Kopi af brev til Europa-Kommissionen (genindførelse af midlertidig grænsekontrol), fra justitsministeren

Side 1/1
Regeringen har i overensstemmelse med reglerne i Schengengrænsekodek-
sen i dag underrettet Europa-Kommissionen og de øvrige medlemsstater
om, at regeringen har besluttet at genindføre den midlertidige grænsekontrol
på Danmarks indre grænser, når den nuværende periode med grænsekontrol
udløber efter den 11. november 2022. Grænsekontrollen genindføres grun-
det sikkerheds- og migrationssituationen.
Kopi af regeringens brev til Europa-Kommissionen vedlægges til oriente-
ring.
Et tilsvarende brev er samtidig hermed sendt til Folketingets Europaudvalg.
Mattias Tesfaye
/
Niklas V. Johansen
Retsudvalget
Folketinget
Christiansborg
1240 København K Dato: 14. oktober 2022
Kontor: Kontoret for Organiseret
Kriminalitet
Sagsbeh: Simon Holmelund Lange
Sagsnr.: 2022-3050-0140
Dok.: 2610344
Slotsholmsgade 10
1216 København K.
T +45 3392 3340
F +45 3393 3510
www.justitsministeriet.dk
jm@jm.dk
Offentligt
REU Alm.del - Bilag 7
Retsudvalget 2022-23


Slotsholmsgade 10
DK - 1216 København K.
Phone +45 7226 8400
Fax +45 3393 3510
www.justitsministeriet.dk
jm@jm.dk
Dear Commissioner Johansson,
1. Please be informed that the Danish Government, in accordance with the
provisions in Article 25 and 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of 9 March
2016 (Schengen Borders Code), has decided to temporarily reintroduce bor-
der controls at the internal borders. The reintroduction of border controls
will be carried out for 6 months as from 12 November 2022. The border
controls may extend to all internal borders, including land, sea and air bor-
ders, whereby the specific border sections and border crossing points are
determined by the Danish National Police. However, the border controls
will focus on the Danish-German land border, the Danish-Swedish land bor-
der (Øresundsforbindelsen) and the Danish ports with ferry connection to
Germany or Sweden.
This decision has been reached in order to be able to effectively counter the
significant threat to our public order and internal security caused by terror-
ists and organized criminals who are able to exploit the free mobility within
the Schengen area as well as the current migration situation within the
Schengen-area. This notification thus provides factual information and elab-
orates on the circumstances and events which give rise to a new serious
threat to our public order and internal security, while taking into account the
free movement of persons in the practical execution of the border controls.
2. First of all, the Russian invasion of Ukraine currently constitutes an ex-
traordinary and uncertain situation in Europe. It is estimated that approxi-
mately 10,5 million people have been displaced since the Russian invasion
while approximately 1,3 million Russian nationals have entered the EU. The
Center for Terror Analysis (CTA), under the Danish Security and Intelli-
gence Service, asseses that the conflict may cause spillover effects
Commissioner Johansson Ministry of Justice
Date: 14 October 2022
Offentligt
REU Alm.del - Bilag 7
Retsudvalget 2022-23
2
influencing on the threat of terror. Thus in the short term the larger flow of
migrants and displaced persons could entail a risk that persons who could
pose a threat to Denmark would be able to travel into the Schengen area.
CTA further asseses that in the long term the presence of an area of conflict
in Europe with presumably high accessibility of firearms could potentially
attract extremists who could pose a threat to Denmark.
Additionally, due to the migratory pressure on the Schengen area's external
border with Belarus the police have had an increased focus on the risk of
human smuggling and human trafficiking since Russia's invasion of
Ukraine. The Danish National Police has further stated that after a short pe-
riod of decline in 2020 and 2021, there is currently an increase in the number
of criminal groups crossing the Danish/German landborder.
In this regard new events such as the recent escalation of the war by Russia,
including through military mobilisation as announced on 21 September
2022, are of great concern to the Danish Government.
The military mobilisation in Russia has resulted in a significant increase in
arrivals of Russian citizens to the Union’s external bordes, as well as in visa
applications and inquiries to Member States. As also stated by the Commis-
sion in the communication of 3 October 20221
, it cannot be excluded that
Russian citizens trying to avoid the mobilisation and entering the EU also
constitute a threat to public policy and the internal security. As also stated
by the Commission regarding the current geopolitical situation and the mil-
itary mobilisation in the Russian Federation these events impact the stability
and security of the Union and its Member States.
This should be seen against a backdrop where CTA assesses that the terrorist
threat against Denmark is considered to be serious.
It is estimated that the threat primarily comes from militant Islamism. CTA
estimates that since the summer of 2012 at least 161 adults have traveled
from Denmark to Syria/Iraq to join militant Islamist groups. Of the 161 per-
sons who have traveled to Syria/Iraq approximately half have currently
1
Communication from the Commission (13054/22) of 3 October 2022 on 1) updating
guidelines on general visa issuance in relation to Russian applicants following Council De-
cision (EU) 2022/1500 of 9 September 2022 on the suspension in whole of the application
of the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the
facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian
Federation; and 2) providing guidelines on controls of Russian citizens at the external bor-
ders
3
returned to Denmark or have taken up residence in other – primarily Euro-
pean – countries, while approximately a third have died in the conflict zone.
According to CTA's information, there are still 29 adults who have left Den-
mark residing in Syria/Iraq or neighboring countries.
CTA assesses that persons who have travelled from Denmark to the conflict
zone in Syria/Iraq may pose a threat to Denmark or to Danish interests
abroad. The possible threat includes planning of attacks, radicalization of
other persons, propaganda activities, logistical support, terrorist financing
and other terrorist-related activities. Persons who departed from countries
other than Denmark, including from other European countries, can also pose
a threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad.
There is also a terrorist threat against Denmark from radicalized individuals
and smaller groups residing in other countries, primarily Denmark's neigh-
boring countries. The threat from militant Islamists living in other Western
countries can emanate from persons with connections to Denmark, but it can
also be people living abroad without any previous connection to Denmark.
In the coming years a large number of persons convicted of terrorism in
Europe will be released. These persons may seek to enter Denmark and thus
pose a threat against Denmark.
Exploitation of refugee and migrant routes has previously been included as
a central element in the planning of attacks by Islamic State against targets
in Europe, and it is possible that militant Islamist groups still intend to ex-
ploit these routes.
Furthermore, criminal patterns of organized criminal networks between
Denmark and Sweden are also of concern to Danish internal security. The
Danish Special Crime Unit is aware of collaboration between different crim-
inal networks and organisations rooted in both Denmark and Sweden.
The Danish Special Crime Unit assesses that during the first half of 2022
multiple violent incidents have taken place between different Swedish crim-
inal networks or organisations in the southern parts of Sweden.
Finally, the recent migration developments within the Schengen area so far
in 2022 (as of end September) show that the number of irregular entries
along the Mediterranian routes is at its highest since 2018, which raises great
concern for Denmark.
4
Austria is currently experiencing more registrations than during the Euro-
pean migration crisis in 2015. As a consequence, secondary movements of
migrants from said countries are seen.
Austria is affected by the movements on the eastern Mediterranian and
Western Balkan route, which traditionally has been the most frequently used
route of asylum seekers travelling to Denmark. There are also indications of
secondary flows to Germany, which probably stems from the Eastern Med-
iterranian and Western Balkan routes.
3. Against this backdrop and after careful consideration, the Danish Gov-
ernment considers temporary reintroducition of internal border controls as a
necessary and effective measure to address these real and current threats to
public order and internal security.
This is also supported by the following facts:
- From 1 January 2022 until 31 July 2022 a total of 202 weapons have
been confiscated in relation to the border controls against Germany.
Over the same period the police has refused entry to 1.994 persons
on the Danish-German border. In the police district of South Jutland
the internal border controls has resulted in 8.195 charges in the pe-
riod from 23 September 2020 to 31 August 2021.
- In the police district of South Zealand and Lolland-Falster the inter-
nal border controls has resulted in 1.304 charges in the period from
23 September 2020 to 31 July 2022.
4. The Danish Government remains committed to the principle of free
movement of persons. Please rest assured that the scope of the internal bor-
der checks will continue to be limited to what is deemed strictly necessary
to respond to the threat to our public order and internal security. It thus re-
mains a matter of priority for the Danish Government that the practical ex-
ecution of the temporary border controls are carried out in a manner with
the least negative impact on persons crossing the border for legitimate rea-
sons and with careful considerations taken to the free movement of persons
within the EU.
The Danish police conducts the border controls in cooperation with neigh-
boring law enforcement authorities where cooperation is also established
regarding exchange of information. During the summer e.g. additional lanes
were opened to help minimize the impact on the traffic crossing the Danish-
German border.
5
The border controls are carried out as spot-checks which in terms of quan-
tity, location and intensity are adapted to the expected number of travelers
as well as the current intelligence picture, the local conditions and the traffic
patterns at the individual border crossing points. In addition to the physical
control at the fixed border crossing points, automatic license plate recogni-
tion-facilities are permanently installed at all border crossing points on the
land border with Germany (the green border) and at all ferry ports on the
sea border with Germany (the blue border) as well as at the Øresund con-
nection, which registers traffic into Denmark. These registrations are used
partly to monitor hits on vehicles registered in the automatic number plate
recognition sytems, partly to prepare analyzes of the traffic across the bor-
ders.
Regarding the temporary border controls on the Danish-Swedish border, the
control is carried out as periodic spot-checks targeting road traffic and train
traffic over the Øresund connection as well as ferry traffic in the ports of
Helsingør, Frederikshavn, Grenå and Rønne. The temporary border controls
on the Danish-Swedish border are currently carried out as 1-2 weekly con-
trols on all larger border crossing points.
The internal border controls are thus substantially different from the system-
atic control of Denmarks external borders. The Danish National Police has
found that the previous border controls have not had a distinctive negative
impact on the free movement of persons across the internal borders. This
will continue to be a priority for the Danish authorities in close cooperation
with both German and Swedish authorities.
5. The Danish reintroduced internal border controls are complementary to
police controls on the territory and is part of a comprehensive police effort
in the border regions. The Danish Government thus in 2019 and 2020 de-
cided to significantly strengthen the use of automatic license plate recogni-
tion. Hence, the Danish police is in the process of implementing new sta-
tionary and mobile automatic license plate recognition-facilities, which will
also serve to strengthen the control of border areas. The Danish National
Police expects that the new equipment will be ready to use by the end of
2023.
However, it is the opinion of the Government that these efforts do not at the
moment fully remedy the need for internal border controls. The reintroduc-
tion of internal border controls thus remains a measure of last resort.
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The Danish Government will notify the other Member States about this de-
cision.
Yours sincerely,
Mattias Tesfaye