COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on import, export and transit measures for firearms, their essential components and ammunition, implementing Article 10 of the United Nations' Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol) (recast)

EN EN
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 27.10.2022
SWD(2022) 298 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council
on import, export and transit measures for firearms, their essential components and
ammunition, implementing Article 10 of the United Nations' Protocol against the illicit
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and
ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol) (recast)
{COM(2022) 480 final} - {SEC(2022) 330 final} - {SWD(2022) 299 final}
Offentligt
KOM (2022) 0480 - SWD-dokument
Europaudvalget 2022
1
Table of contents
1. INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT............................................................... 5
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION .................................................................................................................... 6
2.1 Problem I: Lack of data ......................................................................................................................... 8
2.2 Problem II: firearms trafficking into and from the EU .......................................................................... 9
2.3 Problem III: administrative burden for the legal movement of civilian firearms................................. 19
3. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ........................................................................................................ 22
3.1 Legal basis .......................................................................................................................................... 22
3.2 Subsidiarity: Necessity and added value of EU action ....................................................................... 23
4. OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ............................................................................... 23
4.1 General objectives ............................................................................................................................. 23
4.2 Specific objectives............................................................................................................................. 24
5. WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? .................................................................... 27
5.1. WHAT IS THE BASELINE FROM WHICH OPTIONS ARE ASSESSED?.................................... 27
5.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE POLICY OPTIONS................................................................................... 29
5.2.1. OPTION 1: SOFT-LAW APPROACH............................................................................................... 29
5.2.2. OPTION 2: CLARIFICATION OF THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK................................ 31
5.2.3. OPTION 3: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS............................................................................. 33
5.2.4. OPTION 3 BIS: NEW PROVISIONS WITHOUT CHANGE TO THE INTERPLAY WITH
THE COMMON POSITION .............................................................................................................. 37
5.3. ELEMENTS DISCARDED AT AN EARLY STAGE ....................................................................... 37
6. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ........................................................... 38
6.1. METHODOLOGY.............................................................................................................................. 38
6.2. SOCIAL IMPACTS............................................................................................................................ 39
6.2.1. IMPACTS ON CITIZENS.................................................................................................................. 39
6.2.2. SECURITY IMPACTS....................................................................................................................... 39
6.3. IMPACT ON DIGITALISATION...................................................................................................... 40
6.4. ECONOMIC IMPACT ....................................................................................................................... 41
6.4.1. IMPACTS ON THE OVERALL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY .............................................................. 41
6.4.2. IMPACT ON SMES AND COMPETITIVENESS............................................................................. 41
6.4.3. IMPACTS ON NATIONAL AND EU ADMINISTRATIONS.......................................................... 42
6.5. IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT................................................................................................ 42
6.6. IMPACT ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ........................................................................................ 43
7. HOW DO OPTIONS COMPARE?..................................................................................................... 44
7.1. NECESSITY / ADDED VALUE........................................................................................................ 53
7.2. EFFECTIVENESS.............................................................................................................................. 54
7.3. PROPORTIONALITY / EFFICIENCY.............................................................................................. 56
7.4. COHERENCE..................................................................................................................................... 59
2
7.5. FEASABILITY................................................................................................................................... 60
7.6. ECONOMIC IMPACT ....................................................................................................................... 62
8. PREFERRED OPTION ...................................................................................................................... 63
8.1. OPTION 3: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS............................................................................. 63
8.2. REFIT (SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVED EFFICIENCY)....................................................... 64
8.3. APPLICATION OF THE ‘ONE IN, ONE OUT’ APPROACH ......................................................... 65
9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?.................................. 66
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION............................................................................................ 69
1 LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES.................................................................. 69
2 ORGANISATION AND TIMING...................................................................................................... 69
3 CONSULTATION OF THE RSB....................................................................................................... 69
4 EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY......................................................................................... 69
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT)................................................ 71
1. CONSULTATION STRATEGY ........................................................................................................ 71
1.1. Mapping of stakeholders ......................................................................................................... 71
1.2. Methods and forms of consultation ......................................................................................... 71
2. CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES....................................................................................................... 72
2.1. The Inception Impact Assessment........................................................................................... 72
2.2. The public consultation ........................................................................................................... 74
2.3. Data collection......................................................................................................................... 76
2.4. Confidential survey ................................................................................................................. 76
2.5. Meetings.................................................................................................................................. 78
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? .......................................................................................... 84
1. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE..................................................................... 84
2. SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS ....................................................................................... 98
3. RELEVANT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS............................................................. 101
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS ................................................................................................... 102
ANNEX 5: CASE STUDIES...................................................................................................................... 121
ANNEX 6: TRACEABILITY CHECK-LIST............................................................................................ 129
ANNEX 7: PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND CONFIDENTIAL CONSULTATION............................ 133
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Glossary
Term or acronym Meaning or definition
AEO Authorised Economic Operator
CN Combined Nomenclature: EU customs classification of
goods
COARM Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports
/ Conventional arms export control information system
CRMS EU Common Risk Management System
DUeS Dual-Use electronic System: the EU electronic system to
exchange information on refusals to grant export
authorisations for dual-use goods
ECRIS European Criminal Record Information exchange
System
EU CSW-CERTEX EU Customs Single Window Certificates Exchange
System
HS Harmonised System: customs classification of goods of
the World Customs Organisation
ICS Import Control System
SIENA Secure Information Exchange Network Application
SIS Schengen Information System
Surveillance
TARIC TARif Intégré Communautaire: the EU Customs Tariff
4
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WCO World Customs Organisation
5
1. INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT
Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 establishing export authorisation, and import and transit
measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition was adopted to enable
the ratification by the EU of the United Nations Protocol on the illicit manufacturing of
and trafficking in firearms, their parts, components and ammunition.1
It is part of the EU
international responsibility to properly regulate the trade of firearms in order to prevent
trafficking of firearms.
Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 implements article 10 of the United Nations Protocol
which provides for general requirements for export, import and transit licensing or
authorisation systems. The Regulation makes it compulsory to grant export
authorisations only if the countries of transit or destination authorized the import. It lists
out the information required for the tracing of firearms, establishing simplified export
procedures (notably with no prior authorisation for hunters or sport shooters with a
European Firearms Pass and the possibility for Member States to establish additional
simplifications). The Regulation also provides that authorisations should not be granted
to those who have a criminal record and provides for compulsory mutual exchanges of
information between national authorities about exporters whose application for an
authorisation is refused.
The Regulation does not apply to military firearms (such as assault rifles), to weapons
which were prohibited inside the EU when the Regulation was adopted, or to deactivated
firearms. With respect to firearms which are “specially designed for military use”, export
controls are subject to the 2008 Council Common Position on exports of military
technology and equipment.2
This Decision applies to items mentioned in the EU
Common Military List.3
The Regulation complements for imports and exports the intra-EU rules of the Firearms
Directive.4
While the Directive was revised in 2017 (and consolidated in a new legal
instrument in 2021),5
the revision of the Regulation was announced in the EU Action
1
by Council Decision 2014/164/EU of 11 February 2014 on the conclusion, on behalf of the
European Union, of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime (OJ L 89, 25.3.2014, p. 7). The Protocol against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition was
adopted by resolution 55/255 of 31 May 2001 at the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly of
the United Nations and it entered into force on 3 July 2005.
2
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing
control of exports of military technology and equipment
3
Common Military List of the European Union; ST/5802/2019/INIT; OJ C 95, 12.3.2019
4
Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 amending
Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, OJ L 179,
8.7.2008.
5
Directive (EU) 2021/555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 on
control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, OJ L 115, 6.4.2021.
6
Plan against firearms trafficking 2020-2025.6
This revision was included in the
Commission Work Programme 2021 annex II.
The evaluation report of the application of Regulation (EU) No 258/20127
identified
loopholes due to a lack of homogeneous implementation. In particular, the evaluation
stressed that the Regulation’s added value was limited by the absence of a genuine
harmonisation of national rules and processes. The Regulation was ineffective in
distinguishing between military and civilian firearms, in ensuring the full traceability of
weapons, and in ensuring proper exchanges of information (notably of refusals to grant
export authorisations). The Regulation was also inefficient in terms of reduction of
administrative costs for companies. The Regulation was considered to lack consistency
with other legislation, notably the revised Firearms Directive and the EU Common
Position on the export of military technologies.
The evaluation was followed in April 2018 by a Recommendation calling for
strengthening the implementation of EU rules to improve traceability and the security of
export and import control procedures of firearms and the cooperation between authorities
in the fight against firearms trafficking.8
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
As a general principle, the Regulation seeks to balance the security risk associated with
the circumvention of export and import rules of firearms, their components and
ammunition with the need to protect both the commercial interests of legitimate
producers and traders and the rights of users who legally acquire firearms for legitimate
purposes such as hunting or sport shooting.
This initiative focuses on the risks of diversion or smuggling and difficulties linked to
non-commercial movements and transactions between civilians. Risks and difficulties
linked to sales to the armed forces or public authorities, or government-to-government
transactions, are not addressed by this initiative due to their geopolitical specificities and
relations to the common foreign and security policy.
Problems Specific drivers Specific objectives
Problem I:
Lack of data
- Sensitivity of data
- Absence centralised data
collection at national level
Objective I
Systematise data
collection about
international movements
of firearms for civilian
use, as well as seizure
6
COM(2020)608 final, 24.7.2020.
7
COM(2017) 737 final, 12.12.2017.
8
C(2018) 2197 final, 17.4.2018.
7
data
Problem II (security):
Existing rules on firearms
are circumvented which
leads to firearms being
smuggled and diverted
into the EU. These illicit
firearms are a means to
conduct criminal offences
including terrorism. At
export, there is a risk of
diversion of firearms,
which fuels global illicit
firearms trafficking and
contributes to instability
and organised crime
worldwide.
- lack of exchange of
information on
intelligence, seizures,
transit of firearms, refusals
to grant export
authorisations
- lack of control and risk
assessment to discover
security problems and
trends, and to ascertain the
proper end-use of exported
firearms
- insufficient cooperation
between customs and
licensing authorities to
check convertible or
deactivated weapons, to
prevent diversion and
check the validity of
authorisations
- unclear legal framework
creating inconsistencies,
differences of interpretation
by competent authorities
Objective II
Improve controls, risk
assessments and
traceability measures to
prevent smuggling and
diversion of firearms
into and from the EU
Problem III (market
concern):
Economic operators
continue to face
administrative burden in the
imports and exports of
civilian firearms
- unclear legal framework,
which leaves room for
divergent national
interpretations and rules.
- lack of harmonization
between Regulation (EU)
No 258/2012 and other EU
and national firearms
legislation
- insufficient cooperation
between customs and
licensing authorities
creating administrative
burden for legitimate
producers and traders
Objective III
Simplify procedures to
limit the administrative
burden, by creating
unified processes and
control mechanisms
8
2.1 Problem I: Lack of data
2.1.1 What is the problem?
In order to create a consistent policy on firearms trafficking, it is important to have
precise data. Quantifying the problem constitutes major limitation, as the absence of
accurate, reliable data is itself part of the problem. All studies and research papers in the
field of firearms point to the impossibility to collect accurate, comprehensive and
comparable data on trafficking of firearms.9
In addition, traffickers of firearms make no
distinction between firearms initially sold to the armed forces or firearms sold to
civilians, so that trafficking of firearms extends well beyond civilian firearms only. The
best estimate available accounts for 35 million illicit firearms owned by civilians in the
EU in 2017. This would correspond to 56% of the estimated total of firearms10
.
In order to prevent the trafficking of firearms, it is important to keep track of all firearms.
Therefore, qualitative data is needed on imported firearms. The recommendations issued
by the Commission on 17 April 2018 requests, among other things, that "by 1st
July each
year, Member States should collect detailed statistics of the preceding year”. When the
Commission asked for the data on the number of authorisations, refusals, the quantities
and values of firearms exports and imports, by origin or destination, only 10 Member
States sent data, and only one Member State sent all data asked. Annex 4 contains a
comparison between the data received from the Member States and the available data in
the Eurostat international trade database. The discrepancies between the two datasets
demonstrate the bad quality and unreliability of available statistics.
Furthermore, as there are no technical specificities that enable to distinguish military
firearms from civilian firearms, there is an overlap between both, since some Member
States account firearms as military, while others will categorise the same weapons as
civilian ones. Establishing statistics of the respective shares of military and civilian
firearms markets is therefore impossible.
2.1.2 What are the problem drivers?
One of the main problem drivers is the absence of centralised data at national level.
Member States have been requested to send data on import and export of civilian
firearms multiple times and the 2018 recommendations included a provision on this
statistical data, with only one Member State which sent all requested data for the year
2020. It is possible that the lack of uptake of these requests and the 2018
9
See for instance SAFTE study (Studying the acquisition of illicit firearms by terrorists in Europe
performed by the Flemish Peace institute (https://flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/safte/publications.html) and
UNODC Global study on firearms trafficking 2020 (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-
protocol/firearms-study.html)]
10
9
recommendations is linked to its non-mandatory nature. However, it would have also
involved additional work and a change of administrative habits. Authorisations for
import and export are not always managed centrally or the data is not stored in a central
database. Therefore, the lack of data can result from a weak administrative capacity to
collect the data.
Another of the main drivers is the lack of transparency due to the sensitivity of the data.
Member States are especially reluctant to share data on the export and import of military
firearms, as this data is defence-related. Without this data, it is impossible to know the
total amount of firearms in the EU. Furthermore, as there are no technical differences
between some of the military and civilian firearms, it is difficult to distinguish between
then to collect the correct data. The Council does gather yearly data on military weapons
and publishes this in the Annual report on Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.
However, this data is fragmented, incomplete and differs from one Member State to
another. Annex 4 provides an estimate of the data. The data in the report does not
correspond to the data on exports that can be found in the Eurostat international trade
database.
Furthermore, it has also proven difficult to obtain reliable and concrete data from the
firearms industry. Although several stakeholders complained on the high administrative
burden of the current procedures, the industry never provided concrete data. Furthermore,
data on transactions, size of shipments etc. was considered as sensitive and confidential
business information.
Additionally, data on firearms seizures are an important indicator to estimate the scale of
firearms trafficking. Information on seizures is also important to create targeted policies
for specific regions and treats. However, the data on seizures is currently fragmented and
often not accessible for policy makers. Despite an obligation of Member States subject to
the Schengen acquis to provide statistics of firearms seizures pursuant to the 1999
Decision of the Executive Committee on the illegal trade in firearms,11
the Commission
was never a recipient of such information.
2.1.3 How will the problem evolve without intervention?
Even though Member States have been repeatedly asked to provide statistical data on
import and export of civilian firearms, this data is still not available. Furthermore, the
argument that some of this data is too sensitive to share will not change either. Therefore,
without intervention the lack of data will continue to hinder the development of targeted
policies and research in the field of firearms trafficking, without a complete intelligence
picture of the risks.
2.2 Problem II: firearms trafficking into and from the EU
The import, export and transit of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition
bring risks of diversion to the illicit market.
11
SCH/Com-ex (99) 10
10
At import, the main risks are linked to the circumvention of unclear rules that enable the
import of “semi-finished” firearms and components, as well of alarm and signal weapons
convertible into lethal firearms.
At export, the main risk lies in the diversion of civilian firearms shipped to a non-EU
country and being re-exported to countries subject to embargoes or sold to criminals and
armed forces due to lack of controls and supervision before and after the export process.
Once diverted, those firearms may contribute to destabilisation near the EU borders, or
be eventually smuggled back into the EU.
The circumvention of rules and diversion of firearms contribute to the trafficking of
firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, which is a global problem and a
serious threat to the security of European citizens. Firearms trafficking facilitates violent
crimes and the criminal activities of Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) as the demand for
firearms “is largely driven by criminals”.12
According to a study published in 2018,13
firearms were the lethal means in more than 50% of all homicides in 49 of 195 countries
in 2016; 251,000 people died globally from firearm injuries in 2016 (excluding deaths
from armed conflicts, terrorism and at hands of police), and the majority of firearm injury
deaths were homicides (an estimated 64%, corresponding to some 161,000 deaths).14
The
negative effect of firearms trafficking on stability and development has been
internationally acknowledged in the new United Nations Agenda for Sustainable
Development,15
whose Target 16.4 commits states to significantly reduce illicit arms
flows by 2030. Moreover, over recent years, firearms trafficking contributed to providing
terrorists with the means to perpetrate their acts of terror, with 23 mass-shooting
incidents in the (semi-) public space in Europe in the period 2009-2018, killing 341
people.16
Although the lack of data does not support a precise quantification of the phenomenon,
recent studies on firearms trafficking in Europe highlighted the preponderance of
firearms supposedly made for civilian use vis-à-vis military-grade weapons,17
whose
availability remains more limited. However, it is impossible to make a clear distinction
12
UNODC Illicit Trafficking in Firearms their Parts, Components and Ammunition to, from and
across the European Union; regional analysis report (2020),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf
13
The Global Burden of Disease 2016 Injury Collaborators (2018), Global Mortality from Firearms,
1990-2016. JAMA. 2018;320(8):792–814 (link).
14
The Global Burden of Disease 2016 Injury Collaborators (2018), Section ‘Results’ (link).
15
UNSDG (2015), Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Resolution 70/1 of 25 September. A/RES/70/1 of 21 October.
16
See for instance Flemish Peace Institute, Armed to kill, Brussels, 3 October 2019
(https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Report_Armed_to_kill_web.pdf);
Europol, TE-SAT 2017: EU Terrorism and Trend Report
(https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/tesat-report)
17
See notably UNODC (2020), Global Study on Firearms Trafficking, Vienna: UNODC, available at
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/firearms-study.html. In the EU in 2016-2017,
shotguns accounted on average for 30% of seizures, followed by pistols (22%), rifles (15%) and
revolvers (8%), with submachine guns and machine guns accounting for most of the remainder (2%)
11
based on technical characteristics between civilian and military firearms, since many of
them can indistinctly be used by civilian and the military (inside the EU, civilians may in
exceptional circumstances acquire, possess and trade military-grade firearms, such as
automatic rifles or pistols). This is reflected in the latest version of Directive (EU)
2021/555 (the Firearms Directive), which in exceptional cases allows civilians to acquire
prohibited firearms (e.g. for sport shooting competitions or for the protection of critical
infrastructure). Besides, some manufacturers produce firearms for the civilian market,
which on purpose look like military assault rifles. Handguns (pistols and revolvers) are
the type of firearm most commonly available on the criminal markets, as they are
portable and easier to use and to conceal relative to long guns. It is estimated that more
than half of the firearms in civilian hands in Europe are illegally held.18
2.2.1 What is the problem?
Europol’s Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2021 pointed out that illegal
firearms originate from within the EU but also from weapon stocks outside the EU.19
The
project “Studying the Acquisition of illicit Firearms by Terrorists in Europe” (SAFTE)
stated that in the EU, external supply channels are more important than internal supply
channels in fuelling illicit firearms markets. In particular, cross-border smuggling of
firearms from non-EU countries was considered the most important supply mechanism.20
The durability of firearms means that, once smuggled into a Member State, weapons can
remain inside the EU for many years and easily circulate across borders.21
A recent study
from UNODC showed that the traditional closed character of the illicit firearms market in
the EU is eroding due to continuing cross-border smuggling of firearms into the EU from
post-conflict countries, the increased availability of easily reactivated or converted
weapons and increased access to firearms through online markets. As a result, various
types of firearms have become more easily available for criminals, including terrorists
with the right criminal connections.22
With respect to imports, the Operational Action Plan for Firearms 2022 states that “the
import from some non-EU countries of semi-finished essential components (usually 80%
finished polymer frames of handguns or 80% finished metal barrel of long firearms)” is
an identified threat. “They are not declared as essential components of firearms and
usually enter the European Union via fast parcel and carrier services. They are
accompanied with instructions on how to complete their transformation into firearms
18
Small Arms Survey, “Estimating Global Civilian-held Firearms Numbers”, Briefing Paper, June
2018. Dataset available under
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/Weapons_and_Markets/Tools/Firearms_holdings/
SAS-BP-Civilian-held-firearms-annexe.pdf
19
SOCTA 2021 : p. 57
20
Duquet, N. and Goris, K. (2018), SAFTE project cit., p. 104 (link).
21
See final report of UE funded project FIRE, p. 21 (link).
22
UNODC Illicit Trafficking in Firearms their Parts, Components and Ammunition to, from and
across the European Union; regional analysis report (2020) p.17
https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf
12
with ordinary tools.”23
The action plan also stresses that “homemade conversion of alarm
and signal weapons into firearms […] into more lethal, live-firing firearms is increasingly
sophisticated,” which is major concern as those weapons were traditionally manufactured
outside of the EU and are imported into the EU.
As regards exports, according to UNODC, Europe (in particular the EU) is reported as
the main region of manufacturing of firearms seized across the world.24
This means that
legally EU-manufactured firearms were at some point diverted into the illegal market,
which could be exploited for criminal purposes (e.g. gang violence, terrorist attacks, and
other serious crimes). The 2017 evaluation study had noted that “international trafficking
of firearms remains a major concern.” The EU therefore has a particular responsibility to
fight this threat through its own legislation, and notably to control exported firearms.
Furthermore, research has shown that exported firearms from the EU have ended up in
the arsenals of various non-State armed groups across the globe.25
The EU has issued a
number of arms embargos; the diversion of firearms supports the circumvention of these
embargos. Back in 2016, several reports documented transfers of large quantities of
firearms to the Middle East, which were re-exported to armed groups in Syria.26
The fact
that many firearms can indistinctly be classified as civilian or military means that there is
also a high risk of diversion of civilian weapons, as demonstrated by the recent case of
German-manufactured (non-specifically military) handguns used by armed forces in
Belarus.27
More recently, during the third EU-Mexico High Level Dialogue on Justice
and Security,28
Mexican authorities estimated that more than 230,000 weapons entered
illegally through Mexico’s northern border each year. Overall, 30% of illicit firearms
seized in Mexico were traced to European manufacturers.
23
Operational Action Plan 2022: Firearms trafficking, Council Document 13596/21, 14.11.2021 -
LIMITED
24
UNODC Global study on Firearms Trafficking 2020 p.32; https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-
and-analysis/Firearms/2020_REPORT_Global_Study_on_Firearms_Trafficking_2020_web.pdf
25
UNODC Global study on Firearms Trafficking 2020 p.18; https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-
and-analysis/Firearms/2020_REPORT_Global_Study_on_Firearms_Trafficking_2020_web.pdf;
UNODC, “Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts, Components and Ammunition to, from and
across the European Union”, Vienna, 2020 p. 103 https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-
protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf
26
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/27/weapons-flowing-eastern-europe-middle-east-
revealed-arms-trade-syria; https://balkaninsight.com/2016/07/27/making-a-killing-the-1-2-billion-
euros-arms-pipeline-to-middle-east-07-26-2016/.
27
“Deutsche Waffen für Lukaschenko”, 8.09.2020, https://www.zdf.de/politik/frontal/belarus-
deutsche-waffen-fuer-diktator-lukaschenko-100.html, use of Sig-Sauer P 226
28
held by videoconference on 11 May 2021.
13
The diversion of civilian firearms during authorised international transfers can take place
at different stages of the firearms transfer chain. Diversion techniques include the use of
forged or falsified documentation (e.g. shipping documents, commodity descriptions,
personal information about the shipper and the recipient) or the creation of shell
companies and straw purchaser to hide the real identities of the parties involved in a
transaction. Specific diversion risks arise in relation to each stage of the transfer chain.29
2.2.2 What are the problem drivers?
Most of the drivers are common to both imports and exports, in particular when it comes
to the lack of coordination between licensing authorities, and between licencing and law
enforcement authorities (including customs).
The circulation of firearms is facilitated by the fact that law enforcement authorities
across the EU still do not operate as one, and that exchanges of information and
intelligence amongst them is not sufficient. However and despite its name, the
Regulation does not create common rules and procedures for import authorisations. The
2017 evaluation report stressed that “the Regulation does not establish a harmonised
licensing system for imports and therefore has little relevance in this respect.”
At import
Save for a few generic provisions (recital 11 and the definition of illicit trafficking in
article 2, both referring to the rules of the Firearms Directive), the Regulation does not
regulate import authorisations.
Insufficient exchange of information and uncoordinated controls and risk
assessments of firearms imports lead to ineffective risk profiling between customs and
between import licensing authorities, as the Regulation does not establish the conditions
for such cooperation and does not include any provision in relation to imports. Risk
29
https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/Diversion%20infographic.pdf
Case-study: EU firearms in Mexico
Between 2015 and 2020, 96,948 firearms (worth $38 Mio) [source: https://comtrade.un.org/data/]
were exported from the EU to Mexico. In addition, many EU firearms exported to the USA are
re-exported or trafficked to Mexico, which estimates that half of EU firearms brands seized in
Mexico were either imported or trafficked from the U.S.
During the period 2010-2020, 61,242 firearms were seized of which 2,744 were Italian, mostly
Beretta pistols [source: http://stopusarmstomexico.org/deadly-trade/]. During the period 2015-
2020, 2,749 German-made firearms were seized in Mexico, more than twice as much as the
official exports to this country.
Data provided by the Mexican authorities do not enable the establishment of statistics based on
tracing results. There is no data about the year of manufacture of the EU firearms seized, or about
their point of diversion. It shows however that EU-made firearms (including civilian firearms) do
end up in the wrong hands in high quantities, and that the current EU export control system does
not prevent it.
14
profiling is critical to prevent firearms from being smuggled into the EU. However, there
is currently no systematic sharing of intelligence at EU level and there is a lack of
available data on past firearms seizures and their follow-up investigations, which would
enable evidence-based detection of trends, both at import and export. The Regulation
does not include any provision to that effect. Existing systems (such as the EU’s Customs
Risk Management System –CRMS- or Europol’s Secure Information Exchange Network
Application –SIENA-) are not interconnected (and cannot be under the current
framework), and law enforcement authorities are under no obligation, or do not have the
possibility, to systematically use them (customs typically do not rely on SIENA-based
information and police does not feed into, or rely on the CRMS). When they are, national
authorities do not always include sufficient information to compare data. Finally,
information gathered during the follow-up investigation under the authority of the
judiciary is typically not shared through those channels for future risk assessments.
Moreover, firearms can be smuggled into the EU through the misdeclaration of goods.
Such misdeclaration result from different ways to interpret current EU law, due to its lack
of precision. Even though firearms parts and components are subject to administrative
control, the EU faces the unchecked import of semi-finished “80%” components.
These can be used to replace elements of firearms, but also to (illegally) modify weapons
and even to assemble firearms in their entirety.30
The fact that they are still imported into
the EU shows that there is an unclear legal framework. In the confidential consultation of
national competent authorities, 13% of respondents concerned by import declared that
such elements need to be declared as firearms parts (CN code 9305) but not marked, and
13% that they are not even considered as firearms parts and are not subject to declaration.
This means that in 26% of cases, traceability of those semi-finished products is not
ensured. At the moment, even when such semi-finished components are declared as
firearms for customs purposes, they are not automatically considered as such by licencing
authorities, which can enable the import of such elements by non-authorised individuals.
Recital 11 of the Regulation states that firearms, their parts and essential components and
ammunition, when imported from third countries, are subject to Union law and, in
particular, to the requirements of Directive 91/477/EEC (codified by Directive (EU)
2021/555). As a result, convertible alarm and signal weapons need to be declared and
classified as firearms. Nevertheless, since 2010, those converted foreign-made blank-
firing weapons have been seized in the European Union, which shows that they had not
been imported and declared as firearms as they should have been.31
Despite recent
changes in the legislation of the main producing country of those weapons, they are still
30 Operational Action Plan 2022: Firearms trafficking, Council Document 13596/21, 14.11.2021 -
LIMITED
31
From 2016 to 2020, 15 949 alarm and signal weapons of the brands Ekol, Zoraki and Bruni were
seized by the Member States, most of them within operation CONVERSUS from EMPACT
firearms, with contribution of Europol. (Report from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council on the application of Firearms Directive C(2021)647 final).
15
considered as being easily convertible into firearms.32
These weapons are commonly
used in gun crime across Europe.33
The current legal framework34
does not provide a
legal basis to ensure a uniform approach to certifying the compliance of these weapons
with EU standards on non-convertibility. Consequently, customs or licensing authorities
of different Member States may treat differently imported alarm and signal weapons,
with some considering that they are convertible into firearms, and others that they
comply with EU-level standards.
Finally, it appears that existing customs simplifications can easily be used to avoid
customs checks. The reduced dataset used for e-commerce and the low quality of data
provided by postal operators severely affects the traceability of imported firearms and
components. Besides, under customs simplifications (Simplified Declarations, Entry in
the Declarants Record), the full customs declarations are only submitted after a month
and controls can only be performed ex-posts and most probably be only documentary
controls. As a consequence, the room for diversion of imported firearms is very high.
At export
At export, problems directly stem from the vagueness of the regulation, rather than issues
of enforcement.
Similarly, controls and risk assessments when exporting firearms from the EU vary
in nature and quality from one Member State to another – they are in any case
insufficiently shared and coordinated between Member States, as the 2017 evaluation of
the Regulation identified. This aspect is not governed by the Regulation and left to the
discretion of Member States. An exporter does not always need to provide evidence of
import in the country of destination, end-user certificates are often not requested and
there is currently no systematic post-shipment controls. This leaves room for the
diversion of firearms between the export and the arrival at the destination country, as
well as to re-export or unauthorized used after arrival in the destination country. This
appears as the main source of the problem, since “in the overwhelming majority of
known cases, these firearms were legally transferred from the European Union to the
intended recipient in another part of the world and subsequently diverted in the
32
“Border Patrol seizes $19,000 worth of blank firing pistols from Turkey at Dulles International
Airport”, Washington Post, 2 June 2021
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2021/06/02/border-patrol-pistols-dulles/
33
UNODC, “Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts, Components and Ammunition to, from and
across the European Union”, Vienna, 2020, p.25 https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-
protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf
34
Commission Implementing Directive (EU) 2019/69 of 16 January 2019 laying down technical
specifications for alarm and signal weapons under Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the
acquisition and possession of weapons; OJ L 15, 17.1.2019.
16
destination countries or retransferred to other countries without the approval of the
exporting European Union Member State.”35
Furthermore, the different interpretations of the vaguely worded export control
procedures in the Regulation, and the existence of inconsistencies between the
Regulation and other pieces of EU legislation concerning firearms such as the EU
Firearms Directive (2021/555), leave room for potential security loopholes. For instance,
the Regulation merely states that Member States must refuse to grant an export
authorisation if the applicant has a criminal record concerning an offence covered by the
rules on the European Arrest Warrant (money laundering, corruption, trafficking of
human beings, murder etc.). How and when criminal records are checked currently
remains completely subject to national legislation and practice. The absence of detailed
provisions on what document to check before granting an export licence has led to
persisting differences across Member States in performing background checks on non-
residents (in the confidential consultation of competent authorities, 68,76% of
respondents concerned36
indicated they only request or check their own national criminal
record, not necessarily that of other countries). This might enable an applicant with
relevant criminal records in a Member State to obtain an export license from another
Member State.
Additionally, the rules are not sufficiently clear to ensure that customs or licensing
authorities perform the checks of the non-convertibility of alarm and signal weapons,
and ensure that firearms are not wrongly declared as alarm and signal weapons to avoid
export authorisations and customs checks. This is particularly the case for exports from
Member States, which do not subject the acquisition and possession of alarm and signal
weapons to any authorisation. The reactivation of deactivated firearms is also a known
threat, which leads to the diversion of firearms. Because deactivated firearms fall outside
of the scope of the Regulation, these weapons can be exported without the proper
marking that is needed to improve the traceability of firearms. As a consequence, in the
confidential consultation of national competent authorities,37
3 Member States indicated
that neither export licensing authorities nor customs authorities have to control the
effective deactivation of firearms. This was noted by the 2017 evaluation of the
regulation, which stressed that “the absence of any provisions for export markings in the
case of deactivated weapons or alarm weapons makes traceability impossible”.
Problems are also linked to the insufficient exchange of information and cooperation
between licensing authorities. The Regulation created the obligation to exchange
information on the refusals of export authorisations. However, the Regulation did not
specify via which channels this information needs to be exchanged. The most widely
used – and single available – platform is the online system of the Council’s Working
35
UNODC, “Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts, Components and Ammunition to, from and
across the European Union”, Vienna, 2020 p. 106 https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-
protocol/2020/UNODC-EU-Report-A8_FINAL.pdf
36
50% of respondents did not reply to this question (mostly because they are not involved in export
processes)
37
Annex 2, point 2.4
17
Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM). The 2017 evaluation of the Regulation
stressed that its “provisions have proved insufficient to meet the objective pursued.”
Currently, the fact that some denials are not uploaded on COARM and different channels
are used to exchange information on denials creates the risk that export authorisation
decisions are taken on an incomplete evidence base. The Commission observed in its
report on the implementation of the Regulation that “43 % of national authorities report
having already granted an export authorisation to exporters for essentially identical
transactions which had been refused by another Member State.” Moreover, it increases
the risk of undercutting of decisions taken by other Member States and eventually
increase the security risks related to the circulation of firearms consignment for unlawful
purposes. In other words, information asymmetry that is not addressed through timely
and effective information exchange leaves room for the risk that suspect or problematic
export operations are authorised.
External-transit
Besides, Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 does not regulate the traceability of shipments of
firearms coming from, or destined to third countries during transit operations through the
customs territory of the Union (external transit). This absence of EU rules on the matter
result in a lack of tracing and lack of communication between customs authorities to
ensure efficient checks. A 2017 analysis of the Commission services38
underlined that
“there is a systemic tendency to treat a consignment of firearms as any other consignment
in transit, with no special measures related to the nature of these particular goods.”
Shipments of firearms are managed as any other cargo in transit, rather than as sensitive
consignments. Therefore, Member States have no specific obligation to notify the
Member States of transit that the goods in transit are firearms, that the consignment has
arrived at destination, or that the procedure is closed. This leaves the transit vulnerable
for the diversion of firearms. The Commission highlights that practices related to the
place, time and nature of the customs controls vary significantly from one Member State
to another, thus leaving room for potential security issues. This results directly from the
absence of any provision in that respect in the regulation. The analysis found that “some
MS are making controls only at destination, some at entry, some at unloading but there is
no common approach about the type (documentary, physical) and moment of the
controls. Some Member States make controls systematically for firearms, some based on
risks.” This was reflected in the 2017 evaluation of the regulation, which stressed that
“the traceability of the consignments is not guaranteed during transit operations through
the customs territory of the European Union.” It was confirmed by the 2022 Council
Report on firearms trafficking,39
which stressed that “little information was shared on
domestic transhipments.”
38
“Conclusions on the strengths, gaps and weaknesses in the customs legislation, procedures and risk-
based controls practices related to the illicit trafficking of firearms”; PCA FIREARMS, April 2017,
TAXUD/B2/031/2017, Ref. Ares(2017)2932774 - RESTRICTED
39
op. cit., Council Document 4763/1/21, 3.01.2022 - LIMITED
18
2.2.3. How will the problem evolve without intervention?
Without a targeted and limited intervention, an increasing number of illicit firearms risk
being smuggled into the EU, in particular semi-finished firearms and convertible
weapons. This is confirmed by general view of stakeholders consulted during the public
consultation on the overall future evolution of trafficking. 47% of respondents considered
that without further EU intervention, there would be an increase of smuggling of
firearms, their components, and convertible weapons into the EU and increased exports
(or diversion) of firearms to conflict zones and authoritarian regimes. Among the 12
business representatives which had an opinion, 50% also considered the situation would
deteriorate (50% had no opinion). This view was shared by law enforcement authorities:
during the confidential consultation of competent authorities, one third of customs and
police respondents considered that the situation would deteriorate (26% had no opinion
and 20% considered that it would remain unchanged).
Firearms are extremely durable products, and illicit firearms imported in the EU can
therefore circulate in the Member States for decades. As EU law enforcement authorities
do not operate as one, there is a high risk that they will fail to fully prevent the illicit
movements of firearms from one Member State to another, once they have been
smuggled into the EU territory. Trafficking of firearms is a source of major concern for
the security of European citizens.40
By fuelling violence and organised crime and
providing terrorists with the means to conduct attacks on European soil, illicit firearms
pose a serious threat to internal security.41
The risks of diversion of exported firearms would at the very least remain the same, and
the appetite for EU-made firearms or the need to circumvent embargoes will probably
increase the threat. This risk has already materialised, since the media recently reported
diversion cases of firearms exported in 2020 from the EU to Moldova, from which the
weapons were immediately re-exported to Russia and Belarus, two countries subject to
arms embargoes.42
This is confirmed by the Operational Action Plan for Firearms 2022,
which states that “firearms are also trafficked from the EU towards Ukraine and
Libya.”43
40
Europol (2017), cit., p. 54.
41
European Commission (2018), Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council.
Elements towards an EU Strategy against illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their
Ammunition. "Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens", JOIN(2018) 17 final, Brussels, Section 1
‘Introduction,’ p. 1.
42
“EU arms firms trying to flout Belarus and Russia ban”, 6.10.2021,
https://euobserver.com/world/153145
43
Operational Action Plan 2022: Firearms trafficking, Council Document 13596/21, 14.11.2021 -
LIMITED
19
2.3 Problem III: administrative burden for the legal movement of civilian
firearms
2.3.1 What is the problem?
Economic operators continue to face different national rules, procedures and practices
when trying to obtain an export or import authorisation. This means that EU businesses
are subject to different requirements and administrative procedures, and therefore bear
different costs, depending on the Member State in which they operate. They are notably
faced with burdensome paper-based procedures. According to the results of the survey
conducted during the 2019 study on improvement of the EU rules on imports and export
of firearms, each enterprise employs from 4 to 12 hours each month to deal with the
export authorisation processes. Consequently, despite a degree of harmonisation brought
by the introduction of the Regulation with respect to exports, EU producers, exporters
and importers do not yet operate in a truly unified control environment with a level
playing field, especially as the regulation does not provide for common rules with respect
to imports.
2.3.2. What are the problem drivers?
The main problem driver is an unclear legal framework. One of the main original
objectives of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 was to ensure a harmonised implementation
of the provisions across all Member States, in line with Article 10 of the United Nations
Firearms Protocol. The 2017 evaluation report of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012
highlighted the existence of areas of inconsistent and heterogeneous application that lead
to obstacles to international trade, and movement of civilian firearms. Such areas relate to
the vagueness of the Regulation (e.g. no definition or specifications on simplified
procedures, the general nature of the provisions governing information exchanges and
administrative cooperation, controls for refusals of essentially identical transactions,
check of the criminal record), which does not enable a unified implementation by
Member States. The regulation also includes many optional provisions (e.g. the adoption
of a single procedure for military and non-military firearms, or whether or not to assume
the tacit agreement of third countries of transit) and references to national provisions (e.g.
confirmation of receipt). The evaluation report therefore stated that “allowing the
competent authorities to choose is a weakness of the Regulation, whose implementation
and interpretation should in principle be uniform.” Because the Regulation does not
indicate specific procedures or systems to manage applications for and issuance of export
and import licenses, each Member State is free to decide on the adoption of an electronic
or paper-based procedure, and on the application of a fee for such procedure, according
to national practice. Therefore, channels used for the application and licensing process
(and related costs) differ across Member States.
Besides, the Regulation currently mainly focuses on export controls, thus leaving import-
related processes to national legislation. It notably harmonises deadlines to national
authorities to reply to applications only for export authorisations and not for import
authorisations.
20
Additionally, the Regulation sought to harmonise pre-existing rules on prior
authorisation of transit of firearms in third countries. The evaluation of the Regulation
revealed that transit-related provisions have a relatively large impact on costs.44
More
specifically, economic operators reported difficulties in identifying who the competent
authority is in the country of transit to file their request. Resulting delays increase the
time for obtaining an export authorisation and the costs borne by economic operators
(e.g. the storage of firearm shipments blocked in airports). Regulation (EU) No 258/2012
aimed to mitigate the possible negative impact of the transit measures required by the
United Nations Firearms Protocol by introducing the possibility for Member States to
apply the principle of implied consent, thereby assuming approval of the third country of
transit if no objections to the transit are received within 20 days.45
This optional
provision aimed at balancing the business interest in speeding up the process with the
security interest of ensuring an adequate deadline for the transit states to react to the
exporter’s request.46
Despite this opportunity, not all Member States apply the principle
of implied consent, thus creating an uneven playing field.
Furthermore, the complex articulation between Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 and other
EU and national firearms legislation creates confusion, which enhances the
inconsistencies. The definitions and categories of firearms (prohibited, subject to
authorisation, subject to declaration) were initially the same in the Firearms Directive and
in the Regulation. The Firearms Directive 91/477/EEC was revised in 2017 and codified
in March 2021 by Directive (EU) 2021/555. The revision of the Firearms Directive led to
inconsistencies specifically in the scope and definitions (e.g. removal of the definition of
‘part’ and the modification of the definition of ‘essential component’). The revision of
the Firearms Directive significantly modified the firearms categories, in particular by
introducing new items (notably bringing deactivated firearms and firearms converted into
blank-firing, salute and acoustic weapons into scope) and moving certain types of
weapons (such as certain semi-automatic firearms) to a more stringent regime of
possession. Furthermore, some players (notably collectors, museums and brokers),
previously excluded, are now included in the scope of the Firearms Directive. Therefore
the Regulation currently has a more limited scope than the Directive: it does not regulate
exports by collectors, by museums, the activities of brokers, the exports of deactivated
firearms, or the exports of category A firearms even when they are legally owned by
sport shooters or arms dealers in the EU.
Moreover, there exists a “grey area” of overlap between the scope of Regulation (EU) No
258/2012 and the scope of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, leaving room for
divergent interpretations and inconsistencies in the application of the correct (military or
civilian) export regime to items that fall in this area. While the Regulation excludes from
its scope only “specially designed for military use and, in any case, firearms of the fully
automatic firing type”, 47
it nevertheless provides for the possibility for Member States to
44
EY, SIPRI and RAND (2017), cit, p.43.
45
Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012.
46
COM(2010)273 final.
47
Article 3, paragraph 1, letter b of the Regulation
21
“use a single procedure to carry out the obligations imposed on them by this Regulation
and by that Common Position.”48
This opening has been interpreted by some Member
States as a possibility to subject to the Common Position all weapons falling under the
Common military list, even if they are not specially designed for military use. The
evaluation of the Regulation revealed that Member States tend to interpret the scope of
such overlaps differently. The main problem is the lack of clear objective criteria set in
legislation to establish whether firearms or ammunition are military or civilian.49
When
requested to provide data on imports and exports of civilian firearms, many Member
States proved unable to distinguish them from military weapons, and sent statistics
covering both military and civilian firearms. Besides, the customs tariff classification
includes categories of firearms, which can be either military or non-military.50
This is
most often the case for types of short firearms and semi-automatic firearms, and related
ammunitions. Additionally, the civilian and military-grade export control regimes fall
under the remit of different national administrations in most of the Member States.51
Furthermore, the possibility to apply a single procedure52
results in some Member States
applying an identical procedure and identical criteria to all exports of weapons (both civil
and military). Consequently, transactions regarding substantially the same items can be
treated differently across the EU, as some Member States might decide to apply the
export licensing procedure for civilian firearms, while others might adopt the single
procedure.53
2.3.3. How will the problem evolve without intervention?
In the public consultation, 53% of all respondents considered that without further EU
intervention, the situation will deteriorate, with economic operators and legitimate
firearms owners likely to be faced with increasingly heterogeneous national rules and
procedures. In this consultation, the replies of the 12 businesses and business
representatives were inconclusive, with one third having no opinion, 25% considering
that the situation will improve, 16% that it would remain unchanged and 25% that it
would deteriorate.
In any event, the inconsistencies between the scope of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012, the
Firearms Directive (EU) 2021/555 and the overlap with the Common Position
2008/944/CFSP will not be solved without intervention. Without clear descriptions and
agreed upon procedures, divergent national requirements and administrative procedures
48
Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Regulation
49
Survey feedback: 47% (n=9) of the NCA responding to survey question 11.
50
Headings 9302, 9303, 9305.
51
EY, SIPRI and RAND (2017), cit., integrated with further desk research.
52
Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 allows Member States to adopt a single procedure if
an export is subject to authorisation requirements in accordance with both Regulation (EU)
No 258/2012 and the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. 15 Member States (AT, BG, CY, DE, DK,
ES, FI, HR, LU, LT, LV, MT, SE, SK and UK) and the BWR opted for a single procedure to issue
export authorisations. Source: EY, SIPRI and RAND (2017), complemented by information
collected through the field visits.
53
2019, Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import and transit
measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, p. 35
22
will stay in place and continue to be an obstacle to the establishment of a unified export
and import regime for civilian firearms within the EU Customs Union. This will result in
an uneven playing field between EU importers and lead to divergent costs for firearms
export companies. National differences in the procedures will continue to be an obstacle
to the establishment of a uniform export and import regime for civilian firearms, and will
go against the objectives pursued within the EU Customs Union where customs
procedures are already centralised.54
In particular, national non-harmonised licencing
systems will not be able to connect to the EU Single Window Environment for customs,
thus preventing economic operators from making use of this tool to complete all border
formalities in a single portal.
3. WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT?
3.1 Legal basis
The legal basis for acting in this area is Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) on the common commercial policy. Provisions adopted in
this area fall under the exclusive competence of the EU. This was also the legal basis for
Regulation (EU) 258/2012.55
All firearms covered by the EU Customs tariff56
fall under
the exclusive competence of the European Union. The differences in export, import and
transit authorisation procedures and controls across Member States are at odds with the
very concept of exclusive EU competence in external trade.57
As an area without internal borders in which goods and persons circulate freely, having
common rules on the import and export of firearms, their parts and components and
ammunition is of tantamount importance. Addressing the issues mentioned can only be
done at EU level, as Member States may not exercise this external competence, since this
would directly affect the effectiveness and uniform interpretation of internal EU law (the
Firearms Directive), irrespective of whether the firearms are designed for military or for
civilian use. It would also create regulatory divergences and legal loopholes which
criminals could avail themselves of. The description of the problems and their drivers (in
particular problem 2 linked to the administrative burden) demonstrate the need for
harmonised EU rules on imports and exports of firearms for civilian use.
Besides, considering the need to address extensively aspects of exchanges of information
and cooperation between customs authorities, between customs and competent licencing
authorities, and between those authorities and the Commission, the legal basis of this
initiative should also include article 33 TFEU.
54
Centralised clearance is a simplification that authorises importers/exporters to lodge at the customs
office where they are established, a customs declaration for goods which are presented at another
customs office within the customs territory of the Union.
55
Resolution 55/255 of 31 May 2001.
56
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and
on the Common Customs Tariff, section XIX, chapter 93
57
Article 3(1) of the TFEU establishes that the EU has exclusive external competence over the
Common Commercial Policy, and Article 207 of the TFEU outlines its scope.
23
3.2 Subsidiarity: Necessity and added value of EU action
A subsidiarity check is not required in an area of EU exclusive competence; however, the
need for EU action is clear.
The objective of the legislation is to ensure that no legal loophole in EU import, export
and transit legislation concerning firearms, their parts and components and ammunition
facilitates this diversion.
The UN Firearms Protocol provides for a framework for States to control and regulate
licit arms and arms flows, prevent their diversion into the illegal circuit, facilitate the
investigation and prosecution of related offences without hampering legitimate transfers.
By adopting the Regulation in 2012, the EU was able to ratify the Firearms Protocol in
2013. It is therefore up to the EU to keep fighting and preventing the diversion of
firearms, especially as the EU is a key manufacturing region. Once a firearm is diverted,
it remains a threat for decades.
During the public consultation, respondents clearly stressed the need for EU action.
Almost 70% of respondents (75% of business representatives) considered important or
very important to have common EU rules on imports of civilian firearms from outside of
the EU and on exports of civilian firearms to non-EU countries. 62% considered that
there is a need for EU intervention on current rules on import, export and transit of
civilian firearms and 59,5% considered that there is need for new tools to improve
current rules on import, export and transit of civilian firearms. National authorities
themselves expressed an even higher support. During the closed and confidential
consultation of competent and law enforcement authorities, 76,66% of respondents
considered it important or very important to have common EU rules on imports of
civilian firearms from outside of the EU and 83,3% on exports of civilian firearms to
non-EU countries. The analysis of the free text contributions shows an overwhelming
request for uniform EU rules rather than addition of national procedures.
During the public consultation, many stakeholders (mostly individual firearms users such
as hunters and sport shooters) considered in the free text contributions that EU
intervention was not necessary because smugglers and traffickers do not declare their
activities, and that consequently EU legislation would only harm legitimate traders and
would continue to be disregarded by criminals. This argument ignores the fact that,
except for home-made firearms, firearms used in criminal acts were initially legally
manufactured and sold, and were diverted at some point of their life cycle.
4. OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED?
4.1 General objectives
The strategic objective of this initiative is to close legal loopholes that can facilitate the
circumvention of rules, smuggling and the trafficking of firearms for civilian use by
ensuring a uniform application of the rules on imports and exports of firearms the UN
Firearms protocol. It is essentially a trade policy initiative aiming at better regulating
import and export controls for firearms, their components and ammunitions.
24
Due to their specificities in relation to defence, national security and the implementation
of the common foreign and security policy, this initiative does not address sales to the
armed forces or public authorities, or government-to-government transactions. Export
controls of firearms for military use should remain addressed by the Council Common
Position 2008/944/CFSP, governing exports of all military technology and equipment.
4.2 Specific objectives
To achieve the strategic objective, based on the evaluation of the Regulation, on the
public consultation as well as targeted consultations with stakeholders, the Commission
identified three specific objectives:
The first objective is to improve the systematise data collection about international
movements of firearms for civilian use, as well as seizure data. This implies receiving
annual data by Member States on the number of authorisations, refusals, the quantities
and values of civilian firearms exports and imports, by origin or destination.
Furthermore, receiving seizure data will allow targeted policies to prevent and tackle
firearms trafficking.
The second objective is to enable coordinated controls and risk assessments. This
implies first to ensure the traceability of firearms. Tracing, according to article 2(16) of
the Regulation, “means the systematic tracking of firearms and, where possible, their
parts and essential components and ammunition from manufacturer to purchaser for the
purpose of assisting the competent authorities of Member States in detecting,
investigating and analysing illicit manufacturing and trafficking.” Both at import and at
export, the current framework needs to be improved in that respect, since loopholes have
been identified in both inwards and outwards movements. This applies notably to the
proper recording of firearms-related information and to the need to improve the work of
customs authorities in detecting, while at export it concerns more the work of export
licencing authorities. For both types of movements, the cooperation between law
enforcement authorities (including customs) and licensing authorities should be
improved.
The third specific objective is to ensure a level playing field and reducing the
administrative burden placed on economic operators and firearms users. Here, the
focus is on ensuring a uniform application of EU law and of the UN Firearms Protocol,
instead of the current situation with economic operators being faced with 27 different
types of rules and lack of legal certainty despite the application of the regulation
currently in force.
These objectives are fully compatible with other EU policies and with the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. They are notably fully aligned with the EU commitment to
“continue to promote responsible and effective arms export control in the EU’s
neighbourhood, in accordance with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP for military-grade
25
weapons and Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 for civilian firearms.”58
They are also in line
with the approach taken in the modernisation of the export control mechanism for dual-
use goods under Regulation (EU) 2021/82159
.
58
as mentioned in the Joint Communication of the Commission and of the High Representative
“Elements towards an EU Strategy against illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their
Ammunition” JOIN(2018)17 of 13.6.2018 and in the Council Conclusions on the Adoption of an
EU Strategy Against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons & Their Ammunition,
9.11.2018.
59
Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting
up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-
use items (recast), OJ L 206 11.6.2021
26
Intervention logic
27
5. WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS?
5.1. WHAT IS THE BASELINE FROM WHICH OPTIONS ARE ASSESSED?
In the baseline scenario, the current regulatory framework would remain unchanged, as described
essentially in the evaluation report of the application of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of December
2017.60
Consequently, the problem description would also be unaffected.
With respect to semi-finished firearms and essential components, Rule 2(a) of the World Customs
Organisation’s General rules for the interpretation of the harmonized system (i.e. the world-wide
customs classification of goods)61
already apply and customs must already treat semi-finished
receivers as essential components of firearms, as according to this rule “any reference in a heading
to an article shall be taken to include a reference to that article incomplete or unfinished, provided
that, as presented, the incomplete or unfinished article has the essential character of the complete or
finished article.” This provision would continue to be unevenly applied, with many semi-finished
firearms and components being declared as other types of goods.
As mentioned in the above-mentioned report, some Member States will continue to apply the rules
and procedures of the Regulation to weapons, which are currently excluded from its scope
(deactivated firearms, alarm and signal weapons). The overlap with the Common Position would
continue, and each Member State would continue to have its own rules and procedures regarding
firearms that are legally owned and acquired by civilians but which they consider as “military”.
National competent authorities will continue facing difficulties in determining the civilian or
military nature of firearms (in particular as regards weapons in category ML1)62
based on their
technical characteristics. 15 Member States opted for a single procedure (see section 2.1.2) to issue
export authorisations, the arrangements for which vary greatly from one Member State to another.
The methods for submitting authorisation requests will remain in the hands of the Member States,
with burdensome paper-based procedures remaining a majority.63
In application of article 55 of the implementing provision of the Union Customs Code, the
Commission collects data regarding the import and export of firearms in the Customs Surveillance
System (Military shipments are not subject to submitting declarations and therefore are not subject
to customs Surveillance).64
The data collected could be used at aggregated level (without personal
60
COM(2017) 737 final, 12.12.2017.
61
General rules for the interpretation of the harmonized system https://www.wcotradetools.org/en/harmonized-
system/rules
62
The ML1 list includes smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic
weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm or less and accessories.
63
In the confidential consultation of national authorities, only one third of respondents mentioned the use of
electronic import authorisation processes, and only 40% indicated the use of electronic export authorisation
processes.
64
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for
implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the
Council laying down the Union Customs Code, OJ L 343, 29.12.2015.
28
data), for the development of an EU-level analysis of the licit flows of civilian firearms to and from
the European Union, which would facilitate a better knowledge of the threat and contribute to more
efficient risk profiles and targeting of checks. However, as mentioned in section 2.1.2, customs data
do not enable a distinction between military and civilian firearms; or between the different
categories (prohibited, subject to authorisation, subject to declaration) of firearms according to the
Regulation. Publicly available data are not comparable and different sources contradict one another
(see below section 6.1 and annex 4).
The following issues would remain unresolved in a “no action” scenario. The absence of any
provisions in the Regulation for export markings in the case of deactivated weapons or alarm
weapons makes traceability impossible. Moreover, the traceability of the consignments is not
guaranteed during transit operations through the customs territory of the European Union. The
disparate practices in national records (no single national register) adversely affect traceability.
Similarly, the absence of interconnectivity between intra-EU transfer files and files for export
licences complicates the full reconstitution of movements of firearms. Data about trade,
authorisations, denials and enforcement would continue to be gathered in an uncoordinated way.
An extract from the criminal record is not systematically requested when submitting an application
for an export authorisation, as it is not expressly required by the regulation. There is no indication
that the existence of a crime or an infringement justifying the refusal of the authorisation is always
checked either in the national criminal records, or a fortiori in the criminal records of the other
Member States. Many national authorities will continue to grant export authorisations even when
identical transactions have been refused by another Member State. During the confidential
consultation of national authorities, only 12% of respondents (three replies) mentioned that they
check the criminal record of the applicant in European Criminal Records Information System
before granting an authorisation or that they request the applicant to submit a copy of the national
criminal record of another relevant country. The baseline scenario therefore maintains a major
security gap.
As mentioned in the 2017 evaluation report of the Commission, the regulatory and administrative
landscape will also remain disparate because of the lack of clarity of some provisions, complex
articulations with other instruments, the leeway given to the Member States in their administrative
procedures, in evaluating authorisation requests and in whether or not to recognise the tacit
agreement of third countries of transit, and the general nature of the provisions governing
information exchanges and administrative cooperation. As the Commission is not an addressee of
the information exchanges on authorisation refusals, it will remain unable to monitor the situation
at European level and alert the competent authorities in cases where their respective approaches
diverge.
In the baseline scenario, imports procedures and authorisation processes will remain completely out
of the scope of the Regulation, although this is an exclusive competence of the EU, which Member
States are in principle precluded to regulate.
It is likely that the 2018 Recommendation of the Commission on immediate steps to improve
security of export, import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and essential components
and ammunition65
will continue to be ignored by Member States, as it has been so far. The main
reason for the lack of uptake of the 2018 Recommendation is likely to be its non-mandatory nature.
In addition, implementation of the recommendation would have involved additional work and a
65
C(2018) 2197 final
29
change of administrative habits. This is particularly the case for the lack of provision of statistical
data, which can result from a conjunction of both a difficulty in distinguishing military from
civilian firearms and a weak administrative capacities to collect the data. The Recommendation was
in any case not sufficiently specific to address the disparate practices between Member States. As a
result, exporters will continue to face a non-unified import and export control mechanism for
firearms.
With respect to seizures of firearms, it is unlikely that Member States subject to the Schengen
acquis would substantially improve their provision of statistics pursuant to the 1999 Decision of the
Executive Committee on the illegal trade in firearms, since the Commission is not aware of such
communications.66
In the baseline scenario, since 15 March 2021, customs authorities will have a better oversight of
firearms and firearms parts imported in the EU through fast parcel shipment, since relevant
operators are now under the obligation to issue a summary entry declaration in the EU’s Import
Control System (ICS)2 for all goods shipped to the EU.
5.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE POLICY OPTIONS
5.2.1. OPTION 1: SOFT-LAW APPROACH
Option 1 is based on a soft-law approach, which would focus on complementing the 2018
Recommendation of the Commission on immediate steps to improve security of export,
import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and essential components and
ammunition,67 with additional more detailed guidance and stepping up enforcement of the
already applicable legislation.
Import
With respect to traceability of firearms the 2018 Recommendation notably encourages Member
States, in addition to the unique marking required by the Firearms Directive, to make an additional
and simple marking with the identification of the country of import and year of import, as required
by the UN Firearms Protocol.
With respect to semi-finished firearms and essential components, the Commission would provide
guidance building on Rule 2(a) of the World Customs Organisation’s General rules for the
interpretation of the harmonized system.68
The Guidance would build on those principles
specifically in relation to firearms, by providing a working definition of semi-finished firearms and
components, and requesting Member States to report on how they implement those principles.
The Guidance would include detailed criteria for the correct customs classification of weapons
either as alarm and signal weapons or as firearms.
Export
The Recommendation also calls on Member States to verify systematically that all firearms, which
are deactivated in the EU and are exported to third countries as deactivated firearms, are marked
66
SCH/Com-ex (99) 10
67
C(2018) 2197 final
68
see above in the baseline scenario
30
and that owners are issued a deactivation certificate in accordance with EU law.69
In addition,
Member States would be encouraged to apply the standards of non-convertibility of alarm and
signal weapons70
to exported alarm and signal weapons, in addition to their existing obligation to
check imported alarm and signal weapons pursuant to Implementing Directive 2019/69.
This option would include more specific guidance, listing out the particulars that firearms licensing
authorities should trace and record at export (notably the name of the manufacturer or the brand, the
country or place of manufacture, the serial number and year of manufacture and if possible the
model).
Improved cooperation and exchanges of information between competent authorities
With respect to law enforcement cooperation and exchange of information, this option would
complement the 2018 Recommendation:
- with more detailed templates for the provision of annual statistics about the number of
authorisations, refusals, the quantities and values of firearms exports and imports, by origin
or destination, in order to develop a better picture of the movements;
- by asking them to report on the use of the European Criminal Records Information
Exchange System (ECRIS) when checking the criminal background of applicants;
- by asking them to report on the type of inspection systems and processes to check whether
the conditions for granting an export authorisation continue to be met;
- by upgrading and improving the COARM System, in order to adapt it to civilian firearms,
and ensure that Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 is correctly mentioned as the legal basis in
the system, and asking Member States to report on checks and notifications in COARM;
In addition to the new guidance, the Commission would step up exchanges of information through
the meetings of the Firearms Export coordination group by requesting Member States to report in
that context
- on exchange risk information related to the movement of firearms through the customs risk
management system;
- on exchange of information about the classification of imported alarm and signal weapons
To improve the implementation of the 1999 Decision of the Executive Committee on the illegal
trade in firearms,71
the Commission would provide an update of the categories and type of
information about seizures to be reported annually. It would also call on Member States to share
those data annually according to an updated template with Europol.
69
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2403, amended by Commission Implementing Regulation
(EU) 2018/2403 establishing common guidelines on deactivation standards and techniques for ensuring that
deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable (Text with EEA relevance)
70
Commission Implementing Directive (EU) 2019/69 of 16 January 2019 laying down technical specifications for
alarm and signal weapons under Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of
weapons
71
SCH/Com-ex (99) 10
31
With respect to the coordination of risk assessment and customs controls, in view of the future
releases of the Import Control System 2 (ICS2)72
, the Commission would review the Common Risk
Criteria and standards (CRC) for pre-arrival73
and improve the targeting of firearms trafficked in
commercial shipments, including postal and express consignments, with criteria aimed at prohibited
and restricted items. The new set of CRC would be applied to the Entry Summary Declarations
submitted by the economic operators to the customs office of first entry, for all goods entering the
EU external borders. Moreover, new analytics capabilities (Safety and Security Analytics – SSA) to
complement and enhance the risk analysis will be introduced as per Release 2 of ICS2.
Under Horizon 2020, the Commission will fund activities to improve notably the detection of
weapons, with non-intrusive inspection of cargo or packages and Artificial intelligence image
recognition.74
Administrative simplifications
Under this option, the Commission would also facilitate the activities of economic operators by
publishing a non-binding list of competent authorities in non-EU countries, that would help them
determine who to reach out to in order to get the required import or transit authorisations.
Furthermore, the new guidance of the Commission would include recommendations, based on best
practices of Member States, on the use of simplified procedures. This would notably concern
temporary imports and temporary exports currently not covered by the Regulation. It could also
include specific guidance for facilitations in favour of Authorised Economic Operators with the
Safety and Security element (AEO-S or AEO-F), subject to integration in TARIC.
Such new guidance would also include the use of systematic e-licencing procedure. Besides, the
Commission would provide for Member States a free-of charge voluntary e-licensing procedure,
building on and expanding the e-licensing platform75
(currently dedicated to exports of dual-use
goods) to cover imports and exports of firearms. This e-licensing platform could also support the
data collection.
5.2.2. OPTION 2: CLARIFICATION OF THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Option 2 provides for a legislative clarification, which would remove ambiguities in the
interpretation of the applicable legislation (e.g. type of information to be recorded,
classification of certain weapons and components as firearms), an express legal basis to
require competent authorities to use existing systems to exchange information, harmonising
existing simplified procedures, aligning deadlines, clarifying roles of importers and exporters,
72
Release 2 on 1st
March 2023 (air general cargo) and Release 3 on 1st
March 2024 (all other means of transport).
73
Commission Decision No C (2011) 5170 of 22. July 2011 amending the Decision C (20019) 2601 of 15. April
establishing common risk criteria and standards for security and safety risk analysis for the harmonised
application of certain customs controls pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92
74
ENTRANCE: fficient Risk-based Inspection of freight Crossing borders without disrupting business (entrance-
h2020.eu); C-BORD Project - Effective Container Inspection at BORDer Control Points (cbord-h2020.eu);
ACXIS: Automated Comparison of X-ray Images for cargo Scanning; MULTISCAN3D: Laser-plasma based
source 3D Tomography for cargo inspection; SilentBorder Cosmic Ray Tomograph for Identification of
Hazardous and Illegal Goods hidden in Trucks and Sea Containers
75
https://webgate.acceptance.ec.europa.eu/frontoffice/welcome. Expanding this e-licensing platform, managed by
DG Trade, should not include a large cost. It is estimated that this will cost a couple of thousand euros.
32
and aligning the scope of the Regulation with the Firearms Directive. This option would
essentially translate most of the measures mentioned in option 1 in the text of the Regulation.
Import
With respect to imported alarm and signal weapons, it would fill a gap resulting from the unclear
legal framework and the ensuing lack of proper import controls, which could not be addressed by
the Commission Implementing Directive (EU) 2019/69 because of the limitation of the delegation
of power. It would provide for a compulsory classification as firearms of alarm and signal weapons
not complying with the Firearms Directive and the implementing directive, as early as the stage of
the customs declaration. Member States would also have to designate the authorities in charge of
checking compliance with the implementing directive before the release into free circulation, if it
differs from the authorities designated under the implementing directive.
Export
To support national licensing authorities in ensuring the tracing of exported firearms, this option
includes an explicit reference to the possibility to use the opportunities of the tools for
administrative and investigative cooperation in third countries, provided by article 20 of the 1997
Regulation on mutual assistance.76
Improved cooperation and exchanges of information between competent authorities
This option would provide for a compulsory check of criminal records in ECRIS and provide for
exchange of risk information related to the movement of firearms by using the customs risk
management system.
It would also make it compulsory to notify refusals in a common electronic system and check for
refusals issued by other Member States before granting an authorisation. This system could either
be COARM or an extension of the Dual-Use electronic System (DUeS)77
to cover not only exports
of dual-use goods but also imports and exports of firearms. The Commission would have delegated
powers to determine such a system.78
The relevant provision could be similar to that of articles 4(7)
and 23(6) of the dual-use regulation.79
This digitalisation and compulsory checks of a common
electronic system would contribute to the collection of some data. However, this option would not
oblidge Member States to gather and send in any additional data regarding the export and import
authorisations, their value and destination.
In addition, this option would create a legal basis to enable export licensing authorities to check, in
case of suspicion (e.g. when the firearm was not previously registered in the national data-filing
76
Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative
authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct
application of the law on customs and agricultural matters
77
The Dual Use System (DUeS) offered by the Commission is used by all the Member States in order to share
information on Dual Use export transactions and enforce the controls at European level. DUeS communications
are exchanged over the secured TESTA network thereby ensuring the appropriate level of data confidentiality
and integrity.
78
Extending these systems to incorporate refusals issued by Member States on granting an authorisations, will
take time. During the implementation, DG HOME will take into account the view and limitations of other services.
79
Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union
regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items, OJ L
206, 11.6.2021.
33
system or was not just recently manufactured) whether an exported firearm has been reported lost
or stolen in another Member State by checking the Schengen Information System before granting
an export authorisation.
Under this option, the Regulation would also make applicable the whistle-blower-protection regime
put in place with Directive (EU) No 2019/193780
to persons who report breaches of the Regulation.
The Regulation was not included in the list of Union act to which the Directive applies because of
an incompatibility between the legal bases, which would be solved by a specific provision in the
Regulation. Besides, in order to clarify the legal framework, it would complement the definition of
trafficking of article 2 (15) of the regulation with an additional provision in article 16 (devoted to
sanctions), establishing an express incrimination of arms trafficking.
Administrative simplifications
The revised regulation would clarify definitions and categories of firearms to bring them in line
with those of Directive (EU) 2021/555. It would for instance apply to brokers and collectors. The
list of prohibited weapons to which the Regulation currently does not apply would be expanded to
include the whole category A of the most dangerous firearms. The overlap between the Regulation
and the Common Position would be solved by building on the logic of the current Regulation – and
actually further restricting its scope, thus subjecting the firearms that have been prohibited inside
the EU since the amendment to the Firearms Directive in 2017 only to the Council Common
Position 2008/944/CFSP. This would mean that many weapons currently in the “grey zone” would
only be subject to the Common Position.
To harmonise administrative procedures and provide economic operators with a unified, simpler,
regulatory environment, the Regulation would include new provisions clarifying the roles and
responsibilities of importers and exporters, similar to those currently in force with respect to market
surveillance and compliance of products under article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 (making
sure the right marking is applied to imported firearms, duty of cooperation with competent
authority, duty to inform authorities in case of suspected violation of the rules, etc.).
The Regulation would align deadlines for granting import authorisations to deadlines for export
authorisations (60 days and exceptionally 90 days). It would establish harmonised simplified
procedures for temporary exports not currently covered by the Regulation (such as exhibitions or
repairs). It would repeal the possibility for a global authorisation, which is almost never used.
Finally, the Regulation would turn the current option for Member States to assume implied consent
of the third country of transit (if it has not replied within 20 days) into the default option. Member
States would have to expressly notify the requirement of an express agreement of the third country
of transit.
5.2.3. OPTION 3: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
Option 3 would build on and complement option 2, and add to it new legislative provisions to
ensure the full traceability of imported and exported firearms (e.g. compulsory import
marking, limiting imports of semi-finished components to dealers, computerised data-filing,
post-shipment checks), for national authorities to share statistics and improve exchanges of
80
Directive (EU) No 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the
protection of persons who report breaches of Union law, OJ of 26.11.2019, L 305/17.
34
information between licencing and customs authorities, to establish new simplifications
(temporary imports, general export authorisation, e-procedures), and to remove the scope
overlaps with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP by applying exclusively to all civilian-to-
civilian transactions.
Import
At import, the Regulation would establish a clearer rule than under the current Directive (EU)
2021/555, providing that no firearm or essential component could be released into free circulation
or placed on the market without the unique marking required by the Directive (under the Directive,
marking must take place “without delay after import”). To avoid that unmarked firearms end up in
the wrong hands in third country, such unmarked firearms would have to be destroyed.
To avoid diverging analyses from one Member State to another, the Regulation would establish an
EU-level mechanism to ensure that a given model of alarm and signal weapon is classified under
the same position of the customs combined nomenclature throughout the EU. For imported alarm
and signal weapons, the regulation could also establish a list of non-convertible alarm and signal
weapons that are compliant with implementing directive 2019/69, thus ensuring that the import
authorisation of such weapons would be automatically recognised throughout the EU.
Under this option, the Regulation would provide a common definition of semi-finished firearms and
essential components and limit their import to licensed arms dealers; such semi-finished products
would therefore not be available anymore to private individuals.
Finally, in order to avoid any legal loopholes facilitating misdeclaration of goods, the Regulation
would provide that customs simplifications are not applicable to firearms and their essential
components.
Export
To ensure full traceability at export, the Regulation would make it compulsory for exporters to
provide evidence of final import in the country of destination. It would also provide a legal basis
enabling Member States to entitle third parties to conduct post-shipment controls in their name,
notably through the implementation of Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191.81
In order to take into account the need to ensure full traceability of firearms which could also be
used for military purposes or for internal repression, and to compensate for removal of the overlap
with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (see below – administrative simplifications), the
Regulation would create for weapons prohibited (category A) and subject to authorisation
(category B) an obligation for the exporter to provide an end-user certificate. The Regulation would
include the particulars and characteristics of such an end-user certificate. To limit the administrative
burden, and in line with the User's Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining
common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment,82
only the
actual importer of civilian firearms (i.e. the arms dealer) in the third country would be considered as
81
Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2191 of 19 December 2019 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit
conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer
82
“in the case of an export to a firm which resells the goods on the local market, the firm will be regarded as the
end-user”; https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST%209241%202009%20INIT/EN/pdf;
35
the end-user. The end-user certificate would include a commitment not to re-export firearms
without prior approval of the EU licensing authority and not to sell it to non-civilian users.
Improved cooperation and exchanges of information between competent authorities
To ensure proper record-keeping, the Regulation would require Member States to establish
computerised data-filing systems for import and export authorisations. This would effectively
create digital continuity with internal data-filing systems, which are already computerised pursuant
to the Firearms Directive. Furthermore, this would facilitate the systematic data collection of the
Member States.
In this option, the Regulation would include detailed provisions on the exchange of information
between licensing authorities and customs authorities, to clarify their respective roles and
responsibilities, and ensure good coordination especially when the customs office of entry or of exit
is in a different Member State than the import or export licensing authority. The Regulation would
notably clarify the roles of customs authorities in the case of external transit of firearms, including
in the case of transit (i.e. movements of non-EU goods). Except for temporary imports and exports,
where the declaration would include the particulars of individual firearms or components (see
below), the role of customs would limit itself to the traceability of shipments. The Regulation
would only provide for customs checks based on risk assessment.
Until e-licences and the full inter-connection with the EU Single Window Environment for
Customs are rolled out, it would notably apply to the Regulation article 25 of Regulation (EU)
1020/2019 on market surveillance with respect to controls on products entering the Union market.83
It would also draw inspiration from the rules proposed by:
the 2021 proposal for a Regulation on deforestation:84
 article 24 in relation to the organisation of controls, in particular the check by customs of
the relevant import or export licence before release for free circulation or export;
the 2021 proposal for a Regulation on shipments of waste:85
 article 35, paragraph 3, points a) to e) with respect to transit of firearms between the
customs office of entry and the customs office of import or the customs office of export and
the customs office of exit;
 article 54 with respect to firearms shipped through Member States from and to third
countries
The Regulation would provide a legal basis for the sharing of intelligence by licensing authorities
with customs authorities.
83
Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on market
surveillance and compliance of products and amending Directive 2004/42/EC and Regulations (EC) No
765/2008 and (EU) No 305/2011, OJ L 169, 25.6.2019.
84
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the making available on the Union
market as well as export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and
forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010, COM/2021/706 final
85
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on shipments of waste and amending
Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) No 2020/1056, COM/2021/709 final
36
To improve the knowledge of trends and exchanges of information between licencing and customs
authorities, Member States would be required to submit annually their statistics on the number of
authorisations, refusals, as well as value, amounts, countries of origin and of destination of imports
and exports to the Commission. Besides, the obligation currently stemming from the 1999 Decision
of the Schengen Executive Committee on the illegal trade in firearms86
to “submit each year their
national annual data for the preceding year on illegal trade in firearms” would be enshrined in the
Regulation, thus applying to all EU Member States and EFTA countries. The digitalisation of the
different procedures should support the Member States in this task.
Administrative simplifications
The Regulation would provide a legal basis to use the EU Single Window Environment for
customs,87
enabling a connection between customs systems and import and export e-licensing
systems through an EU database via the EU Single Window Environment for customs via the EU
Customs Single Window Certificates Exchange System (EU CSW-CERTEX)88
. To further simplify
authorisation procedures for economic operators, systematic e-procedures (electronic licensing
system) would be made compulsory (as a complement to the e-licensing system provided by the
Commission under option 1).
In order to provide economic operators and competent authorities with a simpler, unified regulatory
framework, this option would address one of the most-mentioned problems, namely the grey zone
between the civilian firearms of the Regulation and the firearms “specially designed for military
use” subject to the procedures of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. Under this option, the
scope of the Regulation would be fully aligned with the scope of the Firearms Directive (including
the category A of most dangerous firearms). As mentioned in section 4.1 above, State-to-State (i.e.
government-to-government) transactions, as well as direct sales to the armed forces, the police, or
public authorities would still be excluded from the scope of this initiative, and would continue to be
subject to Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. All other transactions would be considered of civilian
nature, and be subject only to the rules and procedure of this Regulation. To summarize, the new
Regulation would:
1. regulate all civilian transactions (the Common position would not apply to them any more)
2. establish for prohibited firearms and firearms subject to authorisation substantive rules that
are similar to those of the Common Position.
Under this option, the Regulation would also set out harmonised simplifications for temporary
imports and exports (for repairs, expertise or exhibition), as well as re-imports following temporary
export or re-exports following temporary imports. In this option, the mere release of the goods by
customs authorities would amount to an import or export authorisation.
The Commission would have the power to adopt delegated acts establishing a general export
authorisation for arms dealers which are Authorised Economic Operators with the Safety and
Security element (AEO-S or AEO-F) under customs rules. This would essentially replace the global
authorisation repealed in option 2. The exact scope of the authorisation would be defined in the
delegated act. As an illustration, it could be limited to intra-group movements (i.e. exports of
86
SCH/Com-ex (99) 10
87
COM(2020) 673 final
88
The creation of this interconnection will be a coordination exercise between different services of the Commission. It
will be important to keep a realistic timeframe in mind
37
firearms to a subsidiary of an EU-based company in a third country), or it could cover exports to
authorised economic operators in third countries recognised by the Member State in application of
an agreement of mutual recognition.
In this option, fees for authorisations and transit (except escorting) would be prohibited, thus
alleviating the financial burden on economic operators.
5.2.4. OPTION 3 BIS: NEW PROVISIONS WITHOUT CHANGE TO THE INTERPLAY WITH
THE COMMON POSITION
Option 3 bis would be substantially similar to option 3, with one exception: instead of
following the logic of the Firearms Directive for the distinction between military and civilian
transaction, the Regulation would maintain the reference to “firearms specially designed for
military use”.
Under this option, avoiding the overlap between the Regulation and the Council Common Position
2008/944/CFSP would require the establishment of the technical characteristics which would define
whether the firearms owned by civilians must be considered as military or civilian ones. Currently
this assessment is done at national level on a case by case basis.
Under this option, the Commission would adopt an implementing or a delegated act listing out the
characteristics of the firearms, and could even issue Decisions to classify a given firearm model
into either the civilian or military category.
5.3. ELEMENTS DISCARDED AT AN EARLY STAGE
Considering their wide range and realistic nature, no option could be discarded as a whole at an
early stage. However, the Commission considers that some individual elements of the options
should in any case not be implemented. They were therefore excluded from the assessment of the
options.
The UN Firearms provides that State parties establish import marking with the marking of the first
country of import and the year of import. Such a measure would concretely not genuinely improve
the traceability of firearms imported in the EU. Within the EU customs union, traceability is
already ensured by the existence of the unique marking provided by the Firearms Directive and the
registration in national computerised data-filing systems, effectively enabling the full traceability of
firearms as required by the Firearms Protocol. When a weapon is seized and cannot be traced back
in the national system of the country of seizure, national law enforcement authorities will send a
tracing request to relevant countries of suspicion, in connection with the case (based on the visible
markings of the weapons, the country of the nationality of the perpetrator or any relevant contextual
element). If that does not yield any result, a search in the Schengen Information System will show
whether the firearm was lost or stolen elsewhere in the EU. Finally, a last resort option is to send a
tracing request to all Member States through Europol’s Secure Information Exchange Network. A
search in Interpol’s iArms database may also determine whether the firearm was lost or stolen
outside of the EU. In most cases, the tracing is ensured in the two first options and do not require
additional information such as the country or year of import. Besides, firearms imported into the
EU are unlikely to be re-exported and diverted outside of the EU, thus making such import marking
unnecessary for traceability purposes. Neither the UNODC Global Firearms Study nor any other
case studies point to any weapons imported into the EU, which were then re-exported and diverted,
38
and for which the import marking would have made a difference. In fact, most firearms exported
from the EU have been manufactured in the EU and therefore would in any case not bear an import
marking. As 19 Member States89
already require import markings, the additional costs of imposing
such marking on the remaining Member States would amount to 2,4 million euro per year.
Consequently the administrative and economic burden of imposing additional import marking
would be out of proportion with the security advantages it would provide in terms of traceability or
with the role-model that the EU could play at international level.
The idea to request an entry summary declaration even in personal luggage was considered a
disproportionate burden. To avoid the risk of smuggling of firearms in personal luggage, the
Regulation would have made compulsory an Entry Summary Declaration for firearms in line with
article 127 of the Union Customs Code,90
effectively disapplying the exemption of article 104 of
Delegated Regulation 2015/2446. Such an option would have required prior customs declaration
before the arrival on the EU customs territory. It would not have provided a specific benefit
compared to the current obligation to declare the firearms at arrival, and would in any case have
been easily circumvented by fraudsters, who would have continued to smuggle firearms and
essential components through that channel.
6. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS?
6.1. METHODOLOGY
Annex 4 describes the methodological constraints faced during this impact assessment in the
collection of governmental and company data.
The main issue that has been encountered consistently since 2017 is the lack of reliable and
consistent data that would enable a quantification of the problems and of the impact of options.
This is due to inadequate data collection at national level (several Member States do not collect
centrally data on import or export authorisations,91
or are unable to distinguish between civilian and
military firearms,92
the statistics about the latter being sometimes confidential) and the reluctance of
economic operators to share data about what they consider is sensitive information, despite the
Commission recommendation to share such data in 2018. Besides, available business statistics
relate only to EU arms manufacturers but not all arms dealers, which are the most relevant ones
when it comes to imports into the EU.
The Commission (and its contractor) repeatedly attempted to collect accurate information during
the 2017 evaluation of the Regulation, during the 2019 study on improvement of the EU rules on
imports and export of firearms, during the 2021 consultation of stakeholders and the consultation of
Member States (official letters of August 2021 and February 2022, targeted questionnaires, face-to-
face interviews). This notwithstanding, the data collection is not comprehensive.
89
BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, HR, HU, IT, LT, LU, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI and SK
90
Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down
the Union Customs Code
91
Especially the largest players such as Germany or Italy. Belgium does not collect data on actual exports.
92
The German national report on firearms policy of 2020 explains that the numbers for ML1 are higher than the
total value of individual small arms licenses because ML1 also covers civilian firearms (revolvers, pistols)
hunting and sporting weapons
(https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Aussenwirtschaft/ruestungsexporte-bmwi-070221.pdf).
39
As a consequence, much of the statistics and figures had to be extrapolated from the scant available
data, or based on a median figure on a range. For instance, the analysis assumes that the
stakeholders concerned by exports are the 1000 EU-based firearms manufacturers, although not all
manufacturers carry out exports, and some retailers of firearms or individual users may also export
firearms. The analysis assumes that the stakeholders concerned by imports are the estimated 20.000
arms dealers in the EU (based on an estimation of industry associations since no official data is
available, annex 4 gives more information). As not all such arms dealers carry out imports from
non-EU countries, the costs of the measures introduced are bound to be an over-estimation93
.
6.2. SOCIAL IMPACTS
6.2.1. IMPACTS ON CITIZENS
Individual citizens will be primarily affected in their capacity of firearms users, be they hunters,
sport shooters, or collectors. The vast majority of them only operate within the EU, and will
therefore not be affected by EU rules on exports and imports. In the public consultation, several
respondents used the free text questions to explain that import and export procedures are currently
so burdensome that they do not engage in such operations. The vast majority of respondents (90%
being individual citizens) considered that they would benefit from a genuinely unified export and
import control system for firearms, which was confirmed in replies to the free text questions.
Establishing unified EU rules for administrative simplifications for temporary exports and
reimports (and temporary imports and re-exports) is a strong request.
Option 1 would have the lowest impact on citizens, as it would not change the legal framework.
The current rules on the use of the European Firearms Pass for temporary exports of hunters and
sport shooters would continue to apply, and those firearms users would not be affected by the new
requirement to provide an end-user certificate at export under option 3. This would in any case not
apply to firearms subject to mere declaration (category C).
Option 2 and 3 would only marginally affect individual citizens, as they already benefit from the
simplifications linked to the European Firearms pass. They would only be affected by the
prohibition to import semi-finished firearms and essential components, and would not be able to
import convertible alarm and signal weapons as easily as they used to. Citizens would benefit from
the clarity of harmonised EU rules (deadlines, harmonised simplifications, e.g. for exhibitions).
Option 3 bis could potentially affect individual citizens more. Especially if those citizens received
an exception to own a prohibited firearm (Category A). Multiple of these weapons could fall
exclusively under the scope of the Common Position, which increases the difficulty of the
procedure to import and export these weapons.
6.2.2. SECURITY IMPACTS
All options would have positive security impacts, although those of option 1 would be dependent
on whether or not Member States fully implement the detailed guidelines. As they already failed to
implement the 2018 Recommendation of the Commission in any substantive way, it is unclear to
which extent option 1 would have a major impact. New written, more comprehensive guidance,
93
For example in Spain only 98 dealers and manufacturers are involved in import and 127 in export, on a total of
1190 manufacturers and dealers. In Slovenia, 115 of the 152 dealers have a licence to export and import
firearms.
40
combined with a more intensive use of the Firearms export coordination group to exchange
information, the provision of a non-compulsory e-licensing tool and the development of Common
Risk Criteria and standards (CRC) for pre-arrival, supported by more harmonised data collection of
seizures, would nevertheless provide noticeable added-value compared to even a “dynamic”
baseline.
Options 2 and 3 would have more noticeable impacts, as they would address existing legal
loopholes, including by turning into law many of the elements of the guidelines in option 1.
They would notably ensure a unified approach of customs authorities with regard to imported alarm
and signal weapons, making sure that they are duly declared as firearms when they should. The
express classification of semi-finished firearms and essential components as the finished product –
and even more the prohibition made to others than arms dealers to import such semi-finished
components – would close a major legal loophole, which so far enabled criminals and extremist
groups to legally import such products in order to manufacture unmarked firearms. They would
also substantially improve exchanges of information between licencing authorities and between
licencing authorities and customs, in particular across borders. This will have a very positive impact
on sharing of intelligence and on risk assessments for individual import and export procedures.
Extending the whistle-blower protection regime to persons who report breaches of the Regulation
would encourage the fight against smuggling and diversion of firearms, as it would encourage
employees of the company to provide information to law-enforcement authorities.
6.3. IMPACT ON DIGITALISATION
Responding to an overwhelming support of stakeholders in the public consultation94
and in the
confidential consultation of competent authorities,95
the digitalisation of import and export
authorisations of the preferred option will have a major impact on stakeholders and public
administrations, which often (more than half of the respondents in the confidential consultation)
still operate with paper authorisations. Digitalisation will enable full digital integration of the whole
import and export cycle, in connection with the ongoing digitalisation of customs processes through
the Single Window environment for customs. It will also enable the connection with the
computerised data-filing systems for firearms registers, which are being established by Member
States as part of the implementation of Directive (EU) 2021/555 on the acquisition and possession
of weapons. This digitalisation will also facilitate the systematic data collection by the Member
States.
The following authorisations/certificates may be put in scope of the EU Single Window
Environment for Customs:
 Import authorisations
 Export authorisations
Any document, which is meant to be checked by customs as a precondition for customs clearance
via the Single window, shall be available in a central Union database to be established by the
Commission.
94
69% supported e-procedures
95
75% supported e-procedures
41
The technical developments that might be required at national level could be offset by the
availability of a single e-licencing portal provided free of charge by the European Commission.
6.4. ECONOMIC IMPACT
6.4.1. IMPACTS ON THE OVERALL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Evaluating the impact on the overall economic activity is a sensitive exercise, due to the limitations
explained in the methodology section (6.1) and in annex 4. Only figures about firearms
manufacturers are available, but not data about arms dealers in the EU, which are the main
importers of weapons. In addition, not all firearms manufacturers export their production, and they
also import weapon parts. Besides, it is currently not possible to quantify actual exports or imports
of civilian firearms, due to the lack or inconsistency of data provided by Member States. However,
the EU sold production of civilian firearms, alarm and signal weapons, their parts and components,
and ammunition accounts for (only) 0.09% of the EU27 total sold production value. Furthermore,
firearms represent only 0,027% of the total value of imports into the EU and 0,069% of the total
value of the export out of the EU. Therefore, the impact of the initiative on the overall economic
activity is bound to be negligible.
During the public consultation and the targeted interviews of business stakeholders, a clear
consensus emerged in favour of a more uniform EU import and export control system for civilian
firearms. Therefore, the economic impact of the options is expected to be positive, as it would meet
the expectations of businesses in terms of simplification. In particular, common rules on temporary
exports and imports would facilitate work of firearms manufacturers in their daily operations
(repairs). The main positive impact would be linked to digitalisation (see above) and to the
clarification of the legal framework with respect to the scope of applicable rules.
The clarification of roles and responsibilities of importers and exporters, along the lines of those
currently in force with respect to market surveillance and compliance of products under article 4 of
Regulation (EU) 2019/1020, would not create new obligations, since it would reflect obligations
they already meet under national legislation when applying for an authorisation.
6.4.2. IMPACT ON SMES AND COMPETITIVENESS
The various options are particularly relevant for small operators, which constitute 90% of the total
number of the economic operators involved. However, 82% of the total manufacturing turnover of
firearms is made by large companies (and 80% of all firms are located in only six Member
States),96
so SMEs would only be marginally affected by the measures.
Neither options 1 or 2 have any specific impact on SMEs, since they do not substantially change the
current regulatory framework or create new obligations. They are either recommendations or
clarifications of the legal framework.
SMEs, like the rest of arms dealers, would only incur (limited) costs under option 3. This concerns
notably systematically providing a proof of import in the third country of destination. This would
not add a specific burden on exporters, as this is an information that is already at hand, and that
they generally already keep in their record in case of future checks.
96
More information on the market structure can be found in Annex 4
42
The perspective to require an end-user certificate for exported category A and B weapons in
option 3 worries business representatives, who have, however, proven unable to quantify the impact
of such a measure. The main concern lies in the impossibility to determine the actual end-user in
the country of destination. This concern is unfounded because option 3 would limit the
administrative burden on exporters by stating that only the actual importer of civilian firearms (i.e.
the arms dealer) in the third country would be considered as the end-user. The main burden would
lie in the need to obtain from the importer an authenticated commitment not to re-export firearms
and not to sell it to non-civilian users. This, however, would not substantially differ from the
existing practice for military firearms, which are already subject to end-user certificates under
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. In fact, during stakeholder interviews, business
representatives explained that many exporters applied for military export licences (with end-user
certificate), in case they had reached the maximum number of authorisations for civilian export
licences. This would demonstrate that the end-user requirement does not create a disproportionate
burden on exporters.
6.4.3. IMPACTS ON NATIONAL AND EU ADMINISTRATIONS
The clarification of the legal framework and the provisions clarifying the respective roles of
customs and licencing authorities would overall imply a greater involvement of customs to ensure
the oversight of firearms shipments. Customs will be called on to enforce sectorial firearms
legislation, by ensuring notably that imported alarm and signal weapons are adequately classified
and accompanied with the required documentation, or that semi-finished components can only be
imported by arms dealers. Considering the small extent of firearms imports and exports (0,027% of
imports and 0,069% of exports), and the fact that customs do not carry out systematic controls, but
only conduct physical checks based on risk profiles, or only ex-post documentary checks, the
impact is deemed to be limited.
Similarly, the impact of making a compulsory use of a specific platform to exchange information
on refusals to grant authorisations would be limited, in view of the small number of denials issued
each year (around 30 refusals per year97
).
Establishing computerised data-filing systems for imports and export authorisations is likely to
require one-off IT investments in most Member States. Although no Member State seemed ready to
provide an estimate, Member States consulted in the targeted consultation all considered that this
would be a practicable exercise. The cost would be largely offset by the advantage of enabling a
direct connection with national data-filing systems of legal owners of firearms and the registers of
firearms dealers.
The planned interoperability of the databases of authorisations and certificates with the EU Single
Window environment for Customs will require additional financial resources, which will be made
available to DG TAXUD by DG HOME to enable the decided interconnection. Currently, the level
of appropriate resources for such work cannot be determined with certainty, but a cost estimate is
provided in annex 3, point 1.
6.5. IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT
None of the options has any particular impact on the environment.
97
Extrapolated from data received of 11 Member States, more information in annex 4
43
6.6. IMPACT ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
By addressing the threat of firearms trafficking, all envisaged options will have a positive impact on
ensuring the security of the EU citizens.
The protection of personal data, enshrined in article 8 of the Charter, is mostly regulated by the
General Data Protection Regulation,98
which allows the processing of such data when it “is
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official
authority vested in the controller” (article 6). In addition, the human rights impact should be offset
with the alignment of the new legislative measure with Directive 2016/68.99
In this case, processing of data will be protected by strong safeguards, notably through:
- prior consultation of the European Data Protection Supervisor
- ensuring access to the databases exclusively on a need-to-know basis
- limiting access in the databases to basic personal information enabling the identification of
the person concerned, any additional information (e.g. on the reasons for refusal) having to
be exchanged on a bilateral basis between competent authorities
- limiting statistical collection about authorisations, exports and imports, and seizures only to
non-nominative data for the purpose of building a comprehensive intelligence picture
Article 16 of the Charter recognises the freedom to conduct a business “in accordance with Union
law and national laws and practices.” The regulation will not affect the right to conduct business as
only authorised arms dealers are already allowed to trade firearms.
It is settled case-law that the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter is not absolute
and is subject to proportionate restrictions in furtherance of objectives of general interest. None of
the envisaged options would deprive legal owners of their property. The provision that would make
it illegal for others than licensed arms dealers to import semi-finished firearms and essential
components would not have retroactive effect (assuming that the previously imported semi-finished
firearms or components have been duly declared under the current legal framework).
Finally, the envisaged options would fully respect the objectives of article 45 of the Charter with
respect to the right of movement of EU citizens, since it would confirm their possibility to
temporarily leave the EU (and come back) with their personal firearm, when travelling for sport or
hunting purposes. Additional simplifications for collectors or museums should also facilitate their
right of movement.
98
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016.
99
Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties,
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L 119,
4.5.2016.
44
7. HOW DO OPTIONS COMPARE?100
In order to assess and compare the different options, each option will be rated for necessity, effectiveness, proportionality and efficiency, coherence,
feasibility and economic impact. This will be scored from 0 to 1 by the coherence of the option with the problems identified under point 2 and the
objectives as described under point 4. The more an option solves the problems identified, the higher the score. The underneath table gives an overview of
the different scores, the second table gives a short content summary of the assessment and then the full assessment can be read underneath.
Assessment criteria
(for civilian firearms transactions only)
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Necessity / Added value Data collection
Security objective
Simplification objective
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,5
0,5
1
1
1
Effectiveness Data collection
Security objective
Simplification objective
0,1
0,1
0,1
0,2
0,6
0,5
0,9
0,8
0,7
Proportionality /
Efficiency
Data collection
Security objective
0,1
0,2
0,1
0,7
0,9
0,9
100
Each option is assessed, for each criteria, on a range from 0 to 1 with respect to its contribution to each policy objective. 0 is the lowest score and 1 is the highest score.
45
Simplification objective 0,3 0,6 0,9
Coherence Data collection
Security objective
Simplification objective
0,1
0
0
0,1
0,7
0,4
1
1
1
Feasibility Data collection
Security objective
Simplification objective
0,2
0,5
0,5
0,2
0,8
1
0,7
0,7
0,7
Economic impact Data collection
Security objective
Simplification objective
NA
NA
0
NA
NA
0,1
NA
NA
0,2
Total (average) 0,18 0,45 0,84
46
Assessment
criteria101
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 3bis
Necessity / Added
value
Data
collection
Security
objective
Simplification
objective
Added value is limited due
to continued focus on
voluntary data collection
and limited digitalisation
Slight added value due to
the upgrade of COARM,
however it does not need
to be systematically used
Hardly any added value
due to not addressing the
vagueness of the
regulation
Added value is limited
albeit slightly better due to
some increase in
digitalisation
There is added value as
some security loopholes
will be closed due to the
clarification of the
regulation
The clarification of the
regulation will increase the
harmonisation of rules
needed and therefore
create an added value
However, the overlap with
the Common Position will
remain.
High added value due to
compulsory data collection
and digitalisation
High added value due to
the inclusion of alarm and
signal weapons, semi-
finished components, end-
user certificates etc.
High added value due to
the new simplifications
introduced responding to
the requests of
stakeholders. Overlap with
the Common Position will
be solved.
Same as Option 3
Same as Option 3
Same as Option 3
101
for civilian firearms transactions only
47
Assessment
criteria101
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 3bis
Effectiveness Data
collection
Security
objective
Simplification
objective
Not effective due to the
continued focus on
voluntary data collection
and limited digitalisation
Not effective due to an
unlikely uptake of the
recommendations by the
Member States. Slight
improvement due to
COARM update
Slight improve of the
situation due to the
clarification of the roles
however no uniform rules.
Not very effective albeit
slightly better due to some
increase in digitalisation
Positive effect due to
adding of semi-finished
components, compulsory
checks of ECRIS,
notification of refusals etc.
Slight effect due to
common deadlines
however no real
harmonisation of rules
Very effective due to
compulsory data collection
High effect due to EU
classifications of alarm
and signal weapons,
import of semi-finished
components limited to
economic operators and
improve of traceability due
to central database and
end-user certificates
High effectiveness due to
Authorisation and
declaration processes
linked to a central database
of firearms import and
export authorisations,
connected to the EU single
window environment for
customs.
Same as Option 3
Same as Option 3
Overlap with the Common
position solved but the
technical definition of
what is a military firearm
could create issues of
interpretation or the
establishment of a list of
military firearms could
48
Assessment
criteria101
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 3bis
give rise to legal disputes.
Proportionality /
Efficiency
Data
collection
Security
objective
Simplification
Low efficiency due to the
availability of an e-
licencing system, this
would still require work of
the Member States to
collect data.
Low efficiency as many
security problems are not
addressed.
Low efficiency as the
administrative burden due
to the different rules
remains however there are
a few simplifications such
Low efficiency and bad
proportionality due to low
digitalisation, which could
help the Member States
gather data
Positive efficiency and low
burden for many Member
States as some already
implement certain
measures and many
measures are easy to
implement, due to the
alignment with the
firearms Directive.
The introduced
simplifications such as
temporary export, implied
consent etc. Have a
positive effect on the
simplification objective.
However not yet a uniform
Increase in digitalisation
will support the Member
States in efficiently
collecting data.
Increase efficiency due to
EU list of non-convertible
alarm and signal weapons,
allowing third parties to
conduct post-shipment
controls etc.
Increased simplification
and full digitalised
procedures will result in
high efficiency gains.
Same as Option 3
Same as Option 3
The technical definition of
military firearms is likely
to be a burdensome and
complex exercise, which
could end up with issues of
49
Assessment
criteria101
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 3bis
objective as the e-licensing system system issues of interpretation.
Coherence Data
collection
Security
objective
Simplification
Low coherence as only
Member States subject to
Schengen acquis are
obliged to provide data on
seizures. Coherence might
increase due to uniform
template.
Low coherence because
the scope of the regulation
will not align with the
Directive and continuous
overlap with the Common
Position.
No coherence as there are
no harmonised rules in the
EU
Low coherence as only
Member States subject to
Schengen acquis are
obliged to provide data on
seizures. Coherence might
increase due to uniform
template.
Increased coherence with
firearms Directive and
Common Position (all
Category A firearms
would be military)
The overlap with the
Common Position is not
sufficiently solved and will
decrease coherent
approach. Clarifying the
roles and responsibilities
of exporters will increase
the coherence
Standardised data
collection will be
mandatory, which will
have a high impact on
coherence
Full coherence with the
Firearms Directive and the
Common Position, no
more overlap will
reinforcing substantive
provisions from the
Common Position.
Consistency with customs
rules ensured and
harmonised rules
throughout the EU would
improve coherence.
Same as Option 3
Coherence with the
Common Position would
be fully ensured, but not
with the Firearms
Directive: Firearms
authorised for civilian
possession and use inside
50
Assessment
criteria101
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 3bis
objective the EU could be classified
as military and therefore
subject to the Common
position and not the
Regulation for export
purposes: therefore some
firearms would be
considered non-military
inside the EU but military
for export purposes.
Feasibility Data
collection
Security
objective
Low feasibility as the lack
of digitalised procedures
hinders data collection.
Good feasibility to create
uniform template.
The different elements are
easy to implement. Except
the Common Risk Criteria,
as the Member States are
reluctant to share risk
profiles
The different elements are
easy to issue however the
Low feasibility as the lack
of digitalised procedures
hinders data collection.
Good feasibility to create
uniform template.
High feasibility with some
possible problems
difficulties regarding the
update of COARM.
Very high feasibility due
to the clarification of
The digitalisation will
increase the feasibility to
collect data significantly.
Extra provisions will
require some extra tasks
for exporters and firearms
authorities and customs
Establishing data-filing
Same as Option 3
Same as Option 3
51
Assessment
criteria101
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 3bis
Simplification
objective
implementation by the
Member States might be
limited
legislation instead of
changing the regulation.
systems will create a cost.
An e-licensing system
could be provided at EU
level, free of charge, which
would increase the
feasibility.
The distinction between
military and civilian
firearms would be
technically feasible, but
would be artificial and not
reflect the reality of the
usage of the weapons.
Economic impact Data
collection
Security
objective
Simplification
objective
NA
NA
As the uptake of measures
will be voluntary for the
Member States, the
economic impact might be
negligible and cannot be
assessed.
NA
NA
No noticeable economic
impact as it mostly relates
to clarifications of the
legal framework. There are
some simplifications
which might have small
impacts such as the clear
deadlines, implied consent
of third country of transit
etc.
NA
NA
The main savings for
economic operators are
expected due to the
digitalisation and the link
with the EU Single
Window Environment for
customs. Furthermore, fees
will be prohibited.
NA
NA
Providing for a technical
definition of military
firearms will likely subject
to the Common position
firearms of the “grey area”
which are currently legally
owned by civilians inside
the EU: hunters and sport
shooters will be prevented
from using administrative
simplifications (European
firearms pass) for those
exports and no
simplifications will apply
for individual exporters
52
Assessment
criteria101
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 3bis
(including no digitalisation
of procedure).
53
7.1. NECESSITY / ADDED VALUE
All options respond to a need, as they all seek to address problems identified.
Being limited to soft-law intervention, option 1 would provide only limited added value, compared
to the existing set of recommendations in the baseline scenario (hence an overall rating of 0.2 with
respect to the three objectives). The vagueness of the current Regulation and the references to
national legislation and procedures would not be addressed.
In particular, data provided both during the evaluation of the Regulation and during this impact
assessment proved to be so heterogeneous102
that it was impossible for the Commission to
determine clear trends on the movements, authorisations and denials of imports and exports of
firearms. However, detailed templates for data provision could incrementally improve data
provision, although it would be long and hypothetical.
More guidance on the definition of semi-finished firearms and on the correct customs classification
of alarm and signal weapons would facilitate a consistent approach across the EU.
The upgrade of the Conventional arms export control information system (COARM) for refusals,
.annulments, suspensions, modifications or revocations of export authorisations by other Member
States would provide more transparency about whether an entry relates more to civilian than
military weapons, but it will not per se lead to it being systematically used.
The provision of an e-licensing platform to Member States who would accept to use it would
facilitate the work of exporters, but as procedures and rules would not be harmonised, it would not
address the regulatory heterogeneity. Furthermore, this e-licensing platform could facilitate the data
collection, however the voluntary nature remains. It is unlikely that the Member States will put
more effort into data collection as this was already asked multiple times before.
Option 2 ranges higher in terms of necessity, although several of the envisaged clarifications are
already implemented by several Member States, for which it would not create a major added value.
In addition it does not address all the problems identified.
For instance, the impact of applying the standards of non-convertibility of alarm and signal
weapons to exported alarm and signal weapons would be fairly limited, since 48% of respondents,
corresponding to 14 Member States103
and 46% of the exports in the confidential consultation
indicated that exported alarm and signal weapons are either considered as firearms under national
legislation and are subject to the same rules (29%) or that they must comply with Commission
Implementing Directive (EU) 2019/69 to avoid being subject to export authorisations (19%).
Most of the elements of option 2 would respond to the need of clarification of the regulation’s
provisions, which would contribute to a more homogeneous implementation and therefore more
simplicity for stakeholders. However, keeping with the initial logic of the regulation of excluding
from its scope all category A firearms, the alignment of categories with those of the firearms
directive would mean that the revised regulation would govern even less firearms than is currently
102
See Annex 4 on methodology
103
BE, CZ, EE, FI, IT, LT, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SL, SK
54
the case: as the Firearms Directive moved several types of firearms from category B (subject to
authorisation) to category A (prohibited except in specific cases), the current scope of the
regulation (only categories B and C) would be smaller than today. All category A firearms would
be governed by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and the regulation would not provide an added
value in their respect. Some of these obligations such as the compulsory check of ECRIS could
provide some data however the added value is expected to be low.
Hence the overall rating with respect to both the security and the simplification is considered to be
0.5 and only 0.2 for data collection.
Option 3 would on the contrary have the highest EU added value. The full alignment of the scope
with that of the firearms directive would mean that the regulation would govern all civilian
transactions of firearms, including civilian trade of automatic firearms, semi-automatic firearms
with high-capacity magazines or semi-automatic long firearms with a folding or telescopic stock.
As in the firearms directive, transactions between governments, or sales to the military or the armed
forces would remain excluded from the regulation, which means the security and the simplification
objectives could only be achieved for civilian firearms. The new simplifications introduced would
respond to the requests of stakeholders to alleviate their administrative burden and provide a
uniform EU approach. Furthermore, the Member States would be obliged to provide annual data.
Option 3 bis would have a similarly high added value, as the overlap with the Common Position
would also be solved.
7.2. EFFECTIVENESS
Option 1 would be the least effective. The full implementation of the 2018 Recommendation of the
Commission would be unlikely to have a different impact from the baseline scenario. A mere
recommendation to provide annual statistics will not be effective in improving security, as Member
States already did not implement the current recommendation. Similarly, the European Criminal
Records Information Exchange System (ECRIS) will continue to be under-used. Risk information
related to the movement of firearms will only partially be exchanged through the customs risk
management system. A technical improvement of the COARM system could marginally facilitate
exchanges of information. With respect to the simplification objective, option 1 would slightly
improve the situation (by providing a list of competent authorities in third country). However, it
would not be effective in establishing the uniform import and export control mechanism that
stakeholders are calling for.
Option 2 would slightly contribute to both the security and the simplification objectives. It would
only marginally improve the traceability of exported signal and alarm weapons, since the share of
alarm and signal weapons is more than double for import than for export.104
At import, a
compulsory classification as firearms of alarm and signal weapons not complying with the
implementing directive, including in the customs declaration, will also contribute to the legibility of
legislation. It will clarify the role of customs authorities, and the need to check the conformity with
harmonised EU law before the release of the goods into free circulation. However, digitalisation
and automation of process will continue to vary from country to country, with uneven application,
with different risk strategies.
104
See annex 4.
55
Requiring the classification of semi-finished firearms and essential components as firearms would
have an impact beyond current customs rules, as it would also apply to licensing authorities and
would therefore limit their import and trigger more controls. Providing a common definition of
semi-finished firearms and essential components would increase legal clarity and contribute to a
common approach of customs authorities at import.
Listing out in the Regulation the particulars describing firearms that should be traced and recorded
would marginally improve the traceability of firearms, as it would facilitate and harmonise access
to information that already exists in different formats and in other databases.
Under this option, a compulsory check of criminal records in ECRIS and provision for exchange of
risk information related to the movement of firearms by using the customs risk management system
would improve the risk assessment capacities of licencing and law enforcement authorities without
creating any specific additional burden. The obligation for export licensing authorities to check in
the Schengen Information System whether exported firearms were reported lost or stolen in another
Member State would further increase security, as it would increase their access to relevant
databases, which would facilitate their risk assessment.
Similarly, a compulsory notification of refusals in a common electronic system would also ensure
that licencing authorities are always informed of denials issued by other Member States.
Applying the whistle-blower-protection regime put in place with Directive (EU) No 2019/1937 to
persons who report breaches of the Regulation would support the fight against diversion, notably by
protecting employees of companies importing or exporting firearms when they detect risks of
smuggling or diversion. In addition, a clear legal provision requiring Member States to establish
criminal sanctions for the trafficking of firearms would substantially address the gaps in
incrimination. It would require several Member States to adapt their legal framework to fully
comply with article 5 of the UN Firearms Protocol.
With respect to the simplification objective, similar deadlines for granting import authorisations,
harmonised simplified procedures (including the default implied consent of the third country of
transit) would partially contribute to providing a more predictable and uniform regulatory
environment for economic operators.
The annual statistical collection would remain voluntary and therefore the effectiveness remains
low.
Option 3 would be substantially more effective. The EU-level mechanism to ensure that a given
model of alarm and signal weapon is classified under the same position of the customs combined
nomenclature throughout the EU would provide additional security safeguards, avoiding that
convertible models are nevertheless not declared as firearms in certain Member States. Establishing
a EU list of non-convertible alarm and signal weapons that are compliant with implementing
directive 2019/69, would ensure that the automatic recognition of the certification of such weapons
throughout the EU. This would increase the security of imports with the guarantee that only
weapons accompanied with such a certificate are not firearms.
Preventing private individuals from importing semi-finished firearms and essential components
would be the most effective course of action to avoid diversion and the illicit manufacture of
unmarked firearms.
56
The traceability of firearms (and therefore the security of the trade) would be greatly improved by
the full computerisation of the data-filing systems. This will in its turn facilitate the annual
collection of statistics.
Authorisation and declaration processes would be substantially facilitated by the creation of a
central database of firearms import and export authorisations, connected to the EU single window
environment for customs.
Requiring exporters to provide evidence of final import in the country of destination would improve
the traceability of exported firearms and reduce the risk of diversion.
The clarification of the scope and the establishment of EU uniform procedures (in particular e-
licencing processes) would respond to the demands of the vast majority of private stakeholders, be
they private firearms users or commercial exporters. However, the maintenance of strict
authorisations procedures means that such a Regulation cannot be fully effective with respect to
simplifications (which would imply a total absence of authorisation procedures).
As a consequence, this option rates higher with respect to the security objective (0,8) than to the
simplification objective (0,7).
Option 3 bis rates just a bit lower (0,6) with respect to the simplification objective. Although the
overlap with the Common position would be solved, the overall effectiveness could be hampered
by disputes of interpretation on the technical definition of what is a military firearm. Similarly,
establishing a list of firearms deemed to be military (by make/model) could give rise to legal
disputes, as exporters might oppose the grounds for the classification.
7.3. PROPORTIONALITY / EFFICIENCY
Being the less invasive solution, the soft-law approach of option 1 ranges high in proportionality.
However, it would be inefficient as the absence of specific obligations or administrative burden
would be largely offset by the continued impossibility to address the problems identified. This
option would provide only a few positive simplifications for companies (possible e-licencing,
guidance on Authorised Economic Operators, list of third country authorities) but not enough to
rank high. It will also have very limited efficiency regarding data collection as lack the
digitalisation will hinder the Member States. They would have to put a lot of effort to collect the
data, which is not proportionate regarding administrative burden. Therefore, this option ranks 0,1
with respect to data collection, 0,2 with respect to the security objective and 0,3 with respect to
simplification.
Option 2 would have a slightly positive impact on the security of transactions, by generalising
practices that already exist in many Member States. As such, in most Member States, the legislative
change would be fairly limited. For instance, requiring Member States to verify systematically that
deactivated firearms are properly marked and owners issued a deactivation certificate would clarify
the already existing practice of Member States. 61% of respondents to the confidential consultation
mentioned that they already require such marking.105
Besides, the obligation already exists for all
deactivated firearms transferred to another Member State or placed on the market, which constitute
105
48% responded that deactivated firearms must be marked in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2015/2403 and
accompanied with a deactivation certificate even if deactivated before 8 April 2016 and 13% only when
deactivated after 8 April 2016.
57
the overwhelming majority of transactions,106
so that this extension to exported firearms would not
substantially change the legal framework. If anything, this extension would further reduce the
attractiveness of exports of deactivated firearms. It could have marginally positive impact on
international security and tracing of weapons, since for those Member States, which do not regulate
the export of deactivated firearms, it would ensure that they cannot be reactivated outside of the
European Union.
The designation of authorities in charge of checking compliance of imported alarm and signal
weapons with the implementing directive before the release into free circulation, if they differ from
the authorities designated under the implementing directive, will not create additional burden
compared to that of the directive. It will mostly be a new obligation on Member States which
currently classify those weapons as firearms and therefore do not check their compliance with the
technical standards of the implementing directive.
With respect to semi-finished firearms and essential components, in the confidential consultation of
competent authorities, 74% of respondents involved in import processes replied that such elements
need to be declared as firearms essential components and marked accordingly, while 13% said they
need to be declared as firearms parts (CN code 9305) but not marked and another 13% that they are
not considered as firearms parts and not subject to specific declaration. Therefore, a change of
legislation would require customs authorities to check the existence of dealer’s licence to import
such goods, but would not substantially affect the work of 87% of them. There too, the measure is
considered to be highly proportionate.
Listing out in the Regulation the particulars describing firearms that should be traced and recorded
at export would have no significant impact on licensing authorities, since the information related to
the name of the manufacturer or the brand, the country or place of manufacture, the serial number
and year of manufacture are already part of the unique marking under the Firearms Directive. This
information is consequently already available in national data-filing systems and on the firearms
present in the EU. The only impact would be to ensure that data-filing systems for export
authorisations include the same information.
The reference to the possibility to use the opportunities of the tools for administrative and
investigative cooperation in third countries, provided by article 20 of the 1997 Regulation on
mutual assistance107
will not add any burden for national authorities or private stakeholder, since it
merely recalls an already existing possibility to request the support of the Commission to conduct
post-shipment controls.
Compared to the absence of notification, providing for a compulsory exchange of information about
denials on a common database would slightly add to the administrative burden of licensing
authorities, although in a very limited way, considering the low number of denials each year
(around 30 refusals per year). If this system is the same as the one currently used for dual-use goods
(DUeS), the added burden would be very low, since most export licensing authorities already have
access to DUeS.
106
In the public consultation and during stakeholder interviews, stakeholders considered that the EU rules on
deactivation currently make it unattractive to sell deactivated firearms, since in their views the deactivation
standards affect too much the integrity of the firearms to preserve its commercial value.
107
Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative
authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct
application of the law on customs and agricultural matters
58
The obligation for export licensing authorities to check in the Schengen Information System
whether exported firearms were reported lost or stolen in another Member State would be
proportionate, since it would only apply in case of suspicious cases and not for weapons registered
in the data-filing system of the Member State of export, or for newly-manufactured firearms.
This option introduces several simplifications (temporary exports, implied consent), which
therefore positively affect the efficiency of the regulation with respect to the simplification
objective, although they do not go as far as to provide a genuinely uniform system for economic
operators, and does not meet their request for e-procedures.
With regards to data collection, this option scores low as the work for the Member States would be
disproportionate due to the absence of full digitalised procedures.
For those reasons, this option ranks very low (0,1) for data collection but ranks higher (0,7) with
respect to the security objective than for the simplification objective (0,6).
Option 3 would provide additional efficiency gains, making it even more proportional. Establishing
a EU list of alarm and signal weapons that are compliant with implementing directive 2019/69
would reduce the administrative burden of both national authorities and economic operators.
Limiting the import of semi-finished firearms and essential components to licensed arms dealers
(and conversely prohibiting them for private individuals) would marginally increase the
enforcement costs of customs. Considering the limited share of firearms imports in the overall trade
and the fact that customs carry out targeted checks based on risk assessments, this impact is
considered negligible. The efficiency of the measure would therefore be very high.
As all exports are matched by a corresponding import in a non-EU country, providing a copy of the
import declaration would not create any additional burden, except in countries with endemic
corruption or failing administrative structures. Enabling Member States to entitle third parties to
conduct post-shipment controls in their name would facilitate post-shipment controls without
adding administrative burden on national administrations or on economic operators.
The new simplifications introduced in this option (connection to the EU Single Window
Environment, scope clarification, further simplified procedures, including with respect to
Authorised Economic Operators) would give this option a high efficiency score. Furthermore, these
digital procedures will increase the efficiency of the annual data collection by the Member States.
As a consequence, this option rates 0,9 out of 1 for all three objectives.
Option 3 bis ranges a bit lower with respect to the simplification objective (0,8). The technical
definition of military firearms is likely to be a burdensome and complex exercise, which could end
up with issues of interpretation. As in practice neither firearms users nor firearms traffickers make
a clear distinction between military and non-military firearms, the dividing line between the two is
bound to be based on arbitrary (albeit objective) criteria, which will inevitably lead to long debates
and possibly unsatisfactory compromise solutions.
7.4. COHERENCE
Option 1 will not improve the consistency with other policies and sets of legislation: overlaps
between the regulation and the Common position will continue, and the scope of the regulation will
not be aligned with that of the Firearms Directive.
59
Under option 1, if Member States subject to the Schengen acquis were to comply with their existing
obligation to provide statistics of firearms seizures, this could have some major security advantages
for a common threat assessment, albeit limited to the Schengen area. As Member States so far did
not implement this obligation, this would probably create administrative burden linked the new
reporting requirements, as well as force the Commission to step up enforcement actions against
Member States who do not.
Therefore, option 1 ranks 0 in terms of coherence.
In option 2, coherence with the Firearms Directive and with the Council Common Position
2008/944/CFSP will increase, automatically subjecting all category A firearms only to the Common
Position, irrespective of their civilian use. There would however not be guarantee that remaining
firearms subject to authorisation could not be subject to the rules for military firearms under
national legislation and the Common position. Overlaps with the Common Position would therefore
remain and coherence with the Firearms Directive could be questionable, since weapons that can be
owned and traded by individuals inside the EU would be subject to the rules for military firearms at
export.
Consistency with the whistle-blower-protection regime put in place by Directive (EU) No
2019/1937 would be substantially enhanced.
Making an express reference to the obligation to submit an entry summary declaration for the
import of firearms after the deployment of the Import Control System (ICS), version 2 will not
create any additional consequence beyond the impact of implementing decision (EU) 2019/2151. It
will however contribute to the clarity of legislation.
Additionally, the express provisions on the roles and responsibilities of exporters would be fully
consistent with similar provisions in other sectorial pieces of legislation (namely article 4 of
Regulation (EU) 1020/2019 on market surveillance with respect to controls on products entering
the Union market).
Finally, as in option 1, only the Member States subject to the Schengen acquis need to comply with
the existing obligation to provide statistics of firearms seizures. The Commission would provide a
template to make this more coherent. However, the annual statistics on the import, export and
transit of civilian firearms would remain voluntary and not coordinated through digitalised
procedures.
Therefore, although consistency would lead to a rating of 0,7 with respect to the security objective,
the continued overlaps with the Common Position would mean that it would rate low (0,4) with
respect to the simplification objective and the lack of digitalisation and an obligation to report
annual statistics means that it would rate low (0,1) with respect to data collection.
In Option 3, coherence with both the Firearms Directive and the Council Common Position
2008/944/CFSP would be fully ensured, by having consistent rules and provisions, and no overlap.
For those weapons of the current “grey area” and which would in the future only be subject to the
Regulation, many substantive provisions of the Common Position would be preserved and be
reinforced by the new Regulation. Those are notably :
- the requirement of an end-user certificate for the export of category A and B firearms
60
- the need to take into account the 8 criteria of the Common position when granting export
authorisations (e.g. respect for human rights, risks of diversion, existing embargoes and
sanctions)
- the possibility to conduct post-shipment checks
- sharing of information on denials and on statistics
In that sense, by doing so, the new Regulation could be seen as making directly enforceable
provisions of the Common Position, which are currently binding but not directly enforceable and
the implementation of which is not unified.
Consistency with customs rules would be fully ensured, through the clarification of the role and
responsibilities of customs authorities, which would be similar to those established by article 35 of
the 2021 proposal for a Regulation on shipments of waste,108
as well as with the customs single
window environment. Expressly regulating semi-finished firearms and essential components would
be fully consistent with section ML16 of the EU Common Military List,109
which subjects to export
controls “forgings, castings and other unfinished products”.
The obligation to annually report statistics with clear objectives of these statistics, together with the
increase digitalisation of the procedures will increase the coherence of the data collection
significantly.
As a consequence, this option rates 1 with respect to all three objectives.
Option 3 bis would rate lower with respect to the simplification objective (0.8), as coherence with
the Common Position would be fully ensured, but not with the Firearms Directive. Firearms
authorised for civilian possession and use inside the EU could be classified as military and
therefore subject to the Common position and not the Regulation for export purposes: therefore
some firearms would be considered non-military inside the EU but military for export purposes.
7.5. FEASABILITY
Under option 1, reviewing the Common Risk Criteria (CRC) and improving the targeting of
firearms trafficked in commercial, postal and express shipments will prove a particularly difficult
exercise, linked to the fact that Member States are currently reluctant to share their own risk
profiles with the Commission. Furthermore, the feasibility to collect annual statistics will be low, as
the Member States will not have the support of digitalised procedures. An update of the template
for data collection of seizures could help somewhat. All other elements of the option will be easy to
issue and publish, although their actual implementation by Member States would be unlikely. For
this reason, this option has a low rating of 0,2 for data collection and medium rating of 0,5 with
respect to both other objectives.
Under option 2, the clarification of the legal framework, which does not bring about a revolution in
the current system for export control of civilian firearms (and which would even take several
categories of weapons out of the scope of the regulation), would be easy to implement and would
108
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on shipments of waste and amending
Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) No 2020/1056, COM/2021/709 final
109
Common Military List of the European Union, ST/5470/2020/INIT
61
not be opposed by Member States and stakeholders. Politically, it could be contested in the
European Parliament as not being sufficiently ambitious, which in contrast demonstrates its very
high feasibility.
In this option, establishing a specific legal basis for the use of a specific system for exchange of
information about denials could be complex and politically sensitive due to the focus of this
database on military goods and the desire of Member States to concentrate of exchanges linked to
exports of firearms under the COARM. Linked to a clarification of the scope of the regulation, an
extension of the Dual-Use electronic System (DUeS) to cover imports and exports of firearms
would be practically feasible and convenient for licencing authorities, which often already use the
DUeS, and since it could also apply at imports.
For those reasons, this option ranks higher in terms of feasibility with respect to the simplification
objective (1) than with respect to the security objective (0,8). No extra support and there for no
increase in feasibility for the collection of data (0,2).
Option 3 ranks highly in feasibility. During the targeted interviews with private stakeholders and
public authorities, the envisaged option received wide appreciation. Questions and concerns will
however be raised with respect to the need to revise and adapt national processes (notably to go
towards digital licencing procedures). Besides, Member States are likely to prove reluctant to step
up their reporting obligations. This option can easily be implemented in national administrative
frameworks where the ministry of foreign affairs is closely involved in all decisions for export
authorisations of firearms (as is the case for instance in Germany or Spain). Therefore, the
clarification of the scope between the Regulation and the Common position should not prevent the
continued involvement of Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the assessments of applications for
export authorisation of firearms only covered by the Regulation, provided Member States put in
place adequate processes for the cooperation/coordination between those ministries and the export
control agencies.
Establishing computerised data-filing systems for imports and export authorisations is likely to
require one-off IT investments in most Member States. Although no Member State seemed ready to
provide an estimate, Member States consulted in the targeted consultation all considered that this
would be a practicable exercise. As a point of reference, in Italy the Integrated System for Arms
Management and Mobilisation (SIGMA) enabling the lodging of licence applications for intra-EU
transfers, imports and exports of firearms, was developed at a cost EUR 800.000. Besides, this type
of IT development is an expense eligible under the EU’s Internal Security Fund, which can alleviate
the budgetary costs of the measure for national authorities. At EU-level, an e-licencing system
could be provided free-of charge to Member States. It would substantially improve the full
traceability of firearms along their life-cycle, by enabling some interoperability with internal data-
filing systems, which are already computerised pursuant to the Firearms Directive. This would
make the annual collection of data feasible for the Member States.
With the application of the licensing/certifications scheme, TARIC documents codes will activate
backup measures, the EU Single Window Environment for Customs will consult the central Union
system which will need to be established, and will need to host authorisations/certificates/licences
that need to be checked by customs, and send the result back to the customs systems.
The main concern expressed by public authorities was that the EU would regulate imports and
exports of military firearms, which was addressed by the limitation of the scope of the initiative to
transactions between civilians. There will however remain wariness linked to the fact that firearms
for civilian use currently included in the Common Military List of the European Union would from
62
now on only be governed by the Regulation. This will be addressed by the fact that category A and
B firearms would require an end-user certificate and that the foreign policy and security
considerations of article 2 of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP would continue to apply when
granting authorisations. The main concern expressed by private stakeholders was linked to the
possibility of imposing the obligation to provide an end-user certificate for certain exported
firearms. They were however reassured by the clarification that the actual importer, not the final
user of the weapon, could be declared as the end-user, provided the certificate includes a
commitment not to use the weapon for non-civilian purposes or to re-export them without
authorisation.
For those reasons, this option rates 0,7 in terms of feasibility with respect to all three objectives.
Option 3 bis rates just a bit lower (0,6) with respect to the feasibility objective because although the
distinction between military and civilian firearms would be technically feasible, it would be
artificial and not reflect the reality of the usage of the weapons. As a consequence, discussions at
technical level on the technical criteria to differentiate military from civilian firearms, or to
establish a list of military firearms by make or model might prove to be very contentious, with split
views of national experts.
7.6. ECONOMIC IMPACT
The economic impact of option 1 is negligible and cannot be assessed, since it would not derive per
se from the recommendations, but from the willingness of Member States to implement them. If all
recommendations were implemented, the impact would be similar to that of option 2.
Option 2 is not considered to have any noticeable economic impact, as it mostly relates to
clarifications of the legal framework. For instance, interviewed representatives of firearms
manufacturers did not consider that applying the standards of non-convertibility of alarm and signal
weapons to exported alarm and signal weapons would create a specific administrative burden. Out
of the 12 businesses or business representatives that replied to the public consultation, 50% did not
reply to the question on the impact of such a measure, and 25% of the remaining considered that
such a measure would not have any impact on them. During the public consultation, 44% of
respondents considered that a compulsory classification as firearms of imported alarm and signal
weapons not complying with the implementing directive would have no or a positive impact on
their administrative burden, and only had 17% considered the impact would be negative.
The envisaged simplifications (implied consent of the third country of transit as a default option,
clear deadlines for import authorisations, clarifications of the simplifications for temporary exports)
are too marginal to have a noticeable economic impact.
This option therefore rates 0,1 with respect to the simplification objective. The data and security
objective is not relevant.
Under option 3, with respect to the limitation of import of semi-finished firearms and essential
components to licensed arms dealers (and conversely its prohibition for private individuals), a
relative majority of respondents to the public consultation (37%) considered that this option would
have no or a positive impact (with 24,7% considering that it would have a negative impact and 38%
not replying to the question.) No stakeholder provided an estimate of the cost of this measure,
although this was specifically asked in the online questionnaire and during bilateral interviews. It
would in any case not harm competition, since, already today, only licensed firearms dealers are
allowed to manufacture or modify firearms. It could however slightly reduce innovation by
63
individuals developing custom-made “desktop” firearms since they would be prevented from
importing such products without going through a licensed dealer.
The main savings for companies would be linked to the use of the EU Single Window Environment
for customs,,
in conjunction with the e-licensing system, to the clarification of the scope (which
would simplify the regulatory framework and the relevant paperwork), the possibility to grant a
general export authorisation for arms dealers which are Authorised Economic Operators – Safety
and Security (AEO-S) under customs rules, and the prohibition of fees for authorisations and
transit. With respect to the latter, the fees currently apply only in 9 Member States,110
which affects
at most 383 companies. The removal of this obligation is estimated to save 86.000 euro a year at
EU level.
Overall, considering the small proportion of firearms in the overall trade and economic activities,
this option is considered to have a small positive impact with respect to the simplification objective
(0,2).
Option 3 bis ranges even lower with respect to the simplification objective (0,1), as the provision of
a technical definition of military firearms will likely subject to the Common position firearms of the
“grey area” which are currently legally owned by civilians inside the EU. As a consequence,
hunters and sport shooters will be prevented from using administrative simplifications (European
firearms pass) for their temporary exports. This would be a step back compared to the current
Regulation. In addition, commercial exporters would not be able to benefit from the various
administrative simplifications envisaged by the Regulation: temporary exports or import would
remain subject to national legislation on military weapons. In some Member States, such operations
do not require prior authorisations, while in others importers or exporters have to go through a full
authorisation processes. Most importantly, the digitalisation of procedures (e-licensing, single
window environment for customs) would not apply to military firearms, even for transactions
between civilians. As a consequence, most of the economic benefits of the Regulation would be
lost.
8. PREFERRED OPTION
8.1. OPTION 3: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
On balance, the option to go beyond mere clarifications of the legal framework and move towards a
genuinely uniform control system for the import and export authorisations of firearms for civilian
use appears to be the most positive one on all counts but one (option 2 ranging higher only in terms
of feasibility).
Option 3 contributes best to both policy objectives: security and simplification. With respect to
security, it addresses fully the identified challenges for imports and exports. With respect to
simplification, it provides the necessary clarity to the existing regulatory framework, by
establishing a genuinely uniform control system of civilian transactions of firearms.
Option 3 meets the necessity test, as it fully responds to the call of the majority of stakeholders, all
categories included, for a uniform control system.
110
CZ, EE, IT, LT, PL, PT, SE, SK, SL
64
It effectively ensures the proper tracing of imported and exported firearms, and provide the right
tools for effective cooperation between licencing authorities, and between licencing and customs
authorities. It would close a number of legal loopholes and clarify legislation, thus contributing to
uniform application of the rules.
It is proportionate and therefore efficient (i.e. the legislative intervention would be commensurate
with the benefits), as it provides for more tracing tools, more simplifications, extended e-
procedures, and stricter security provisions.
Option 3 ensures the highest consistency with other legal texts, in particular the Firearms Directive
and the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, thus addressing one of the main problems
identified in the 2017 evaluation. It solves the overlap with the common position, and would ensure
full complementarity and concordance of concepts, definition, personal and substantive scope with
the Firearms Directive. It ensures full consistency with customs legislation and clarifies the role and
duties of customs authorities when applying sectorial legislation.
Creating more obligations for Member States than option 2, option 3 might be contested, but it
however ranks high in feasibility, as it takes into account the main concerns of Member States
(concerning the scope that still excludes transactions with governments and armed forces) and of
companies (which feared a higher burden linked to end-user certificates).
The overall economic impact of the option 3 would be slightly positive (i.e. with a slight reduction
of administrative burden), taking into account the introduction of new administrative
simplifications.
8.2. REFIT (SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVED EFFICIENCY)
Per the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT), all initiatives
aimed at changing existing EU legislation should aim to simplify and deliver the stated policy
objectives more efficiently (i.e. by reducing unnecessary regulatory costs). The analysis of impacts
suggests that the preferred option is anticipated to limit the overall burden on Member States.
Improved exchanges of information and targeted controls imply an additional workload notably for
customs authorities, but the competent authorities interviewed considered that this workload will be
moderate, especially considering the fact that checks will remain targeted and risk-based and not
systematic. Besides, the trade of civilian firearms constitutes a negligible fraction of the overall
imports and exports. Additional checks of licencing authorities will include the obligation to:
- systematically check refusals issued by other Member States
- check the Schengen Information System in case of suspicion
- check the European Criminal Record Information System
- reply to a request for an import authorisation within a set deadline of 60 days (exceptionally
90 days)
- submit annual statistics
Besides, the preferred option includes measures to alleviate the workload of competent authorities.
This is notably the case for:
- the establishment of simplified procedures for temporary imports or exports, which will
alleviate the workload of licencing authorities to such simple movements
- EU list for the import of alarm and signal weapons in a central database, facilitating checks
by customs authorities
65
- possibility to entitle third parties to conduct post-shipment controls in the name of
competent authorities
- full digitalisation of import and export licensing will remove the need for manual entries
and checks of paper requests
On substance, with the requirement of an end-user certificate, the new export licencing system for
category A and B firearms would be substantially similar to that already in place under the Council
Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, thus creating no additional burden for public administrations.
The prohibition of fees to process authorisations will have no significant budgetary impact on the
administrations (EUR 86.000 per year for the EU as a whole).
8.3. APPLICATION OF THE ‘ONE IN, ONE OUT’ APPROACH
The overall economic for businesses and citizen’s impact of the preferred option is considered to be
negligible, considering the small share of production of firearms for civilian use in the overall EU
GDP, and the share of imports and exports of such firearms in the overall extra-EU trade of the
EU.111
Under the current legal framework (be it Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 or national rules and
procedures), companies already incur most of the required obligations. Most of the provisions
introduced in the preferred option therefore affect national administrations rather companies.
In any event, applying the “one in, one out” approach to this initiative lead to the assessment, based
on the limited available statistics, of a positive overall balance of EUR 791.560112
per year for the
whole of the EU. The full calculation details can be found in Annex 4.
The biggest cost saving will happen due to the digitalisation of the import and export authorisations
via the e-licensing system. According to the external study of 2019113
, the current export procedure
takes between maximum 12 hours of work per authorisation for the exporters. In Italy, there is
already an e-licencing tool used, which leads to around 6 hours of work per authorisation. The
study estimated that there are 1.000 manufacturers active in the EU and that annually 7.000 export
authorisations are requested. However, import authorisations are mainly requested by dealers
(estimation of 20.000 dealers in the EU). There are only have as many import authorisations
requested; around 3.500. When taking into account an average cost for a FTE employee of €25,7
per hour, then introducing an e-licensing procedure would create a cost saving of €1.603.680.
Similar cost savings will result from the implied consent of third countries for the transit of firearms
after 20 days. Not all export authorisations need such an implied consent, assuming that 4.000 out
of the 7.000 annually do need it and following this estimation of the EY study that the follow-up to
obtain a written “no objection” to the transfer took about one hour, this should lead to a cost saving
of €56.540
111
The EU sold production of civilian firearms, alarm and signal weapons, their parts and components, and
ammunition accounts for only 0.09% of the EU27 total sold production value. Firearms represent only 0,027% of the
total value of imports into the EU and 0,069% of the total value of the export out of the EU.
112
Explanations on how these calculations were conducted can be found in annex 4
113 EY (2019), Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import
and transit measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, Annex I,
p. 156
66
If no authorisations for specific operations, such as temporary import and export, would be needed
for institutions such as museums, collectors etc. then this would decrease the costs. Such an
authorisations takes on average 6 hours, however the frequency is very low. The estimation is that
this could concern all arms dealers however it would only happen 0.01 time a year. Therefore,
abolishing the need for such authorisations, would amount to a saving of €30.840.
The biggest additional cost for companies will be the requirement to use an end-user certificate.
Based on the number of hours for the whole export authorisation procedure, it is estimated that end-
user certificate procedures will not take longer than 4 hours. Following the above numbers of 1.000
manufacturers and 7.000 export authorisations, this extra cost would amount to €719.600.
Furthermore, if companies would have to provide evidence of the final import certificate, this
would also contain some costs. However, these certificates should already be used, the only
difference would be that these certificates would be sent to a central bureau or database. Therefore,
this task should not take more than one hour. Based on the same calculation as above, this would
amount to a cost of €179.900.
9. HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?
One of the core measures of the initiative is to provide – currently non-existent – tools for an
adequate monitoring and evaluation of impacts, based on hard data. This requires the development
of reliable, comprehensive and comparable data-collection at national level, both from the side of
legal trade (number of authorisations, or denials, countries, type of weapons and values concerned,
customs data on actual exports and imports) and on the side of law enforcement (seizure data with
information about the type of firearms seized). Comprehensive data will enable the Commission to
identify threats based on uncommon or suspicious shipments (e.g. a sudden change of a country of
destination for a specific type of firearm after the imposition of sanctions against a non-EU country
could reflect an attempt to circumvent an embargo).
The establishment of a reliable data-collection system in Member States might require some
adaptation time, with a delayed application of the relevant provisions in the new regulation. This
would enable Member States to upgrade (or create) their national data-filing systems, and to
establish a reliable data-collection tool for seizures of firearms. No valuable reporting on the
implementation of the regulation should take place before those systems are fully operational,
realistically not less than 5 years after the entry into force of the amended regulation.
Besides, the role of the current Firearms export coordination group established by the current
regulation will be substantially enhanced to enable continuous monitoring of the situation, and
discussions based on concrete examples (for instance different decisions to classify imported alarm
and signal weapons) or on transparent commercial trends.
There are multiple data that will be gathered to monitor the successful implementation:
- The yearly collection of statistical data (number of import and export authorisations, of
denials, of actual imports and exports, and of seizures, broken down by category of weapon)
gathered by the Member States should improve. The expected improvement will derive
from its mandatory nature, from digitalisation of the import and export authorisation
processes, the harmonisation in classification of firearms etc. The completeness of this data
will be monitored yearly, and it will result in a more complete and stable collection of data
for all Member States, which will allow for actual comparison between the years. This data
can then feed into the policy work.
67
- In general, the digitalisation of procedures will allow for a more efficient monitoring. These
digital tools allow for yearly statistical overviews to monitor their use by the different
Member States, e.g. the monitoring of the obligation to check the criminal records in ECRIS
will be done through requesting the statistical data of ECRIS. This data can then be
compared to the data of the e-licensing system on export authorisations in order to check if
the obligation was met. The same data gathering will be possible for e.g. the compulsory
notification of refusals in a common electronic system.
- Multiple measures have a customs component to them. In order to operationalise these
measures, interconnections between systems will be created. When these connections are
created, it will also be possible to gather yearly statistics on their use. For instance, on
limiting import of semi-finished firearms and essential components to licenced firearms
dealers: in order to implement this measure, customs will be able to check the lists of
licences firearms dealers. When this system is operational, it will be possible to gather
yearly data on how often customs consulted the lists of licenced firearms dealers. This will
on the one hand show if the measure is consequently implemented, but on the other hand
will also allow for analyses on which Member States import the most semi-finished firearms
and essential components. This information can then be linked to operational firearms
trafficking cases.
The following criteria and indicators following the above monitoring will be used to assess the
success of the new Regulation. These will include:
 number of import and export authorisations (objectives 1 and 3)
 number of refusals (objectives 1 and 2)
 quantities and values of actual imports and exports (objectives 1, 2 and 3)
 number of seizures (objectives 1 and 2)
 number of searches in ECRIS (objective 2)
 number of checks in the Schengen Information System and in Interpol’s iArms about lost
and stolen firearms (objective 2)
 number of customs authorities connected to SIENA (objective 2)
 number of Risk Information Fiches entered in CRMS (objective 2)
 number of Member States having a fully digitalised licensing system (objective 3)
 number of post-shipment checks carried out (objective 2)
 changes to the national criminal codes to criminalise trafficking of firearms (objective 2)
 number of temporary import and export declarations granted (objective 3)
 number of operators benefiting from a general export authorisation (objective 3)
The review of the implementation of this Regulation will be done through
 an interim application report within 5 years after the entry into force of the Regulation;
 a full report within 10 years, notably to take into account the time needed to full roll-out the
digitalisation of procedures and the interconnection with the single window environment for
customs.
Those will include a specific stakeholder consultation to assess the success of the regulation.
During that consultation, the effects of replacing the global authorisation by a general export
68
authorisation for Authorised Economic Operators, the simplified temporary exports and imports,
the implied consent of the non-EU country of transit as a default option and the digitalisation of
processes will be assessed from the viewpoint of the industry.
69
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION
1 LEAD DG, DECIDE PLANNING/CWP REFERENCES
The lead DG is the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) for the
preparation of the initiative and the work on the evaluation and impact assessment. The agenda
planning reference is PLAN/2020/8730. This revision was included in the Commission Work
Programme 2021 annex II.
2 ORGANISATION AND TIMING
The inception impact assessment was published on 4 June 2021. Within this framework, the impact
assessment was prepared.
An Inter-Service Group was set up in May 2021 with the participation of the following
Commission Directorates-General: Secretariat-General (SG); Legal Service (LS); Taxation and
Customs Union (TAXUD), External Trade (TRADE), Neighbourhood and Enlargement
Negotiations (NEAR); International Partnerships (INTPA) and the European External Action
Service (EEAS). The Inter-Service Group met on 3rd
December 2021 to discuss the main outcomes
of the public consultation, the description of problems and of options and on 2nd
February 2022 to
discuss the revised description of problems and options, the assessment of the options and the
impact of the preferred option.
3 CONSULTATION OF THE RSB
On 4 March 2022, the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs submitted the present
impact assessment report to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, in view of its meeting on 6 April 2022.
Underneath table shows how the comments of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board were taken into
account.
Comment RSB Addressed through:
The report had to better describe the expected
evolution of the problems
Extending the explanation of the baseline in
section 5.1
Clarify the value of the soft-law option (option
1) and consider sub-options if policy choices
need to be made
The explanation linked to option 1 in section
5.2.1 was increased and option 3 bis was added
in section 5.2.4
Recognize the lack of reliable data as a fully-
fledged problem
The problem description and the description of
the policy options were adjusted to
accommodate the comment.
Develop the section on future monitoring and
evaluation.
The section 9 has been enhanced and
indicators were added to monitor the
development of the success of the Regulation.
A first interim application report will be sent to
Council and Parliament 5 years after the
70
adoption
Clarify the estimates of the administrative
costs
Annex 4 was increased to better explain the
calculations of the administrative costs.
The report should compare the options more
clearly in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and
coherence. It should explain the scoring
methodology.
The full section 7 was adopted to explain better
the comparison of the different options.
4 EVIDENCE, SOURCES AND QUALITY
The impact assessment is notably based on the stakeholder consultation (see annex 2) and the two
external evaluation studies. The Commission applied a variety of methods and forms of
consultation, ranging from consultation on the Inception Impact Assessment, which sought views
from all interested parties, to targeted stakeholders’ consultation by way of questionnaires, a
confidential survey towards public authorities and experts’ interviews, which focused on subject
matter experts, including practitioners at national level.
In 2017, the Commission carried out an evaluation of the Firearms Regulation114
which concluded
that while it has reached to a large extent its objectives, its effectiveness and added value would
improve if its content was further specified and updated, reflecting also the evolution of the arms
trafficking policy framework. It was followed by a Commission recommendation of 17 April 2018
on immediate steps to improve security of export, import and transit measures for firearms, their
parts and essential components and ammunition.115
Other data and evidence gathered by the
Commission will feed into the analysis. Initial consultation of stakeholders already took place in
those contexts.
The Commission also took into account the findings of the ‘Study on the improvement of the EU
system of export authorisation, and import and transit measures for civilian firearms, their parts and
components and ammunition’. This study was commissioned by DG HOME and developed by the
contractor based on desk research and the following stakeholder consultation methods: surveys,
interviews with subject matter experts, questionnaires, and practical case studies through focus
groups.
114
COM(2017)737, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2017:0737:FIN:EN:PDF
115
C(2018)2197, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
security/20180417_commission-recommendation-immediate-steps-improve-security-firearms-ammunition_en.pdf
71
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION (SYNOPSIS REPORT)
This annex provides a synopsis report of all stakeholder consultation activities undertaken in the
context of this impact assessment.
1. CONSULTATION STRATEGY
The main objective of the consultation was to receive addition input from stakeholders to enable an
evidence-based revision of the Firearms Regulation. The consultation strategy aimed at improving
and updating the evidence gathered so far. More specifically, the consultation sought to gather data
and analyses of stakeholders:
 on the problems they consider should be addressed in the initiatives;
 on the roles of different actors in the actions to be taken and the level of action needed,
taking into consideration the principle of subsidiarity;
 on challenges and shortcomings, but also best practices;
 on the possible options to tackle the problems and the impact thereof;
 to fill any data gaps in the evidence base.
While using the data collected and analyses already available, the consultation activities sought to
achieve a balanced and comprehensive assessment of the policy options and their impacts.
In this regard, a major challenge existed in the fact that Member States do not always have the
relevant statistical data, and when they do, are reluctant to provide it, both on legal trade and on
seizures of firearms, which affects the analysis of the threats and of the problems. On the side of
manufacturers and arms dealers, data collection has also so far proven difficult, with complaints or
assessments of administrative burden which are unsupported by any figures, or which do not relate
to the implementation of the Regulation itself.
1.1. Mapping of stakeholders
In preparing the initiative, Commission services carried out an initial mapping of stakeholders.
Three main categories of stakeholders that may have an interest in the revision of the firearms
regulation on import, export and transit.
 the competent authorities at Member State level:
o administrative bodies in charge of import and export licences (customs, ministry of
trade, export agency etc.)
o law-enforcement authorities (police, customs)
 firearms users, in particular sport shooters, hunters, collectors
 economic operators, notably arms dealers, including manufacturers and brokers
1.2. Methods and forms of consultation
In view of the crisis due to the coronavirus, it was difficult to interact with stakeholders in physical
meetings. Therefore, the consultation activities focused on alternatives such as online surveys,
semi-structured phone interviews, as well as meetings via video conference.
72
The consultation activities started with the publication of the Inception Impact Assessment116
.
The objective was to gather feedback by the public on the outline for the initial structure of the
project. The consultation period lasted for 4 weeks from 4 June until 2 July 2021.
A public consultation was launched for 14 weeks117
, in order to give the possibility to the wider
public to share their views on the functioning of the existing exports, imports and transit of civilian
firearms regulation, on the need for EU action and possible policy options and their impact. The
questionnaire for public consultation was available in all languages.
Targeted consultation activities were aimed to build on the consultation activities that took place in
the course of the two external studies mentioned in annex 1118
. Stakeholders were invited in
meetings and through an online questionnaire to complete their submissions with additional written
contributions. Specific focus was given to Member States’ authorities; two requests119
were sent out
to collect detailed statistics of the preceding year about the number of authorisations, refusals, the
quantities and values of firearms exports and imports, by origin or destination and a confidential
survey was distributed to gather data from the competent law enforcement agencies. Meetings
were carried out with some Member States and representatives from manufacturing associations.
With the exception of the public consultation, the consultation activities were conducted in English,
French and German.
2. CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES
2.1. The Inception Impact Assessment
The Inception Impact Assessment was published for feedback by all interested parties on the
Commission’s ‘Have your say’ portal. Respondents were invited to provide online comments.
A total of 27 contributions were submitted over the 4-week feedback period. The division of these
answers according to category of respondent and by country can be seen in the following two
graphs.
116
The Inception Impact Assessment consultations are available here.
117
12 weeks extended by 2 weeks due to the summary holidays.
118
The study on ‘the evaluation of the Firearms Regulation’ and the ‘Study on the improvement of the EU system of
export authorisation, and import and transit measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition’
119
In August 2021 and in February 2022
73
There is a large discrepancy between the views of the respondents. Six respondents expressed their
concern regarding stricter rules as these might have negative effects on sport shooting and hunting.
This specifically concerned the need to still be able to import and export their firearms for
competition or to be able to buy spare parts. The simplified procedure was considered useful.
Nevertheless, four respondents are supportive of the Commission’s initiative to strengthen the
current rules. One respondent stated that there is a need for both legislative and non-legislative
actions and three respondents indicated that there was a need to train custom officers in the EU.
Additionally, nine respondents specifically agreed with the Commission on the need for
harmonisation within the EU as the current legislation was seen as too unstable. The comments
made focused on the need for a uniform implementation of the legislation, the need to streamline
the procedures and the need to use the same documents in the whole of the EU. Suggestions were
also raised about the need to streamline the scope of the Firearms Directive and Regulation 258,
specifically linked to deactivated firearms and alarm and signal weapons. It was also clear from the
answers that not all respondents could distinguish between the Firearms Directive and the
Regulation 258 as some answers focused on inter-EU transit or on the categorisation of firearms.
The majority of respondents gave suggestions and comments on specific proposals. Four
respondents shared the need for improving the data collection; however, two other respondents
expressed their concern on possible vulnerabilities if data is stored in a centralised way. Six
respondents expressed their concern about the vagueness of the proposals linked to semi-finished
parts as these are different from essential components and are therefore not well defined.
Furthermore, the proposals regarding the marking of semi-finished parts were looked at
suspiciously, as these could entail additional costs and delays. Nine respondents were concerned
about the proposals linked to streamlining military and civilian firearms. The consensus was that
the trade of these two kinds of firearms are very different and therefore should remain separate.
Three respondents expressed their concern about the possible political sensitivity of post-shipment
controls. Furthermore, three business organisations expressed the need for the involvement of the
industry in the process of changing the legislation. Additionally, five businesses requested a clear
maximum duration for the proceedings regarding export and import of firearms.
26%
26%
22%
19%
7%
By category of respondent
business
associations
EU citizen
NGO
company/business
organisation
academic/research
institution
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
By country
74
2.2. The public consultation
The European Commission launched a public consultation on 5 July 2021, which aimed to gather
feedback and collect opinions on the effectiveness of the current legislation and policy framework
and on existing problems and possible options for future initiatives. The consultation closed after
14 weeks on 11 October 2021.
Methodology
The public consultation was conducted through an online questionnaire published on the internet in
all EU languages. It was advertised on the European Commission’s website120
and the Commission
sent out emails to stakeholders (hunters associations, shooting clubs and industry), to EMPACT
firearms, to the European Firearms Expert group (EFE) and to the Firearms committee to alert them
of the public consultation. The questionnaire consisted of a series of 27 mainly closed questions,
along with a limited number of open questions to allow for clarifying remarks and/or remarks of a
more general nature.
It should be noted, as a disclaimer, that the questions that were presented to the respondents
depended on the profile they had indicated (as depicted in Annex 6). This explains why the
questions on trafficking of firearms only have 19 answers, as only firearms specialists and EU
National competent authorities were presented with them. Furthermore, it is important to note that,
even though the consultation specifically excluded intra-EU movements, many of the written
comments seemed to mix intra-EU movements with imports to, and exports out of the EU.
The respondents
227 valid contributions were received. 78% of all contributions came from individual EU citizens.
5% of respondents were business associations or individual companies. 4,6% of respondents were
academics, think tanks and other NGOs. Only 7 national competent authorities replied (2,95% of
replies). This low number of participating national competent authorities was anticipated in the
consultation strategy. It was mediated by setting up specific meetings and by creating a confidential
survey.
Most respondents came from the Netherlands (25%), Belgium (21%), Romania (17%), Germany
(13%) and Sweden (5%). 65.82% of the respondents indicated that they were a firearms user such
as hunter, sport shooter and collector.
Main findings
A vast majority of respondents consider that more uniform EU rules for imports and exports of
firearms are needed. 47% considered that without further EU intervention, there will be an increase
of exports (or diversion) of firearms to conflict zones and dictatorships, as well as smuggling of
firearms, their components, and convertible weapons into the EU. And 53% considered that without
such intervention, economic operators and legitimate firearms owners will be faced with
increasingly heterogeneous national rules and procedures.
The respondents were especially vocal about challenges that could hamper the legal movement of
civilian firearms. The Commission had identified a number of these challenges and for almost all of
these, the majority of respondents indicated that, indeed these challenges created a high to very
high burden for legal movements of civilian firearms. When asked to identify additional challenges,
120
See DG HOME weOnlibiste.
75
most respondents reiterated the need for harmonised rules and for digitalisation. However, four
respondents commented on the lack of knowledge by officers involved in the procedure and
therefore the need for training of these officers.
When the focus of the survey shifted to identifying risks for firearms trafficking, the responses are
less decisive. The highest risks perceived where inadequate controls of the end-use of exported
firearms, poor coordination amongst export authorities and between customs and licensing
authorities.
When focusing on possible policy options linked to improving legal import, export and transit of
civilian firearms, the majority of respondents indicated that digital import and export licences
(59%), clear rules for ‘simplified procedures’ (63%) and publishing a list of competent authorities
(50%) would have a high to very high impact. While having the same licensing procedure for
civilian as for military firearms was considered not at all or only to a small extent important to
improve the legal import, export and transit of civilian firearms.
When discussing policy options to improve the fight against trafficking of firearms, the respondents
perceived that almost all of the options would have a high to very high impact. The only options on
which the respondents were indecisive where the systematic checking of criminal records in other
MS before granting an import/export licence, imposing marking of the first country of import and
limiting imports of unmarked semi-finished essential components.
A large majority of respondents identified many issues as creating a high or very high
administrative burden on their operations. However, except a tiny number of replies, almost no
respondent was in a position to provide quantitative estimates (in monetary terms or in full-time
equivalent) of the costs of the current rules or of any of the options put forward. When asked to
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
% of respondents indicating high to very high burden for legal
movements of civilian firearms
76
evaluate the policy options effect on the administrative burden, positive impact was expected for
digitalisation, clear and simple rules for ‘simplified procedure’, removing the obligation to
translate, publishing information and clarifying the role of competent authorities and especially
homogenising the process for requesting import and export licenses. On the other hand, negative
impact was expected for having the same licensing procedure for civilian and military firearms,
limiting import of unmarked semi-finished essential components and stepping up post-shipment
controls.
The majority of the written comments focused on the need for harmonisation of rules at the EU
level to support trade of firearms. The highest amount of requests focused on the need for
digitalisation and simplified procedure. However, many replies of individual citizens considered
that strengthening import and export controls of firearms would not have any impact on trafficking.
Instead, these responded focused on the need for effective law enforcement response.
2.3. Data collection
The 2019 Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import and
transit measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition121
was mostly
based on desk and field research (including national case studies, interviews and web survey). The
data collection was faced with limitations that prevented a reliable estimate of the scale of
trafficking of firearms, with the absence of EU statistics concerning the civilian firearms. In general
it was difficult to engage stakeholders in consultation activities, and stakeholders found it difficult
to quantify and qualify costs.
In August 2021, the Commission sent a letter to the Member States,122
requesting them to collect
and sent detailed statistics of the preceding year about the number of authorisations, refusals, the
quantities and values of firearms exports and imports, by origin or destination. 10 Member States123
sent (some of) the information requested.
The quality and completeness of the information differs greatly between the Member States. Some
Member States only sent data regarding export of civilian firearms; other Member Stated did not
sent the value of shipments or information regarding origin or destination countries.
Faced with continued lack of, or unsatisfactory data, the Commission sent an additional letter to
Member States in February 2022.124
Annex 4 contains an analysis of this data, together with data from open sources such as Eurostat,
data sent to the Commission by stakeholders and data from past evaluation reports.
2.4. Confidential survey
A confidential survey was organised to entice more EU National authorities to reply, as there were
little responses in the public consultation. This confidential survey also allowed for more details
questions than the public one. The confidential survey was sent to all national authorities
responsible for Regulation (EU) 258/2012 on 1 October 2021. They were asked to reply by 30
121
2019, Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import and transit measures for
civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition not published
122
Ares(2021)5101296
123
BG, EL, ES, FR, HR, LT, NL, PL, RO, SI
124
Ares(2022)1143821
77
October 2021. It contained 75 mainly closed questions, along with a limited number of open
questions. The full questionnaire can be found in annex 6.
In total 32 answers were received from 20 EU Member States125
. Most respondents represented the
police (11), customs (5), Ministry of trade (5), Ministry of justice or home affairs (5) and other
export licensing authorities (5).
The answers of the confidential survey confirm the lamentation of the non-harmonised import and
export procedures voiced by the public consultation. Exemplary of this are the 16 respondents
stating that a specific import authorisation form, according to national legislation, 9 respondents
indicating that there is no simplified procedure for temporary imports, 3 respondents stating that the
export authorisation model established by Regulation 258 is not used. Furthermore, 18 respondents
stated that the MS uses a paper-based import and export process, 15 respondents stated that there
are fees linked to the authorisations etc. There are also large differences observed regarding the
time between a request and an import authorisation. There are 3 respondents stating that there is not
maximum time stated in the legislation, the other respondents declared maximum times between 9
months and 10 days. The respondents also indicated average process times between 5 days and 1,5
months.
However, the findings of the confidential survey are especially interesting regarding the drivers
identified with trafficking of firearms. When it comes to exchange of information, only 25% of the
respondents declared that they sent systematic SIENA messages for data in relation to smuggling of
firearms into the EU and 12% creates systematic Risk Information Fiches (RIF) in the Customs
Risk Management System (CRMS). Furthermore, when a refusal or withdrawal of an export
authorisation is issues, only 40% of the respondents indicated that this is always uploaded in
COARM.
This also has an influence on the uncoordinated controls and risk assessments, as only 49% of the
respondents stated that they systematically check the COARM system to see if similar transactions
have been refused in other MS. 12% of the respondent even state that they never check COARM.
When establishing risk profiles to check firearms imports 34% uses their own national statistics,
22% rely on experiences shared in CRMS and 28% use SIENA-based information.
Furthermore, 12% of the respondents stated that there are no specific checks about the
convertibility of alarm and signal weapons when they are imported. Additionally, 9% of the
respondents stated that P80- branded ‘80%’ receivers are not considered as a firearm part and
therefore no specific declaration is needed when importing them. When export authorisations are
granted, 25% of the respondents check criminal records in the national database, 3% checks ECRIS
and 12% requests national criminal records. Lastly, when exporting deactivated firearms, 12% of
the respondents states that no specific rules apply and 22% state that no specific rules apply when
exporting signal and alarm weapons.
125
AT, BE, CY, CZ, EE, FI, FR, DE, IT, LV, LT, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, ES, SE
78
There is also a problem with the cooperation between customs and licencing authorities as 56%
indicated that they do not have access to EU customs information system. Also when licences are
withdrawn, suspended, modified or revoked, 9% of the licencing authorities do not inform customs.
The Commission had identified a number of policy options which could have an impact on the fight
against firearms trafficking. For almost all of these, the majority of respondents indicated that,
indeed these policy options could have a high to very high impact on the fight against firearms
trafficking. Requiring end-use certificates at export scored the highest.
2.5. Meetings
List of meetings with stakeholders during the 2019 Study on the improvement of the EU
system of export authorisation, and import and transit measures for civilian firearms, their
parts and components and ammunition.126
Name
Entity/
Organisation
Position Specific topics
Experts
Daniel Prins United Nations
Office for
Director of
Conventional Arms
PoA on small arms and its ITI
International Small Arms
126
2019, Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import and transit measures for
civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, not published
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
% of respondents indicating high to very high impact on fight
against firearms trafficking
79
Name
Entity/
Organisation
Position Specific topics
Disarmament Affairs Branch Control Standards
Arms Trade Treaty
Simonetta Grassi United Nations
Office on Drugs and
Crime
Head of Global
Firearms Programme
United Nations Convention
Against Transnational
Organized Crime
Firearms Protocol
Nicholas Marsh Peace Research
Institute, Oslo
(PRIO)
Research Fellow Global trends in firearms
trafficking
Arms export and transfer
controls
Nils Duquet Flemish Peace
Institute
Senior researcher Illicit firearms markets in the
EU
Terrorist access to illicit
firearms markets in the EU
Nicolas Florquin Small Arms Survey Senior Researcher Illicit firearms markets in the
EU
Converted firearms in the EU
Paul Holtom Small Arms Survey Senior Researcher Risk of diversion in Europe
Non-EU countries:
 Australia: three representatives from the Department of Defence and Department of Home
Affairs.
 Brasil: one representative from the Divisão de Repressão a Crimes contra o Patrimônio e ao
Tráfico de Armas.
 Canada: two representatives from Global Affairs Canada’s Trade Export Control department.
 USA: five representatives from the US State Department and Department of Justice.
Regional/international regulatory frameworks:
 Arms Trade Treaty: one representative from the Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat.
 Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC): two representatives
from the Conventional Arms Branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs.
 The Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA): one representative
from the Department for Public Safety of the OAS.
 Wassenaar Arrangement: two representatives from the Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat.
EU Member States
MS Stakeholder
category
Entity/ Organisation Field research
activity
BE NCA
Flanders - Flemish Department of
Foreign Affairs — Strategic Goods
Control Unit
Phone interview,
11th
December 2018.
Wallonie - Public Service of Wallonia
Operational Directorate-General for the
Economy, Employment and Research
Questionnaire,
14th
March 2019
80
MS Stakeholder
category
Entity/ Organisation Field research
activity
Firearms Licensing Directorate —
Administrative assessment and
implementation
LEA
Belgian Federal Police Phone interview,
18th
February 2019.
Customs
Customs - Operational Expertise
Legislation and Regulations
Phone interview,
22nd
February 2019.
Producers/exporte
rs
Browning International Phone interview,
5th
February 2019.
Users’ association
Royal Union of Shooting Societies of
Belgium
Phone interview,
12nd
December 2018.
CZ
NCA
Ministry of Industry and Trade -
Licensing Office
Prague,
29th
January 2019
morning session
LEA
Ministry of Interior- Police and Firearms
Unit
Customs
Customs Administration Prague,
29th
January 2019
morning session
Producers/exporte
rs
Czech Association of Arms &
Ammunitions Producers and Sellers
Prague,
29th
January 2019,
afternoon session.
Sport & Defence
Users’
associations
Czech Shooting Federation Phone interview,
22nd
January 2019
Association of Czech Hunters Phone interview,
12th
February 2019
DE
Producers/exporte
rs
Association of Hunting, Sporting and
Ammunition Manufacturers
Munich,
18th
January 2019
Manfred Alberts GmbH
Walther Arms, Inc.
L & O Holding GmbH & Co. KG
J. P. Sauer & Sohn GmbH
Ruag Ammotec GmbH
Frankonia Handels GmbH & Co. KG (2
participants)
Users’
associations
National German Hunters Association Phone interview,
11st February 2019
Association of Legal Gun Owners Phone interview,
21st
February 2019
ES
NCA
Secretariat of State for Commerce-
International Trade in Defense Material
and Dual Use
Questionnaire,
7th
February 2019
LEA Civil Police
Customs
State Agency of Tax Administration
(AEAT)
81
MS Stakeholder
category
Entity/ Organisation Field research
activity
Producers/exporte
rs
Asociación Armera Eibar,
5th
February 2019
Beretta-Benelli Iberica S.a. (2
participants)
Dikar S.c.l.
Grulla Armas S.l.
Rade tecnologias S.l.
Maxam Outdoors S.a.
Trust Eibarres S.a.
Carmusa
Users’ association
National Association of Spanish
Weapon- Asociación Nacional del Arma
de España
Phone interview,
15th January 2019
FI
NCA
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Phone interview, 30th
January 2019
Producers/exporte
rs
Lynx Rifles Phone interview, 30th
January 2019
Users’ association
Sport Shooters Association Phone interview,
30th
January 2019
IT
NCA/LEA
Ministry of Interior – Public Security
Department
Phone interview,
9th
January
Producers/exporte
rs
Benelli Armi Rome, 4th
December
Tanfoglio S.r.l.
Pedersoli Davide & C.
Cheddite Italy S.r.l.
Fiocchi Munizioni S.p.a.
ANPAM Association (2 participants)
Users’
associations
Association for the defence of the rights
of legal holders of arms
Phone interview, 21st
January 2019
Italian Hunting Federation Phone interview,
4th
December 2018.
LT
NCA
Police Department - License Division
(2 participants)
Vilnius,
23rd
January 2019,
morning session
LEA
Ministry of Interior - Division of Public
Security Police (2 participants)
Customs
State Border Guard Service
Customs Department - Procedures
Division
Producers/exporte
rs
Guns Merchants Association of Lithuania Vilnius,
23rd
January 2019,
afternoon session
Oksalis
Zala Arms
Vollit
Lithuanian Defence and Security Industry
Association (2 participants)
PT NCA/LEA
Police - Firearms and Explosives
Department
(3 participants)
Lisbon,
8th
February 2019,
morning session
82
MS Stakeholder
category
Entity/ Organisation Field research
activity
Customs
Tributary and customs authority
Lisbon,
8th
February 2019,
afternoon session
Producers/exporte
rs
Browning Viana (2 participants) Lisbon,
8th
February 2019,
afternoon session
BRG - Portugal
Cartuchos Sulbeja, Lda
Users’
associations
Portuguese Federation of Hunting Phone interview,
20th
February 2019
National Confederation of Portuguese
Hunters
Questionnaire,
22nd
February 2019
RO
NCA/LEA
Ministry of Home Affairs - General
Inspectorate of the Romanian Police -
Weapons, Explosives and Dangerous
Substances Unit
Bucharest,
22nd
January 2019
Customs
National Agency for Fiscal
Administration - Directorate-General for
Customs (2 participants)
Bucharest,
14th
December 2018
Producers/exporte
rs
S.C. Interarms Impex S.r.l. Bucharest,
22nd
January 2019
S.C. Lotus Distribution & Service S.r.l.
Users’
associations
General Association of Hunting and
Fishing Athletes
Bucharest,
18th
December 2018
UK127
NCA
Department for International Trade Phone interview, 28th
January 2019
NCA Department for International Trade London, 25th
January
2019
LEA National Crime Agency
Customs Formerly HR Customs & Excise
Producers/exporte
rs
EGADD: Export Group for Aerospace,
Defence, and Dual-Use
Phone interview, 23rd
January 2019
Helston Gunsmiths Questionnaire,
8th
February 2019
RPA International Phone interview,
28th
January 2019
Gun Trade Association (GTA) Ltd Phone interview, 15th
January 2019
D&B Militaria Phone interview, 15th
January 2019
Users’
associations
Formerly British Association for
Shooting and Conservation
Phone interview, 15th
January 2019
127 During the 2019 study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and
import and transit measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, the
UK was still part of the EU.
83
MS Stakeholder
category
Entity/ Organisation Field research
activity
Law Enforcement International Phone interview, 15th
January 2019
List of meetings with stakeholders during the impact assessment.
Throughout October and November 2021, the Commission organised 10 meetings with a variety of
stakeholders128
. During these meetings, the stakeholders gave further comments and suggestions on
policy options presented by the Commission. The meetings allowed the Commission to get
information from about the different procedures and difficulties in the Member States and
experienced by business associations.
Each of the meetings with the Member States focused on the answers provided by the Member
States in the confidential survey. The various options and comments were discussed in order to get
a thorough understanding of the needs and responsibilities of the various actors. The meetings with
the business associations focused mainly on trying to quantify the administrative burden of the
various options.
- 21/10/2021: meeting with the Austrian authorities
- 21/10/2021: meeting with Olivier Verstraeten, Secretary General of the Association of
European Manufacturers of Sporting Firearms aisbl
- 22/10/21: meeting with the Belgian authorities (law enforcement and licensing authorities)
- 28/10/2021: meeting with the Italian authorities (customs, police)
- 29/10/2021: meeting with Mauro Silvis, representative of the Italian national association of
manufacturers of sport and civilian weapons and munitions (ANPAM) and of the – Institut
Européen des Armes de Chasse et de Sport (EU transparency register 169603610073-70)
- 03/11/2021: meeting with the Czech authorities
- 05/11/2021: meeting with the Swedish authorities
- 15/11/2021: meeting with the Dutch authorities
- 3/12/2021: meeting with the German authorities
128
Association of European Manufacturers of Sporting Firearms aisbl, Italian national association of manufacturers of
sport and civilian weapons and munitions (ANPAM), Institut Européen des Armes de Chasse et de Sport (EU
transparency register 169603610073-70), Austrian, Belgian, Italian, Czech, Swedish, Dutch, German and Spanish
authorities
84
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW?
1. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE
The preferred option is option 3, which includes both clarifications to the existing legislation and new legislative provisions. The following table sets out
the different measures it includes and how they affect various stakeholders.
Description of the measure Import/export licensing
authorities
Law enforcement
authorities
Firearms users Arms dealers (retailers
and manufacturers)
Imports
Compulsory classification as
firearms of alarm and signal
weapons not complying with
Implementing Directive
(EU) 2019/69 + EU list of
non-convertible alarm and
signal weapons
Import licencing authorities
would have to issue an
import authorisation for
alarm and signal weapons
which are convertible
Customs authorities would
have to check the validity of
the certificate accompanying
the customs declaration. The
necessary human resources
will need to be provided.
NA Importers of alarm and
signal weapons would need
to make sure that checks are
preformed to establish the
non-convertibility if they do
not want to declare the
weapons as firearms at
import.
EU-level mechanism for
harmonised classification in
case of disagreements
between authorities
Licencing authorities would
inform the Commission of
their decisions to issue or
declare an alarm and signal
weapon as non-convertible.
They could rely on a
Commission decision
determining whether a given
Customs could rely on a
Commission decision
determining whether a given
model of alarm and signal
weapon is convertible or
not.
Importers could complain to the Commission if they notice
diverging approaches between Member States in relation to
the same alarm and signal weapon.
85
Description of the measure Import/export licensing
authorities
Law enforcement
authorities
Firearms users Arms dealers (retailers
and manufacturers)
model of alarm and signal
weapon is convertible or
not.
Designation of the
authorities in charge of
checking compliance with
the implementing directive
before the release into free
circulation
The designation of authorities will enable customs, in case
of doubt (e.g. risk of forgery), to double check the validity
of the certificate with the issuing authority.
Importers will have clarity as who to turn to in order to
receive the compliance certificate.
Limit import of semi-
finished firearms and
essential components to
licenced firearms dealers
Import licensing authorities
will only grant an import
licence to licensed firearms
dealers.
Customs will only check
whether the importer has a
valid licence.
They will also have to fully
implement the customs rules
by classifying the unfinished
components as the final
product. This will require a
strong risk assessment to
avoid misdeclaration of
goods. The necessary IT and
human resources will need
to be provided.
Private individuals will not
be able to import such
products anymore, which
will prevent them from
creating their own custom-
made firearms. Legitimate
users will have to ask a
licensed arms dealers to
create the final product.
Arms dealers are unaffected
by this measure. Retailers
are likely to benefit from the
substitution effect, with
private individuals
requesting their services to
import the unfinished
product and
manufacture/assemble the
finished firearm.
60-day deadline to grant Import licensing authorities
will have to establish
NA Importers will have clarity about deadlines and will enjoy
86
Description of the measure Import/export licensing
authorities
Law enforcement
authorities
Firearms users Arms dealers (retailers
and manufacturers)
import authorisations processes to deal with
requests within the set
deadline. As for export
authorisations currently, the
countdown would only start
once all the necessary
supporting documents and
information has been
received by the authority.
the same conditions throughout the EU.
Exports
Exporters to provide
evidence of final import in
the country of destination
The authority will received
the copy of the import
declaration in the non-EU
country. National authorities
will have to establish proper
procedures to check after the
deadline that the evidence
has been provided. If it has
not, it should inform
immediately the customs
offices of export and of exit,
start tracing the firearm to
recover it, and withdraw or
suspend the export
authorisations.
Customs and relevant law
enforcement authorities
should be immediately
notified if the evidence is
not provided – this
information should be fed
into the national and EU
customs risk management
systems to control with
attention similar
movements.
NA as firearms users carry
out temporary exports
Exporters will have to
follow-up their exports and
make sure that the importers
in the non-EU countries
provide them with the
evidence of import. If they
do not, the exporters might
have to forgo unreliable
clients who are not able to
provide evidence of imports.
This is unlikely to be an
issue for professional
traders, who work with
trustworthy arms dealers
abroad.
87
Description of the measure Import/export licensing
authorities
Law enforcement
authorities
Firearms users Arms dealers (retailers
and manufacturers)
Member States may entitle
third parties to conduct post-
shipment controls
This provision would create
a legal basis to support the
work of licensing authorities
when conducting post-
shipment controls in a
context of constrained
budgets and short staffing.
The outcome of negative
post-shipment controls
would contribute to a more
precise knowledge of the
threat. More post-shipment
checks provide a better
understanding of diversion
mechanisms.
NA
End-user certificate for
exported category A and B
firearms
They will check the
presence of the certificate
before granting the
authorisation, which would
align the rules for civilian
firearms with those currently
in place for military
weapons.
Customs will have to check
the presence of the
certificate as an
accompanying supporting
document for export
declaration. The necessary
human resources will need
to be provided for these
checks.
NA (they benefit from the
simplification of the
European Firearms Pass)
This requirement will only
create a new obligation in
Member States which do not
already apply the rules of
the Council Common
Position to those firearms.
Exporters will be dependent
on the trustworthiness of the
importer and the public
authorities in the country of
destination. They might lose
commercial opportunities by
demanding a written
commitment not to sell the
firearms to the armed forces
or not to re-export them. The
clarification of scope means
that arms dealers aiming at
88
Description of the measure Import/export licensing
authorities
Law enforcement
authorities
Firearms users Arms dealers (retailers
and manufacturers)
selling weapons for military
use will have to do it under
national rules and
procedures of the Council
Common Position.
Cooperation and exchanges of information
compulsory check of
criminal records in ECRIS
In addition to requesting a
copy of the criminal record
from the applicant, the
competent authority will
have to proactively (and
ideally automatically) check
whether an applicant has a
criminal record in another
Member State.
NA NA NA
compulsory notification of
refusals in a common
electronic system
Competent authorities will
be affected differently
depending on the type of
system eventually used.
COARM would enable joint
analysis of refusals for
military and non-military
transactions, while DUeS
would be an easy platform
already used by competent
NA NA Increased exchanges of
information between
authorities might have an
indirect effect on exporters,
as they would be treated
more equally across the EU,
compared to the current
situation
89
Description of the measure Import/export licensing
authorities
Law enforcement
authorities
Firearms users Arms dealers (retailers
and manufacturers)
authorities
Possible check of the SIS This would further reinforce
the threat assessment for
suspicious or unusual
requests
NA NA NA
Whistle-blower protection
regime
Competent authorities and law enforcement would benefit
from inside information, which could facilitate the risk
assessment.
NA Arms dealers already have
to implement Directive (EU)
2019/1937 on the protection
of persons who report
breaches of Union law , with
respect to the Firearms
Directive (for intra-EU rules
on acquisition and
possession of firearms).
They would not face a
substantive change in their
internal processes with
respect to whistle-blowing
in the context of imports and
exports.
Clarification of the roles and
responsibilities of customs
and licencing authorities.
Customs will inform the
competent licensing
authority that the goods have
left the customs territory of
the Union; at import they
Customs controls will
continue to be risk-based;
customs will check the
presence of the appropriate
import or export declaration,
NA NA
90
Description of the measure Import/export licensing
authorities
Law enforcement
authorities
Firearms users Arms dealers (retailers
and manufacturers)
will contact the licensing
authority in case of doubt
about the conformity of
imported goods.
or the EU list of non-
convertibility for imported
alarm and signal weapons.
In case of transit, the
customs authorities of transit
and of export will exchange
relevant information. The
necessary human resources
will need to be provided to
implement these risk-
assessments.
Legal basis for intelligence
sharing between customs
and licencing authorities
Reference shall be made to article 47 of the Union Customs
Code (Regulation (EU) No 952/2013). Competent
authorities and law enforcement authorities, including
customs will also be expressly entitled to exchange
information about ongoing investigations for the purpose of
tracing firearms and to improve the threat assessment.
NA NA
Submission of annual
statistics on trade and
seizures
Member States will have to
centralise information about
numbers and values of
import and export
authorisations; they will
have to collect accurately
data about actual imports
Law enforcement authorities
(including customs) will
have to establish systematic
data-collection of firearms
seizures, and if necessary
modify their internal
reporting processes,
NA NA
91
Description of the measure Import/export licensing
authorities
Law enforcement
authorities
Firearms users Arms dealers (retailers
and manufacturers)
and exports, for each
category of firearms, notably
by monitoring whether and
how authorisations are used
for actual imports or
exports.
including possibly by
creating a database of seized
firearm. They might have to
adapt the categories used in
their current system to the
type of data requested. Data-
collection will have to be
centralised and not be kept
only the local customs or
police offices. The necessary
IT and human resources will
need to be provided.
Administrative simplifications
Alignment of the personal
scope with Directive (EU)
2021/555
NA NA Collectors and museums
will be included in the scope
of the Regulation, meaning
they will be subject to its
obligations and benefit from
the simplifications, instead
of being subject to their
national laws only.
Brokers will be subject to
the same obligations as arms
dealers when importing and
exporting firearms.
However, they were already
considered as “exporters”
under the current version of
the regulation, which means
they would not be affected
by the clarification.
92
Description of the measure Import/export licensing
authorities
Law enforcement
authorities
Firearms users Arms dealers (retailers
and manufacturers)
Clarification of the
substantive scope, covering
only transactions between
civilians and removing the
overlap with Common
Position 2008/944/CFSP
Licensing authorities will
have to clearly distinguish
the procedure for exports of
military firearms from the
procedure for exports in the
context of transactions of a
civilian nature. They will
however not be profoundly
affected on substance, since:
 sales to foreign
governments or
armed forces will
remain under the
Common Position
and existing national
law;
 civilian transactions
of category A or B
firearms will still
require an end-user
certificate and the
respect of the foreign
and security policy
considerations of the
Common Position.
NA Many firearms users will
benefit from this
clarification, as many of
them had to undergo a
burdensome procedure for
temporary exports
(including holders of a
European Firearms Pass), in
Member States which
subjected the export of
civilian firearms to the
standard rules of military
exports. The European
Firearms Pass will be more
automatically recognised,
without the need for a priori
authorisation.
This clarification will
greatly benefit commercial
exporters, as they will all be
faced with identical rules for
export authorisations,
irrespective of the Member
State in which they lodge
the export authorisation.
They will know exactly
which type of procedure to
apply, depending on who is
the end-user of the sale.
93
Description of the measure Import/export licensing
authorities
Law enforcement
authorities
Firearms users Arms dealers (retailers
and manufacturers)
Express reference to the
roles and responsibilities of
importers and exporters
(making sure the right
marking is applied to
imported firearms, duty of
cooperation with competent
authority, duty to inform
authorities in case of
suspected violation of the
rules, etc.)
NA Law enforcement authorities
will be more easily entitled
to hold responsible
importers and exporters for
the lack of compliance with
the rules, if the due diligence
obligations are not
respected. This will facilitate
the incriminations for
firearms trafficking.
Importers (in particular commercial importers) will face
standard reporting and due diligence obligations, making
sure in particular that imported firearms respect the
applicable legislation. As Member States already by and
large transposed the Firearms Directive, similar rules
already apply at national level. The Regulation will reflects
those obligations in the directly applicable EU legal order
for clarity and transparency.
Replace global authorisation
by a general export
authorisation for Authorised
Economic Operators
Licencing authorities will
benefit from reduced
administrative burden, as a
global authorisation will
apply to specific operators in
specific conditions, thus
removing the obligation to
process individual
applications and grand
individual licences.
The impact on customs will
depend on the exact scope
and modalities of the general
authorisation, to be
determined in a delegated or
implementing act. If the
relevant operators are
recorded in a centralised
database, the checks would
be done automatically
through the EU Single
Window Environment for
customs.
NA Regular and trustworthy
exporters would be
exempted from the
obligation to lodge
individual export
applications in specific
cases. One of the conditions
would be for them to be
certified by customs as
Authorised Economic
Operators with the Safety
and Security element. The
other conditions could be
linked to the countries of
destinations, or to the
specific end-users, or for
94
Description of the measure Import/export licensing
authorities
Law enforcement
authorities
Firearms users Arms dealers (retailers
and manufacturers)
specific processes (such as
intra-group transactions).
Harmonised simplifications
for temporary exports and
imports
This simplification would
take away part of the
administrative burden of
licensing authorities, who
would not have to grant
prior authorisations in
specific cases (exhibitions,
repairs etc.)
Customs would have to pay
particular attention to the
effective re-imports or re-
exports after the period of
discharge, and ensure that
the particulars of the
firearms concerned appear
expressly on the import or
export declaration. The
necessary human resources
will need to be provided.
Collectors or museums
would particularly benefit
from this measure as the
mere export or import
declaration would be
sufficient for temporary
exports or imports. They
would have to mention
expressly all the particulars
of the weapons concerned in
the declaration (brand, serial
number, etc.) in their
declaration.
Manufacturers (in the case
of temporary imports) and
retails (for temporary
exports), in particular for
repair purposes, or for
international fairs, would
only need export or import
declaration for temporary
exports or imports. They
would have to mention
expressly all the particulars
of the weapons concerned in
the declaration (brand, serial
number, etc.) in their
declaration.
Implied consent of the non-
EU country of transit as the
default option
Member States would have
to expressly notify the
Commission if they do not
recognise the absence of
reply of the third country of
transit as an implicit
agreement to the transit.
NA The default option (unless expressly disapplied by
competent authorities) would ease the burden placed on
exporters, who complain that waiting for the consent of the
third country of transit constitutes one of the main costs of
current processes. After 20 days without reply, the consent
of the third country of transit will be deemed to have been
granted, and the exporter will be able to lodge its
application for an export authorisation.
95
Description of the measure Import/export licensing
authorities
Law enforcement
authorities
Firearms users Arms dealers (retailers
and manufacturers)
Full digitalisation
(computerised data-filing
systems, e-licencing, use of
the EU Single Window
Environment for customs)
Import licencing authorities
will either have to digitalise
the whole application
process or use the
Commission’s e-licencing
platform,129
which will be
provided to them free of
charge.
Member States which still
operate a decentralised (and
sometimes paper-based)
application system will need
to centralise and digitalise it.
They will be encouraged to
link this new system to the
central data-filing systems
that they are bound to set up
in application of the
Firearms Directive.
Customs authorities in
particular will greatly
benefit from the
digitalisation process, linked
to the rolling out the EU
Single Window
Environment for customs.
This means that most of the
customs documentary
checks will be fully
automatized: instead of
checking manually the
presence (and validity) of an
import/export authorisation,
this authorisation issued by
the licencing authority will
be automatically linked to
the customs declaration
through a central database.
The absence of the
authorisation will lead to an
automatic rejection of the
customs declaration.
This measure responds to a strong request from all
stakeholders, who will be faced with a uniform multilingual
digital environment, providing them direct and immediate
connection with the licencing and the customs authorities. It
will remove much of the burden of the obligation to provide
additional paper supporting documents.
129
Based on the platform for dual-use goods: https://webgate.acceptance.ec.europa.eu/frontoffice/welcome
96
Description of the measure Import/export licensing
authorities
Law enforcement
authorities
Firearms users Arms dealers (retailers
and manufacturers)
Prohibition of fees for
authorisations and transit
The prohibition would only
affect a few Member
States.130
When these fees
are abolished, these Member
States will have to adapt
their procedure and forgo
income. The Commission
estimates the annual
budgetary loss to public
finances to amount to
86.000 euro per year at EU
level.
NA By prohibiting fees, firearms
users in the affected
Member States will receive
equal treatment.
By prohibiting fees, arms
dealers in the affected
Member States will receive
equal treatment.
The proposal will entail extra checks by licensing authorities and customs. However, the actual impact will be limited as the market share is very small
for civilian firearms. The creation of interoperability of systems will also envisage a simplification of customs control.
The proposal will provide that in the future the interoperability of the database for import and export authorisations with the EU Single Window
environment for Customs will be ensured. Such work will need financial resources devoted to it and made available to DG TAXUD to provide for the
decided interconnection to be made possible. Currently, the level of appropriate resources for such work cannot be determined with certainty, but it is
estimated that it could require a maximum estimated budget of 0.950 million EUR over a 5-year period, while a maintenance fee of 0.100 million EUR
will be needed annually thereafter. It is further estimated that DG TAXUD would require 1,5131
FTE during the first five years of implementation and 0.2
130
Czech Republic (€20), Estonia (€13), Italy (€32), Lithuania (€14), Poland (€19), Portugal (at import: for private citizen €25,6/firearm, for gunsmiths €12,8/firearm; at export
€3,8/firearm), Slovakia (at least €33, but normally 0,1% of the value of the products), Slovenia (€49,8) and Sweden (€120)
131
0,5 FTE for policy work and 1 FTE for work on the Single Window
97
FTE for the maintenance of the interconnection with the EU Single Window Environment for Customs. As the development investment will be carried
out over a 5-year period, the amount to be charged in the period 2024-2027 will be proportional to the effort made.
98
2. SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS
I. Overview of Benefits (total for all provisions) – Preferred Option
Description Amount Comments
Direct benefits
Import: Existing rules on
firearms import will be
harmonized and
strengthened to prevent
diversion of firearms at
import and to establish a
level playing field for all
importers.
An EU list will be created containing the alarm
and signal weapons which are compliant with
implementing directive 2019/69. The
compulsory checks and classification of these
alarm and signal weapons will prevent the entry
of convertible alarm and signal weapons into the
EU, where they can be used in criminal or
terrorist offences. Limiting import of semi-
finished firearms and essential components to
licenced firearms dealers will also prevent
illegal manufacturing of firearms which could
then be used for criminal or terrorist offences.
While the increase in security cannot be
quantified, the SOCTA clearly indicates these
imports as a threat for the security of EU
citizens. The case studies on these imports
reinforce this picture. By increasing the import
regulations, these threats will decrease.
Creating a uniform EU certificate, designating
authorities to check the compliance and
establishing a 60-day deadline to grant import
authorisations will also result in a level playing
field for all importers. Due to the lack in data
received from the firearms industry, it is not
possible to quantify this, however during the
consultations the need for harmonisation was the
main focus of the stakeholders.
Export: reinforcing rules
on firearms export will
decrease the risk of
diversion of firearms, which
fuel global illicit firearms
trafficking and contributes
to instability and organised
crime worldwide
When exports are followed-up through
providing evidence of final import, end-user
certificates and conducting post-shipment
controls the risks of diversions will decrease.
While such an increase cannot be quantified,
examples such as those in Mexico (96.948
firearms seized during 2015-2020 with a worth
of $38 million) show the large monetary value
of diverted firearms. Furthermore, the cases of
circumvention of embargos through Moldova
shows the international responsibility of the EU
to strengthen export controls.
Administrative
simplification to harmonize
the existing EU rules and to
facilitate the trade of
firearms.
During the stakeholder consultation, the need for
harmonisation and administrative simplification
was the most recurring comment. This
simplification will be obtained by creating a full
digitalisation of import and export
99
authorisations. This will lead to a yearly benefit
of €1.603.680 for the arms dealers (retailers and
manufacturers).
Furthermore, the prohibition of fees for the
import and export authorisations, as
implemented by some Member States, will be a
yearly direct saving of €86.175 for the arms
dealers.
Harmonising and simplifying the temporary
exports and imports will save museums,
collectors and dealers around €30.840 each year.
Furthermore, implementing the implied consent
of the non-EU country of transit as the default
option saves the arms dealers annually €56.540.
Indirect benefits
Cooperation and exchange
of information: improving
the cooperation between
customs and licencing
authorities and increasing
the exchange of information
on firearms authorisations,
refusals and trade will allow
for better risk assessments.
The clarification of the role and responsibilities
of customs and licensing authorities and a legal
basis for intelligence sharing will enable both
authorities to improve the risk assessments. This
will support the prevention of firearms diversion
at import and export.
Increasing the cooperation and exchange of
information might have an indirect effect on
exporters, as they would be treated more equally
across the EU, compared to the current situation.
Due to the lack in data received from the
firearms industry, it is not possible to quantify
this, however during the consultations the need
for harmonisation was the main focus of the
stakeholders.
Administrative cost savings related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach*
cost reduction through the
use of e-licencing system
for import and export
authorisations
€ 1.603.680 When import and export authorisations can
be processed through an e-licensing system,
this will reduce the amount of time spent on
each authorisation, for the firearms dealers
and the authorities who need to assess the
authorisations.
Implied consent of third
countries for transit
€ 56.540 If implied consent of third countries for the
transit of firearms is always granted after
20 days, this would decrease the costs for
firearms dealers.
No prior authorisation for
special temporary
operations
€ 30.840 If no authorisations for specific operations,
such as temporary import and export,
would be needed for institutions such as
museums, collectors etc. then this would
decrease the costs for these stakeholders.
II. Overview of costs – Preferred option
100
Citizens/Consumers Businesses Administrations
One-off Recurrent One-off Recurrent One-off Recurrent
Creating
an EU
central
database
for import
and export
authorisati
on
Direct adjustment
costs
NA
NA NA NA € 950.000
(DG
TAXUD
estimate)
€100.000
Direct
administrative
costs
NA NA NA NA
NA NA
Direct regulatory
fees and charges
NA NA NA NA
NA NA
Direct
enforcement costs
NA NA NA NA
NA NA
Indirect costs NA NA NA NA NA NA
Exporters
to provide
evidence
of final
import in
the
country of
destinatio
n
Direct adjustment
costs
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
Direct
administrative
costs
NA NA NA €179.900 NA NA
Direct regulatory
fees and charges
NA NA NA NA NA NA
Direct
enforcement costs
NA NA NA NA NA NA
Indirect costs NA NA NA NA NA NA
End-user
certificate
for
exported
category
A and B
firearms
Direct adjustment
costs
NA
NA NA
NA
NA NA
Direct
administrative
costs
NA
NA NA
€719.600
NA NA
Direct regulatory
fees and charges
NA NA NA NA NA NA
Direct
enforcement costs
NA NA NA NA NA NA
Indirect costs NA NA NA NA NA NA
extending
current e-
licensing
system of
DG
TRADE
Direct adjustment
costs
NA NA NA NA
Rough
estimate of
couple of
thousand
euro
NA
Direct
administrative
costs
NA NA NA NA
NA NA
Direct regulatory
fees and charges
NA NA NA NA
NA NA
Direct
enforcement costs
NA NA NA NA
NA NA
Indirect costs NA NA NA NA NA NA
101
Costs related to the ‘one in, one out’ approach
Total
Direct adjustment
costs
NA NA NA NA
Indirect
adjustment costs
NA NA NA NA
Administrative
costs (for
offsetting)
NA NA NA € 899.500
(1) Estimates (gross values) to be provided with respect to the baseline; (2) costs are provided for each identifiable
action/obligation of the preferred option otherwise for all retained options when no preferred option is specified; (3) If
relevant and available, please present information on costs according to the standard typology of costs (adjustment
costs, administrative costs, regulatory charges, enforcement costs, indirect costs;). (4) Administrative costs for
offsetting as explained in Tool #58 and #59 of the ‘better regulation’ toolbox. The total adjustment costs should equal
the sum of the adjustment costs presented in the upper part of the table (whenever they are quantifiable and/or can be
monetised). Measures taken with a view to compensate adjustment costs to the greatest extent possible are presented in
the section of the impact assessment report presenting the preferred option.
3. RELEVANT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
III. Overview of relevant Sustainable Development Goals – Preferred Option(s)
Relevant SDG Expected progress towards the Goal Comments
SDG no. 16.4 – By 2030,
significantly reduce illicit
financial and arms flows,
strengthen the recovery and
return of stolen assets and
combat all forms of
organized crime
Establishment of an EU-level harmonised data-
collection level enabling the identification of the
proportion of seized, found or surrendered arms
whose illicit origin or context has been traced or
established by a competent authority in line with
international instruments;
Revised Serious and Organised Crime Threat
Assessment stating a reduction of the threat of
imported convertible alarm and signal weapons
and semi-finished firearms and essential
components;
New issue of the UNODC Global Firearms Study
identifying a reduction of illicit firearms of EU
origin seized in non-EU countries.
As no comprehensive, accurate or
comparable statistics in relation to firearms
seizures are available either worldwide or at
EU level, the progress towards the goal
cannot be measured against sound baseline
data.
102
5 ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL METHODS
Methodology for the overall study
In order to conduct this study, data was gathered in a number of manners:
- A letter was sent to Member States to gather detailed statistics of 2020 about the number of
authorisations, refusals, the quantities and values of firearms exports and imports, by origin
or destination; 132
Following the missing or inaccurate information from many Member
States, this letter was complemented by a last sent to Member States in February 2022.133
- Businesses were asked to provide quantitative evidence of administrative burden in the
public consultation;
- During meetings with manufacturing associations, more detailed statistics were asked;
- Public datasets, as used by the two external studies, were consulted.
This came in addition to the data-collection exercise conducted
- During the 2017 evaluation of the regulation.134
- During the 2019 Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and
import and transit measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and
ammunition135
Difficulties gathering the data
In August 2021, the Commission sent a letter to all Member States requesting to receive detailed
statistics of 2020 about the number of authorisations, refusals, the quantities and values of firearms
exports and imports, by origin or destination. The Member States were reminded of the
recommendations issued by the Commission on 17 April 2018, which requested Member States
taking immediate steps to improve the security of export, import and transit measures for firearms,
their parts and essential components and ammunition. One of these recommendations provides that
"by 1st
July each year, Member States should collect detailed statistics of the preceding year”.
Even though this recommendation was at the time three years old, only 10 Member States136
answered to the letter of the Commission. Furthermore, only one Member States (Spain) sent all the
data asked. The remaining Member States sent partial data; some sent only information on export,
others included the quantities of firearms imported and exported but not the value, others did not
include the quantities and often the origin and destination countries were missing. Additionally, the
same data had already been asked multiple times before, notably for the two external evaluation
studies in 2015 and 2017.
Furthermore, when comparing the data received by the Member States, with public data used for
the market analysis, there are clear discrepancies (table1). The differences between the data where
at times so large, that the researchers decided to only focus on the public data, as this was also used
132
Ares(2021)5101296
133
Ares(2022)1143821
134
COM(2017) 737 final, 12.12.2017 and its accompanying staff working document SWD(2017) 442 final
135
EY (2019), not published
136
BG, EL, ES, FR, HR, LT, NL, PL, RO and SI
103
by the two external studies and provides data for all Member States. Nevertheless, as explained
below, this data is most likely a major underestimation. The poor quality of available data regarding
import and export of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition is a known fact. It
remains important to change this, as good data is necessary to calculate the impact of policy
options.
Table 1 - Value of import and export in 2020 for four different Member States according to
data provided by that Member State and to public data (Eurostat International Trade
Database)
In order to estimate the costs of policy options, it was also important to get information on the
administrative costs for businesses and public authorities involved in the export and import of
firearms, parts and components, alarm and signal weapons and ammunition. Calculating this costs
is especially important as multiple businesses and manufacturing companies have complained about
high administrative costs. However, calculating the actual costs has proven difficult in the past.
Therefore, businesses and manufacturing companies were asked to give an estimate about this cost
in the public consultation. From the 12 business organizations and associations, only one was able
to provide some estimate. In the aftermath of the meetings organized by the Commission with
business associations, there was one association, which did provide more information.
The European Commission also organized meetings with public authorities to gather more
information for this study. During these meetings, most public authorities stated that the
administrative costs were not that high notably because civilian firearms are only a tiny part of
licensing processes (dual use goods and military weapons were considered much more important).
The market analysis
Even though the above proves that the publically available data is not reliable or representative of
the firearms market, this report does include a market analysis. It is based on the best available data
for the EU, which is the public customs data. This section presents the analysis of the civilian
firearms sector in terms of size, structure (including employment and level of investment), and
extra-EU trade (including import and export flows and international competitiveness).
Methodology for the market analysis
Following the two external studies, this analysis focuses on the same dimensions deemed relevant
to have an overview of the market of firearms for civilian use, parts, essential components and
ammunition. In particular, the topics covered were:
- Market size;
- Market Structure, Employment and Investment;
firearms parts ammunition firearms parts ammunition
data provided by MS 36.304.561 € 495.939 € 97.985.430 € 98.054.860 € 49.036.758 € 195.353.269 €
public data 1.209.915 € 5.895.850 € 8.135.188 € 38.501.820 € 4.603.454 € 72.213.331 €
data provided by MS 10.646.833 € 5.870.547 € 17.298.035 € 1.932.338 € 75.041 € 15.389.547 €
public data 9.229.684 € 7.445.348 € 11.368.777 € 2.096.157 € 2.072.250 € 70.964.905 €
data provided by MS 2.412.082 € 447.539 € 334.904 € 2.807.011 €
public data 399.406 € 7.490.460 € 131.141 € 3.157.596 €
data provided by MS 3.209.562 € 9.728.000 € 11.431.154 € 1.924.375 € 24.760.603 €
public data 3.208.637 € 3.610.375 € 1.039.441 € 1.728.682 € 2.741.986 €
ES
FR
LT
PL
Value of import Value of export
104
- Extra-EU trade;
When referring to the EU market, it is intended to mean the EU27.
Due to the limits of the data received from the Member States, official sources have been analysed.
The same indicators and sources were used as the two external studies. Furthermore, the analysis
uses the same detailed list of products covered, except for the extra-EU trade. For this topic, the
analysis uses the harmonized system (HS) classification, instead of the Standard International Trade
Classification as used by the external studies. Following the use of DG TAXUD in TARIC, the HS
code appeared to be the most adequate to select the correct categories.
However, even with the use of the HS codes, the impossibility to distinguish between firearms,
parts and components, and ammunition for the civilian firearms market from those for law
enforcement agencies remains a limitation. As a result the sector figures represent an
overestimation. For some units of analysis it was possible to distinguish products which fall within
the scope of Regulation 258 from products which do not, while for others this was not possible.
Identified statistical codes often include more goods than those within the scope of Regulation 258.
For instance, the “Parts and accessories” code, which includes both firearms parts -which are
covered by Regulation 258- and accessories which are not essential to the functioning of a firearm
and are therefore not within the scope of Regulation 258.
Furthermore, while the analysis of the market size and the extra-EU trade could be focused on
civilian firearms, this was not feasible for the analysis of the market structure, which can only
provide an aggregated picture of the whole firearms sector (including both civilian and military
firearms).
The table below summarises the dimensions of the analysis, and which sources and indicators have
been used to provide a descriptive assessment of the context in which the firearms, their parts and
components are produced, exported and imported. Together with this, a detailed list of products
covered by each dimension is added.
Market
Dimension
Indicators Sources Products Covered
Market Size Sold
production
quantity
and value
Eurostat
PRODCOM
database,
WFSA137
Firearms
NACE Rev.2 – 25401230 – Revolvers and
Pistols
NACE Rev.2 – 25401250 - Shotgun, rifles,
carbines and muzzle loaders
NACE Rev.2 – 25401270 - Firearms
(explosive charge)
137
World Forum on the Future of Shooting Activities.
105
Alarm and signal weapons
NACE Rev.2 - 25401290
Parts and components
NACE Rev.2 – 25401400 – Parts and
accessories for revolvers, pistols, non-
military firearms and similar devices
Ammunition
NACE Rev.2 – 25401300 –Cartridge and
other ammunition
NACE Rev.2 – 20511130 – Propellant
Powders
NACE Rev.2 – 20511270 – Percussion or
detonating caps, igniters and electric
detonators
Market
Structure,
Employment
and Investment
Turnover,
Number
and size of
firms,
Number of
employees
Eurostat SBS Firearms, Parts and components, and
Ammunition138
NACE Rev.2 – 2540 –Weapons and
Ammunition
Extra-EU trade Export-
EU27
export and
import in
quantity
and value
Eurostat
International
Trade Database,
UN COMTRADE
database
Firearms
HS 9302 – Revolvers and pistols, other than
those of heading 9303 or 9304
HS 9303 – Other firearms and similar
devices which operate by the firing of an
explosive charge (for example, sporting
shotguns and rifles, muzzle-loading
firearms, Very pistols and other devices
designed to project only signal flares,
pistols and revolvers for firing blank
ammunition, captive-bolt humane killers,
138
Such a dimension of analysis considers all the sectors 2540 of NACE Rev.2, including also military weapons. The
granularity of available data did not give the possibility to extrapolate more detailed information related to civilian
firearms.
106
line-throwing guns)
- Excluding HS 9303 90 – Other
Alarm and signal weapons
HS 9303 90 – Other
HS 9304 – Other arms (for example, spring,
air or gas guns and pistols, truncheons),
excluding those of heading 9307
Parts and components
HS 9305 – Parts and accessories of articles
of headings 9301 to 9304
- Excluding HS 9305 91 – Of military
weapons of heading 9301
Ammunition
HS 9306 – Bombs, grenades, torpedoes,
mines, missiles and similar munitions of
war and parts thereof; cartridges and other
ammunition and projectiles and parts
thereof, including shot and cartridge wads
- Excluding HS 9306 30 30 – for
military weapons
- Excluding HS 9306 90 10 – for
military weapons
The results of the market analysis
Market size
The EU sold production of civilian firearms, alarm and signal weapons, their parts and components,
and ammunition reached over €4.3 billion in 2020, which accounts for (only) 0.09% of the EU27
total sold production value.
Ammunition represents the largest share, on average around 51% of the EU sold production since
2011. However, the highest percentage was reached in 2015 when 64% of the total EU sold
production was taken up by ammunition. By 2020, this decreased to only 39% of the total EU sold
107
production. Parts and components shows a significant increase since 2016, both in absolute values
(compared to previous years) and relative to the other categories of products (Figure 1).
Figure 1 - Annual sold production of firearms for civilian use, alarm and signal weapons,
parts and components, and ammunition for EU27 (left) and trend per type of product (right).
Source: Eurostat Prodcom
Six Member States together accounted for 71% of the total EU27 value in 2020: Italy ranked first,
with at total sold production accounting, for 38.9% of the EU27 production, followed by France
(11%), Czechia (7.5%), Germany (7.4%), Spain (4.1%), and Croatia (2.5%).
Market structure
The EU firearms sector is rather concentrated. Most European firms operating in the
manufacturing sector of weapons and ammunition139
are micro firms,140
82% of the total turnover is
made by large enterprises, which account for less than 3% of the total number of enterprises141
(Error! Reference source not found.).
139
Following EY, SIPRI and RAND (2017), Study in view of a report evaluating the implementation of Regulation
258/2012, the analysis of the market structure relates to weapons and ammunition in general without distinguishing
between civilian and military firearms.
140
Considering the following classification of firms: micro <10 employees; small 10-49 employees; medium 50-249
employees; large >250 employees.
141
According to Structural Business Statistics database (SBS), there are 1,110 firms operating in the Manufacture of
weapons and ammunition sector in the EU, including 52 large, 79 medium, 135 small and 868 micro firms.
0
500
1.000
1.500
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
€
Millions
Revolvers and Pistols NACE Rev. 2 - 25401230
Shotgun, rifles, carbines and muzzle loaders NACE Rev. 2 - 25401250
Firarms (explosive charge) NACE Rev.2 - 25401270
alarm and signal weapons NACE Rev.2 - 25401290
Parts and accessories NACE Rev.2 - 25401400
Cartridge and other ammunition NACE Rev.2 - 25401300
Propellant powders NACE Rev.2 - 20511130
Precussion or detonating gaps NACE Rev.2 - 20511270
0 €
500 €
1.000 €
1.500 €
2.000 €
2.500 €
3.000 €
3.500 €
4.000 €
4.500 €
5.000 €
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
€
Millions
Firearms alarm and signal weapons
parts and components ammunition
108
Figure 2 – Shares of number of enterprises and turnover in 2019142
(left), and share of
enterprises per MS in 2019143
(right)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat SBS
The sector is also concentrated in terms of geographic presence of enterprises, with around 80% of
firms located in only six Member States144, with Italy and Germany hosting the highest number
of firearms-related companies. According to the Eurostat database a little less than 1.000
manufacturing companies operate within the EU. In terms of employment, in 2019 the weapons and
ammunition sector included an estimated figure of 57.028 people working in the civilian firearms
and ammunition sector. The evaluation study of the EU Firearms Directive 2021/555 estimated that
there were around 20.000 arms dealers and brokers and about 100.000 employees in the EU145
.
In January 2022, the Commission asked the Member States to provide more detailed data on the
number of manufacturers, retailers and employees in their respective countries. 13 Member States
answered and they reported a total of 7.898 retailers active in their Member States. Based on this
number, it can be stated that the estimate of 20.000 arms dealers and brokers seems correct.
However, the Commission did receive information that not all these dealers and brokers are
actually involved in import and export from and outside the EU. For example in Spain only 98
dealers and manufacturers are involved in import and 127 in export, on a total of 1190
manufacturers and dealer. In Slovenia, 115 of the 152 dealers have a licence to export and import
firearms.
Underneath data shows the discrepancies between the data received and the public data on the total
amount of manufacturing companies in the respective Member States. As the Commission did not
receive the data from all Member States, it was decided to use the database of Eurostat, although it
is likely that this data is an underestimation.
142
For the number of employees, the last available year was taken in order to include as many companies as possible.
143
Calculations for 2016 consider the sum of enterprises reported for all MS as the total number of enterprises in the
EU, since no aggregated value for EU28 is provided.
144
Data from multiple Member States such as Belgium and France is missing, these two countries do have a large
firearms industry.
145
COM (2015) 751 final evaluation of Council Directive 91/477/EC of 18 June 1991, as amended by Directive
2008/51/EC of 21 May 2008, on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, p. 25
78,1%
12,3% 6,6% 2,8%
1,3% 3,2%
13,4%
82,1%
0,0%
20,0%
40,0%
60,0%
80,0%
100,0%
Micro small medium large
number of enterprises turnover
31%
5%
22%
7%
7%
8%
20% Germany
Spain
Italy
Austria
Poland
Sweden
other EU MS
109
Table 2: total amount of manufacturer in 2020 according to data provided by that Member
State and to public data (Eurostat SBS)
total manuf.
according to data
MS
total manuf.
According to public
data
CY 9 3
DE 821 221
ES 39 36
FI 136 26
HU 31 17
PT 2 8
RO 9 0
SI 42 15
Extra-EU trade
The EU27 is a net exporter of civilian firearms, alarm & signal weapons, their parts and
components and ammunition to third countries. The total value of exported good reached €1.342
million in 2020, while the value of imported goods was around €462 million. This represents
0,027% of the total value of import into the EU and 0,069% of the total value of the export out of
the EU.
The export has mostly stagnated and import has grown (Figure 3) between 2015 and 2020. The
import has an annual growth rate of 4.1%. A decreased in export occurred between 2016 and 2019.
This is a large difference with the data of the external study of 2019, which discovered a trend of
8.8% annual growth in export between 2010 and 2017.
Figure 3 - Overall trend of Extra-EU trade in civilian firearms, alarm & signal weapons, parts and
components and ammunition
Source: Eurostat International Trade Database
0 €
200.000.000 €
400.000.000 €
600.000.000 €
800.000.000 €
1.000.000.000 €
1.200.000.000 €
1.400.000.000 €
1.600.000.000 €
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
import Export Linear (import) Linear (Export)
110
Civilian firearms make up about 50% of the export of the EU27 and ammunition consist of around
30% (Figure4). While in import, civilian firearms have the smallest share and ammunition the
largest with 39% (Figure5). The share of alarm and signal weapons is more than double for import
than for export. This is important considering the fact that the confidential consultation revealed
that 12% of imported alarm and signal weapons are not checked for compliance with Commission
Implementing Directive 2019/69.
Figure 4 - Share of civilian firearms, alarm and signal weapons, parts and components and
ammunition in the export of EU27
Source: Eurostat International Trade Database
Figure 5 - Share of civilian firearms, alarm and signal weapons, parts and components and
ammunition in the import of EU27
Source: Eurostat International Trade Database
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
civilian firearms alarm and signal weapons parts and components ammunition
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
civilian firearms alarm and signal weapons parts and components ammunition
111
Extra-EU export
The EU is not a only a net exporter but is, on aggregate, the first exporter of civilian firearms, alarm
and signal weapons, parts and components, and ammunition in the world in terms of export value
(2020) followed by the USA. The bulk of the extra-EU export value is made by five Member States
(Error! Reference source not found.), accounting for over 75% of total extra-EU export with Italy
ranking first.
Figure 6 - Share of extra-EU exports per MS (2020)
Source: Eurostat
International Trade Database
Central and North America are the main destination markets (54,18 % of the total EU27 export
value in 2019 – Figure 7) with the US being the main destination country and accounting for 48 %
of the total export value. This data is confirmed by the previous external studies. Furthermore, the
share of Central and North America only amounted to 45,81 % in 2017. Therefore, Central and
North America is becoming an increasingly important destination market. Smaller shares are
represented by exports to Middle-east (12,9 %), non-EU European countries (10,84 %) and Eastern
Asia (9,13 %).
12%
18%
11%
8%
28%
23% Czechia
Germany
Spain
Croatia
Italy
Other EU
112
Figure 7 - Destination of EU28 export of civilian firearms, alarm and signal weapons, parts
and components and ammunition in 2019 (left) and share of export per main destination
market (right)
Source: UN COMTRADE
Europe’s world share of exports is deteriorating. Between 2007 and 2020, the EU28146
overall share
of exports of firearms, parts and components and ammunition reduced by around 11,1 percentage
points moving from 42.2% in 2007 to 38.5% in 2017 to 31.1 % in 2020. The external studies
contributed this decrease to a gradual loss of competitiveness of the EU compared to non-EU
countries
Extra-EU import
146
The UK was added to the numbers of 2020 in order to make a comparison possible.
0 400.000.000 800.000.000
Africa
Carribbean and Bahamas…
Central and North America
Eastern Asia
Europa (non EU)
Middle-East
Oceania
South America
Western Asia
rest of the world
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Australia
Canada
Saudi Arabia
switserland
USA
firearms alarm and signal weapons
parts and components ammunition
113
In terms of import, the bulk of the value is
also concentrated in five Member States
(Figure 8). Germany imports the largest share
of the European level from extra-EU
countries accounting alone to over one
quarter of total import (26%).
The USA remains the main country of origin
of imported firearms, alarm and signal
weapons, parts and components and
ammunition in the EU.
Figure 8 - share of extra-EU import per MS
(2020)
Data analysis
Share of civilian firearms
The share of civilian firearms in relation to the overall turnover of firearms manufacturers (which
also sell military weapons) is a central indicator, as it would reflect the actual amount of civilian
firearms and therefore allow calculations on the impact of policy changes on businesses.
Each year the Council publishes an Annual report on Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP
defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment 147
.
This report is based on data provided by Member States on their arms exports. In theory, this data
should be should be consistent with the information on the Eurostat international trade database148
.
Table 3 proves the differences between the public data for military weapons and the data used in
the annual report on Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. Furthermore, the data in the table
also shows that the export value for civilian firearms is much higher than for military firearms. This
is not what the researchers expected, as it is generally assumed that the export value of military
weapons is higher than for civilian firearms.
It is possible that data of firearms for military use became mixed in with data on civilian firearms.
Due to the possibility to use a single procedure (article 4 of the Regulation), military firearms in the
ML1 category of the Common military list of the European Union149
can include firearms subject to
the Regulation and vice versa. Furthermore, during an informal meeting with business association
147
Twenty-Third Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining
common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment, document ST/12189/2021/INIT,
OJ C 515, 21.12.2021.
148
The main custom code for military firearm is 9301 (Military weapons, incl. sub-machine guns (excl. revolvers and
pistols of heading 9302 and cutting and thrusting weapons of heading 9307)(2002-2500);Military weapons, incl. sub-
machine guns (excl. revolvers and pistols of heading 9302 and cutting and thrusting weapons of heading 9307)(1988-
2001)) together with 9305 91 (parts and accessories of military weapons of heading 9301), 9306 30 30 (cartridges and
parts thereof for military weapons) and 9306 90 10 (bombs grenades, torpedos, mines, missiles and other ammunition
and projectiles and parts thereof for military purposes).
149
Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of
12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less and accessories, as follows, and specially designed components
7%
26%
9%
11%
5%
42%
Belgium
Germany
France
Lithuania
Poland
Other EU
114
ANPAM150
, it became clear that it is sometimes the company itself, which decides whether to apply
for a military or a civilian authorisation. If they had an export license for 1000 civilian firearms
under Regulation 258, and get an additional order, they can ask for a military authorisation under
the Common position for exactly the same type of firearm. The German national report on firearms
policy of 2020 explains that the numbers for ML1 are higher than the total value of individual small
arms licenses because ML1 also covers civilian firearms (revolvers, pistols) hunting and sporting
weapons151
.
Furthermore, table 3 shows clear gaps in data of military weapons. For multiple Member States,
data is missing. Amongst these Member States are some countries that have large firearms
industries such as Germany, France, Belgium and Italy. There is more information on the value of
the licenses granted for the export of ML1. However, based on the differences between the column
showing the actual value of export and the value of licenses, it is clear that this last data cannot be
used to calculate the total turnover. Furthermore, the German national report states that the approval
values for licenses of weapons of war cannot be directly linked to the value for actual export of
weapons of war. The German national report states that this is the result of the validity period of
licenses, the fact that the granting of a license and the actual export may fall into a different
calendar year or because despite the authorisation granted, the export does not take place.152
Table 3 Extra-EU Export value for the year 2020 of all EU Member States based on custom
codes and on the annual report on Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP
REPORTER/PERIOD
export value
according to
custom codes
for military
weapons
ML1 value of
export
value of
licenses
granted for the
export of ML1
export value
according to
custom codes
for civilian
firearms
European Union - 27
countries 321.191.242 487.267.833 2.148.830.533 1.342.106.983
Belgium 0 0 126.287.938 12.053.934
Bulgaria 0 42.234.210 46.902.342 0
Czechia 285.970 20.385.210 5.585.183 167.169.573
Denmark 2.470.263 0 563.399 7.488.084
Germany 0 0 141.838.116 235.164.370
Estonia 0 0 346.596 1.122.023
Ireland 50 0 49.160 189.316
Spain 175.529.010 5.321.193 12.244.606 143.892.414
France 0 0 6.211.272 78.440.802
Croatia 6.716.010 66.367.892 444.092.125 101.530.351
Italy 0 0 68.956.348 382.476.093
Cyprus 0 0 403.937 3.648.421
Latvia 8.000 0 24.000 176.816
Lithuania 2.060.180 26.516.348 567.383 3.292.970
Luxembourg 188.610 0 0 26.753
150
Italian national association of manufacturers of sport and civilian weapons and munitions
151
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Aussenwirtschaft/ruestungsexporte-bmwi-070221.pdf, p Page 32
152
Entwurf eines Dritten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Waffengesetzes und weiterer Vorschriften, p. 28
115
REPORTER/PERIOD
export value
according to
custom codes
for military
weapons
ML1 value of
export
value of
licenses
granted for the
export of ML1
export value
according to
custom codes
for civilian
firearms
Hungary 1.108.423 1.597.093 28.871.589 28.469.458
Malta 0 9.577 9.265 9.577
Netherlands 50.513.548 582.384 1.287.403 1.973.137
Austria 9.657.301 281.636.387 974.320.831 15.732.697
Poland 24.956.288 16.041.636 152.604.255 10.777.312
Portugal 672.121 73.779 76.279 32.706.783
Romania 0 11.625.049 7.921.489 0
Slovenia 2.962.107 2.419.955 74.390.611 7.321.030
Slovakia 26.875.895 11.282.107 37.185.006 25.264.837
Finland 1.010.396 693.106 17.534.504 52.020.060
Sweden 16.177.070 481.907 556.896 24.624.290
Greece 0 0 0 6.535.882
The lack of data could be mitigated by focusing on national reports sent to parliaments on arms
import and exports. When zooming in on Belgium, it is also peculiar that this country is not
included in the top five Member States for extra-EU export (as established by underneath market
analysis). Belgium, specifically the Walloon region, hosts FN Herstal, which is one of the largest
firearms producers in the EU. According to both the public data and the data from COARM,
Belgium had zero export value of military firearms during 2020153
. Even for the 2019 report, the
focus of the published data is on the value of the licenses granted to export ML1 weapons. In order
to establish the overall turnover and the share for military and civilian firearms, it is important to
know the actual export. The only published numbers in this regards, is the overall export of all
military firearms, so not specifically for ML1. According to the 2019 Walloon report154
, 76% of the
value of the licenses is actually exported. As the Walloon region is responsible for about 90% of
Belgians total export, this number can be used to extrapolate the value of ML1 for all of Belgium.
This would mean that the value of Belgium ML1 export would amount to €95.978.832,88.
However, if the same exercise is done for France, a completely different picture emerges.
According to the French national report155
, only 8,8% of the value of all the licenses is actually
exported156
. The French national report does not give numbers on the actual export for ML1,
therefore it is not possible to calculate this number without using the overall percentage of 8,8%.
Based on this, the value of France ML1 export would amount to €546.591,94.
153
The lack of data is also reinforced by the fact that the Walloon region has not yet published their regional report on
the export of arms of 2020. The situation even triggered a petition to address this alleged lack of transparency.
154
https://dirupo.wallonie.be/files/Rapport%20armes%20annuel%202019.pdf
155
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/fre/content/download/585007/9955311/RAP%202020-Parties%201-2-
3%2Bannexes%20BD_29ao%C3%BBt20.pdf
156
This low number could be due to the different kind of industry in France. The French defence industry’s focus is not
on small and light weapons. Therefore, if one order, for example for aircrafts, does not go through, the effect on the
overall percentage of actual export can be high.
116
The German national report gives a lot of information on the licenses granted and rejected.
Furthermore, there is detailed information to be found on the strict rules regarding export to third
countries. However, when it comes to the value of actual exports, the same lack of transparency is
notable; only the overall exports of military firearms is published. As a result of the lack of data on
the actual export of ML1, the same calculation as above shows that 23,6% of the value of all
licenses is actually exported. Extrapolating this percentage to the value of ML1 export, this would
amount to €33.473.795,38.
If the data based on the above calculations is added to the available data on the export of ML1
weapons, the total value would amount to €617.267.052. However this still does not include the
data of all Member States. The reason for such a lack of transparency by the Member States is
unknown.
Another way to calculate the total amount of ML1 exported value is to focus on the data that is
known from the other Member States and extrapolate this to the missing data. The percentage of
actual exported ML1 weapons compared to the licenses granted ranges from 3,3% (Slovenia) to
4673,4% (Lithuania). Based on these numbers, the average would be that 383,2% of all licenses
granted result in actual export. Based on the numbers in table …, this would amount to
€1.808.084.528. However, the percentage of Lithuania (4673,4%) is so exceptional that it
extensively influences the numbers. If this exceptionally large percentage is ignored, an average of
71,6% of licenses granted results in actual export. If this percentage is extrapolated on the missing
data, the overall turnover for the export of ML1 weapons would amount to €734.059.261.
As can be seen in the table3 and with the explanation of the calculations possible to fill in the
missing data, the exact calculation for the total turnover for military and civilian firearms is not
possible. According to the public data using custom codes, the value of civilian firearms exports
amounts to 1.342 billion euro. The value of the licenses granted for the export of ML1 weapons
amounts to 2.148 billion euro. Due to the missing data, the value of the actual export of ML1
weapons ranges somewhere between 734 million and 1.808 billion euro. Therefore, based on the
calculations made, this study will conclude that the share of civilian firearms compared to military
firearms is about 50-50. It is important to realize, that this is not a scientifically sound way of
statistical analysis, however it was the only available method due to the available data.
Administrative costs for national competent authorities, companies and citizens
Administrative costs for national competent authorities (NCA)
The “Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import and transit
measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition” calculated that each
NCA spends from 8 to 15 hours to complete all the pre-authorisation activities for each
authorisation request. According to Eurostat157
, the average wage for national civil servants in the
EU is 2.658 Euro/month. Based on a 38 hours workweek, this amounts to an average cost for a FTE
civil servant of 25,70 euro per hour. Therefore, the cost for the pre-authorisations activities ranges
between €205,6 and €385,5 for one authorisation.
157
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/prc_rem_avg/default/table?lang=en
117
Furthermore, the study of 2017 also computed that on average a NCA needs to employ between
0.55 and 0.95 FTEs to comply with all requirements of the Regulation158
(the pre-authorisation
steps and the information exchange activities).159
Fees
According to the “Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import
and transit measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition” and the
results of the confidential survey published in October 2021, most Member States do not charge
any fees to apply for an export authorisation. However, there were some exceptions highlighted:
Czech Republic (€20), Estonia (€13), Italy (€32), Lithuania (€14), Poland (€19), Portugal (at
import: for private citizen €25,6/firearm, for gunsmiths €12,8/firearm; at export €3,8/firearm),
Slovakia (at least €33, but normally 0,1% of the value of the products), Slovenia (€49,8) and
Sweden (€120). Unified EU rules could harmonise this and reduce the costs for producers/exporters
and citizens in those countries.
According to underneath table of the study160
, if the option of including a fee was abolished, this
would create an overall annual benefit of €86.301,4161
for companies.
Table 4 – Number of export authorisations of firearms, parts essential components and
ammunition to third countries granted per year and number of companies registered in 2018
MS 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 average
Number
of
companie
s
AT 67 916 873 1005 969 889 786
45
BE 5 10 8 10 7 6 8 15
CY 82 532 163 223 278 190 245 3
CZ 1,142 1,569 983 797 986 801 1046 95
DE 181 771 757 746 0 0 409 207
ES 506 409 498 558 726 827 587 42
FR 0 430 491 479 511 0 318 115
HU 0 4 2 0 5 8 3 16
IE 18 9 16 27 22 19 19 0
IT 646 672 714 1,018 1,243 955 875 167
LT 0 0 5 26 16 18 11 1
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PL 0 0 9 22 12 14 10 50
PT 0 2,027 1,262 1,714 1,912 777 1282 10
RO 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0
SE 17 286 353 280 310 217 244 55
158
Annex I, p. 157
159
Based on the average of 98 export authorisations as can be seen in table4
160
2019, Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import and transit measures for
civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, Annex I, p. 156
161
EE, PT and SL not included
118
MS 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 average
Number
of
companie
s
SK 32 46 35 36 40 61 42 26
total 2706 7691 6179 6951 7047 4792 5895 847
Source: Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import and transit
measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.
Administrative burden for companies
As stated above, collecting the data on the administrative burden of the EU procedures for
companies has proven difficult. One business answered in the public consultation that about 10 %
162
of the value of a contract goes to the management of EU procedures. Based on the data of the
market analysis and extrapolating this singular business information to all businesses this would
account for around € 180.411.889.
The Study on the improvement of the EU system of export authorisation, and import and transit
measures for civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, together with
information received from ANPAM,163
does however present a different picture. According to the
study, producers/exporters indicated that it takes between 4 and 12 hours of work per authorisation
request. ANPAM indicated that it takes on average about 6 hours of work. With an average costs
for a FTE employee of 25,7 euro per hour. Therefore, the costs for one export authorisation request,
according to the study would be between €102,8 and €308,4. According to the data of ANPAM the
cost would be around €154,2.
ANPAM reported that in Italy around 1.500 export authorisations are requested each year. The
external study of 2019 reported an average of 875164
export authorisations each year. As a result,
the cost of the procedure to apply for export authorisations vary between €89.950 and €462.600. If
only the ANPAM data is considered, then the costs amounts to €231.300. A study from 2017 by
ANPAM and the Carlo Bo University of Urbino165
, estimated that the total turnover of the Italian
firearms industry in 2017 amounted for €581.022.940. Therefore, the costs of the procedure to
apply for export authorisations amount to 0.04% of the total turnover.
According to the market analysis, Italian firearms industry amounts for 18% of the firearms
industry in the EU. If the Italian numbers are extrapolated to the entire EU166
, this would mean that
the costs for the producers of firearms to apply for export authorisations range between €499.722
and €2.570.000 per year.
162
ESFAM also informed the Commission that they expect the costs to be between 4 and 10 % of the total costs of their
members.
163
The Commission had an informal meeting with Italian national association of manufacturers of sport and civilian
weapons and munitions (ANPAM), after which ANPAM sent data on authorisations and costs to the Commission.
164
See table…
165
https://a9bdafc9-266f-4ac0-bde4-ac366975cd51.filesusr.com/ugd/3fd127_38a861c3fa0a4f1297594f8ef4f1747d.pdf
166
As Italy uses SIGMA, the extrapolation of Italian numbers might result in an underestimation. SIGMA, Sistema
Integrato di Gestione e Movimentazione Armi (Integrated System for Arms Management and Mobilisation) is an
industry-led initiative launched and developed to allow a faster, more accurate and more efficient processing of all
requests for licenses (for both intra-EU and extra-EU transfers). The portal, powered by a dedicated software, was
entirely developed and funded by 15 Italian industries (at a cost of about €800,000) and is accessible to relevant local
(Questura) and national (Ministry of Interior) authorities to share and access information more effectively
119
Furthermore, the external study of 2019 estimated that on average a producer/exporter needs to
employ between 0.4 and 0.9 FTEs to comply with all requirements of the Regulation167
. The study
also focused on the length of the authorisation procedure which was considered having an
important negative impact on the business of companies exporting civilian firearms. It was however
not possible to quantify this.
If an e-licensing system would be used to process the export authorisation requests, the time needed
for manufacturers to obtain an authorisation should decrease. As Italy is already using a system and
they estimate that it takes 6 hours for one export authorisation, this is a difference of 6 hours
between the highest estimate of the EY study and the highest estimate from Italy. Therefore, the use
of an e-licensing system could be a saving of €1.079.400 (average cost for FTE €25,7 per hour
multiplied by a frequency of 7 authorisations per manufacturer, multiplied by 1.000 manufacturers
in the EU).
Additionally, if implied consent of third countries for the transit of firearms is always granted after
20 days, this would decrease the costs. Not all export authorisations imply the transit of firearms
through third countries, assuming that 4 out of 7 do and according to the EY study on firearms
improvements, the follow up to obtain the written “no objection” to the transfer takes on average
about one hour. Therefore, the savings for the 1.000 manufacturers in the EU combined would add
up to €56.540.
According to table …, 847 companies handed in 5.985 authorisation request during 2018. On
average, this amounts to just under 7 requests for each company. If end-user certificates would
become mandatory then this would entail an extra costs for businesses. Based on the amount of
hours for the whole export authorisation procedure, it is estimated that end-user certificate
procedures will not take longer than 4 hours. Based on the average costs for a FTE employee of
€25,7 per hour, one end-user check would cost around €102,8. If each company has to perform this
on average 7 time a year and knowing that there are around 1.000 manufacturers active in the EU,
this would amount to a cost of €719.600.
Furthermore, if companies would have to provide evidence of the final import certificate, this
would also contain some costs. However, these certificates should already be used, the only
difference would be that these certificates would be sent to a central bureau or database. Therefore,
this task should not take more than one hour. Based on the same calculation as above, this would
amount to a cost of €179.900.
Administrative burden for citizens
During the public consultation, citizens were asked to quantify the administrative burden they
experienced when exporting or importing firearms. The general consensus was that the
unharmonised rules were too complicated. Many citizens complained that it took hours to go
through the whole administrative procedure. The few monetary quantifications stated that the costs
amounted somewhere between €250 and €500 for one export authorisation.
Administrative burden for museums, collectors etc.
If no authorisations for specific operations, such as temporary import and export, would be needed
for institutions such as museums, collectors etc. then this would decrease the costs. Such an
167
EY (2019), not published, Annex I, p. 160
120
authorisations takes on average 6 hours, however the frequency is very low. The estimation is that
this could concern all arms dealers however it would only happen 0.01 time a year. Therefore,
abolishing the need for such authorisations, would amount to a saving of €30.840.
Administrative burden linked to import
The data for import is even more limited than for export as until now, there are hardly any
provision in the Regulation. The data on the amount of import authorisations received from the
Member States was linked to the import share of that Member States in order to calculate that
around 3.511 import authorisations are granted each year.
Furthermore, based on the data from Eurostat, 62.099.451 pieces of firearms were imported into the
EU in 2020. As there are around 20.000 dealers, this would mean an annual import of about 3.105
pieces of firearms by each dealer. All these weapons should be provided with an import marking.
According to the German national impact assessment168
, an import marking takes 0,425 minutes. At
an average cost for a FTE employee of €25,7 per hour, one marking would cost less than €0,43
(calculated by using 1 minute time). If all firearms receive an import marking, this would cost
€26.702.763,91. However according to the EY study on firearms improvements, 19 Member
States169
are already requiring import markings. A further three Member States170
require proof
marks of a recognised Proof House. The remaining 6 Member States171
did not provide enough
information. These 6 Member States imported172
5.567.690 firearms during 2020. If these Member
States require import marking, this would lead to an ‘new’ cost of €2.394.106,7.
If an e-licensing system would be used to process the import authorisation requests, the time needed
for dealers to obtain an authorisation should decrease. As Italy is already using a system and they
estimate that it takes 6 hours for one export authorisation, this is a difference of 6 hours between the
highest estimate of the EY study and the highest estimate from Italy. As there are 20.000 dealers
active in the EU and there are 3.511 import authorisation granted each year, each of these dealers
only has 0.17 authorisation request each year. Therefore, the use of an e-licensing system could be
a saving of €524.280 (average cost for FTE €25,7 per hour multiplied by a frequency of 0.17
multiplied by 20.000).
168
German Bundestag, Entwurf eines Dritten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Waffengesetzes
und weiterer Vorschriften, Drucksache 19/13839, 09.10.2019, p. 125, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/138/1913839.pdf
169
BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, HR, HU, IT, LT, LU, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI and SK
170
BE, FR and UK
171
AT, EL, IE, LV, MT and NL
172
There are 91 manufacturers in these 6 Member States.
ANNEX 5: CASE STUDIES
In order to mediate the lack of data, case studies have been added to this annex. These
case studies focus on the security risks related to export and import of firearms, alarm
and signal weapons and semi-finished components.
Case studies related to the export of firearms
Case-study: EU firearms in Mexico
Between 2015 and 2020, 96,948 firearms (worth $38 Mil)173
were exported from the EU
to Mexico. In addition, many EU firearms exported to the USA are re-exported or
trafficked to Mexico, which estimates that half of EU firearms brands seized in Mexico
were either imported or trafficked from the U.S.
During the period 2010-2020, 61,242 firearms were seized of which 2,744 were Italian,
mostly Beretta pistols.174
During the period 2015-2020, 2,749 German-made firearms
were seized in Mexico, more than twice as much as the official exports to this country.
Data provided by the Mexican authorities do not enable the establishment of statistics
based on tracing results. There is no data about the year of manufacture of the EU
firearms seized, or about their point of diversion. It shows however that EU-made
firearms (including civilian firearms) do end up in the wrong hands in high quantities,
and that the current EU export control system does not prevent it.
Case-study: EU firearms in Brazil
The National Firearms Focal Point of Brazil provided the European Commission with
data, according to which 65956 firearms were seized in 2018, of which 3433 (i.e 5%)
were EU-made firearms, most of them from Austria –Glock- (some of them could be
from EU brands manufactured in USA or exported to USA and re-exported or trafficked
to Brazil). By type, 69% were pistols, 12% revolvers and 8% assault rifles.
The same year, 4826 firearms (worth $1,4 Mil) [source: https://comtrade.un.org/data/]
were exported from the EU to Brazil, only 18 from Austria while the same year 1329
Austria-made firearms were seized.
During the period 2014-17 the National Firearms Focal Point traced around 11000 seized
firearms, of which 950 were of Austrian manufacture, 546 from Czech Republic, 231
from Italy, 230 from Belgium, 191 from Germany, 153 from Spain, 147 from Romania,
43 from Hungary, which represented the 22,64% of total number. During that period of
time, 21260 firearms (worth $5 Mil) [source: https://comtrade.un.org/data/] were
exported from the EU to Brazil.
173
https://comtrade.un.org/data/
174
http://stopusarmstomexico.org/deadly-trade/
The Firearms Focal Point obtained positive results of investigations on traceability from
1735 firearms, which mean it was possible to know the last known record of legal owner.
1480 of them (85%) where from countries neighbouring or from the same continent,
including EU-made firearms.
Case study: circumvention of embargos through Moldova
The EU imposed arms embargoes on Belarus and Russia in 2011 and 2014.
Czech Republic-Moldova- Russian Federation
During 2019 and 2020 the Czech Republic exported rifles and pistols to Moldova.175
The
same year, Moldavian authorities received and authorised the request of a Moldovan
company to export pistols to Russian Federation, same of them from the above import
operation.
The shipment included 'CZ TSR'-model sniper rifles, which can be used for sport or by
special police.176
Slovakia-Moldova-Belarus
On 25 September 2019, Moldavian authorities received the request to import 130.000
cartridges from Slovakia, the same day the same authorities received the request to
export the same amount of cartridges to Belarus.
Case studies related to the import of firearms and semi-finished components
Case study: circumvention of embargos via Kyrgyzstan to Lithuania.177
On 1st of June 2021, a large-scale Russian weapons trafficking scheme was exposed and
four people were detained in Vilnius (Lithuania). In addition, more than 300 SAIGA
rifles and semi-automatic carbines and 12 000 pieces of ammunition were seized during
raids. The total value of firearms and ammunitions has been estimated at around 335 000
EUR.
The detained individuals are suspected of creating and taking part in a scheme seeking to
circumvent international sanctions imposed in 2014 on Russian arms manufacturers. As
part of the scheme, brand new Russian firearms were exported via Kyrgyzstan to
Lithuania and then sold both in the country and in other EU MS. Officers estimate that
175
Meeting with Moldavian authorities. RESTRICTED
176
“EU arms firms trying to flout Belarus and Russia ban”, 6.10.2021,
https://euobserver.com/world/153145
177
EMPACT firearms “bulletin” newsletter number 17. October 2021. EU LIMITED.
the Lithuanian company involved in the criminal activity might have imported around
1.500 semi-automatic carbines.
Although the arms were bought in Russia, their documents stated that they were
purchased from the Central Asian country in order to bypass international sanctions.
Once the arms reached Lithuania, the weapons would be legalised and sold in Lithuania
as well as other EU member states, mainly Germany and Austria.178
Details seized weapons:
154 Shotgun “Saiga-12”, calibre 12 mm;
155 semi-automatic rifle “Saiga”, calibre 5.45 mm;
2 submachine guns “Saiga-9”, calibre 9 mm;
2 smoothbore hunting carbine “TR3”, calibre 7.62 mm;
4 semi-automatic carbines Saiga Tigr”, calibre 7.62 mm;
16 776 pieces of Tulammo ammunition, calibre 5,45x18.
Case study: imports of convertible alarm and signal weapons into the EU
Some alarm and signal weapons can easily be converted into lethal firearms with simple
tools and minimum knowledge. This modus operandi was identified as a particular threat
by the competent authorities of the Member States and the Commission179
. Based on it
operation CONVERSUS focus on that threat within the EMPACT firearms, focus on the
traceability of imported alarm and signal weapons in EU, which have been proved that
are easily converted to live firearms and used in criminal activities.
The main reasons of the threat are the following:
 Before the update of the Firearms Directive in 2017, alarm and signal weapons
were not included in the scope of the Directive nor in the Regulation on
import/export of civilian firearms, so not specific control of them.
 In 2018 the Implementing Directive 2019/69 on technical specifications of alarm
and signal weapons entered into force, but due to the delay of transpositions, there
are thousands of alarm and signal weapons with previous technical specifications
already in the market.
178
https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1425297/large-scale-russian-arms-trafficking-scheme-
busted-in-lithuania
179
EU SOCTA 2021: pag. 68 and operational action plans of the EMPACT FIREARMS since 2014
(EU RESTRICTED)
 The current legal framework180
does not provide a legal basis to ensure a uniform
approach to certifying the compliance of these weapons with EU standards on
non-convertibility. Consequently, customs or licensing authorities of different
Member States may treat differently imported alarm and signal weapons, with
some considering that they are convertible into firearms, and others that they
comply with EU-level standards.
From 2016 to 2020, 15 949 alarm and signal weapons were seized and contributed to
EUROPOL, most of them imported from Turkey (brands Ekol and Zoraki) but also Italy-
made brand Bruni. 181
These seizures were contributed by Member States to EUROPOL, where there are some
significant facts and figures182
:
 In Denmark, converted alarm and signal weapons were in top 3 (total of 123) of
seized firearms in the country in 2019.
 In Sweden, 30% of the seized weapons are converted alarm and signal weapons
and 10% of the shooting recorded were made with these kind of converted
weapons.
 In the Netherlands, roughly 40% of the seized weapons are converted alarm and
signal weapons.
Bulgaria, Spain and Slovakia provided data to EUROPOL in the framework of operation
CONVERSUS, showing gas and alarm weapons imported from Turkey and sold to
individuals from 2016 to 2021:
2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 TOTAL
BY MS
Bulgaria 2989 4067 375 5 1267 3197 11900
Spain 279 81 1861 3 524 395 3143
Slovakia 20 653 48 451 2088 749 4009
TOTAL
BY
YEARS
3288 4801 2284 459 3879 4341 19052
180
Commission Implementing Directive (EU) 2019/69 of 16 January 2019 laying down technical
specifications for alarm and signal weapons under Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the
acquisition and possession of weapons; OJ L 15, 17.1.2019.
181
Source EUROPOL, reflected in the report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council on the application of Firearms Directive C(2021)647 final.
182
Source: data from EUROPOL (EU RESTRICTED)
The results of the operations are the following:
2016: 556 alarm and signal weapons seized and 245 arrests in a series of international
actions in 10 Member States.183
2018: 222 alarm and signal weapons seized and 112 arrests in a series of international
actions in 16 Member States.
2020: 1776 alarm and signal weapons seized and 11 arrests in a series of international
actions in 25 Member States.184
2021: 1534 alarm and signal weapons were seized in a series of international actions in
24 Member States.185
Case study: import of semi-finished components
French authorities reported on the risk linked to the import of semi-finished components
in the country186
.
These semi-finished components are imported from USA, particularly semi-finished
frames of Glock-type semi-automatic pistols and of semi-finished lower receivers of AR-
15 type rifles.
Currently semi-finished essential components of firearms are not regulated in France, so
their acquisition is out of regulation of firearms.
Among many models, the POLYMER 80 kit marketed by the company of the same name
is the most present on the French illegal market. The price is around 160 USD.187
This kit consists of (e.g. for the PF940V2 model for Glock 17 type guns):
 an integral but incomplete and non-functional frame since holes must still be
made and material must be removed in certain places (1) ;
 a plastic jig with holes serving as drilling / filing guides into which the frame
is inserted (2) ;
 a locking / unlocking block comprising the front breech rails, while for
original Glock pistols the breech rails are integrated into the receiver (3) ;
 a removable metal block comprising the rear rails, which receives the ejector,
and the rear trigger module (4) ;
 thus, due to the tools: 2 pin-pins (5) , 2 drill bits (6) and a milling cutter (7).
183
https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/operation-bosphorus-against-firearms-
trafficking-results-in-nearly-250-arrests-in-2016
184
https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/1-776-firearms-seized-in-international-
sweep-against-illegal-trafficking-of-manufactured-weapons
185
https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/over-1-530-firearms-taken-streets-in-
europol-coordinated-operation
186
EMPACT firearms “bulletin” newsletter number 14. RESTRICTED
187
www.polymer80.com
The user of the kit must then:
 drill 2 holes allowing the locking / unlocking unit to be fitted with the front
rails;
 drill 1 hole for mounting the rear unit (rear rails, ejector, trigger module) ;
 milling material inside the frame to allow mounting of the barrel ;
 file the future location of the cylinder head rails to allow mounting of the
cylinder head.
Making these “80% kits” functional is an easy operation that requires no specialized tools
and can be completed in a short time. Once completed, the receiver can be assembled
with generic or original cylinder heads and barrels.
According to French´s contributions to EUROPOL,188
there is an upsurge in the seizures
of Glock-type firearms, where some of them were assembled using P80-branded 80%
receives, notable those commercialized in France by a specific company. The rest of
essential components of these firearms where imported illegally from USA (barrels and
slides) French´s contribution to EUROPOL informed of the seizure of a Glock 19-type
Parabellum 9mm pistol and a Glock 35-type Smith and Wesson 40 calibre pistol
188
French contribution to EUROPOL on 21 June 2020. CONFIDENTIAL
although other short firearms may have been assembled and sold. Other types of kits in
the market are semi-finished receivers from Colt 1911 and Sig P320-type semi-automatic
pistols.
Another French´s contribution to EUROPOL189 informed of the seizured of 3 AR 15-type
assault rifles in overseas territories with semi-finished lower receivers.
189
French contribution to EUROPOL on 22 October 2020. CONFIDENTIAL
ANNEX 6: TRACEABILITY CHECK-LIST
Article 2(16) of Regulation (EU) 258/2012 defines tracing as “the systematic tracking of
firearms and, where possible, their parts and essential components and ammunition from
manufacturer to purchaser for the purpose of assisting the competent authorities of
Member States in detecting, investigating and analysing illicit manufacturing and
trafficking.”
One of the objectives of the Regulation and of its proposed revision is to improve the
traceability of firearms and their essential components to ensure more efficient controls
and avoid diversion and smuggling.
The following check-list summarizes the various measures included in the preferred
option, that ensures increased firearms traceability.
In all cases (except automated verifications), the role of customs is risk-based and not
systematic. Checks may be either documentary (e.g. with respect to the authorisation) or
physical (e.g. with respect to the presence of the required marking).
Type of measure Role for licensing
authorities
Role for customs Others / comments
Import
Import authorisation
(for finished and
unfinished firearms and
components)
Assess request, grant
authorisation to
import firearms and
essential components
(within 60 days)
Check the presence
of the authorisation –
ask the responsible
authorities in case of
doubt
Firearms may not be
placed on the
market/released into
free circulation without
the appropriate marking
Ensure that all
imported firearms are
marked with name of
the manufacturer /
brand, country / place
of manufacture, serial
number and year of
manufacture
Check the presence
of the required
marking – otherwise
ask that the shipment
be placed under
another customs
regime (such as
warehousing)
Alarm and signal
weapons: list of non-
convertibility
Create list of non-
convertibility
Check the presence
of alarm and signal
weapon on the list –
ask the responsible
authorities in case of
doubt
Temporary imports Register the
temporary export and
monitor its actual re-
exports.
Grant the temporary
import authorisation
on the ATA carnet or
the Single
Administrative
Document, provided
the description of the
goods includes the
information
necessary for tracing
the firearms.
Inform the import
licencing authority of
the temporary export
and about the actual
re-import (after
discharge on the
ATA carnet or the
SAD)
Transit (between point
of entry and point of
import)
Competent authority
of transit sends
acknowledgment of
receipt to the notifier
and copies to other
competent authorities.
Competent authorities
of transit ensure
that the customs
office of entry and the
customs office of
import are informed
of their decisions to
consent to the
shipment.
As soon as the
shipment has been
released into free
circulation, customs
office of import
informs the
competent authority
of dispatch and the
import licencing
authority
Copy of the
movement document
provided by the
carrier to the customs
office of entry and
the customs office of
import.
Release of the goods
into free circulation
NA Contact the licensing
authority in case of
doubt about the
conformity of
imported goods
Export
End-user certificate Licensing authority to
check the presence of
the end-user
certificate when
assessing the
application
NA
Export licence Issue the export
licence
Check the presence
of the authorisation –
ask the responsible
authorities in case of
doubt
In case of Global export NA To be determined
depending on the
authorisation scope of a delegated
or implementing act
Temporary exports Register the
temporary export and
monitor its actual re-
import.
Grant the temporary
export authorisation
on the ATA carnet or
the Single
Administrative
Document, provided
the description of the
goods includes the
information
necessary for tracing
the firearms.
Inform the export
licencing authority of
the temporary export
and about the actual
re-import (after
discharge on the
ATA carnet or the
SAD)
Transit (between point
of export and point of
exit)
Competent authority
of transit sends
acknowledgment of
receipt to the notifier
and copies to other
competent authorities.
Competent authorities
of transit ensure
that the customs
office of export and
the customs office of
exit are informed of
their decisions to
consent to the
shipment.
As soon as the
shipment has left the
Union, customs
office of exit informs
the competent
authority of dispatch
Copy of the
movement document
provided by the
carrier to the customs
office of export and
the customs office of
exit.
Release of the goods for
exports
NA Inform the licensing
authority that the
goods have left the
customs territory
Provide evidence of
final import in country
of destination
Check that evidence
has been provided
and inform the
customs offices of
export and exit if it
has not been
NA Exporters to make
sure that the importer
provide them with
the evidence
Post-shipment controls Conduct post-
shipment controls (or
NA
delegate this task to
third parties)
Transit in the EU of a shipment between two non-EU countries
The first and last
competent authority
of transit in the Union
ensure that the
customs office of
entry and the customs
office of exit are
informed of their
respective decisions
to consent to the
shipment
The customs office of
exit, as soon as the
shipment has left the
Union, informs the
competent
authority(ies) of
transit
ANNEX 7: PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND CONFIDENTIAL CONSULTATION
1. questionnaire of the web-based public consultation
The questionnaire is structured in three main parts:
- Part I: Questions concerning current problems
- Part II: Need for EU action and possible policy options
- Part III: Evaluation of the impact of options
The table below shows the detailed list of questions included under each section with indication of the specific category of stakeholders the questions are
addressed to.
Survey question Survey answer Type stakeholder190
NC
A
US
R
EC
O
SPE
OT
H
General questions
1. Please indicate what is your interest
in this initiative
Dropdown list x x x x x
2. Country of origin Dropdown list x x x x x
Part I: Questions concerning current problems
3. How important it is to have common
EU rules on imports of civilian
o Not important Multiple
choice – single
x x x x x
190
Stakeholders are : National competent authorities (NCA), Firearms users (USR), Economic operators (ECO), Firearms specialists (SPE) and Others (OTH)
firearms from outside of the EU? o Slightly important
o Moderately important
o Important
o Very important
o I do not know
response
4. How important it is to have common
EU rules on exports of civilian
firearms to non-EU countries?
o Not important
o Slightly important
o Moderately important
o Important
o Very important
o I do not know
Multiple
choice – single
response
x x x x x
5. How important is the current
administrative burden created for
you personally by current EU rules
on exports of civilian firearms?
o Non-existent
o Slight
o Moderate
o Important
o Very important
o I do not know
Multiple
choice – single
response
x x x
6. If you have replied “important” or
“very important”, can you quantify
this impact (in monthly full-time
equivalent and costs)?
Open x x x
7. Please explain the extent of the risks
of firearms trafficking for each of
the following types of movements
(do not include in your assessment
transfers of firearms within the
European Union)?
- Import (entry and release in
o No risk
o Small risk
o Moderate risk
o High risk
o Very high risk
o I do not know
Multiple
choice – single
response
x x
free circulation)
- Export (release of the goods
and exit)
- Transit (and transshipments)
inside the EU191
- Transit (and transshipments)
outside the EU192
8. The Commission has preliminarily
identified a number of challenges
that could hamper the legal
movement of civilian firearms. For
each of them, can you mention to
what extent, in your view, they
create a burden for legal movements
of civilian firearms?
- Non uniform rules on
exports
- Non uniform rules on
imports
- Lack of a clear distinction
between civilian and military
firearms (and lack of clarity
about the applicable
procedure)
- Single market rules apply to
o Not at all
o Small extent
o Moderate extent
o High extent
o Very high extent
o I do not know
Multiple
choice – single
response
x x x x x
191
Movement of EU or non-EU goods on the EU customs territory, in line with articles 226 to 236 of Regulation (EU) nr 952/2013
192
Movement of goods leaving the customs territory of the EU across a non-EU country before reaching the destination in another non-EU country.
more goods (e.g. deactivated
firearms, automatic firearms)
and persons (brokers,
collectors) than
import/export rules
- The need to have the express
prior authorisation of transit
countries before granting an
export licence
- Insufficient unified EU rules
for simplified procedures
(hunters, sport shooters,
repair, exhibition, etc.)
- Paper-based procedures
- Obligation to submit
translations of supporting
documents
- Fees for export
authorisations or transit
inside the EU
- No use of the global export
authorisation
9. If you see additional challenges that
may hamper legal movements of
civilian firearms, can you please
describe them here along with their
relative importance?
Open x x x x x
10. Without further EU intervention,
how do you think the legal
movements of civilian firearms will
o The situation will improve: the
current framework will be enough
to ensure seamless legal
Multiple
choice – single
x x x x x
develop in the next 5-10 years? movement of firearms, and
increased cooperation and
exchanges of best practices will
bring more consistency in the
application of the rules.
o The situation will remain
unchanged: the current framework
will be enough to ensure legal
movement of firearms, but current
difficulties will not be overcome.
o The situation will deteriorate:
economic operators and legitimate
firearms owners will be faced
with increasingly heterogeneous
national rules and procedures.
o I don’t know
response
11. The Commission has preliminarily
identified a number of aspects which
could create risks of firearms
trafficking. For each of them, can
you mention to what extent they
increase those risks?
- Imports into the EU of
unmarked signal and alarm
weapons
- Lack of marking identifying
the first country of import
into the EU
- Imports into the EU of
unmarked semi-finished
essential components of
firearms
o Not at all
o Small extent
o Moderate extent
o High extent
o Very high extent
o I do not know
Multiple
choice – single
response
x x
- Risk of export of firearms
used in crimes
- Inadequate controls of the
actual end-use of exported
firearms
- Available statistical data
does not enable evidence-
based detection of trends
- Poor coordination amongst
export licensing authorities
(possibility to grant export
licences when similar
transactions where
authorised)
- Poor coordination between
customs and licensing
authorities
12. If you see additional challenges that
could increase risks of firearms
trafficking, can you please describe
them here along with their relative
importance?
Open x x
13. Without further EU intervention,
how do you think firearms
trafficking will develop in the next
5-10 years?
o The situation will improve: the
current framework will be enough
to ensure increased cooperation
amongst law-enforcement
agencies, more intelligence
gathering, and increased detection
of smuggling of firearms.
o The situation will remain
unchanged: the current framework
Multiple
choice – single
response
x x x x x
will be enough to ensure proper
law enforcement cooperation, but
intelligence-based targeted checks
at import and export will remain
defective.
o The situation will deteriorate:
exports (or diversion) of firearms
to conflict zones and
dictatorships, and smuggling of
firearms and convertible weapons
into the EU will increase.
o I don’t know
14. Is there anything else you would
wish to add or mention on the
problems regarding imports and
exports of civilian firearms to and
from the European Union?
Open x x x x x
Part II: Need for EU action and possible policy options
15. In your view, is there a need for EU
intervention on current rules on
import, export and transit of civilian
firearms?
o Yes
o No
o I don’t know
Multiple
choice – single
response
x x x x x
16. Do you see the need for new tools to
improve current rules on import,
export and transit of civilian
firearms?
o Yes
o No
o I don’t know
Multiple
choice – single
response
x x x x x
17. For the two previous questions,
please provide more detailed
Open x x x x x
considerations
18. If EU intervention was considered
necessary, what should be its main
focus?
- Non-legislative measures
(guidelines,
recommendations)
- Clarification of existing
legislation
- New legislative provisions
- Other
- I do not know
o Uniform import/export procedures
o Tracing of firearms
o Exchange of information
o Trade facilitation
o Other
Multiple
choice – single
response
x x x x x
19. If you selected other, please explain Open x x x x x
20. To what extent do you think the
following measures could contribute
to improved legal import, export and
transit of civilian firearms?
- Clarifying the distinction
between military and civilian
firearms
- Having for civilian firearms
the same licensing procedure
as for military ones
- Digital import and export
licenses
- Set out clear rules for
“simplified procedures”
o Not at all
o Small extent
o Moderate extent
o High extent
o Very high extent
o I do not know
Multiple
choice – single
response
x x x x x
- Linking simplified
procedures to the status of
Authorised Economic
Operator Safety/Security
- Replace the global
authorisation by a general
export authorisation for
specific countries and
exporters (authorised
economic operators)
- Systematically assuming the
agreement of non-EU
country of transit in the
absence of a reply
- Removing the obligation to
provide translations of
supporting documents
- Publishing a list of
competent authorities
(including in non-EU
countries)
- No fees for authorisations
and transit
- Other
21. Please explain why Open x x x x x
22. To what extent do you think the
following measures could contribute
to improved fight against trafficking
of firearms?
o Not at all
o Small extent
o Moderate extent
o High extent
Multiple
choice – single
response
x x
- Ensuring that convertible
alarm and signal weapons are
always classified as firearms
at import
- Ensuring tracing of
deactivated or converted
firearms, regulating the
activities of brokers
- Homogenising the
processing of requests for
imports licenses
- Homogenising the
processing of requests for
exports licenses
- Systematic check of criminal
records in other EU Member
States before granting an
import/export licence
- Exchange of information on
refusals to grant import or
export authorisations
- Computerised data-filing
systems of import or export
authorisations (and exchange
of information)
- Imposing marking of the first
country of import
- Limiting imports of
unmarked semi-finished
essential components
o Very high extent
o I do not know
- Sharing and analysing
general statistics on imports,
exports and seizures of
firearms
- Clarifying the role of
customs authorities
- Clarifying the roles of
competent authorities
- Requiring end-use
certificates at export
- Stepping up post-shipment
controls at export
- National inspection systems
to check whether the
conditions of an export
licence continue to be met
- Other
23. Please explain why Open x x
Part III: Evaluation of the impact of options
24. For each of the measures mentioned
below, please indicate how they
would affect, for you personally, the
administrative burden.
- Clarifying the distinction
between military and civilian
firearms
- Having for civilian firearms
the same licensing procedure
o Very negative impact
o Negative impact
o No impact
o Positive impact
o Very positive impact
o I do not know
Multiple
choice – single
response
x x x
as for military ones
- Digital import and export
licences
- Set out clear rules for
“simplified procedures”
- Linking simplified
procedures to the status of
Authorised Economic
Operator Safety/Security
- Replace the global
authorisation by a general
export authorisation for
specific countries and
exporters (authorised
economic operators)
- Systematically assuming the
agreement of non-EU
country of transit in the
absence of a reply
- Removing the obligation to
provide translations of
supporting documents
- Publishing a list of
competent authorities
(including in non-EU
countries)
- No fees for authorisations
and transit
- Ensuring that convertible
alarm and signal weapons are
always classified as firearms
at import
- Ensuring tracing of
deactivated or converted
firearms, regulating the
activities of brokers
- Homogenising the
processing of requests for
imports licenses
- Homogenising the
processing of requests for
exports licenses
- Systematic check of criminal
records in other EU Member
States before granting an
import/export licence
- Exchange of information on
refusals to grant import or
export authorisations
- Computerised data-filing
systems of import or export
authorisations (and exchange
of information)
- Imposing marking of the first
country of import
- Limiting imports of
unmarked semi-finished
essential components
- Sharing and analysing
general statistics on imports,
exports and seizures of
firearms
- Clarifying the role of
customs authorities
- Clarifying the roles of
competent authorities
- Requiring end-use
certificates at export
- Stepping up post-shipment
controls
- National inspection systems
to check whether the
conditions of an export
licence continue to be met
25. Where possible, for the above
measures, could you provide a
quantitative estimate of the impact
on administrative burden (average
monthly full-time equivalent, costs)?
Open x x x x x
26. If you wish to add further
information — within the scope of
this questionnaire — please feel free
to do so here.
Open x x x x x
27. Please indicate here whether you
would agree to be contacted to
discuss your answers and provide
more detailed replies
- Yes
- No
Multiple
choice – single
response
x x x x x
28. Please feel free to upload a concise
document, such as a position paper.
Open x x x x x
2. Questionnaire of the confidential consultation
Survey question Survey answer Type
1. What body do you represent? - Police
- Customs
- Ministery of foreign affairs
- Ministery of trade
- Ministry of justice or home affairs
- Other export licensing authority
- other
Multiple choice –
single response
2. Country of origin Dropdown list
3. How do you mark firearms at import? - with the unique marking of Directive (EU)
2021/55 (the Firearms Directive) only
- with an import marking enabling the
identification of the country of import and
the year of import
- other
- NA (eg; I only deal with exports)
Multiple choice –
single response
4. Please explain and indicate the
relevant legislation
Open question
5. What form of import authorisation do
you have?
- The standard authorisation to acquire or
transfer a firearm under Directive (EU)
2021/555?
- A specific import authorisation
- A mere customs declaration
- I do not know
Multiple choice –
single response
6. Please explain Open question
7. Please upload a template of your
import authorisation
Uploaded document
8. What is the maximum time between a
request and an import authorisation
Open question
9. At import, who checks compliance of
alarm and signal weapons (CN Code
9304) with EU standards on non-
convertibility of Implementing
Directive 2019/69 before release into
free circulation?
- Customs
- Ballistic laboratory
- Test bench
- Nobody
- Other
- NA (eg. I only deal with export)
Multiple choice –
single response
10. How do you regulate imports of
unmarked P80-branded “80%”
receivers (e.g.Glock-type semi-
automatic pistols, or lower receivers
of AR-15-type assault rifles)?
- Need to be declared as firearms parts (CN
code 9305) but not marked
- Need to be declared as firearms essential
components (CN code 9305) and marked
accordingly
- Not considered as firearms parts - no
specific declaration
- NA (eg. I only deal with exports)
Multiple choice –
single response
11. Are you aware of a risk of firearms
being legally exported from third
countries into the EU, but kept
undeclared at arrival in hold luggage?
- Yes
- No
- NA (eg. I only deal with exports)
Multiple choice –
single response
12. How do you regulate/check imports of
firearms in hold luggage?
- We request a entry summary declaration
- We demand a standard import authorisation
but no advance notification of customs
- Other
- We don’t
- I do not know
Multiple choice –
single response
13. Please explain Open question
14. Will the Import Control System 2
(ICS 2) make a difference?
- Yes a big one
- Yes, a bit
- No difference
- I do not know
Multiple choice –
single response
15. Please explain Open question
16. How do you share data at EU level in
relation to smuggling of firearms into
the EU?
- Systematic SIENA message
- Occasional SIENA message
- Systematic Risk Information Fiches (RIF) in
the Customs Risk Management System
(CRMS)
- Occasional RIF in CRMS
- Regular sharing with Europol of general
seizure data
- Regular sharing with Europol of detailed
seizure statistics (by CN code, type of
Multiple choice –
single response
misdeclaration, country of origin, category
of firearms etc.)
- Regular sharing with European Commission
(DG TAXUD) of general seizure data
- Regular sharing with European Commission
(DG TAXUD) of detailed seizure statistics
(by CN code, type of misdeclaration,
country of origin, category of firearms etc.)
- Mere bilateral exchanges with Member
States concerned
- Other
- NA (eg. I only deal with exports)
17. Please explain Open question
18. When establishing risk profiles to
check firearms imports, do you take
into consideration for your assessment
imports and smuggling statistics into
the EU?
- We use our own national statistics
- We rely on experience shared in CRMS
(Risk Information Fiches)
- We use SIENA-based information
- We use other sources of intelligence
- We have EU-level statistics on which to base
our risk assessment
- NA (eg. I only deal with exports)
Multiple choice –
single response
19. Please explain Open question
20. What would be the impact of
subjecting firearms to Surveillance
(article 55 of Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2015/2447)?
- Very positive impact
- Slightly positive impact
- No impact
- Slightly negative impact
- Very negative impact
Multiple choice –
single response
- I do not know
21. Please explain Open question
22. Do you have simplified procedures for
temporary imports, or re-imports
following temporary exports?
- No - they are subject to standard import
authorisations
- Yes, for sport shooters
- Yes, for hunters
- Yes, for exhibition purposes
- Yes, for repair purposes
- Yes, for imports from specific (non-EU)
countries
- Yes, for Authorised Economic Operators –
safety and security
- Yes, other
- NA (eg. I only deal with exports)
Multiple choice –
multiple response
23. Please explain Open question
24. For Export authorisations, do you use
the model established in the annex of
Regulation 258?
- Yes
- No
- NA (eg. not involved in granting export
authorisations)
Multiple choice –
single response
25. Please upload a template of the export
authorisations you use
Upload document
26. Before granting an export
authorisations, do you:
- systematically check the criminal record of
the applicant in your national database
- systematically check the criminal record of
the applicant in European Criminal Records
Multiple choice –
single response
Information System (ECRIS)
- your national criminal record system does
automatic searches in the European Criminal
Records Information System (ECRIS)
- request the applicant to submit a copy of
his/her criminal record in your country
- request the applicant to submit a copy of the
national criminal record of another relevant
country (country of residence or of
nationality)
- check in the Schengen Information System
(SIS) if the firearms concerned are sought
for seizure elsewhere in the EU
- systematically check if the applicant is
involved in any present or past criminal
investigation
- NA (eg. not involved in granting export
authorisations)
27. Similar transactions, do you - Systematically check the COARM system to
see if similar transactions have been
refused/revoked/modified in other Member
States
- Occasionally check the COARM system to
see if similar transactions have been
refused/revoked/modified in other Member
States
- Always ask another authority (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs) to check in COARM
- Sometimes ask another authority (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs) to check in COARM
Multiple choice –
single response
- Never check in COARM
- NA (eg. not involved in granting export
authorisations)
28. For refusals (or withdrawal of export
authorisations), do you:
- Always upload them (or have them
uploaded) in COARM
- Sometimes upload them (or have them
uploaded) in COARM
- Never upload them (or have them uploaded)
in COARM
- NA (eg. not involved in granting export
authorisations)
Multiple choice –
single response
29. After having granted an export
authorisation, do you:
- regularly check the criminal record of the
person concerned?
- conduct reviews of existing authorisations to
check if conditions are still met?
- reassess/withdraw authorisations in the light
of new risks of diversion?
- always request the exporter to confirm
import in the country of destination?
- conduct regular post-shipment checks to
verify the weapon have not been illicitely re-
exported or diverted?
- NA (not involved in the export authorisation
process)
Multiple choice –
single response
30. Please explain Open question
31. How do you control exported - They are not subject to any specific rule at
export
Multiple choice –
deactivated firearms? - They must be marked in accordance with
Regulation (EU) 2015/2403 and
accompanied with a deactivation certificate
even if deactivated before 8 April 2016
- They must be marked in accordance with
Regulation (EU) 2015/2403 and
accompanied with a deactivation certificate
only when deactivated after 8 April 2016
- Other
- I do not know
single response
32. Please explain Open question
33. How do you control exported signal
and alarm weapons?
- They are not subject to any specific rule at
export
- They are considered as firearms under
national legislation and are subject to the
same rules
- They must comply with Commission
Implementing Directive (EU) 2019/69 to
avoid being subject to export authorisations
- Other
- I do not know
Multiple choice –
single response
34. Please explain Open question
35. Please explain how you organize the
national control system and which
designated national authority chairs
the national control system pursuant to
Open question
article 5 of the Arms Trade Treaty.
36. Please explain which are the
designated national competent
authorities and if all of them are
involved in the national control system
pursuant to article 5 of the Arms Trade
Treaty.
Open question
37. Do you apply a Single Procedure for
firearms covered both by Regulation
(EU) 2012/258 and Common Position
2008/944/CFSP?
- Yes: the same procedure is applied to all
firearms
- Yes: mere consultation of the ministries
responsible (foreign affairs/defence)
- Yes: single form/website for the application,
but different types of licences
- Yes: other
- No
- I don’t know
Multiple choice –
single response
38. Please explain Open question
39. Please explain the difference between
the two
Open question
40. Do you have simplified procedures for
temporary exports, or re-exports
following temporary imports?
- Yes, for sport shooters and hunters (as
required by Reg. 258)
- Yes, for exhibition purposes (temporary
exports)
- Yes, for repair purposes (temporary exports)
- Yes, for exports to specific (non-EU)
countries
Multiple choice –
multiple response
- Yes, for Authorised Economic Operators –
safety and security
- Yes for re-exports after temporary admission
- Yes, other
- NA (eg. I only deal with exports)
41. Please explain Open question
42. Do you have electronic import and
export authorisation processes?
- electronic import processes
- paper-based import processes
- electronic export processes
- paper-based export processes
- I don't know
Multiple choice –
multiple response
43. Do you have a computerised data-
filing system for record-keeping of
import and export authorisations?
- Yes, for import
- Yes, for export
- Yes, also for refusals
- No
- I do not know
Multiple choice –
multiple response
44. Do import and export licensing
authorities have access to the EU
Customs Information System?
- Yes, at import (they are customs authorities)
- Yes, at import (non-customs authorities)
- Yes, at export (they are customs authorities)
- Yes, at export (non-customs authorities)
- No
- I do not know
Multiple choice - -
single response
45. When your customs authorities
discover an illicit movement, please
explain how they communicate with
the competent authority which granted
Open question
the export authorisation (in your
country or in other Member States)
46. If an export authorisation is
withdrawn, suspended, modified or
revoked, does your export licencing
authority inform the customs
administration?
- Yes, within the same Member State
- Yes, to the authorities of the Member State
of exit
- Other
- No
- I don’t know
Multiple choice - -
single response
47. Please explain Open question
48. Do you impose fees for import and
export authorisations?
- Yes, for import authorisations
- Yes, for export authorisations
- Yes, for transit inside the EU
- Yes, escorting fees only
- Other
- No. None of the above
Multiple choice -
multiple response
49. How much? (indicate price per
authorisation, or according to the
quantities concerned)
Open question
50. In your view, how important it is to
have common EU rules on imports of
civilian firearms from outside of the
EU?
- Not important
- Slightly important
- Moderately important
- Important
- Very important
- I do not know
Multiple choice -
single response
51. In your view, how important it is to
have common EU rules on exports of
civilian firearms outside of the EU?
- Not important
- Slightly important
- Moderately important
- Important
- Very important
- I do not know
Multiple choice -
single response
52. How important is the current
administrative burden created for you
personally by current EU rules on
exports of civilian firearms?
- Non-existent
- Slight
- Moderate
- Important
- Very important
- I do not know
Multiple choice -
single response
53. If you have replied “important” or
“very important”, can you quantify
this impact (in monthly full-time
equivalent and costs)?
Open question
54. The Commission has preliminarily
identified a number of challenges that
could hamper the legal movement of
civilian firearms. For each of them,
can you mention to what extent, in
your view, they create a burden for
legal movements of civilian firearms?:
- Non uniform rules on exports
- Non uniform rules on imports
- Lack of a clear distinction
between civilian and military
- not at all
- small extent
- moderate extent
- high extent
- very high extent
- I do not know
Multiple choice -
single response
firearms (and lack of clarity
about the applicable
procedure)
- Single market rules apply to
more goods (e.g. deactivated
firearms, automatic firearms)
and persons (brokers,
collectors) than import/export
rules
- The need to have the express
prior authorisation of transit
countries before granting an
export licence
- Different national rules for
simplified procedures (hunters,
sport shooters, repair,
exhibition, etc.)
- Paper-based procedures
- Obligation to submit
translations of supporting
documents
- Fees for export authorisations
or transit inside the EU
- No use of the global export
authorisation
55. If you see additional challenges that
may hamper legal movements of
civilian firearms, can you please
describe them here along with their
relative importance?
Open question
56. Without further EU intervention, how
do you think the legal movements of
civilian firearms will develop in the
next 5-10 years?
- The situation will improve: the current
framework will be enough to ensure
seamless legal movement of firearms, and
increased cooperation and exchanges of best
practices will bring more consistency in the
application of the rules.
- The situation will remain unchanged: the
current framework will be enough to ensure
legal movement of firearms, but current
difficulties will not be overcome.
- The situation will deteriorate: economic
operators and legitimate firearms owners
will be faced with increasingly
heterogeneous national rules and procedures.
- I do not know
Multiple choice –
single response
57. Please explain the extent of the risks
of firearms trafficking for each of the
following types of movements (do not
include in your assessment transfers of
firearms within the European Union).:
- Import (entry and release in
free circulation)
- Export (release of the goods
and exit)
- Transit (and transshipments)
inside the EU
- Transit (and transshipments)
outside the EU
- no risk
- small risk
- moderate risk
- high risk
- very high risk
- I do not know
Multiple choice –
single response
58. The Commission has preliminarily
identified a number of aspects which
could create risks of firearms
trafficking. For each of them, can you
mention to what extent they increase
those risks?:
- Imports into the EU of
unmarked signal and alarm
weapons
- Lack of marking identifying
the first country of import into
the EU
- Imports into the EU of
unmarked semi-finished
essential components of
firearms
- Risk of export of firearms used
in crimes
- Inadequate controls of the
actual end-use of exported
firearms
- Available statistical data does
not enable evidence-based
detection of trends
- Poor coordination amongst
export licensing authorities
(possibility to grant export
licences when similar
- not at all
- small extent
- moderate extent
- high extent
- very high extent
- I do not know
Multiple choice –
single response
transactions where authorised)
- Poor coordination between
customs and licensing
authorities
59. If you see additional challenges that
could increase risks of firearms
trafficking, can you please describe
them here along with their relative
importance?
Open question
60. Without further EU intervention, how
do you think firearms trafficking will
develop in the next 5-10 years?
- The situation will improve: the current
framework will be enough to ensure
increased cooperation amongst law-
enforcement agencies, more intelligence
gathering, and increased detection of
smuggling of firearms.
- The situation will remain unchanged: the
current framework will be enough to ensure
proper law enforcement cooperation, but
intelligence-based targeted checks at import
and export will remain defective.
- The situation will deteriorate: exports (or
diversion) of firearms to conflict zones and
dictatorships, and smuggling of firearms,
their components, and convertible weapons
into the EU will increase.
- I do not know
Multiple choice –
single response
61. Is there anything else you would wish
to add or mention on the problems
regarding imports and exports of
Open question
civilian firearms to and from the
European Union?
62. In your view, is there a need for EU
intervention on current rules on
import, export and transit of civilian
firearms?
- Yes
- No
- I do not know
Multiple choice –
single response
63. Do you see the need for new tools to
improve current rules on import,
export and transit of civilian firearms?
- Yes
- No
- I do not know
Multiple choice –
single response
64. For the two previous questions, please
provide more detailed considerations
Open question
65. If EU intervention was considered
necessary, what should be its main
focus?:
- Non-legislative measures
(guidelines, recommendations)
- Clarification of existing
legislation
- New legislative provisions
- Other
- I do not know
- Uniform import / export procedures
- Tracing of firearms
- Exchange of information
- Trade facilitation
- Other
Multiple choice –
single response
66. Please explain Open question
67. To what extent do you think the
following measures could contribute
to improved legal import, export and
- not at all
- small extent
- moderate extent
Multiple choice –
single response
transit of civilian firearms?:
- Clarifying the distinction
between military and civilian
firearms
- Having for civilian firearms
the same licensing procedure
as for military ones
- Digital import and export
licences
- Set out clear rules for
“simplified procedures”
- Linking simplified procedures
to the status of Authorised
Economic Operator
Safety/Security
- Replace the global
authorisation by a general
export authorisation for
specific countries and
exporters (authorised
economic operators)
- Systematically assuming the
agreement of non-EU country
of transit in the absence of a
reply
- Removing the obligation to
provide translations of
supporting documents
- Publishing a list of competent
authorities (including in non-
- high extent
- very high extent
- I do not know
EU countries)
- No fees for authorisations and
transit
- Ensuring that convertible
alarm and signal weapons are
always classified as firearms at
import
- Ensuring tracing of deactivated
or converted firearms,
regulating the activities of
brokers
- Homogenising the processing
of requests for import licenses
- Homogenising the processing
of requests for export licenses
- Systematic check of criminal
records in other EU Member
States before granting an
import/export licence
- Exchange of information on
refusals to grant import or
export authorisations
- Computerised data-filing
systems of import or export
authorisations (and exchange
of information)
- Imposing marking of the first
country of import
- Limiting imports of unmarked
semi-finished essential
components
- Sharing and analysing general
statistics on imports, exports
and seizures of firearms
- Clarifying the role of customs
authorities
- Clarifying the roles of
competent authorities
- Requiring end-use certificates
at export
- Stepping up post-shipment
controls at export
- National inspection systems to
check whether the conditions
of an export licence continue
to be met
- Other
68. Please explain why Open question
69. For each of the measures mentioned
below, please indicate how they would
affect, for you personally, the
administrative burden.:
- Clarifying the distinction
between military and civilian
firearms
- Having for civilian firearms
the same licensing procedure
as for military ones
- Digital import and export
- very negative impact
- negative impact
- no impact
- positive impact
- very positive impact
- I do not know
Multiple choice –
single repsonse
licences
- Set out clear rules for
“simplified procedures”
- Linking simplified procedures
to the status of Authorised
Economic Operator
Safety/Security
- Replace the global
authorisation by a general
export authorisation for
specific countries and
exporters (authorised
economic operators)
- Systematically assuming the
agreement of non-EU country
of transit in the absence of a
reply
- Removing the obligation to
provide translations of
supporting documents
- Publishing a list of competent
authorities (including in non-
EU countries)
- No fees for authorisations and
transit
- Ensuring that convertible
alarm and signal weapons are
always classified as firearms at
import
- Ensuring tracing of deactivated
or converted firearms,
regulating the activities of
brokers
- Homogenising the processing
of requests for import licenses
- Homogenising the processing
of requests for export licenses
- Systematic check of criminal
records in other EU Member
States before granting an
import/export licence
- Exchange of information on
refusals to grant import or
export authorisations
- Computerised data-filing
systems of import or export
authorisations (and exchange
of information)
- Imposing marking of the first
country of import
- Limiting imports of unmarked
semi-finished essential
components
- Sharing and analysing general
statistics on imports, exports
and seizures of firearms
- Clarifying the role of customs
authorities
- Clarifying the roles of
competent authorities
- Requiring end-use certificates
at export
- Stepping up post-shipment
controls at export
- National inspection systems to
check whether the conditions
of an export licence continue
to be met
- Other
70. Where possible, for the above
measures, could you provide a
quantitative estimate of the impact on
administrative burden (average
monthly full-time equivalent, costs)?
Open question
71. If you wish to add further information —
within the scope of this questionnaire —
please feel free to do so here.
Open question
72 Free text question Open question or
upload a document