution offices needs to be improved. Political party and
election campaign financing, local administrations, land administration and management, and
the construction and transportation industries (especially when implementing projects via
public-private partnerships) remained particularly prone to corruption. The increasing use and
wide scope of exemptions in procurement procedures undermined the integrity of public
procurement. Outstanding GRECO recommendations on political party financing have not
been addressed.
Institutional framework
Prevention measures
Türkiye continued to lack a permanent, functionally independent anti-corruption prevention
body. The level of coordination between various preventive bodies remains inadequate. The
State Supervisory Council, which is responsible for coordinating preventive anti-corruption
measures, is not independent. Financial control of political parties remained ineffective.
There have been no regular awareness-raising campaigns on anti-corruption.
Law enforcement
There are no specialised law enforcement authorities, prosecution services and courts
specifically dedicated to the fight against corruption. The executive retained undue political
influence over the judicial police. Financial investigations are not systematically started in
28
corruption and organised crime cases. The legal framework of anti-corruption remains weak,
including for the private sector.
Legal framework
Türkiye is party to all international anti-corruption conventions, including the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption. However, Türkiye needs to fully implement such provisions.
The legislative amendments envisaged in previous anti-corruption strategies (i.e. the Law on
general administrative procedure, the Law on public procurement, the Code of Ethics for
Members of Parliament and the Law on whistle-blower protection) have not been adopted.
In November 2022, the OECD Working Group on Bribery also underlined Türkiye’s
continued inaction with respect to long-standing recommendations on the liability of legal
persons in particular in relation to foreign bribery, as well as issues concerning whistle-
blower protection and prosecutorial independence, and the lack of enforcement of its foreign
bribery laws.
Türkiye failed to comply with the GRECO recommendations on judicial independence, and
on transparency of the legislative process and political party financing. Legal loopholes
remain in the Criminal Code’s corruption-related provisions, which do not meet the standards
put in place by the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Public procurement legislation
is not in line with the EU’s acquis. The legal privileges of public officials continued to
provide legal protection for public officials and hamper anti-corruption criminal and
administrative investigations. The legal framework on conflicts of interest as well as public
officials’ asset declarations remained inadequate. Türkiye has no legislation governing
lobbying.
Strategic framework
Previous anti-corruption strategies and action plans failed to meet most of their key
objectives. Outstanding anti-corruption measures for these action plans have not been
followed up. There is no ongoing anti-corruption strategy and action plan, and no efforts were
made to develop new ones with the involvement of relevant institutions and civil society.
Fundamental rights
Human rights continued to deteriorate and no progress was made on last year’s
recommendations. The Turkish legal framework includes general guarantees of respect for
human and fundamental rights, but the legislation and its implementation need to be brought
into line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) case law. No legislative amendments were adopted to eliminate the
remaining elements of the 2016 state of emergency laws. The Council of Europe’s
Parliamentary Assembly continued to monitor Türkiye’s respect for human rights, democracy
and the rule of law. Türkiye’s continued refusal to implement certain ECtHR rulings further
increased concerns regarding the judiciary’s adherence to international and European
standards. The 2021 HRAP continued to be implemented but did not address critical issues or
improve the overall human rights situation. Trials and convictions of journalists, writers,
lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and other critical voices for alleged support for
terrorism have continued.
In addition to addressing the shortcomings set out in this section, which have still not been
addressed, Türkiye should in particular in the coming year:
→ align its criminal and anti-terror legislation, and its implementation of European
standards, the ECHR, ECtHR case law and the Venice Commission recommendations;
29
→ ensure that any allegations of offences are subject to due process, based on concrete
evidence and fully transparent procedures carried out under the authority of an
independent and impartial judiciary; and fully respect the right to a fair trial and relevant
procedural rights, in particular the presumption of innocence, the principle of legal
certainty, the right to defence, equality of arms and the right to an effective remedy;
→ improve the legislative framework and its implementation, in order to effectively tackle
all forms of violence against women, including domestic violence, psychological and
physical abuse, sexual harassment, rape, so-called ‘honour’ crimes, stalking and forced
marriage;
→ improve the legislative framework and its implementation to effectively tackle all forms
of racism and discrimination, including against LGBTIQ persons and ensure the
protection of minorities.
→ implement the ECtHR judgments as a matter of priority, including in the case of Kavala v
Türkiye.
Türkiye is a party to most international human rights instruments, but serious human
rights violations continued. The Council of State ruled in January 2023 that the President’s
decision to withdraw from the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating
violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention) was lawful.
Türkiye has not yet signed the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from
Enforced Disappearance and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
continued its full monitoring procedure.
In June 2023, there were 23 851 applications pending before the ECtHR. The ECtHR
delivered judgments on 637 applications and found breaches of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) in 66 out of 69 cases (against 70 violations in 2022) that mainly
concerned the right to respect for private and family life, the right to a fair trial, the right to
liberty and security and freedom of assembly and association. During the reporting period,
there were 13 232 new applications allocated to a decision body of the ECtHR. There are
currently 184 cases against Türkiye under enhanced supervision by the Committee of
Ministers.
There were no developments with regard to the implementation of the ECtHR’s July 2022
Grand Chamber judgment on the Kavala case as part of the ongoing infringement procedure
launched by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe against Türkiye (see the
‘Judiciary’ section).
Regarding promotion and enforcement of human rights, the March 2021 human rights
action plan (HRAP) continued to be implemented. The annual monitoring report, which was
due in March 2023, has not been published and an evidence-based assessment of the
implementation of the HRAP is missing. The HRAP does not include measures to address the
main shortcomings in the human rights situation in Türkiye that were identified in previous
years’ reports by the European Commission.
The Human Rights and Equality Institution of Türkiye (HREI) and the Ombudsman are the
main human rights institutions. The Ombudsman processes complaints against the actions of
the public administration while the HREI only accepts cases that fall outside the
Ombudsman’s remit. The HREI lacks ex officio powers to initiate investigations and to
intervene in cases with legal remedies. The number of cases treated by the two institutions
increased, but concerns remain regarding the operational, structural and financial
independence of both institutions and the appointment of their members. The effectiveness of
30
both institutions remained limited. The HREI was accredited to the Global Alliance for
National Human Rights Institutions with a B status in October 2022.
In 2022, the HREI received 2 020 applications (1 185 in 2021), visited 63 institutions
(including prisons) and adopted 69 reports prepared within the scope of visits. The HREI
makes prison visits in its role as the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM), but does not
have set and independent criteria for announced visits. In some visits, it only interacted with
the administration and did not speak to the detainees. It has not visited all the prisons with the
highest number of allegations of human rights violations, or did so with a significant delay.
The recommendations mainly deal with minor issues and do not make concrete statements on
serious human rights abuses. The HREI needs to improve its reputation regarding effectively
tackling human rights issues and engaging in constructive dialogue with civil society. The
HREI remained largely ineffective due to legislative and structural restrictions, including by
not accepting applications filed by civil society organisations and by being overly cautious in
tackling cases of torture and ill treatment. 132 of the 3 638 applications filed with the
parliament’s Human Rights Inquiry Committee in 2022 were not processed.
The term of office of the State of Emergency Commission expired in January 2023. The
Commission found 17 960 of the 109 332 filed applications to be admissible but rejected
86% of them.
The space for civil society organisations and human rights defenders continued to be very
limited due to continuous pressure through judicial and administrative investigations, threats,
surveillance, arbitrary detentions and ill-treatment of human rights defenders. The
chairperson of the Turkish Medical Association was arrested after calling for an investigation
into allegations that the Turkish armed forces had used chemical weapons in Northern Iraq.
She was later released and the case is ongoing. Similar cases, coupled with smear campaigns
by some media outlets close to the government and aggressive language by high-level
officials, had a chilling effect on civil society. Intimidation of, and court cases against,
lawyers who provide legal assistance to members of the civil society and human rights
defenders continued.
The three court cases lodged against the Human Rights Association’s chairperson ended in
acquittal, but appeals were made against two of them and are pending before courts of appeal.
The court case continued regarding the 2015 killing of Tahir Elçi, a lawyer and the
chairperson of the Diyarbakir Bar Association. Several female human rights defenders and
activists were detained and faced fines for participating in demonstrations for women’s
rights. The GÖÇİZ-DER court case in which 23 human rights defenders are being tried for
‘using EU and UN funds to conduct research and develop projects on social migration
movements in line with the aims and objectives of the PKK’ continued. There were concerns
regarding the recurrent and disproportionate use of anti-terrorism legislation against NGOs
and human rights defenders.
The retrial of the Büyükada case resulted in the acquittal of four human rights defenders,
including Amnesty International Türkiye's honorary chair, who had been originally sentenced
to over 6 years in prison on charges of ‘membership in a terrorist organisation’.
Concerning the right to life, urgent measures need to be taken by the authorities to align
legislation with ECtHR case-law in order to ensure that credible and effective investigations
are held into reported killings by the security services. The legislation adopted in June 2016,
which grants judicial privileges to the security services and increases the risk of impunity, has
remained in force. In many cases, the authorities did not grant permission to prosecute civil
servants, thus seriously limiting accountability and fostering a climate of impunity for the
31
security forces. No credible investigations were launched into some of the death cases
reported in the media. No adequate investigations have been carried out regarding the alleged
cases of abductions and enforced disappearances by the security services that have been
reported since the 2016 attempted coup. Alleged killings by the security forces in the south-
east, especially during the events in 2015, have not been investigated and prosecuted
effectively. Military or police officers have been implicated in most of these cases (as also
underlined by the ECtHR judgments and the reports of the UN Working Group on ‘Enforced
or Involuntary Disappearances on Turkey’) and investigations have never been properly
carried out. The statute of limitations remains a major concern as regards the impunity of the
offenders. Most of the crimes dating from the 1990s in the south-east have ended in impunity
through acquittal or due to the statute of limitations (for example, the murder of the writer
Musa Anter in Diyarbakır in 1992).
According to various reports, torture and ill-treatment continued to occur in detention
centres, prisons, informal places of detention and transportation vehicles, and on the street
during demonstrations. Disproportionate use of force by security forces continued. Although
tasked with the role of the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM), the HREI does not meet
the key requirements under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) and did not
effectively process cases referred to it. The authorities have not authorised the publication of
the 2016, 2018, 2021 and 2022 reports by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the
Prevention of Torture (CPT). There have been reports documenting several cases of violence,
torture and other abuses committed by the police and gendarmerie in the regions affected by
the February 2023 earthquakes as well as threats against lawyers who documented a torture
case. In some limited cases, administrative actions were taken against the accused officers.
The UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT) visited Türkiye in September 2022 to
assess how the authorities and Türkiye’s national preventive mechanism had implemented the
SPT’s previous recommendations. Effective investigations into allegations of torture and ill
treatment remained limited.
While the number of prisons continued to increase, overcrowding remains a major problem.
As of April 2023, the prison population exceeded 350 000 (with a capacity of 290 000) and
continued to be the largest in Europe. Incidents broke out in Hatay's T-Type Closed Prison
after the authorities denied the inmates’ requests to see their families affected by the
earthquakes. Pilot projects are being implemented in several prisons to improve inmates’
contact with their families, notably via secure video teleconference systems. However,
allegations of human rights violations (including arbitrary restrictions on the rights of
detainees, denial of access to medical care, mistreatment, limitation of open visits and solitary
confinement) continued to be reported. Education, rehabilitation and resocialisation
programmes remained limited. The new S-type security prisons are assessed as increasing
inmates’ isolation. Communal activities remained limited and arbitrary. Transfer to remote
prisons continued, sometimes without early warning. Such transfers had a negative effect on
family visits, especially for poor families and juvenile inmates.
There were allegations of discrimination by prison authorities, especially against LGBTIQ
persons. There was no improvement regarding investigations into allegations of suicides,
strip-searches and discriminatory behaviour by prison guards. Concerns related to the
independence of the Forensic Medicine Institute persisted. Access to medical care for sick
inmates continued to be uneven and at times delayed or denied, causing deaths in prison or
soon after release. Following complaints about food quality and living conditions, the daily
allowance for prison food was increased from TRY 20 to TRY 50 in March 2023.
32
The HREI, as the national preventive mechanism, is also tasked with monitoring the prison
administration and observation boards, but this work has remained ineffective. The work of
the boards is not transparent and not supervised by independent bodies.
On the protection of personal data, the 2016 Personal Data Protection Law is still not
aligned with the EU acquis, notably with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
and the Law Enforcement Directive (LED) that constitutes a potential obstacle in several
policy areas, including with regard to enhanced operational cooperation with Eurojust and
Europol. The scientific commission that was established in 2021 to advance acquis
harmonisation continued its work, but progress has been slower than anticipated. The
legislation needs to be improved, notably with regard to the exceptions for processing of
personal data by judicial and law enforcement authorities and the independence of the
Personal Data Protection Authority. The 2018 Protocol amending the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Council of
Europe, CETS No 223) has yet to be signed.
On freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of worship continued to be
generally respected. The lack of legal personality for the non-Muslim and Alevi communities
remained a serious concern, notably in relation to the lack of legal status for the patriarchates,
the chief rabbinate, synagogues, churches and Cem houses (Alevi places of worship). The
Venice Commission’s recommendations on the legal status of non-Muslim religious
communities and the right of the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul to use
the title ‘Ecumenical’ have yet to be implemented and have continued to be challenged.
Following the publication in June 2022 of the long-awaited Community Foundations Election
Regulation, the vast majority of minority foundations completed their elections, albeit under
strict control and restricted by the state electoral process, and new boards of directors have
taken office. However, rules for the election of the board members in the foundations
controlling community hospitals have yet to be issued. Five articles of the Election
Regulation were improved in September 2022. Decisions in cases related to the property of
religious communities still need to be implemented. The lack of legal provisions on
conscientious objection to army service remained an issue for Jehovah’s Witnesses and other
citizens because refusal to serve in the military results in conviction for desertion. Several
ECtHR judgments and a decision by the United Nations that found violations of the rights of
Jehovah’s Witnesses remained unimplemented. School textbooks need to be revised in order
to remove all discriminatory elements and hate rhetoric against all religious and faith groups.
Further damage to Hagia Sophia was reported, indicating a lack of proper care of this
historical monument. No steps were taken to address the UNESCO World Heritage
Committee’s grave concern about the potential impact of the monument’s status change into
a mosque on the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia. No steps were taken to re-open
the Halki (Heybeliada) Greek Orthodox Seminary, which has been closed since 1971.
Attacks continued against Cem houses and Alevi religious leaders during the reporting
period. The court case concerning the July 2022 attacks in Ankara was concluded at the first
instance court in July 2023, with the main perpetrator sentenced to 3 years in prison, for
damaging places of worship and for deliberate injury. A presidential decree establishing the
Alexi-Bektash Culture and Cemevi Presidency was adopted in November 2022. The Decree
defines the duties and powers of this new state body attached to the Presidency of the
Republic. However, it does not recognise Cem Houses as places of worship. Alevi
organisations held demonstrations in several cities, demanding legal rights and official
recognition of Cem houses.
33
In March 2023, Türkiye submitted an action plan to the Council of Europe regarding the
implementation of four ECtHR judgments filed by the Alevi community on compulsory
religion and ethics classes and the status of Cem houses. In June 2023, the Committee of
Ministers reviewed the cases. On the positive side, this review led to developments allowing
the partial elimination of the imbalance in religious public services provided to the Alevi
community by the State. However, no measures were taken by the authorities to address the
shortcomings identified by the Court as regards the compulsory religious culture and ethics
classes.
Hate speech and hate crimes against Christians, Protestants, Jews and Alevis continued (see
the section on minorities below). No official data exists, but the general trend is that those
most targeted and subjected to hate speech and crimes are Syrians (often refugees), Greeks,
Armenians, Jews and Alevis. The Jewish community and the Chief Rabbi hold annual
holocaust remembrance ceremonies in İstanbul, which are occasionally attended by
authorities at local level. Protestants continued to face problems in gaining official
recognition for their places of worship. Hate speech and insults against atheists and deists
continued. The court case on the killing/disappearance of the Chaldean Catholic couple in
Şırnak in 2020 continued.
The Diyanet (Religious Affairs Presidency) Academy that was established with the amended
March 2022 law started vocational training for imams and Diyanet staff. Reports of
maltreatment and sexual abuse within some Sunni sects continued. The increased work,
powers and influence of the Diyanet continued in all spheres of public life.
Acts of vandalism and destruction of minority worship places and cemeteries were reported
during the period and need to be investigated and prosecuted effectively. In July 2022, the
Jewish cemetery in Istanbul was vandalised and 81 gravestones were damaged. In January
2023, a fire broke out at the Surp Pırgiç Armenian Church lodgings and resulted in the death
of two elderly residents. The authorities condemned the incidents and investigations were
launched. Regarding the fight against antisemitism, Türkiye is an observer country to the
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and it has been taking actions to support and
preserve Jewish cultural heritage.
Two non-Muslim persons were elected as members of parliament in May 2023, one
Armenian and one Syriac. As the Venice Commission underlined in 2010, Türkiye should
continue the reform process and introduce legislation to eliminate all obstacles preventing
non-Muslim religious communities from exercising all their rights and acquiring legal
personality, in accordance with European standards.
There are reports concerning the ill-treatment and detention of members of the Ahmadi
Religion, currently kept in the detention centre of Edirne, for attempting to seek asylum at the
border with Bulgaria. A request for interim measure with the European Court of Human
Rights for their release was rejected on the grounds that national measures need to be
exhausted first.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom of expression
Türkiye continues to be at an early stage in this area and the serious backsliding observed in
recent years continued. The implementation of the criminal laws relating to national security
and anti-terrorism continued to contravene the ECHR and to diverge from ECtHR case law.
Cases and convictions of journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers, opposition
politicians, students, artists and social media users continued. The dissemination of
34
opposition voices and freedom of expression were impaired by the increasing pressure and
restrictive measures. Regarding the May 2023 elections, the ODIHR identified an
environment with restrictions on freedom of expression, both private and public media did
not ensure editorial independence and impartiality in their coverage of the campaign, thus
reducing voters’ ability to make an informed choice.
The recommendations from the European Commission’s last five annual reports were not
addressed. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ release journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers and academics being held in
pre-trial detention and ensure that the criminal cases against them are concluded in
accordance with the criteria set by the ECHR and the ECtHR;
→ ensure a safe and pluralist environment that enables the media to carry out their work
independently and without fear of reprisals and dismissals. This includes ending the
practice of both state and non-state agents of intimidating, interfering with, and putting
pressure on the media;
→ revise criminal legislation, in particular the anti-terror law, the Criminal Code, the data
protection law, the internet law, the new media law in relation to the definition of ‘fake
news’, and the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) law, to ensure that they
comply with European standards and are implemented in a proportionate manner, which
does not curtail freedom of expression;
→ ensure that criminal law provisions on defamation and other similar offences are not used
as a means of putting pressure on critical voices.
Intimidation of journalists
Activities of journalists, writers, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders, opposition
politicians and critical voices continued to be restricted through arrests, detentions,
prosecutions and convictions. These practices continued to hinder the exercise of their
freedoms and led to self-censorship. A few journalists covering the search and rescue efforts
in the area of the earthquakes were reportedly blocked by the police on the basis of the three-
month State of Emergency declared in the region. Some were taken into custody on the
grounds that they had taken pictures without permission. Earthquake victims who spoke to
journalists were also threatened.
Türkiye is ranked 165th
out of 180 in the Reporters without Borders (RSF) 2023 annual
World Press Freedom Index (down from 149th
in 2022). As of June 2023, 59 journalists and
media employees were in prison, either awaiting trial or serving a sentence. In 2022, at least
40 (41 in 2021) journalists were taken into custody and 28 (35 in 2021) journalists were
sentenced to a total of 50.5 years in prison (92.5 in 2021). A large number of cases continued
to be launched against writers and journalists. Threats and physical attacks on journalists and
media organisations due to their work continued during the reporting period. At least 55
opposition journalists in Türkiye were physically assaulted by politically motivated groups.
Prosecutions were initiated against over 700 people, with some 180 people being detained
and more than 40 people arrested, for their social media posts on the February 2023
earthquakes.
Legislative environment
The current laws on anti-terrorism, the internet, intelligence services and the Criminal Code
impede freedom of expression and run counter to European standards. Selective and arbitrary
application of legislation continued to raise concerns as it infringes the basic principles of the
35
rule of law and right to a fair trial. Despite legislative changes introducing the need for a
strong evidence base in ‘catalogue crimes’, cases relating to freedom of expression remained
in the category of crimes that automatically requires ‘arrest pending trial’.
No legislative changes to the Criminal Code and the anti-terrorism law to comply with
ECtHR case law took place in relation to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 2021
resolution on a long-standing series of freedom of expression cases against Türkiye.
The case fi to enable the concentration of resources on rescue efforts, led with the Council of
State by the Union of Turkish Bar Associations against the circular issued by the President in
January 2022 addressed to all print, audio and visual media, including social media and
digital platforms, is ongoing. The circular’s aims include to ‘protect youth, children and
family institutions from bad habits and ignorance and to protect national and moral values
from alienation and degeneration’.
A new Media Law was adopted by the parliament in October 2022. It raises concerns due to
its vague and ambiguous language with regard to what constitutes ‘false or misleading
information’, as it allows arbitrary use of the law to stifle criticism of the government. The
Law leaves the final decision as to what is ‘fake news’ to the judiciary, which does not have
the tools to examine complex situations and does not provide guarantees of independence
from the executive power. Equally worrying is the provision of the Law that stipulates
imprisonment for the crime of disinformation. The Law also increases the punitive powers of
the Press Advertisement Agency (BIK) and increases the sanctions to be imposed on internet
service providers that breach provisions related to information requests from the authorities.
On the positive side, the Law allows internet news sites to benefit from public advertisements
and allows journalists working for internet sites to receive press cards and enjoy certain social
security benefits.
The new Media Law may have serious negative consequences for freedom of expression as it
may foster self-censorship and stifle public debate. Several hundred cases were launched
against social media users on the basis of the Law in relation to the government’s post-
earthquake response. The opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader was the first
high-profile public figure to be charged with ‘disinformation’ for his criticism of the
government response to the earthquakes. He was also charged with ‘insulting the Turkish
nation, the State of the Republic of Türkiye, and the institutions and organs of the State’. An
individual application was lodged with the Constitutional Court on behalf of the first
journalist convicted on charges of ‘openly disseminating information misleading the public’
in December 2022.
The Venice Commission issued an urgent opinion in October 2022 on the draft amendments
to the Turkish Penal Code introducing a provision on ‘false or misleading information’. This
opinion criticised the new Media Law for its lack of proportionality and the risk of increased
media self-censorship and violation of the right of anonymity over the internet.
Implementation/institutions
Selective and arbitrary application of the legislation continued to raise concerns. The quality
of the indictments and accusations remains low as they fail to make a direct and credible link
between the alleged offence and the act. The alleged offences are often acts which constitute
constitutional guarantees, such as attending press conferences or trade union activities.
Despite the 2022 final ECtHR ruling on the Vedat Şorli case, which pronounced that the
article of the Turkish Penal Code providing a maximum sentence of 4 years for insulting the
President is not in line with ECHR principles. This article continued to be used extensively to
36
prosecute persons who criticised the President.
Following the Constitutional Court judgment of July 2019 (finding that the conviction of the
‘Academics for Peace’, who had been dismissed from their positions after signing a
declaration criticising the government over human rights violations in the 2015-2016
operation in the south-east, violated their freedom of expression), some courts have since
ruled in their favour and opened the way for their reinstatement. As a result, a number of
academics were reinstated in their university positions.
The 15 Kurdish journalists and one media worker, who were detained in Diyarbakır in June
2022, were released in July 2023 under judicial control condition. The next trial session is
due in November.
11 journalists were detained in April 2023 and subsequently charged with ‘membership of a
terrorist organisation’.
In January 2023, the Turkish Medical Association (TMA) Chair was sentenced to 2 years, 8
months and 15 days in prison for ‘terror propaganda’ because she had called for an
investigation into the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Turkish armed forces. She was
released from pre-trial detention and the case is being appealed.
The Press Advertising Agency (BIK), which is responsible for placing public advertisements
in the media, replaced its General Board Decision on the Code of Press Ethics of 1994. The
new Decision now includes vague wording on possible violations that may contribute to
further media self-censorship. It also includes ambiguous and generic provisions such as
‘sharing information and visuals on terror organisations’ that are open to interpretation and
can contribute to media censorship. The Constitutional Court ruled in August 2022 that the
broad-ranging authority granted to the BIK concerning the imposition of sanctions (such as
public advertisement bans and fines) and the way it was used violated the right to freedom of
expression. BIK then issued a decision stating that it would not examine applications on Code
of Press Ethics until the parliament amended the law. At the same time, the BIK continued to
allocate public advertising in a discriminatory way that favoured pro-government media. The
discriminatory application of its powers risks pushing independent media into self-
censorship. Measures therefore need to be taken to ensure that the State advertising budget is
fairly distributed in an impartial, accountable and transparent way.
Public Service Broadcasters
The public service broadcaster Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) is affiliated
with the Presidential Communication Authority, and the Radio and Television Supreme
Council (RTÜK) is affiliated with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. No changes were
made to TRT’s editorial policy, which reflects the government’s official lines. RTÜK has
continued to impose fines on independent television and radio channels for their broadcasting
content, on the vague grounds that the content is ‘contrary to the national and moral values of
society, general morality and the principle of family protection’. Media outlets critical of the
government were frequently fined by RTÜK on various grounds, ranging from displaying the
imprisoned former HDP co-chair Demirtaş’ new book to ‘failing to be objective’ when
reporting on the government’s response to the earthquakes. The Industry and Technology
Ministry did not extend the operating license of Deutsche Welle’s (DW) Turkish office,
which closed at the end of March 2023. This decision meant that DW was not able to insure
its employees who can therefore only continue practising journalism as freelancers. In August
2023, upon the request of the RTÜK, a criminal judge of peace decided to block access to the
Voice of America Turkish service, for providing broadcasting services over the internet
without obtaining a broadcast license. The concerns relating to RTÜK’s independence and
37
neutrality persisted as members continue to be elected by the parliament without any
consultation of civil society or professional media organisations. Currently, six members are
nominees of the ruling coalition, two from the CHP party and one from the HDP party.
Economic factors
The ownership of the Turkish media outlets, which is heavily concentrated in a few large
companies close to the government, undermined the independence of editorial policies as it
lacked transparency. In addition, the distribution channels of printed media, which are used to
allocate public advertising revenues and deliver newspapers to retail outlets, are owned by a
single company close to the government. The Broadcasting Law, which does not ensure fair
competition because it does not prevent monopolisation, was not amended.
Internet
The current legislation and its implementation do not guarantee an open and free internet in
Türkiye. There were frequent website and social media bans for those who expressed views
critical of the government. Authors of such websites faced harassment and at times
prosecution. There are no official statistics on banned websites or the blockage of content, in
accordance with the rulings of the criminal judges of peace. In August 2023, upon the request
of the RTÜK, a criminal judge of peace decided to block access to the Voice of America
Turkish service, for providing broadcasting services over the internet without obtaining a
broadcast license.
By March 2023, RTÜK had issued 25 penalties based on its authority to inspect online
broadcasts. In February 2023, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority
(BTK) blocked access to one of Türkiye’s most popular social networks, the online
discussion forum Ekşi Sözlük, due to its coverage of the post-earthquake response. The
authorities also reduced Twitter’s bandwidth on the second day of the earthquakes. Access
was reinstated the next day after severe criticism that this had put search and rescue efforts at
risk. Legal action was taken against 609 persons, 150 people were detained and 29 were
arrested for ‘provoking the public into hatred and hostility’ on social media platforms in
connection with the recent earthquakes.
Professional organisations and working conditions
Journalism in Türkiye remains a precarious and risky profession, with low wages, a high risk
of judicial harassment and no job security. Trade union rights are limited and labour
legislation is not properly applied. According to the Journalists Union of Türkiye, only 11%
of journalists are unionised. The new Media Law made the issuing of press cards and
accreditations highly arbitrary, due to the composition of the Press Card Commission, in
which only 1 of the 19 members comes from the journalists’ union and the others have been
appointed by the executive branch of the government. Investigative journalism on politically
sensitive issues continued to be subject to editorial pressure, self-censorship and judicial
harassment (see also Chapter 10 on digital transformation and media).
The existing legislation includes vague provisions that can be used to restrict freedom of
artistic expression. A number of artistic events and performances were banned by the
authorities, and artists critical of government policies were subject to intimidation and
insulting remarks by pro-government figures and RTÜK officials.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
There was no progress in the area of freedom of assembly and association where legislation
and its implementation are not in line with the Turkish Constitution, European standards or
38
the international conventions that Türkiye is party to. Bans on peaceful gatherings were
widely imposed and public events were often dispersed with a disproportionate use of force
by the police. Demonstrators frequently faced investigations, court cases and administrative
fines on charges of terrorism or of violating the Law on demonstrations and marches. Attacks
on opposition gatherings and premises were often not investigated or prosecuted. Türkiye
needs to urgently apply the ECtHR case law and to revise relevant national laws.
Protests and demonstrations for human rights, environmental rights, and political and socio-
economic rights were banned and dispersed by the police on several occasions (including
demonstrations by dismissed civil servants, on the occasion of the International Women’s
Day and by mothers of disappeared persons). Participants in public events were often
detained (including with the use of force) and later released. The legislation on meetings and
demonstrations allowed authorities to prohibit meetings and demonstrations on the basis of
vague, discretionary and arbitrary criteria. All activities related to the “Armenian Genocide
Commemoration Day” were banned in April 2023. All activities and gatherings to mark anti-
homophobia and Pride Month in May and June 2023 were also banned. Some activists that
participated in the June march were detained and later released.
In a positive development, the Constitutional Court ruled in September 2022 that the blanket
ban on demonstrations issued by Ankara’s governor between 2016 and 2018 constituted a
violation of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court ruled in February 2023 that the
Beyoğlu District’s governor’s ban on the gathering of the Saturday Mothers violated their
rights. Following the Court’s decision, the Saturday Mothers tried to meet in their original
venue, but they were repeatedly detained and released on the same day. The court case
against 46 human rights defenders and the relatives of Saturday Mothers continued.
Dozens of women and a journalist were detained for gathering to mark the International Day
for the Elimination of Violence against Women in November 2022. There were reports of
torture and ill-treatment by the police in Cizre. The ‘November 25 Platform’ lodged a
criminal complaint about the police brutality on that day in İstanbul.
Regarding freedom of association, many human rights defenders were detained or arrested
and NGOs, especially in the south-east, were subjected to police raids. The legal provision
requiring information on the identity of members of associations by the authorities remained
in place. Regarding political associations, the 8th
Administrative Court of Ankara found
unlawful the stance of the Ministry of Interior, which prevented the establishment of the
Green Party by not providing a ‘received’ certificate for the application and decided to stay
the execution of the process. The Court of Appeal has since removed the stay of execution
decision regarding the Ministry of Interior’s act, the Green Party is again prevented from
being established and the case is still pending. The file for the establishment of the Humanity
and Freedom Party is pending before the Constitutional Court.
The Law on the prevention of financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
has continued to be implemented in a manner not compatible with international human rights
standards and this is threatening freedom of association in Türkiye. The Council of Europe
Venice Commission’s July 2021 opinion on the law was not taken into account. Türkiye used
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations to categorise NGOs as medium to
high risk for terrorism financing abuse in an arbitrary way, and to subject rights-based NGOs
to frequent and burdensome audits. Many associations and foundations, especially recipients
of international funds, have been subjected to repeated audits. The case against the Ministry
of Interior’s October 2021 circular, requiring NGOs to be audited based on a risk analysis, is
ongoing. The recommendations made in the 2021 Venice Commission opinion should be
implemented, including with regard to fundraising activities by NGOs.
39
Issues of labour and trade union rights are further covered in Chapter 19 on social policy
and employment.
On property rights, the Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures, whose
term ended in January 2023, did not provide an effective domestic remedy for confiscations.
There are ongoing court cases against the decisions of the Inquiry Commission. The case of
the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality against the Directorate-General for Foundations
(DGF) on the ownership of the Taksim Gezi Park is ongoing.
In March, the EctHR found Türkiye in violation of property rights in the case of the Chief
Rabbinate of Türkiye – İzmir Jewish Synagogue Foundation and ordered a retrial of the case.
In December 2022, the Constitutional Court found the transfer of the Armenian Sanasaryan
Inn to the State unlawful. There will be a retrial of the case, which was launched by the
Armenian Patriarchate. In January 2023, the Constitutional Court ruled that there had been a
violation of the right to property regarding the Greek Bebek Aya Haralambos Church, Bebek
Aya Yani Cemetery Dova Church and the Cemetery Foundation. In April 2023, the Mor
Batlo Syriac Orthodox Church and the cemetery in Mardin/Turabdin were transferred to the
Housing Development Administration (TOKI). Court cases regarding the 2016 expropriations
in Diyarbakir Sur District are ongoing.
In the south-east, the restoration of cultural and religious heritage and urban housing
construction continued. Several important cultural and religious heritage sites were damaged
by the February 2023 earthquakes in the region, especially in Hatay/Antakya. Regarding the
implementation of the Law on foundations for minority communities, many appeals on
rejected claims for the restitution of property were ongoing either before a local court or at
the EctHR. Litigation brought forward by state institutions or municipalities against returned
immovable property resulted in lengthy legal proceedings and uncertain property rights. The
case of the Mor Gabriel Monastery Syriac Orthodox Church Foundation’s land borders
continued before the Constitutional Court. Other cases in relation to the ownership of the land
of the Mor Gabriel Monastery continued. Other non-Muslim community foundations also
have properties that have not yet been returned. Council of Europe Resolution 1625 of 2008
regarding property rights on the islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) still
needs to be fully implemented. There is an urgent need to revise the relevant legislation on
the issue of property rights for non-Muslim minorities and other legislation covering all
issues of property rights to ensure a more comprehensive framework.
Legislation on non-discrimination is not in line with European standards and not duly
enforced in practice. There were serious concerns regarding the implementation of the April
2021 Law on security investigations and archive checks for people who are to be appointed to
public posts for the first time, as this takes into consideration not only final convictions but
also other factors (e.g. ongoing investigations, pending cases and even intelligence against a
person). The law decree issued under the State of Emergency to allow arbitrary dismissals
expired in July 2022. However, dismissals with no objective criteria of civil servants
continued on the basis of the Law on civil servants. Reports on profiling and discrimination
against civil servants in employment on vague legal grounds continued. Cases of
discrimination and hate crimes based on ethnic, religious grounds, sexual orientation and
gender identity continued to be reported. Diyarbakır football team was subjected to racist
attacks in two different provinces during matches. The HREI, which is in charge of applying
non-discrimination legislation, finalised the examination of 166 applications in 2022 but
received 355 new applications during the year falling under the scope of the task of
‘combating discrimination’. The finalised decisions are sent to the relevant public authorities,
but there is no systematic follow-up of corrective actions that were taken. School textbooks
40
still need to be revised, especially regarding some content on minorities, secularism, religion
and gender equality. The HREI and the Ombudsman did not accept applications on sexual
orientation and identity. Türkiye should urgently adopt a law on combating discrimination in
line with the EU acquis as well as the ECHR, covering discrimination on the grounds of
sexual orientation. Protocol 12 of the ECHR, which provides for the general prohibition of
discrimination, remained unratified and the recommendations of the Council of Europe
Commission against racism and intolerance (ECRI) were not implemented. Legislation
against hate crime, including hate speech, is still not in line with international standards and
does not cover hate offences on the basis of sexual orientation, ethnicity, age or gender
identity. No progress was made with the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the
Convention on Cybercrime concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic
nature committed through computer systems.
In the area of gender equality, the backsliding on the rights of women and girls remained.
Türkiye ranked 129th
out of 146 countries, as measured by the World Economic Forum’s
Global Gender Gap Report 2023 (compared to 124th
place in the 2022 Report).
Widespread promotion of stereotyped gender roles and definitions continued, including in
school textbooks and in the media. Statements by the authorities targeting independent
women’s organisations and women activists threatened the freedom of operation of women’s
rights associations. State authorities increasingly came under the influence of Sunni religious
sects that promote illegal practices, such as early marriage. Efforts should be increased to
prevent school drop-out due to early marriage (e.g. establishing early warning systems in
schools, ensuring that domestic violence is properly investigated and prosecuted, and
establishing a sufficient number of shelters for vulnerable individuals).
The Council of State concluded in its final ruling that the decision to withdraw from the
Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and
Domestic Violence (also known as the Istanbul Convention) was in compliance with Turkish
law. The Istanbul Convention is an important international standard, so this constitutes
serious backsliding in Türkiye’s progress. According to reports, 334 women were killed in
2022 (339 in 2021) and 245 more women died in suspicious circumstances. There is no
comprehensive data collection system in this area. Despite the continued implementation of
the Fourth National Action Plan for Combating Violence against Women (2021-2025), there
are no effective policies (including deterrent sentences), implementation of legislation is
weak and the quality of available support services is low. The February 2023 earthquakes
worsened the already difficult situation of women and children in the region, due to the
collapse of women’s shelters, crowded temporary accommodation and a lack of proper
preventive policies. In the earthquake areas, priority has been given to certain basic needs,
but the provision of hygiene products for women, separate and protected toilets, and
reproductive health facilities was neglected.
The protection of the rights of the child remained weak, including in the juvenile justice
system and in relation to the consequences of the earthquakes. Urgent action is needed to
ensure protection of children in the areas affected by the February 2023 earthquakes in order
to avoid exploitation and abuse.
Several human rights violations were reported in the regions affected by the earthquakes,
including against children and persons with disabilities. The Religious Affairs Presidency
issued a ruling (fatwa) soon after the earthquakes, stating that there is no religious obstacle to
a marriage between a person and their adopted child. This is cause for very serious concern.
A coherent and effective monitoring mechanism by public institutions for children in
earthquake regions, including for unaccompanied and missing children, is urgently needed.
41
In January 2023, a Parliamentary Commission for Investigation of Child Abuse was
established at the National Grand Assembly. A national action plan needs to be put in place
to combat and prevent child, early and forced marriages and to raise awareness of the harmful
impacts of child marriage. Consistent efforts are needed to eradicate child labour, especially
among refugees.
Türkiye is effectively pursuing a de-institutionalisation strategy. However, 60% of the
children living in the childcare system are in institutional care. Adequate funding should be
directed towards reinforcing community-based care and ensuring proper de-
institutionalisation. Particular concern is caused by the construction of new institutions
following the earthquakes and the wars in Syria and Ukraine.
Children can benefit from free legal aid for criminal disputes, but no such scheme is in place
for civil cases and/or other complaint mechanisms. Concerns remained about juveniles facing
arrest and detention on charges of membership of terrorist organisations. Non-custodial
measures for children need to be improved. The capacity of NGOs and bar associations to
intervene, monitor and lodge strategic litigation is limited, both in law and practice. There is
an insufficient number and geographical coverage of specialised child courts, child assize
courts and qualified staff including judges, prosecutors, lawyers and experts. Almost half of
the children on trial are still being tried before non-specialised courts. There are currently 81
juvenile courts and 12 juvenile high criminal courts, in accordance with the law that requires
that there is a juvenile court in every province. However, this is not enough for the needs of
big cities. Child-specific services (such as child-friendly interview rooms and child
monitoring centres) were reportedly interrupted in various cities. A comprehensive training
programme for all professionals working with children in contact with the law, with a
certification mechanism and incentives, needs to be developed.
Concerning the rights of persons with disabilities, a national action plan to implement the
‘2030 Barrier-Free Vision Document’ was adopted by the government in February 2023,
covering actions until 2025. The action plan pursues a rights-based approach and largely
reflects the EU strategy in this field. The Monitoring and Evaluation Board on Rights of
Persons with Disabilities became operational in November 2022 and convenes twice a year
under the coordination of the Ministry of Family and Social Services, of which it is
structurally part. Türkiye has ratified the UN Convention for the Protection of the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, but shortcomings persist in its
transposition and implementation. There is insufficient data collection in the field of
accessibility of services and public infrastructure. The consequences of the February 2023
earthquakes will need to be reflected in the national action plan, including to ensure that
public institutions include persons with disabilities in their preparedness, evacuation and
post-disaster recovery plans. This will require a number of actions, including a thorough
assessment of the number of people who became disabled as a consequence of the
earthquakes, along with proper rehabilitation and psychological support measures.
Türkiye continued to pursue a de-institutionalisation policy for persons with disabilities,
coupled with a home-based care support programme. However, independent-living
mechanisms and opportunities remained very limited. The human resources capacity of
services for people with chronic mental disorders and intellectual disabilities was enhanced in
2022. Quality standards developed for community mental health centres are now in active
use. However, Türkiye has no mental health legislation and no independent monitoring
mechanism for mental health institutions. In school education, the proportion of students with
disabilities attending inclusive classrooms reached 75%. The remaining 25% (more than 60
000 children) continued to attend special schools.
42
The lack of protection for the fundamental rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons continued to raise serious concerns. The lack of
legal protection against hate speech and hate crimes based on sexual orientation or gender
identity was further exacerbated by negative stereotyping in the media and discriminatory
rhetoric from high-level officials, including the highest political level. Anti-LGBTIQ rallies
were organised in various parts of the country during the reporting period and were allowed
by the authorities. LGBTIQ associations were regularly targeted by pro-government media
for being funded by foreign countries. Discrimination, intimidation and violence against the
LGBTIQ community and especially transgender persons increased, in part due to the lack of
effective criminal sanctions. Several court cases related to LGBTIQ persons who were
murdered or seriously assaulted continued. Access to gender reassignment surgery and to
health and social services remained cumbersome and problematic for trans persons. LGBTIQ
prisoners suffered discrimination and solitary confinement. LGBTIQ activities, marches and
pride parades were banned in several provinces and police intervened to disperse participants.
The appeal case against the Middle East Technical University (METU) students who took
part in a pride gathering on the university campus in May 2019 continued. A new court case
was launched against METU students for their participation in the pride march of 2022. The
court case against the former executives of the Ankara Bar Association for criticising the
Diyanet’s president’s homophobic speech continued. A court case against the Izmir Bar
Association’s former president and ten board members started in April 2023 on charges of
insulting religious values, due to the statement they issued on their official website against
the discriminatory Friday sermon of the president of religious affairs against private life,
different life preferences and LGBTIQ individuals. The Human Rights and Equality
Institution (HREI) continued to not process applications by LGBTIQ persons on the grounds
that it does not consider discrimination against LGBTIQ to be within its remit, because the
law establishing the HREI does not consider ‘sexual orientation and gender identity-based
discrimination’ to be a criterion for discrimination.
On procedural rights, legislation and its implementation are not in line with the EU acquis
or European standards, since basic minimum procedural rights’ standards are missing. The
2023 earthquakes seriously hindered access to justice in the affected areas, especially for
disadvantaged groups, women and children. In addition to the loss of life, many lawyers’
offices and some bar associations’ premises were destroyed by the earthquakes. The Union
of Bar Associations provided support to lawyers in the affected regions but, overall,
problems of access to justice remained extensive. Several complaints were launched by bar
associations concerning human rights violations, property rights and other issues.
ECtHR judgments condemning Türkiye for violating the right to a fair trial and the
presumption of innocence due to its failure to respect procedural rules continued to be
handed down. The 2018 law issued under the state of emergency that restricted fundamental
freedoms (including in the Code on Criminal Procedures and Anti-Terror Law) remained in
force.
Access to legal assistance for convicted children remained limited. Lawyers (especially those
providing legal assistance to human rights defenders and civil and political activists)
continued to face difficulties in performing their duties. In some cases, lawyers were
subjected to ill-treatment by law enforcement personnel.
Protection of victims’ rights is regulated under the penal legislation. The presidential decree
on Supporting the Victims of Crime has been in force since June 2020. Accordingly, there is
a specialised Department of Victims’ Rights under the Ministry of Justice. The ‘Judicial
Support and Victim Services Directorates’ established in 167 courthouses provide
43
information, orientation and psycho-social support services to the victims of crime during
judicial proceedings. Currently, there are 166 forensic interview rooms in 159 courthouses in
81 provinces, where victims can give their statements outside the courtroom with the support
of experts and without having to face the alleged perpetrator. Compensation and redress for
victims remained limited. Steps need to be taken to align national legislation with the EU
Victims’ Rights Directive and the directive relating to compensation for crime victims.
Hate speech and hate crime remained a serious issue for persons belonging to ethnic and
national minorities. No steps were taken to revise school textbooks to remove discriminatory
and derogatory references. Minorities continued to face difficulties, such as the lack of legal
status for religious institutions, protection for languages, schooling support, clergy training,
the economic non-viability of media in minority languages and complications in enjoying
property rights for foundations. The lack of legal personality for minority communities’
churches, synagogues, patriarchates, monasteries and chief rabbinates continued to create
difficulties in exercising their freedom of association and religion, and impacted their
property rights. Minority schools received no public funds. Regular and substantive subsidies
to the newspapers run by members of the Armenian, Greek, Jewish and Syriac communities
were granted by the Press Advertising Authority, in order to ensure their viability, given their
limited circulation. In the court case against public officials involved in the killing of
Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007, the Court of Cassation in June 2023 upheld some of
the convictions given by the local court and some acquittals. In April 2023, as a result of an
on-going investigation, a new case was launched against some of the perpetrators of Dink’s
murder on charges of ‘being a member of an armed organisation’, ‘deliberate killing’ and
‘attempting to remove the constitutional order’. The first hearing was held in June 2023.
The ‘Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day’ was banned by the Istanbul governorate and
other provinces. During the reporting period, a member of the Armenian community was
appointed as a sub-province governor (kaymakam) for the first time. The restoration studies
continued on the Büyükada (Prinkipo Island) Greek Orphanage, a cultural heritage
monument. Mechanisms should be in place to support the participation of minorities in
decision-making and to ensure that they are adequately represented in the public
administration and in politics (see also Chapter 23 on cultural rights).
Concerning the Roma, Dom and Abdal communities, Türkiye adopted in January 2023 a new
Roma strategy and a related action plan covering the period until 2030. The aim is to align
with the EU Roma Strategic Framework, however, a horizontal objective of fighting
antigypsyism and discrimination and quantitative national targets connected to indicators and
baselines that would allow measuring progress towards the EU level headline targets remains
to be defined. The implementation of the strategy needs to be monitored inclusively,
including with the broad participation of civil society. Ten municipalities across Türkiye
voluntarily took part in an EU programme to promote participation in local governance using
social mediators. Specific policy measures are needed for the inter-sectional vulnerabilities of
Roma women. No official data on the situation and living conditions of Roma exists in
Türkiye.
The February 2023 earthquakes increased the difficulties of the Roma population in the
affected areas in terms of living conditions, livelihood, basic needs and health, especially for
women and children. Dramatic increases in housing prices particularly hit Roma families,
who often live in poor conditions and have limited property ownership. Lack of emergency
savings and high dependence on informal jobs made Roma in earthquake-affected regions
more vulnerable. The Roma were among the vulnerable groups who had more difficulties in
accessing relief aid. A holistic approach is needed to address drug use disorder among the
44
Roma, taking particular account of social and economic factors. Roma children being more
integrated into the education system would contribute to eliminate child labour and early
marriage. Targeted support measures for Roma entrepreneurs and self-employed need to be
introduced. The problem of incorrect diagnosis of Roma children with mental disabilities or
learning difficulties should be effectively tackled. No EU-Türkiye Joint Roma Seminar was
held. Concrete measures should be taken to prevent the increase of antigypsyism and to
combat prejudice and discrimination against Roma. The capacity of the National Roma
Contact Point to programme and mainstream funds targeting all aspects of Roma inclusion
remained limited. No members of parliament in the new parliamentary term have an overt
Roma identity.
On cultural rights, there were no legislative developments to allow public services to be
provided in languages other than Turkish. Legal restrictions on mother-tongue education in
primary and secondary schools remained in place. Optional courses in Kurdish and
Circassian are provided in public state schools, but the requirement of a minimum of 10
students for these courses continued to be an impediment. The small number or complete lack
of teachers for these courses remained another limiting factor. University programmes are
available in Kurdish, Arabic, Syriac, Zaza and Circassian. Only a few political parties
explicitly included mother-tongue education in their election platforms. The state-appointed
trustee mayors in the south-east continued changing the original names of streets. The
increased powers of the governors and arbitrary censorship continued to have a negative
impact on arts and culture and a number of art and culture groups in Kurdish language were
dismissed by the trustees. A dozen concerts, festivals and cultural events were banned by
governorates and municipalities on the grounds of ‘security and public order’. Kurdish
cultural and language institutions, media outlets and numerous art spaces remained mostly
closed, as they have been since the 2016 coup attempt, which contributed to a further
shrinking of their cultural rights (see also Chapter 26 – Education and culture).
2.2.2. Chapter 24: justice, freedom and security
The EU has common rules for border control, visas, residence and work permits, external
migration and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls within the
EU. The Member States also cooperate with Türkiye in the fight against organised crime and
terrorism, and on judicial, police and customs matters, all with the support of the EU justice
and home affairs agencies.
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of justice, freedom and security. Some progress
was made in relation to the further strengthening of the surveillance and protection capacity
of the land border with Iran. Türkiye has still not implemented the provisions pertaining to
third-country nationals in the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, which entered into force in
October 2017. Türkiye continued to make significant efforts to host and meet the needs of 3.6
million refugees. Türkiye still needs to align its legislation on data protection with European
standards.
Most of last year’s recommendations still need to be addressed and remain valid. In the
coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ fully implement the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 (notably the returns from the
Greek islands and the prevention of irregular routes to all Member States) and implement
all the provisions of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement towards all EU Member
States;
45
→ align legislation on personal data protection with European standards, which could have a
positive effect for the possible conclusion of an international agreement between the EU
and Türkiye on the exchange of personal data between Europol and Türkiye;
→ revise legislation and practices on terrorism in line with the European Convention on
Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights case law and the EU acquis and
practices. The proportionality principle should be observed in practice;
→ adopt and implement a strategy and action plan on border management with the aim of
enhancing coordination between border services at national and international levels.
Fight against organised crime
Türkiye has some level of preparation to implement the EU acquis in this area. Some
progress was made at operational level through participation in an increasing number of joint
operations with EU Member States and neighbouring countries. A new strategy and new
action plan against organised crime were adopted. However, Türkiye needs to improve the
effectiveness of law enforcement in fighting certain forms of crime, such as money
laundering and financial crimes. Coordination remains crucial for all stakeholders involved in
fighting organised crime.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ improve the legal framework and practices on counterterrorism in line with the EU
acquis; and continue addressing the remaining recommendations in order to be delisted
from the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) ‘grey list’;
→ conclude an international agreement with the European Union on cooperation with
Eurojust;
→ enhance efforts in the fight against the smuggling of migrants, including final convictions
and asset confiscation;
→ revise Law No 7262 in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission;
→ increase its operational willingness to cooperate and exchange information with EU law
enforcement partners.
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
There are a number of specialised departments dealing with various forms of organised
crime, under two main law enforcement agencies; namely the gendarmerie and the police
under the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The Coast Guard Command also plays an important role
in preventing migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. The Financial Crimes
Investigation Board (MASAK) is the Turkish financial intelligence unit attached to the
Ministry of Treasury and Finance. Cybercrime is addressed by a specialised department for
combating cybercrime affiliated to the Turkish national police (the TNP) as well as the public
order division of the gendarmerie at central level and the 31 provincial gendarmerie branches.
The TNP comprised a total of 339 563 officers (equivalent to 399.48 officers per 100 000
inhabitants). By comparison, the EU average is 335.3 officers per 100 000 inhabitants
(Eurostat, 2019-2021). The total number of gendarmerie staff (excluding conscripts) was
196 285 (equivalent to 230.34 gendarmerie personnel per 100 000 inhabitants). The Coast
Guard Command comprised of 8 343 personnel (equivalent to 9.81 personnel per 100 000
inhabitants). Between April 2022 and April 2023, 1 054 personnel were dismissed from the
46
gendarmerie. These figures include the personnel dismissed due to their affiliation to the
Gülen movement and the Parallel State Structure (PDY).
The legal framework for the fight against organised crime and police cooperation is partially
aligned with the EU acquis.
Türkiye adopted a new national strategy (2022-2027) and an action plan (2022-2024) against
organised crime in December 2022. The Ministry of Interior’s Department of Smuggling
Intelligence, Operations and Data Collection is responsible for coordinating the
implementation.
The legal framework pertaining to trafficking in human beings is largely in accordance with
international conventions and the EU acquis. A new action plan on trafficking in human
beings requested by the Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking
in Human Beings (GRETA) has not been adopted. Türkiye needs to fully align its definition
of trafficking in human beings with the Council of Europe Convention on Action against
Trafficking in Human Beings.
The completion of an international agreement between the EU and Türkiye on the exchange
of personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities with responsibility for fighting
serious crime and terrorism is still pending considering also that the Turkish data protection
legislation is still not aligned with the EU’s acquis.
Türkiye is party to the Council of Europe’s ‘Budapest’ Convention on cybercrime, but it has
yet to sign its Second Additional Protocol on enhanced cooperation and disclosure of
electronic evidence, which was opened for signature in May 2022.
Türkiye’s Information and Communication Technologies Authority has been a member of
INHOPE (International Association of Internet Hotlines) since 2011 and cooperates with
other hotlines to fight against child sexual abuse. Article 21 (entitled ‘Protection of
Children’) of the By-law on the provision of radio, television and on-demand media services
via the internet environment requires media service providers that have been granted an
online broadcasting license and online media platform operators that have been granted an
authorisation certificate for the online transmission of media services to take measures to
ensure parental control. It also makes these institutions responsible for taking the necessary
technical measures to protect children and young audiences. In this context, examples such as
PIN systems, and child profile and protective symbol systems are used by media service
providers operating in Türkiye to protect children in online audiovisual media services. In
January 2023, the Turkish parliament set up a research commission with the objective of
preventing child abuse. The establishment of this commission was prompted by a specific
case involving the forced marriage of a six-year-old girl (see the section on fundamental
rights of the child).
MASAK is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, which facilitates
cooperation and intelligence sharing between national financial intelligence units to
investigate and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.
Türkiye is party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the
Proceeds of Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No 198).
Türkiye has a witness protection system to protect witnesses from intimidation and threats.
However, the scope of the Law on witness protection needs to be expanded to include all
types of serious crimes and procedural rules need improvement.
47
Implementation and enforcement capacity
In the reporting period, operational capacity continued to be strengthened through new
recruitment and training programmes.
In total, 6 145 operations were carried out by the gendarmerie and the Turkish national
police (the TNP) to tackle organised crime, cybercrime, smuggling of migrants and
trafficking in human beings.
Concerning firearms trafficking, 2 388 small and light weapons (SALW) were seized by the
gendarmerie and 4 138 by the TNP during the reporting period. In 2022, 877 cases of
firearms trafficking (Article 12 of the Turkish Criminal Code) were brought before criminal
courts, resulting in the conviction of 584 persons.
Since July 2004, cooperation between Europol and Türkiye has been based on the Strategic
Agreement on Cooperation. This does not include the possibility of sharing personal data, but
it does facilitate cooperation in a range of areas. A Turkish liaison officer has been seconded
to Europol since 2016. Türkiye is connected to and configured for the full use of the Secure
Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) with third parties and EU Member
States. The EU (through Europol) and Türkiye have a joint interest in stepping up law
enforcement cooperation to effectively address common challenges.
16 EU Member States have 30 liaison officers in Türkiye and Türkiye has 10 liaison officers
in 7 EU Member States. A cooperation agreement with the European Union Agency for Law
Enforcement Training (CEPOL) has been in place since 2010. Its revision has been pending
since the end of 2022. Exchange and training programmes were carried out involving the
gendarmerie and the TNP. As well as participating in the courses held by EU Member States,
TNP also organises joint workshops with CEPOL.
The track record on combating money laundering and terrorist financing showed a gradual
improvement. Turkish judicial statistics showed a consistent upward trend. There were 19
files, 49 separate offences and 47 convictions in 2020, while there were 26 files, 61 separate
offences and 61 convictions in 2021. In 2022, 39 criminal files and 118 offences resulted in
116 convictions.
The domestic terrorist asset freeze mechanism continued to be implemented through the joint
decisions issued by the Ministry of Treasury and Finance and the Ministry of Interior. In
2021, the assets of 1 145 real persons and 16 corporate identities were frozen through three
interministerial decisions. In 2022, 4 interministerial decisions resulted in the assets of 64 real
persons and 14 corporate identities being frozen.
The country’s geographic location makes it an important player in the fight against organised
crime groups, in particular drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, arms trafficking, intellectual
property crime and money laundering. Türkiye is used as a financial hub between south-east
Asian countries, the Gulf region and Europe for facilitating illicit money flows in exchange
for irregular migrants and illicit commodities. As far as participation in the European Multi-
disciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) is concerned, Türkiye was in 2022
a participant in one operational action (in the operational action plan on intellectual property
crime, counterfeit goods and currencies). In 2023, Türkiye is participating in 16 operational
actions. Regarding cross-border cooperation, Türkiye has not participated in any EU joint
investigation teams (JITs) to date.
Türkiye continues to be an important transit and destination country for trafficking in
human beings. By the end of 2022, the number of victims identified by the Turkish
authorities stood at 345 (compared to 2021 when 403 victims were identified). Sexual and
48
labour exploitation constitute the highest number among the purposes of trafficking. Most
victims are of Syrian origin. In 2022, 115 cases of trafficking in human beings (Article 80 of
the Turkish Criminal Code) were brought before Türkiye’s criminal courts. 23 cases ended
with convictions. 65 people accused of trafficking were convicted by the criminal courts of
first instance.
There are two shelters in Ankara and Kirikkale provinces run by the Presidency for Migration
Management (PMM). Their total capacity to host victims of trafficking in human beings is 42
persons. There is an urgent need to increase the capacity to host and provide services to
victims of human trafficking. Additional shelters are planned for the provinces of Aydin and
Kutahya. Türkiye should bolster its collaboration with civil society organisations to enhance
its capacity in identifying victims and delivering essential victim support services.
Specialised services should be strengthened for all victims of trafficking.
The many Syrian and other refugees, including children, are vulnerable to being exploited
through forced labour. Reports of early marriages increased in the wake of the pandemic as a
negative economic coping mechanism.
There are insufficient training programmes for law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and
judges that focus on a victim-centred approach. Partnership with civil society should be
sought in order to encourage the identification of victims of trafficking and to provide them
with shelter and services. The reasons why the crime of trafficking in human beings is not
prosecuted should be identified and measures should be taken to ensure that victims are
allowed to appear in court via video link when the circumstances of the case and the
vulnerability of the persons concerned require this.
Gun violence in Türkiye has surged in recent years, while the overwhelming majority of
firearms owned by individuals are unregistered due to lax enforcement of the Law on
unregistered weapons.
In 2022, 47 079 suspects were detected in 8 252 cases of cybercrime (Articles 243/1, 244,
103 and 226 of the Turkish Criminal Code), resulting in the conviction of 123 persons. In the
reporting period, there was no national strategy and action plan in place against cybercrime.
The National Cyber Security Strategy and Action Plan 2020-2023 covers public
administration systems, information systems belonging to critical infrastructures operated by
the public and private sectors, small and medium-sized industry, and all the components of
cyber space at the national level (including all private and legal persons).
Cooperation in the field of drugs
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
The High Council for the Fight against Drugs consists of 12 ministers and is responsible for
coordination and monitoring at national level. The national strategy and the action plan aimed
at combating illegal drugs, which have been in effect for the period of 2018-2023, are coming
to an end. The secretariat for coordinating their implementation is within the Ministry of
Health’s Directorate-General for Public Health. All ministers involved in the implementation
of the strategy and action plan are also members of the High Council. A research committee
conducts research into drug addiction and a scientific committee provides recommendations
for studies, training and awareness-raising activities on drug abuse. An Action Plan on the
Fight Against Methamphetamine 2022-2024 has been in force since August 2022 under the
coordination of the Ministry of Interior. The Ministries of Justice, Family and Social
Services, Interior, Defence, Health and Trade take part in the implementation.
49
Türkiye is a member of the European Information Network on Drugs and Drug Addiction
(Reitox).
The Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (TUBİM) continues to act as
the national focal point of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
(EMCDDA) and is the national drug observatory. Türkiye has had a participation agreement
in place with the EMCDDA since 2007 and is a member of the Management Board of the
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). It has a monitoring
role at national and international level and drafts the annual Turkish drug report. It collects
data, makes risk assessments and provides recommendations with regard to the National
Early Warning System on new psychoactive substances. A total of 1 006 new psychoactive
substances have been included in the national legislation and 35 of these were put on the list
in 2022. The instant data-flow system, which uses encryption and anonymisation of personal
data for monitoring and reporting, is operational. The responsible body for controlling drug
precursors is the Turkish Medicine and Medical Devices Agency of the Ministry of Health,
which grants licences and permits for manufacture, possession, selling, purchase,
transportation, consumption, distribution, importation, exportation and legal use including for
pharmaceutical and industrial purposes.
Within the framework of the 7th
Judicial Reform Package adopted in April 2023, some
penalties have been increased under the Turkish Penal Code with regard to manufacturing
and trading certain types of drug substances, which have a higher potential to cause addiction
and serious health problems. The minimum imprisonment penalty was increased from 10 to
15 years. Some amendments were made in relation to treatment, rehabilitation and probation.
Random tests may be conducted under probation, and compulsory treatment and
rehabilitation can be exercised on the convict or prisoner.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Türkiye remains a transit route for drugs between Asia and Europe, but information exchange
and collaboration with EU law enforcement partners are to be enhanced, particularly for
heroin. In 2022, Turkish law enforcement services conducted operations that resulted in the
seizure of, inter alia, 71 967 kg of cannabis including skunk (2021: 64 125 kg), 2 276 kg of
cocaine (2021: 2 841 kg), 7 957 kg of heroin (2021: 22 202 kg), 16 210 kg of
methamphetamine (2021: 5 528 kg), 5 050 325 ecstasy tablets (2021: 7 618 013) and 23 945
026 captagon tablets (2021: 13 790 648).
In 2022, a total of 69 430 cases in relation to Article 188/3 of the Turkish Criminal Code
involving 90 919 suspects were launched by the prosecution for illicit drug related offences.
28 181 suspects were convicted.
In the field of prevention, the Ministry of Health (MoH) operates 237 counselling centres in
81 provinces. In 2022, 30 new centres became operational. The anti-drug counselling hotline
received 78 152 calls in 2022. There are 135 treatment centres for drug dependence in 81
provinces. 59 of the centres focus on inpatient treatment and 20 of those are specifically
dedicated to treating children. The other 76 centres are outpatient centres and 20 of those are
specifically dedicated to children. The waiting time for applicants to be admitted to the
treatment centres is currently 1-3 days. Bed capacity is 1 372. Despite improvements, the
rehabilitation and treatment capacity remains insufficient.
Fight against terrorism
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
50
Türkiye’s continuing efforts to tackle terrorism reduced terrorist activity and improved the
security situation. The country continued to face threats from various terrorist groups. The
EU has condemned all acts of terrorist violence perpetrated in Türkiye. Türkiye has
prioritised the fight against the PKK and the dismantling of the Gülen movement. The PKK
remains on the EU’s list of persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism. Türkiye
has a legitimate right to fight terrorism. However, bringing the Turkish anti-terrorism
legislation in line with EU standards still remains an essential outstanding reform.
The legal framework regulating the fight against money laundering
and terrorist financing should be aligned with the recommendations provided by the FATF
and those outlined by the Venice Commission on the Law on preventing financing of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Türkiye has been on the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring (the ‘grey list’) of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) since October 2021. Türkiye's EU candidate status and
commitment to address shortcomings identified by the FATF and to align with the EU’s
acquis have prevented it from being added to the EU’s high-risk third countries list.
Türkiye’s response to the concerns of the EU and the FATF continues to be closely
monitored in the framework of the Association Agreement. Türkiye must diligently adhere to
the outstanding FATF Action Plan items to secure its removal from the grey list. With regard
to the outcomes of the FATF’s Mutual Evaluation Report on Türkiye and the recommended
actions by the FATF, Türkiye promulgated an overarching national AML/CFT strategy
document in July 2021. The strategy document was revised in 2022 to comply with the
outstanding recommended actions. Türkiye also updated its National Risk Assessment at the
end of 2022. The country is also supported by the EU’s Global Facility on Anti-Money
Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism project.
In 2022, Türkiye adopted regulations regarding politically exposed persons and guidance to
the private sector on detecting terrorist financing. It also increased its financial intelligence
agency’s proactive dissemination of financial intelligence. In July 2023, the FATF concluded
that Türkiye has taken positive steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime. Türkiye is
now compliant with 14 recommendations, largely compliant with 25 recommendations, with
only one recommendation (Recommendation 15 on new technologies) remaining as partially
compliant.
The Law on the prevention of financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has
not been revised in line with the Venice Commission’s recommendations. The Ministry of
Interior and the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) developed a risk-based
methodology for the audit of the non-profit organisations (NPOs). As a result of the risk-
based methodology, the Ministry of Interior’s audits prioritised the humanitarian aid NPOs.
More than 600 NPOs have been audited repeatedly in accordance with the provisions of law
since 2021. None of the audited NPOs and their executives have been prosecuted as a result
of these audits. Civil society remained concerned about potential disproportionate
implementation of the law to further restrict the legitimate activities of NGOs and to put
additional pressure on critical voices.
Türkiye is an active member of the Global Coalition against Daesh.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Türkiye faces threats from various terrorist groups. Türkiye actively engaged in the regular
biannual review of the EU terrorism list under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘CP 931’).
The PKK, IBDA-C, DHKP/C and TAK remain on the EU’s terrorism list. However,
terrorism prosecutions often disproportionately targeted legitimate activities of political
51
opposition. Counterterrorism efforts need to be pursued in accordance with the rule of law
and fundamental rights and freedoms.
In the reporting period, MASAK continued to strengthen its institutional capacity as well as
its cooperation with law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities. MASAK has
consistently built a sound track-record. The number of suspicious transaction reports
submitted decreased from 504 995 in 2021 to 425 322 in 2022. Systematic inter-agency
cooperation between the law enforcement agencies, prosecution and MASAK has improved.
As a result of its anti-money laundering / countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT)
analysis and inspections, MASAK forwarded criminal complaints to the prosecution for 496
persons.
Türkiye reaffirmed its commitment to freeze the assets of persons/entities designated by the
United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee. The government also continued to
use the domestic assets freezing instrument as a deterrent.
Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters
Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters is regulated by the Law on international
civil law and procedural law, circulars and international conventions. Türkiye is a party to
most international conventions. However, it has not acceded to relevant international
conventions in the area of civil justice, many of which were drawn up by the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, including in particular the 1996 Convention on
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of
Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, the 2007 Convention on
the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance and the
2005 Convention of Hague on Choice of Court Agreements. Türkiye has not yet ratified the
European Convention on the Compensation of Victims. In 2022, within the scope of the
Convention on Civil Procedure, 15 judicial legal assistance requests were made by EU
Member States and 196 by Türkiye. Within the scope of the Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 77 judicial legal assistance requests were
made by EU Member States and 1 937 by Türkiye.
The main legislation governing judicial cooperation in criminal matters has been in place
since 2016 and Türkiye has acceded to most of the international conventions. 33 mutual legal
assistance requests following the introduction of videoconferencing have been processed and
2 of these have been finalised. Under the new ‘consensual extradition’ procedure, extradition
of an offender now takes 1-2 months on average, whereas the previous extradition procedure
lasted around a year. As for the transfer of sentenced persons, introduction of the procedure
of ‘exact execution’ paved the way for the removal of the obligation on local courts to
comply with domestic legislation. In 2022, a total of seven convicts were transferred to
Türkiye from EU Member States under the new procedure, while one convict was transferred
from Türkiye to an EU Member State. The independence and accountability of the justice
system has to be substantially strengthened for a smooth application of the principle of
mutual recognition of judgments and court decisions in criminal matters.
In 2022, EU Member States accepted 18 extradition requests from Türkiye, while 29 were
rejected, 19 requests became redundant and 151 are still pending. Of the 15 extradition
requests from EU Member States, 3 were rejected and 12 are still pending. EU Member
States did not agree to any transfer of convicts to Türkiye, but Türkiye agreed to 2 transfers to
EU Member States. Five contact points have been designated by Türkiye to coordinate and
follow up judicial cooperation on criminal matters with Eurojust. In 2022, Türkiye was
involved in 13 Eurojust cases on terrorism, terrorism financing, cybercrime (fraud), migrant
52
smuggling, attempted murder, money laundering, forgery and drug smuggling (compared
with 15 cases in 2021). However, negotiations for an International Agreement with the EU on
cooperation with Eurojust have not started yet.
Cooperation arrangements should also be established with the European Public Prosecutor’s
Office (EPPO), which started operating in June 2021. In 2022, there were four EPPO cases
involving Türkiye. Until August 2023, Türkiye had not formally communicated whether it
would cooperate with the EPPO on the basis of the declarations made by Member States to
the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, recognising the EPPO
as a national competent authority for the purpose of the Convention.
Legal and irregular migration
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
The Presidency for Migration Management (PMM) is in charge of coordinating migration
policy; ensuring coordination between relevant agencies and organisations; carrying out
functions and actions related to foreigners’ entry into, stay in and exit from Türkiye as well as
their removal, international and temporary protection; and the protection of victims of
trafficking in human beings. The PMM currently has 13 267 personnel.
Following the December 2019 amendment of the Law on foreigners and international
protection, which introduced alternatives to detention, the implementing regulation on
alternative obligations to administrative detention was adopted on 14 September 2022. The
regulation breaks down the procedures applicable for the implementation of each alternative
to detention. In addition to alternatives to detention based on residence and notification duty
that were already implemented (before the regulation entered into force), methods such as
return counselling and family-based return have been rolled out. Alternatives to detention that
require an electronic infrastructure (such as voice recognition software and electronic
bracelets) have yet to be put into practice. Irregular migration bureaus are set up to monitor
the implementation of alternatives to detention in all the Provincial Directorates of Migration
Management (PDMMs). Monitoring working groups were established in the İstanbul,
Ankara, İzmir and Antalya PDMMs.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The EU-Turkey Statement remained the main framework for cooperation between the EU
and Türkiye.
The PMM suffered loss of personnel and infrastructure due to the devastating February 2023
earthquakes, which affected 11 provinces of Türkiye. The buildings of the PDMMs in
Malatya, Osmaniye, Hatay, Adıyaman and Gaziantep were damaged, while a large number of
personnel from other provinces have been appointed to the affected areas to provide services
to foreigners. In the reporting period, PMM continued to employ a limited number of
psychologists, social workers, interpreters and lawyers, some of whom are financed by the
EU.
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 378 migrants lost their
lives in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2022 (111 in 2021). Between January and September
2023, 22 421 irregular migrants arrived in the EU from Türkiye (including Greece, Italy and
Bulgaria) compared to 22 821 arrivals during the same period in 2022. The sea route to Italy
saw a substantial decrease (down by 55%), while arrivals in Greece increased considerably
by 123%. However, the number of arrivals in Cyprus via the Green Line went down by 42%
between January and September 2023, in comparison with the same period in 2022.
53
The average number of daily irregular arrivals in Greece from Türkiye was 42 in 2022 (up
from 20 in 2021). In 2023, by September, the average number of daily irregular arrivals in
Greece from Türkiye increased to 78. Turkish irregular migrants occupied the top spot among
those who arrived in Greece, followed by Syrians and Afghans. In 2022, the number of
irregular arrivals in Cyprus reached 17 365 (11 600 in 2021), most of whom crossed the
Green Line after arriving from Türkiye via the non-government-controlled area of Cyprus. In
2023, by September, 6 969 irregular arrivals were recorded in the government-controlled area
of Cyprus.
As regards the irregular sea route from Türkiye to Italy in 2023, 4 913 irregular arrivals were
recorded until September, compared to 10 805 in the same period in 2022. The total number
of irregular migrants who arrived in the EU from Türkiye in 2022 stood at 33 514 (including
15 582 in Greece, 15 805 in Italy, 1 884 in Bulgaria and 173 in Romania), a substantial
increase compared to 21 295 irregular arrivals in 2021 (7 410 in Greece, 12 916 in Italy, 936
in Bulgaria and none in Romania). At the same time, in 2022, the number of irregular arrivals
in Cyprus via the Green Line also increased substantially to 17 365, from 10 918 in 2021.
280 206 irregular migrants were apprehended in Türkiye in 2022 (162 996 in 2021). As in
past years, irregular migrants from Afghanistan, Syria and Pakistan were the most frequently
apprehended nationalities. The Turkish Coast Guard (TCG) rescued 49 518 irregular migrants
at sea in 2022 (23 676 in 2021).
In 2023, by August, the Turkish authorities had apprehended 102 746 irregular migrants,
around 24 405 of whom were intercepted by the TCG. Nationals of Afghanistan, Syria and
Palestine topped the list of nationalities. According to the government, law enforcement
forces apprehended 9 149 smugglers in 2022 (an increase on the 7 942 apprehensions in
2021). As regards 2023, as of August, 3 259 migrant smugglers had been apprehended. 1 720
people and organised crime groups were convicted for migrant smuggling in 2022.
No progress was made as regards the full implementation of the EU-Turkey Readmission
Agreement. Türkiye maintained its position that it would not implement the provisions
concerning third-country nationals until the visa requirement for its citizens travelling to the
Schengen Area is lifted.
Türkiye has unilaterally suspended the return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands on
public health grounds since March 2020. The European Commission and Greece have
repeatedly called on Türkiye to resume return operations in line with the commitments made
under the EU-Turkey Statement. The resumption of returns to Türkiye remains key to
effectively fighting irregular migration and migrant smuggling networks in the region.
Between 2016 and 2020, 2 140 persons (including 412 Syrian nationals) were readmitted to
Türkiye from Greece under the ‘One-for-One’ scheme. The bilateral Readmission Protocol
between Greece and Türkiye remained suspended. Türkiye did not readmit third-country
nationals from Bulgaria under either the bilateral border agreement or the EU-Turkey
Readmission Agreement.
As regards resettlement from Türkiye to the EU under the ‘One-for-One’ scheme, 5 046
Syrian refugees were resettled in eight EU Member States in 2022. Moreover, the
Resettlement Support Facility run by the European Union Agency for Asylum in Istanbul
facilitated the processing of 2 585 resettlement candidates. The total number of Syrian
refugees resettled from Türkiye to the EU Member States under the ‘One-for-One’ scheme
reached 39 648 as of September 2023. At the same time, 561 758 Syrian refugees were
voluntarily repatriated from Türkiye to Syria between 2016 and 2023 according to
government data. Out of the total number, 58 758 Syrians were repatriated in 2022.
54
Türkiye returned effectively 124 441 irregular migrants to their home countries in 2022, an
increase of more than 160% on the 2021 figure of 46 653. The total number of irregular
migrants returned since 2018 reached 372 790. The total number of Afghan nationals
returned from Türkiye in 2022 was 66 534, while 12 385 Pakistani nationals and 40 898 other
countries’ nationals had been returned to their countries as of 22 December 2022. None of
these returns were carried out within the scope of the readmission agreements that are in
force between Türkiye and third countries. Türkiye did not sign any new readmission
agreements in the reporting period.
Türkiye continued voluntary returns of irregular migrants financed through national as well
as EU funds. 737 irregular migrants were returned through the national voluntary return
scheme while 2 259 were returned with the assistance of IOM and EU financing in 2022.
According to the government, 280 206 irregular migrants were prevented from entering
Turkish territory in the eastern and southern provinces in 2022 by Turkish security forces.
Some of the 30 removal centres were heavily damaged by the February 2023 earthquakes and
the capacity to host irregular migrants dropped from 18 000 to 15 710. The removal centre in
Hatay was evacuated due to heavy damage and is no longer operational, whereas hosting of
migrants in other removal centres was suspended pending reparations. The number of
temporary accommodation centres managed by the PMM increased from 7 to 9, leading to an
increase in capacity from around 66 000 to 77 000. Temporary accommodation centres also
started hosting earthquake victims of Turkish origin along with Syrians.
Civil society, bar associations and various media reported incidents of alleged human rights
violations as well as pervasive challenges relating to access to rights and services in removal
centres, particularly with regard to access to information and legal aid. In 2022, more than
280 000 irregular migrants were apprehended, most of whom were subject to return
procedures in removal centres. A limited number of irregular migrants (939) benefited from
free legal aid in 2022 (1 059 in 2021). In addition to the free legal aid scheme, 37 876
migrants were able to have access to and meet their lawyers in removal centres.
Overall, irregular migration continued to be a polarising topic in society and was heavily used
by political parties in their electoral campaigns.
1 345 488 foreigners were legal residents in Türkiye on 1 December 2022 (1 275 741 in
2021). Nationals of Iraq, Russia, and Turkmenistan were the most common holders of
residence permits. The number of Russian nationals with residence permits increased from
approximately 66 000 in 2021 to around 155 000 in 2023. Approximately 560 000 Ukrainians
have arrived in Türkiye since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in
February 2022. Many had already left for a third country or voluntarily returned to Ukraine
by September 2022. Around 46 000 Ukrainians were residing in Türkiye in April 2023.
The legislation on the acquisition of nationality by foreign investors remained unchanged
during the reporting period. Moreover, according to Articles 35 and 36 of the Land Registry
Law, natural persons who are the nationals of countries designated by the President of the
Republic can acquire real estate in Türkiye. As of October 2022, the list contained 185
countries. The list is not publicly available because it is not published on the website of the
General Directorate of Land Registry. Such schemes pose risks in relation to security, money
laundering, tax evasion, terrorist financing, corruption and infiltration by organised crime. As
a candidate country, Türkiye should refrain from any measure that could jeopardise the
attainment of the EU’s objectives when using its prerogatives to award nationality.
Asylum
55
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
The Presidency for Migration Management (PMM) is the main institution responsible for all
asylum-related procedures. The status determination processes are carried out by the
Provincial Directorates of Migration Management (PDMMs) as well as by the International
Protection Bureaus (decision centres) in Ankara and Istanbul (established in 2018 and 2019
respectively), with a view of reducing case backlog. A new International Protection Bureau
was established in Samsun in 2022. In addition to those bureaus, mobile teams were
established in 2019. Decisions on refugee status determination are subject to administrative
and judicial appeal procedures.
Legislation in this area is partially aligned with the EU acquis. The Law on foreigners and
international protection maintains the reservation (geographical limitation) expressed in the
New York Protocol to the 1951 Geneva Convention as a result of which the vast majority of
persons seeking international protection in Türkiye cannot apply for fully-fledged refugee
status but only for ‘conditional refugee’ status and subsidiary protection. Conditional refugee
status limits the stay in the country ‘until the moment a recognised conditional refugee is
resettled to a third country’. By law, Syrian refugees are granted a specific refugee status
under the Temporary Protection Regulation. However, in February 2022, the Ministry of
Interior announced that newly arriving Syrians who have not been registered will not
automatically receive temporary protection status in 16 provinces. According to the
announcement, residence permit applications by foreigners would not be accepted in any
neighbourhood in which 25% or more of the population consisted of foreigners (this was
reduced to 20% in June 2022).
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Türkiye continued to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world, with (as of 31
August 2023) 3 298 817 Syrians under temporary protection and slightly over 300 000 non-
Syrians (including those who hold or who have applied for international protection status).
The number of asylum seekers slightly increased over the reporting period. 33 246
international protection applications were received in 2022 (29 256 in 2021). 19 400
applications were made by Afghans, 7 131 by Ukrainians and 4 083 by Iraqis. This was a
different pattern from 2021 due to the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In 2022,
Türkiye granted international protection (refugee status, conditional refugee status or
subsidiary protection) to 12 857 applicants, a slight decrease compared with 13 227 in 2021.
The authorities rejected 12 030 applications (11 908 in 2021). In 2022, the cumulative total of
pending international protection applications stood at 272 336. Despite a slight decrease on
last year, this remains a significant backlog that has not been reduced over the years. There is
no publicly accessible data on international protection with a breakdown by category of
decisions and of pending cases at the end of the year.
As of June 2022, Türkiye officially closed registration of temporary protection applications in
16 provinces in an attempt to avoid an increase in the number of foreigners where they
already exceed 20% of the total population. When asylum seekers are denied registration in a
‘closed’ province, they are most often not officially referred to another province with
supporting documentation. Outside the officially ‘closed’ provinces, NGOs and lawyers
repeatedly referred to the de facto closure of international protection registration in other
provinces, except for highly vulnerable cases. Such barriers to registration hinder access to all
other essential services and put asylum seekers in an irregular situation if they are
apprehended.
56
Almost half of all Syrians in Türkiye are registered in four provinces – Istanbul, Gaziantep,
Hatay and Şanlıurfa. The rest reside in various other provinces across Türkiye. 67 548
Syrians are hosted in seven temporary accommodation centres (50 736 in 2021). 230 998
Syrians had been granted Turkish citizenship as of April 2023.
The destructive earthquakes of 6 February 2023 affected a total of 11 provinces
(Kahramanmaraş, Hatay, Gaziantep, Malatya, Kilis, Osmaniye, Diyarbakir, Adana,
Adıyaman, Sanliurfa) where most of the migrant and refugee population (in particular 1 738
035 Syrians under Temporary Protection) had been living. According to a statement by the
Interior Minister, 6 969 foreigners (mostly Syrians) lost their lives because of the
earthquakes. The earthquakes have led to great human mobility, including refugees and
migrants, inside the country.
In ordinary circumstances, Türkiye imposes travel restrictions on refugees, prohibiting them
from travelling out of the provinces in which they are registered with local authorities unless
they have a permit. On 7 February 2023, the authorities lifted these restrictions for about
1.7 million refugees under temporary and international protection in the earthquake region for
90 days (with the exception that they could not travel to İstanbul). A second circular reduced
this to 60 days and granted those travelling from the worst-affected five provinces (Hatay,
Malatya, Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman, and Gaziantep) unconditional access to other
provinces, but made travel from the other five (Kilis, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Adana, and
Osmaniye) dependent on the applicant’s home being seriously damaged and the existence of
medical needs that could only be met in other provinces. This circular is still in place and is
extended on a regular basis excluding Istanbul. Another administrative order gave Syrians
under temporary protection, registered and residing in the 11 earthquake-affected provinces,
the opportunity to return to Syria temporarily. Syrians returning temporarily can stay in Syria
for up to 6 months. Temporary returns to Syria started in February 2023 and by June the total
number of temporary returns was 70 086 individuals. By September 62 936 individuals had
returned to Türkiye. The deadline for re-entry to Türkiye was 15 September 2023, after which
the temporary protection status of Syrians who had not returned to Türkiye was cancelled.
The earthquakes and their consequences resulted in increasing discomfort for a large portion
of the public. In the lead-up to the general elections in May 2023, opposition politicians made
speeches that further fuelled anti-refugee sentiment and called for Syrians to return to Syria.
Throughout 2022, the PMM continued the verification of data of Syrians under temporary
protection, updating and completing the information gathered during their original
registration. 2 071 051 Syrians’ data was verified in 2022.
Additionally, in the context of the 20% rule, the PMM introduced an address-verification
exercise for Syrians. As a result of this exercise, the temporary protection status of Syrians
who were found to be residing in locations other than their officially registered addresses has
reportedly been deactivated. The PMM invited these individuals to approach their provincial
offices to declare their current residential addresses so that they could reactivate their
protection status. In practice, deactivation of the status means discontinued access to services
such as education and healthcare.
A key mechanism for identifying vulnerable asylum seekers is protection desks in PDMMs
which interview and make referrals based on their specific needs assessment. There are
protection desks in 50 provinces. In 2022, protection desks identified and processed referrals
for 153 054 asylum seekers. In 2022, 181 unaccompanied children were referred to the
Ministry of Family and Social Services (MoFSS) by various agencies. Unaccompanied
children continue to face protection risks, particularly during initial identification and age
57
assessment processes, which are undertaken by different agencies (including law enforcement
services). Children are referred to hospitals for bone x-rays, which give a broad two-year age
range. In the absence of holistic age-assessment processes, individuals whose results indicate
that they are aged 16-18 might be registered as adults. A multi-disciplinary approach to age
assessment procedures, which take psychosocial aspects into consideration, is necessary in
order to increase compliance with European standards.
Applicants for international protection, conditional refugee status holders and people under
temporary protection, i.e. Syrians, can apply for work permits. However, a large majority of
refugees and asylum seekers do not have effective access to the labour market, in particular to
formal employment, due to low employability (lower levels of education and skills), language
barriers and limited access to information and services. Around 400 000 refugee children in
Türkiye (especially in the 15-18 age group) do not regularly attend school. According to the
Ministry of National Education, 822 524 refugee students were enrolled at schools in 29
provinces in January 2023.
The EU has mobilised close to EUR 10 billion in support for refugees in Türkiye since 2011.
The full operational budget of EUR 6 billion of the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey was
committed, with over EUR 5.1 billion disbursed by June 2023. The Facility mobilises both
humanitarian and development assistance for refugees and host communities in Türkiye to
meet basic needs, increase access to education and healthcare (including for vulnerable
groups, children and women) and strengthen border protection at the eastern borders with
Iran and Iraq.
A first top-up of EUR 535 million was allocated in 2020 and an additional EUR 3 billion was
mobilised by the EU in June 2021 to continue support for refugees and host communities in
Türkiye in 2021-2023. This funding is committed to continuing the provision of basic needs,
inclusive quality education for refugees, their socio-economic empowerment in Türkiye as
well as border management. Part of it (EUR 350 million) is being mobilised to support
refugees and host communities in the regions affected by the February 2023 earthquake.
The PMM and the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) continued their cooperation
with the implementation of the 2022-2023 Cooperation Roadmap, which offers capacity-
building support and peer-to-peer exchanges on best practices in the fields of asylum,
reception, resettlement and organisational change.
NGOs and lawyers report concerns about the quality of decisions on asylum, their reasoned
notification and challenges with the awareness of and access to legal aid for appeals.
Visa policy
Türkiye made no progress in meeting the six unfulfilled benchmarks of the visa liberalisation
roadmap (on the anti-terror law, personal data protection legislation, implementation of the
EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement, conclusion of an international agreement with the EU
on Europol, implementation of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)
recommendations on anti-corruption and judicial cooperation with all EU Member States).
Türkiye needs to further harmonise its visa policy with the EU’s visa policy. This would
include further aligning Turkish visa requirements with the EU lists of visa-free and visa-
required countries; full phasing-out of the issuing of visas at borders (currently the citizens of
33 countries are eligible to obtain a visa on arrival, compared with 24 in 2021) and of
electronic visas; and ensuring that the issuing of visas at its diplomatic missions is carried out
in line with the conditions and procedures set out in the EU Visa Code. Türkiye continues to
apply a discriminatory visa regime against nationals of Cyprus, but it has abolished the short-
58
stay visa requirements for the other 26 Member States.
Türkiye has introduced the biometric collection of fingerprinting for sticker visas issued by
its diplomatic missions in a number of countries (primarily in Africa) with a view to
increasing the authorities’ capacity to tackle irregular migration. The authorities have relaxed
the rules governing the entry and residence of Ukrainian nationals in Türkiye as a result of
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
Schengen and external borders
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
No new legislation for the sector was adopted during the reporting period. The coordination
of the work of the State bodies dealing with border management matters is the responsibility
of the Directorate-General for Provincial Administration in the Ministry of the Interior (MoI).
The Border Management Implementation Board did not meet in the reporting period, while
preparations for its 6th
meeting since its establishment in 2016 have been underway for some
time. Its supervising body, the Integrated Border Management Coordination Board, has not
yet met. In addition, relevant interinstitutional meetings were held at technical level on
specific topics.
The Ministry of the Interior created a new department in autumn 2021 for the coordination of
the future work of the National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Centre (NACORAC).
Several border management services within the Turkish administration assigned staff to
NACORAC, which is located in Ankara. Given its responsibilities at Türkiye’s green border,
personnel from the Land Forces Command (in the Ministry of National Defence) should be
assigned. The centre was formally established in 2016 and an inauguration ceremony was
held in November 2022 to formalise the handover of EU-financed equipment, but it is not yet
fully operational. Staff detachments from all other relevant institutions have been completed,
but the staff assignment process from the Land Forces Command is still ongoing.
NACORAC has started collecting data from central and local institutions, albeit at a basic
level. The risk analysis process has also been initiated to a limited extent, while negotiations
with all relevant institutions for enhanced data-sharing are ongoing.
Following the establishment in February 2021 of the Institute of Heads of Civil Border
Administration, transfer of certain border management responsibilities from governors in 11
border regions (mostly in eastern Türkiye) to the Directorate-General for Provincial
Administration has continued. Two heads were appointed at land borders during the reporting
period, bringing the total number of heads appointed by the Directorate-General for
Provincial Administration for border gates to eight (six at airports, including Istanbul,
Ankara, Izmir and Antalya; and two at land borders). This reform seeks to streamline the
coordination of border management at central level.
In terms of new coordination mechanisms at local level, ‘Security Commissions’ have been
established (under the chairmanship of the Civil Border Administration with the participation
of the representatives of the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, the Ministry of Trade,
the Ministry of Health, the Turkish National Police and the gendarmerie) and will meet every
month at civil airports, ports and border gates to develop, implement and evaluate measures
with regard to security, training and inspection services.
Similar to last year’s recommendations, in order to bring the country’s border management
system in line with the EU acquis, Türkiye should further improve inter-service and
international cooperation, accelerate the adoption of an integrated border management (IBM)
strategy and update its IBM national implementation action plan from 2006. It also needs to
59
take steps to enact new legislation to set up a non-military border management body in
charge of all aspects of border management, including border surveillance at the green
border, which is currently under the responsibility of the Turkish land forces.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
Türkiye continued to invest significant effort and financial resources in modernising border
security at the land border, especially in the south and south-east of the country. After the
construction of a modular security wall and a panel/barbed-wire fence, patrol roads, lighting,
sensors and thermal cameras along the Syrian border, the installation of modern electro-
optical communication and surveillance masts continued at the Iranian border.
Communication and surveillance masts were also being erected on the western land border.
The EU provides substantial support to Türkiye to modernise its border surveillance
infrastructure, including at its eastern borders with Iran and Iraq.
Relations with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) are based on the
Memorandum of Understanding of 2012 and a three-year cooperation plan covering the
period 2020-2022. The authorities continued to provide monthly reports on irregular
migration flows at the country’s western land and sea borders. Türkiye did not engage in joint
operations in the reporting period but did participate in training sessions and conferences.
Cooperation with neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria within the framework of a trilateral
Police and Customs Co-operation Centre at the Bulgarian-Turkish border crossing point at
Kapitan Andreevo/Kapıkule continued through data-sharing, and regular ad hoc meetings
between the countries’ respective authorities within the scope of existing agreements.
Türkiye continued contributing to Interpol’s databases, albeit only on the basis of manual
inquiries in case of need (using the ‘POLNET’ website of the TNP’s Interpol & Europol
Department). Interpol’s ‘Stolen and Lost Travel Documents’ (SLTD) database is not
integrated with Türkiye’s local database and there is no access to other international police
databases. Local database connections are used by authorised officers of the Turkish National
Police in all 81 provinces. Certain staff members in the following services have access to the
databases: the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM), the Disaster and Emergency
Presidency (AFAD), the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, the Turkish Atomic Energy
Authority, the Ministry of Trade (DG Customs Enforcement), the Turkish Coast Guard
Command and the General Gendarmerie Command.
Türkiye has committed itself to removing all anti-personnel landmines by 31 December 2025
in order to fulfil its obligations under the Ottawa Convention (or Anti-personnel Mine Ban
Treaty). This deadline has been extended several times since 2014. So far, only a relatively
small stretch of the total of 2 949 km of land border has been cleared entirely. Türkiye needs
to substantially increase its national investment in removing mines not only along its borders
with Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Armenia, but also inside Türkiye in order to fulfil its obligations
under the Ottawa Convention. The EU is currently providing significant financial support for
demining.
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2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA
In line with the conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993, EU
accession requires the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.
2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy
The Turkish economy is well advanced but made no progress over the reporting period.
Serious concerns persist over the continued proper functioning of Türkiye’s market economy.
There has been prolonged backsliding on important elements, such as the conduct of
monetary policy and the institutional and regulatory environment over most of the reporting
period. Since the May parliamentary and presidential elections, the authorities have taken
some steps to revert to more stability-oriented macroeconomic policies.
Although economic growth remained robust in 2022, Türkiye moved further away from
market-oriented policies, which weakened its economic fundamentals and increased
vulnerabilities and risks. Inflation decreased somewhat but remained very high as monetary
policy prioritised exceptionally low interest rates, which remain deeply negative in real terms
and are sustained by a web of regulatory and prudential measures. After the presidential and
parliamentary elections in spring 2023, monetary policy has started to tighten, also signalling
a gradual simplification of the macroprudential framework. The current account deficit
increased to 5.4% of GDP in 2022, driven by a negative terms-of-trade shock and large
imports of non-monetary gold. The relatively good budget performance in recent years masks
an underlying trend of growing fiscal risks. The authorities’ commitment to fiscal discipline
wavered, as the fiscal stance turned pro-cyclical in 2023, with earthquake-related expenditure
pressure adding to pre-electoral budgetary largesse. However, the fiscal stance was tightened
Table 5.1: 2020 2021 2022
Türkiye - Key economic figures
GDP per capita (% of EU-27 in PPS)1)
65 61 63 69
Real GDP growth 4.3 1.8 11.4 5.6
Economic activity rate of the population aged 15+ (%), total 52.1 49.3 51.4 53.1
female 32.8 30.9 32.8 35.1
male 72.0 68.2 70.3 71.4
Unemployment rate of the population aged 15+ (%), total 11.1 13.2 12.0 10.4
female 13.8 15.0 14.7 13.4
male 9.9 12.3 10.7 8.9
Employment of the population aged 15+ (annual growth %) 2.3 -4.8 7.9 6.7
Nominal wages (annual growth %) 16.5 18.0 19.3 73.2
Consumer price index (annual growth %) 11.2 12.3 19.6 72.3
Exchange rate against EUR 4.2 8.0 10.4 17.4
Current account balance (% of GDP) -2.7 -4.5 -0.9 -5.4
Net foreign direct investment, FDI (% of GDP) 1.1 0.6 0.8 0.9
General government balance (% of GDP) -2.0 -2.9 -2.3 -1.1
General government debt (% of GDP) 29.0 39.7 41.8 31.7
Notes:
1) Eurostat
Source: national sources
2014-19
average
61
after the elections and a revised budget, including sizeable tax increases, was adopted in July.
The institutional and regulatory environment lacks predictability and transparency, and
complicates the post-electoral economic policy normalisation. Market exit remains costly and
slow. However, Türkiye made progress in digitalising government services to businesses.
Although the size of the informal economy has fallen in recent years, it still accounts for a
significant share of economic activity. State intervention in price-setting mechanisms persists.
The provision of State aid lacks proper implementation rules, enforcement and transparency.
The banking sector remained broadly stable but is facing financial stability challenges due to
the numerous overly complex and far-reaching macroprudential and regulatory measures. The
labour market strengthened further, although structural challenges remain significant, in
particular for youth and female employment. Regional labour market disparities declined and
reached one of the lowest levels in years. The recent net minimum wage increases were
pro-cyclical.
The Commission’s recommendations from 2022 were not fully implemented and remain
valid. In order to improve the functioning of the market economy, Türkiye should in
particular:
→ restore the independence of the central bank and tighten monetary policy in order to
reduce inflation sustainably towards the target;
→ develop a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation plan that underpins a gradual return
to primary surpluses, while accommodating transparent reconstruction spending and
addressing fiscal risks, including from contingent liabilities;
→ further improve the business environment, including by reducing State interference in
price-setting mechanisms, simplifying the macroprudential and regulatory framework,
and enhancing the transparency and control of State aid.
Economic governance
Türkiye moved further away from market-oriented policies, weakening economic
fundamentals and increasing risks, but has taken some steps to reverse this course since
the May elections. Monetary policy prioritised maintaining deeply negative real interest
rates, despite soaring inflation and tightening global financial conditions. This necessitated
the adoption of far-reaching macroprudential and regulatory measures that have disrupted the
functioning of the financial markets and increased vulnerabilities. However, the central bank
has started to tighten monetary policy after the presidential and parliamentary elections in
spring 2023, also signalling a gradual simplification of the macroprudential framework.
Fiscal policy turned strongly expansionary in the first half of 2023, with earthquake-related
expenditure pressure adding to pre-electoral budgetary largesse. Ad hoc policy measures have
increasingly become the norm, undermining, in conjunction with high macroeconomic
instability, the credibility of medium-term planning. A budget rebalancing and large tax hikes
in July have sought to limit the bulging budget deficit. Subsidies and transfers to curb the
effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine increased significantly in 2022 but are
planned to decline in 2023. Türkiye has not joined the EU restrictive measures against Russia
and continued to benefit from its extensive and growing trade relations with it, particularly in
energy, tourism and agriculture. The implementation of the policy guidance set out in the
conclusions from the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2022 has been limited.
Macroeconomic stability
62
Türkiye’s economic growth
remained upbeat but unbalanced.
Real GDP grew by 5.5% in 2022,
which was above the five-year
average (2018-2022) of 4.5%,
although, after a strong first half of
the year, it decelerated in the second
half. It expanded further in the first
half of 2023 and growth even
strengthened a bit, despite the
devastating February earthquakes.
Domestic demand, in particular very
strong household consumption fuelled by pre-election expenditure, remained the main driver
of this. Net exports’ contribution to growth turned negative in the second half of 2022,
following a loss in export momentum and a pick-up in imports, which worsened further in
early 2023. Inventories continued to wind down and very weak construction investment
pulled down total investment growth last year. A notable expansion of technology-intensive
and export-oriented sectors lifted industrial production to record high levels in 2022. The 6
February earthquakes caused a tragic loss of life and significant destruction of capital assets.
High frequency indicators captured the first negative economic effects of the earthquakes
already in February, with steep monthly falls in industrial production and retails sales, and
declining economic confidence. However, economic activity rebounded quickly in the
following months and consumer confidence increased sharply to levels not seen in 5 years,
before steeply falling back in the aftermath of the elections. Due to Türkiye’s relatively
strong performance during the COVID-19 crisis, income convergence with the EU resumed,
with per capita GDP in purchasing power standards rising to 69% of the EU average in 2022
from 59% in 2019, and above its 2015 high of 68%.
External imbalances increased and remained a major vulnerability. The current account
deficit swelled to 5.4% of GDP in 2022 and increased further in the first half of 2023 to more
than double its average in 2018-2022, as the negative terms-of-trade shock and large imports
of non-monetary gold (a traditional safe asset in times of policy uncertainty in Türkiye) drove
the trade deficit back into double digits for the first time in a decade. However, excluding
gold and energy trade, the current account recorded a 5% surplus. The high external deficits
remain a key macroeconomic vulnerability, aggravated by the strong reliance on short-term
borrowing, a very high sovereign risk premium and the low level of foreign exchange
reserves (with a large share in non-
core foreign currencies). The central
bank’s net foreign assets even turned
negative in April as it used its
reserves to defend the exchange rate
before the elections. Reflecting
deteriorating market perception of
domestic economic policy, the five-
year credit default swap has been
high and very volatile. After peaking
in the summer of 2022 above 900 bps
(basis points), it declined to between
500 bps and 600 bps by the end of the year before spiking again following the presidential
and parliamentary elections in the spring of 2023. External debt remained moderately high at
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
16
20
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Graph 5.1: Türkiye - Real GDP growth and
contributions
Priv. cons. Gov. cons. GFCF
Stocks Net exports Real GDP growth
Source: WiiW
% y-o-y
-6
-3
0
3
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Graph 5.2: Türkiye - Current account selected
components and FDI
Goods and services trade balance Workers' remittances balance
Current account balance Net FDI
% of GDP
Source: IMF and Central Bank of Türkiye
63
around 50% of GDP in early 2023, decreasing from the peak of 60% of GDP that it reached
during the COVID-19 crisis. However, the debt stock remains sensitive to the lira’s exchange
rate fluctuations and its structure worsened as economic agents increased their reliance on
short-term funding as a response to rising refinancing costs. Banks’ increased exposure to
foreign currency swaps with the central bank raises economy-wide foreign currency liquidity
concerns. The external debt roll-over ratios have been stable at close to 100% for the banking
sector but have rapidly come down under 100% in early 2023 (albeit from high levels) in the
non-banking sector. The non-financial sector’s foreign exchange deficit remained broadly
unchanged at less than 10% of GDP and its short-term position remained positive – important
factors attenuating external vulnerability.
Inflation remained high as, before the elections, monetary policy prioritised the
maintenance of exceptionally low interest rates sustained by an expanding web of
regulatory and macroprudential measures. Inflation peaked at 85.5% in October 2022. It
declined steeply in the following months on the back of sizeable base effects before
rebounding again since June, exceeding the 5% target by a very large margin. Before the
elections, inflation targeting and the free-floating exchange rate were effectively no longer
the guiding framework of monetary policy. The monetary policy transmission mechanism
was broken, with limited responsiveness by key market interest rates to the central bank
policy rate. Despite very high inflation and tightening global financial conditions, the central
bank lowered its key policy rate in the autumn of 2021 and cut it further in several steps by a
cumulative 1 050 bps to 8.5% in February 2023 (the last 50 bps cut was delivered after the
earthquakes). To sustain the resulting deeply negative real-interest rate and alleviate its policy
contradictions, the authorities have introduced an increasingly complex web of regulatory and
macroprudential measures to reduce dollarisation, support the lira, lower inflationary
pressures, ration and direct credit, and cap interest rates. This set of measures achieved some
short-term results but failed to address the fundamental drivers of high inflation; namely
deeply negative real interest rates, the absence of an effective policy anchor and the lack of
institutional independence of the central bank and key agencies. After depreciating by 40%
against the US dollar in the first three quarters of 2022, the lira remained broadly stable
before resuming its depreciation trend in early March 2023, which intensified (along with
exchange rate volatility) after the May elections. Starting in June and under the guidance of a
new central bank governor, the central bank increased the key policy rate to 25.0% in August
and signalled a gradual further tightening of monetary conditions and simplification of the
existing micro- and macroprudential framework.
64
The authorities’ commitment to fiscal discipline wavered and the fiscal stance turned
pro-cyclical in early 2023, necessitating the adoption of a revised budget in July. The
budget continued to outperform expectations, ending 2022 with a central government budget
deficit of 0.9% of GDP – significantly below the revised budget target of 3.4% and the
previous year’s deficit of 2.8% of
GDP. The general government deficit
fell to 1.1% of GDP, which was also
far below the expected 3.2% of GDP.
The initial 2023 central government
budget targeted a deficit of TRY
659.4 billion (3.5% of GDP) but was
based on a rather optimistic
macroeconomic assumption of 5%
real GDP growth and 24.9% average
consumer price inflation. Total
revenue was planned to increase by
36.0% and expenditure by 52.0% in comparison with the 2022 budgetary outcome. The
budget introduced some new measures but failed to fully exit the ‘crisis mode’ of ad hoc
decisions. On the revenue side, the 2% accommodation tax adopted in 2021 started to be
applied at the beginning of 2023. The corporate income tax rate has been lowered as planned
to 20%. Government expenditure increased strongly in early 2023 due to the elections and the
earthquakes. The government budget continued underwriting costly and poorly targeted
measures to support the lira and cushion the impact of high energy prices, although lower-
than-expected international gas prices and financial repression measures that forced domestic
banks to increase their holdings of government bonds led to some savings. Some spending
measures with a large budgetary impact (including public wage and pension hikes, and the
removal of the age requirement for early retirement) were finalised after budget adoption and
were not fully reflected in the original budget. The fiscal stance was tightened after the
elections. A revised budget was adopted in July, including multiple and sizeable tax increases
(VAT, corporate income tax, special consumption tax, motor vehicle tax, etc.) and additional
expenditure to cover earthquake reconstruction needs and pre-election spending measures.
The relatively good budget performance in recent years masks an underlying trend of
growing fiscal risks. The government debt ratio peaked at 42.3% of GDP in early 2022 but
came down to 31.2% of GDP in early 2023, helped by the strong denominator effect from the
very high level of inflation. Concerted ‘liraisation’ efforts increased the share of new
domestic borrowing in lira to 90% in 2022. Nonetheless, two thirds of the total debt stock
remains denominated in foreign currencies, while the average time to maturity of the debt
stock remained unchanged at 5.4 years, as external debt maturity decreased for the fifth year
in a row. Some measures, such as the FX-guaranteed lira deposits, had a direct and sizeable
impact on the budget and are a significant source of (contingent) budget liabilities, even after
they were fully transferred to the central bank in July. Successive crises and shocks triggered
the adoption of numerous ad hoc measures with budgetary effects that have strained public
finance management. The multiple and sizeable tax exemptions and reductions undermine tax
bases and complicate planning, while successive tax amnesties have become the rule rather
than the exception, despite official policy declarations. The planned new single consolidated
framework for all public-private partnerships has yet to be adopted. Even though fiscal
performance has been consistently robust in recent years, there are still no national fiscal
rules or independent fiscal institutions to monitor fiscal performance. The medium-term
budget framework is subject to frequent changes and is not sufficiently credible and binding.
0
10
20
30
40
50
-4
-2
0
2
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Graph 5.3: Türkiye - Fiscal developments
Primary balance (lhs) Interest (lhs)
GG balance (lhs) Public debt (rhs)
Source: National sources
% of GDP
65
The macroeconomic policy mix remained largely focused on the pursuit of growth at the
expense of rising economic vulnerability. Fiscal policy turned expansionary in early 2023,
despite the very high level of inflation and large external imbalances. The maintenance of
deeply negative real interest rates by the central bank and the complex web of regulatory and
macroprudential measures to sustain them created major vulnerabilities, led to market
fragmentation and disrupted price signals. The low level of policy credibility and institutional
weaknesses (including the lack of central bank independence) undermine the effectiveness of
the policy mix and hinders the post-electoral economic policy normalisation.
Functioning of product markets
Business environment
The institutional and regulatory environment is characterised by weaknesses in
transparency, predictability and rule-based implementation. The government’s highly
interventionist pre-election policy increased uncertainty and volatility on the product and
financial markets. Türkiye lacks a mechanism for systematically consulting business
organisations and social partners during the preparation of new legislation. Intellectual
property right enforcement continues to be very weak. According to the e-Government
Benchmark report of the EU for 2022, Türkiye performed above the EU average in enabling
regular areas of business operation (such as administrative and tax requirements, human
resources and refund of VAT) on digital platforms, except for those that require cross-border
transactions. However, Türkiye's performance is lower in online services for new business,
which remain relatively cumbersome. Market exit remained costly and time-consuming due
to complicated insolvency procedures. Türkiye digitalised some steps in the insolvency
procedure, such as liquidation, but it still takes 1 037 days on average to complete a
bankruptcy process through the judicial system. Even though alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms have been promoted, commercial judicial processes are slow and a large backlog
of commercial court cases remains. The number of newly established businesses increased by
27.8% in 2022, while the number of liquidated companies went up by 26.0% and the number
of closed ones by 42.8%. The acquisition and management of companies under the
trusteeship of the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF) are carried out in a non-
transparent manner. In June 2023, the trusteeship of the Fund was managing 620 companies
based in 35 provinces across Türkiye, with a total asset value of TRY 128.9 billion and
27 213 employees.
The informal sector’s share in the economy declined but remains structurally high and
well above the OECD and EU averages. In 2022, the share of unregistered employment fell
to 26.8% from 34.8% in 2019, while in the non-agricultural sector it was down to 16.8% from
23.3%. The government announced its new action plan for the fight against the informal
economy (2023-2025) in December 2022. The plan includes 44 actions to measure the size of
the informal economy; raise the level of social awareness and voluntary compliance; improve
cooperation and interagency data sharing; adopt legal, administrative and technical measures;
and strengthen audit capacity. However, the plan lacks performance indicators to track its
implementation progress.
State influence on product markets
The State increased its intervention in the price-setting mechanism of key sectors. More
than a quarter of the consumer basket is composed of goods whose prices are set or heavily
influenced by public authorities. A 25% upper cap on rent increases was applied until July
2023. A month before the May elections, the Energy Market Regulatory Authority cut
electricity tariffs by 15%. Households and places of worship were exempted from natural gas
66
payment for a month and 25 cubic meters have been provided free of charge to citizens
starting in June 2023 for the following 11 months. Meanwhile, the regulators have continued
carrying out intensive price audits to investigate allegations of unfair pricing and stockpiling,
particularly in essential products. The VAT exemption period for new equipment and
machinery deliveries to the manufacturing sector for innovation, design and R&D activities
was extended until the end of 2024. Following the February 2023 earthquakes, the VAT rate
applicable to prefabricated buildings and containers to be delivered to the earthquake zone
was reduced from 18% to 1% until 31 December 2023.
State aid transparency and control remains weak. Legislation to implement the State aid
law has not been adopted. The newly established Directorate-General for State Aid has not
been assigned any enforcement power regarding the State aid law. The lack of implementing
legislation and an operational institutional framework mean that this law is not enforceable.
Türkiye has not formally set up a comprehensive state aid inventory or adopted an action plan
to align all State aid schemes with the EU acquis. The current structure of State aid control is
neither independent nor operational (see Chapter 8). The committed investment for the 64
supported projects reached TRY 491 billion in May 2023. As is the case for the general
incentive scheme, Türkiye has not published data concerning the actual support granted to
these projects. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) benefit from numerous support
measures and initiatives in a fragmented way. The SME Development Organisation of
Türkiye (KOSGEB) and the Ministry of Industry and Technology conducted evaluations of
four more support programmes in the reporting period and published them on KOSGEB’s
website.
Privatisation and restructuring
The scope of privatisation remained limited. Privatisation receipts increased from
USD 413 million in 2021 to USD 504 million in 2022 (less than 0.1% of GDP), with 87.5%
related to the sale of real assets. The Turkish Wealth Fund (TWF) holds shares in major
companies in the financial (including state-owned banks, Borsa Istanbul and consolidated
public insurance companies), telecommunications, petrochemicals, real estate, mining,
agriculture and transport sectors. The Law on the Istanbul Financial Centre adopted in June
2022 granted the TWF the right to conduct all business and management operations in the
Istanbul Financial Centre area for 20 years, with a managing company established as a joint
stock company. The involvement of the TWF through this company means that these
operations will be exempted from audit by the Turkish Court of Accounts (see Chapter 32).
In addition to the numerous immunities granted to the TWF, this law provides a series of new
tax exemptions, deductions and incentives. The TWF’s total assets increased to TRY 3.2
trillion (44.1% of GDP) at the end of 2021, up from TRY 2.2 trillion (43.6% of GDP) in
2020.
Functioning of the financial market
Financial stability
The banking sector has remained broadly stable but is facing financial stability
challenges. The commercial banks’ average regulatory capital ratio declined from its peak of
20.4% in early 2022 to 18.7% in July 2023 but stayed significantly above the required
minimum. The decline was more pronounced in State-owned banks, whose capitalisation fell
to 14.5% in early 2023 – a two-decade low – despite several recapitalisation rounds in
previous years, before rebounding to 16.3% in July. The fall in capitalisation was the result of
banks’ support for the authorities’ economic and development agenda, including in the
aftermath of the February 2023 earthquakes. Some of the macroprudential measures to
67
40
45
50
55
60
0
10
20
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Graph 5.4: Türkiye - Labour market trends
(15+ age group)
Unemployment rate (lhs) Participation rate (rhs)
Employment rate (rhs) Source: Turkstat
protect capital adequacy have been modified but remain in place (e.g., allowing the use of an
outdated FX rate and the suspension of mark-to-market accounting rules). Credit growth, the
extremely negative real interest rates and growing collateral valuation brought the non-
performing loans ratio down to a new low (falling in July 2023 to 1.6% in the banking sector
as a whole and to just 1.0% in the State-owned banks) while loan-loss provisioning increased
further. The share of stage 2 loans under close monitoring also declined to below 10%. Bank
profitability improved but remained negative in real terms. The average return on assets was
3.7% and return on equity was 49.9% for the banking sector as a whole in 2022, but were
only 2.0% and 29.9% respectively in State-owned banks. FX-guaranteed deposits were
around a quarter of total deposits in mid-2023, bringing the share of lira-denominated
deposits to 57.4% (still below their level a decade ago), while underlying dollarisation
increased.
Access to finance
The financial sector operates in an overregulated environment. Far-reaching
macroprudential and regulatory measures have disrupted the functioning of the financial
markets. Reducing interest rates and keeping them down necessitated additional actions to
mitigate the fundamental contradictions of such a policy in a high-inflation environment. A
series of incentives and restrictions have been introduced since late 2021, covering:
FX-protected lira-denominated deposits; maintenance of a certain share of lira-denominated
deposits; reserve and security requirements; collateral in swap and interbank money markets;
tax exemptions; FX-surrender requirements for exporters; capital adequacy ratios; risk
weighting; and commercial loans. These measures rationed and directed credit, and replaced
price signals with quantitative targets or directly socialised risk. As part of the economic
policy changes initiated after the elections, the authorities have undertaken some limited steps
to gradually simplify the macroprudential framework. After declining in 2022, total lending
rebounded in early 2023 (mainly driven by SME, consumer, and credit card loans) but was, at
52.1% of GDP in June, still far below its five-year moving average. Lending to non-financial
companies remained largely subdued – except for SME loans, which were supported by
regulatory measures. The very high level of inflation led to banking-sector assets falling
sharply from 127% of GDP in 2021 to 96% in 2022, while the share of foreign-owned banks
in total banking sector assets declined from 25.9 % to 24.9%.
Functioning of the labour market
The labour market strengthened but structural challenges remain significant. Job
creation was very strong in 2022 but slowed down in early 2023. In the second quarter of
2023, the seasonally adjusted labour force participation and employment rates reached 53.4%
and 48.2% respectively. The labour force moved into more productive activities. There were
notable job gains in industry and
construction, and particularly large job
creation in services, while agriculture
continued shedding labour. The shift in
employment out of agriculture also
caused a decline in the share of
workers without social security
registration to around a quarter of all
employment in early 2023. The
seasonally adjusted unemployment rate
declined to single digits for the first
time in 5 years. However, time-related
68
underemployment and the potential labour force increased from an already high level,
indicating labour market slack that is still structurally significant (as evidenced by the 23.5%
labour under-utilisation). Women’s participation in the labour market continued to increase,
although the gap with male participation remained very high (above 35 pps). Türkiye
maintained its strong focus on supporting entrepreneurial learning and women’s
entrepreneurship. However, job creation lagged and the gap between the male and female
employment and unemployment rates widened further. In the second quarter of 2023, the
share of young people (15-24 years) not in employment, education or training (NEET) stood
at 20.8%, falling across most educational levels. Regional labour market disparities declined
and reached one of the lowest levels in years, with the unemployment rate across different
regions ranging from 6.2% to 19.2% in 2022. Following two large increases in 2022, the net
minimum wage was raised again by 54.6% in early 2023 and by 34.0% in July – pro-cyclical
rises that fostered inflation and further disrupted the functioning of the labour market.
2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the
Union
Türkiye has a good level of preparation and made limited progress in achieving the
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Despite
improved vocational training, the mismatch between the education system and labour market
needs remains a concern. Expenditure on research and development has continued to
increase, albeit at a very slow pace, and is still below the government’s target. Investment
was relatively subdued in 2022. There was progress in the diversification of energy supplies
and the share of energy generated from renewable sources increased significantly. However,
the local content requirement in the renewable energy generation sector is a discriminatory
practice and a cause for concern. Trade openness increased further, but integration with the
EU continued falling, although remaining high. Deviations from Türkiye’s obligations under
the EU-Turkey Customs Union continue to hinder bilateral trade.
The Commission’s recommendations from 2022 were not fully implemented and remain
valid. In order to improve competitiveness and support long-term growth, Türkiye should in
particular:
→ continue increasing enrolment in education (especially pre-education), support the school-
to-work transition and the activation of young people who are not in education,
employment or training (NEET) NEET and incentivise female labour market
participation;
→ take further steps to diversify energy supplies and increase the share of renewables in the
energy mix;
→ improve SMEs’ access to long-term finance.
Education and innovation
Efforts to improve human capital continued, but skills mismatch remains a key
concern. Total expenditure on education was 4.8% of GDP in 2021, representing a real year-
on-year decrease of 27.1%. Government spending was 3.4% of GDP in 2021, decreasing
further by 0.6 pps from 2020. In the 2021-2022 school year, net enrolment rates decreased for
primary education (the first 4 years) but increased for lower secondary education (the second
4 years), upper secondary (the final 4 years) and (marginally) for tertiary education. There
has been a significant progress in pre-school attendance (see Chapter 26). However, Türkiye
continues to score poorly in educational attainment in the Gender Gap Index calculated by the
69
World Economic Forum, ranking 129th of 146 countries in 2023. The share of students in
vocational and technical secondary education has reversed its previous downward trend and
increased by 0.6 pps to 28.0% in 2022. The share of pupils in religious education fell below
10% in upper secondary education for the first time in 8 years. It also decreased, albeit
marginally to 13.4%, in lower secondary education. Türkiye has the largest skills gap for
workers with tertiary education among the OECD countries. There is a persistent mismatch
between the skills acquired in the education system and the requirements of the labour
market, including those relevant for the digital transformation and green transition.
Investment in R&D increased further, albeit at a slow pace and lagging the EU’s
performance. R&D expenditure increased gradually from 0.8% of GDP in 2013 to 1.4% in
2021, but the gap with the EU average of 2.3% remains large. The government has intensified
its support for business research and innovation, including through tax incentives. The private
sector continues to be the main driver of R&D, with a 61.3% share of R&D expenditure.
There is still significant room to enhance cooperation between research institutions and
economic operators. In the Global Innovation Index 2022, Türkiye’s overall score has
improved so that it now ranks 37th out of 132 countries, thus entering the top 40 for the first
time ever. However, according to the EU innovation scoreboard, Türkiye’s innovation score
declined from 49.2% in 2021 to 47.7% in 2022 and the performance gap with the EU has
widened further. The number of domestic patent applications increased by 6.8% in 2022 by
comparison with 2021, but Türkiye’s total international patent applications declined
significantly by 25.0% in the same period.
Physical capital and quality of infrastructure
Investment activity was relatively subdued in 2022. In 2022, total investment accounted
for 29.2% of GDP, up by 1.0 pps from its 2021 level. Construction’s share of total investment
fell to a historic low level in 2022, but rebounded in the first half of 2023, with the
government’s social housing project and its reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of the
February earthquakes. Machinery and equipment’s share of investment followed the opposite
pattern, falling from its 2022 peak to 44.6% in the second quarter of 2023. Total net foreign
direct investment (FDI) were 0.9% of GDP in 2022, close to its 5-year average. Geopolitical
uncertainties, the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances and an unpredictable business and
regulatory environment remain the main obstacles to attracting foreign investment.
Diversification of energy supplies has improved and the use of renewables substantially
increased. Türkiye has high ambitions to become a regional energy hub and is investing
heavily in the exploration of new gas fields in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as well
as in building new LNG terminals. However, dependence on oil and gas imports (particularly
natural gas imports from Russia) remains high and energy demand is steadily growing despite
energy efficiency measures. The establishment of a national emissions trading system (ETS)
aligned with the EU ETS and with a sufficient level of ambition (notably in the overall cap on
allowances) remains a necessary precondition for the economy’s cost-effective
decarbonisation. Türkiye raised the share of renewable energy in the country’s installed
power capacity to 54% in 2022. Private investment continued driving growth in renewable
installations and the preferential feed-in-tariff was extended until 2030. In addition, the
National Energy Plan (2023-2035) released in January 2023 aims at further increasing the
shares of renewable energy sources and of nuclear energy in installed capacity and in primary
energy consumption by 2035. The plan was prepared in line with Türkiye’s 2053 Net Zero
Emission Target, which implies a further increase of up to 50% of renewable energy sources
in primary energy consumption, as well as a sharp decrease in the share of fossil resources
from 83.3% in 2020 to 20.8% by 2053.
70
Competition and pricing mechanism issues persist in the energy sector. There was
limited progress in liberalising energy markets, as the unbundling of the State-owned gas
company BOTAȘ was once again suspended. As a result, BOTAȘ remained vertically
integrated (comprising gas trade, pipeline and LNG infrastructure) and retained its dominant
market position – thus hindering transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory pricing.
The local content requirement practices in the renewable energy generation sector are
discriminatory and a cause for concern because they impair EU companies’ competitiveness
in the Turkish energy market. Türkiye continues to be an important gas-transit country,
ensuring the smooth operation of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) which, as part of
the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), transmits natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe by
connecting to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) (see Chapter 15).
The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the economy’s digital transformation. The
telecommunication sector is subject to specific taxation and various fees that were increased
as part of the budget consolidation efforts in July. Although the ICT sector’s share in GDP
remains low at 2.3% in 2022, the number of broadband internet subscribers reached
90.6 million in 2022, up from 88.2 million in 2021. The total number of mobile broadband
users was 71.7 million at the end of 2022, representing a population penetration rate of 84%
that remains significantly below the OECD average of 124.5%. Türkiye nevertheless has the
lowest average download speed of fixed broadband connection in the OECD. The share of
citizens using e-government rose from 58.9% in 2021 to 68.7% in 2022. Türkiye ranks 16 out
of 35 countries with an overall score of 72% in e-Government maturity, which is above the
EU average (68%). Digitalisation efforts in business continued, with the share of enterprises
involved in e-sales increasing to 19.3% in 2021, up by 6.8 pps from 2020 level (see Chapter
10).
Sectoral and enterprise structure
The economy is dominated by the service sector, but its share declined. Service sector
employment remained largely unchanged in the last 5 years, accounting for 56.6% of total
employment in 2022. Service activities surged in 2022, led particularly by accommodation
and food, transportation, and financial and insurance services. However, their share in GDP
declined to a multi-year low of 56.6%, largely due to the expansion of industry. Industry
accounted for 21.7% of employment in 2022, up by 0.3 pps from its 2021 level. It increased
its share of GDP from the low 20s pre-COVID-19 to above 26% of GDP in 2021 and 2022.
The construction sector slowed down, with its share in GDP decreasing slightly from 5.1% in
2021 to 4.9% in 2022. Similarly, the sector’s share in total employment declined to 6.0%,
down by 0.1 pps from its 2021 level. By contrast, the agriculture sector’s share in GDP
increased from 5.5% in 2021 to 6.5% in 2022. However, its share in total employment
dropped further to 15.7% in 2022 (down by 1.5 pps from its 2021 level).
Small and medium-sized enterprises are the backbone of the economy but face multiple
challenges. SMEs employ around three quarters of all workers and generate more than half
of the economy’s value added. Around 56% of SMEs in the manufacturing sector operate in
low technology sectors. Türkiye has continued to implement various economic support
schemes targeting SMEs. Targeted credit support improved SMEs access to finance and their
share in total loans increased to around 28% in the first half of 2023, up from 24% in the
previous 5 years. However, long-term finance remains a key problem for SMEs and they are
financed mostly through short-term loans or equity. KOSGEB provides support to companies
on R&D, innovation, product development, internationalisation, entrepreneurship and
investment in high technology and strategic products. The Scientific and Technological
Research Council of Türkiye also implements SME support schemes.
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Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness
Economic integration with the EU declined further but remains high. Türkiye is the
EU’s seventh largest trading partner, representing 3.3% of the EU’s total trade in goods with
the world in 2022, while the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far.
The EU’s share of Turkish exports declined to 40.5% in 2022 – on a downward trend since
2018 – while the share of Turkish imports originating in the EU decreased strongly from
31.5% in 2021 to 25.6% in 2022 – well below its long-term average and largely due to strong
price effects and increased energy imports from non-EU countries (notably Russia). The
EU’s share of FDI inflows into Türkiye increased markedly from 40% in 2021 to 79% in
2022. The EU’s share in the overall stock of FDI rebounded to 68% in 2022 but was still
below its long-term average of around 70%. Trade openness continued to increase steeply in
2022, reaching 81% of GDP (up from levels around 50% before 2017) as both exports and
imports reached new highs.
In 2022, Türkiye removed some of the additional duties imposed on products of non-EU
origin and in free circulation within the EU-Turkey Customs Union. However, many
additional duties remain in force, in breach of the rules of the EU-Turkey Customs Union.
Non-tariff barriers, such as import surveillance and excessive customs checks, continue to
hinder trade flows.
2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS, FINANCIAL CONTROL
Chapter 5: Public procurement
EU rules ensure that the public procurement of goods and services in any Member State is
transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal
treatment.
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of public procurement, with significant gaps
remaining to align with the EU acquis. There was backsliding in the reporting period as
Türkiye increased the use of the negotiated procedure (lacking transparency), of
discriminatory domestic price advantage practices and continued to allow offsets that favour
local content.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented, and therefore
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ revise its public procurement legislation to further align it with the 2014 EU directives on
public procurement, including utilities, concessions and public-private partnerships, and to
increase transparency;
→ reduce the excessive use of the negotiated procedure that distorts competition and limits
transparency;
0
10
20
30
40
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Graph 5.5a: Türkiye - Exports of goods
EU CEFTA Other
Source: WiiW
% of GDP
0
10
20
30
40
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Graph 5.5b: Türkiye - Imports of goods
EU CEFTA Other
Source: WiiW
% of GDP
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→ repeal exemptions that are incompatible with the EU acquis and refrain from the use of
discriminatory domestic price advantages and offset practices.
Institutional set-up and legal alignment
In terms of the legal framework, Türkiye's national public procurement legislation broadly
reflects the principles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. However, it
includes compulsory domestic price advantages and offsets, which allow authorities to
demand compensatory measures if goods are not produced domestically, which is
discriminatory and contradicts the EU acquis.
The Public Procurement Law (PPL) is partially aligned with the EU Public Procurement
Directives of 2014. A growing list of exclusions that are incompatible with the acquis
reduces the scope of public procurement rules. In addition, many sector-specific laws limit
transparency. The legislation allows the mandatory procurement of goods and services from
the State Supply Office for public institutions and organisations. In practice, this mandatory
centralised purchasing system enables Türkiye to expand the scope of exclusions, as State
Supply Office procurements under TRY 66.2 million are exempt from the PPL. The
thresholds are also higher than those used in the EU for supplies and services.
The country still lacks a unified framework for coordinating, supervising and monitoring
public-private partnership operations. A more consistent legal framework for concessions and
public-private partnerships is needed to increase transparency and efficiency. Türkiye does
not publicly disclose information on public-private partnership contracts in a transparent
manner in order to avoid allegations of political influence on public tenders. Doing so would
also enable a better evaluation of contingent fiscal liabilities.
Public procurement legislation and policy papers, including Türkiye's Green Deal action plan,
do not include strategies for transitioning to green procurement, which would contribute
significantly to sustainable consumption and production.
Türkiye's 11th
Development Plan (2019-2023) and 2023 Presidential Annual Programme aim
to increase domestic production by using public procurement as tool to grant subsidies. For
this purpose, it makes available a compulsory domestic price advantage of up to 15% for
some ‘medium and high-technology industrial products’ and has put in place legislation
encouraging offset practices. Based on updated statistics, a high percentage of international
tenders apply the domestic price advantage, rising from 37% in 2017 to 43.5% in 2022. The
overall value of these tenders increased from 44% to 52.4% of the total over the same
timeframe. The domestic price advantage, distorting competition against international
tenderers, was applied in 63% of supply tenders, 38% of work tenders, 74% of consultancy
and 18% of service tenders, corresponding to 41%, 65%, 23% and 74% of the total value of
tenders respectively.
The operational independence of the Public Procurement Board within the Public
Procurement Authority is potentially impaired since the President of the Republic is
authorised to directly appoint the chair and members without specific regard to candidates'
education or sector experience.
Implementation and enforcement capacity
The size of Türkiye's public procurement market increased slightly from 4.1% in 2021 to
4.8% of GDP in 2022.
The level of monitoring of contract awards and implementation is satisfactory. The Public
Procurement Authority issues statistics every six months to help measure performance and
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improve the public procurement system. The capacity of contracting authorities to manage
public procurement processes continued to improve. Türkiye extended the mandatory use of
electronic procurement to cover 47 659 tenders (up from 30 198 in 2021).
Mechanisms are in place to identify and tackle corrupt and fraudulent practices, including
rules on integrity and conflict of interest. However, the use of the negotiated procedure
continued to increase significantly, reaching nearly one third of all tenders (both in value and
number). Contracting authorities are allowed to exercise discretion in certain unexpected
circumstances that cannot be objectively measured. This limits competition and transparency
regardless of any threshold when using this procedure. In 2022, it was the case in 91.34% of
the tenders (in value) where the negotiated procedure was used. Such widespread use of this
practice, which limits transparency and competition, strengthened allegations of political
influence on public tenders. It is important to develop instruments to evaluate contract
performance and benchmark the economic performance, effectiveness, and efficiency of
public procurement procedures and of contract management by an individual contracting
authority or entity. A risk indicator system is needed to alert on potential integrity problems
in the procurement process.
Efficient remedy system
The right to a legal remedy, secured in the Constitution and the Public Procurement Law,
creates an institutional framework and a mechanism for handling complaints. The review and
remedies system ensures that complaints and penalties are dealt with and resolved in an
efficient, timely and competent manner. However, the system needs to be further aligned with
the EU Remedies Directive. To that end, creating a fully independent procurement review
board, separate from the Public Procurement Authority and ensuring the independence of
board members, remains pending as a priority.
The implementation capacity of the Public Procurement Board remains stable with 341 staff.
The Board received 1 773 complaints in 2022 (2.08% of contracts that allow for complaints),
down from 2 343 complaints in 2021 (which corresponded to 3.25% of contracts). The
appointment policy and the Board’s position as part of the Public Procurement Authority
remained a source of concern. A fully independent Public Procurement Board would
eliminate potential conflicts of interest and increase transparency.
Chapter 18: Statistics
EU rules require Member States to produce statistics based on professional independence,
impartiality, reliability, transparency, and confidentiality. Common rules are in place for the
methodology, production and dissemination of statistical information.
Türkiye is moderately prepared on statistics and made some progress in the reporting
period, with work continuing to harmonise its statistical methodology with EU standards. The
Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) improved its compliance with the timeframes for
publishing annual national accounts and excessive deficit procedure notifications. It took
further steps to improve cooperation with other main data providers. However, Türkiye needs
to increase the credibility of TurkStat and public trust in official statistics.
The Commission’s 2022 recommendations were only partially met, and therefore remain
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ increase the credibility of TurkStat and public trust in its macroeconomic statistics by
different measures, including setting transparent, professional criteria on the appointment
of the president of TurkStat and any grounds for dismissal, which cannot compromise
TurkStat’s professional or scientific independence;
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→ step up efforts to fully align national accounts with the European System of Accounts
2010 (ESA 2010) and the requirements of the ESA 2010 transmission programme;
→ improve statistics on agriculture, migration and asylum, and make progress towards
alignment with the new requirements in short-term business statistics.
As regards statistical infrastructure, Türkiye’s statistics legislation is based on the
European Statistics Code of Practice. TurkStat is an associated institution to the Ministry of
Treasury and Finance. However, there are concerns about the credibility of TurkStat and
about the declining public trust in certain macroeconomic statistics. Frequent previous
changes in management have significantly undermined the institution’s credibility. The
principles of transparency and merit-based selection processes are important for the integrity
of the institution. The institution still lacks transparent appointment and dismissal procedures,
including transparent, professional criteria for the appointment of the president of TurkStat.
Preparations for the fifth strategic plan (2024-2028) are ongoing. In February 2023, TurkStat
published a new regulation outlining the principles and procedures for preparing and
implementing official statistics programmes. Improvements have been made to the use of
public institutions' administrative records and in cooperation between TurkStat and other data
providers. Registers in the statistical office are updated regularly. The main classifications are
aligned with the EU acquis.
Regarding macroeconomic statistics, Türkiye improved the level of compliance of its annual
national accounts in terms of timeliness, but there are still data gaps, both for annual and
quarterly national accounts. Gross National Income (GNI) calculations are not yet fully in
line with the ESA 2010, and its GNI inventory is not fully aligned with the latest Eurostat
GNI Inventory Guide. Türkiye made some progress in the excessive deficit procedure
reporting, in particular in terms of data timeliness, but further efforts are required to timely
prepare and transmit complete excessive deficit procedure notifications and government
finance statistics. Türkiye produces good quality statistics on international trade in goods. It
continued reporting quarterly balance of payments and international investment position data.
It provided monthly data for the harmonised index of consumer prices. Türkiye submits all
the data required for the calculation of purchasing power parities.
Türkiye continues to extend the use of administrative data to produce business statistics.
TurkStat works on aligning its statistical business registers with the European Business
Statistics Regulation requirements. Short-term business statistics are partly aligned. Research
and development statistics have achieved a high level of compliance. The annual surveys on
the use of information and communication technologies meet EU standards to a large extent.
Rail, maritime and regional transport statistics also have a high level of compliance. In
August 2022, a data transfer agreement was signed between TurkStat and the Ministry of
Transport and Infrastructure for road freight transport statistics. The country has not yet
transmitted data to Eurostat on foreign affiliates statistics.
On social statistics, Türkiye published the results of the 2021 population and housing census
in December 2022. TurkStat conducted a survey on building and dwelling characteristics to
provide administrative data sources on housing characteristics for the census. It carries out
the survey on income and living conditions in line with EU standards and sends data to
Eurostat. Social protection statistics are highly compliant with EU standards and labour
market statistics are fully aligned. TurkStat has yet to provide Eurostat with Labour Force
Survey data in line with the new EU acquis. Türkiye regularly sends data for the labour cost
index, though the data is not yet fully complete. It runs the structure of earnings survey every
four years, in line with EU legislation. Statistics on education and vocational training are
75
available. Based solely on administrative registers, Türkiye published indicators on higher
education employment for the first time in August 2022. Public health statistics are available,
but further progress is needed on health expenditure, non-monetary healthcare statistics and
causes of death statistics. TurkStat also provides some data on the functioning of the justice
system and prison statistics. Türkiye also produces statistics on immigration and emigration,
but it does not yet collect statistics on asylum in line with EU requirements.
On agricultural statistics, Türkiye has not carried out an agricultural census since 2001. The
2016 farm structure survey results have not yet been sent to the Eurofarm system. TurkStat
and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry have to strengthen their efforts to improve
administrative registers. Statistics for most of the crops and for most of the critical animal
production, milk and dairy are available and sent to Eurostat, even though sometimes with
delay. Cereals and oil seed crop balances are also transmitted to Eurostat. The economic
accounts for agriculture are still not fully in line with the EU acquis.
Energy statistics are mostly in line with EU requirements. Monthly and annual energy
statistics are sent regularly. Data on energy prices are also sent to Eurostat regularly and are
of good quality. Work is ongoing on energy consumption in households. TurkStat is making
progress in physical energy flow accounts. On environmental statistics, Türkiye produces
waste and water statistics, but further progress is still needed on water resources, water
abstraction and waste generation statistics. Statistics related to greenhouse gas emissions,
environmental taxes, material flow accounts, air emission accounts and environmental
protection expenditure accounts are available.
Chapter 32: Financial control
The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial
accountability, sound financial management of income and expenditure, and external audit of
public funds. The financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against
fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting.
Türkiye has a good level of preparation on financial control. It made no progress over the
reporting period. The public internal financial control policy paper was not updated. The
purpose, authority and responsibility of internal audit are undermined by the lack of a legal
requirement to have internal audit units in ministries.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ organise a new round of public expenditures and financial accountability (PEFA) to assess
the performance of the current public finance management, help prepare a comprehensive
public financial management strategy and update the public internal financial control
policy paper and the related action plan;
→ adopt a national anti-fraud strategy;
→ review the arrangements for including municipalities and state-owned enterprises in the
treasury single account.
Public internal financial control
The strategic framework is partially in place. There has been no progress on the update of
the public internal financial control policy paper since 2012. Türkiye still lacks a
comprehensive strategic framework for public administration reform and for public finance
management. Public finance management-related goals are contained in different planning
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documents and strategies, and there is no mechanism to coordinate implementation of
reforms and to ensure regular monitoring and reporting.
The Turkish administration has a uniform management structure that combines elements of
managerial accountability and delegation with a results-oriented performance management
system. The Public Financial Management and Control Law (PFMC Law) applies to all
public institutions and specifies the elements of financial control. It sets out the
responsibilities of the heads of public institutions, including managerial duties and delegates
authority to authorising officers, with the Ministry of Finance and Treasury assigned a
coordinating role. Further efforts are needed to harmonise legislation, managerial
accountability, including reporting structures, delegating decision-making responsibilities and
the functioning of internal control. The use of public finance management diagnostic tools
such as PEFA could help identify and fill current gaps in implementing the public financial
management and control Law.
The PFMC Law regulates internal control, which functions largely in line with international
standards. Implementation of internal control systems remains undermined by capacity and
ownership issues. Work needs to continue to apply risk management. The monitoring and
reporting of irregularities also merits further development. Türkiye has a treasury single
account, but the fact that it includes in its scope local administrations and state-owned
enterprises raises concerns.
Internal audit practice is regulated in line with international standards in the PFMC Law.
The internal audit manual and a code of ethics prepared by the Central Harmonisation Unit
have not been updated since 2013. Türkiye has adopted implementing legislation on working
procedures and principles of internal audit and took steps to increase the number of internal
auditors and provide training. However, there is still no legal requirement for ministries to
have an internal audit unit, only for internal auditors. In addition, there is no formal status for
heads of internal audit as unit heads. There is no entity that performs the role of an audit
committee and therefore auditors report directly to their deputy ministers or to a senior
manager. These reporting arrangements could compromise auditor independence. There is no
systematic follow-up to the implementation of internal audit recommendations. The lack of
clarity in the legislation and in practice between the internal audit and inspection
organisations compromises the effectiveness of the internal audit function.
Two Central Harmonisation Units (CHU) are tasked with setting standards, monitoring and
reporting on implementing public internal financial control. The CHU for financial
management and control sets standards and the methodology providing guidance, training
and overall coordination to public administrations in this field. The Internal Audit
Coordination Board is the CHU for internal audit, which notably monitors the internal audit
systems of the public administrations, develops internal audit standards and publishes
manuals. The CHU for financial management and control has prepared a draft guide on
internal control quality reviews and completed pilot projects in three public administration
bodies. The Internal Audit Coordination Board consists of seven members appointed by the
President for four years and is now fully attached to the Ministry of Finance and Treasury.
Further action is needed to ensure its independence and boost its capacity, organisational
structure and resources to fulfil its mandate.
External audit
The constitutional and legal framework provides for the independence of the Turkish Court
of Accounts (TCA). There are concerns regarding the fiscal discipline, transparency and
accountability of the Türkiye Wealth Fund (TWF), chaired by the President of the Republic
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and not fully subject to direct audit by the TCA. The TWF is audited by an independent audit
firm and by auditors appointed by the President. Not all companies in the TWF portfolio are
audited by the TCA. The 2022 audit report was not published on the TWF website. In 2022,
amendments to the Law on the establishment of the Türkiye Wealth Fund Management
Company (TWFMC) introduced exemptions and exceptions. These new provisions are
applicable to companies, funds and their subsidiaries of which the TWF or the TWFMC is the
controlling shareholder. Operations and management of the Istanbul Financial Centre will be
carried out by a TWF managing company, which is not accountable to the TCA. The Disaster
Reconstruction Fund, created in 2023 to manage the funds allocated to disaster recovery
work, is excluded from the general budget and the TCA audit scope. The law establishing the
Fund requires it to be audited in line with international auditing standards, but it does not
clearly specify the procurement principles to be used for Fund expenditure.
Turkish Court of Accounts Law is in line with International Organisation of Supreme Audit
Institutions (INTOSAI) standards. It provides for an almost exhaustive audit mandate and
gives the TCA full discretion in discharging its responsibilities. The TCA has both audit and
judicial functions. In 2022, it had 1 837 staff, including 819 auditors, down from 1 920 staff
in 2021, of which 865 were auditors. The TCA is implementing its 2019-2023 strategic plan,
which includes running risk-based audits and strengthening its human resources capacity. It
has updated its manuals for public enterprise audit, performance audit, audit reporting and
local government company audit.
The TCA has improved the quality of audit work. It submits four audit reports a year to the
parliament in addition to a statement of general conformity. The TCA reports are only
evaluated by parliament during its budget deliberations.
Regarding the impact of audit work, TCA reports are published online every year, with the
exception of those on state-owned economic enterprises. The audited institutions should
systematically and swiftly implement the TCA recommendations. A working group between
the TCA and the Ministry of Treasury and Finance is operational but more parliamentary
scrutiny of TCA audit findings and recommendations is needed. There is a need to separate
the discussion of budget and audit issues. Setting up a working group between the TCA and
the parliament solely dedicated to discussing the performance of public institutions and their
spending could be instrumental in this regard.
Protection of the EU’s financial interests
Although Türkiye has reached a good level of alignment with the EU acquis, it still needs to
fully align its legislation with the EU Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s
financial interests by means of criminal law. The State Supervisory Council was designated
as the anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS); AFCOS is operational and held its first
meeting in June 2022. There is no national anti-fraud strategy for protecting the EU’s
financial interests. Türkiye reported 917 cases to the Commission via the online irregularity
management system from 2006 to 2022, of which 127 cases were reported in 2022. Türkiye
needs to continue on the path of its improved track record of cooperating with the
European Commission during investigations. It should keep on building its track record on
reporting of irregularities along the trends of the last years.
Protection of the euro against counterfeiting
Türkiye has reached a high level of alignment with the EU acquis in this area. A dedicated
department in the Central Bank carries out technical analysis of counterfeit money, including
euro banknotes and coins. In addition, the Turkish State Mint carries out technical analyses of
counterfeit coins, including euro coins. Credit institutions that do not withdraw counterfeits
78
from circulation are subject to financial penalties.
3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Cyprus
Türkiye continued to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus. Despite repeated calls by
the Council of the EU and the European Commission, Türkiye has yet to fulfil its obligations
as outlined in the Declaration of the European Community and its Member States of 21
September 2005 and in Council Conclusions, including those of December 2006 and
December 2015. Türkiye did not fulfil its obligation to ensure the full and non-discriminatory
implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and did not remove
all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links
with the Republic of Cyprus. Türkiye also refused to cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus
on security-related issues, including terrorism. Türkiye continued to veto applications by the
Republic of Cyprus to join several international organisations, including the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
There were no unauthorised drilling activities by Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean during
the reporting period. Türkiye issued several navigational telexes (NAVTEX) for conducting
seismic surveys and scientific research activities but none in areas that include parts of the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Cyprus. The EU remains committed to defending its
interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. In
November 2022, following the third annual review of the framework for restrictive measures
in response to Türkiye’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, the
European Council extended the regime for a further year until 12 November 2023. Currently,
two individuals are subject to sanctions.
Türkiye’s military exercises in the maritime zones of Cyprus continued. Violations by
Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles in the Nicosia flight information region and the national
airspace of the Republic of Cyprus also continued unabated. Türkiye continued to increase
the militarisation of the occupied area by upgrading the military drone base in Lefkoniko and
the naval base in Bogazi. The harassment of Cypriot fishing vessels by Türkiye also
continued.
In the reporting period, Türkiye continued to criticise the decision of the UN Security
Council (UNSC) to renew the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) without the consent of the Turkish Cypriot community. UNFICYP’s mandated
authority extends throughout the island of Cyprus and the restrictions on its freedom of
movement can pose serious risks to the safety and security of United Nations personnel
serving in peacekeeping operations. In August 2023, after unauthorised construction work
was conducted by the Turkish Cypriot side within the UN buffer zone near Pyla/Pile, Türkiye
rejected the UN Security Council’s statement condemning the violation of the status quo,
which subsequently led to escalating tensions. This escalation included the assault on
UNFICYP peacekeepers by Turkish Cypriot personnel on 18 August 2023, an act strongly
condemned by the EU. In October 2023, the UN brokered an understanding between both
sides on the way forward regarding Pyla/Pile area, which was welcomed by Türkiye and the
EU. Nevertheless, these developments continued to undermine the prospect of resuming
negotiations and reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.
Despite international condemnations, and the inadmissibility of the settlement of any parts of
Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as stipulated in UNSC resolution 550 (1984),
79
Türkiye continued with its plan to open the entire fenced-off area of Varosha, creating a new
fait accompli on the ground. The new restrictions imposed in 2022 on the activities of
UNFICYP within the fenced-off area of Varosha remained in effect – challenging
UNFICYP’s ability to execute its tasks in accordance with its mandate, and violating UNSC
Resolution 789 (1992).
Türkiye repeatedly advocated for a two-state solution in Cyprus, contrary to relevant UN
Security Council Resolutions. In November 2022, the so-called but not internationally
recognised ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ was accepted as an observer in the
Organization of Turkic States (OTS). This violates the principle of territorial integrity and the
UN Charter. The EU recognises only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law,
in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and has stressed that any
action to facilitate or assist in any way the international recognition of Turkish Cypriot
secessionist entity severely damages efforts to create an environment conducive to resuming
settlement talks under the auspices of the United Nations.
The EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue, within
the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions and in line with the
principles on which the EU is founded and its acquis. The EU has called, most recently in the
European Council conclusions of June 2023, for the speedy resumption of negotiations and
expressed its readiness to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process,
with all the appropriate means at its disposal.
As emphasised in the Negotiating Framework and Council declarations, Türkiye is expected
to actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the
Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council
resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the EU acquis. It
is important that Türkiye reaffirms its commitment to the UN-led settlement talks on Cyprus
in line with the relevant UNSC resolutions, including their external aspects. No unilateral
actions should be taken that could raise tensions on the island and prevent the resumption of
talks. On Varosha, Türkiye must immediately reverse the unilateral actions announced on
20 July 2021 and all steps taken since October 2020 that run contrary to the relevant UNSC
resolutions. The EU underlines the importance of the status of Varosha and calls for full
respect of UNSC resolutions (particularly Resolutions 550, 789 and 1251).
Peaceful settlement of border disputes
Relations between Türkiye and Greece deteriorated until early 2023. Hostile rhetoric grew
during this period, including threatening statements regarding the sovereignty of Greek
islands. However, the February 2023 earthquakes prompted a marked improvement in
relations. Greece rapidly provided humanitarian aid and support to Türkiye, which helped de-
escalate tensions and rhetoric. This was followed by several high-level phone calls and
meetings. The Turkish and Greek foreign ministers met in March 2023 on the margins of the
International Donors’ Conference organised by the European Commission and the Swedish
Presidency of the Council of the EU. The Turkish and Greek deputy foreign ministers met in
Ankara in March 2023 to relaunch the fourth round of the Positive Agenda talks between the
two countries. The Greek Defence Minister visited Türkiye in April 2023.
In July, the Greek Prime Minister met with the Turkish President on the sidelines of the
NATO Summit in Vilnius. The meeting took place in a good atmosphere. The two leaders
agreed to build on the positive momentum and activate multiple channels of communication
in the coming period, including holding the next meeting of the High-Level Cooperation
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Council between Greece and Türkiye in Thessaloniki. The two leaders tasked the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs to guide the process and keep them informed on progress.
The possible extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean Sea
under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
continued to weigh on Greece-Türkiye relations. The 1995 declaration of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly that any unilateral action by Greece to extend its territorial waters would
be considered a casus belli, still holds.
The Turkish violations of Greek airspace intensified in 2022 and in December 2022 Türkiye
also threatened Greece with retaliation if the latter proceeded with any expansion of its
territorial waters in the Aegean. As of February 2023, violations of Greek airspace
diminished drastically, and no flights over Greek inhabited areas were reported.
As highlighted by the Council Conclusions in December 2022 and the European Council’s
Conclusions of June 2022 and stemming from obligations under the Negotiating Framework,
Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations,
international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse, if
necessary, to the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that
damage good neighbourly relations, normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus and
respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well
as all their sovereign rights, including inter alia the right to explore and exploit natural
resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the UNCLOS.
In October 2022, Türkiye and the Government of National Unity of Libya signed a
memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the development of bilateral scientific, technical,
technological, legal, administrative and commercial cooperation in the field of hydrocarbons
on land and at sea based on the 2019 MoU on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas
between Türkiye and the National Unity Government of Libya. The MoU infringes on the
sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with UNCLOS and cannot produce any legal
consequences for third states. Actions that could undermine regional stability should be
avoided.
Regional cooperation
Good neighbourly relations are an essential part of Türkiye’s accession process. Bilateral
relations with other enlargement countries were good overall but remained challenging with
neighbouring EU Member States, particularly Greece and Cyprus. Tensions in the Aegean
and Eastern Mediterranean were markedly reduced after the February 2023 earthquakes.
Türkiye’s policy in the Western Balkans is generally aligned with the EU’s strategic
objectives of regional stability, Euro-Atlantic integration and economic development.
Türkiye portrayed itself as an EU partner in the region, while leveraging its distinctive
cultural and economic ties. Türkiye continued to ask for action against alleged members of
the Gülen movement in the region, urging their extradition and the closure of all affiliated
schools. This caused friction with some countries in the region.
Türkiye’s relations with Albania have continued to strengthen with regular high-level
contacts and the agreement by the two countries to bring their bilateral relations to the level
of strategic partnership. Albania extradited, Faruk Fatih Ozer, the founder of the Turkish
crypto-exchange Thodex. Türkiye reiterated its readiness to strengthen Albania’s defence
capacity.
Türkiye remained close to Bosnia and Herzegovina and President Erdoğan visited the
country in September 2022. Türkiye maintained regular contacts with all members of Bosnia
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and Herzegovina’s tripartite Presidency, keeping a balanced approach and supporting the
country’s territorial integrity and stability. Türkiye supported the Office of the High
Representative.
Türkiye’s relations with Serbia are very good. The two Presidents maintained frequent
contacts. President Erdoğan visited Serbia in September 2022. President Erdoğan emphasised
Türkiye’s readiness to support a solution between Serbia and Kosovo . The two countries
signed a number of agreements, including on the mutual abolition of tourist visas.
Türkiye maintained strong cultural and economic ties with Kosovo and continued to lobby
for its international recognition. Prime Minister Kurti paid his first official visit to Türkiye in
February 2023. Türkiye and Kosovo explored cooperation opportunities in the economic,
commercial, security and defence fields.
Türkiye’s relations with Montenegro were stable. The two countries publicly stated that they
aimed at further developing their bilateral cooperation.
Türkiye and North Macedonia continued to engage actively in the economic, educational
and cultural sectors. The two countries celebrated 30 years of diplomatic relations.
Türkiye is Georgia’s second largest trading partner and its relations with Georgia are at a
strategic partnership level. High-level contacts were regular. Türkiye strongly supported
Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Türkiye also supported Georgia’s NATO
integration efforts.
Türkiye’s relations with the Republic of Moldova remained stable and at the level of
strategic cooperation. Türkiye continued to support Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity. Türkiye also welcomed the EU’s decision to grant candidate status to Moldova.
Türkiye’s relations with Ukraine are at the level of strategic partnership. Türkiye
consistently supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Türkiye rejected Russia’s aggression
against Ukraine, called for the rights of Crimean Tatars to be respected, provided
humanitarian aid and military assistance to Ukraine and engaged politically and
diplomatically, including in the facilitation of the export of Ukrainian grain and of the
prisoners’ exchange, aiming at facilitating talks between Ukraine and Russia and working on
de-escalation and bringing about a cease-fire.
4. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET
This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1), freedom of movement for workers
(Chapter 2), right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3), free
movement of capital (Chapter 4), company law (Chapter 6), intellectual property law
(Chapter 7), competition policy (Chapter 8), financial services (Chapter 9), and health and
consumer protection (Chapter 28). This cluster is key to the good functioning of the EU-
Turkey Customs Union and to integrating Türkiye into the EU’s internal market.
Türkiye has achieved a good level of preparation for the free movement of goods. However,
technical barriers to trade and requirements discriminating against EU products remained in
place. Preparations in the areas of freedom of movement for workers, and the right of

This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
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establishment and freedom to provide services are at an early stage, and substantial efforts
are still required to align with the acquis. Türkiye is moderately prepared on free movement
of capital, as limitations remain on foreign ownership and on capital movement. Türkiye
needs to continue to address outstanding issues in its framework regulating the fight against
money laundering and terrorist financing, while ensuring objective implementation that does
not restrict the legitimate rights of NGOs.
Türkiye is well advanced in the area of company law but needs to make further progress in
aligning with the EU acquis. Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of
intellectual property law, notably in terms of legislative alignment, but it needs to improve
implementation and enforcement. Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of
competition policy. Backsliding was observed as serious concerns persist in relation to the
legislative framework, enforcement capacity and transparency in the field of State aid.
Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of financial services, however the
banking sector faced an increasingly challenging operating environement in the reporting
period. Türkiye has a good level of preparation on consumer and health protection, with
limited progress made, notably on strengthening its surveillance system for health (security)
services. The capacity of the healthcare system was seriously affected by the February 2023
earthquakes in the affected regions.
Chapter 1: Free movement of goods
The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU
based on common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the
principle of the free movement of goods prevents these from creating unjustified barriers to
trade.
Türkiye has achieved a good level of preparation on the free movement of goods. It made
some progress in aligning with the EU acquis, particularly under the 'old approach' and the
'new and global approach' to product legislation. The market access barrier on agricultural
and forestry tractors was removed following alignment with the EU acquis. However,
technical barriers to trade, unjustified checks for EU products and requirements
discriminating against EU products remained, in breach of Türkiye’s obligations under the
Customs Union.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially met, and therefore
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ eliminate the remaining non-tariff barriers to the free movement of goods that are in
breach of Customs Union obligations, including the surveillance regimes for the import of
certain products, export restrictions, prior registration requirements, conformity
assessments and inspections, licencing surveillance and other documentation requirements
for imports, and non-acceptance of EU certificates of good manufacturing practices;
→ review the remaining schemes setting local content requirements or relocating production;
→ increase the coverage and effectiveness of market surveillance measures and ensure timely
reporting on results for public transparency.
General principles
The EU framework for the free movement of goods is largely in place in Türkiye. However,
implementation issues remain, as Türkiye continues to implement a range of non-tariff
barriers to the free movement of goods that are in breach of Customs Union obligations. In
the reporting period it further extended the scope of the surveillance regime to cover the
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import of certain products, such as photovoltaic cells. Export restrictions, prior registration
requirements, risk-based import control system, conformity assessments and inspections and
other documentation requirements remained in place. Türkiye still does not accept EU good
manufacturing practices certificates. While Türkiye adopted several measures to adjust the
localisation and prioritisation schemes for pharmaceuticals, the EU’s assessment on whether
Türkiye has completed the implementation of all findings in the Arbitrators’ Award is still
ongoing. The local content requirements in renewable energy remain in place and new local
content requirements were put in place for tobacco products. These schemes create de facto
market access barriers for EU products, which are not in line with the Customs Union.
Türkiye’s product safety controls on imported goods processed through its electronic
TAREKS system can require the provision of additional documentation and information on
products coming from the EU, contrary to the Customs Union provisions.
Non-harmonised areas
Türkiye’s mutual recognition legislation in the non-harmonised areas is in line with the EU
acquis. However, Türkiye has notified only five product legal acts in the non-harmonised
areas in the reporting period. This is not sufficient, given the size of Türkiye’s economy and
legislative activity and close ties with the European Union’s economy under the Customs
Union.
Harmonised areas: quality infrastructure
Türkiye is aligned with the EU acquis on standards, technical regulations, conformity
assessment, accreditation, metrology and market surveillance. It has also aligned with the EU
acquis on general product safety, the European Conformity mark (CE mark), conformity
assessment bodies, notified bodies and conformity assessment methods.
The national Standards Institute is independent, adequately resourced and financed, and able
to implement European and international standards. Since 2012 it is a full member of the
European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for
Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC). By the end of the reporting period, it had
adopted 24 318 national standards aligned with European standards. The rate of
harmonisation with both CEN and CENELEC standards is 99.96%. Eight Turkish economic
operators are full members of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
and one is an observer.
Türkiye has 64 notified bodies, five recognised third-party organisations, and two technical
approval bodies in place. The Turkish Accreditation Agency (TÜRKAK) is a signatory of
multilateral agreements as part of the European cooperation for Accreditation (EA) and takes
part in the mutual recognition of data agreement of the OECD Good Laboratory Practices
Working Group (OECD-GLP). The National Metrology Institute (TÜBITAK-UME) is a
member of the European Association of National Metrology Institutes (EURAMET). The
Ministry of Industry and Technology participates in the European Legal Metrology
Organisation (WELMEC). TÜBİTAK-UME chairs a Technical Committee and participates
in the Committee of the European Metrology Programme for Innovation and Research at
EURAMET.
Türkiye implements market surveillance in compliance with the EU acquis and submits its
annual programme to the European Commission. There is a horizontal framework for market
surveillance in place in line with the applicable EU acquis. The relevant ministries published
separate market surveillance regulations governing personal protective equipment and
construction products in the reporting period. According to the market surveillance report for
2022, a total of 233 644 products were checked by market surveillance authorities in 2022
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representing a 11.8% increase as compared to 2021. About 10 881 products were found
uncompliant or unsafe as against 12 455 products in 2021. Access to information on market
surveillance activities is important for producers and consumers. The budget allocated to
market surveillance increased by 51% in 2022 as compared to 2021, in a high inflation
environment. Surveillance remained limited with regard to activities in e-commerce.
Harmonised area: sectoral legislation
On the ‘new and global approach’ to product legislation, Türkiye adopted legislation to
align with the latest acquis on medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices. It also
aligned with the acquis on eco-design and on energy labelling of several types of heaters,
computers, servers, and several types of household goods.
On the ‘old approach’ to product legislation, in January 2023, the new Turkish legislation
on agriculture and forestry tractors entered into force, phasing out the discriminatory
treatment of EU tractors in terms of engine emission requirements, thus solving the relevant
market access barrier. It also adopted legislation aiming to align with the acquis on certain
medicinal products, good distribution practices of medicinal products for human use and on
vaccines and immune serums. Türkiye adopted legislation designed to align with the latest
acquis on good clinical practice and pharmacovigilance. Türkiye aligned to a large extent its
cosmetics regulatory framework with the acquis by adopting a new cosmetics regulation in
May 2023. A new guideline on free from claims in cosmetics was published in June 2023
Türkiye does not accept EU good manufacturing practice certificates on medicines for human
use, in breach of Customs Union rules. Regarding chemicals, Türkiye has adopted two new
regulations on the export and import of hazardous chemicals and on hazardous substances in
electrical and electronic equipment, aligning with the EU acquis. Türkiye is almost fully
aligned with the European Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), apart from on biocidal products.
On procedural measures, Türkiye has specific licencing and regulation systems for
economic operators dealing with drug precursors, with a strict follow-up and monitoring
system in cooperation with the police and customs. It is aligned with the EU acquis regarding
licencing procedures for firearms. However, it made no progress on alignment with the
acquis on cultural goods.
Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers
Citizens of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be
given the same working and social conditions as other workers.
Preparations in the area of freedom of movement for workers are at an early stage and no
progress was made during the reporting period.
Türkiye made no progress on access to the labour market or on the coordination of social
security systems. The number of bilateral social security agreements with EU Member States
remained the same, with 15 agreements concluded. Türkiye should prepare its legislation and
administrative practices in view of joining the European Labour Authority and the European
Employment Services (EURES) network. There were no developments on future
participation in the EURES network.
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
EU natural and legal persons have the right to establish themselves in any Member State and
to provide cross-border services. For certain regulated professions, there are rules on mutual
recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of
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universal service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an
independent regulator.
Preparations in the area of right of establishment and freedom to provide services are at an
early stage. There was no progress in the reporting period. Right of establishment continues
to be restricted, service providers registered in the EU still face requirements on registration,
licencing and authorisation. Postal services are not regulated in line with the acquis.
Continuous and substantial efforts are needed on the mutual recognition of professional
qualifications. Overall, substantial efforts are still required to achieve alignment in this area.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ align its national legislation with the Services Directive and set up a point of single
contact;
→ continue aligning with the EU acquis in the area of postal services;
→ align its national legislation with the EU acquis on mutual recognition of professional
qualifications, including the Professional Qualifications Directive and the Proportionality
Test Directive.
There was no progress on the right of establishment, which continues to be restricted by
several requirements in Türkiye.
Regarding the freedom to provide cross-border services, service providers registered in the
EU still face requirements on registration, licencing and authorisation. The point of single
contact has not yet been created.
No progress was made in the area of postal services. Legislation regulating postal services
in accordance with the EU acquis has not yet been adopted. Türkiye has yet to align with the
provisions of the Postal Services Directive, as a reserved area in the letter mail market is
maintained for the state-owned universal service provider. The Information and
Communication Technologies Authority (ICTA) monitors postal market development.
National legislation still needs to be aligned with the provisions of the Regulation on cross-
border parcel delivery services.
On the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, the Vocational Qualifications
Authority continued to implement the national qualification framework. The number of
occupations that require compulsory certifications has increased (204 occupations in total).
The number of national occupational standards reached 901 and the number of national
qualifications prepared in line with occupational standards reached 650. The Turkish
Referencing Report to the European Qualifications Framework is still not updated. Some
regulated professions still require reciprocal mutual recognition. Nationality and language
requirements have not been removed. However, it is possible to make an online application
for the recognition and equivalence of higher education qualifications. There is no specific
regulation or practice governing the temporary or occasional provision of services.
Continuous and significant steps are needed to align national legislation with the EU acquis
in this area.
Chapter 4: Free movement of capital
In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common
rules for cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to
support the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
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Türkiye is moderately prepared on free movement of capital. Overall, there was some
progress in this area in the reporting period. Limitations on foreign ownership persist in
numerous sectors. There are still restrictions on capital movements and foreign exchange-
denominated transactions. Türkiye has improved its instant payment system infrastructure.
The country remains on the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring ('grey list') by the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Though the FATF did not call for the use of increased
due diligence measures in the reporting period, Türkiye needs to take more steps to
implement its action plan and tackle the strategic shortcomings in its anti-money laundering
and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. It is important for Türkiye to
ensure an objective implementation that does not instrumentalise measures to target or restrict
the legitimate rights of NGOs.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to some extent. In the
coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ minimise limitations on foreign ownership and on capital movements;
→ make further progress in tackling the strategic shortcomings in its AML/CFT regime, in
line with the EU acquis and FATF recommended actions in order to be delisted from the
FATF grey list;
→ address the recommendations of the Venice Commission regarding the law on the
prevention of financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Concerning capital movements and payments, restrictions on foreign ownership are still in
place in many sectors, including broadcasting, education, transportation, financial services,
the electricity market and real estate. Türkiye’s legislation on real estate acquisition by
foreigners remains opaque and does not apply to all EU nationals in a non-discriminatory
way. On this point, Türkiye lags behind its commitments under the EU-Turkey Association
Agreement. The ability for citizens of neighbouring countries in border provinces to buy real
estate is still restricted for national security reasons. Türkiye maintains its restrictions on
capital movements and foreign exchange-denominated transactions. Exporters are still
required to sell 40% of their foreign-earned income to the Central Bank and Türkiye brought
in some additional incentives to encourage exporters to convert their foreign-earned revenues
into Turkish lira. Türkiye also imposes a range of informal measures on banks and operators
to limit the purchase of foreign currencies.
Türkiye has made some progress in payment systems adding to the good level of preparation
already achieved. The Central Bank has increased the scope and coverage of the Instant and
Continuous Transfer of Funds (FAST) system. Banks began to provide services via the Open
Banking Gateway (GEÇİT) infrastructure. Türkiye also launched FAST Merchant Payments
in 2023. The first payment transactions were made on the Digital Turkish Lira Network.
Meanwhile, the Central Bank published guidelines on data sharing services in payment
services in December 2022. The Central Bank also launched the Security Overlay Service to
facilitate the exchange of information with a view to improving the detection of illicit
transactions. All Turkish banks had stopped accepting the Russian MIR payment system by
October 2022.
Türkiye has made some progress in the fight against money laundering and terrorist
financing. Türkiye has been on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list of jurisdictions
under increased monitoring ('grey list') since October 2021, but has not been added to the
EU’s list of high-risk third countries. This is due to Türkiye's candidate status, high-level
political commitment to the EU to tackle the outstanding shortcomings identified by the
FATF and to its endeavours to reach full alignment with the EU acquis.
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Türkiye revised its national strategy document on anti-money laundering and countering
the financing of terrorism in 2022 to comply with FATF recommended actions. In 2022,
Türkiye adopted regulations regarding politically exposed persons to comply with the FATF
Standards and the EU acquis. Also in 2022, Türkiye issued guidance to the private sector on
detecting terrorist financing and increased its financial intelligence agency’s proactive
dissemination of financial intelligence. In July 2023, the FATF concluded that Türkiye has
taken positive steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime. Consequently, the FATF
upgraded the country’s ratings on five of its recommendations, including Recommendation 8
on the audit of the non-profit organisations. Türkiye remains partially compliant on one
recommendation. Nevertheless, the law on the prevention of financing of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction has not been revised in line with the Venice Commission’s
recommendations.
The Turkish Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) strengthened its capacity and
the level of cooperation with law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities. The number
of suspicious transaction reports submitted fell from 504 995 in 2021 to 425 322 in 2022. The
number of money laundering prosecutions has been rising in recent years. 70 cases resulted in
conviction between 2013 and 2018. Since 2018, 225 people have been convicted in money
laundering cases and in 2022 alone, 4 904 people were convicted in Türkiye.
Türkiye reaffirmed its commitment to freeze the assets of people/entities designated by the
United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee. The government also continued to
use the domestic assets freeze instrument effectively.
Chapter 6: Company law
The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a
company, with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory
audit.
Türkiye is well advanced in the area of company law. Some progress was made during the
reporting period, by adopting the financial reporting standards for small and micro
companies. However, there was no progress on the other 2022 recommendation, which
remains valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ align national legislation with the acquis on encouraging long-term shareholder
engagement;
→ align national legislation with the acquis on cross-border conversions, mergers and
divisions and on the use of digital tools and processes in company law.
On company law, Türkiye took limited legislative action over the reporting period.
Alignment is needed on some outstanding issues in the context of cross-border mergers,
domestic mergers and divisions, and takeovers. Alignment is also necessary with the 2019
acquis on the use of digital tools and on cross-border operations (mergers, divisions,
conversions) with the rules on shareholders’ rights, including on the encouragement of long-
term shareholder engagement and on gender equality on boards of directors. As regards the
disclosure of company documents in the business register, the country still lacks provisions
requiring all limited liability companies to publish annual accounts and on the online filing of
company documents. Türkiye also lacks a fully online process to register limited liability
companies.
On company reporting, a Presidency decision on the procedures and principles for
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determining the companies subject to independent audit was published in November 2022.
This lowered the audit exemption thresholds. In January 2023, the Public Oversight,
Accounting, and Auditing Standards Authority (POA) published the financial reporting
standard for small and micro enterprises. Based on changes in the International Code of
Ethics for Professional Accountants (including International Independence Standards), the
POA also updated the standards in the Code of Ethics for Auditors, in March 2023. There is
still a lack of clarity regarding the alignment of non-financial information and reports on
payments to the government. Türkiye will need to align with the 2022 EU Directive on
corporate sustainability reporting. As regards transparency requirements for listed
companies, the Law on capital markets regulates the general responsibilities of issuers.
Implementing rules are published by the Capital Markets Board with the aim of aligning with
the EU acquis in this area. The Turkish Commercial Code was amended to increase
transparency and provide the identity information of bearer shareholders.
Chapter 7: Intellectual property law
The EU has harmonised rules for the legal protection of intellectual property rights (IPR),
copyright and related rights. Rules for the legal protection of IPR cover, for instance, patents
and trade marks, designs, biotechnological inventions and pharmaceuticals. Rules for the
legal protection of copyright and related rights cover, for instance, books, films, software and
broadcasting.
Türkiye has a good level of preparation, notably in terms of legislative alignment. No
progress was made during the reporting period. Some legislative discrepancies remain, as do
outstanding problems regarding implementation and enforcement, notably in relation with
judicial procedures. Türkiye was the second major country of provenance by number of
counterfeit articles entering the EU.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ improve enforcement measures to efficiently fight against industrial and intellectual
property rights infringements, including online sales of counterfeit and pirated goods,
improve the level of specialisation in courts dealing with IPR infringements and resolve
difficulties in the judicial procedures to obtain search and seizure warrants for criminal
law enforcement;
→ improve cooperation with IPR owners for efficient implementation and effective
enforcement of the Law on industrial property, in particular in cases of accelerated and
simplified destruction procedures by the judiciary and the customs authorities;
→ ensure the collection and processing of accurate statistical data, especially on effective
judicial enforcement of intellectual and industrial property rights, with a view to
facilitating the analysis of systemic IPR shortcomings.
Regarding copyright and related rights, Türkiye amended one specific article of the Law on
copyright and extended legal protection against circumvention of technological measures to
all works, performances, phonograms, productions and broadcasts, in addition to computer
programmes. The Law on copyright has yet to be fully modernised to provide sufficient
protection, in line with technological developments. Systemic issues continue, particularly
regarding collective rights management, the lack of autonomy and the supervision of
collective rights management organisations (CMOs), as well as discrimination against foreign
right holders in the management of CMOs. A number of issues remained unresolved, in
particular the lack of fair distribution of private copy levies, licencing difficulties,
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uncertainties in online education exceptions, public performance right problems,
unauthorised use of copyrighted material via online platforms and well-known e-commerce
websites. Türkiye is not yet aligned with the Directive on copyright and related rights in the
Digital Single Market.
Regarding industrial property rights, the Turkish Patent and Trademark Office continued to
strengthen its administrative capacity and digitalise services. The lack of a precise definition
of bad faith applications as regards trade marks has made the invalidation procedure
ineffective. The procedures to revoke, oppose and invalidate trade marks remained expensive
and lengthy. There are currently no legal provisions for supplementary protection certificates.
Another area of continued concern is the absence of an effective system for protecting
undisclosed test and other data generated to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical
and agrochemical products. Even though Türkiye has in place a regulatory data protection
regime since 2005, the scope is limited and excludes biologics and combination products.
The length is also limited reducing the effective protection period in Türkiye. Turkish law
links the length of the regulatory data protection with the duration of patent protection.
Hence, once a product is considered off-patent, it automatically loses its regulatory data
protection.
Concerning judicial enforcement, criminal courts rarely order deterrent fines for commercial
scale IP infringements, even though legal provisions may provide for higher penalties.
Stakeholders continue to report complaints about inefficient litigation procedures, including
at courts of appeal. They report difficulties and inconsistencies in deciding preliminary
injunctions and monetary compensation claims, storage and destruction problems and
financial burdens related to the storage of counterfeit goods, and the overuse of expert
witness statements.
Despite strong evidence provided by right holders about counterfeiting, few search and
seizure warrants are granted and very few counterfeit goods are seized. Public prosecutors
and judges require additional evidence, which is not reasonable to substantiate the claims of
the right holders. Obtaining preliminary injunctions also remains difficult and the level of
deterrence of the penalties ordered by judicial authorities is reportedly low. Enforcement
authorities, in particular the police and judges, need to increase the efficiency of action
against IP infringements. The number of IP courts has decreased over the past years in
Türkiye, which has a negative effect on the quality and consistency of the court decisions.
Action to combat counterfeiting at physical marketplaces remains insufficient. The Law on e-
commerce and its implementing regulation introduced new provisions relating to the notice
and takedown procedure and clarified the responsibility of e-commerce intermediary and
direct service providers in complaints regarding the infringement of intellectual property
rights. There has been an increase in online sales of counterfeit goods at well-known e-
commerce marketplaces. In this context, and with a view to stopping IPR infringements, it
will be important for Türkiye to apply notice and takedown procedures.
The number of customs applications for seizures increased from 2 431 in 2021 to 2 637 in
2022. However, Türkiye needs to improve customs enforcement to combat counterfeit goods,
in particular for goods in transit and exports, which makes Türkiye the second major country
of provenance by number of counterfeit articles entering the EU, according to the 2022 report
on the EU enforcement of IPR. The number of articles coming from Türkiye detained at the
EU borders by customs authorities has increased. Counterfeiting concerns a wide range of
products from food and alcoholic beverages to vehicles, vehicles accessories and spare parts.
The customs enforcement legislation is not fully aligned with the acquis.
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There are only limited awareness campaigns from public institutions on the dangers of
counterfeiting and piracy to public health, consumer safety, rule of law and labour market,
and on the economic benefits of IPR-intensive sectors. Stronger political commitment is
needed to enforce IPR and to stop the flow of counterfeit trade from Türkiye to the EU.
Chapter 8: Competition policy
EU rules enable free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements
between companies and the abuse of a dominant position, and also include rules on
concentrations between companies which would significantly impede effective competition.
EU rules also set out a system of State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant
State aid if strict conditions are met, with a view to prevent distortion competition.
Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of competition policy. Backsliding was
noted due to serious concerns in relation to the legislative framework, enforcement capacity
and transparency in the field of State aid. Institutional framework and the new administrative
structure clearly deviate from the EU acquis. By repeatedly postponing the creation of a
functional enforcement structure, Türkiye’s legislative framework is, de facto, ineffective.
The lack of a transparent State aid inventory covering all aid schemes remains a source of
concern.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ ensure the independence and functionality of the State aid institutional framework in
accordance with the EU acquis;
→ implement the State aid Law by adopting implementing legislation without further delay;
→ make available a transparent and up-to-date inventory of all aid schemes.
Antitrust and mergers
The legislative framework is broadly aligned with the EU acquis. The Law on the protection
of competition broadly reflects Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU). Implementing legislation in this field is largely in place. The
relevant legislation must still be aligned in order to ensure full compliance with the Vertical
Block Exemption Regulation.
In terms of the institutional framework, the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) is
responsible for enforcing the Law on the protection of competition. Its decision-making body,
the Competition Board, has seven members. Despite being affiliated with the Ministry of
Trade, the TCA has administrative and financial autonomy.
The enforcement capacity of the Authority is adequate. In 2022, overall implementation was
effective and the number of decisions in the areas of antitrust (78 compared with 74 in 2021),
exemption/negative clearance decisions (19 compared with 22 in 2021) and
merger/acquisition/joint venture/privatisation (245 compared with 309 in 2021) were
comparable with those adopted in the previous year. The total amount of fines levied by the
Authority for infringements of competition law (fines related to substance) remained at
TRY1.7 billion, an average for the previous five years. The total number of ex-officio
investigations and preliminary investigations increased from 15 in 2021, to 18 in 2022. In
2022, 80% of the 139 judgements concluded as a result of appeals against the Turkish
Competition Authority decisions were upheld by Turkish courts.
State aid
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Action taken in 2022 on the legislative framework amounted to a backslide. Türkiye’s Law
on the monitoring and supervision of State aid is broadly in line with Articles 107 and 108
TFEU. However, by repeatedly postponing the creation of a functional enforcement structure,
Türkiye has rendered its legislative framework, de facto, ineffective.
Following the abolition of the Directorate General for State Aid (DGSA), in 2022, Türkiye
established a new DGSA, under the Presidency of Strategy and Budget. However, the new
DGSA does not have the same full legal mandate as its predecessor. The decree establishing
the new DGSA gives a different definition of State aid than the definition given in Law on
the monitoring and supervision of State aid, which was aligned with the EU acquis. The
President postponed implementation of the law and its implementing legislation indefinitely.
As a result, not only the law is not enforceable, but the institutional framework and the new
administrative structure also clearly deviate from the EU acquis. Accordingly, Türkiye still
needs to make substantial efforts to align its legislation with the EU acquis.
In 2023, the project-based investment programme – where the transfer of State resources is
provided on a selective basis (i.e. only to certain undertakings) – included 64 projects with an
investment amount of TRY 491 billion (incentives granted since the beginning of 2022,
covering 25 projects with an investment of TRY 336 billion). The breakdown of State aid for
these investments was not disclosed, contrary to the commitments made under the EU-
Turkey Customs Union. The lack of a transparent State aid inventory covering all aid
schemes – including the amount or budgeted amount of the State support granted – remains a
source of concern.
Liberalisation
State-owned enterprises are subject to competition and State aid rules, however the overall
challenges in the area of State aid also apply to state-owned enterprises.
Chapter 9: Financial services
EU rules aim to ensure fair competition among, and the stability of, financial institutions,
namely banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities
markets. They include rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions.
Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of financial services. It made limited
progress in the reporting period by strengthening the insurance market and developing new
alternative financing instruments. However, Türkiye's pre-2023 election approach to apply a
set of unorthodox macroprudential and regulatory measures made the operating environment
for the banking sector increasingly challenging during the reporting period. The country
should make further efforts to align with the financial services acquis, focusing on the
priorities identified based on the current state of play.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented, and
therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ gradually phase out distortive macro-prudential and regulatory measures and improve the
transparency of asset quality review;
→ further strengthen bank governance and supervision, crisis management and the resolution
framework;
→ continue to support the development of Türkiye's capital markets and their supervision.
Regarding banks and financial conglomerates, Türkiye is in line with the Basel III
framework (but not taking into account the Basel III Finalisation of 2017) according to the
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Basel Committee. In October 2022, Türkiye released the 2022-2025 participation finance
strategy, with the aim of building a legal, administrative and corporate infrastructure for
participation finance.
Overall, the banking sector has remained resilient, with the indicators tracking asset quality
improving. The share of non-performing loan ratios continued to fall, down to 1.9% in
February 2023. The capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector remained above the legal
thresholds, supported by the sector's strong profitability performance. Action is needed to
improve the transparency and predictability of the financial sector regulatory framework,
including by carefully phasing out distortive regulatory measures and conducting transparent
asset quality reviews.
Türkiye made some progress on insurance and occupational pensions. In October 2022, the
Insurance and Private Pension Regulation and Supervision Agency (SEEDK) published a
new regulation laying down the procedures and principles for the collection, storage and
sharing of insurance data. Under a new regulation on the state contribution to the private
pension system, state contributions can be received in the following years for contributions
paid above the annual limit. In November 2022, SEEDK announced its roadmap for traffic
insurance aiming at overcoming structural weaknesses in the sector. It mainly plans to switch
to person-based insurance and to improve the arbitration process. In June 2023, a possibility
of electronic applications was introduced for insurance arbitration system through an online
platform. Following the February 2023 earthquakes, SEEDK took several measures to ease
the burden of insurers such as extending the maturities of all expired mandatory earthquake
insurance policies or removing the penalty for delays to compulsory motor insurance.
As regards financial market infrastructure, the Capital Markets Board adopted some
amendments to the sale methods and distribution principles applied to initial public offering
of shares to protect investors’ rights. It also amended the criteria for institutional investors.
Portfolio management companies are now considered individual investors and no longer as
institutional investors. To raise awareness of sustainability among companies trading in the
Borsa Istanbul markets, Türkiye launched futures contracts based on BIST Sustainability 25
Index for trading on the derivatives market in January 2023.
Regarding securities markets and investment services, the Borsa Istanbul made some
amendments to the regulations on precious metals in August 2022 by expanding the scope of
conversion transactions to include all precious metals. As part of the efforts to develop
alternative investment instruments, Turkish State mint gold certificates started trading on the
commodity market segment of the Borsa Istanbul Equity Market at the end of November
2022.
On sustainable and digital finance, Türkiye took a number of steps to accelerate the digital
transformation of the banking sector over the last few years. Amendments were made to the
remote identification services of banks, mainly allowing legal entities to access these
services, and facilitating the use of the system by persons with disabilities. The use of crypto
currency and crypto assets directly or indirectly as an instrument of payment is still banned in
Türkiye. In February 2022, Türkiye adopted guidelines on green debt instruments, sustainable
debt instruments, green lease certificates and sustainable lease certificates. They are based on
the Green Bond Principles of the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) and aim
to improve transparency and international comparability of green bonds, sustainable bonds,
green sukuk and sustainable sukuk.
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Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection
EU rules protect consumers’ economic interests and in relation to product safety, dangerous
imitations and liability for defective products. The EU also ensures high common standards
for tobacco control, blood, tissues, cells and organs, and medicines for human and veterinary
use. The EU also has rules for upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and in
preparing for and responding to cross-border health threats, including communicable
diseases.
Türkiye has a good level of preparation on consumer and health protection. Limited
progress was achieved overall over the reporting period in this chapter. Efforts were made to
strengthen its surveillance system for health (security) services and to tackle serious cross-
border health threats. However, implementation issues remain regarding consumer protection
and enforcement, and consumers continue to face problems in exercising their rights. The
capacity of the healthcare system was seriously affected by the February 2023 earthquakes in
south-east Türkiye.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ strengthen consumer rights enforcement and further improve coordination and
cooperation with the consumer movement and with enforcement bodies; increase raising
awareness activities and take more measures on infringements in the digital environment
and more measures to support vulnerable consumers;
→ strengthen its primary healthcare services by providing sufficient resources for public
health emergencies risk assessment and risk management at central and provincial levels;
→ boost its workforce and administrative capacity to ensure effective multi-sectoral
preparedness and response to disasters, within and across the relevant sectors.
Consumer protection
While Türkiye’s national legislation remains mostly aligned with the acquis on consumer
protection in non-safety-related issues, with further legislative alignment on consumer
arbitration, issues remain in the application of consumer rights. Consumers face problems in
exercising their right to choose, and consumer awareness and education remain insufficient.
The level of cooperation and coordination between consumer organisations and enforcement
bodies remains low. The national consumer information system (TÜBİS) is complex,
preventing its widespread usage. Consumer NGOs lack financial and professional support
and are unable to participate actively in legal and public decision-making mechanisms.
Consumer arbitration committee members remain insufficiently trained and lack a common
understanding of the legal issues. Of 602 613 decisions taken by consumer arbitration
committees in 2022, 50% were in favour of consumers and 50% against them. Cooperation
between out-of-court and court consumer systems is yet to be improved. Alignment with the
representative actions Directive is at an early stage and significant work is still needed.
On safety-related measures, there is a low level of consumer awareness of the national
unsafe products information system. Regular monitoring and more robust regulatory tools are
required to combat online sales of counterfeit goods that endanger consumer and public
health (see Chapter 7- Intellectual property law). Market surveillance of e-commerce
remained limited, although the volume of online shopping has increased (see Chapter 1-Free
movement of goods).
Public health
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In the field of public health, while Türkiye was recovering from the impact of COVID-19
pandemic, two earthquakes hit the country in February 2023. The earthquakes had a direct
impact on 15 million people, claiming over 50 500 lives and injuring over 120 000 people.
Hospitals, family health centres and public health laboratories in the region suffered damage.
The earthquakes interrupted the diagnostics chain from health facility to laboratory. Disease
surveillance was set up for infections and communicable disease outbreaks, including
airborne and waterborne diseases. The capacity of the health system remained insufficient to
meet the healthcare needs in the earthquake-affected areas, especially the mental health
needs, and psychological and nutrition needs. The COVID-19 pandemic and the February
2023 earthquakes have shown that inter-sectoral linkages and collaboration on emergency
prevention, preparedness and response are vital in ensuring public health safety and
wellbeing in the aftermath of disasters.
Türkiye’s health system faces a growing burden from non-communicable diseases,
including cardiovascular diseases and cancer. These illnesses have a significant impact on
premature mortality. In 2022, Türkiye scaled up its cancer screening activities to 7.3 million
scans across the country from 4.4 million in 2021. Of these scans, 2.8 million were for breast
cancer, 2.7 million for cervical cancer, and 1.8 million were for colon cancer.
Türkiye made good progress on serious cross-border health threats including communicable
diseases, especially in workforce development and in building institutional capacity for
central and provincial public health professionals. To strengthen the capacity to detect and
counter the threats posed by outbreaks of infectious diseases, Türkiye introduced a molecular
laboratory-based surveillance component to its national health surveillance system. It
prepared acute public health threats guidelines for biological, chemical, environmental and
radio nuclear threats at central level and distributed the guidelines to the provincial
authorities for implementation.
On tobacco control, the actions planned to meet the targets set under Türkiye's 2017-2025
non-communicable diseases action plan to reduce tobacco and salt consumption by 30% are
insufficient. Tobacco is consumed by 31% of the Turkish population.
No progress was made regarding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, neither on
drug abuse prevention. On blood, tissues, cells and organs, Türkiye developed a patient
blood management software for ensuring quality, safety and effectiveness of transfusion
applications.
On mental health, Türkiye set up community mental health centres and provided
psychological first aid for children as part of the earthquake response., Türkiye’s capacity to
provide mental health and psychosocial support is not sufficient to meet the needs resulting
from the crisis. In earthquake-impacted regions, 20% of people are estimated to have
developed a mental health disorder due to earthquake-related traumas, and 5% are
experiencing severe long-term mental health problems.
On health inequalities, vulnerable groups namely LGBTIQ persons, people living with HIV
and sex workers as well as refugees are subject to discrimination and continue to face
significant challenges to access healthcare information and services.
CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
This cluster covers: digital transformation and media (Chapter 10), taxation (Chapter 16),
economic and monetary policy (Chapter 17), social policy and employment (Chapter 19),
industrial policy (Chapter 20), science and research (Chapter 25), education and culture
(Chapter 26), and Customs Union (Chapter 29).
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Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of digital transformation and media. It
continued to backslide as it did not address concerns regarding the lack of sufficient
competition, lack of transparency of media funding, concentration of media ownership,
political influence on editorial policies, restrictions on the freedom of expression and the
lack of independence of regulatory authorities. Türkiye’s preparations in the area of science
and research are well advanced and Türkiye made good progress during the reporting period,
notably as a result of joining Horizon Europe and continued efforts to raise awareness of and
capacity for the programme. Türkiye is moderately prepared on education and culture, and
continued to make some progress, notably through the continued implementation of the
national qualifications system and the increased participation in some EU programmes.
Access to education in south-east Türkiye was significantly impacted by the February 2023
earthquakes.
On the economy-related chapters, backsliding continued on economic and monetary policy,
where Türkiye has some level of preparation. The Central Bank continued to loosen its
unorthodox monetary policy stance, which triggered multi-year high inflation and unhinged
inflation expectations. Until the parliamentary and presidential elections in May 2023, the
Central Bank was subject to significant political pressure to keep real interest rates deeply
negative. Far-reaching prudential and regulatory measures disrupted the functioning of
financial markets and increased risks. After the elections, the Central Bank has started to
tighten monetary policy and the new government took measures to limit the bulging fiscal
deficit. Türkiye is moderately prepared and made limited progress on enterprise and
industrial policy. Major challenges in relation to measures incompatible with EU industrial
policy principles remain unaddressed. Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of
social policy and employment. The labour market situation improved but concerns remain
over trade union rights and effective social dialogue, persistent levels of informal economic
activity and the gender gap in employment. The February 2023 earthquakes had a major
impact on the labour market in the affected regions.
Türkiye is moderately prepared on taxation. It made no progress during the reporting period
and still needs to enable tax information exchange with all EU Member States. Türkiye
maintains a good level of preparation for the customs union but made limited progress over
the reporting period. Several longstanding and new trade barriers still infringe the basic
provisions of the EU-Turkey Customs Union.
Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media
The EU supports the smooth functioning of the internal market for electronic
communications, electronic commerce and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers
and support the universal availability of modern services.
Türkiye has some level of preparation in this area. Backsliding continued during the
reporting period. Concerns persist regarding the lack of sufficient competition, the lack of
transparency of media funding, the concentration of media ownership, political influence on
editorial policies, restrictions on the freedom of expression, and the lack of independence of
regulatory authorities.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ align the universal service, authorisation arrangements, market access and rights of way in
electronic communications with the EU acquis;
→ strengthen the independence of the regulatory authority and its board members and amend
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the Internet Law in line with the Venice Commission’s recommendations, with a view to
ensuring media pluralism;
→ take steps to strengthen the public broadcaster’s independence.
On electronic communications and information technology, Türkiye made no progress in
aligning its legislation with the acquis on market access and universal service. Concerns
remain regarding the lack of financial and administrative independence of the regulatory
authorities. More transparency in spending is needed. Further regulatory and administrative
steps are required to establish a competitive and consumer-friendly market in
telecommunications.
Competition on the market for fixed voice communications remains limited. The market
share of alternative fixed voice operators was 12.9% in the first quarter of 2023, down from
14.6% in the last quarter of 2022. The lack of sufficient competition on the broadband market
remains a concern. The number of fixed broadband subscribers increased to 22.3% in March
2023, against the OECD average of 34.7%. The total number of mobile broadband users was
71 million, which corresponds to a penetration rate of 84.4% of the population at the end of
2022, against the OECD average of 128.2%. The number of LTE subscribers rose to 84
million in the first quarter of 2023 as compared to 82.9 million at the end of 2022.
There was no progress reported in the procurement of 5G. Türkiye still needs to allocate
additional frequencies for the development and predictability of the sector. In 2022, 94.1% of
households had access to the internet, increasing from 92% the previous year. In the last
quarter of 2022, Türkiye published a new Regulation on the electronic seal. The regulation
covers the procedures and principles governing electronic seal certificates and the obligations
of electronic seal holders, further regulating this area. Türkiye has yet to revise its Data
Protection Law to align with the acquis.
Regarding the recording of a new unified Cypriot plan below 700 MHz under the Geneva 06
ITU plan, Cyprus is still facing an objection from Türkiye to such recording in International
Telecommunications Union (ITU). It is essential that Türkiye’s objection in ITU be lifted; the
television channels below the 700 MHz band, including those channels that have been agreed
to be used by Turkish Cypriots, are still not registered in this ITU Plan, which deprives from
the necessary regulatory protection against interferences coming from neighbouring
countries, a situation where both Greek and Turkish Cypriots are affected.
The level of enforcement of consumer rights in the telecommunication sector remained very
weak. The main focus of consumer complaints included the quality of internet services,
subscription services for fixed lines and cable TV services.
Regarding the information society services, the number of services offered by the e-
Government Gateway reached 7 229. The number of integrated institutions increased to 994.
The number of citizens using e-government increased from 57 663 331 in 2021 to 61 743 325
in 2022, and to 63 193 741 by May 2023. In order to ensure better services to citizens and
establish a governance structure to enable public administrations from all levels and sectors
to co-create and coordinate the exchange of information across network and information
systems, Türkiye should seek alignment with both the European Interoperability Framework
and the Interoperable Europe Act.
The volume of e-commerce in Türkiye reached TRY 800.7 billion in 2022, increasing 109%
compared with the previous year. Following the amendment of the e-commerce Law in July
2022, Türkiye published an implementing regulation on e-commerce service providers and e-
commerce intermediary service providers. Some objectives of the revised e-commerce Law
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are in line with the Digital Markets Act, such as preventing unfair competition and
monopolisation.
On audiovisual policy, the mainstream media remains dominated by pro-government voices.
According to independent reporting, the government can exert power in the management of
90% of the most-watched TV stations and newspapers. This impedes media independence,
pluralism, encourages self-censorship, and limits the scope of public debate. A large share of
these companies’ revenue stems from state advertising and public tenders. Türkiye aimed at
aligning its national legislation regarding audiovisual media services with Directive
2010/13/EU and efforts are underway to align the new rules introduced by Directive
2018/1808 into the national legislation. Yet, the legislation on the rules of radio, television
and on-demand media services lacks clarity in terms of its scope, definitions, licencing
criteria, and has controversial rules regarding jurisdiction and restricting access to online
content.
Between mid-June 2022 and March 2023, the Radio and Television Supreme Council
(RTÜK), issued 1 768 penalties to media service providers. 1 405 (nearly 80%) of these
penalties were due to infringements of the Law regulating commercial communications. In
the same period, Turkish courts imposed 128 broadcasting bans on broadcasters. A pending
application by the Turkish Bar Association at the Council of State continues to halt and
cancel the execution of a presidential decree, dated January 2022, obliging media entities and
institutions to eliminate content that contravenes Turkish values and culture and to take
necessary action to prevent its dissemination. The decree risks violating basic rights and
freedoms and leading to self-censorship.
Chapter 16: Taxation
EU rules on taxation cover value added tax, excise duties and aspects of corporate taxation.
They also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of
information to prevent tax evasion.
Türkiye is moderately prepared on taxation, with no progress made over the reporting
period. In line with the tax screening process used for the purpose of drawing up the EU list
of non-cooperative jurisdictions, Türkiye still needs to activate effective exchange
relationships with all EU Member States to enable the automatic exchange of financial
account information.
The Commission's recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ put arrangements in place for the automatic exchange of tax information with EU Member
States;
→ align the range of excisable energy products with the EU acquis;
→ continue to combat the informal economy and report on progress transparently through
performance indicators.
In the area of indirect taxation, Türkiye still has a wide range of products that are subject to
a 1% value added tax (VAT), in breach of the EU acquis. The accommodation tax,
introduced in December 2019, entered into force in 2023. The VAT exemption period for
deliveries of new machinery and equipment to the manufacturing industry for innovation,
design and R&D activities introduced in 2018, was extended until the end of 2024. Following
the February 2023 earthquakes, Türkiye declared a state of force majeure in the affected
provinces until the end of June 2023. As a result, in addition to the delayed liabilities,
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taxpayers were allowed to pay their arrears in 24 instalments. It also reduced the VAT rate
applicable to prefabricated buildings and containers for delivery to the regions affected by the
earthquakes from 18% to 1% until December 2023. The legislation on structure, exemptions,
special schemes and the scope of reduced rates is not fully aligned with the EU acquis.
Although the overall level of taxation on cigarettes is close to EU levels, Türkiye’s legislation
on cigarette excise duties differs from the EU acquis in terms of specific and proportional
elements of the tax. Excise duties on energy products are lower than the EU minimum rates
and coal, coke and electricity are not subject to excise duties, which is not in line with the EU
acquis. Kerosene is subject to excise duty, but it is zero rated. A 7.5% digital services tax (on
digital advertising, content, and intermediary services) has been in force since March 2020.
On direct taxation, Türkiye issued a new amnesty on the repatriation of foreign and
domestic assets in July 2022, and a new provision on tax restructuring entered into force in
March 2023. This means that, since 2016, Türkiye has adopted five tax repatriations and six
tax restructuring measures, extending their implementation periods repeatedly. Thus, contrary
to the emphasis made in policy papers of the importance of taxpayer voluntary compliance
and the priority placed on increasing the predictability of the taxation system declared, tax
restructuring and cash repatriation have become established practices. Such uninterrupted
periods of capital repatriations and regular tax restructuring practices undermine the
effectiveness of the voluntary tax collection mechanism and distort the reliability and
predictability of the taxation system.
Türkiye extended implementation of the corporate income tax exemption brought in to
promote the FX-protected TRY time deposit account scheme until the end of 2023. Due to
the high levels of inflation in 2022, it postponed the inflation accounting (adjustment)
practice to the end of 2023. In March 2023, it brought in a one-time additional tax on
corporate income taxpayers to compensate for the tax losses incurred as a result of the
earthquakes.
Türkiye has exempted the minimum wage from income tax since 2022, including the tax on
all wages corresponding to the minimum wage.
On administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, Türkiye is still listed in Annex II to
the Council Conclusions on the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes for
criterion 1.1 (automatic exchange of tax information on financial accounts), as it is still not
fully in line with the requirements. The OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange
of Information for Tax Purposes (Global Forum) decision in November 2022 qualified
Türkiye as 'largely compliant' on the exchange of information on request and Türkiye
fulfilled the Council Conclusions on criterion 1.2, exchange of tax information on request. In
February 2023, the Council concluded that Türkiye should continue the technical work and
ensure that tax information is exchanged effectively with all EU Member States to meet
criterion 1.1 of the EU list.
To manage its operational capacity and computerisation, the Turkish Revenue
Administration uses an electronic document management system. The use of e-tax
statements, which began in 2004, reached 99.9% of taxpayers by 2022. Türkiye is in the
process of developing an integrated public finance management information system. In 2022,
it unveiled a new action plan to combat the informal economy (2023-25). However, the new
action plan lacks performance indicators and a publicly accessible system to track
implementation.
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Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy
EU rules require the independence of central banks and prohibit them from directly financing
the public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal,
economic and financial surveillance.
Türkiye has some level of preparation on economic and monetary policy. There was
backsliding during the reporting period, as the Central Bank continued to loosen its
unorthodox monetary policy stance, which triggered multi-year high inflation and unhinged
inflation expectations. Until the parliamentary and presidential elections in May 2023, the
Central Bank was subject to significant political pressure to keep real interest rates deeply
negative. Far-reaching prudential and regulatory measures disrupted the functioning of
financial markets and increased risks. After the elections, the new government has started a
process of policy normalisation, gradually removing some of these measures and tightening
the monetary and fiscal policy stance. In 2022, Türkiye made efforts in sending fiscal
notifications.
The Commission's recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ restore the functional independence of the Central Bank and implement an appropriately
tight monetary policy stance, reinstalling interest rates as the key monetary policy tool,
with a focus on price stability and re-anchoring inflation expectations;
→ continue to gradually unwind the most disruptive regulatory measures under a transparent
monetary policy framework, and underpinned by consistent communication;
→ further align fiscal reporting and notifications under the excessive deficit procedure
(EDP), as well as government finance statistics (GFS) reporting, with ESA 2010, by
gradually expanding data coverage and quality.
On monetary policy, over the last decade the Central Bank drifted away from the official
inflation target of 5% that it set jointly with the government. Concerns over the Central Bank
independence persist. The President of the Republic has extensive powers to appoint and
dismiss the Central Bank Governor and Board members and has made repeated public
comments about the need to lower interest rates. The monetary policy framework proved to
be inefficient in anchoring inflation expectations, strengthening the lira and restoring market
confidence. According to the Law on the Central Bank, monetary financing of the public
sector is prohibited, and the public sector cannot have privileged access to financial
institutions.
Inflation reached a peak of 85.5% on an annual basis in October 2022, before falling
gradually to 38.2% in June 2023 on the back of a strong base effect. Inflation rebounded
again in the following months driven by renewed depreciation of the lira and sizeable tax
increases that needed to curb the mounting budget deficit. Reducing interest rates and
keeping them very low was the announced policy ‘anchor’ until the summer, which required
wide-ranging and disruptive macroprudential and regulatory measures to reduce its
fundamental contradictions in a context of high inflation. The Central Bank kept the real
interest rate deeply negative, despite soaring inflation and global tightening of financial
conditions. It lowered its key policy rate by 500 basis points from 14% to 9% between
August and November 2022, and by an additional 50 basis points, down to 8.5% in February
2023 in the aftermath of the February 2023 earthquakes. After the presidential and
parliamentary elections in May, and under a new governor, the Central Bank has started a
policy normalisation, raising its key rate to 25% in August and launching a process of a
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gradual unwinding of some of the macroprudential and regulatory measures. The costs of the
FX- and gold-protected time lira deposit scheme has been fully transferred to the Central
Bank and are not yet publicly disclosed.
Meanwhile on economic policy, Türkiye consolidated the medium-term fiscal plan with the
medium-term programme for 2023-2025 set out in a single document. A more credible
economic plan, based on more updated assumptions and fully reflecting all fiscally relevant
measures, has not been developed before September 2023. Türkiye could improve the
credibility of its macroeconomic forecasts by providing alternative scenarios. Türkiye is still
not aligned with the Directive on Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks and lacks
numerical fiscal rules and an independent fiscal body to monitor compliance with these rules.
The excessive deficit procedure (EDP) notification tables for 2021 and 2022, with the latest
one received in April 2023, were largely complete. However, further progress is needed on
the coverage and quality of EDP notifications and government finance statistics reporting.
Türkiye submitted its 2023-2025 Economic Reform Programme (ERP) on time. However,
it did not consult external stakeholders on the document and did not publicly present it before
adoption. Further efforts are needed to boost the institutional capacity needed to design,
implement and monitor structural reforms. The ERP included measures to nurture
competitiveness, tackle the green transition and strengthen digital transformation. However,
the analysis of structural challenges is incomplete and some of the measures fall short of
addressing the core problems in these areas. Implementation of the policy guidance set out in
the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2022 has been limited, with
a lower rate of implementation than in the previous year.
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment
EU rules in the social field include minimum standards for labour law, equality, health and
safety at work and non-discrimination. They also promote social inclusion and social
protection, and social dialogue at European level.
Türkiye has some level of preparation on social policy and employment. It made no
progress over the reporting period. The labour market situation improved, but concerns
remain over trade union rights and effective social dialogue, persistent levels of informal
economic activity, and the gender gap in employment. The February 2023 earthquakes had a
major impact on the labour market in the affected regions.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were met only to a very limited degree,
and therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ remove obstacles limiting the exercise of trade union rights and use social dialogue
mechanisms effectively;
→ tackle emerging challenges in health and safety at work, particularly in relation to fatal
incidents in the construction and mining sectors, as well as plastic waste recycling;
→ increase the employment rate of women by adopting effective active labour market and
work-life balance policies.
Türkiye made no progress on labour law. A number of workers in agriculture, forestry and
domestic services, as well as apprentices, remain exempt from several protective clauses of
the labour law. Although unregistered employment fell to 26.8% in 2022, its high level
hampers worker’s access to effective minimum wage protection and other labour rights and
social protection. Digital labour platforms need to be regulated to ensure that platform
workers can fully exercise their right to labour law protection. Capacity-building efforts to
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tackle child labour continued at national and local levels. Nevertheless, child labour practices
that breach international standards persisted, affecting adolescents and migrant boys in
particular. Türkiye lacks adequate data on child labour that would provide the evidence
needed to tackle the root causes of the problem. Regulatory frameworks for emerging jobs,
such as platform workers, need to be strengthened.
In the area of health and safety at work, despite some alignment there are several
implementation challenges, in particular as regards to enforcement and labour inspection
resources. The government continued workplace inspections and awareness-raising efforts to
improve health and safety at work, in high-risk sectors in particular. Workplace inspections
slightly increased to 26 434 in 2022 (up from 24 099 in 2021), conducted by the Directorate
of Guidance and Inspection of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. Yet, the number of
fatal workplace incidents continued to rise. According to the latest available official data, in
2021, 1 394 people lost their lives at work, increasing from 1 240 the previous year. The
informal economy remains a major risk factor as many workplace accidents took place in
sectors where undeclared work is common. Asbestos, dust, and construction-specific risks for
employees need to be accounted for in rubble-removal and reconstruction efforts in the
earthquake-affected regions. Plastic recycling facilities in Istanbul and Adana pose long-term
health threats for workers and surrounding residents. Observance to occupational safety and
health standards should be supervised.
There was no progress on social dialogue. Türkiye does not have a functioning economic and
social council, and the existing tripartite social dialogue mechanisms are very limited in
scope. The unionisation rate was 14.42% for private-sector employees and 72.63% for civil
servants. In the private sector, serious impediments to unionisation persist, including lengthy
legal appeal procedures suspending bargaining certification of trade unions. The government
continued imposing de facto bans on strikes in non-essential services. Adequate protection in
line with International Labour Organisation conventions needs to be provided against anti-
union dismissals and discrimination. Türkiye has yet to recognise the right to strike for civil
servants, and collective agreements need to have wider material scope beyond social and
financial rights.
On employment policy, the labour market situation in Türkiye has improved. The
employment rate (15+) was 47.5% in 2022, compared with 45.2% the previous year. The
unemployment rate (15+) fell from 12% in 2021 to 10.4% in 2022. The composite measure of
labour underutilisation fell from 24.4% in 2021 to 21.3% in 2022. Despite a 2.3 percentage
point increase, the labour force participation rate of women (15+) remained low at 35.1%.
The youth unemployment rate (15-24) continued to fall from 22.6% in 2021 to 19.4% in
2022. Female youth unemployment fell from 28.7% to 25.2%. The rate of unemployed young
people aged 15-24 neither in employment nor in education or training fell slightly from
24.7% in 2021 to 24.2% in 2022, yet it remained particularly high for women (32.3%). Adult
learning (25-64) was at 5.8% in 2020.
The number of job and vocational counsellors in the Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR)
remained around the same level at 4 734, against 4 755 in 2021. The number of people
registered in active labour market programmes fell significantly by 65%. At the same time,
the number of vocational training courses on offer fell sharply from 5 027 to 514, and the
number of on-the-job training courses from 93 840 to 40 332 in 2022. The vocational training
courses previously available for vulnerable groups were discontinued in 2022. Türkiye should
reverse the trend and invest in more re- and upskilling of its labour force through targeted
active labour market policies. The number of people, not in employment, education or
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training, under the new counselling model initiated by ISKUR, increased to 100 150 in 2022,
up from 80 730 in 2021.
The informal economy continues to undermine the social security and welfare systems, and
one of the most affected groups are the Roma community. Efforts to grant Syrian migrants
access to the formal labour market continued. This remains low, given the large working age
population of Syrian migrants.
Due to loss of life, injury, workplace damage, and internal displacements, the February 2023
earthquakes had a major impact on the labour market in the affected regions. Türkiye
authorised the swift execution of payments under short-term work allowances, and people
who were not entitled to this payment received wage support in cash. The government also
declared an employee dismissal ban in the earthquake zone.
For the European Social Fund, Türkiye maintained a good level of preparation. The
Ministry of Labour and Social Security continued to manage an operational programme under
IPA II, covering areas of employment, education and social inclusion. (Concerning the
effectiveness of management of IPA funds, refer to Chapter 22 - Regional policy and
coordination of structural instruments).
On social inclusion and protection, Türkiye still lacks a dedicated poverty reduction
strategy. Sustained price increases further posed the risk of poverty for the unemployed and
wage labourers in precarious jobs. The poverty rate reached 14.4%, up from 13.8% in 2021.
The severe-material-deprivation rate reached 28.4% in 2022 (2021: 27.2%). The child
poverty rate for 2022 was particularly high at 41.6%. In 2022, social assistance payments
amounted to TRY 151.9 billion, or 1.01% of GDP. Türkiye has fragmented benefits at local
and national level, and it still lacks a general minimum income scheme. It has adopted a
national strategy on Roma (2023-2030), including measures on employment and social
protection.
Türkiye needs to step up efforts to de-institutionalise care and move towards community
and family-based care services.
Türkiye lacks a strategy for non-discrimination in employment and social policy. There is
still no ban under Turkish law on discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. The
effectiveness of the Human Rights and Equality Institution and the Ombudsman in combating
workplace discrimination is limited. Clear rules of conduct are needed for public-sector
recruitment, as are appropriate remedies for victims of discrimination. The adopted 2023-
2025 action plan on the rights of persons with disabilities includes measures on non-
discrimination, such as legal sanctions and soft measures as the revision of the legal
framework. When accessing employment however, legislation and practices that discriminate
against persons with disabilities persist. This includes the law on judges and prosecutors that
prohibits the appointment of physically disabled candidates. The principle of reasonable
accommodation should be promoted among employers by providing both financial and non-
financial incentives.
On equality between women and men in employment and social policy, the gender gap
remained very high, despite improvements on the labour market. Legislative work is needed
to achieve full alignment with the EU Directive on work-life balance for parents and carers.
Beyond big urban centres, access to quality and affordable formal care services and early
childhood education is rudimental in Türkiye (see Chapter 26 – Education and culture). The
barriers that women still face in accessing employment include the lack of childcare facilities,
gender bias in caring responsibilities, and discriminatory stereotypes. Further action is needed
to prevent harassment and violence at work, including data collection and awareness raising.
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The share of women in decision-making positions remained very limited (see Chapter 23 -
Judiciary and fundamental rights). Despite the increase from 17.3% in 2022, following the
2023 elections, the representation of women in parliament remains low at 20.1%; 600
members of parliament comprise of 481 men and 121 women.
Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy
EU industrial policy strengthens competitiveness, facilitates structural change and
encourages a business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs).
Türkiye is moderately prepared on enterprise and industrial policy. It made limited
progress over the reporting period with phasing out of discriminatory treatment of certain
EU products. However, concerns persist that the public procurement practices are
incompatible with EU industrial policy principles. There are also concerns over the lack of
transparency in State aid for large investments, the large informal economy, the long-term
financing needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and the insufficient legal
framework for microfinance.
The Commission's recommendations from last year were only partially implemented, and
therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ remove schemes, such as local content requirements and public procurement price
premiums that are incompatible with industrial policy principles and substitute them with
measures that encourage innovation effectively;
→ publish the results of implementation of the industry strategy from 2019 to 2021 as well as
the amounts distributed under the industry support programme;
→ continue conducting assessments on the impact of the SME support framework and
identify any gaps and overlaps.
On enterprise and industrial policy principles, Türkiye maintained the scope of the 15%
domestic price advantage in public procurement and made it compulsory for medium and
high-tech industrial products. In 2022, the percentage of international tenders using the
domestic price advantage increased to 43% (see Chapter 5 – Public procurement). Türkiye
adopted a national technology entrepreneurship strategy (2022-2025) in October 2022,
aiming to stimulate competitive technology entrepreneurship and to strengthen the
ecosystem. A policy tool under the strategy allows the use of public procurement to develop
techno-entrepreneurship, including models enabling direct procurement. While Türkiye
adopted several measures to adjust the localisation and prioritisation schemes for
pharmaceuticals, the EU’s assessment on whether Türkiye has completed the implementation
of all findings in the Arbitrators’ Award is ongoing. In January 2023, the new Turkish
legislation entered into force, phasing out the discriminatory treatment of EU agricultural and
forestry tractors in terms of engine emission requirements.
Türkiye has yet to publish the results of performance indicators tracking the industrial
strategy adopted in 2019. In December 2022, Türkiye adopted a new action plan and strategy
to combat the informal economy (2023-2025). As in previous versions, this new strategy
lacks performance indicators. In July 2022, Türkiye established a Coordination Board on
Sustainable Development to monitor and coordinate the work on aligning with the UN
sustainable development goals. Türkiye continued to successfully implement the Small
Business Act framework.
On enterprise and industrial policy instruments, Turkish legislation is still not fully
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harmonised with the Late Payment Directive. Türkiye continued to implement various
schemes supporting companies, particularly small and medium-sized. It granted incentives,
subsidies, and amnesties on public liabilities to companies in earthquake-affected regions.
However, support for innovation eco-systems is fragmented across numerous programmes.
Smart specialisation strategies were formulated in some regions, but limited information is
available on how these strategies will be implemented.
The SME support administration (KOSGEB) continued to run a range of technical assistance
and financing schemes. In total, nine evaluation reports are publicly available on KOSGEB’s
website. As of March 2023, 98 technology development zones were in place; 82 were
operational. 1 627 patents were obtained from 51 085 completed projects in these zones
(compared with 1 511 patents obtained from 47 456 completed projects in 2021).
On policy instrument, Türkiye signed the Single Market Programme Association Agreement
in March 2023, and completed the national ratification procedures necessary for the entry into
force. Türkiye is participating in the SME pillar of this programme. There were no sectoral
policy changes adopted. Türkiye's 11th
development plan, along with the complementary
industry and technology strategy, focus on technological transformation of manufacturing at
all levels, and follow a sectoral prioritisation approach. Under the technology-focused
industrial movement programme and under the project-based investment support programme,
Türkiye intends to support investments in strategically chosen sectors such as machinery,
computers, electronics, optics, electrical hardware, pharmaceuticals, chemistry, and transport
vehicles. In 2023, a total of 64 projects received support with an investment of TRY 491
billion under the project-based investment support programme (see Chapter 8 – Competition
policy). The breakdown of State aid for these investments was not disclosed, contrary to the
commitments made under the EU-Turkey Customs Union. For the last three tenders, the
overall financial amounts were not disclosed on the relevant Ministry’s website.
Chapter 25: Science and research
The EU provides significant support for research and innovation. All Member States can
benefit from the EU’s research and innovation programmes and benefit from them,
especially where there is scientific excellence and solid investment in research and
innovation.
Overall, Türkiye’s preparation in the area of science and research is well advanced. It made
good progress during the reporting period, notably linked to Türkiye’s participation in
Horizon Europe and continued action to raise awareness of and capacity for the programme.
There is good, active and expanding cooperation between the EU and Türkiye on research
and innovation.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ continue its efforts to align its national research area (TARAL) with the new European
Research Area;
→ step up efforts to increase innovation to remedy the continued fall down the rankings in
the European Innovation Scoreboard.
On research and innovation policy, in March 2023, the Turkish Statistical Institute revised
the calculation method for R&D expenditure and provided updated data in line with the
Frascati Manual guidance: the share of R&D expenditure in GDP rose slightly to 1.4% in
2021 from 1.37% in 2020. The total number of full-time equivalent R&D personnel increased
by 11%, from 199 371 in 2020 to 221 811 in 2021, but the share of female personnel in
research remained at 32%. Türkiye came closer to the commitment made in its industry and
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technology strategy to increase national R&D expenditure and personnel to 1.8% and to 300
000 respectively by 2023. However, a wide gap remains between R&D expenditure in
Türkiye and the EU-27 average (2.26% in 2021).
According to the 2023 European Innovation Scoreboard, Türkiye remains an Emerging
Innovator, performing at 47.6% of the EU average. Türkiye’s performance is below average
of the Emerging Innovators (54.0%) and the performance it achieved in 2022 (47.7%). The
gap between Türkiye’s performance and the EU average is widening. According to the
Scoreboard, Türkiye has strengths in knowledge-intensive services, as well as in government
support for R&D conducted by businesses. However, Türkiye does not yet provide data on
some relevant indicators, such as “Venture capital expenditures” and “Air emissions by fine
particulate matter”. Providing the full set of indicators might help raise Türkiye’s overall
performance in the European Innovation Scoreboard.
On the policy side, Türkiye updated the study entitled Priority Research, Development and
Innovation (RDI) Areas for 2022 and 2023. With a focus on green and digital technologies, in
line with EU priorities, the updated study has three main pillars: RDI topics in priority and
key technologies, RDI topics for compliance with the EU Green Deal and adaptation to
climate change, and strategic and needs-oriented RDI topics.
Support measures focus both on developing the innovation ecosystem and on building the
innovation capacity of enterprises. However, support continues to focus on regions with more
mature innovation systems, which widens the gap between urban hubs and less developed
regions in Türkiye.
Türkiye’s action plan to boost the national research and innovation capacity and awareness
on Horizon Europe contributes to the positive trend of Türkiye’s performance in the
programme. Türkiye has improved its performance in recent years, practically doubling the
average yearly amounts at the end of Horizon 2020 and doubling again over the first years of
Horizon Europe. Cooperation on the EU Missions is promising, particularly in the context of
climate-neutral and smart cities’ mission. Istanbul and Izmir were selected among 100 cities
interested in becoming climate neutral by 2030.
Türkiye is in the process of implementing the 2019 national European Research Area (ERA)
roadmap, which needs to be updated. Türkiye has yet to actively engage in a set of European
Research Area priorities. Türkiye’s participation in the activities of the European Institute of
Innovation and Technology (EIT) is satisfactory.
There is good and active cooperation between the EU and Türkiye on research and
innovation. A High-Level Dialogue on Science, Technology and Innovation took place in
autumn 2022. It underlined the shared ambition to design and deploy cutting-edge
technologies and to transform the research and innovation outputs into green and sustainable
industrial products.
Chapter 26: Education and culture
The EU supports cooperation in education and culture through funding programmes and the
coordination of Member State policy through the ‘open method of coordination’. The EU and
the Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for
children of migrant workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Türkiye is moderately prepared on education and culture. There was some progress in the
reporting period, notably through the continued implementation of the national qualifications
system and the increased participation in some EU programmes. On cultural policy, Türkiye
took some steps to implement the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of
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the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Türkiye does not have a national youth strategy nor an
officially recognised national youth council. The February 2023 earthquake seriously
disrupted the education system in the affected areas.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially met, and therefore
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ further improve inclusive education, with a particular focus on girls and children from
disadvantaged groups and closely monitor and continue work to reduce the proportion of
school dropouts;
→ ensure the good functioning of the Turkish Qualifications Framework and Turkish Higher
Education Quality Council;
→ take further steps to implement the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.
On education, access to early childhood education (ECE) in Türkiye varies by age group and
region. The net enrolment rate for preschool education (age 5) increased from 56.89% in
2020-2021 to 81.63% in 2022, and the combined enrolment rate for children aged 3-5
increased from 28.35% to 44.05%. In 2019-2020, before the COVID-19 pandemic, the rate
for preschool education (age 5) was 71.22%, and the combined rate for children aged 3-5 was
41.78%. The need to expand flexible and community-based ECE models, set targets and
strategies to include vulnerable children, and guarantee effective and free access to and the
quality of ECE services remains a valid recommendation for Türkiye.
The net enrolment rate in primary school fell slightly from 93.23% in 2021 to 93.16% in
2022, and increased slightly in lower secondary school from 88.85% to 89.84%. In secondary
education, the net enrolment rate continued to increase from 87.93% to 89.67%. A slight
increase in the enrolment rates of higher education was registered from 44.41% in 2021 to
44.66% in 2022.
Although Türkiye increased the duration of compulsory education for children to 12 years in
2012, the level of non-attendance at the upper secondary level (grades 9-12) remains
significant, though varying from province to province.
Regarding students in special education, the enrolment rate increased from 425 816 in 2021
to 472 686 in 2022. Given public investments in recent years, a large majority of children
with special needs (75%) receive inclusive education in mainstream classrooms. However,
nearly 50 000 children with special needs still study in separate classrooms, and more than
50 000 are in separate schools. Reliable data is needed on the educational achievements of
boys and girls with disabilities as well as on school attendance rates.
The February 2023 earthquakes seriously disrupted the education system in the affected
areas. Türkiye has made large investments to improve its digital learning platform called
Education Information Network, to reduce the impact of emergencies (e.g. pandemic,
earthquake, refugee crisis) on children’s learning and to increase preparedness for future
shocks.
Türkiye remains advanced in its implementation of the Bologna process, though notable
disparities remain in the quality of Türkiye's 208 higher education institutions. In March
2023, the European Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education (EQAR) approved the
Turkish Higher Education Quality Council’s registration based on compliance with the
Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the European Higher Education Area
(ESG). Türkiye is also actively participating in 7 European Education Area (EEA) working
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groups, which foster European collaboration on education and prepare youth for the green
and digital transitions.
On technical and vocational education and training (TVET), Türkiye continues to
implement the National Vocational Qualifications System (NVQS) by the Vocational
Qualifications Authority (VQA). As of June 2023, the number of national occupational
standards published in the Official Gazette reached 901 (893 in June 2022), and the number
of qualifications approved was 648 (up from 586 in June 2022). During the reporting period,
the number of authorised certification bodies in Türkiye increased to 277 from 272, and the
number of VQA vocational qualification certificates issued for individuals through exams
and skills tests run by the certification bodies increased to 2 507 663 from 2 253 424.
Although the Turkish Qualifications Framework (TQF) is operational in Türkiye, the
vocational training provided by vocational education and training institutions remains
incompatible with the needs of national qualification (NQ) candidates. This is due to
candidates falling short of demonstrating full competence, seeking to obtain a higher
qualification, or moving horizontally/vertically between qualifications in the related
occupation. To improve the functioning of the TQF, in addition to the existing vocational
education and training institutions, continuous education centres of universities should
prepare modular vocational training courses for specific occupation levels that are in line
with the expected NQ learning outcomes and in cooperation with the authorised certification
bodies.
Since 30% of the minimum wage payment to students of the vocational training centres was
introduced in December 2021, the number of students in centres has increased from 159 000
in 2021 to 1 200 000 in 2022. Despite considerable progress in this area, the credibility of the
NVQS remains a serious challenge in VET implementation in Türkiye. It is essential to
closely align the quality and validity of vocational education and training provided by
companies with the requirements of the associated national qualifications and with the
occupational standards on which they are based. The accreditation of national qualifications
education and training providers and the programmes they deliver is crucial to the successful
functioning of the NVQS and TQF in Türkiye.
On education, training and youth, Türkiye continues to participate in EU programmes. For
Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps, the number of contracted projects increased
from 918 in 2021 to 1075 in 2022, with an overall budget of EUR 225 million. The number
of participants who carried out a mobility activity (from and to Türkiye) within both
programmes, exceeds 239 000. Regarding the European Solidarity Corps programme, the
number of awarded applications remained constant at 184 in both 2021 and 2022, with a total
budget of over EUR 5 million.
On culture, the freedom of cultural expression is still restricted in Türkiye. The authorities
continue to censor, confiscate, restrict distribution, or reclaim funding for books and films
based on allegations of ‘harmful and obscene contents’, ‘terror propaganda’, or ‘scenario
change’. The ban on live music at night, imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, remains
in place. Music events and festivals are cancelled at the discretion of governors, district
governors, or mayors, citing security and public morality concerns (see also political
criteria). The February 2023 earthquakes caused damage to Türkiye's cultural heritage in the
affected regions. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism reported that more than 8 500
registered cultural assets in 10 provinces have been affected by the disaster. Action plans to
salvage cultural assets were prepared. The restoration and conservation of damaged cultural
properties has commenced.
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To implement the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of
Cultural Expressions, Türkiye's cultural industries platform is operational. The platform, set
up by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, is a forum to share opinions, statistics and data,
where civil society organisations, public or private-sector entities, can inform users about
events or activities planned in support of cultural industries. The Cultural Industries Support
and Incentives Guide was updated in 2023, listing support and incentive mechanisms of
public institutions for cultural and creativity-intensive industries.
Türkiye’s participation in the EU’s Creative Europe programme is not yet finalised. Türkiye
is seeking to re-join parts of the programme, having left it in 2017.
Regarding youth, Türkiye still lacks a national youth strategy and an officially recognised
national youth council. The number of youth centres increased from 388 in 2021 to 451 (June
2023) located in 81 provinces of Türkiye. More than 850 000 higher education students,
including foreign students, are living in 800 student dormitories located all over the country.
1.5 million higher education students, including students receiving education abroad, receive
an education credit or a state scholarship.
There are 64 sports federations in Türkiye. The revenue of sports federations flows from
participation shares, registration fees, sponsorship, advertisement, donations and similar
incomes.
Chapter 29: Customs Union
All Member States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and
procedures. This requires legislative alignment as well as adequate implementation and
enforcement capacity, and access to the common computerised customs systems.
Türkiye maintains a good level of preparation for the Customs Union. It made limited
progress in the reporting period.
Several longstanding and new trade barriers still infringe the basic provisions of the EU-
Turkey Customs Union. Duty relief, free zones and surveillance measures are not fully
aligned with the EU acquis, again in clear contradiction with Türkiye’s obligations under the
Customs Union.
The Commission's recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ step up efforts to fully align new legislation with the EU Customs Code;
→ bring risk-based controls and simplified procedures in line with the EU acquis;
→ fully eliminate import and export restrictions as well as additional duties on goods in free
circulation in the EU-Turkey Customs Union.
Türkiye made limited progress on customs legislation. Türkiye lifted some additional duties
applied on imports of a long list of products originating in third countries, which are in free
circulation in the EU or imported from third countries. However, the scope was not
significantly narrowed as new additional duties were introduced in parallel.
Turkish customs authorities started to systematically request subsequent verifications of
movement certificates and certificates of origin documents for textiles and materials used in
the production of textiles and to require financial guarantees to release the goods in certain
cases pending the result of the post-verification.
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Türkiye's implementation of value-based import surveillance measures and the lack of a legal
remedy to recover overpaid amounts are neither aligned with the EU acquis nor compatible
with transparent, objective and verifiable customs valuation procedures. Turkish authorities
are continuing to implement export tax measures on hides, skins and wet-blue leathers and an
export licencing regime on copper scrap. New export registrations were put in place on a
number of products, in particular feldspar and clays and were often applied in an opaque and
discretionary manner.
Turkish Customs Law needs to be fully harmonised with the EU Customs Code, including
implementation of risk-based controls and simplified procedures to facilitate legitimate trade
while ensuring security and safety. The designation of specialised customs offices is not
compatible with the provisions of the Customs Union. Rules on free zones and duty relief are
yet to be aligned with the EU acquis.
On administrative and operational capacity, efforts continued to strengthen customs
enforcement capacity for border controls. Yet, more work is needed to align the Law on the
customs enforcement of intellectual property rights and in particular on export and in-transit
operations. Risk-based controls to enforce safety and security measures need to be improved
and brought in line with Customs Union provisions. Türkiye implements the computerised
transit system as part of its membership in the Convention on a Common Transit Procedure.
However, it has not yet put in place tariff IT systems. It needs to implement the IT strategy in
line with business initiatives and update the documented customs business processes in line
with the legal basis.
CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY
This cluster covers: transport policy (Chapter 14), energy (Chapter 15), trans-European
networks (Chapter 21) and environment and climate change (Chapter 27).
Türkiye is moderately prepared in transport policy. It made limited progress during the
reporting period, mainly linked to the update of the nationally determined contribution under
the Paris Agreement with a specific chapter on transport mitigation policies. Türkiye is
moderately prepared in the area of energy, and made limited progress overall. It increased its
energy dependence on Russia. Progress continued on renewable energy deployment, reforms
in the natural gas sector and legislative alignment on nuclear safety. Türkiye is well
advanced on trans-European networks and made no progress. The trans-Anatolian pipeline
continues to operate smoothly and transmit gas to the European section of the Southern Gas
Corridor. The construction of the flagship Halkali-Kapikule railway line connecting the EU
border to Istanbul continued.
Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of environment and climate change and
made limited progress over the reporting period. Türkiye submitted its updated nationally
determined contribution under the Paris Agreement. It faces critical environmental and
climate challenges, and needs more ambitious and better coordinated environment and
climate policies, strategic planning, substantial investment and stronger administrative
capacity.
Chapter 14: Transport policy
The EU has common rules for technical and safety standards, security, social standards,
State aid and market liberalisation in road transport, railways, inland waterways, combined
transport, aviation and maritime transport.
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Türkiye is moderately prepared in transport policy. It made limited progress in the
reporting period. Türkiye published its first updated Nationally Determined Contribution
(NDC), under the Paris Agreement with a specific chapter on transport mitigation policies.
The number of cities implementing sustainable urban mobility plans (SUMPs) increased. The
new railway framework law has not yet been adopted and the reform of the incumbent
railway operator has not progressed.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially met, and therefore
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ consider charting project-led pathways to achieve its net-zero targets for the
decarbonisation of the transport sector;
→ prioritise disaster resilience of urban mobility in Turkish cities and include disaster aspects
as a part of the evolving SUMPs;
→ improve policy dialogue and increase institutional coordination between local and central
authorities on sustainable urban mobility.
Regarding general transport, Türkiye published its first updated nationally determined
contribution (NDC), under the Partis Agreement with a specific chapter on transport
mitigation policies. The number of cities implementing sustainable urban mobility plans
(SUMPs) increased. The preparation of Türkiye’s online electronic legislation inventory tool,
which will digitally track Türkiye's transport legislation in English to create a continuous
monitoring system with the EU acquis, reached its final stage. Regarding sustainable urban
mobility, policy guidance and better institutional coordination between local and central
bodies still need to be improved.
On road transport, the legal framework has a good level of alignment with the EU acquis.
Limited progress was made during the reporting period. Turksat, the communications satellite
operator of Türkiye, advanced work to create a user portal to provide access to best practices
on the intelligent transport services, which is compatible with the EU. The Director General
for Communications was appointed as the national access point for Intelligent Transport
Systems (ITS) issues. Institutional capacity remains insufficient to meet Türkiye’s national
ITS targets. No progress was made on the smart tachographs transition for road transport. The
implementing legislation on the transport of dangerous goods by road entered into force in
June 2022. In the area of road safety, the number of road fatalities remains well above the EU
average and continuous efforts are needed in the implementation of the road safety strategy.
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the field of rail transport and made no further progress
during the reporting period. The comprehensive railway framework Law was not adopted and
Türkiye is not aligned with the EU’s fourth railway package. A draft law aiming to align with
the Directive on Railway Interoperability reached its final stage of preparation. The
independence of the National Safety Authority, currently assigned to the DG for Railway
Transport Services, has yet to be achieved. The subsidies to the incumbent railway operator
and the financial independence of transport operator from the infrastructure manager remain
major issues.
Türkiye achieved a good level of preparation in aligning with the EU acquis in the field of
maritime transport. Some progress was made during the reporting period. Türkiye issued a
new regulation to support the shifting of freight from road to maritime services. According to
a new regulation adopted in August 2022, Türkiye will provide USD 2 per nautical mile to
roll-on/roll-off operators to open new ro-ro lines. To this end, a new line was opened from
Izmir to Sète. Türkiye’s efforts on maritime decarbonisation and green shipping continued
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through the renewal of the maritime fleet with energy-efficient and more environmentally
friendly ships. The switch to alternative fuels like green hydrogen and green methanol is
planned under the scope of government incentives. A national legislation implementing the
EU Port Services Regulation is yet to be developed.
Türkiye's legislation on inland waterways is not yet aligned with the EU acquis. Türkiye has
limited inland waterways and it has not signed the main international agreements on this
issue.
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the field of aviation. It made some progress during the
reporting period. Discussions started on the renewal of the working arrangements between
Türkiye and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency. The regulations on training
organisations, continuous air worthiness management and maintenance personnel licencing
were updated to further align with the EU acquis. Türkiye adopted the regulation on CORSIA
requirements for carbon off-setting and implementation. The regulation on accreditation of
institutions carrying out monitoring, reporting and verification services entered into force.
The lack of adequate communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and
Cyprus continued to compromise air safety in the Nicosia flight information region, requiring
an operational solution. Türkiye continues to refuse to accept the principle of EU carrier
designation in its air services agreements with Member States, which is a cornerstone of the
EU internal market in aviation.
There was limited progress on combined transport. The by-law on combined freight
transport was published in May 2022.
Regarding EU passenger rights, further efforts are needed to align in all modes of transport.
As long as restrictions remain in place on vessels and aircrafts registered in Cyprus, related to
Cyprus, or whose last port of call was Cyprus, Türkiye will not be in a position to fully
implement the EU acquis relating to this chapter.
Chapter 15: Energy
EU energy policy covers energy supply, infrastructure, the internal energy market,
consumers, renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, radiation
protection and nuclear safeguards.
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of energy. Limited progress was achieved
during the reporting period. Overall, energy dependency on Russia has increased; Türkiye
reduced gas imports from Russia but it increased imports in oil and coal and inaugurated a
new nuclear power plant built and operated by Russia. While the rollout of renewable energy
continued at good pace, local content requirement practices in the sector remained in place.
Türkiye made some legislative changes related to the natural gas market, but the reformative
effect of these changes is contradictory. Türkiye made efforts in the legislative alignment of
nuclear safety regulations.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ deepen natural gas market reform by setting up a legally binding plan and a timetable for
unbundling activities and by updating the natural gas market Law to ensure it is
compatible with the EU's third energy package;
→ complete the legislative alignment on nuclear safety and stress tests on the Akkuyu
nuclear power plant;
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→ discontinue local content requirement practices in the renewable energy sector, as such
practices contradict WTO and EU-Turkey Customs Union rules.
On security of supply, Türkiye remains an important transit country, ensuring the smooth
operation of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which transmits Azeri natural gas to
Europe by connecting to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline. Natural gas also continued to flow to
Europe, which also includes Russian gas via the TurkStream pipeline. Türkiye actively
expanded its import capacity for liquefied natural gas (LNG) as well as its gas storage
capacity. The country now has five LNG import facilities, three of which are floating storage
regasification units. The latest new facility started operations in early 2023. The largest gas
storage facility at Tuz Gölü has a capacity of 5.4 bcm and the second gas storage facility at
Silivri has a capacity of 4.6 bcm since December 2022.
Although significant amounts of natural gas have been discovered in the Black Sea by the
Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), Türkiye remains dependent on energy imports.
Russia provides more than one third of the country’s natural gas imports and a quarter of the
country’s oil imports and is building, operating and owns the first nuclear power plant in
Türkiye, launched in April 2023. Faced with rising energy prices, Türkiye took measures to
satisfy consumer demand while providing support to cushion high energy prices. Türkiye
continued to invest in becoming a natural gas hub thanks to the country’s existing
infrastructure of pipelines, LNG terminals, gas storage facilities, gas exchange and a
balancing system.
On the internal energy market, Türkiye made only limited progress on the natural gas
market reforms. It suspended yet again the unbundling of the state-owned gas company
BOTAȘ and has not set a date to achieve it. Amendments to the Natural Gas Market Law,
adopted in April 2023, lifted the restrictions on long-term gas imports, simplified the export
scheme and abolished the strict limitations and time-based obligations aimed to reduce the
market share of BOTAȘ. The entry of new long-term importers and exporters to the gas
market depends on the Ministry of Energy. The Energy Market Regulatory Authority
(EMRA) was authorised to draft regulations for determining quantities, terms, and procedures
for spot pipe gas imports in line with the opinion of the Ministry of Energy. The new law also
changed the approach to transmission tariffs and paved the way for setting exclusive tariffs
for gas exports that will be based on a separate methodology. These changes will not help
transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory pricing.
Türkiye has modernised its wholesale electricity market and it follows developed market
practices. The eligibility limit in the electricity market was reduced to 1 000 kWh by an
EMRA Board decision in December 2022. Türkiye brought in the concept of 'aggregator' as a
separate market operation in the electricity market by amending the Law on the electricity
market of December 2022. The implementing regulation for licencing was amended in
November 2022 but additional work is needed to address the missing issues.
On hydrocarbons, Türkiye is at an advanced stage of alignment with the EU acquis.
However, alignment with the Directive on the safety of offshore oil and gas operations
remains insufficient, also regarding the transit of hydrocarbons. Amid growing concerns
about energy price inflation, Türkiye has accelerated action to produce gas domestically from
its recently discovered Sakarya field in the Black Sea, with an estimated potential of 710
billion cubic meters.
On renewable energy, Türkiye announced ambitious goals when it published its latest
national energy plan (2023-2035) in January 2023. The plan envisages maximising solar and
wind energy to achieve the country’s greenhouse gas emission targets. The declared goal is to
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increase the share of renewable energy in primary energy consumption from 16.7% currently
to 23.7% in 2035, and the share of nuclear energy from zero to 5.9% in 2035. With the
integration of intermittent renewable resources, the need for flexibility in the system will
increase.
At the beginning of 2023, Türkiye published a new hydrogen technologies strategy and
roadmap strategic document, highlighting that green hydrogen will be an important element
for the country to achieve its net-zero emission targets. The local content requirement
practices in Türkiye continue to raise concerns as they contradict WTO and the EU-Turkey
Customs Union rules and undermine the competitiveness of the EU and other international
companies on the Turkish energy market.
As regards energy efficiency, in the context of Türkiye’s 2053 climate targets, energy
efficiency and renewable energy standards in buildings are being tightened, electrical
vehicles are promoted and the use of different modes of transport is prioritised. In the
buildings and transport sectors, Türkiye plans to achieve an energy savings potential of 50%
to reach its climate targets.
On nuclear energy, nuclear safety and radiation protection, Türkiye’s latest national
energy plan estimated that the total installed nuclear power capacity in the system will reach
7.2 GW by 2035. The first reactor in the Akkuyu power plant (built with a 99.2% investment
by Russia’s Rosatom) became operational in April 2023. Türkiye continued work to build 11
more large-scale reactors across the country.
Following Türkiye’s voluntary commitment to conduct stress tests on the Akkuyu power
plant using the EU model, an agreement between the Commission and the Turkish nuclear
regulatory authority has been reached to move from the previously envisaged two-phase
approach to a more streamlined single-phase approach. In July 2022, Türkiye ratified the
Joint Convention on the safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management.
Chapter 21: Trans-European networks
The EU promotes trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport,
telecommunications and energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth
and employment.
Türkiye is well advanced on trans-European networks. It made no progress during the
reporting period. Concerning energy networks, smooth operation of the Trans-Anatolian
Pipeline (TANAP) continues to transmit gas to the European section of the Southern Gas
Corridor. On transport networks, construction of the flagship Halkali-Kapikule railway line
connecting the EU border to Istanbul continued, despite significant difficulties.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ establish a transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory gas transit regime in line
with the EU acquis;
→ take concrete steps to prepare the Yavuz Sultan Selim bridge railway connections;
→ accelerate action to align with key pieces of the EU acquis to facilitate alignment in the
TEN-T networks.
Concerning the transport networks, Türkiye continued to progress in the construction of the
new Halkali-Kapikule high speed railway line connecting the Asian part of Türkiye and
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Europe. The progress rate on the main line reached 64%. The contracts under the Ispartakule-
Cerkezkoy (Stage II) and Ispartakule-Halkali (Stage III) sections were signed, but
implementation remains at a very early stage.
There has been no progress on the preparatory work for the railway connection between the
new railway line and the Yavuz Sultan Selim bridge to allow rail traffic towards the Asian
side of the straits. Due to high congestion, services and infrastructure at the border crossing
points between the EU and Türkiye should be strengthened in view of the expected increase
over the long term in transport flows.
Türkiye made no progress on energy networks. The operation of the TANAP transmitting
gas to the European section of the Southern Gas Corridor continues. Türkiye is actively
expanding its import capacity for liquefied natural gas as well as its gas storage capacity. In
October 2022, Türkiye and Russia agreed to explore the scope for Türkiye to become a major
gas hub, by expanding the current TurkStream pipeline and creating a gas distribution centre
on the borders to Greece and Bulgaria. In January 2023, an agreement of cooperation for 13
years was signed between Türkiye’s National Petroleum Corporation BOTAȘ and Bulgargaz,
for a volume of up to 1.5 billion cubic meters per year. The first transit via Marmara Ereglisi
LNG Terminal took place in April 2023. Regarding gas networks and transmission system
operator cooperation, BOTAȘ applied for observer membership at the European Network of
Gas Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-G). The state-owned BOTAȘ remains
vertically integrated and dominates the market with its trading and grid operator functions,
which stifles market competition. Amendments to the natural gas market Law adopted in
April 2023 changed the gas import and export rationale of Türkiye (see Chapter 15 –
Energy). BOTAȘ completed the Saros Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FRSU)
Terminal in February 2023, as a result of which Türkiye now has five LNG import facilities.
Concerning electricity networks, Türkiye renewed the Turkish Electricity Transmission
System Operator's observer membership of the European Network of Transmission System
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) as of January 2023 for a 3-year duration. The safe
integration of increased amounts of intermittent renewable energy remains a major challenge
in modernising the electricity network.
Chapter 27: Environment and climate change
The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the
environment. EU rules contain provisions addressing climate change, water and air quality,
waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise and civil
protection.
Türkiye has some level of preparation and made limited progress over the reporting period
in this area. On climate change, Türkiye submitted its updated Nationally Determined
Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement with a slightly increased, albeit still critically
insufficient, mitigation goal. It still lacks a long-term strategy for decarbonisation
substantiating its net-zero-emission goal. The main strategic documents on climate policy still
have a time horizon to 2023 and need to be thoroughly updated. Enforcement and
implementation remain weak. Türkiye has yet to set and then implement more ambitious and
better coordinated environment and climate policies. The level of strategic planning,
including quantified objectives and milestones, substantial investment and stronger
administrative capacity, which are key prerequisites to increase preparedness, remains low.
The Commission's recommendations from last year were only partially met, therefore remain
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
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→ ensure that environmental standards are met when building back better in the earthquake-
affected areas, notably through full implementation of the Environmental Impact
Assessment Directive and other horizontal environmental legislation, and ensure that
protection from exposure to asbestos in these areas is duly implemented;
→ complete alignment with the directives on industrial pollution, water and waste as well as
on nature protection and air quality;
→ complete its alignment with the EU acquis on climate action, notably but not limited to
emission trading, and finalise the pending contributions required under the Paris
Agreement on climate change.
Environment
Türkiye has achieved some level of preparation in the area of horizontal legislation, but no
progress was made over the reporting period. Turkish legislation is aligned with the Strategic
Environmental Assessment Directive and mostly aligned with the Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) Directive. However, Türkiye is still not party to the Espoo Convention and
thus, non-alignment with EIA procedures in transboundary contexts persists. Moreover,
Türkiye is not yet party to the Aarhus Convention on access to information, public
participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. The level of
alignment on Environmental Liability Directive remains limited. The National Environment
Agency, set up in 2020, became operational in 2022.
On air quality, Türkiye has yet to adopt national legislation in line with EU directives on
ambient air quality and national emission ceilings. It reports on severe air pollution in some
cities on an annual basis. It has a national strategy for air quality monitoring and all eight
planned regional networks are established and operational with 360 monitoring stations.
The legal framework on waste management is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Türkiye
continued to implement the legislation on zero waste adopted in 2019. In 2023, Türkiye’s
recycling rate increased to 27%. Preparations continued for the introduction of the Deposit
Management System, designed to recycle disposable beverage packages. On medical waste
treatment, alignment and capacity building for sorting and recycling continued. The level of
implementation of waste management plans at local and regional level is insufficient. Türkiye
has not adopted legislation on ship recycling to mirror the requirements of the EU Ship
Recycling Regulation and concerns persist regarding safety, sound waste management and
environmental hazards in some of these facilities. Two Turkish shipyards were removed from
the EU list of ship recycling facilities, but three more Turkish shipyards were added to it. On
textiles, the Turkish apparel sector published in January 2023 a sustainability strategy and
action plan to transform the sector by aligning it with the EU acquis. The February 2023
earthquakes had a major impact on the waste management systems of affected municipalities,
impacting the existing infrastructure and equipment. In addition, the management of
construction debris remains a major environmental problem in terms of polluting the
ecosystems into which the debris is dumped, including due to the release of asbestos.
In the area of water quality, the legislative alignment is advanced, but the level of
implementation and enforcement remain low. Türkiye has started preparing river basin
management plans in line with the Water Framework Directive and has already adopted 8 out
of 25 basins plans. Preparations of all 25 flood risk management plans are close to
completion, but the preparation of drought management plans and groundwater management
plans is at an early stage. Türkiye has not yet aligned its provisions with the revised EU
Directive on drinking water and transboundary consultations on water issues have not
advanced. Wastewater treatment capacity has increased as a result of continuous investments
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and with the construction of 1 176 wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) in the country,
reaching a coverage of 89% of the municipal population. Türkiye aimed to reach 100% by the
end of 2023, but the February 2023 earthquakes, which damaged much urban infrastructure
in the affected area, including drinking water, sewerage networks and stormwater collection
systems and the WWTPs, hampers the progress on this. The preliminary estimated cost of the
damage is USD 3 billion. Alignment with the EU marine strategy remains pending.
Türkiye has some level of preparation on nature protection. Türkiye committed to setting
national targets to implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework,
adopted at the 15th
Conference of Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity
(COP15), in December 2022. However, nature protection remains a challenge in Türkiye. It
made no progress on adopting the framework legislation, the national biodiversity strategy or
an action plan. Planning and construction in wetlands, forests and natural sites are still not in
line with the EU acquis. In December 2022, Türkiye amended the mining regulation to allow
mining in agricultural areas, protected areas, national parks and coastal areas, which caused
concern among NGOs and the general public.
In industrial pollution and risk management, alignment with the EU acquis is at an early
stage. Türkiye ratified the Minamata Convention on mercury management in October 2022
and committed to phasing out existing mercury mines and the use of mercury in product and
processes. Türkiye made no progress on aligning the Industrial Emissions Directive, the eco-
management and audit scheme or the Directive on the limitation of emissions of volatile
organic compounds.
On chemicals, Türkiye has achieved an advanced level of legislative alignment overall, but
the level of implementation and enforcement remains weak. Türkiye is almost fully aligned
with the European Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of
Chemicals (REACH). The transitional period of enforcement finishes at the end of 2023.
Alignment with legislation on noise is well advanced but the level of implementation and
enforcement remains weak. The noise legislation was amended to extend its scope in 2022.
On civil protection, Türkiye is a participating state of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism
(UCPM). In the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, Türkiye activated the Mechanism.
Subsequently, all member and participating states offered major collaborative support via the
Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) of the European Commission. Türkiye
has not yet installed the Secure Trans-European Services for Telematics between
Administrators system to be able to connect through the Common Emergency
Communication and Information System (CECIS) with the ERCC.
Climate change
Türkiye has achieved some level of preparation in this area and made limited progress over
the reporting period. It is in the process of revising the current climate change strategy and
action plan (2011-2023) and has adopted an implementing legislation on fluorinated
greenhouse gases (F-gases). Türkiye submitted an updated nationally determined contribution
(NDC) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in April 2023. The
overall objective is slightly higher than in the previous NDC and it contains an economy-
wide goal. However, the emission reduction target remains critically insufficient, as it means
that emissions could rise by over 30% by 2030. This is neither in line with the EU’s
collective objective to cut emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared with 1990, nor with
the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report. It remains crucial to step up the
level of ambition in line with science. It is also necessary to adopt a long-term strategy on
decarbonisation that reconciles the new NDC and Türkiye's objective to reach net-zero
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emissions by 2053. Türkiye has not published a national adaptation plan nor an adaptation
communication under the Paris Agreement.
Regarding its other commitments under the UNFCCC, Türkiye submitted the latest national
inventory on greenhouse gases in April 2023. It has yet to adopt a climate law and provisions
for the establishment of a domestic emission trading system. Similarly, on climate adaptation,
Türkiye has yet to adopt a new national adaptation strategy beyond 2023. Türkiye still does
not fully implement the Fuel Quality Directive, nor does it align with EU emissions standards
for new light and heavy-duty vehicles. Türkiye needs to draw up an alignment plan for the
Carbon Capture and Storage Directive and for the certain pieces of legislation under the Fit
for 55 package adopted during the reporting period.
CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION
This cluster covers: agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11), food safety, veterinary
and phytosanitary policy (Chapter 12), fisheries and aquaculture (Chapter 13), regional
policy and coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22), and financial and budgetary
provisions (Chapter 33).
Türkiye reached some level of preparation in the area of agriculture and rural development.
Backsliding continued during the reporting period, as its agricultural policy keeps moving
away from the main principles of the EU common agricultural policy and as Türkiye
continued to restrict imports of agricultural products from the EU. Türkiye is a major
exporter of food products to the EU, and made limited progress in the area of food safety,
veterinary and phytosanitary policy, where it reached some level of preparation. Full
implementation of the EU acquis in this area requires significant further work. Türkiye is
moderately prepared in the area of fisheries and acquaculture, and made some progress on
fisheries governance, inspection and control.
Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of regional policy and the coordination of
structural instruments, and continued to make some progress in accelerating the absorption
of IPA II funds and setting up the structures for IPA III funds. Türkiye has some level of
preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions but made no progress during the
reporting period.
Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development
The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and ensures Europe’s food security.
It helps tackle climate change and the sustainable management of national resources;
maintains rural areas and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by
promoting jobs in farming, agri-food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong
management and control systems. There are also common EU rules for marketing standards,
quality policy and organic farming.
Türkiye achieved some level of preparation on agriculture and rural development.
Backsliding continued, however, as Türkiye’s agricultural support policy moved away from
the principles under the EU common agricultural policy and the country still continues to
restrict imports of agricultural products from the EU. It still lacks a strategy for producing
agricultural statistics and has not yet implemented a functioning integrated administration and
control system (IACS).
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ adopt and start implementing a strategy for producing agricultural statistics and
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implement IACS;
→ develop and start implementing a strategy to align its agricultural support policy with the
EU acquis;
→ ensure the smooth implementation of the EU instrument for pre-accession assistance for
rural development (IPARD III), including the entrustment of new measures and smooth
extension of IPARD III to the whole country.
On horizontal issues, Türkiye took no significant steps to advance on sustainable agriculture
under the Turkish Green Deal action plan. Türkiye continued to move away from the
principles governing agricultural direct support under the EU’s common agricultural policy.
In particular, it increased support coupled to production and continued to shift to a region- or
basin-based management model. Türkiye has not started implementing the integrated
administration and control system (IACS). It revised the province-based application of the
farm accountancy data network (FADN) and, as of 2022, procedures are carried out country-
wide based on NUTS-1 level, consisting of 12 regions. It has not yet completed the
agricultural census and adoption of the strategy for agricultural statistics remains pending.
Further alignment requires agriculture support measures to be brought in line with EU
policies.
Limited progress has been observed on common market organisation, mainly in terms of
implementation of the related strategy. Türkiye has yet to fully implement its obligations
under the trade agreement with the EU for agricultural products by opening quotas for beef
and live animals on a lasting basis. Türkiye needs to implement a transparent system to
manage import quotas.
On rural development, Türkiye has adopted a sectoral agreement underpinning the EU
instrument for pre-accession assistance for rural development (IPARD III). Meanwhile,
implementation of the IPARD II continued steadily, although it has been affected by the
consequences of the earthquakes.
On quality policy, Türkiye continued to implement legislation on the protection of
geographical indications, which is largely aligned with the EU acquis.
On organic farming, further alignment with the EU acquis is needed. There is potential to
further develop the sector and to use the support opportunities available under the IPARD III
programme.
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
EU hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensure a high level of food safety. Animal health
and welfare and the safety of food of animal origin are safeguarded together with the quality
of seeds, plant protection material, the protection against harmful organisms and animal
nutrition.
Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of food safety, veterinary and
phytosanitary policy. Overall, it achieved limited progress in this area over the reporting
period, particularly on animal identification and registration. On food safety, it has yet to
upgrade food establishments to meet EU standards. Full implementation of the EU acquis in
this area requires significant further work.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ upgrade food establishments to meet EU standards, notably for raw milk;
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→ meet EU maximum limits for pesticide residues, and effectively address recurrent
shortcomings;
→ make further progress in addressing zoonoses.
Türkiye made limited progress in implementing the acquis on general food safety. The
number of notifications to the rapid alert system for food and feed on pesticide residues in
fruits and vegetables imported from Türkiye into the EU remained high, a trend observed
since 2020.
Türkiye continued its work to fully align its veterinary policy with the EU acquis. On animal
diseases, Türkiye increased cooperation with neighbouring countries in controlling infectious
and transboundary diseases in the veterinary field by running vaccination campaigns and
increased the work on animal identification and registration. Further structural and
administrative work is still necessary to fully implement the acquis on animal welfare.
Türkiye made limited progress on controlling zoonoses.
Türkiye continued to run training, inspection and monitoring programmes on the placing of
food, feed and animal by-products on the market, which resulted in better administrative
capacity for official controls. It made no progress on developing the national plan for
upgrading agri-food establishments. Significant work is still needed to apply new rules on
registering and approving food establishments. Substantial work is also required on animal
by-products, notably to prepare a strategy on raw milk and on the entry into force of general
rules to be implemented by raw milk producers. It has yet to adopt specifications of raw milk
and rules on the use of milk that does not meet the somatic cell criteria. Türkiye’s provisions
on funding inspections are not yet aligned with the EU system.
Türkiye made progress on the alignment of its food safety rules with the EU acquis on issues
such as labelling. However, progress on specific rules for feed and on phytosanitary policy
remained limited. Interinstitutional collaboration on food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary
policies is too low to properly integrate the EU’s One Health Approach into its policies.
Türkiye has yet to align its legislation on novel food and on genetically modified organisms.
Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture
The common fisheries policy lays down rules on fisheries management, protects living
resources of the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting
catch quotas, managing fleet capacity, rules on markets and aquaculture and support for
fisheries and coastal communities. Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture.
Türkiye is moderately prepared in this area. It made some progress on fisheries
governance, on inspections and control, namely by improving and extending the scope of
legislation and strengthening institutional capacity and infrastructure.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially met, and therefore remain
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ step up efforts to align fisheries management with EU law, including data collection and
data sharing for scientific stock assessments;
→ step up efforts to align its market policy with EU rules, in particular on the criteria
governing the recognition and roles of professional organisations;
→ improve fisheries control and inspection at sea in view of improving compliance at both
the Mediterranean and Black Seas, and of effectively fighting illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing activities (IUU), including catch documentation schemes.
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Türkiye made some progress on resources and fleet management. It amended its
commercial fisheries regulation to further protect aquatic biodiversity. It closed the anchovy
fishing season in the Marmara Sea earlier to protect and ensure sustainable fishing of the
stocks. It improved the institutional capacity and infrastructure for data collection and stock
assessment. The information systems established to manage fisheries and fishing fleet
became functional and contributed to monitoring, control and surveillance. The country needs
to reduce the by-catch of sensitive species, in line with the General Fisheries Commission for
the Mediterranean’s (GFCM) recommendations and promote the use of selective gear. A
Fisheries and Aquaculture Scientific and Technical Advisory Council was established in
August 2022, with a first meeting in December, to provide scientific opinion for fisheries and
aquaculture management. Türkiye ran support programmes for the exploitation of pufferfish,
an invasive species, to protect marine biodiversity.
The amended Fisheries Law also provided for some structural action, such as a stronger
conservation regime. Structural measures are in place to support traditional coastal fisheries.
On inspections and control, Türkiye continued to make progress on legislative alignment
and on implementing the recommendations for control measures by the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the GFCM. In line with
ICCAT rules, Türkiye has implemented the circular that regulates Bluefin tuna (BFT)
fisheries and has identified the BFT fishing vessels for the 2023-2025 period. The number of
inspections increased, and 169 fisheries vessels were confiscated in 2022 due to IUU fishing.
New technologies such as drones are used in fisheries inspections.
On market policy, Türkiye developed IT tools for the collection of data from producer
organisations and for disseminating market intelligence. These tools were set up to support
the development and control of professional organisations in line with EU market policy.
Türkiye provides State aid for aquaculture and to improve data quality on marine and inland
artisanal fishing vessels for sustainable management of fisheries.
Regarding international agreements, Türkiye continued cooperating with the EU in regional
and international platforms. As the EU implements the provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, including in the common fisheries policy, Türkiye’s
ratification of the Convention would improve cooperation with the EU on fisheries and
maritime policy. Türkiye participated with an active and supportive stance in the works of the
GFCM.
Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments
Regional policy is the EU’s main tool for reducing regional disparities and investing in
sustainable and inclusive socio-economic growth. It is operating through “shared
management” between the Commission and EU Member States. The implementation of
cohesion policy programmes requires appropriate administrative capacity on programme
and project level, the establishment of systems of sound financial management and control
and also the fulfilment of other EU acquis elements such as environmental or public
procurement legislation.
Türkiye is moderately prepared on regional policy and on coordinating structural
instruments. Overall, it made some progress in accelerating the absorption of IPA II funds
and setting up the structure for IPA III funds.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ address structural weaknesses in implementing regional policy;
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→ accelerate implementation of ongoing operations under IPA II to deliver high quality
results by the set deadlines and avoid de-commitments;
→ ensure the proper functioning of local democracy.
Regarding the legislative framework, Türkiye made no progress in the reporting period. It
has yet to set up mechanisms for evidence-based policymaking, policy and programme
evaluations, and impact assessments.
A general framework is needed to put in place appropriate statistical tools to monitor and
evaluate performance of the National Strategy for Regional Development (NSRD) and
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). The limited impact of implementing the NSRD on
national policymaking persists, and regional level considerations continue to be inadequately
reflected at central level. Türkiye has put in place key tools for implementation, namely the
growth poles support programme, social development support programme, producing cities
programme, institutional transformation and sustainability support programme, the working
and producing youth programme, Regional Development Fund, and the RDAs project
support, but the tools’ functionality can be improved. Türkiye started preparations on the
twelfth development plan (2024-2028).
Concerns remain regarding state overregulation and interventionism in the planning decisions
taken by local authorities, as well as the lack of consultations with local authorities. The
financial autonomy of local authorities remains restricted by their limited capacity to
calculate the rate of local taxes, and the fact that a large proportion of local revenue (more
than half) still comes from the State budget.
Türkiye has achieved no progress to remedy the situation faced by locally elected
representatives. The government continues to open criminal investigations against mayors on
the grounds of a broad definition of ‘terrorism’ in Türkiye’s anti-terror legislation. It
suspends the representatives targeted and replaces them with unelected officials, a practice
that seriously undermines the democratic choice of Turkish citizens and impedes the proper
functioning of local democracy in Türkiye.
On the institutional framework, the functioning of the Indirect Management by Beneficiary
Countries (IMBC) authorities remains monitored by the National IPA Coordinator office
(NIPAC) in coordination with the National Authorising Officer (NAO) and with regular
oversight by the Presidential Office. The Financial Cooperation Committee, gathering all
IMBC authorities, met on a regular basis. There is a continuous need to strengthen the role of
the NIPAC to coordinate effectively amongst ministries, to prioritise interventions under IPA
III, and monitor their impact. Türkiye made good progress regarding the institutional set-up
and the system for managing IPA funds in IMBC, which still needs some adaptation to the
IPA III requirements and alignment with the Financial Framework Partnership Agreement
between Türkiye and the Commission.
Türkiye made some progress in administrative capacity of the IPA structures.
Implementation of the action plan drawn up by the NIPAC and NAO continued to deliver
some results. However, the capacity of IMBC structures require strengthening to ensure
efficient and timely contracting and implementation of IPA programmes, improved capacities
for programming, monitoring and evaluation activities, as well as strengthened Audit
Authority. There is no clear staff retention policy and strategy. The action taken to re-focus
the IMBC on specific sectors together with the political instability have not aided staff
motivation in some structures. Most Operating Structures have reduced their ex-ante control
rejection rates to below 10%.
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Türkiye made some progress on programming, in line with the coordination framework set
up under IPA III. The NIPAC coordinates the programming process, ensuring overall
monitoring and evaluation of the implementation. For this purpose, the NIPAC coordinates
the work to implement the evaluation plans, which are presented to the Commission annually.
However, as there is no clear EU alignment strategy, the programming lacks a national
anchor strategy.
On monitoring and evaluation, all but one Operating Structures (the Ministry of Transport)
have set up and operationalised their monitoring systems, including Management Information
Systems (MISs). The main weaknesses are observed in the systems operated by the NIPAC
and the NAO. To overcome these weaknesses, work is ongoing to revise the existing MIS
used by the NIPAC, namely NIPAC online. The process aims to ensure the system meets the
requirements for IPA III procedures. A specific electronic system to manage the follow-up
and implementation of Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) and procedures is also fully
functional.
Concerning financial management, control and audit, the Operating Structures have built
capacity for programming, implementation and absorption. Over-programming has become
an issue in the context of very low de-commitment rates. Management and control systems
have improved, including controls on tender files. Türkiye has made progress on the rate of
ex-ante tender approvals and on the number of monitoring activities. It has also improved the
approach taken to project management. The principle of single audit is duly reflected in the
work of the Audit Authority for audits and supervision of the NAO. A monitoring framework
protocol was developed by NIPAC-NAO in the IPA I period, and since then the NAO
supervises execution of the protocol. The Audit Authority drafts audit strategies and specific
manuals and submits them to the Commission for review. In addition, there is a general
circular issued by the President and specific provisions for EU project audits, as set out in the
regulation of the Audit Authority (see Chapter 32 – Financial control).
Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions
This chapter covers the rules governing the funding of the EU budget (‘own resources’).
These resources mainly consist of: (i) contributions based on the gross national income of
each Member State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource and (iv) a
resource based on value added tax. Member States must have the appropriate administrative
capacity to adequately coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment
and control of own resources.
Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions. It
made no progress over the reporting period. The country needs to set up solid coordination
structures, build administrative capacity and adopt implementing rules for the correct
application of the own resources system.
The Commission’s recommendation from last year was not met, and therefore remains valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ further align the gross national income inventory with Eurostat’s GNI Inventory
Guide.
Türkiye has already put in place the basic principles and institutions in the underlying policy
areas linked to the application of the own resources system (see Chapters 16 - Taxation, 18 -
Statistics, 29 - Customs union and 32 - Financial control). The Customs Union with the EU
on processed agricultural goods and industrial goods (with the exception of coal and steel
products) continues to ensure considerable alignment of Türkiye’s customs legislation with
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the acquis on customs. Türkiye has yet to adopt a draft customs law aligned with the Union
Customs Code. This will facilitate preparation in traditional own resources (mainly customs
duties).
For the value added tax-based resource, systems are not yet in place to correctly calculate
the VAT base and the weighted average rate. VAT and customs duties fraud remains an issue
as does the size of the informal economy. Legislation on structure, exemptions, special
schemes and the scope of reduced rates is not fully aligned with the EU acquis.
Concerning the gross national income-based resource, Türkiye has undertaken efforts to
bring its national accounts and GNI calculations fully in line with the European system of
accounts (ESA 2010). It also needs to improve the exhaustiveness of the estimates to ensure
that they take account of the non-observed economy. The GNI inventory is not fully aligned
with Eurostat’s Inventory Guide and the transmission of data does not always occur in a
timely manner.
In terms of the administrative infrastructure, Türkiye needs to set up a fully operational
coordination structure, with sufficient administrative capacity and the implementing rules
needed to ensure that it can correctly calculate, forecast, account for, collect, pay, monitor
and report own resources to the EU in line with the EU acquis.
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS
There are two chapters in this cluster: external relations (Chapter 30), and foreign, security
and defence policy (Chapter 31). Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of external
relations and made no progress over the reporting period. Large deviation from the Common
Customs Tariff was still in place. Divergence from the EU Generalised Scheme of
Preferences persisted, in violation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union. Türkiye’s official
development assistance was largely directed towards humanitarian support for the Syria-
related activities on Türkiye’s own territory.
Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of foreign, security and defence policy, and
made no progress overall in the reporting period. Türkiye’s unilateral foreign policy
remained at odds with the EU priorities under the common foreign and security policy.
Chapter 30: External relations
The EU has a common trade and commercial policy towards third countries, based on
multilateral and bilateral agreements, and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules
on humanitarian aid and development policy.
Türkiye is moderately prepared on external relations. It made no progress over the
reporting period. Türkiye removed some additional customs duties but also introduced other
duties, thus resulting in a very limited re-alignment. Türkiye is still not in line with the
Common Customs Tariff as a wide scope of additional customs duties remained in place, as
were a number of trade agreements with the third countries where the EU has no such
agreements. The divergence from the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences persisted, in
breach of the EU-Turkey Customs Union. Türkiye’s official development assistance was
0.79%, above the 0.7% target enshrined in Sustainable Development Goal 17. A large share
of its official development assistance comprised humanitarian support for projects related to
Syria but carried out in Türkiye.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met, and therefore remain valid.
In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
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→ re-align the customs tariff completely with the Common Customs Tariff;
→ complete the alignment with the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences and dual-use
export control regime.
Türkiye made no progress on the common commercial policy. It lifted some of the
additional duties but it brought in other duties. It has yet to tackle a major deviation from the
Common Customs Tariff, which has fundamentally distorted the once good level of
alignment with the EU common commercial policy, by eliminating the remaining additional
duties. Türkiye also needs to align fully with the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences in
terms of countries and products. Türkiye did not initiate any new safeguard investigations but
it continues to run review investigation of two safeguard measures to extend them. The
initiation of anti-circumvention investigations based on weak evidence is a cause of concern.
There is a need for closer coordination between the EU and Türkiye within the World Trade
Organisation, in particular on the Doha Development Agenda, in the OECD and in the G-20.
The 1998 Agreement on agricultural products, and the 1996 Agreement on coal and steel
products covered by the European Coal and Steel Community need to be aligned with current
rules of the Pan-euro-Mediterranean (PEM) Convention on rules of origin. Discussions
between EU and Türkiye continue on the (revised) PEM Convention transitional rules of
origin aiming for a complete agreement, including issues of full cumulation and duty
drawback.
Türkiye has 82 bilateral investment treaties in force, 23 of which are with EU Member States.
On export controls of dual-use goods, Türkiye did not align with the EU position on certain
multilateral export control arrangements, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, and the Missile
Technology Control Regime. Türkiye’s non-alignment with EU restrictive measures against
Russia and its intensified trade and economic ties with Russia increase the potential
transportation of dual-use goods. Türkiye has an export credit agency and is a Participant in
the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits since 2019.
Regarding bilateral agreements with third countries, Türkiye continued to implement its
free trade agreement with Malaysia and Venezuela, diverging from the common commercial
policy under the EU-Turkey Customs Union as the EU has no such agreements with those
countries. Moreover, a free trade agreement that Türkiye signed with the United Arab
Emirates entered into force. In addition, Türkiye signed preferential trade agreements with
Uzbekistan and Pakistan and implemented the agreement with Pakistan. Türkiye continued to
implement the agreement with Azerbaijan and extended its current scope to include some
additional agricultural and industrial products.
As for development policy and humanitarian aid, Türkiye granted official development
assistance in 2022 of EUR 7 billion, which is equivalent to 0.79% of its gross national
income (GNI). It increased in real terms in volume compared with previous years and
remained above the 0.7% target enshrined in the Sustainable Development Goal 17. The
assistance was largely directed towards humanitarian support for projects related to Syria but
carried out in Türkiye.
Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy
Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue under EU foreign, security and
defence policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU actions, and apply agreed
sanctions and restrictive measures.
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Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of foreign, security and defence policy,
and made no progress overall in the reporting period. Türkiye is an active and significant
actor in the area of foreign policy, which constitutes an important element in the context of
the EU-Türkiye relationship. However, Türkiye’s unilateral foreign policy remained at odds
with the EU’s priorities under the common foreign and security policy (CFSP).
Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye condemned the Russian
military aggression, and engaged politically and diplomatically, including in the facilitation
of the export of Ukrainian grain and the prisoners’ exchange. Türkiye worked towards
facilitating talks between Ukraine and Russia and on de-escalation and bringing about a
cease-fire. Nevertheless, Türkiye refrained from aligning with EU restrictive measures
against Russia, and has significantly intensified trade and economic ties with Russia in
several sectors (energy, tourism, transport, etc).
Türkiye also intensified its “regional normalisation” policy with the Arab states, with
Armenia, and Israel. Its rhetoric in support to terrorist group Hamas following its attacks
against Israel on 7 October 2023 is in complete disagreement with the EU approach. The
rapprochement with the Syrian regime, facilitated by Russia, in the absence of a political
solution to the Syrian conflict, is at odds with the EU’s policy. Türkiye has a growing
presence and geopolitical ambition in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and continued
the efforts to extend relations with African, Latin American and Asian countries. Türkiye’s
pragmatic engagement on Afghanistan, and vocal position on the developments in Sudan,
underscored its ambition to be a key player in the context of major international crises.
The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially met, and therefore
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:
→ take decisive steps to significantly improve alignment with High Representative
statements on behalf of the EU and relevant Council decisions on CFSP;
→ step up cooperation on preventing and detecting circumvention of restrictive measures, in
particular regarding advanced technology items that can be diverted for military purposes;
→ further enhance the political dialogue on foreign and security policy with the EU and seek
collaboration on convergent interests while working on reducing divergences.
The political dialogue between the EU and Türkiye on foreign and security policy issues
continued, through contacts at senior officials’ level. There were regular contacts between the
High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission and the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Türkiye, who also met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York
in September 2023. In June 2023, the President of the European Commission and the
President of the European Council held a telephone call with the President of Türkiye, and
both Presidents met with the Turkish President in the margins of the NATO summit in
Vilnius in July 2023. The President of the European Council also met the Turkish President
on the margins of the G20 meeting in September 2023. Türkiye attended the Brussels VII
Syria Conference organised in June 2023 by the EU.
The institutional framework enabling Türkiye’s participation in the EU common foreign
and security policy (CFSP) and, respectively, the common security and defence policy
(CSDP) remained in place, at both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Defence, but Türkiye maintained a very low alignment rate of 10% with relevant High
Representative statements on behalf of the EU and relevant Council decisions (as of August
2023), compared to 8% in 2022.
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As a general policy, Türkiye consistently refrained from aligning with EU restrictive
measures against Russia and maintained its position of not supporting sanctions adopted
outside the UN framework. Türkiye continued to operate flights to Russia. The EU’s
International Special Envoy for the implementation of EU sanctions visited Türkiye in March
and July 2023 to underline the importance of taking concrete steps and cooperating to fight
against the circumvention of EU restrictive measures against Russia in a joint and systemic
manner. While Turkish customs authorities highlighted the good technical cooperation with
EU Member States on a case-by-case basis, Türkiye should continue to find ways to prevent
the re-export of sensitive items that can be used for military purposes by Russia.
As regards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Türkiye is a party to most
international treaties and conventions and participates in export control regimes and other
politically binding arrangements, complying with its legally-binding obligations and political
commitments. However, it continued to prevent the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in
the Conference on Disarmament, its membership in the Wassenaar Arrangement and in the
Zangger Committee. While Türkiye aligns with a number of EU positions in multilateral non-
proliferation and disarmament fora, its alignment record has further worsened since February
2022. It is still to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty.
Türkiye continued to seek involvement in CSDP and EU defence initiatives, whilst at the
same time continuing to exclude a Member State from all possible cooperation with NATO.
Türkiye’s narrow interpretation of the EU-NATO cooperation framework continued to pose
an obstacle to building a genuine organisation-to-organisation relationship, in particular by
limiting the exchange of information and blocking the inclusive participation of all Member
States in joint activities of the two organisations. After protracted negotiations, Türkiye’s
National Assembly ratified Finland’s NATO accession bid in March 2023. On the sidelines
of the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023, the Turkish President committed to forward the
accession protocol for Sweden to the Turkish parliament as soon as possible. The president
submitted the bill for ratification to the Parliament on 23 October 2023.
Türkiye actively engaged with international organisations, while continuing to obstruct the
accession of EU Member States. At the UN General Assembly, in September 2022, Türkiye
reiterated its support for the reform of the UN Security Council, making a plea for
multilateralism. Türkiye participated in the G20 Bali Summit in November 2022 and the 29th
OSCE Ministerial Council in December 2022. Türkiye attended the 4th
Summit of the
Council of Europe in May 2023, but it did not join the 37 Member States + Canada, Japan,
the US and the EU that created a register of damage for Ukraine as a first step towards an
international compensation mechanism for the victims of the Russian aggression. In
September 2022, Türkiye was invited as a guest to the 22nd
Summit of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and reiterated its wish to become a full member. In
February 2023, Türkiye attended the G20 meeting in New Delhi and hosted the 23rd
meeting
of the foreign ministers of MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Türkiye, and
Australia) on the sidelines of G20. In many international organisations, Türkiye continued to
oppose the participation of international and European Non-Governmental Organisations,
accusing them, without providing evidence, of supporting terrorist organisations. Türkiye is
not a State Party to The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
In terms of security measures, in the reporting period there was no Security of Information
Agreement (SIA) for the exchanges of EU classified information (EUCI) with Türkiye. Since
2006, a framework participation agreement allows Türkiye’s participation, including
reception of EUCI, in the context of CSDP missions.
In the framework of the EU crisis management missions and operations under the CSDP,
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Türkiye continued to participate in Operation EUFOR ALTHEA as the biggest non-EU troop
contributor.
Regarding hybrid threats, in the context of international conflicts and crises, foreign
information manipulation and interference (FIMI) activities, including the circulation of false
information and propaganda on social and mainstream media, was observed in Türkiye's
information environment. Türkiye did not restrict the operations of Russian state-controlled
media outlets in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
Türkiye continued to progressively expand its global diplomatic network and pursued the
development of intense relations and strategic partnerships with countries worldwide, while
enhancing regional normalisation efforts.
In 2022, Türkiye recognised Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine as a state of war
and rejected the Russian military aggression. During the reporting period, Türkiye maintained
a position it describes as a 'balanced’ one between the warring parties. Turkish high officials
have had regular contacts with both Russian and Ukrainian counterparts. The UN- and
Türkiye-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative was terminated by Russia in July. Türkiye
continued to refrain from aligning with the EU packages of restrictive measures against
Russia. As of March 2023, Türkiye implemented a ban on exporting sanctioned goods,
originating from the EU, the United States, and the United Kingdom, to Russia. This ban
specifically targeted goods that were in transit, stored in warehouses, or located within free
zones in Türkiye. However, the potential transportation of dual-use and sensitive technology
goods, as well as the unrestricted movement of sanctioned goods from Türkiye to Russia still
need to be addressed. Türkiye also significantly increased its trade and economic relations
with Russia. Frequent high-level Turkish-Russian contacts took place in the run-up to the
opening of the Akkuyu nuclear facility, financed and operated by Russia’s Rosatom, attended
online by the Russian President.
Türkiye, a NATO ally, remained both an important and a challenging partner for the United
States. Türkiye and the US engaged on regional issues, including Ukraine, Afghanistan,
humanitarian access to Syria, and counter-terrorism activities. Key points of friction included
the Russian made S-400 air defence missile system owned by Türkiye, the participation of
Türkiye in the F-35 programme, Turkish criticism of US support for the YPG forces in
northern Syria, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, and the respect of
human rights in Türkiye. A number of high-level meetings took place between the two
countries including a meeting of the two Presidents in the margins of the G20 summit in
November 2022 and at the NATO summit in July 2023, and two meetings of the US-Türkiye
Strategic Mechanism. Türkiye and Canada, as NATO allies, maintain open channels of
communication at high level, reiterating and reaffirming their commitment for strong bilateral
cooperation. Canada acted quickly to mobilise support following the earthquakes.
Türkiye’s efforts for rapprochement in the Gulf region continued and intensified in the
reporting period. Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) held high level meetings
and signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in March 2023. In July 2023,
during the Turkish President’s visit to the UAE, 13 agreements on investments estimated to
be worth USD 50.7 billion were signed. Relations with Bahrain remained stable, while ties
with Saudi Arabia continued to strengthen. In March 2023, the two countries signed an
agreement, for a USD 5 billion swap deposit to the Turkish Central Bank. Additionally, in
July 2023 they sealed a substantial defence export deal, involving the sale of Turkish drones
to Saudi Arabia. Türkiye and Oman held in November 2022 the Joint Economic Commission
and signed a cooperation agreement to boost bilateral trade and investments. Türkiye
enhanced its relations with Kuwait in the defence industry sector, signing a contract for the
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purchase of Turkish-made Bayraktar drones in January 2023. Türkiye and Qatar continued
their cooperation in various fields and maintained close coordination on regional and
international issues. Turkish-Egyptian normalisation efforts picked up pace in the first half
of 2023, and both countries agreed to exchange ambassadors. After an initial encounter at
Presidential level in 2022, contacts continued at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
culminated in the meeting between the Presidents on the sidelines of the G20 meeting in
September 2023.
Türkiye’s relations with Israel were re-launched in 2022. In August 2022, the two countries
decided to restore full diplomatic relations, including the exchange of ambassadors, and, in
September 2022, the Turkish President held talks with the Israeli Prime Minister. Despite the
rapprochement, Türkiye continues to criticise Israel’s actions in the occupied Palestinian
territory, in particular related to the respect of the status quo of the Holy sites in Jerusalem.
Following the Hamas terrorist group’s attacks against Israel in October 2023, Türkiye
refrained from condemning and qualifying them as terrorism and strongly criticised Israel’s
response. Türkiye strongly condemned the loss of civilian lives in both sides and proposed to
act as mediator between Israel and Hamas. Türkiye is currently re-evaluating its ties with
Israel. On the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), Türkiye’s position aligns with the EU’s
position supporting the two-state solution.
Türkiye remained critically important actor in the Syrian crisis and shares with the EU the
objective of achieving a stable and prosperous Syria, in the first place through the
implementation of UNSCR 2254. While in the past Turkish approach was more similar to the
EU’s position, that of exercising and maintaining pressure on Damascus, since December
2022 Türkiye has become involved in a series of meetings, encouraged and facilitated by
Russia, with the Syrian regime. These culminated in a quadripartite meeting of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Türkiye, Iran and the Syrian regime in Moscow in May 2023.
Türkiye still maintains a military presence in parts of northern Syria and resumed significant
military cross-border operations into northern Syria in November 2022. Following the
February earthquakes, two additional crossing points on the Turkish border temporarily
opened to allow humanitarian aid into the quake-stricken northwest of Syria.
Regarding relations with Libya, Türkiye advocated for an agreement in the framework of the
Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process and supported the efforts of the new UNSG
Special Representative to hold national elections in 2023. Based on the 2019 Turkish-Libyan
maritime delimitation agreement, in October 2022, Türkiye signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Libyan Government of National Unity to develop bilateral scientific,
technical, technological, legal, administrative, and commercial cooperation in the field of
hydrocarbons on land and at sea. The EU considers the Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement
an infringement upon the sovereign rights of third states, non-compliant with the Law of the
Sea and having no legal consequences for third states. Ankara continued to claim that the UN
embargo provisions, the articles on the withdrawal of all mercenaries, foreign fighters and
foreign forces from the Libyan territory, and the suspension of military training in the cease-
fire agreement had no bearing on the legitimate government. Türkiye’s lack of cooperation
continued to hamper the EU’s efforts to implement the UN embargo effectively. In March
2023, Türkiye, as a flag state, withheld its consent to Operation IRINI’s request to inspect a
vessel, the tenth such incident since Operation IRINI started.
Türkiye continued its anti-terrorism operations against PKK groups and affiliates in Iraq and
in the semiautonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The last operation, launched in November
2022, was strongly condemned by the Iraqi government. In August 2023, on a visit to Iraq,
the Turkish Foreign Minister asked Iraq to designate PKK as a terrorist organisation. Türkiye
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maintained a high-level dialogue with Iran although some tensions were noticeable in the
contexts of the Syrian and north-Iraqi theatres.
Türkiye-Armenia normalisation process continued with regular contacts between the two
special envoys, although Türkiye links progress with developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan
relations. The Turkish and Armenian leaders met for the first time in October 2022, in the
margins of the European Political Community summit and in June 2023 the Armenian Prime
Minister participated in the inauguration ceremony of the Turkish President. After three
decades, in February 2023, the Türkiye-Armenia border reopened temporarily to facilitate
the passage of Armenian humanitarian aid transports to the quake-struck Turkish region,
followed by a visit of the Armenian Foreign Minister to Türkiye. Direct cargo flights
between the two countries started in January 2023 but were interrupted a few months later.
As regards the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, while voicing support to the peace
negotiations, Türkiye expressed full support to the military actions undertaken by
Azerbaijan both in September 2022 and in September 2023. Türkiye continued maintaining
a very close relationship with Azerbaijan, ensuring a strong collaboration and continuous
consultation on the normalisation process with Armenia. The two countries had regular high-
level visits and consultations, and held joint military exercises. Türkiye extended by one year
the deployment of a small military contingent to Azerbaijan, in the framework of the joint
Russian-Turkish monitoring centre established in Aghdman after the November 2020
Tripartite Statement signed by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia to monitor the ceasefire in
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone. Türkiye supports the construction of a transport
corridor to Azerbaijan via Armenia and emphasises energy and trade cooperation, vocally
supporting prospects for connectivity as means to ensure peace and prosperity of the region.
Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Georgia also cooperate through a trilateral platform, the last edition
of which was held in February 2023 in the format of Defence Ministers.
In Central Asia, EU and Türkiye policies converged to some extent. Türkiye attached great
importance to connectivity and maintained close relations with the countries in the region.
Türkiye and Kazakhstan further developed their cooperation in the defence industry sector.
Türkiye and Turkmenistan focused on the possible transportation of Turkmen gas to
Western markets. At the invitation of Uzbekistan, Türkiye participated as a guest in the
Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation regional security group
summit in September 2022. The Turkish President attended the 9th
Summit of the
Organisation of the Turkic States (OTS) in Samarkand in November 2022, and held an
Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State of OTS in Ankara in March 2023.
Türkiye’s relations with Pakistan remained strong, with regular high-level exchanges. In
August 2022, Türkiye and Pakistan signed a preferential trade agreement offering each other
concessions on tariff lines. Türkiye increasingly became an important source of military
equipment, notably for the Pakistani marine. Türkiye maintained a pragmatic approach on
Afghanistan, holding regular talks with the Taliban de facto authorities, hosting Afghan
political opponents without facilitating the formation of a joint opposition or armed
resistance, and increasing trade. Türkiye continued sending humanitarian aid to Afghanistan
and kept operating the Maarif schools.
Türkiye systematically focused on development opportunities in Asia through its Asia Anew
Initiative and becoming the axis connecting Asia to Europe. Türkiye is part of the multilateral
Middle Corridor Initiative, which aims to develop connections with China via Türkiye, the
Caucasus and Central Asia, in synergy with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. On the
sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation regional security group Summit in
September 2022, the Turkish President met with his Chinese counterpart and agreed to
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elevate their strategic cooperation to a higher level. Türkiye continued to strengthen its trade
ties with China, its second biggest trading partner. Türkiye continued to voice its views
regarding the treatment of the Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group in China, but in a less visible
manner than before. Türkiye and Indonesia agreed to further enhance their bilateral relations
and announced the formation of a High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council during the visit
of the Turkish President in the margins of the G-20 Summit in November 2022. The Turkish
President and the Prime Minister of India met in September 2022 and September 2023 and
discussed ways to deepen the bilateral cooperation.
Türkiye maintained its diplomatic engagement with countries of Latin America, aiming to
expand and strengthen the political relations. Türkiye pursued its active policies in Africa,
maintaining strong ties in particular with Somalia in the Horn of Africa. Türkiye maintained
a balanced position between the warring parties in the Sudanese conflict.
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ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TÜRKIYE
Within the framework of accession negotiations, 16 chapters have been opened so far and one
of these was provisionally closed. In December 2022, the Council of the European Union
reiterated its position of June 2018 that Türkiye continues to move further away from the
European Union and that accession negotiations with the country are therefore at a standstill
and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing.
The European Council has repeated that the EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure
environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and
mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. The EU is ready to engage with Türkiye in a
phased, proportionate and reversible manner to enhance cooperation in a number of areas of
common interest, subject to the established conditionalities set out in European Council
conclusions. In case of renewed unilateral actions or provocations in breach of international
law, the EU will use all the instruments and the options at its disposal, including in
accordance with Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, in order to defend its interests and
those of its Member States. The European Council in June 2022 also recalled that it expects
Türkiye to fully respect international law, to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional
stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to promote good-neighbourly relations in a
sustainable way. With its June 2023 conclusions, the European Council reconfirmed its
commitment to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the UN
framework, in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions and in line with the principles
on which the EU is founded and the acquis. It also called for the speedy resumption of
negotiations and stated that the EU is ready to play an active role in supporting all stages of
the UN-led process, with all appropriate means at its disposal. The European Council in June
2023 invited the High Representative and the Commission to submit a report to the European
Council on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations, building on the instruments and options
identified by the European Council and with a view to proceeding in a strategic and forward-
looking manner.
The Council adopted conclusions in July 2019, as a response to Türkiye’s unauthorised
drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. In November 2022, following the third annual
review of the framework for restrictive measures in response to Türkiye’s unauthorised
drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, the European Council extended the regime
for a further year, until 12 November 2023. Currently, two individuals are subject to
sanctions.
Reforms and developments in Türkiye continued to be monitored by the bodies set up under
the Association Agreement, with subcommittees kept being held throughout the reporting
period. High-level engagement continued in areas of joint interest in the second half of 2022.
Türkiye is the EU’s seventh largest trading partner, while the EU is Türkiye’s largest,
representing more than one third of Turkish trade and its main source of investment.
Türkiye’s exports to the EU amounted to EUR 98.68 billion in 2022 and imports from the EU
amounted to EUR 99.65 billion.
In May 2023, Türkiye participated in the annual economic policy dialogue between the
representatives of the EU Member States, the Western Balkans and Türkiye, the European
Commission and the European Central Bank, as well as representatives of the central banks
of the Western Balkans and Türkiye. The dialogue aims to prepare the future participation in
the European Semester of the Western Balkans and Türkiye. The EU and Türkiye also
continue to coordinate in the framework of the G-20.
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Regarding the Customs Union, the Commission recommended opening negotiations with
Türkiye on the modernisation of the Customs Union in December 2016. In March 2021, the
EU Leaders invited the Commission to intensify talks with Türkiye to address current
difficulties in the implementation of the Customs Union, ensuring its effective application to
all Member States, and invited in parallel the Council to work on a mandate for the
modernisation of the Customs Union. Such a mandate may be adopted by the Council subject
to additional guidance by the European Council. The Commission continued intensified
engagement with Türkiye to discuss issues hampering the smooth functioning of the Customs
Union. The European Commission and Türkiye continue their engagement on the EU Green
Deal.
In the area of visa, migration and asylum, the implementation of the March 2016 EU-
Turkey Statement has continued to deliver concrete results in reducing irregular and
dangerous crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean route to Europe and in saving lives at sea.
Türkiye sustained its considerable efforts to provide significant support to 3.6 million
refugees, of which 3.3 million Syrians (as of September 2023). In the context of the EU-
Türkiye visa liberalisation dialogue, no outstanding visa liberalisation benchmarks were
fulfilled. An international agreement on the exchange of personal data between Europol and
the Turkish authorities competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism is yet to be
concluded. The Council of December 2022 recalled that the full and effective implementation
of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement and cooperation in the area of justice and home
affairs with all EU Member States remain essential.
Türkiye and the EU continued to have fruitful cooperation for supporting refugees in Türkiye.
Out of the almost EUR 10 billion in EU support to refugees allocated since 2011, EUR
6 billion were provided under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. The full operational
budget of the Facility was contracted by the end of 2020. Facility funding continued to
support projects focused on humanitarian assistance, education, migration management,
health, municipal infrastructure, and socio-economic support. Over 2 million refugees,
including those most vulnerable, continue to receive basic needs support and close to 774 390
refugee children are enrolled in school with Facility and post-Facility support. Other
achievements of the Facility include the construction of 160 new schools (out of a target of
348) and delivering over 30.3 million primary health care consultations. After bridge funding
of EUR 535 million in 2020, the Commission continued implementation of an additional
package of EUR 3 billion covering the 2021-2023 period requested by the Council. This
additional funding continues providing support, in particular in key areas such as basic needs,
health care and education, border management, and protection and socio-economic support.
Overall, some EUR 7 billion has been disbursed by September 2023.
Regarding bilateral financial assistance, projects under the Instrument for Pre-accession
Assistance (IPA) for Türkiye continued to be implemented, in compliance with the political
guidance of the EU Budgetary Authority. Financial assistance under the IPA III focuses on
priorities linked to the fundamental pillars of the enlargement strategy and sectors of common
strategic interest, mainly related to the green, connectivity and digitalisation agendas, as well
as on building more resilient and more sustainable economies and societies.
Following the February 2023 earthquakes, the Commission rapidly deployed humanitarian
and relief support to Türkiye. It also hosted, together with the Swedish Presidency of the
Council of the EU, an International Donors' Conference for the people in Türkiye and Syria
on 20 March, where it pledged EUR 1 billion for the people in Türkiye. Beyond immediate
relief and humanitarian assistance, the EU will also provide longer term reconstruction
assistance. Assistance will be mobilised for the benefit of the population in Türkiye affected
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by the earthquakes, including refugees and their host communities, covering the areas of
health, education, socioeconomic support, job creation and recovery of municipal
infrastructure, notably water and sanitation.
Türkiye has expressed interest to participate in a number of EU programmes in the period
2021-2027 and has signed association agreements for its participation in Erasmus+, Horizon
Europe, the European Solidarity Corps programme, the Customs programme, the Single
Market Programme (small and medium size enterprises (SME) component) and the Digital
Europe Programme. Negotiations on association agreements for the participation in other
programmes continue. Türkiye participates in the European Environmental Agency, the
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and the Union Civil Protection
Mechanism. The Turkey Investment Platform (TIP) under the European Fund for Sustainable
Development Plus Instrument (EFSD+) will enable stronger EU support to investments
through guarantee programmes in the three overarching policy priorities, namely the Green
Deal, global gateways as well as jobs and growth. To facilitate progress on sustainable
development in the country, Türkiye is participating as an observer in a pilot project under
the Technical Support Instrument.
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STATISTICAL DATA (as of 31/08/2023)
Türkiye
Basic data Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Population (thousand) 72 561 s 79 815 s 80 811 s 82 004 bs 83 155 s 83 614 s
Total area of the country (km²) 1) 785 347 w 780 270 sw 779 972 w 779 972 w 779 972 w 779 972 w
National accounts Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 1 167 665 3 133 704 3 758 774 4 311 733 5 048 220 7 248 789
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 584 856 760 497 658 544 678 180 626 742 689 547
GDP (euro per capita) 8 000 9 470 8 090 8 210 7 520 8 190
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS)) 13 127 19 363 19 177 18 481 18 325 20 337
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 52.7 66.0 63.3 59.0 61.0 62.7
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 8.4 7.5 3.0 0.8 1.9 11.4
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) : : : : : :
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the
previous year (%)
: : : : : :
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) : : : : : :
**3 year change (T/T-3) in the nominal unit labour cost growth index (2015 = 100) : : : : : :
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU
average (EU-27 = 100)
: : : : : :
Gross value added by main sectors
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 10.2 6.8 6.4 7.1 7.5 6.2
Industry (%) 21.0 23.3 24.9 24.3 25.6 29.1
Construction (%) 6.9 9.6 7.9 6.0 5.9 5.7
Services (%) 62.0 s 60.3 s 60.7 s 62.7 s 61.0 s 59.1 s
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 77.6 73.0 70.9 72.4 71.9 68.4
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 24.6 29.9 29.7 25.9 27.4 28.1
Changes in inventories, as a share of GDP (%) 2.1 0.8 - 0.3 - 0.7 4.1 3.7
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 21.2 26.0 31.2 32.5 28.7 35.3
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 25.5 29.7 31.4 30.2 32.2 35.5
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) : : : : : :
Business Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 69.8 112.7 114.2 113.6 115.4 135.6
Number of active enterprises (number) 2 678 787 w 3 100 412 w 3 160 371 w 3 228 421 w 3 304 088 w 3 578 931 w
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
: 14.1 13.3 12.9 14.7 :
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of
enterprises active in t (%)
12.8 12.1 11.5 : : :
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People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial
business economy) (%)
77.6 sw 74.2 sw 74.4 sw 73.8 sw 73.9 sw 74.0 sw
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 2) 84 181 sw 127 683 sw 106 199 sw 110 591 sw 95 660 sw 88 925 psw
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 2) 153 453 w 236 088 w 202 005 w 208 171 w 181 250 sw 178 072 psw
Inflation rate and house prices Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) 8.6 d 11.1 d 16.3 d 15.2 d 12.3 d 19.6 d
**Annual change in the deflated house price index (2015 = 100) : : : : : :
Balance of payments Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) - 34 121.9 - 35 995.3 - 17 585.8 9 696.1 - 28 125.9 - 5 958.1
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) - 42 605.3 - 51 370.2 - 33 861.9 - 15 027.1 - 33 199.4 - 24 845.2
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 12 688.0 22 968.3 25 774.4 34 541.0 12 476.9 27 103.6
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) - 5 436.3 - 9 811.8 - 10 144.2 - 10 590.5 - 7 560.4 - 9 012.0
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 1 231.7 2 218.4 651.9 781.2 149.4 792.9
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 425.9 1 644.7 223.5 547.5 90.9 355.2
**3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) : - 3.8 - 3.5 - 2.0 - 1.9 - 1.3
**Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) : 6.8 5.6 8.8 - 2.0 7.4
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 3) 4) 5 745.6 w 7 444.8 s 7 805.3 s 5 978.0 s 3 942.6 s 5 832.2 s
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 3) 4) 1 117.9 w 2 321.7 3 049.7 2 653.2 2 829.2 4 204.1
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) 3) 4) 430.1 w 713.8 1 716.7 1 266.9 1 065.9 1 748.6
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 3) 4) 6 863.5 w 9 766.5 10 855.0 8 631.2 6 771.8 10 036.3
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) 3) 4) 3 878.8 w 2 555.0 3 094.7 1 174.7 1 206.5 2 349.1
**Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) - 46.7 w - 51.5 w - 42.2 w - 40.7 w - 53.9 w - 31.7 w
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant
workers (%)
5) 0.2 sw 0.1 sw 0.1 sw 0.0 sw 0.0 sw 0.0 sw
Public finance Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) - 2.8 w - 2.8 w - 2.9 w - 4.4 w - 4.7 w :
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) : 28.0 w 30.2 w 32.7 w 39.8 w :
Total government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) 32.6 w 31.2 w 31.8 w 31.0 w 31.2 w :
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) 35.3 w 34.0 w 34.7 w 35.4 w 35.9 w :
Financial indicators Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 3) 39.7 sw 52.5 sw 54.8 sw 54.7 sw 60.4 sw 54.3 sw
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 196.1 w 202.0 w 179.0 w 166.6 w 209.3 w 154.7 w
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 65 975.6 w 99 086.3 w 84 551.5 w 108 083.1 w 135 348.7 w 143 842.8 w
Money supply: M2 (M1 plus deposits with maturity up to two years, million euro) 286 594.7 w 357 980.4 w 321 665.4 w 367 703.3 w 369 288.3 w 347 910.9 w
Money supply: M3 (M2 plus marketable instruments, million euro) 300 181.9 w 370 715.7 w 330 910.9 w 384 079.8 w 379 878.0 w 354 818.1 w
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Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) 282 814.2 377 583.0 349 848.6 409 716.3 408 386.7 397 220.1
**Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) : 31.4 18.2 11.8 38.9 50.1
**Private credit flow, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 6) 7) 12.3 w 15.0 w - 2.9 w 4.2 w 13.0 w 7.6 w
**Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 56 84 82 80 89 89
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 6.59 11.58 17.76 20.52 10.85 17.87
Lending interest rate (one year), per annum (%) 7) 12.56 w 18.12 w 28.96 w 15.86 w 16.25 w 22.79 w
Deposit interest rate (one year), per annum (%) 8) 8.97 w 13.53 w 22.31 w 14.56 w 13.51 w 17.85 w
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 1.997 4.121 5.708 6.358 8.055 10.512
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) 153.2 75.9 55.7 49.7 40.2 30.6
**3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries
(2015 = 100)
0.0 sw - 0.3 sw - 0.4 sw - 0.5 sw - 0.5 sw - 0.5 sw
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 3) 64 847.2 w 95 361.6 w 78 770.5 w 94 413.6 w 81 937.5 w 94 006.1 w
External trade in goods Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 138 720 207 000 188 337 181 038 182 328 219 224
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 85 298 139 229 142 290 153 201 140 035 180 299
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) - 53 422 - 67 771 - 46 047 - 27 836 - 42 293 - 38 925
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 9) : 98.1 sw 94.4 sw 94.5 sw 98.5 sw 85.9 sw
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 40.0 s 40.9 s 43.3 s 42.2 s 41.1 s 41.1 s
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 36.5 s 33.6 s 32.9 s 31.6 s 33.1 s 31.1 s
Demography Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus
deaths (per thousand inhabitants)
11.8 10.8 10.1 be 9.1 be : :
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 12.0 9.2 9.3 9.1 : :
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 74.2 75.7 76.2 76.4 : :
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 79.4 81.3 81.6 81.8 : :
Labour market Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that
is economically active (%)
10)
11)
55.9 61.9 62.3 62.2 58.7 61.2 bw
*Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are
in employment (%)
10)
11)
50.0 55.3 55.6 53.8 51.0 53.9 bw
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 10)
11)
72.7 76.1 76.0 73.2 70.1 73.6 bw
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 10)
11)
28.0 34.5 35.2 34.4 32.0 34.1 bw
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are
in employment (%)
10)
11)
29.6 34.4 35.3 33.6 31.1 33.4 bw
Employment by main sectors
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Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 10)
11)
23.7 s 19.4 s 18.4 s 18.1 s 17.6 s 17.2 bw
Industry (%) 10)
11)
19.9 s 19.1 s 19.7 s 19.8 s 20.5 s 21.3 bw
Construction (%) 10)
11)
6.3 s 7.4 s 6.9 s 5.5 s 5.7 s 6.2 bw
Services (%) 10)
11)
50.1 s 54.1 s 54.9 s 56.6 s 56.2 s 55.3 bw
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
11)
10)
13.5 w 13.3 w 15.4 w 16.8 w 17.7 w 16.9 bw
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64
(%)
11)
10)
86.5 w 86.7 w 84.6 w 83.2 w 82.3 w 83.1 bw
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 10)
11)
10.7 10.9 10.9 13.7 13.2 12.0 bw
Male unemployment rate (%) 10)
11)
10.4 9.4 9.6 12.4 12.4 10.7 bw
Female unemployment rate (%) 10)
11)
11.4 13.9 13.8 16.5 14.9 14.8 bw
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 10)
11)
19.7 20.5 20.2 25.2 25.1 22.6 bw
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for
12 months or more (%)
10)
11)
2.8 2.4 2.4 3.2 3.3 3.7 bw
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%)
10)
11)
9.2 8.9 9.1 12.3 11.8 10.4 bw
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED
levels 5-8) (%)
10)
11)
7.0 9.4 9.8 10.6 10.0 10.0 bw
Social cohesion Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 12) 1 142 w 2 287 w 2 509 w 2 857 w 3 501 w 3 904 w
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the
inflation index) (2016 = 100)
: : : : : :
GINI coefficient 44 43 43 42 43 43
Poverty gap 32.3 26.4 25.8 27.4 27.5 27.5
*Early leavers from education and training: proportion of the population aged 18–24 with at
most lower secondary education who are not in further education or training (%)
11)
10)
43.1 32.5 31.0 28.7 26.7 23.0 bw
Standard of living Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) 102.0 149.0 151.0 150.0 157.0 163.0
Number of mobile phone subscriptions relative to population size (number per thousand
population)
837.0 w 964.0 w 977.0 w 972.0 w 982.0 w 1 019.0 w
Mobile broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 9.8 w 70.5 w 74.5 w 75.0 w 78.5 w 82.7 w
Fixed broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 10 w 15 w 16 w 17 w 20 w 21 w
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Infrastructure Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 13)
14)
12.2 sw 13.1 s 13.2 s 13.3 s 13.3 sw 13.5 sw
Length of motorways (kilometres) 2 080 2 657 2 842 3 060 3 523 3 532
Innovation and research Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) : 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.0 3.5 sw
*Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 0.79 0.95 1.03 1.06 1.09 1.13
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP
(%)
0.36 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.28 0.28
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 41.6 80.7 83.8 88.3 90.7 92.0
Environment Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
*Index of greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 181.4 w 240.4 w 238.5 w 231.2 w 238.4 w :
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant
prices)
191.5 175.3 167.7 168.6 162.7 159.7
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 26.5 w 29.4 w 32.2 w 43.6 w 41.9 w 35.6 w
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 94.3 w 95.4 w 94.8 w 94.8 w 94.6 w 95.6 w
Energy Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 31 412 36 466 39 909 45 134 43 636 46 208
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 2 478 2 695 3 010 3 102 3 274 3 518
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 16 741 15 682 16 547 17 429 15 006 17 151
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 562 292 351 390 363 324
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 74 712 s 116 755 s 109 980 s 105 649 s 104 983 s 115 096 s
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 105 375 150 445 148 120 150 123 148 064 161 774
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 211 097 296 429 303 852 302 796 305 426 333 412
Agriculture Note 2010 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Agricultural production volume index of goods and services (at producer prices) (2010 = 100) : : : : : :
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) : 38 120.0 38 239.0 37 712.0 37 747.0 38 038.0
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) : 16 105.0 p 17 220.9 p 17 872.3 18 158.0 18 036.1
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) : : : : : :
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) : 44 312.3 s 46 117.4 s 48 481.5 s 54 112.6 s 57 519.2 s
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) : : : : : :
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 32 773.0 36 598.8 34 705.8 35 202.1 38 050.8 32 602.0
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 17 942.0 21 149.0 18 900.0 18 055.0 23 026.0 18 250.0
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) : 30 826.0 29 987.0 31 041.0 31 120.0 31 691.0
Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Türkiye
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: = not available
b = break in series
d = definition differs
e = estimated value
p = provisional
s = Eurostat estimate
w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and without any assurance as regards their quality
and adherence to EU statistical methodology
* = Europe 2020 indicator
** = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator
Footnotes:
1) Area values are calculated by reference to corine classifications and adapted to LUCAS. Corine data production period is 6 years.
2) Data converted in EUR by Eurostat
3) Average of year exchange rate used to convert to euros.
4) Based on BPM6.
5) Average of year exchange rate used to convert to Turkish Lira.
6) Data cover debt securities and loans.
7) Updated values.
8) Average of monthly data. Overnight deposit facility.
9) With the January 2021 press release, foreign trade statistics according to the general trade system were used in the calculation of the indices and the base year was updated as
2015=100. Data are given as of January 2013. Since the indices based on 2015=100 are not withdrawn annually, the requested data cannot be provided.
Indices are calculated with Fisher index formula and 2015=100.
10) *In HLFS, the series is not comparable to previous years due to the adjustments in the definition, scope and design of the survey with the year 2021.
11) Annual LFS results.
12) Source: Income and Living Conditions Survey.
13) Main lines only.
14) Main lines only.
Area values are calculated by reference to corine classifications and adapted to LUCAS. Corine data production period is 6 years.
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