Kommissionens meddelelse om retsstatssituationen i EU, landekapitlet om Danmark og Kommissionens anbefalinger til medlemslandene

EN EN
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Luxembourg, 13.7.2022
COM(2022) 500 final
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2022 Rule of Law Report
The rule of law situation in the European Union
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KOM (2022) 0500 - Bilag 1
Europaudvalget 2022
1
1. INTRODUCTION
The European Union is a Union of values: fundamental rights, democracy, rule of law. This is
the bedrock of our society and our common identity1
. Challenges to the rule of law in a Member
State affect the legal order and the functioning of the EU as a whole. The rule of law benefits
everyone in the EU and it is clear that citizens in every Member State strongly support the rule
of law principles2
.
In recent years, we have seen challenges to the rule of law mounting both here in the EU and
globally. The COVID-19 pandemic tested the resilience of national systems in upholding the
rule of law in times of crisis, putting pressure on the established systems of constitutional
checks and balances and on the ability of democratic institutions and their watchdogs to do
their work.
Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine and its people
constitutes a direct challenge to EU values and the rules-based world order. It grossly violates
international law and the principles of the UN Charter and undermines democracy as well as
the rule of law, in addition to European and global security and stability. Safeguarding and
upholding our democratic institutions and values is a shared responsibility of Member States
and EU institutions. This is all the more important now when the EU and its Member States
are threatened by hostile foreign actors using disinformation and cyber attacks to try to
undermine our democracies.
The Commission recognises its particular role in realising this shared responsibility, whether
through galvanising change, driving cooperation, or pointing out and acting on failings. This
role is fulfilled in different ways through the different instruments available to the Commission,
but the objective is always clear: to make a real difference in the way in which citizens feel the
impact of the rule of law in their everyday life. The Commission has also ensured that the
Recovery and Resilience Facility has given priority to driving Member State reforms of the
judiciary, anti-corruption frameworks, public administration and digitalisation of their justice
systems, as essential to a strong investment climate.
Throughout the past year, the rule of law has been a prominent theme on the European agenda,
with the 2021 Rule of Law Report bringing a major contribution to informing the political as
well as the technical debate at both EU and national level. The annual Rule of Law Report is
indeed central to our efforts to have a practical impact on promotion and safeguarding of the
rule of law in the EU. By duly taking into account national traditions, ensuring equal treatment
and being based on a transparent and objective methodology, the report has allowed for a
constructive discussion and a rich exchange of best practises among Member States, both in
Council and at technical level, as well as in the framework of the discussions held in the
European and in national Parliaments with the Commission on the basis of the 2021 report.
Learning from each other’s experience better equips Member States to find the best way
forward and to prevent that challenges to the rule of law emerge or deepen.
1
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of
law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are
common to the Member States in a societyin which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity
and equality between women and men prevail.” (Treaty on European Union, Article 2).
2
Eurobarometer 508 on Values and identities of EU citizens (2021) shows that 82% of Europeans are supporting
these principles.
2
This third edition of the report takes the next step in the Commission’s investment in the rule
of law as the first to include specific recommendations to Member States, as announced by
President von der Leyen in the 2021 State of the Union address3
. In line with the preventive
nature of the report, the objective of the recommendations is to support Member States in their
efforts to take forward ongoing or planned reforms, to encourage positive developments, and
to help them identify where improvements or follow-up to recent changes or reforms may be
needed, also with a view to address systemic challenges in certain cases.
In drawing up the recommendations, the Commission has paid close attention to keeping them
focused and anchored in European law and standards, while also respecting the specificity of
national legal systems. Equally important is consistency and synergies with other processes
and instruments, such as the European Semester, the general regime of conditionality for the
protection of the EU budget and the Recovery and Resilience Facility. Subsequent editions of
the Rule of Law Report will look at the follow-up given to the recommendations.
As in the previous editions, the 2022 Rule of Law report examines developments related to:
- Justice systems in the Member States, focusing on their independence, quality and
efficiency. These are key parameters that ensure that the application and enforcement of
EU law is effective, that the rule of law is upheld and that mutual trust is maintained. Well-
functioning and fully independent justice systems are crucial for ensuring that justice
works to the benefit of citizens and businesses. They are also essential for judicial
cooperation across the EU, as well as for the functioning of the Single Market, and the
EU’s legal order as a whole 4
.
- The anti-corruption frameworks, focusing on the effectiveness of national anti-
corruption policies and assessing different key areas of action taken by Member States to
prevent and fight corruption. Effective anti-corruption frameworks as well as transparency
and integrity in the exercise of state power, strengthen legal systems and citizen and
businesses’ trust in public authorities.
- Media freedom and pluralism, focusing on core areas including the independence of the
media regulatory authorities, transparency of media ownership, transparency and fairness
in the allocation of state advertising, the safety of journalists and access to information.
This year’s report includes for the first time a systematic coverage of public service media.
A free and pluralistic media environment is key for the rule of law, democratic
accountability and the fight against corruption. The importance of free and pluralistic
media has led to several recent initiatives at EU level5
.
- Institutional issues related to checks and balances, focusing on areas of key importance
for the rule of law, such as the quality and inclusiveness of the national legislative process,
the role of Constitutional Courts and independent authorities such as the Ombudsperson,
3
2021 State of the Union address.
4
2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
5
Commission Recommendation on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other
media professionals in the European Union, C(2021) 6650, 16.9.2021; proposal for a Directive on protecting
persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings
(“Strategic lawsuits against public participation), COM(2022)177, 27.4.2022; and Commission
Recommendation protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from
manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (“Strategic lawsuits against public participation”),
C(2022)2428, 27.4.2022. The Commission is also implementing the Media and Audiovisual Action Plan,
increasing EU funding support to media freedom and pluralism projects.
3
equality bodies6
and National Human Rights Institutions, and the role of civil society
organisations in safeguarding the rule of law. The changing impact of and response to the
COVID-19 pandemic is a further element included in the analysis. This year’s report
includes for the first time an overview of the implementation of rulings of the European
Court of Human Rights.
The Rule of Law Report also presents significant developments at EU level and should
furthermore be seen in the broader context of other workstrands contributing to upholding
democratic values and human rights both within the Union and beyond. The Commission’s use
of key tools such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the General Conditionality
Regulation7
and the EU Justice Scoreboard are summarised in this report. The Commission
also pursues infringements when rule of law issues constitue breaches of EU law.
Another example of complementary action is work to promote fundamental rights: the 2022
Report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights8
will focus on the civic
space and its role in protecting and promoting these rights. Civil society is a key partner for the
EU in the implementation of its policies in the area of fundamental rights and a debate is under
way at EU level on how to increase support and their involvement at EU level.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine emphasised the importance of democratic values, human rights
and the rule of law. The EU has a particular role in projecting these values worldwide, as an
alternative to authoritarian models violating international law and human rights, as well as this
being a central feature of the enlargement process. The credibility of our external policies relies
on the state of the rule of law in the EU itself.
2. KEY ASPECTS OF THE RULE OF LAW SITUATION IN MEMBER STATES
This Report sets out significant common themes and trends, specific challenges and positive
developments across the four pillars. The examples given that reflect these trends are drawn
from the assessments to be found in the 27 country chapters, which are integral part of this
Report and provide the detailed context in each Member State 9
. The Report also includes
specific recommendations to Member States10
.
Methodology of the Rule of Law Report and its recommendations
The assessment contained in the country chapters has been prepared in line with the scope
and methodology, as updated following discussions with Member States11
. The country
chapters rely on a qualitative assessment autonomously carried out by the Commission,
focusing on a synthesis of significant developments since July 2021 and presenting both
challenges and positive aspects identified in Member States. In each country chapter, the
analysis focuses in particular on topics where there have been significant developments, or
6
In 2022 the Commission will propose measures to strengthen the role and independence of equality bodies.
7
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the
protection of the Union budget, OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1.
8
Publication scheduled in December 2022.
9
The country chapters are available here.
10
The recommendations are referenced in footnotes throughout this Report, listed in the Annex and also included
in the individual country chapters.
11
The methodology was updated following discussions with Member States, notably to better specify the use of
sources for the assessment and take into account the inclusion of recommendations in the Report. The
methodology is available here.
4
where important challenges have been identified in the previous report and persist during the
reporting period.
In line with the preventive nature of the Report, the objective of the recommendations is to
assist and support Member States in their efforts to take forward reforms and to identify
where improvements or follow-up to recent changes or reforms may be needed, based on
continuous dialogue with them12
.
In preparing the recommendations included in this Report, the following principles have
been observed:
• All Member States are subject to country-specific recommendations, in full respect of
the principles of equal treatment and proportionality.
• The recommendations are integrated in the report and are based on an in-depth
assessment in the country chapters, applying objective criteria grounded in EU law or
European and international standards.
• The recommendations are proportionate to the challenges identified. They also
encourage pursuing positive reform efforts.
• The recommendations are sufficiently specific to allow Member States to give a concrete
and actionable follow-up, taking into account the national competences, legal systems
and institutional context, as relevant.
• In preparing the recommendations, the Commission has paid close attention to
consistency and synergies with other processes, such as the European Semester, the
General Conditionality Regulation and the national Recovery and Resilience Plans13
.
• Subsequent editions of the Rule of Law Report will integrate the follow-up given to the
recommendations.
The Report is the result of close collaboration with Member States and relies on a variety of
national, international and other sources14
. All Member States were invited to participate in
the process, provide written input15
and join in dedicated country visits held between
February and April 202216
. A targeted stakeholder consultation also provided valuable
horizontal and country-specific contributions17
. The Council of Europe also provided an
overview of its recent opinions and reports concerning EU Member States18
. Prior to the
adoption of this report, Member States have been given the opportunity to provide factual
updates to their country chapter.
12
The recommendations are without prejudice to any proceedings the Commission may initiate under other legal
instruments, such as infringement procedures or the General Conditionality Regulation.
13
Where relevant, established Commission positions under these processes relating to the Member State in
question are set out before the recommendations.
14
The sources of the annual Rule of Law Report include in particular written input received from Member States,
written contributions received during the targeted stakeholder consultation and information produced by
international organisations or received from national authorities and stakeholders during country visits. The
sources inform the Commission’s assessment and do not, as such, represent the Commission position.
15
2022 Rule of law report - input from Member States.
16
Information on the country visits can be found in the country chapters. During these country visits, the
Commission discussed with Member States’ national authorities, including judicial and independent
authorities, law enforcement, as well as stakeholders, such as journalists’ associations and civil society.
17
The consultation was carried out between December 2021 and January2022. 2022 Rule of law report - targeted
stakeholder consultation.
18
2022 Rule of law report - Council of Europe contribution.
5
2.1 Justice systems
Independence, quality and efficiency are essential parameters of an effective justice system.
Effective justice systems are crucial for the application and enforcement of EU law and
upholding the rule of law. Judicial independence is vital for the fairness of judicial proceedings.
It is a requirement stemming from the principle of effective judicial protection, referred to in
Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and from the right to an effective remedy
before a court or tribunal, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
EU19
. Independent judges and courts guarantee that the rights of individuals deriving from EU
law are protected and that the values common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU,
in particular the value of the rule of law, are safeguarded20
. When reforming their justice
systems, Member States must fully respect the requirements set by EU law and the case law of
the CJEU21
.
Perceived judicial independence across the EU
The perception of independence among companies improved in about two thirds of Member
States when compared to 2021, according to the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard, Eurobarometer
surveys conducted in 202222
. However, amongst the general public, surveys pointed to
decreases in the perception of judicial independence in more than half the Member States.
There was little change in the relative perceptions between Member States. In Finland,
Denmark, Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Germany, the level of perceived
independence remains particularly high among the general public (above 75 %), while in
Slovakia, Poland and Croatia, it remains very low (below 30%).
Councils for the Judiciary and procedures for judicial appointments as key safeguards for
judicial independence
Councils for the Judiciary can be particularly important safeguards for judicial independence,
as recognised in the case law of the CJEU23
. They can act as a buffer between the judiciary and
the other branches of power in matters such as the appointment and career of judges or
magistrates, as well as their role in the management of the justice system. Important European
standards have been developed in the framework of the Council of Europe on how the Councils
for the Judiciary should be established to best safeguard their independence, including on their
composition24
. The Councils for the Judiciary also need adequate resources to function in an
effective way and fulfil their mandates.
Legislative efforts to strengthen the independence of judicial councils were initiated in a
number of Member States. In Luxembourg, legislative amendments have been tabled to align
the composition of the future Council for the Judiciary with European standards. These would
specify the competences of the Council for the Judiciary regarding the management of
magistrates’ careers, and introduce a new disciplinary regime. In Croatia, recent amendments
strengthen the role of the two Councils in the selection of judges and state attorneys. In Italy,
a new law has recently been adopted to reform the justice system, providing for the
19
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
20
CJEU judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 paras. 44 and 58.
21 A reference to the key judgments since the last report can be found in section 4.
22
Figures 50 and 52, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
23
The CJEU has recognised that a Council for the Judiciary can constitute a safeguard for judicial independence
provided that such body is sufficiently independent from the executive and legislative powers and from the
body to which it is submitting an opinion. See e.g. judgment of 2 March 2021, AB and Others (Appointment
of judges to the Supreme Court – Actions), C-824/18, paras. 123-125, and case-law cited.
24
See in particular Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Council of Europe.
6
establishment and functioning of the High Council for the Judiciary, including the way in which
its members are elected. In Cyprus, reforms have recently been voted by Parliament related to
the composition of the Council for the Judiciary. In the Netherlands, possible changes to the
composition and appointment of the Council for the Judiciary are foreseen. In Sweden, since
2020 an all-party Committee of Inquiry has been examining how to strengthen the
independence of the judiciary and is expected to deliver its report by February 2023.
Developments around national Councils for the Judiciary are a key theme in several Member
States. In Spain, concerns remain about the delays in the renewal of the Council for the
Judiciary and there have been further calls to modify the Council’s appointment system. In
Bulgaria, there are increasing concerns related to the functioning of the Supreme Judicial
Council and a need to address its composition. In Ireland, the proposed composition of the
envisaged Judicial Appointments Commission raises some concerns. In Slovakia, the Judicial
Council has taken up new tasks following the Constitutional reform, while concerns remain
over the regime for dismissal of its members. In Portugal, the finalisation of the legislative
framework for the High Council for Administrative and Tax Courts is pending since 2004 and
new measures were taken to address issues regarding the allocation of cases in courts25
.
In other Member States, structural or systemic concerns have not been addressed. In Poland,
serious concerns on the independence of the national council for the judiciary remain
unaddressed, even though these have been raised in a number of rulings of the CJEU and of
the European Court of Human Rights, confirming concerns identified by the Commission in
the context of the procedure under Article 7(1) TEU. These concerns are also reflected in the
broader European Semester country-specific recommendation to safeguard judicial
independence. In Hungary, the National Judicial Council continues to face challenges in
counter-balancing the powers of the National Office for the Judiciary President as regards the
management of the courts and the country-specific recommendation to strengthen judicial
independence, made in the European Semester, as well as related concerns expressed in the
context of the Article 7(1) TEU procedure, remain unaddressed26
.
The method for the appointment of judges can have a key impact on judicial independence and
public perception of independence. As established by the CJEU, in order to guarantee judicial
independence, substantive conditions and procedural rules governing judicial appointments
must be sufficient to prevent reasonable doubts as to the imperviousness of the judges
concerned to external factors and as to their neutrality as judges27
.
Since the last report, some Member States have embarked on improvements to judicial
appointment procedures. In Ireland, the new draft law on judicial appointments limits the
discretion of the Government in the procedure. In Croatia, the process for appointing the
Supreme Court President was concluded, and the procedure governing the selection procedure
was amended to avoid a potential future deadlock. In Czechia, amended legislation aims to set
up a transparent and uniform system of recruitment and selection of judges and court
25
Recommendations concern BG, IE, ES, IT, CY, LU, PT, SK, SE.
26
Recommendations concern HU.
27
See Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 2 March 2021, AB and Others (Appointment of judges
to the Supreme Court – Actions), C-824/18, paras.117, 119, 123 and case law cited. Participation of
independent bodies, such as councils for the judiciary, in the process of judicial appointment process may, in
principle, be such as to contribute to making that process more objective, provided that such a body is itself
sufficiently independent of the legislature and the executive (See judgments of 15 July 2021, Commission v
Poland, C-791/19, paras. 98-108; of 20 April 2021, Repubblika and Il-Prim Ministru, C-896/19, para. 66; of
2 March 2021, AB and Others (Appointment of judges to the Supreme Court – Actions), C-824/18, paras. 66,
124 and 125; and of 19 November 2019, AK et al, joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, paras. 137
and 138).
7
presidents. In Cyprus, Parliament has recently voted on the reform on the appointment
procedures for judges and Presidents of the new proposed Supreme Constitutional Court and
High Court. In the Netherlands, several changes to further strengthen judicial independence are
under consideration, including as regards the appointment of Supreme Court judges.
In other Member States that have taken steps to improve these procedures, challenges remain,
particularly regarding appointment in higher courts and for court president positions. In Malta,
while steps have been taken to depoliticise the appointment of the Chief Justice, there is still
no involvement of the judiciary. In Greece, concerns remain regarding the appointment
procedure for the most senior positions of judges and prosecutors, including the lack of judicial
involvement in the selection process. In Austria, a reform of the appointment procedure for the
Supreme Court President and Vice-President has been announced to address the lack of judicial
involvement in the procedure, but concerns remain regarding the limited involvement of the
judiciary in the appointments of court presidents and vice-presidents at administrative courts28
.
Appointment procedures to high-level judicial positions remain a key issue. In Lithuania, the
appointment of the President of the Supreme Court is pending since September 2019, as the
law does not foresee deadlines for the respective selection procedure and confers discretion to
the President of the Republic as to the timing of selection procedures for the Supreme Court.
In Latvia, the rejection by Parliament of a candidate to the position of Supreme Court judge
was marked by controversies regarding possible undue political influence. In Poland, specific
appointments to the Supreme Court have been subject to key rulings of CJEU and of the
European Court of Human Rights. In Hungary, concerns relate in particular to the possibility
of discretionary decisions as regards judicial appointments and promotions, including the
election of the President of the Supreme Court, case allocation and bonuses. In Bulgaria, the
absence of regular competition for judicial appointments to higher positions, combined with an
extensive use of secondments, creates risks for the independence of the judiciary29
.
Autonomy and independence of the prosecution services as essential elements for the good
functioning of the criminal justice system
While there is no single model in the EU for the institutional set-up for prosecution services,
institutional safeguards are always needed to ensure that the prosecution is sufficiently
autonomous and can carry out effective and impartial investigations and bring cases to Court
free from political pressure. This is not only essential for national and EU criminal law, but
also for many other important questions such as the protection of the EU financial interest and
the fight against hate speech in the digital environment.
Several Member States embarked on reforms to strengthen the independence of their
prosecution service. In Austria, preparatory work continues for a reform of the prosecution
service, with the aim of strengthening its independence. The reform in preparation in Czechia
would establish a fixed term of office for Prosecutor General and other chief prosecutors, and
apply clear conditions for their dismissal. In Bulgaria, the Government has committed, under
the Recovery and Resilience Plan, to establish an effective mechanism for the accountability
and criminal liability of the Prosecutor General and his/her deputies, as well as a judicial review
of prosecutorial decisions not to open an investigation. In Spain, legal amendments were
adopted aiming at an increased transparency of relations between the Government and the
Prosecutor General, while concerns on the coincidence in the term of office of the Prosecutor
General and the Government remain. In Slovakia, the Ministry of Justice is preparing an
28
Recommendations concern EL, CY, MT, AT.
29
Recommendations concern BG, LV, LT, HU.
8
amendment to restrict the power of the Prosecutor General to annul prosecutorial decisions in
individual cases, after concerns were raised over decisions to close several high-level
corruption cases30
.
However, in some Member States, concerns exist regarding the independence and autonomy
of the prosecution services. In Slovenia, concerns have been raised over the impact on the
independent work of prosecutors of the Minister of Interior’s powers to instruct the police in
individual cases. In Poland, concerns regarding the functioning of the prosecution service
persist, with the offices of Minister of Justice and Prosecutor-General occupied by the same
person. Polish courts have also pointed to concerns that the practice of seconding prosecutors
can be considered as a form of demotion and discrimination. In Hungary, the rules on the
removal of the Prosecutor General have been amended, while the GRECO recommendation to
remove the possibility to maintain the Prosecutor General in office after the expiry of his/her
mandate remains unaddressed and the lack of accountability for not opening or closing
investigations is a matter of concern31
.
Disciplinary frameworks and accountability for judges and prosecutors
The CJEU has continued to develop its case law on essential safeguards to ensure that the
disciplinary framework cannot be used as an instrument for political control of judicial
decisions32
. These safeguards include having clear rules that define the conduct that qualifies
as a disciplinary offence and the applicable sanctions. Disciplinary proceedings need to be
carried out with the involvement of an independent body and procedures must fully safeguard
the rights enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, in particular the rights of the defence.
Finally, rules must be in place to ensure that the decisions taken by disciplinary bodies can be
challenged in Court33
.
In some Member States, reforms are ongoing to increase safeguards for judicial independence
in disciplinary proceedings. In Spain, a new disciplinary regime for prosecutors was
established. In Slovenia, amendments are in preparation, on initiative of the judiciary, to
improve the disciplinary framework. In Belgium, standard forms for reporting on disciplinary
action regarding judges and prosecutors have been introduced, with a first consolidated report
on disciplinary procedures to be prepared by the High Council for Justice in the course of 2022.
In other Member States, concerns remained that disciplinary proceedings could be used to
curtail judicial independence. In its Recovery and Resilience Plan, Poland committed to
undertake reforms of the disciplinary regime regarding judges, to dismantle the Disciplinary
Chamber of the Supreme Court, and to create review proceedings for judges affected by
decisions of that Chamber34
. The plan aims to strengthen certain aspects of the independence
of the judiciary. In the meantime, despite rulings of the Court of Justice, the Disciplinary
Chamber continued to decide on cases concerning judges, including by suspending them in
office. In Romania, the application of disciplinary sanctions and the role of the Judicial
Inspection continued generating concerns, though draft legislation now in preparation is
30
Recommendations concern CZ, ES, AT, SK. A relevant milestone is included in the BG RRP.
31
Recommendations concern PL.
32
The Court has recalled this principle most recently in cases referring to the disciplinary chamber of the Polish
Supreme Court (Judgment of 15 July 2021, European Commission v Republic of Poland, C-791/19.) and the
Romanian Judicial Inspection (Judgment of 18 May2021, Asociaţia 'Forumul Judecătorilor din România' and
Others v Inspecţia Judiciară and Others, joined Cases C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, C-355/19 and
C-397/19).
33
CJEU Judgment of 25 July 2018, LM, C-216/18 PPU, para. 67.
34
A number of legislative changes were adopted in June 2022.
9
expected to reform the disciplinary regime. Other accountability mechanisms also require
safeguards. In Croatia, new laws requiring periodic security checks on judges and state
attorneys conducted by the National Security Agency raised concerns. In Slovakia, concerns
remain as regards the regime of criminal liability of judges for ‘abuse of law’. In Slovenia,
rules governing parliamentary inquiries lack safeguards on independence of judges and state
prosecutors35
.
Investing in the quality and efficiency of justice
An efficient justice system manages its caseload and backlog of cases, and delivers its decisions
without undue delay. While there are many differences across and within Member States,
depending on the type of proceedings (e.g. civil and commercial, criminal, administrative) and
on court instances, excessively long proceedings and substantial backlogs undermine the trust
citizens and businesses place in national justice systems and on the effectiveness of the fight
against corruption (see also Section 2.2). Adequate human and financial resources are essential
conditions for the quality and efficiency of justice systems. A number of Member States have
recognised this by allocating additional resources to strengthen the resilience of justice systems
in their national Recovery and Resilience Plans and by investing in the digitalisation of justice.
Investing in human and financial resources and digitalisation of the justice system is essential
to meet the broader efficiency challenges that exist in a number of Member States. In Croatia,
Cyprus, Malta and Portugal initiatives are under way to tackle long-standing challenges related
to the efficiency of the justice system, including as regards lengthy court proceedings. In Italy,
comprehensive civil and criminal justice reforms have been adopted, aiming at improving the
quality and efficiency of the justice system, including backlogs and length of proceedings. In
Greece, the new legislation on the organisation of the courts and the status of judges has been
recently adopted to address the challenges regarding the efficiency and the quality of justice.
In Hungary, a new law on pecuniary compensation for delay in civil proceedings entered into
force, providing for compensation in case of violation of the fundamental right to have civil
proceedings completed within a reasonable time. In Ireland, a draft law establishing a
compensation scheme for cases of excessive length of court proceedings has been proposed.
Part of ensuring the long-term resilience of the justice system is to ensure the attractiveness of
judicial professions, including through adequate remuneration, and to minimise the number of
open vacancies for judges, prosecutors and court staff. In Belgium, efforts were made to
increase the resources allocated to the justice system. In Germany, an extension of the ‘Pact
for the Rule of Law’ has been announced, to provide additional resources for the judiciary and
digitalisation, but longer-term challenges remain regarding recruitments and the level of
salaries of judges. In Portugal and France, the Government is taking steps to address the
shortage of human resources allocated to the justice system, although challenges remain. In
Slovenia, the Government decreased, without consultation with judicial authorities, the
previously agreed budget for courts, the Judicial Council and the State Prosecution, and the
Judicial Council launched procedures for constitutional review of judges’ salaries. In Denmark,
the limited expenditure on the justice system as a percentage of GDP and low number of judges
remains a longer-term challenge, in particular in view of ensuring efficient case handling36
.
Initiatives to improve the digitalisation of justice continue in many Member States, often
drawing on the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is important to ensure that digital
35
Recommendations concern HR, PT, RO, SI, SK. As regards PL, the disciplinary regime for judges has been
the subject of infringement proceedings. A relevant milestone is included in the national RRP.
36
Recommendations concern BE, DK, DE, FR, MT.
10
tools are effective in practice. In Belgium, Bulgaria Malta, challenges remain, but
improvements are foreseen in the respective RRPs. In Italy, digitalisation is further progressing
at civil courts, while challenges remain at criminal courts and prosecution offices. Member
States with projects under way to further improve the level of digitalisation of justice include
Sweden, the Netherlands, Latvia, Portugal, Estonia, Denmark, Austria, Romania, Slovenia,
Spain and Finland37
.
Lawyers as key actors for judicial systems based on the rule of law
Lawyers and their professional associations play a fundamental role in strengthening the rule
of law and ensuring the protection of fundamental rights, including the right of a fair trial.
Some Member States took steps towards facilitating access to a lawyer. In Latvia, the Supreme
Court affirmed that lawyers’ participation in court proceedings is essential for ensuring the
right to a fair trial and ruled in favour of lawyers’ right to access information to exercise their
functions. In Luxembourg, legislation to make legal aid more accessible was developed jointly
bythe Ministry of Justice and the Bar Association. In Lithuania, a reform of the legal aid system
is being prepared. In Ireland, high litigation costs and shortcomings within the legal aid system
continue to raise concerns, while work is ongoing to address those challenges38
.
One essential element of the freedom of exercise of legal professions is respect of the
confidentiality of the relationship with clients. Council of Europe recommendations make clear
that any exceptions to the principle of secrecy must be compatible with rule of law principles.
In Lithuania, questions regarding the respect for professional secrecy of lawyers are pending
before the European Court of Human Rights.
2.2 Anti-corruption framework
Corruption is detrimental to the rule of law and to citizens’ and businesses’ trust in public
institutions. A comprehensive approach to fighting corruption must rely on a combination of
preventive and repressive measures. This requires a robust legal and institutional framework,
sufficient administrative and judicial capacity, as well as the political will to enforce, including
effective investigation and prosecution. On the prevention side, reliable and effective integrity
measures include preventing and addressing conflicts of interest, ensuring the transparency of
lobbying, asset and interest disclosure systems, an effective protection of whistleblowers, as
well as transparency of political party financing.
Corruption perceptions across the EU
The results of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)39
show that ten Member States are in the
top twenty of the countries perceived as least corrupt in the world while the average score of
the EU is globally good and has improved in comparison to last year40
. Some Member States
have improved their score compared to previous years, whereas others continue to score
significantly lower than the other EU Member States.
37
Recommendations concern FR, IT, NL, FI.
38
Recommendations concern IE, LT, LU.
39
Published annually by Transparency International: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021
40
As last year, six Member States (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany) score
80/100 or above on the index, and a further five (Austria, Estonia, Ireland, Belgium and France) score above
72/100.
11
The 2022 Eurobarometers on corruption41
show that corruption remains a serious concern for
EU citizens and businesses in the EU. Almost seven in ten Europeans (68%) believe that
corruption is widespread in their country and over four in ten Europeans (41%) consider that
the level of corruption has increased in their country. In the meantime, only 31% of respondents
are of the opinion that their government’s efforts to combat corruption are effective. In
addition, more than six in ten European companies (63%) consider that the problem of
corruption is widespread in their country and a majority of companies (51%) think that it is
unlikely that corrupt people or businesses in their country would be caught, or reported to the
police or prosecutors.
National anti-corruption strategies and their implementation
Member States are required by international law to maintain effective and coordinated anti-
corruption policies42
. The most common way to facilitate this is to set up and implement a
national anti-corruption strategy43
. While having such strategies in place is not a requirement
in itself, they are important for political commitments to be translated into concrete actions, to
ensure that legislative or institutional gaps are addressed in a coherent, comprehensive and
coordinated manner and to adapt anti-corruption efforts to an evolving landscape44
. Almost all
Member States currently have in place national anti-corruption strategies, which they regularly
evaluate and revise. Since July 2021, Croatia, Romania, Greece, Lithuania and Malta have
revised or adopted strategies and accompanying action plans and Germany, Czechia, Italy and
Latvia are currently revising their respective strategies. The implementation process has led to
important reform proposals in some Member States. In Portugal, a legislative package aimed
at fighting and preventing corruption in both the public and private sectors has been adopted,
and in Finland revisions of the criminal law anti-corruption legislation are ongoing45
.
Strengthening the capacity of institutions and the legal framework to combat corruption
Member States have extensive legislation in place providing their criminal justice system with
tools to fight corruption. Several Member States continued their efforts to fill legislative gaps
and bring existing frameworks in line with international anti-corruption standards46
and EU
law47
. Poland increased criminal sanctions for corruption in public life and Greece strengthened
41
Special Eurobarometer 523 on Corruption (2022) & Flash Eurobarometer 507 on Businesses’ attitudes towards
corruption in the EU (2022). The Eurobarometer data on business attitudes towards corruption as is updated
every second year. The Eurobarometer data on corruption perception and experience of citizens and businesses
as reported last year is updated every second year. The previous data sets are the Special Eurobarometer 502
(2020) and the Flash Eurobarometer 482 (2019).
42
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) obliges States Parties, in accordance with the
fundamental principles of their legal systems, to develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated
anticorruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law,
proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability. All
Member States and the EU are parties to the Convention.
43
See also The Kuala Lumpur Statement on Anti-Corruption Strategies.
44
As mentioned in last year’s report, clear and measurable objectives, adequate resources, dedicated support and
monitoring of implementation, regular evaluations and well-defined responsibilities for specialised
institutions, as well as a strong involvement of relevant stakeholders, are important elements for such strategies
to be effectively implemented and lead to tangible results (COM(2021) 700 final, p. 11).
45
Recommendations concern LV, LT, PT, SI, FI.
46
Primarily the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and its Civil Law Convention on
Corruption; the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions; and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.
47
EU legislation with an important impact on facilitating the fight against corruption includes rules on the
criminalisation of corruption, asset freezing and confiscation, protection of the EU financial interests,
standards to protect whistleblowers, revised rules against money laundering, notably by setting up beneficial
12
the definition of active and passive bribery. Reforms of substantive or procedural criminal law
are under discussion in other Member States. Finland is planning to criminalise trading in
influence, while Slovakia aims at widening the definition of bribery in its national law.
Germany committed to strengthening criminal sanctions for bribery by members of Parliament.
Specific legislative gaps remain in other Member States. In Sweden, shortcomings in the legal
definition of foreign bribery have led to limited prosecutions and final judgements48
.
Fighting corruption relies both on having a robust anti-corruption legal framework as well as
on ensuring its effective implementation. The capacity of law enforcement, prosecution
authorities and the judiciary to enforce anti-corruption criminal law provisions is essential to
effectively combat corruption. This rests on the competences and autonomy of the bodies
responsible, and on their specialisation, analytical capacity, and resources. Access to relevant
information and interconnection of registries is also key to enable these authorities to carry out
complex financial investigations. Successful anti-corruption investigations and prosecutions
also rely on efficient cooperation between law enforcement authorities and other agencies, such
as financial intelligence units as well as tax, audit and competition authorities.
In some Member States, structural and organisational changes took place or are being
considered with a view to increasing the capacity of the anti-corruption authorities. In
Denmark, a new national investigative unit was established to improve the approach to serious
crime, including complex corruption cases. In Bulgaria, reforms are envisaged to restructure
the Anti-Corruption Commission, while the specialised judicial authorities have been
abolished. At the same time, such reforms need to prioritise the effective investigation of
corruption, in particular with regard to high-level corruption cases49
.
Many Member States have taken steps to increase the capacity of the prosecution authorities
responsible for the fight against corruption, for example through additional resources (Ireland,
Latvia) or extra training (Estonia, Spain). Resource limitations are cited by prosecution services
in many Member States as a challenge, sometimes exacerbated by additional shortcomings. In
Romania, seniority requirements are seen as obstacles to the recruitment of specialised
prosecutors. In Luxembourg and Portugal, the lack of resources has been seen to lead to delays
in prosecuting cases. In Slovakia, allegations of politically motivated decisions to open
corruption investigations risk eroding law enforcement cooperation and the effectiveness of the
fight against corruption as well as the public’s trust in the integrity of the institutions. In
Slovenia, concerns were raised regarding the operational autonomy of the police in corruption
investigations50
.
Eliminating obstacles to criminal investigation, prosecution and the application of dissuasive
sanctions for corruption
Procedural shortcomings can severely obstruct the investigation and prosecution of corruption
cases and undermine the effectiveness of the fight against corruption. Examples include
excessively cumbersome or unclear provisions on lifting immunities, and short statutes of
limitations, which can prevent the finalisation of complex cases, in particular if combined with
other factors contributing to lengthy proceedings. Such obstacles can be particularly harmful
ownership registries of companies, and further steps to help the exchange of financial information and to speed
up financial investigations.
48
Recommendations concern FI, SE.
49
Recommendations concern BG.
50
Recommendations concern CY, IT, FR, LU, RO, SI, SK.
13
for high-level and complex corruption cases and may create a risk of impunity, depriving anti-
corruption efforts of their deterrent effects.
Some Member States introduced measures to reduce obstacles to effective investigation and
prosecution. New measures in Portugal seek to increase the effectiveness of the judicial system
in handling corruption cases and to accelerate the work of the prosecution, including by
extending the statute of limitation for corruption offences. In Lithuania, the legislative
framework was changed to enable a wider use of digital tools51
.
An excessive length of criminal proceedings in corruption cases may prevent cases from
reaching a timely conclusion, hampering the establishment of a robust track record of final
judgements. In Malta, while increased resources have been allocated to investigation and
prosecution overall, investigations into high-level corruption cases remain lengthy. Results in
terms of final judgments are still lacking. Delays in prosecuting high-level corruption cases
have also been raised in Czechia. In Spain, the length of corruption investigations and
prosecutions remains a concern, in particular with regard to complex, high-level corruption
cases52
.
In some Member States, immunity for corruption offences for members of the Government has
been an issue of concern. Croatia has recently adopted amendments to remove the immunity
of members of Government for corruption crimes. Concerns exist in Poland on the broad scope
of immunities of senior executives who are also members of Parliament, and on provisions
granting impunity for public officials who commit the crime of abuse of office53
.
Some Member States are continuing to consolidate their track record of investigating,
prosecuting and sanctionging high-level corruption54
. In Austria, investigations into high-level
political corruption are subject to close scrutiny, including through a parliamentary
investigation committee. In Romania, the effectiveness of the investigation and sanctioning of
high-level corruption further improved, including by advancing on cases that had been pending
for years for procedural reasons. France has seen tangible results continuing in high-level
corruption cases, despite challenges linked to the limited resources as well as structural
weaknesses.
In other Member States, a solid track record of tackling high-level corruption cases, including
via efficient investigations and prosecutions and the application of dissuasive sanctions by final
convictions, remains to be established. In Bulgaria, a robust track-record of final convictions
in high-level cases of corruption is still lacking. In Greece, a limited number of prosecutions
related to corruption were taken forward, although progress on final decisions remains to be
established. In Hungary, some new high-level corruption cases have been opened, however the
lack of a robust track record of investigations, prosecutions and final judgements of corruption
allegations concerning high-level officials and their immediate circle remains a serious
concern55
.
51
In the context of the RRP.
52
Recommendations concern CZ, ES, MT. A milestone on reducing backlogs and length of proceedings is also
included in the HR RRP.
53
Recommendations concern PL.
54
As noted in the 2020 Rule of Law Report, the lack of uniform, up to date and consolidated statistics across all
Member States makes it difficult to track the comparative success of the investigation and prosecution of
corruption offences. The assessment is based on the data provided by Member States.
55
Recommendations concern BG, EL, HU.
14
Strengthening the corruption prevention and integrity framework
Transparent and accountable governance and integrity frameworks are key to prevent
corruption at all levels of the public administration and government. Member States have
continued taking measures to strengthen the corruption prevention and integrity frameworks in
the past year, including to update ethical standards, better enforce or revise rules on asset and
interest disclosure, incompatibilities and conflicts of interest, strengthen internal control
mechanisms, and regulate lobbying and revolving doors.
Fostering integrity in public life and preventing conflicts of interest
Conflicts of interest arise when a public official has a private or professional interest that could
interfere with the impartial and objective performance of their duties56
. To prevent such
conflicts of interest, most Member States have measures in place covering a wide range of
elected and appointed public officials. Challenges have been identified in a number of Member
States and some are taking steps to strengthen their frameworks. In Spain, the Office for
Conflicts of Interest has stepped up its role in providing ethics guidance and training activities
to public officials. In Slovakia, discussions are ongoing to set up an Office for the Protection
of the Public Interest, which would oversee the implementation of new rules on conflict of
interest. In Malta, integrity rules in the public service, including within the police, were
updated. In the Netherlands, work is ongoing in relation to the integrity framework of the
police, with new structures being set up. In Romania, an increased focus on integrity of law
enforcement has led to positive results. Bulgaria has continued deploying measures aiming at
improving integrity of specific sectors, including the police and the judiciary. In Ireland, an
upcoming legislative reform aims to strengthen the Standards in Public Office Commission so
that it can better enforce the integrity framework. In Estonia, guidelines on conflicts of interests
exist but are not subject to an effective verification and enforcement mechanism 57
.
Senior government officials and Members of Parliament are often subject to specific integrity
rules. Most Member States have in place codes of conduct and rules on preventing conflicts of
interest and incompatibilities with other activities. It is important that the practical
implementation of these rules is subject to regular verification and evaluation. Developments
in the past year include strengthened rules on extra-parliamentary work and activities of
Members of Parliament, such as participation in boards or committees of companies in
Luxembourg. The Commission for Ethics of the National Assembly in France has been active
in issuing opinions and verifying financial statements to detect conflicts of interest. In some
Member States, improvements have been identified or are ongoing. In the Netherlands, a Code
of Conduct for ministers and state secretaries is in preparation. Finland is preparing legislation
to strenghten the rules on conflicts of interest for public officials and Ministers respectively.
Belgium lacks a broad integrity policy for Ministers and their private offices as well as for
Members of Parliament and existing codes of conduct continue to have gaps. Czechia lacks
Codes of Ethics to govern the integrity framework for members of Parliament. In Italy, a
proposal on conflict of interest for political office holders, including parliamentarians, has been
pending in Parliament for several years58
.
56
Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec(2000)10 on Codes of conduct for public officials.
57
Recommendations concern BG, EE, IE, SK.
58
Recommendations concern BE, CZ, NL.
15
- Lobbying and revolving doors
Lobbying is a legitimate act of political participation59
. However, it needs to be accompanied
by strong requirements of transparency and integrity to ensure accountability and inclusiveness
in decision-making60
(see also Section 2.4). Some Member States have revised their
frameworks to ensure more transparency whereas in others, rules are still missing or could be
improved. Cyprus adopted rules on lobbying and publically-accessible registers on lobbyists
and meetings. Germany’s new lobby register at the federal level entered into force in 2022 and
the introduction of a ‘legislative footprint’ has been announced.
In other Member States (Belgium, Croatia, Italy, Spain, and Latvia) discussions on new
lobbying legislation are ongoing. In Estonia, guidelines for lobbying exist and discussions on
legislative transparency and integrity with regard to lobbying have taken place. In Austria, a
working group mandated over two years ago to propose a lobbying reform has not yet been
able to find agreement. In France, there are concerns about the consistency of application of
lobbying rules to all types of lobbying actors. Dedicated regulation on lobbying is still missing
or could be improved in a number of Member States61
.
Another area under public scrutiny in many Member States is the regulation and enforcement
of rules on ‘revolving doors’ between public and private functions. Croatia extended the
cooling-off period for appointments of officials to management posts in relevant companies
from 12 to 18 months. In the Netherlands, the government announced its intentions to introduce
stricter post-employment restrictions. In several Member States, rules on revolving doors show
gaps or shortcomings. Germany’s rules on post-employment restrictions and cooling-off
periods remain fragmented and inconsistent for different functions. In Sweden, the rules on
revolving doors for top executive functions in the Government are overall limited in scope and
the government has launched an evaluation of the current framework. In Denmark, there are
no rules on revolving doors for ministers. In Czechia, cooling off periods covering civil
servants and government members remain limited62
.
- Asset and interest disclosure
Asset and interest declarations by public officials support public sector transparency and
accountability, to promote integrity and prevent corruption. All Member States have some rules
in place to ensure that categories of public sector officials are subject to asset and interest
disclosure obligations. However, these vary in the scope, transparency and accessibility of
disclosed information, as well as in the level and effectiveness of verification and enforcement.
While in some Member States reform efforts are progressing, there are still challenges that
need to be addressed. In Portugal, the asset declaration obligations on political and senior
public office holders were extended and strengthened. While the body in charge of monitoring
and verifications is not yet operational, efforts are ongoing to address this. In Romania, the
electronic submission of asset and interest disclosures is mandatory since January 2022, though
some challenges exist with regard to the effective verification of the submitted data. In Greece,
while asset declarations are filed by a great number of officials, only a limited proportion are
verified on their accuracy. In Hungary, concerns remain about the lack of systematic checks
59
OECD (2021) Lobbying in the 21st
century.
60
OECD (2010), Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying;
Council of Europe standards on lobbying transparency, Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)2.
61
Recommendations concern BE, DK, DE, EE, IE, ES, FR, HR, IT, LV, LU, HU, NL, PL, RO, SK. Relevant
milestones are also included in the RRP for CZ.
62
Recommendations concern BE, DK, DE, IE, NL, SE.
16
and insufficient oversight of asset declarations. In Belgium, the verification and transparency
of such declarations remains an issue of concern, as the content of the asset declarations can
only be assessed in the course of a criminal investigation. In Austria, members of Parliament
are not obliged to disclose assets, interests, debts and liabilities63
.
- Whistleblower protection
Encouraging and protecting those who disclose wrongdoing plays an essential role in the
detection and prevention of corruption, both in the public and the private sector. The
transposition of Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on whistleblower protection64
has triggered a
number of Member States to adopt legislation, while many are still in the process of revising
existing national legislation or introducing new rules and streamlining the institutional setting
for handling whistleblower reports.
Political party financing
Political party financing is an important risk area for corruption and several Member States
have adopted or are considering reforms to increase transparency and oversight. In Poland, the
rules on political party financing have been revised to increase transparency. In the
Netherlands, discussions continue on protecting political parties against foreign interference.
In Estonia, draft legislation being prepared would aim to increase the powers of the Political
Parties’ Financing Surveillance Committee. In Austria, Parliament is in the process of adopting
reforms to address long-standing issues with the current system, including as regards the
powers of its Court of Audit. Denmark aims to review and amend the political party financing
system, although with no concrete timeline. Challenges exist in other Member States, such as
Italy, where the practice of channelling donations to political parties through political
foundations poses an obstacle to public accountability because of the absence of a single
electronic register65
.
Investor citizenship and investor residence schemes
Investor citizenship and investor residence schemes create corruption risks and raise concerns
about security, money laundering and tax evasion66
. The Commission considers that the
granting of EU citizenship in return for pre-determined payments or investments, without any
genuine link to the Member State concerned, undermines the essence of EU citizenship and is
in breach of EU law67
. As a consequence, the Commission called on Member States to repeal
investor citizenship schemes and take appropriate measures to address the risks of investor
residence schemes68
. Bulgaria repealed its investor citizenship scheme in March 2022. Cyprus
had already stopped receiving new applications under its scheme in November 2020 and it has
now also stopped handling applications. Malta suspended its scheme for Russian and
Belarusian nationals on 2 March 2022, but continues to operate it for other nationals69
.
63
Recommendations concern CZ, IE, EL, CY, HU, PL, AT, PT, SK. Relevant milestones are also included in
the HR RRP.
64
Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of persons who
report breaches of Union law (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17).
65
Recommendations concern DK, IT, AT.
66
Commission report on ‘Investor Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the EU’ adopted on 23 January 2019,
COM(2019) 12 final.
67
The Commission launched infringement procedures regarding the schemes operated by Cyprus and Malta.
68
Recommendation in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in relation to CBI and RBI schemes
adopted on 28 March 2022, C(2022) 2028. Residence byinvestment schemes are in use in a total of 19 Member
States: Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia.
69
The Commission has continued infringement proceedings against Malta.
17
Countering the impact of the pandemic on corruption
The trend of heightened COVID-19 related corruption risks lasts since 2020, with areas at risk
continuing to include issuance of COVID-19 vaccination, tests or recovery certificates and the
procurement of medical protective equipment. The increased use of accelerated and simplified
procurement procedures often resulted in direct awards or non-competitive procurement
procedures. To detect and prevent corruption in such procedures, Member States stepped up
transparency and monitoring. The responsible authorities in several Member States carried out
targeted audits (Austria, Czechia, Slovenia and Portugal) or monitoring activities (Lithuania).
In Belgium, the Court of Audit released a special dashboard to increase transparency with
regard to government support measures.
2.3 Media pluralism and media freedom
Independent and free media are the watchdogs of democracy. A free and pluralistic media
environment is instrumental to defending the rule of law by holding power and institutions to
account. Political or state pressure or control over the media undermines both freedom of
speech and expression and the freedom to seek, receive and impart information. Conflict of
interests and a highly concentrated market dominated by only a few players might also have
the effect of undermining freedom of the media. In the EU, Member States have a positive
obligation to guarantee an enabling environment for journalists, protect their safety and
promote media pluralism and freedom. Challenges in this area identified by the previous rule
of law reports have led to several recent EU initiatives, including a recommendation on the
safety of journalists and a package of measures to address abusive lawsuits against public
participation.
The Media Pluralism Monitor
The Media Pluralism Monitor assesses the risks to media freedom and pluralism in all Member
States, focusing on four areas – basic protection of media freedom, market plurality, political
independence and the social inclusiveness of media70
. The latest results of the Monitor (MPM
2022) reveal that there has been no major change across these areas since 2021 though there
has been some variance in specific indicators within those general areas. The indicator relating
to the journalistic profession and its protection has registered a slight deterioration. There has
been an improvement in the indicator relating to transparency of media ownership following
the implementation by several Member States of EU legislation regulating the matter. News
media concentration retains its very high risk level across the continent while there has been
no progress in terms of political independence, which remains at medium risk. For the first
time, the Media Pluralism Monitor has introduced an overall ranking of Member States
clustered into five levels of risk, in which Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania
and Slovenia are considered to be high risk countries.
70
The Media Pluralism Monitor is an important source for the Commission’s Rule of Law Reports. It is a
scientific and holistic tool that documents the health of media frameworks, detailing threats to media pluralism
and freedom in Member States and some candidate countries. It is co-financed by the EU and has been
implemented, in an independent manner and on a regular basis, by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media
Freedom, since 2013-14. The Commission has also used other sources, such as Reporters Without Borders’
World Press Freedom Index and the Council of Europe’s Platform to promote the protection of journalism and
safety of journalists, as referenced in the country chapters.
18
Strengthening the independent functioning of media regulators
National media regulators play an important role in upholding media pluralism. To ensure this,
they need to be functionally and effectively independent and sufficiently resourced, and
exercise their powers impartially and transparently. All Member States have legislation in place
setting out the competences and independence of media regulators. The Audiovisual Media
Services Directive (AVMSD)71
revised in 2018 includes a list of requirements – independence
from government, impartiality, transparency, accountability, resources, appointment and
dismissal and appeal mechanisms – which Member States must ensure with regard to their
media authorities. Since the publication of the 2021 Rule of Law Report, Cyprus, Estonia,
France, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Slovenia, have followed other Member States and
adopted provisions to enhance the independence of media authorities and/or extend the
authorities’ competences over new domains. Reforms are pending in other Member States.
In some Member States, despite the formal update of the legal framework, concerns persist
about its effectiveness or the functional independence of regulators in practice. Some of these
concerns relate to possible undue political influence over the nomination process or the
functioning of regulators, others to insufficient resources. In Hungary, where sufficient funding
and a detailed legal framework for the establishment and operation of the Media Authority are
in place, its functional independence needs to be strengthened. In Slovenia, questions persist
on whether the new legal framework would ensure independence from political interference,
and fully implementing the extensive competences with the available resources remains a
challenge. In Spain, new legislation attributes new competences to the Audiovisual regulator,
but concerns on its resources remain. In Romania, concerns about the functioning and budget
of the National Audiovisual Council persist, notably in view of the funds required to improve
IT systems72
.
Improvements and obstacles related to the transparency of media ownership
Transparency of media ownership is directly linked to media freedom and pluralism, in
particular when ownership results in direct or indirect control of or significant influence over
the content provided. Information on ownership allows users to make better informed
judgements about the content. European standards73
encourage Member States to adopt specific
measures in this area, which is also provided for under EU legislation74
. Since the last report,
new legislation enhancing the transparency of media ownership or improving public
availability of media ownership information has been adopted in Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia,
Greece, Poland, Portugal and Spain. Laws to enhance transparency in media ownership are
being considered in Bulgaria and Slovakia. Practical measures to enhance transparency have
been taken in Lithuania, where a specific Information System of Producers and Disseminators
of Public Information was launched.
The implementation of rules is facing particular challenges in some Member States. In Czechia,
rules to enhance transparency of beneficial ownership of media outlets enacted in 2021 still
require full implementation and concerns persist with regard to the lack of full transparency of
71
Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of 14 November 2018.
72
Recommendations concern ES, HU.
73
Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)11 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on media pluralism and
transparency of media ownership.
74
Directive (EU) 2010/13/EU of 10 March 2010, Article 5(2), as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of 14
November 2018. General (non-sectoral) obligations of transparency of beneficial ownership also exist in the
Anti-Money Laundering Directives (Directive (EU) 2018/843 of 30 May 2018 and Directive (EU) 2015/849
of 20 May 2015).
19
ownership and conflict of interests. Challenges remain on transparency of media ownership in
the Netherlands and France. In Slovenia, there are still challenges in identifying the ultimate
ownership structure of certain media outlets75
.
Safeguarding media from political pressure and influence
Vulnerabilities and risks to the rule of law increase when media is subject to political pressure
and political influence, notably from public authorities and the ruling parties, undermining
media independence. Transparent and equitable rules for the allocation of state advertising, and
safeguards to prevent the politicisation of public service media, have both been identified as of
particular importance. Another way by which political pressure can be exercised is linked to
licensing.
- Mitigating risks related to lack of transparency and fairness in the allocation of state
advertising
State advertising includes all uses of the budget of the state, at all levels, or of state-controlled
companies for the purposes of advertising and campaigns. It is important that allocations are
transparent and take place on the basis of fair criteria, to prevent the risk that state advertising
is used as a means of political influence and of leveraging funds to favour certain media outlets.
While issues remain in several Member States, developments in a few others have sought to
address specific concerns about the transparency of state advertising. In Croatia, updated rules
covering transparency of state advertising were adopted, with some remaining room for
improvement. While not enshrined in legislation, Malta and Cyprus have adopted guidelines,
the former establishing standards for the disbursement of government advertising and
promotional material, and the latter relating to awareness-raising and advertising campaigns by
the government press and information office. In Austria, the Government has announced a
reflection process given concerns about high spending on state advertising, the fairness and
transparency of its allocation, and political influence in the process76
.
- Safeguarding the independence of public service media
Rules on the independent governance and editorial independence of public service media are
key to preventing political interference in this important media sector. While the funding of
public service broadcasting and funding granted to broadcasting organisations for the
fulfilment of this public service remains a prerogative of each Member State insofar as such
funding does not unduly affect trade and competition in the EU77
, European standards and
guiding principles exist on independence, the regulatory and policy framework, funding,
appointments, accountability, management, transparency and openness78
. All Member States
have legislative and institutional systems to regulate public service media and some are looking
to strengthen the independence of their public service broadcaster. In Bulgaria, a revision of
the law geared at defining in more detail the public service remit and related financing is under
consideration. In Romania, a reform of the law on the public broadcasting and radio companies
aiming at a more independent and professionalised management is being discussed. In
Luxembourg, a draft law to reinforce the independence of public service media has been
presented to Parliament. In some Member States, however, existing rules have not sufficiently
guaranteed independence. Issues of concern include the risk of politicisation of appointments
and dismissals of managers and board members in Czechia, Slovakia and Cyprus, the
75
Recommendations concern CZ, FR.
76
Recommendations concern BG, HR, HU, AT.
77
Protocol (No 29) on the system of public broadcasting in the Member States, annexed to the Treaty on
European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
78
Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1 on public service media governance.
20
independence and governance of public service media in Malta, and the practical challenges
faced under the existing rules in limiting political influence in Slovenia. In Poland, concerns
over the independence of public service media remain, including over safeguards for
appointments to executive positions. In Greece, while public service media are regulated by a
strong legal framework, there are concerns with regards to potential political influence in the
appointment of board members. In Hungary, public service media operates in a complex
institutional system amidst concerns about editorial independence79
.
- Political pressure and influence on the media through licensing restrictions and
decisions
While the European Convention on Human Rights expressly states that the right to freedom of
expression shall not prevent States from submitting broadcasting and television enterprises to
a licensing system, the exercise of this prerogative needs to take account of the plurality of the
media landscape and be based on objective and transparent procedures and criteria. In Poland,
a proposal for legislative amendments geared at prohibiting broadcasting concessions to
operators controlled by persons registered outside the EEA was ultimately vetoed by the
President. However, two television stations faced particularly long administrative proceedings
for the extension of their licenses by the regulator80
.
Access to information as a necessary prerequisite for the media, civil society and public trust
The right of access to information held by public authorities is fundamental for journalists to
do their work, as well as for civil society and citizens at large. Since the publication of the last
Rule of Law report, new legislation came into force in the Netherlands making access to public
information broader and swifter. In Finland, steps are being taken to reform the Act on the
Openness of Government Activities to extend the constitutionally-guaranteed access to
documents. In Spain, legislative work is ongoing to strengthen access to information through
a reform of the law on official secrets. In Denmark, political discussions are under way to
consider removing some restrictions on the right to access information. In other Member States
some practical or legal concerns remain. In Belgium recent legislation introducing new refusal
grounds and delays in treating public document requests might affect the right of access to
information and public documents. In Lithuania, there are concerns that the authorities’
interpretation of data protection rules has led to restrictions on journalists’ access to
information. In Austria, challenges persist in relation to the lack of a comprehensive and
enforceable legal framework for access to documents and public information, and draft
legislation has not progressed. In Malta, journalists continue to face obstacles when requesting
access to information held by public authorities. In Hungary, access to public information
continued to be hindered under the ‘state of danger’81
.
Threats against the safety of journalists
Journalists continue to face threats and obstacles to their work, including physical attacks
reported in several Member States. In 2021, both the Council of Europe Platform to Promote
the Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists and the Mapping Media Freedom
Platform identified a significant increase in alerts82
which also includes an increase in online
attacks. Violations have included verbal harassment, legal threats, physical assault, attacks on
79
Recommendations concern CZ, CY, HU, MT, PL, RO, SI, SK.
80
Recommendations concern PL. An infringement procedure is ongoing regarding HU.
81
Recommendations concern BE, DK, DE, EE, ES, LT, LU, MT, AT, FI.
82
The Council of Europe’s Platform shows a 42% increase in alerts while the MMF Platform registered a 72%
increase in alerts in EU Member States between 2020 and 2021, with a sizeable percentage of the 2021 alerts
related to online harassment and attacks during COVID-related protests.
21
property, incitement, smear campaigns and censorship. The 2021 Commission
Recommendation on the safety of journalists includes measures relating to effective and
impartial investigation and prosecution of crimes, independent response and support
mechanisms, access to venues and information, safety during demonstrations, training and
online safety and digital empowerment.
Some Member States have taken or stepped up existing measures to improve the safety of
journalists. In France, legislation recognised the role of journalists in demonstrations and a
liaison committee between the Ministry of the Interior and the press now enables permanent
dialogue on safety in protests or demonstrations. In the Netherlands, the Government has
continued to enhance, fund and develop the ‘PersVeilig’ platform and to promote close
cooperation between prosecutors, the police and media stakeholders. In Germany, Länder
authorities, the Press Council and other media stakeholders are currently discussing an update
the existing principles of conduct for the media and the police to address the safety of
journalists during protests. In Greece, threats and physical attacks have been frequently
reported and the Government has recently agreed a Memorandum of Understanding on the
protection of journalists. In other Member States more determined efforts would be needed to
address the situation. In Croatia, the professional environment for journalists is impacted by
verbal aggressions against journalists, including by politicians. In Slovenia, a hostile
environment, online harassment of and threats against journalists are growing sources of
concern. In Slovakia, the adoption of proposed legislation on the protection of journalists has
been postponed83
.
Criminal trials continue in the cases of journalists murdered in the EU. In Malta, an alleged
mastermind of the assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia has been indicted on
charges of complicity in murder and criminal association and criminal proceedings are
ongoing. The separate report of the public inquiry into the assassination was published in July
2021, finding that the State and its entities had failed to fully protect the journalist from the real
and immediate risks, and had failed to act to prevent her assassination. The report established
a set of recommendations relating to the rule of law, including the media landscape in the
country. In Slovakia, the trial related to the assassination of Jan Kuciak and his fiancee Martina
Kusnirova is ongoing, while in the Netherlands, the trial related to the murder of journalist
Peter R. de Vries has started. The murder of journalist Giorgios Karaivaz in April 2021 is under
investigation by the authorities in Greece.
Legal threats and abusive court proceedings against public participation
Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) are a particular form of harassment
used against journalists and rights defenders engaged in public participation on matters of
public interest. This phenomenon has been gaining ground in the EU. Effective safeguards are
needed to prevent such harassment from silencing journalists and create a chilling effect on
media freedom and freedom of expression. Defamation is one of the most common grounds on
which SLAPPs are brought against journalists.
In order to address the threat of SLAPPs, some Member States started debating or considering
introducing procedural safeguards and/or are in the process of revising their defamation laws.
In Lithuania, legislative amendments have been prepared to allow for the early dismissal of
such cases, as well as revising the criminal liability for defamation. In Ireland, the Department
of Justice initiated a review which led to recommendations looking at a new mechanism against
SLAPP allowing for early dismissal. In Malta, the Government has proposed legislative
amendments to reform certain procedural aspects of the defamation law. In Italy, while prison
83
Recommendations concern EL, HR, SI, SK.
22
sentences for defamation have largely been abolished following a landmark Constitutional
Court ruling in 2021, the increasing prevalence of SLAPP cases and the combination of
criminal and civil defamation raises concerns. Amendments in Slovakia to reduce the
punishment for defamation are still pending. In Croatia, the number of cases of abusive
litigation targeting journalists remains high, threatening the existence of smaller, local media
outlets and freelance journalists. There continue to be a number of examples of such lawsuits
against journalists by politicians or public officials, including judges. In Poland, the news
media community continues to be exposed to threats stemming from strategic lawsuits against
public participation that appear to target mainly journalists scrutinising Government actions84
.
2.4 Other institutional issues linked to checks and balances
Institutional checks and balances are integral to the rule of law in a democracy. They provide
a system of mutual control, ensuring that the power exercised by one state authority is subject
to the scrutiny of others. While the model of checks and balances may vary between Member
States according to their legal and constitutional traditions, they all need to be subject to such
a system to ensure the respect for the rule of law and democratic norms. Civil society
organisations, and independent authorities such as equality bodies, the Ombudsperson and
National Human Rights Institutions are an indispensable element in the system of checks and
balances in a healthy democracy, and attempts to restrict their operating space can present a
threat to the rule of law.
Quality and inclusiveness of the legislative process
Following the trend noted in the 2020 and 2021 Rule of Law Reports, a number of Member
States have continued to improve the quality of the legislative process. Improving stakeholder
participation, including for civil society organisations, can benefit the quality of legislation as
well as the transparency of the process. Bulgaria adopted new rules to improve the law-making
process while Spain is undertaking initiatives to increase public participation in policy-making.
In Estonia, efforts are focused on the creation of new digital platforms for public participation
in the decision-making process. The practice of nationwide public consultations in France was
further reinforced and extended to other fields, including the justice system. A draft
constitutional revision aiming to introduce a legislative initiative for citizens has been
presented in Luxembourg.
In a number of Member States, the lack of a formal framework for the consultation of
stakeholders or their insufficient application in practice continue to raise concerns. In Cyprus
and Malta, there is no formalised process for public consultations and they play a limited part
in policy-making. In Greece, public consultation on draft legislation is often organised too late
for input by civil society organisations and the public to have an impact. In Luxembourg and
Slovakia, concerns regarding the overall inclusiveness of the legislative process persist. In
Latvia, there are some concerns about the limited involvement of civil society organisations at
local level. Poland made a commitment under its Recovery and Resilience Plan to adopt
measures that would ensure a better and more stable regulatory framework. In Hungary, the
lack of public consultation, coupled with an accelerated legislative process, has further
weakened the quality of the regulatory environment. In Romania, concerns remain regarding
the regular use of Government emergency ordinances as well as the practical realities of public
consultations, in particular on the effective follow-up of proposals submitted by the civil
society85
.
84
Recommendations concern IE, HR, IT.
85
Recommendations concern EE, CY, LV, LU, PT, RO.
23
Lessons learned from the use of emergency measures and the COVID-19 pandemic
Faced with the challenges brought by the return of the COVID-19 pandemic in autumn and
winter 2021, some Member States continued to apply states of emergency, whereas in most
Member States such regimes and the related restrictions to fundamental rights were
progressively phased out. A number of Member States are now drawing the lessons from this
experience and are in some cases updating their legal frameworks to improve preparedness for
future crises. In Portugal and Sweden, dedicated structures are looking at how to put in place
permanent legal frameworks to govern exceptional circumstances, with similar reflections
under way in the Netherlands. In Denmark, the use of the Epidemic Act adopted in February
2021 was reviewed by the Government and subject to a broad consultation of stakeholders. In
Czechia, the Ministry of Health conducted an audit of the adoption process of pandemic
measures, after several of those measures had been annulled by courts. In France, the Council
of State dedicated its 2021 Annual Study to the states of emergency and made proposals to
better define and organise them.
The use of emergency powers have also continued outside the context of the COVID-19
pandemic in relation to other crises. Hungary declared another ‘state of danger’ under amended
constitutional provisions, following the invasion of Ukraine. Poland introduced a state of
emergency on the Polish-Belarusian border, leading to stakeholder concerns as to
constitutionality and restriction of fundamental rights. Lithuania also declared a state of
emergency in response to the instrumentalisation of migration by Belarus. Restrictions on the
work of monitoring bodies and journalists sparked criticism and were gradually lifted.
The role of Constitutional Courts in the system of checks and balances
Constitutional Courts play a key role in the system of checks and balances and have continued
to exercise this role in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. This was the case in France,
where the Constitutional Court defined the limits of the executive and legislative powers during
the health emergency regime and in Germany, Spain and Italy, where the Constitutional Courts
exercised constitutional review on the emergency measures taken to fight the COVID-19
pandemic.
Constitutional Courts also exercised scrutiny in other key areas, such as elections. In Portugal,
the Constitutional Court was called to review electoral acts. The new parliamentary term started
after this review and the subsequent repetition of the vote. More structural reflections are under
way in Cyprus, with the creation of a Constitutional Court still under discussion in Parliament.
In other Member States, some decisions taken by Constitutional Courts have raised concerns
as regards the primacy of EU law. In Romania, the Government has made a clear commitment
to the principle of primacy of EU law, but concerns remain regarding the challenge to this
principle by the Constitutional Court86
. In Germany, following formal commitments by the
German Government clearly recognising the primacy of EU law, the Commission closed the
86
In two judgments, the CJEU ruled that national courts should not be prevented by a risk of disciplinary
sanctions from disapplying decisions of the Constitutional Court which are contrary to EU law (Judgment of
the Court of Justice of 21 December 2021, Euro Box Promotion e.a., in joined cases C-357/19, C-379/19, C-
547/19, C-811/19 and C-840/19) and that EU law precludes any national rule or practice that would give rise
to disciplinary liability for national judges’ failure to comply with such decisions (Judgment of the Court of
Justice of 22 February 2022, RS, in cases C-430/21, para. 87). Importantly, the Romanian High Court of
Cassation and Justice issued several judgments setting aside the case-law of the Constitutional Court on the
composition of judges’ panels to give effect to the judgment of the CJEU of 21 December 2021, thus giving
precedence to the principle of primacy of EU law.
24
infringement procedure concerning a judgment of the German Constitutional Court. In Poland,
the Constitutional Tribunal has expressly challenged the primacy of EU law, and considered
certain provisions of the EU Treaties as unconstitutional. This led the Commission to launch
an infringement procedure against Poland, which is still ongoing87
.
National Human Rights Institutions, Ombudspersons, equality bodies and implementation of
European Court of Human Rights rulings
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs)88
, Ombudspersons, equality bodies and other
independent authorities have continued to play a role in the national system of checks and
balances. In some Member States, the status of such authorities has been further strengthened.
In Sweden the newly created National Human Rights Institution started work in January 2022.
In Portugal, the internal structure of the Office of the Ombudsperson has been reformed in
order to better reflect its mandate and in Latvia, the appointment rules for the Ombudsperson
were amended. In Belgium, the Federal Human Rights Institute has issued numerous opinions
and recommendations during its first years of activity. Ensuring appropriate follow-up to the
findings of independent institutions is an important part of a system of effective checks and
balances89
.
However, NHRIs, Ombudspersons and equality bodies need structural guarantees of
independence as well as sufficient resources to work effectively, and a number of them
continue to face challenges. In Poland, the new Ombudsman, appointed in July 2021, continues
to play a key role as a rule of law safeguard, though its capacity to act is constrained by limited
resources. In Lithuania, there are concerns that the Office of the Parliamentary Ombudspersons
lacks the resources to fulfil its mandate and new draft legislation has been criticised for a
possible negative impact on its work. In Hungary, concerns as regards the independence of the
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights persist after the integration of the Equal Treatment
Authority in the Office of the Commissioner, and, in March 2022, the UN Sub-Committee on
Accreditation of the Global Alliance of NHRIs maintained its recommendation that the
Hungarian national human rights institution be downgraded to B-status. In Croatia, challenges
exist regarding the follow-up to and monitoring of the Ombudsperson’s recommendations, and
on access to information. A number of Member States have so far not established a NHRI in
line with the UN Paris Principles. While Italy, Malta and Romania have started this process,
there are no such plans in Czechia90
.
The track record of implementing leading judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) is also an important indicator for the functioning of the rule of law in a country. The
country chapters therefore for the first time include systematic indicators on the
implementation of ECtHR leading judgments by all Member States91
. While performance
varies between Member States, overall around 40% of the leading judgments of the ECtHR
relating to EU Member States from the last ten years have not been implemented92
.
87
Commission press release IP/21/7070, of 22 December 2021. See below, Section 3.2.
88
The UN Paris Principles, endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 1993 (Resolution A/RES/48/134), set out
the main criteria that NHRIs are required to meet. NHRIs are periodically accredited before the Subcommittee
on Accreditation of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions.
89
Recommendations concern HR, NL, PL.
90
Recommendations concern CZ, IT, LT, MT, PL, RO, SI.
91
The adoption of necessary execution measures for a judgment by the ECtHR is supervised by the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
92
European Implementation Network and Democracy Reporting International, Justice Delayed and Justice
Denied: Non-Implementation of European Courts Judgments and the Rule of Law.
25
National checks and balances in relation to the use of spyware
In July 2021, Amnesty International and a group of investigative journalists, uncovered that
several governments across the world had deployed a particularly intrusive spyware, known as
‘Pegasus’. In the EU, targets included journalists, lawyers, national politicians and MEPs. This
subject has gradually gained importance over last year93
: while linked to national security, there
is a need for national checks and balances to ensure safeguards are in place and fundamental
rights are respected. In Hungary, investigations have been concluded following allegations
related to the use of Pegasus surveillance software against lawyers and journalists, while there
are concerns due to the absence of effective judicial supervision as regards the use of secret
surveillance measures outside criminal proceedings. In Poland, despite allegations related to
the use of Pegasus and equivalent spyware surveillance software, no investigation was
launched by the prosecution service. In France, a criminal investigation was opened by the
Paris Prosecutor’s Office into alleged use of surveillance spyware targeting in particular
journalists. In Spain, the use of Pegasus and equivalent spyware surveillance software was
subject to an investigation by the Ombudsperson and judicial proceedings. Although Member
States are competent to guarantee their national security, they must apply relevant EU law,
including the case-law of the CJEU, when doing so. The rule of law requires that the recourse
to such tools by Member States’ security services is subject to sufficient control that it fully
respects EU law, including fundamental rights such as the protection of personal data, the
safety of journalists and freedom of expression. The use of surveillance means in criminal
investigations also have to respect procedural rights, including the rights of defendant. Robust
institutional checks and balances are therefore needed to guarantee the functioning, cooperation
and mutual control of State organs, so that power is exercised by one state authority under the
scrutiny of others.
Civil Society Organisations as essential actors for the rule of law
Civil society organisations and human rights defenders play an essential role as watchdogs
against breaches of the rule of law and actively contribute to fostering the rule of law,
democracy and fundamental rights on the ground. EU law94
, complemented by European
standards,95
set out key requirements for ensuring the operation of civil society organisations
without unjustified interference. Following the arrival of millions of people to the EU fleeing
Russia’s military aggression, civil society has played a key role in their reception in the
respective Member States and providing them with essential items and services, including
psychological and medical support.
Steps are being taken to improve the situation for civil society organisations in several Member
States. In Bulgaria, a Council for Civil Society Development set up with the objective of
assisting civil society organisations has become operational. In Romania, while civil society
organisations are facing challenges, there are plans to simplify registration procedures for non-
governmental organisations. In Sweden, the framework rules on the operation and funding of
civil society organisations are being reviewed. In Malta, existing concerns on civil society
organisations’ access to funding were addressed. While in the majority of Member States, there
is an enabling and supportive environment for civil society and the civil society space continues
93
The European Parliament established a specific investigative committee (‘PEGA’) to address the use of the
‘Pegasus’ surveillance spyware and other similar technologies in the EU.
94
Judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v Hungary, C-78/18, EU:C:2020:476, paragraphs 112 and 113.
95
See in particular Recommendation Rec(2007)14 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on
the legal status of non-governmental organisations in Europe.
26
to be considered as ‘open’96
, in some Member States civil society organisations continue to
face challenges. These can include burdensome registration procedures, difficulties in
accessing funding, restrictive legislation and inadequate protection against attacks and threats,
including SLAPP and smear campaigns. In Ireland legal obstacles persist for the funding of
civil society and in Germany, the regime for the tax-exempt status of civil society organisations
remains a concern, though this could be addressed in forthcoming reforms. In Slovenia, civil
society faced challenges as regards negative narratives, while issues linked to funding and
limitations on freedom of assembly were addressed. In Czechia, some concerns exist about the
access of civil society organisations to public funding while in Slovakia, public subsidies
schemes continue to exclude organisations working on issues related to gender equality and
LGBTIQ rights. In Cyprus, the Government has taken action to better assist civil society and
to improve communication with public authorities. The registration procedures for civil society
organisations remain complex in Italy. In Greece, some registration requirements continue to
be considered disproportionate, while a review of the existing legislation is pending before the
Council of State. In Spain, the Parliament is working on the reform of the Citizen Security Law
following concerns raised regarding the law including by civil society. In France, while new
laws have been adopted to improve the financial environment for associations, a number of
stakeholders raised concerns as regards the impact of the Law on republican principles on the
civic space97
.
In some Member States, systematic restrictions have further aggravated the ability of civil
society to operate with a potential chilling effect. In Poland, civic space has further deteriorated
and recent draft legislation might have an additional negative impact. In Hungary, independent
civil society remains under pressure and organisations representing the LGBTIQ community
report being targeted by smear campaigns launched by the Government, while the State’s role
in financing civil society raises questions98
.
3. DEVELOPMENTS AND ACTIONS AT EU LEVEL
3.1 Dialogue and follow-up to the Rule of Law Report
Inter-institutional dialogue
The Council continued the practice of organising its annual rule of law dialogue on the basis
of the Rule of Law Report. In September 2021, the Council Presidency organised a horizontal
discussion on general rule of law developments in the General Affairs Council. The General
Affairs Council also held country-specific discussions, focusing on the relevant developments
highlighted in the country chapter of the Rule of Law Report, in November 202199
and April
2022100
. Targeted discussions on rule of law-related topics also took place in the Justice
Council, where Ministers exchanged views on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the
functioning of courts in December 2021, and discussed the issue of access to a lawyer and the
rule of law in March 2022. Member States showed a clear interest to share developments and
96
According to the rating given by CIVICUS (non-governmental organisation). Ratings are on a five-category
scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed and closed. Compared to 2021, two Member States
have been downgraded on the scale from open to narrowed and one from narrowed to ‘obstructed’.
97
Recommendations concern DE, IE, EL, SE.
98
Recommendations concern HU, PL.
99
The discussion focused on key developments in Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia and Lithuania.
100
The discussion focused on key developments in Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands and Austria.
27
best practices and to contribute to the prevention of problems in an inclusive and constructive
manner.
The European Parliament continued to hold debates on the rule of law. Since July 2021, it has
adopted several resolutions on the rule of law and on more specific issues such as media
freedom and civil society101
. The Parliament also adopted a specific resolution on the 2021
Rule of Law Report102
, welcoming in particular the commitment to include specific
recommendations to the Member States. The resolution reiterated recommendations issued
previously, notably on the need to identify tools that can be used if shortcomings are not
addressed, as well as Parliament’s support for an inter-institutional agreement on an EU
Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights. The Commission values
the cooperation with the European Parliament and has made clear that inter-institutional
cooperation plays a central part in strengthening the EU’s capacity to monitor and uphold the
rule of law. The decision to include recommendations in the 2022 report also responds to a call
from the European Parliament.
The European Parliament also organised country specific debates, notably in the Democracy,
Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group of the European Parliament’s
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The Monitoring Group
conducted monitoring missions in Bulgaria, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia and held discussions
on its findings. In addition to a debate on the primacy of EU law, the European Parliament has
adopted a resolution calling for more action to be taken to address the rule of law concerns in
Poland and Hungary103
.
The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), through its Ad hoc group on
Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law104
, and the Committee of Regions, through its
Commission for Citizenship, Governance, Institutional and External Affairs105
, have also
continued to debate the rule of law at EU level. In November 2021, the EESC organised a
conference focused on the contribution of civil society to the Rule of Law Mechanism.
101
European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the CJEU ruling,
P9_TA(2022)0074; European Parliament resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society
in Europe, P9_TA(2022)0056; of 16 December 2021 on fundamental rights and the rule of law in Slovenia, in
particular the delayed nomination of EPPO prosecutors, P9_TA(2021)0512; of 15 December 2021 on the
impact of organised crime on own resources of the EU and on the misuse of EU funds with a particular focus
on shared management from an auditing and control perspective, P9_TA(2021)0501; of 11 November 2021
on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil
and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society, P9_TA(2021)0451.
102
European Parliament resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report
(P9_TA(2022)0212).
103
European Parliament resolution of 5 May 2022 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Poland
and Hungary, P9_TA(2022)0204; The European Parliament has adopted three resolutions in total on the rule
of law in Poland and Hungary since 20 July 2021: resolution of 21 October 2021 on the rule of law crisis in
Poland and the primacy of EU law, P9_TA(2021)0439; of 16 September 2021 on media freedom and further
deterioration of the rule of law in Poland, P9_TA(2021)0395; of 8 July 2021 on breaches of EU law and of
the rights of LGBTIQ citizens in Hungary as a result of the legal changes adopted by the Hungarian Parliament,
P9_TA(2021)0362.
104
The ad hoc group on Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law (FRRL) is a horizontal body within the EESC
tasked to provide a forum for European civil society organisations to meet and share their assessment on the
state of fundamental rights, democracy and rule of law in the Member States.
105
The remit of the CIVEX Commission includes Constitutional Affairs, and Governance, better Law-Making,
Subsidiarity and Proportionality.
28
Dialogue with authorities and stakeholders in the Member States
The Commission has continued its outreach at national level in the Member States. Bilateral
meetings at both political and technical level were held to discuss key reforms as a follow up
to the 2021 Report. National Parliaments have a crucial role in upholding the rule of law, both
as lawmakers and in holding the executive accountable, and discussions following up on the
2021 Report were an important theme of Commissioners’ visits to national Parliaments106
.
The network of rule of law contact points provides for an open channel for regular exchange
between the Commission and the Member States. The network has continued to meet on a
regular basis to prepare the annual Rule of Law Report and is increasingly acting as a forum to
exchange best practice and share information on planned or ongoing reforms at national level.
The Commission will continue strengthening the dialogue with stakeholders and authorities in
the Member States, also with a focus on the follow-up to the recommendations contained in
this report.
Dialogue with and support for civil society at EU level
Civil society remains a key partner for the European Commission in the preparation of the
annual Rule of Law Report. In addition to the large number of written contributions received
from civil society and the meetings carried out as part of the country visits, the Commission
has also organised horizontal meetings with a number of key networks of civil society
organisations and other key interlocutors107
. These networks have made joint recommendations
on the process for the rule of law report108
. Civil society can also play an important role in the
follow-up to the report, and the Commission will pursue such follow-up with civil society at
national level in cooperation with Commission Representations and the Fundamental Rights
Agency.
Through the Citizens Equality Rights and Values programme (CERV), the Commission has
stepped up efforts to support civil society organisations, in particular the smaller, local ones
facing particular constraints. Out of the available budget of the programme (€1.55 billion)
almost a third is reserved specifically for the civil society organisations, with at least 40% of
this amount to be allocated to the local and regional civil society organisations. As well as
support to specific projects, there is also some provision for grants to support the capacity
building of civil society organisations, funding their running costs and development.
The Commission remains committed to consider how to increase involvement of civil society,
professional networks and other stakeholders in the rule of law debate at national and EU level.
This applies both to the preparation of the report and its follow-up. More generally, and as a
follow up of the Conference on the Future of Europe, the Commission will consider ways of
broadening the scope of its rule of law work to more directly involve citizens.
106
Annual Report 2021 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and on relations
with national parliaments.
107
Human Rights and Democracy Network, the Fundamental Rights Agency, the European Network for National
Human Rights Institutions and Civil Society Europe.
108
Civil society recommendations: how the Commission can improve the credibility, inclusiveness and impact
of the Rule of Law Report, European Partnership for Democracy.
29
3.2 International cooperation
The rule of law is a key guiding principle for the EU action beyond its borders. The rule of law
is central to EU action at global level, where working with partners to protect and promote
human rights and strengthen democracies around the world is a priority. The EU and its
Member States are the biggest global donor of democracy support. The Russian invasion of
Ukraine underlines the need to reinforce our actions to promote and defend our values, to lead
by example and to work with our international partners, as for example in UN and Council of
Europe fora. The Commission and several Member States contributed to the commitments of
the Summit for Democracy hosted by the President of the United States to promote democratic
values worldwide, and are leading efforts during the Year of Action to implement them.
The EU is a staunch defender of human rights, democracy and the rule of law throughout the
world, as demonstrated by the EU Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy 2020-
2024109
, and in line with the Sustainable Development Goals110
. In the immediate
neighbourhood, key requirements for EU membership set out in the ‘Copenhagen criteria’
include the rule of law, which is essential for candidate countries and potential candidates to
realise their European perspective, and the revised enlargement methodology, placing the rule
of law at the very heart of the accession process. The EU will continue to pursue a coherent
approach in its cooperation with candidates and potential candidates and countries across the
neighbourhood as well as in all its external action, at bilateral, regional and multilateral level.
The EU addresses rule of law issues regularly in human rights dialogues with partner countries
and at multilateral level, in particular the United Nations.
Upholding the rule of law at global level includes strengthening cooperation on rule of law
issues with international and regional organisations111
. The rule of law, democracy and human
rights remain the key priorities for the cooperation between the EU and the Council of
Europe112
. In this context, the EU has renewed its commitment to protect and promote an
independent civil society, while also protecting human rights defenders and free media. EU’s
commitment to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, democracy and the rule of law
consistently and coherently in all areas of its external action and to support the UN human
rights system as a cornerstone of its external action is also a key guiding principle for the EU
participation in the UN fora. International organisations, notably key bodies of the Council of
Europe113
, remain important partners in the preparation of the Report, and upholding the rule
of law in Europe, with which the Commission will continue to cooperate closely.
The Commission aims to further strengthen this key element in its rule of law work, building
on its close relations with the Council of Europe and other international bodies.
3.3 EU action to uphold the rule of law
The annual Rule of Law Report is a preventive mechanism, aimed at improving the rule of law
situation across the EU, raising awareness of challenges and facilitating solutions early on to
prevent deterioration. It complements a number of other mechanisms and instruments at EU
109
EU Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024.
110
Sustainable Development Goals.
111
Such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
112
Council conclusions on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2020-2022.
113
The Venice Commission, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
30
level, each with their own purpose. This section includes an overview of relevant actions and
mechanisms.
The case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the rule of law continued
to consolidate. The CJEU ruled on a number of requests for preliminary rulings brought by
national courts. In a judgment of 6 October 2021114
, the CJEU clarified the three types of
situations in which a national court of last instance can refrain from submitting a request for a
preliminary ruling to the CJEU where a question concerning the interpretation of EU law is
raised before it115
. In another case, the CJEU ruled that EU law precludes a national supreme
court from declaring a request for a preliminary ruling unlawful on grounds that the questions
referred are not relevant or necessary 116
. The CJEU also declared that, by virtue of the primacy
of EU law, national courts should not be prevented, by a risk of disciplinary sanctions, from
disapplying decisions of a Constitutional Court which are contrary to EU law117
.
The CJEU has continued to examine infringement cases brought before it by the Commission.
When CJEU interim measures have not been complied with, the Commission has requested the
CJEU to impose financial penalties118
. The Commission has continued to exercise its role as
guardian of the EU treaties by launching infringement procedures where relevant to address
specific breaches of the rule of law119
.
The procedure for upholding the common values of the EU set out in Article 7 TEU continues
in the Council as regards Poland and Hungary. This procedure allows the Council to determine
the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach of the Union’s values and follow up on such
risks. The Council held hearings for Poland in February 2022, and for Hungary in May 2022
as well as a general state of play on both Member States in December 2021120
.
Respect for the rule of law remains a fundamental precondition for the proper management of
EU funds. The General Conditionality Regulation121
is intended to protect the sound financial
management of the Union budget and the financial interests of the Union from breaches of the
principles of the rule of law. The Commission has been monitoring the situation in all Member
States since the General Conditionality Regulation became applicable on 1 January 2021 and
114
Judgment of 6 October 2021, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi, C-561/19,
ECLI:EU:C:2021:799.
115
The Court had set out three situations in which national courts or tribunals of last instance are not obliged to
make a reference for a preliminary ruling in Cilfit (Judgment of 6 October 1982, Cilfit and Others, 283/81,
ECLI:EU:C:1982:335): (i) the question is irrelevant for the resolution of the dispute; (ii) the provision of EU
law in question has already been interpreted by the Court; and (iii) the correct interpretation of EU law is so
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. By contrast, if the question concerning the interpretation
of EU law does not involve any of those situations, the court or tribunal of last instance must bring the matter
before the Court.
116
Judgment of 23 November 2021, IS, C-564/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:949.
117
Judgment of 21 December 2021, Euro Box Promotion e.a., in joined cases C-357/19, C-379/19, C-547/19, C-
811/19 and C-840/19.
118
On 27 October 2021, the Court of Justice imposed €1 million as a daily penalty payment on Poland for as long
as the interim measures order of 14 July 2021, regarding notably the functioning if the disciplinary chamber
of the Polish Supreme Court, had not been fully complied with.
119
Notably, on 22 December 2021, the Commission decided to launch an infringement procedure against Poland
because of serious concerns with respect to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and its recent case law
challenging the supremacy of EU law.
120
Proceedings under Article 7 TEU were brought by the Commission against Poland in 2017 and by the
European Parliament against Hungary in 2018.
121
Regulation 2020/2092 of 16 December 2020, OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1.
31
has adopted guidelines on its application122
. In its judgements of 16 February 2022, the CJEU123
confirmed the conformity of the regulation with the EU Treaties. In April 2022, the
Commission launched for the first time the formal procedure under the General Conditionality
Regulation with regard to Hungary124
.
A related framework for the protection of several EU funds is the Common Provisions
Regulation (CPR)125
, which entered into force on 1 July 2021. It requires Member States to put
in place, as part of the ‘horizontal enabling conditions’, effective mechanisms to ensure
compliance of the programmes supported by the Funds and their implementation with the rights
and principles enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, including the right to an
effective remedy and to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal previously
established by law. Member States have to ensure that the horizontal enabling condition is
fulfilled when preparing a programme and that it remains fulfilled throughout the programming
period.
A number of rule of law-related issues – notably as regards the effectiveness of justice systems,
the fight against corruption and the quality and inclusiveness of the law-making process - are
also part of the European Semester to the extent that those aspects are of macroeconomic
relevance and have an impact on the business environment, investment, economic growth and
jobs. In order to address a number of relevant country specific recommendations under the
Semester by concrete rule of law reforms and investments, the Commission discussed and
agreed with several Member States concrete milestones in the framework of the national
recovery plans under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which were subsequently
formally approved by the Council.
In the 2022 European Semester Spring Package, the Commission has proposed to the Council
further recommendations to two Member States related to the rule of law126
. The Commission
is also providing technical support to Member States, notably through the Technical Support
Instrument, to improve efficiency, quality and independence of public administration and
justice systems.The Commission continues to promote judicial reform through the annual EU
Justice Scoreboard127
. The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard for the first time includes survey data
on how companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection in the different Member
States128
. The results suggest that administrative conduct, stability and quality of the law-
making process, as well as effectiveness of courts and property protection, are key factors of
comparable significance for confidence in investment protection. The European Semester and
the Justice Scoreboard are complementary to the Rule of Law Report and both feed into the
report where relevant.
Media freedom and media pluralism has become an important area of action at EU level. The
2020 European Democracy Action Plan and Media and Audiovisual Action Plan announced a
series of initiatives to support and safeguard media freedom and pluralism. The Commission
122
C(2022) 1382 final. Guidelines on the application of the general regime of conditionality regulation.
123
See cases C-156/21 and C-157/21. On 16 February 2022, the CJEU rendered its judgements and dismissed the
actions lodged by Poland and Hungary for the annulment of the General Conditionality Regulation.
124
On 27 April 2022, the Commission launched for the first time the step of the procedure established under
Article 6(1) of the General Conditionality Regulation.
125
Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of 24 June 2021.
126
2022 European Semester: Spring package.
127
The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard was published on 19 May 2022: EU Justice Scoreboard.
128
Figures 54 and 55, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
32
presented in September 2021 a Recommendation to Member States on the safety of
journalists129
. In April 2022, the Commission adopted a package of measures to protect
journalists and civil society organisations against abusive litigation (SLAPP)130
. The
Commission is also preparing a European Media Freedom Act.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS
The rule of law is fundamental to a stable, resilient, fair and democratic political, economic
and social environment across the EU. It is essential to a well-functioning Single Market and
to the Union as a whole. It is also a reflection of Europeans’ aspirations and values, enshrined
in Article 2 of the Treaty. The Commission is committed to protect and promote the rule of
law, as guarantor of the EU Treaties and of the primacy of EU law. A vibrant, forward-looking
EU transitioning to a greener, more digital and more socially just society needs to continue
being built on firm foundations. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a reminder of the pressure
on our cherished EU values. Protecting our citizens and their rights needs a determined and
consistent defence of the rule of law across the EU.
The annual Rule of Law Report is an important part of efforts to promote and safeguard the
rule of law in the EU, both at the national and European level. Relying on a continued
engagement and cooperation with Member States, this year’s Report shows that important rule
of law reforms have continued to take place in many Member States to address challenges
identified in previous editions. However, important concerns remain in some Member States.
With this third edition, the Rule of Law report and the ensuing cycle of discussions with the
Member States, including national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the Council is a
well-established exercise. In line with the preventive nature of the report, the recommendations
included for the first time this year seek to support Member States in their reforms. In some
instances, recommendations guide Member States to take measures to address particular
concerns raised in the Report.
The Commission has prepared this report based on continued dialogue with the Member States,
while fully preserving political responsibility for its assessment and the recommendations
issued. The next edition will follow-up on the developments and assess the implementation of
the recommendations.
At the start of a new annual cycle of dialogue on the rule of law, the Commission invites the
Council and the European Parliament to continue holding general and country-specific debates
on the basis of this report, also using the opportunity of the recommendations to look further
at concrete implementation. The Commission also welcomes further debate at national level,
involving national parliaments, civil society and other key actors, but also at European level,
with increased citizen’s engagement. The Commission invites Member States to effectively
take up the challenges identified in the Report and stands ready to assist Member States in the
efforts to implement the Report’s recommendations.
129
Commission Recommendation on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other
media professionals in the European Union, C(2021) 6650 final, 16.9.2021.
130
Proposal for a Directive on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded
or abusive court proceedings (“Strategic lawsuits against public participation), COM(2022)177 final,
27.4.2022 and Commission Recommendation protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage
in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (“Strategic lawsuits against
public participation”, C(2022)2428, 27.4.2022.


EN EN
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Luxembourg, 13.7.2022
SWD(2022) 504 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
2022 Rule of Law Report
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark
Accompanying the document
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
2022 Rule of Law Report
The rule of law situation in the European Union
{COM(2022) 500 final} - {SWD(2022) 501 final} - {SWD(2022) 502 final} -
{SWD(2022) 503 final} - {SWD(2022) 505 final} - {SWD(2022) 506 final} -
{SWD(2022) 507 final} - {SWD(2022) 508 final} - {SWD(2022) 509 final} -
{SWD(2022) 510 final} - {SWD(2022) 511 final} - {SWD(2022) 512 final} -
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{SWD(2022) 516 final} - {SWD(2022) 517 final} - {SWD(2022) 518 final} -
{SWD(2022) 519 final} - {SWD(2022) 520 final} - {SWD(2022) 521 final} -
{SWD(2022) 522 final} - {SWD(2022) 523 final} - {SWD(2022) 524 final} -
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Offentligt
KOM (2022) 0500 - Bilag 1
Europaudvalget 2022
1
ABSTRACT
The level of perceived judicial independence in Denmark continues to be very high. Gaps in
the digitalisation of the judiciary remain, notably related to digital solutions to initiate and
follow administrative and criminal proceedings. The limited expenditure on the justice
system as a percentage of the GDP and low number of judges remains a long-term challenge,
in particular in view of ensuring efficient case-handling. Discussions on a multiannual
budgetary framework for the period 2023-2026 are ongoing. A new law on court fees came
into force, which aims to make the fees more understandable and to incentivise settlements.
The justice system overall remains efficient and legislation to speed-up the handling of
criminal cases was adopted. However, the average case-handling times for district courts
have increased in both civil and criminal cases in 2021.
Denmark is perceived as the least corrupt country in the EU and the world. The anti-
corruption system continues to be based to a large extent on general rules on ethics and
integrity, social norms and public scrutiny with a high degree of trust in well-functioning of
the public administration. A new national investigative unit was established for a more
efficient approach to serious crime including complex corruption cases. New legislation was
introduced to strengthen the protection of whistleblowers along with new reporting channels.
Additional measures on political party financing to address multiple donations were
announced by the Government though no concrete roadmap for their adoption is planned.
Challenges regarding the implementation of international recommendations in relation to the
anti-corruption framework remain unaddressed, as there are no plans to address the absence
of rules on ‘revolving doors’ for ministers and on lobbying, and to ensure adequate control of
asset declarations submitted by persons entrusted with top executive functions.
Initiatives to strengthen the media self-regulatory system in Denmark through the creation of
a media ombudsperson and to update the current framework for media responsibility to fit the
digital media reality are currently ongoing. The independence of the two Danish public
service broadcasters is safeguarded by secondary legislation. Political negotiations have been
conducted regarding the possible amendment of the Access to Public Administrative
Documents Act, which restricts the right to access information in some cases, but there are no
concrete plans for reforms yet. Organisations representing Danish journalists, media and
cultural stakeholders, together with the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Culture, have
published a national action plan to further strengthen the already robust framework for the
safety of journalists. The Criminal Code has been amended to allow stricter sentences for
threats to freedom of expression.
A number of developments related to checks and balances could be observed in Denmark.
The first commission of scrutiny, following this newly established system of control,
examined the decision on culling of mink and submitted its report to a Parliament committee
on 30 June 2022. The Court of Impeachment, responsible for deciding on cases involving
breaches of ministerial responsibility, issued a ruling in 2021. In addition, the Government
has reviewed the use of the Epidemic Act and invited public comments. The guidelines of
Parliament’s Standing Orders Committee on fast-track procedures have been overall
respected notwithstanding an increase in legislative activity in 2021. The civil society space
remains open and the framework for public participation remains robust.
2
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended to Denmark to:
• Ensure adequate human and financial resources for the justice system in the next
multiannual framework, taking into account European standards on resources for the
justice system.
• Adopt new legislation on political party financing that will address the issue of multiple
and anonymous donations and introduce sanctions for breaching the rules on the political
parties framework.
• Introduce rules on ‘revolving doors’ for ministers and on lobbying, and ensure adequate
control of asset declarations submitted by persons entrusted with top executive functions.
• Continue the process geared at reforming the Access to Public Administrative Documents
Act in order to strengthen the right to access documents, in particular by limiting the
grounds for rejection of disclosure requests, taking into account the European standards
on access to official documents.
3
I. JUSTICE SYSTEM
The Danish justice system consists of 24 district courts, two high courts (courts of appeal)
and a Supreme Court, as well as two specialised courts1
. The independent National Court
Administration is in charge of the administration and development of the courts, which
includes allocation of courts’ budgets and management of buildings and systems related to
information and communications technology. The independent Judicial Appointments
Council2
makes non-binding proposals for the appointment of judges to the Ministry of
Justice, who then proposes them for formal appointment by the executive (the Queen)3
. Only
one judge is proposed per vacancy by the Appointments Council. There have been no cases
where the executive did not follow the proposal of the Appointments Council4
. Disciplinary
measures for judges can be issued by Court Presidents or the Special Court of Indictment and
Revision5
. The prosecution service is an autonomous institution acting under the supervision
of the Ministry of Justice and led by a Prosecutor General6
. The Bar and Law Society is the
independent body governing the legal profession and ensuring its independence7
.
Independence
The level of perceived judicial independence in Denmark continues to be very high both
among the general public and companies. Overall, 84% of the general population and 87%
of companies perceived the level of independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly or very
good’ in 20228
. According to data in the 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard, the level remains
consistently very high for both the general public and companies since 2016. Both figures
have increased in comparison to 2021 (75% for the general public and 83% for companies).
However, the level of perceived judicial independence among the general public is slightly
lower in comparison with 2016 (88%).
1
The Maritime and Commercial Court and the Land Registration Court. CEPEJ (2021), Study on the
functioning of the judicial systems in the EU Member States.
2
Members are appointed by the Minister of Justice and consist of one Supreme Court and one High Court
judge proposed by the respective courts, one District Court judge proposed by the Danish Association of
Judges, one lawyer proposed by the Bar and Law Society and two representatives of the general public
proposed by Local Government Denmark and the Danish Adult Education Association.
3
With the exception of the President of the Supreme Court, who is selected and appointed directly by the
Supreme Court according to an internal procedure. In addition, as regards members of the Supreme Court,
the law sets out a special procedure under which the candidate chosen by the appointments board is vetted by
judges of the Supreme Court before the appointment is confirmed.
4
For transparency, the Judicial Appointments Council issues a press release when making their proposal.
5
2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 2.
6
The Prosecutor General is appointed by the executive (formally the Queen) on recommendation of the
Minister of Justice following approval of the Governments’ Recruitment Board and can be dismissed on a
motivated recommendation of the Minister of Justice (in the latter case the recommendation is submitted
directly to the Queen). The Minister of Justice can issue instructions to prosecutors in individual cases, with
a number of safeguards applicable (2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law of
situation in Denmark, p. 3).
7
Administration of Justice Act, Chapter 15.
8
Figures 50 and 52, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised
as follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very
good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%).
4
Quality
Gaps in the digitalisation of the judiciary remain, notably related to digital solutions to
initate and follow administrative and criminal proceedings. The shortcomings as regards
digitalisation identified in the 2020 and 2021 Rule of Law Reports9
have remained largely
unchanged. While digital communication tools for courts and the prosecution service are in
place10
, procedural rules for digital tools are only partly in place for civil, administrative and
criminal proceedings11
and digital solutions to initate and follow administrative and criminal
proceedings remain very limited12
. While gaps still remain on arrangements for machine-
readability of judgments13
, the introduction of an online database for judgments by the
National Court Administration as of 6 January 2022 is an improvement14
. In addition, the
National Courts Administration has received funding for a project to develop a new IT
system for processing criminal and probate cases15
. Nevertheless, the COVID-19 pandemic
has accentuated the existing gaps concerning the digitalisation of justice, which remains a
challenge.
The resource situation and the low number of judges remains a challenge. The
expenditure on the justice system as a percentage of GDP remains very low in Denmark (at
0.17% of GDP)16
as does the number of judges per 100 000 inhabitants (at 6.6 per 100 000
inhabitants)17
, which presents a long-term challenge18
. The budgetary resources allocated to
the Danish courts in the annual budget for 2022 are approximately EUR 257.02 million
(DKK 1 911.5 million), which remains stable compared to 202119
. In spite of some efficiency
gains in 202020
, the Danish courts have experienced an increase of pending cases and case
processing times in the past years, notably on civil and criminal cases21
, which, in spite of
9
2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 4.
10
Figures 44-45, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
11
Figure 42, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
12
Figures 46-47, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
13
Figure 49, 2021 EU Justice Scoreboard.
14
The database presently contains a small number of recent judgments, but it will be gradually extended to
include more as new judgments are delivered, integration with the IT systems of the courts is improved and
new systems for digitising the decisions of the courts are implemented. The judgments are pseudonymised.
National Courts Administration (2022), Judgments database is open.
15
The budget for the project is approximately EUR 81.25 million (DKK 604.6 million). The objective of the
new IT system is to replace the outdated IT-systems used by the courts with a more user-friendly, effective
and future-proof solution. The project will be rolled out in six stages, whereby the first project stage will be a
probate portal that will support the registration of claims concerning the administration of the estate of the
deceased, to be rolled out in November 2022 and the last stage in 2026. The Danish district courts deal with
about 300 000 criminal and probate cases a year. National Courts Administration (2021), Digitisation of new
criminal and probate system under way.
16
Figure 35, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
17
Figure 36, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
18
2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 4 and 2021 Rule of
Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 3.
19
In 2021, the total financial resources for the judiciary have increased to approximately EUR 259.59 million
(DKK 1 931.8 million) compared to approximately EUR 255.79 million (DKK 1 903.5 million) in 2020. In
2021, there were 2 078 full-time employees, including 685 judges and other legal advisers, and 1 202 office
staff (in 2020, the figures were 680 and 1 181 respectively). Input from Denmark for the 2022 Rule of Law
Report, p. 9-10 and written contribution from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit.
20
As noted in the ‘Efficiency’ section below.
21
The COVID-19 pandemic is not the only reason for the increase in pending cases. The National Court
Administration estimates that the activity in criminal cases at the district courts would have been roughly at
the same level as in 2019 without the COVID-19 cancellations and other constraints on case management
5
additional financial allocations in 2021 and 202222
, may require a long-term increase in
resources in order to address them, in particular for the creation of new posts for judges, as
already pointed out by stakeholders in the 2021 Rule of Law Report23
. In this context, the
Danish Association of Judges has emphasised that a number of laws in the past years have
increased the burdens on courts and prolonged their disposition times, notably in criminal
cases, while no additional longer-term human or financial resources have been allocated to
the courts; this has led to an increase in caseload and length of procedures24
. The multiannual
budgetary framework for the Danish courts for the period 2023-2026 is currently being
discussed. These discussions normally take place at an administrative level between the
National Courts Administration, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance25
. In a
departure from previously established practices, however, it has recently been suggested that
in light of the challenges faced these discussion should be brought up to the political level
and involve exchanges among parties in Parliament (Folketing)26
. According to Council of
Europe recommendations, each State should allocate adequate resources, facilities and
equipment to the courts to enable them to function in accordance with the standards laid
down in Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and to enable judges to work efficiently27
.
A new law on court fees came into force which aims to make the fees more
understandable and to incentivise settlements. On 1 October 2021, the new Court Fees Act
came into force28
. It aims to simplify the rules on court fees29
and to incentivise settlements,
by allowing the parties a longer period to reach a settlement, under which the plaintiff or
appelant can be reimbursed the court fees30
. While the stakeholders generally welcomed the
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the last five years, district courts have received significantly more of the
serious criminal cases than in the previous five years; at the same time, cases have also become more
complex and time-consuming. National Court Administration (2022), Even longer processing times in 2021.
National Courts Administration (2022), Graph of average case processing time in selected criminal cases in
district courts 2012-2021. National Court Administration (2022), Key figures on case turnover and
processing times, pp. 4-5 and 10.
22
The Government allocated to Danish courts additional funding to tackle the caseload of criminal cases in
June 2021 (approximately EUR 3.36 million or DKK 25 million) and for 2022 (approximately EUR 6.39
million or DKK 47.5 million). National Courts Administration (2022), Annual report 2021 has been
published. In addition, the Government has allocated EUR 1.75 million (DKK 13 million) per year for the
period of 2021-23 to address the caseload impact of the COVID-19 pandemic; written contribution from the
Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit.
23
See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 3.
24
The Danish Association of Judges has regularly referred to the issue of resources and impact on efficiency in
its replies on legislative proposals, see for example the statements in replies to public consultations on the
draft law on police activities or the draft law amending the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure
and the Road Traffic Act (from 14 March 2022 and 21 September 2021, respectively). The Danish Bar and
Law Society has also regularly pointed out that there is a shortage of resources to handle cases and that as a
result waiting times have increased dramatically, commentary in Berlingske Tidende (2022), Commentary:
Long waiting times must not undermine confidence in the justice system (and republished by the Danish Bar
and Law Society.
25
Altinget (2022), ‘Parties to negotiate on court finances: “It is not a law of nature that the agreement must be
administrative’.
26
Ibid.
27
Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, paragraph 33.
28
The Law on Court Fees, Law Nr. 425 of 16 March 2021.
29
A fee of approximately EUR 100 or 200 (DKK 750 or DKK 1 500) applies depending on the value of the
court case. Input from Denmark for the 2022 Rule of Law report, p. 8.
30
Written contribution from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit.
6
objective of the proposal, they considered it too early to assess its impact31
. As noted in the
2021 Rule of Law Report, the Ministry of Justice set up a pre-legislative committee to review
the existing legal aid system in April 202032
. The work of the pre-legislative committee was
delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but it resumed its work in September 2021 and is
expected to present its results by 31 August 202333
.
Efficiency
The justice system overall remains efficient, but the average case handling time for
district courts has increased in both civil and criminal cases in 2021. The number of
incoming civil, commercial, administrative and other cases at first instance in 2020 remains
very high (47.5 cases per 100 000 inhabitants compared to 49.3 cases in 2019)34
with
simultaneously one of the lowest number of judges per 100 000 inhabitants as compared to
other Member States35
. While the clearance rate for civil, commercial, administrative and
other cases has remained stable (100.6% in 2019 compared to 100.8% in 2020), the rate for
litigious civil and commercial cases has improved markedly in 2020 (111.1%, up from 91.8%
in 2019)36
and the estimated time to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases has slightly
decreased on average at all instances in 2020 compared to 2019 (from 222 to 190 days for
first instance cases)37
. However, according to National Courts Administration’s data for 2021,
the average case handling time for district courts has increased in both civil and criminal
cases, and the pending criminal cases at the end of 2021 increased by 16% in spite of a
decrease of incoming criminal cases by 11%38
.
The Government has adopted legislation to speed up the handling of criminal cases in
court, which touches upon the right to choose a lawyer freely. The Government is
undertaking efforts to improve the efficiency of the justice system in relation to the
processing of criminal cases, considering that processing times for criminal cases is seeing an
increasing trend39
. Since 2018, the Act on Administration of Justice includes a rule that, in
criminal cases related to certain types of offences, defendants cannot choose a certain
attorney, if their request of attorney will result in a delay of the proceedings; this rule has
been overall expanded to cases related to additional types of criminal offences (dangerous
crimes committed against another individual) with an amendment from December 202140
.
According to the Government, this is applicable in cases where the criminal proceedings
foreseen by law would be delayed by more than two or three weeks; the refusal can be
31
Information received from the National Courts Administration and the Danish Bar and Law Society in the
context of the country visit.
32
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 3.
33
Information received from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit to Denmark.
34
Figure 3, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. This category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-
litigious cases, non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases,
administrative law cases and other non-criminal cases.
35
Figure 36, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
36
Figures 11 and 12, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
37
Figure 7, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. No separate data on administrative cases is available.
38
National Court Administration (2022), Key figures on case turnover and processing times, p. 2.
39
National Court Administration (2022), Even longer processing times in 2021, National Courts
Administration (2022), Graph of average case processing time in selected criminal cases in district courts
2012-2021, and information received from the National Court Administration during the country visit.
40
While some types of criminal offences are no longer covered by that provision, a number of criminal
offences have been added since December 2021. Written contribution from the Ministry of Justice in the
context of the country visit.
7
appealed to the Special Court of Indictment and Revision41
. Some stakeholders42
have
expressed caution about a possible impact on the defendants’ rights to freely choose an
attorney43
. In addition, to streamline the processing of criminal cases, the Government also
tabled a proposal in Parliament in April 202244
. Some stakeholders have expressed criticism
on some elements of the law, such as the possibility for the police under certain conditions to
have access to information of the whereabouts of a suspect or another person without a court
order45
. The prioritisation of certain criminal cases46
in Danish courts is to the detriment of
other cases, including civil cases47
.
II. ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK
The Danish anti-corruption system is to a large extent based on general rules on ethics and
integrity as well as social norms and public scrutiny. Various authorities are involved in
preventing corruption, promoting good administrative practice and compliance with the legal
framework. This includes amongst others the National Audit Office. The Employee and
Competence Agency and the Prime Minister’s Office have responsibilities with regard to the
promotion of integrity among civil servants and ministers. The Ministry of Justice ensures
41
The defendant can appeal the court’s decision to deny the requested attorney to the Special Court of
Indictment and Revision within a week after the decision. Written contribution from the Ministry of Justice
in the context of the country visit.
42
In the public consultation on the proposal, the Danish Bar and Law Society has noted that a free choice of
attorney is one of several pillars of confidence in the process that can lead to serious sanctions and that this
must be borne in mind when limiting the choice of defence. Danish Bar and Law Society (2021), Response
to the consultation on draft law amending the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Road
Traffic Act. The Danish Human Rights Institute referred to its consultation response to the 2018 amendment
that introduced this rule, in which it expressed the view that the starting point should be that the defendant
has the right to choose their attorney and that refusal on the grounds of speeding up the criminal proceedings
should be exceptional. Danish Institute for Human Rights (2021), Response to public consultation on draft
law amending the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Road Traffic Act. The Danish
Association of Judges considered that the amendment in practice maintains a status quo and reflects a change
in priority of cases to be dealt with first and does not give rise to problems in practice. Written information
received from the Danish Association of Judges in the context of the country visit to Denmark.
43
According to Article 6§ 3(c) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms everyone charged with a criminal offence has the minimum right to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing. The European Court of Human Rights has held that this right
cannot be considered to be absolute and, consequently the national courts may override that person's choice
when there are relevant and sufficient grounds for holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice.
The existence of such grounds has to be assessed in light of the particular circumstances of each case.
Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 20 October 2015, Dvorski v. Croatia, 25703/11,
paragraphs 79-82 and the case-law cited therein.
44
Proposal L 182: Proposal for an Act amending the Penal Code, the Code of Judicial Procedure and various
other laws (Streamlining the criminal case chain and the tribunal process, etc. in the Juvenile Delinquency
Board, increased access to disclosure and recording of photos, improving police opportunities for
investigation, etc.) (L 182: Forslag til lov om ændring af straffeloven, retsplejeloven og forskellige andre
love (Effektivisering af straffesagskæden og nævnsprocessen m.v. i Ungdomskriminalitetsnævnet, øget
adgang til videregivelse og optagelse af fotos, forbedring af politiets muligheder for efterforskning m.v.))
and written contribution from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit.
45
See notably the responses to the public consultation on the draft law amending the Penal Code, the Code of
Judicial Procedure and various other laws by the Danish Association of Judges (2022) and the Danish
Institute of Human Rights (2022), p. 16-18.
46
The so-called VVV-cases related to violence, weapons and rape have a priority in the judicial system and
need to be dealt with within 30 days.
47
See opinion shared by the Danish Bar and Law Society in Berlingske Tidende (2022), Commentary: Long
waiting times must not undermine confidence in the justice system.
8
cooperation between national authorities in elaborating anti-corruption measures48
. As of 1
January 2022, the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SØIK)
was replaced by two entities: the National Special Crime Unit (SCU) and the State Prosecutor
for Special Crime (SPSCU). Denmark does not have a dedicated anti-corruption strategy nor
a specialised agency dealing with corruption issues.
The perception among experts and the business community is that Denmark is one of
the least corrupt countries in the world. In the 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index by
Transparency International, Denmark scores 88/100 and ranks first in the European Union
and globally49
. This perception has been stable over the past five years50
. The 2022 Special
Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 16% of respondents consider corruption widespread
in their country (EU average 68%) and 5% of respondents feel personally affected by
corruption in their daily lives (EU average 24%)51
. As regards businesses, 18% of companies
consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 63%) and 7% consider that that
corruption is a problem when doing business (EU average 34%)52
. Furthermore, 28% of
respondents find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from corrupt
practices (EU average 34%)53
, while 50% of companies believe that people and businesses
caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 29%)54
.
A reform to set up a new national investigative unit responsible for serious crimes,
including complex corruption-related cases, has been implemented. The National Special
Crime Unit (SCU) as well as the State Prosecutor for Special Crime Unit55
(SPSCU) replaced
as of 1 January 2022 the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime
(SØIK)56
. As a result, SCU has both investigative and prosecution competences and SPSCU,
among others, supervises SCU’s complex criminal proceedings, and conducts legality control
and appeals before the high courts. Their main focus remains the same as that of their
48
While the Ministry of Justice has set up an anti-corruption forum for internal coordination, it has not met
since 2015 and coordination is carried out through ad-hoc written consultations. Written contribution from
the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit.
49
Transparency International (2022), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021, pp. 2-3. The level of perceived
corruption is categorised as follows: low (the perception among experts and business executives of public
sector corruption scores above 79); relatively low (scores between 79-60), relatively high (scores between
59-50), high (scores below 50).
50
In 2017 the score was 88, while, in 2021, the score is 88. The score significantly increases/decreases when it
changes more than five points; improves/deteriorates (changes between 4-5 points); is relatively stable
(changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years.
51
Special Eurobarometer 523 (2022). The Eurobarometer data on citizens’ corruption perception and
experience is updated every second year. The previous data set is the Special Eurobarometer 502 (2020).
52
Flash Eurobarometer 507 (2022). The Eurobarometer data on business attitudes towards corruption as is
updated every second year. The previous data set is the Flash Eurobarometer 482 (2019).
53
Special Eurobarometer 523 (2022).
54
Flash Eurobarometer 507 (2022).
55
Danish Government (2020), Reflection Paper for an Agreement on the finances of the Police and
Prosecutor’s Office 2021-2024 Ministry of Justice, pp. 17-21; Information received by the Prosecution
Service in the context of the country visit to Denmark.
56
Law 2601 of 28 December 2021. As noted in the Rule of Law Report 2021, the objective of the reform was
to bring under the same roof investigators and prosecutors, who will be better able to follow serious crime
cases all the way from district level to appeal, with the aim of ensuring a more efficient and coordinated
approach regarding serious crime, including complex cases of corruption. 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country
Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 6.
9
predecessor institution, namely serious crime cases, including complex corruption-related
cases57
.
Complex cases involving bribery are addressed effectively while more general reporting
of corruption cases is lacking. The Danish authorities consider that the existing anti-
corruption system based mainly on general rules on ethics and integrity, social norms and
public scrutiny works well and does not require a dedicated anti-corruption strategy58
. In
2021, the investigation and prosecution for those cases that was carried out by the State
Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SØIK)59
were limited to bribery
cases. Authorities continue to report that resources available and training for officials are
adequate to fulfil the tasks assigned to them60
. At the same time, the overall number of
investigations and the enforcement of corruption-related cases are difficult to measure within
the current system of processing data (case-handling system)61
.
There are no plans to address the outstanding shortcomings related to the integrity
framework for ministers and top executive functions. As reported in the 2021 Rule of Law
Report62
, public servants63
are subject to a Code of Conduct in the Public Sector64
, which
refers to the criminal law provisions and obligations under the Public Administration Act65
.
As regards ministers66
and top executives, there are currently no plans67
to address the issue
previously highlighted by GRECO, namely that declarations on assets submitted by persons
entrusted with top executive functions need to be subject to substantive control68
. According
to the Danish authorities the system works well and further strengthening of the rules in
57
Written contribution from the Employee and Competence Agency in the context of the country visit.
58
Information received from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit.
59
There were six judgments passed in 2021 (compared to 18 in 2020) based on the Criminal Code section 122
(active bribery), two judgments passed in 2021 (compared to 14 in 2020) based on Criminal Code section
144 (passive bribery), five judgments passed in 2021 (compared to one in 2020) based on the Criminal Code
section 299 (private sector bribery).
60
Information received from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit to Denmark.
61
According to the Danish authorities, the existing IT system consists of a case-handling system which does
not process nor identify statistics on corruption-related cases. Nevertheless, the Danish authorities were able
to provide the statistics related to bribery under sections 122 and 144 of the Danish Criminal Code, as in
footnote 59 above.
62
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, pp. 6-7.
63
Public Servants in Denmark include special advisers and top-level civil servants. 2021 Rule of Law Report,
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 6.
64
Agency for modernisation (2017), Code of conduct in the public sector; 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country
Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 6.
65
Public Administration Act, Chapter 2, Sections 3-6. For the areas not covered by the public administration
act, a general fundamental legal principle of impartiality applies; Agency for modernisation (2017), Code of
conduct in the public sector; GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, p. 15.
66
New ministers are given a ministerial handbook which is updated regularly and contains the main applicable
rules and guidelines on integrity-related matters regarding governmental work including rules on secondary
employment, gifts and other benefits and conflicts of interests. 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter
on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 6. However, ministers have legal and political responsibility
towards Parliament including duties on truthfulness, confidentiality, disqualification or conflicts of interest.
The disregard of these rules can be sanctioned in some instances as stated in Section 5 of the Ministerial
Accountability Act of 1964. Application of this provision is very rare. 2021 Rule of Law report, Country
Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 7.
67
Information received from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit to Denmark.
68
GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Compliance Report, recommendation vii, pp. 9-10.
10
question is not necessary69
. Overall, due to the lack of a monitoring and verification
mechanism, the efficacy of the mentioned rules is difficult to evaluate. There are no plans
either to address the GRECO recommendations70
on the lack of binding rules on asset
declarations, and the exclusion of special advisers71
. Moreover, the authorities report no plans
either to adopt legislation establishing a ‘revolving doors’ policy for ministers72
despite
GRECO’s views that the current framework poses integrity risks73
and despite a public
debate on this issue74
.
There are no plans to regulate contacts between decision-makers and lobbyists. As
already noted in the 2020 Rule of Law Report, interest representatives have no duty to report
on their activities75
. There are currently no plans to adopt rules on lobbying as the authorities
do not consider strengthening of the rules necessary76
. According to GRECO, introduction of
rules and guidance on lobbying is recommended with regard to contacts between persons
entrusted with top executive functions and lobbyists. Overall, GRECO also underlined the
need to increase the transparency of contacts and subject matters concerning lobbying of
persons entrusted with top executive functions77
.
Additional measures on political party financing were announced by the Government,
though no concrete roadmap for their adoption is foreseen. Due to the current debate78
on
the shortcomings in the rules on transparency of political party financing79
, criminal law
measures are planned to address situations of several donations below the threshold
(approximately EUR 3 000 in 2022), which add up to a sum above the threshold, or through
different companies owned fully or partially by the same person, which partly addresses
international recommendations80
. It is not clear at this stage if the new law would also address
69
The declarations of ministers are published on the website of the Prime Minister’s Office and thereby subject
to scrutiny by Parliament, the press and the public at large, and ministers bear political responsibility for this
information, as mentioned above, see GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Compliance Report, pp. 9-10.
70
GRECO recommends (i) enshrining in regulation or legislation an obligation for members of the government
to publicly declare their assets, income and financial interests; (ii) that quantitative data on income as well as
data on assets and significant liabilities is included in the financial declarations; and (iii) that it be considered
to oblige special advisers to declare their financial interests publicly on a regular basis as well. GRECO Fifth
Evaluation Round – Compliance Report, pp. 8-9.
71
Information received from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit to Denmark. Denmark
considers that the non-binding nature and the lack of quantitative data strikes a fair balance between
transparency and the privacy of the ministers, and that special advisers have a duty to report potential
conflicts of interest to the permanent secretary of their ministry or their manager, see GRECO Fifth
Evaluation Round – Compliance Report, recommendation viii, pp. 9-10.
72
Written contribution from the Employee and Competence Agency in the context of the country visit.
73
GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, p. 8.
74
Altinget (2022), Hækkerup's shift calls for democratic self-examination, Altinget (2022), Hækkerup's exit
reignites debate over conflict of interest: Here are the top politicians who took the revolving door before
him, TV 2 (2022), That's why former ministers are so attractive to business.
75
2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, pp. 7-8.
76
Information received from the Employee and Competence Agency in the context of the country visit to
Denmark.
77
GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round on Denmark – Compliance Report, pp. 7-8.
78
Politiken (2021), Broad majority in parliament wants to tighten rules and ban Britt Bager-finten.
79
2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 8; Politiken (2022),
The Liberal Party kept recipients of party support secret: ‘If the rest of us filled out forms from Tax or other
authorities in the same way, we would not get away with it’.
80
Written contribution from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit.
11
other outstanding issues such as anonymous donations to political parties and the introduction
of sanctions for breaching the rules that are considered a concern by GRECO81
.
New legislation was adopted to strengthen the protection of whistleblowers and new
reporting channels were created. The Danish Whistleblower Act was adopted by the
Parliament on 24 June 202182
and entered into force on 17 December 2021, aiming to
transpose the EU Whistleblowers Directive83
. The Act covers serious breaches of legislation,
including both national and EU law. A general external reporting channel in the Danish Data
Protection Agency has been established84
. Since 17 December 2021, the Agency received 45
reports on whistleblowing85
. Additional funds were granted to the Agency to ensure its
capacity to operate this channel86
. Moreover, two special external reporting channels for the
Danish Security and Intelligence Service and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service have
been established87
. The establishment of the special external reporting channels does not
affect the whistleblower’s right to use the general external reporting channel established in
the Danish Data Protection Agency, however, whistleblowers from the services are
encouraged to use the external channels established in the ministries88
. To ensure correct
implementation, the Danish Ministry of Justice has published guidance notes for private and
public organisations and whistleblowers89
.
No specific monitoring for the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the measures such
as in the area of public procurement has been put in place. The impact of the new
provision added to the Criminal Code in April 2020, doubling the penalty for a number of
crimes related to measures adopted as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic90
, has not yet
been assessed. In parallel, the necessity for a close monitoring of rules, in particular related to
public procurement implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic, was the object of public
debate91
. The National Special Crime Unit received more than 450 cases of suspected fraud
with regard to measures adopted as a response to the pandemic92
. In parallel, the National
Audit Office is currently conducting audits regarding implementation of measures
implemented in 2021 and as a follow-up to the audits carried out in 202093
.
81
GRECO Third Evaluation Round – Addendum to the second compliance report on Denmark.
82
Law Nr 1436 from 29 June 2021 on the protection of whistleblowers.
83
Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the
protection of persons who report breaches of Union law.
84
Website of the whistleblower channel in the Danish Data Protection Agency available in English,
https://whistleblower.dk/english.
85
Information received from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit to Denmark;
Datatilsynet (2022), Whistle-blowing at half a year.
86
Input from Denmark for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 14.
87
This is done in order to ensure correct handling of reports concerning the intelligence services, which is
likely to include confidential information. The two channels are placed in the Ministry of Justice and the
Ministry of Defence respectively.
88
Written contribution from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit.
89
Ministry of Justice (2021), Whistleblowing.
90
See also 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 9.
Stakeholders such as the Danish Association of Judges have criticized this as it removes discretion for
judges to consider individual circumstances of a case.
91
Politiken (2022), 'It's completely, completely wrong what's going on': 2 billion taxpayer kroner worth of
rapid tests bought without a tender.
92
Written contribution from the Danish Police in the context of the country visit.
93
Information received from the National Audit Office in the context of the country visit to Denmark.
12
III. MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM
The Constitution provides the overall framework for the protection of the freedom of
expression. The tasks, organisational structure and rules of procedure of the national media
regulatory authority, the Danish Radio and Television Board, are prescribed in law94
.
Secondary legislation also provides safeguards for the independence of the public service
broadcasters95
. There are no specific laws pertaining to transparency of media ownership,
allocation of state advertising, editorial independence or ownership of media companies.
Access to documents is regulated in the Access to Public Administrative Documents Act of
2014. The Audiovisual Media Services Directive96
has been transposed97
.
The existing media self-regulatory system is being assessed in view of possible future
updates. In May 2022, the Government announced the new political Media Agreement for
2022-2025 consisting of different policy initiatives98
. One of the initiatives concerns
examining the future role of the Danish Press Council and a possible creation of a new media
ombudsperson to support it. The ombudsperson could be based on the Swedish model and
could investigate cases on its own initiative and contribute to good journalistic practice
through opinion-forming, media ethics debates and initiatives. The Media Agreement states
an intention to establish a committee with representation from the media industry, experts and
others to make recommendations in this regard with a view to subsequent political
discussions99
. Should the post of the ombudsperson be created, stakeholders have submitted
that it will be important that the ombudsperson is appointed by the media industry and not by
the Government in order to safeguard the editorial independence of the media100
.
Editorial independence has traditionally a strong culture. According to the Danish Media
Liability Act, all news media – broadcast, print and online press – must have one responsible
editor empowered to make a final decision regarding the relevant content101
. There are no
specific legal safeguards regarding editorial independence102
. In practice, this is not being
perceived as generating any major issues103
and the self-regulating body has so far been
successful at securing editorial autonomy of the Danish news media104
, although the MPM
2022 gives some examples of parliamentary parties exerting influence105
. The fact that most
94
The Radio and Television Broadcasting Act, Executive Order on the Radio and Television Board and the
Danish Public Administration Act.
95
The Radio and Television Broadcasting Act, Ordinance of the Radio and Television Broadcasting Act, Act
Amending the Act on Radio and Television Broadcasting Act.
96
Complete transposition of Directive (EU) 2018/1808 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of
certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the
provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market
realities was notified to the Commission on 18 September 2020.
97
Denmark ranks 2nd in the 2022 Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index compared to 4th in
the previous year.
98
Ministry of Culture (2022), Media Agreement for 2022-2025.
99
Ibid, p. 13.
100
Information received from the Danish Union of Journalists in the context of the country visit to Denmark;
Journalisten (2022), Government proposals have raised concerns - but in Sweden the state has no power over
the media ombudsman.
101
The Media Liability Act – Consolidating Act 2018-12-27 no. 1719, sections 3 and 5.
102
2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report for Denmark, pp. 8-9, 16 and 28.
103
Information received from the Danish Media Association, the Danish Union of Journalists and the Danish
Press Council in the context of the country visit to Denmark.
104
2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report for Denmark, p. 17.
105
2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report for Denmark, pp. 16-17.
13
newspapers in Denmark are foundation-owned can serve as a safeguard against commercial
pressure exerted by owners106
. The Media Agreement sets out an intention to study
possibilities to update the current framework for media responsibility to fit the digital media
reality, including responsibilities of influencers over the content that they upload online107
.
The independence of public service media is prescribed by law. In Denmark, there are two
public service broadcasters, Danmarks Radio (DR) and the regional broadcaster TV 2.
According to the Radio and Television Broadcasting Act and further regulation in connection
with the Act, Danish public service media are organised as independent media undertakings
and the State cannot interfere with their programme services or administrative and financial
management108
. Members of, or candidates for, the Parliament, the Regional Council, the
European Parliament or municipal councils may not be members of their respective top
managerial and supervisory boards109
. The relationship between public service media and the
Government is also guided by an arm’s length principle, which means that neither politicians
nor the Ministry of Culture should interfere in the decisions of the public service media once
the general rules have been laid down, or act as arbiters of taste110
. The principle is aimed at
preventing the political level from interfering in editorial discussions and day-to-day
practices111
and is deemed to result in a low-risk score for the independence of public service
media governance and funding112
. Indeed, the Danish public service media do not report any
issues with their independence but identify digital transformation and big tech companies
occasionally removing from their digital distribution services public service media content
without proper explanation as a source of challenges113
. DR and TV 2 are both supervised by
the Radio and Television Board, which issues regular opinions on statements by broadcasters
concerning the performance of public service contracts and licences to provide public service
programming114
. The Media Agreement for 2022-2025 foresees financial strengthening of
DR in the coming years115
.
A possible revision of the Access to Public Administrative Documents Act continues to
be debated. As noted in the 2020 and 2021 Rule of Law Reports116
, the Access to Public
Administrative Documents Act, which provides the rules for all public administration bodies
and Ministries on public access to information and documents, continues to be subject to
certain restrictions limiting public and journalistic access to specific governmental files, in
particular internal working documents of authorities and documents, which are being
106
Blach-Ørsten, M., Burkal, R., Mayerhöffer, E., & Willig, I. (2021), Denmark: High media independence and
informal democratic traditions in the newsroom. In J. Trappel, & T. Tomaz (Eds.), The Media for
Democracy Monitor 2021: How leading news media survive digital transformation (Vol. 2), p. 155.
107
Ministry of Culture (2022) Media Agreement for 2022-2025, p. 13.
108
Input from Denmark for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 20.
109
Article 16(3)(4) and Article 36(2) of LBK Nr. 1350 of 0409/2020 Ordinance of the Radio and Television
Broadcasting Act.
110
Ministry of Culture (2012), Quadrennial periodic report on measures to protect and promote the diversity of
cultural expressions – Denmark, pp. 3-4; written contribution from the Radio and Television Board in the
context of the country visit.
111
Blach-Ørsten, M., Burkal, R., Mayerhöffer, E., & Willig, I. (2021), Denmark: High media independence and
informal democratic traditions in the newsroom. In J. Trappel, & T. Tomaz (Eds.), The Media for
Democracy Monitor 2021: How leading news media survive digital transformation (Vol. 2), p. 167.
112
2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report for Denmark, p. 16 and 18.
113
Written contribution from Danmarks Radio in the context of the country visit.
114
Article 39(1)(3) of LOV nr 2212 of 29/12/2020 Act Amending the Radio and Television Broadcasting Act.
115
Ministry of Culture (2022) Media Agreement for 2022-2025, p. 6.
116
2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 10; 2021 Rule of Law
Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 10.
14
exchanged at a time when a minister needs the advice and counsel of his staff117
. Negotiations
mandated by a Parliament resolution118
are currently ongoing regarding a possible political
agreement to restrict the use of some of these exceptions under the Act, which can have the
effect of keeping the basis of some political agreements confidential119
. No proposed solution
or timeline has been made public120
. The Parliamentary Ombudsperson reports that access to
documents cases is one of the areas of complaints that are growing rapidly. In 2021, the
Ombudsman received 399 complaints related to access to documents, which was an increase
of more than 100 complaints compared to 2020121
.
An action plan on safety of journalists has been launched and the Criminal Code was
amended to introduce more severe sentences for threats to freedom of expression. In
June 2022, the Danish Union of Journalists, the Danish Media Association, International
Media Support, UNESCO Denmark, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Culture,
published a national action plan on the safety of journalists122
. The plan’s aim is to facilitate
journalists’ reporting of harassment and threats. Additionally, in December 2021, the Danish
Criminal Code was amended to make it an aggravating circumstance when a threat is aimed
at preventing the victim from making use of their freedom of speech123
. The law helps
citizens to participate in public debate on social media and applies also to journalists. The
MPM 2022 considers that in Denmark, there is a very low risk to the protection of freedom of
expression, although risks online are more difficult to assess124
and two incidents have been
reported regarding journalists’ ability to publish specific type of information. In December
2021, the Council of Europe’s Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of
journalists published one new alert for Denmark concerning meetings held between the
Danish intelligence services (PET and FE) and three Danish media companies in which the
intelligence services had warned against unlawful disclosure of classified information
following the arrest of four intelligence officers accused of leaking information125
. The
Danish State has clarified that the action was justified in light of the Criminal Code126
.
Danish media stakeholders also point to one strategic lawsuit against public participation
(SLAPP) case in Denmark whereby businesspersons sued a journalist and a daily newspaper
117
Sections 19 to 33 and Section 35 of the Access to Public Administrative Documents Act.
118
Danish Parliament (2021), Resolution on the convening of negotiations on the Danish Public Access Act;
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 10.
119
According to Recommendation CM/Rec(2002)2 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to
member states on access to official documents, Member States may limit the right of access to official
documents when set down precisely in law, necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to one of the
listed aims.
120
Information received from the Ministry of Justice, Danish Media Association, the Danish Union of
Journalists and the Danish Press Council in the context of the country visit to Denmark.
121
Parliamentary Ombudsman (2022), 2021 Annual Report, p. 6.
122
Danish Union of Journalists (2022) Action Plan on the Safety of Journalists.
123
Input from the Danish Government for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 20; law Nr. 2601 of 28 December
2021, § 1(5).
124
2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, country report for Denmark, p. 10; There are no reports of journalists being
killed, assaulted or arbitrarily arrested.
125
Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists, Denmark;
flagged also in the Contribution from the Danish Human Rights Institute via ENNHRI for the 2022 Rule of
Law Report.
126
Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists, Denmark,
Reply from the Danish authorities (21 March 2022).
15
for a number of critical articles but later dropped the case127
. As part of the public discussion
around the case, the Chairman of the Danish Bar Council wrote a statement, stressing the
need for independent media and asking lawyers to look out for SLAPP cases and consider
carefully whether to go to court against journalists and media128
.
IV. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES
Denmark has a unicameral, parliamentary system of government, in which both the
Government and members of Parliament can propose legislation, although draft bills are in
general presented by the Government. In the absence of a constitutional court, ex-post
constitutionality review can be carried out by all courts in concrete cases129
. The
Parliamentary Ombudsperson provides oversight on decisions by public authorities and the
Danish Institute for Human Rights monitors the respect of fundamental rights.
The guidelines of Parliament’s Standing Orders Committee on fast-track procedures
have been overall respected notwithstanding an increase in legislative activity in 2021.
In 2021, Parliament experienced a significant increase in legislative activity130
. This was
following an agreement between Parliament and Government in 2020 to limit the number of
legislative proposals and motions due to the COVID-19 pandemic131
. As noted in the 2021
Rule of Law Report, a report by the Standing Orders Committee from March 2021132
proposed a number of guidelines for the use of fast-track proceedings133
. It also highlights the
importance of submitting all proposals, including urgent ones, to a public consultation. After
a period in 2020-2021 with a stronger use of fast-track proceedings, the proportion of fast-
track proceedings is slowly diminishing134
. Since the adoption of the Standing Orders
Committee report in March 2021, 27 legislative drafts were presented and adopted by
Parliament under the fast-track proceedings, which were overall complying with the formal
127
Journalisten (2022), Plaintiffs dropped million-kroner case against Jonas; Information received from the
Danish Press Council, the Danish Media Association and the Danish Union of Journalists in the context of
the country visit to Denmark.
128
Danish Bar and Law Society (2022), Bar Council says: Lawyers must watch out for SLAPP cases.
129
This happens rarely and there has only been one case in which the Supreme Court decided to disapply a law
for being incompatible with the Constitution that is the 1999, Tvind case, U 1999.841 H.
130
For the period October 2020 – October 2021, 259 proposals were submitted to Parliament, the highest
number in the past ten years. Input from Denmark for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 22 and written
contribution from the Danish Parliament Standing Orders Committee in the context of the country visit.
131
Information received from the Danish Parliament Standing Orders Committee during the country visit.
132
Standing Orders Committee (2021), Report concerning urgent consideration of government draft laws.
133
The draft legislation should contain a sunset clause, leading to an act ceasing to apply, unless Parliament
before that date has adopted a revision of the relevant provision. Nevertheless, there are exemptions to the
use of the sunset clause, for example it is not necessary where the effect of the legislation according to its
content is limited or specific well-founded circumstances require an absence of a sunset clause. Furthermore,
if there has been no consultation due to extraordinary circumstances, Parliament needs to be provided with
an explanation of the relevant circumstances. Written contribution from the Ministry of Justice in the context
of the country visit.
134
The sessional year of the Parliament runs from the first Tuesday of October until the first Tuesday of
October the following year. In this context, it is also worth noting that the periods October 2019 – October
2020 and October 2020 – October 2021 were marked by an increase in laws adopted in an expedited
procedure, i.e. within 30 days after their proposal, in particular due to the COVID-19-crisis (22% and 14%,
respectively). For the period October 2021 – 7 April 2022, the proportion of expedited procedures (5%)
appears to be reverting toward the usual proportion (between 3% and 5% between 2012 and 2019). Input
from Denmark for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 22 and written contribution from the Ministry of Justice
in the context of the country visit.
16
requirements of the guidelines135
. While the general framework for stakeholder consultation
is considered to be robust136
, some stakeholders have continued to refer to shortened
consultation periods which can limit the ability to participate for civil society organisations
with fewer resources137
.
A Government report on the use of the new Epidemic Act was subject to a public
consultation. As noted in the 2021 Rule of Law Report, a new Epidemic Act was passed on
23 February 2021 providing for a greater involvement of the Parliament when handling
COVID-19 and other future epidemics138
. Under this Act, before the Government issues an
executive order on areas enabled in the Epidemic Act, it must be presented to the
Parliamentary Committee of Epidemics139
. In cases of immediate danger or threats to public
health, the consultation of that Committee can be postponed until after the executive order
has been issued, but the consultation must take place at the earliest possible date thereafter140
.
This derogation has not been used141
. In October 2021, the Government sent a report on the
use of the new Epidemic Act to Parliament142
. The report touches upon the experiences of the
public authorities in applying the law, such as the impact of the limitation of executive orders
to four weeks or the experience in applying the rules on automatic local closures.
Subsequently, in February 2022, the Government submitted to Parliament the responses to
the report received in the public consultation; the stakeholders have welcomed the review,
while among other commenting on the composition on the Epidemics Commission or their
experiences on public consultations143
. The Minister of Health has discussed the report and
the responses from the public consultation with parties in the Parliament, and is expected to
prepare a change relating to the rules of procedure for the Epidemics Commission, which will
be subject to a public consultation144
. The Parliamentary Ombudsman has received about 100
complaints on Government measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic145
. The Supreme
Court did not review any cases challenging Government measures adopted in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic146
.
The first example of the new commission of scrutiny procedure examined the decision
on culling of mink and has submitted its report to a Parliament committee on 30 June
2022. As noted in the 2021 Rule of Law Report, in April 2021, Parliament passed legislation
introducing a new system of commissions of scrutiny147
, with commissions able to be
135
Written contribution from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit.
136
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 12.
137
Contribution from the European Civic Forum for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 4
138
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 12.
139
Section 9, first paragraph of the Epidemics Act, Law Nr. 285 of 27 February 2021.
140
If the committee objects, the Government must repeal the executive order. Section 9, second paragraph of
the Epidemics Act, Law Nr. 285 of 27 February 2021.
141
Input from Denmark for the 2022 Rule of Law report, p. 23.
142
Danish Ministry of Health (2021), Report to Parliament on the application of the Epidemics Act.
143
Danish Parliament (2022), Consultation summary and consultation response regarding the Ministry of
Health's statement on the application of the Epidemics Act, from the Minister of Health.
144
Input from Denmark for the 2022 Rule of Law report, p. 23 and information received from the Ministry of
Health in the context of the country visit.
145
The types of complaints concerned a variety of issues, such as access to information by journalists,
vaccination framework or whether vaccines should be offered to children. The Parliamentary Ombudsman
also carried out own-initiative investigations, for example how the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions were
being applied in prisons. Parliamentary Ombudsman (2022), Annual report 2021, p. 5 and information
received from the Parliamentary Ombudsman in the context of the country visit.
146
Information received from the Supreme Court in the context of the country visit.
147
Act amending the Act on Commissions of Inquiry and the Code of Judicial Procedure.
17
established under the control of Parliament to carry out a more focused investigation on
specific matters within 12 months148
. The first such commission was set up to examine the
Government’s actions related to the culling of minks, including whether there was a sufficient
legal basis for the decision149
. The commission of scrutiny carried out a number of hearings,
which involved the Prime Minister and a number of members of Government150
. Its mandate
was further expanded in November 2021151
to include the outreach activities by the police
using so-called ‘action cards’. On 30 June 2022, the commission delivered its report to the
Parliament’s Scrutiny Committee152
, which, on 5 July 2022, endorsed the commission’s
findings as regards the Prime Minister and a former minister153
.
The Court of Impeachment has rendered an important ruling relating to the
accountability of a former minister. The Court of Impeachment consists of up to 15
Supreme Court judges and the same number of members elected by the Parliament154
.
According to the Ministerial Responsibility Act, ministers can be sanctioned if they
intentionally or through gross negligence fail to fulfil the duties incumbent on them under the
Constitution, legislation in general or pertaining to the nature of their office155
. In December
2021, the Court of Impeachment sentenced a former minister156
. Judgments by the Court of
Impeachment are very rare and since its establishment in 1849, there have been only six
impeachment proceedings (the previous one being in 1995)157
.
The Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Danish Institute for Human Rights consider
that the authorities cooperate effectively with them and follow-up on their
recommendations. The Parliamentary Ombudsman has sufficient resources to fulfil its
mission158
, but the trend towards an increasing number of complaints may pose a challenge in
the future159
. In terms of complaints received in 2021160
, since the COVID-19 pandemic they
148
By contrast, the Government is responsible for commissions of inquiry. See also 2021 Rule of Law Report,
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 13.
149
The Mink Commission (2021), Terms of reference.
150
This has included the Minister of Finance, Minister of Justice and Minister of Health. The Mink
Commission (2022), Hearings.
151
The Mink Commission (2021), Terms of reference.
152
The Mink Commission (2022), The commission of scrutiny has delivered its report.
153
DR (2022), Mette Frederiksen gets a nose for her role in the mink case, TV 2 (2022), Mette Frederiksen
officially gets a nose.
154
The politically elected members are supposed to add their political experience to the assessment of cases
against ministers. They cannot be members of Parliament. In the case at hand, there were only 26 judges
because two Supreme Court judges had recused themselves and the number of politically elected members
was adjusted downwards accordingly. Danish Parliament (2022), Court of Impeachment and information
received from the Supreme Court during the country visit.
155
Article § 5, paragraph 1 of the Act on Ministerial Responsibility.
156
The former minister was found guilty to have, in the period from 10 February to 18 March 2016, initiated
and maintained a separated accommodation of asylum-seeking spouses and cohabiting couples, where at
least one party was under 18 years of age, in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights and in breach of general principles of administrative law. Court of Impeachment, judgment of 13
December 2021, p. 143-144. Court of Impeachment (2021), The Court of Impeachment has ruled in the case
against former Minister Inger Støjberg.
157
Danish Parliament (2022), Court of Impeachment.
158
The Parliament allocated approximately EUR 12.5 million (DKK 93.3 million) in annual funding of the
Ombudsman institution in 2021. Input from Denmark for the 2022 Rule of Law report, p. 25.
159
According to the Ombudsman’s data for 2021, the institution handled a total of 5 587 cases of which about
14% led to led to an investigation (815 cases, of which 200 full investigations and 615 shortened
investigations). Out of the 200 full investigations, 78 have led to criticism or recommendations. In 2021, the
Parliamentary Ombudsman opened 5 643 cases, which is the second highest number in the history of this
18
have more frequently concerned delays in the handling of administrative procedures. Own-
initiative investigations have particularly focused on the handling of family matters and
access to documents requests161
. The Parliamentary Ombudsman did not experience any
obstruction or refusal to cooperate by public authorities and considers the Ombudsman’s
recommendations are being implemented162
. The Danish Institute for Human Rights which is
the independent National Human Rights Institution accreddited with A-Status, reports that the
public authorities tend to take recommendations from the Institute into thorough
consideration163
. The Institute considers to have sufficient resources164
.
On 1 January 2022, Denmark had 3 leading judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights pending implementation165
. At that time, Denmark’s rate of leading
judgments from the past 10 years that remained pending was at 60% and the average time
that the judgments had been pending implementation was only 6 months166
. The former is
explained by the fact that only 5 European Court of Human Rights judgments have been
delivered against Denmark in that period, 3 of which were made final in the last 2 years and
were pending implementation167
. On 1 July 2022, the number of leading judgments pending
implementation remains at 3168
.
The civic space in Denmark remains open with a robust framework for the involvement
of civil society organisations. The civic space in Denmark continues to be considered as
open169
with robust mechanisms for the involvement of civil society organisations170
. In
November 2021, the Government parties agreed to distribute approximately EUR 115 million
(DKK 860.5 million) over the next four years, into the social, health and labor market sector,
which also includes a civil society strategy for the period 2022-2025 for the aforementioned
body and just below the record number 5 912 cases in 2020. Parliamentary Ombudsman (2022), Annual
report 2021, p. 8 and 72 and information received from the Parliamentary Ombudsman in the context of the
country visit.
160
Parliamentary Ombudsman (2022), Annual report 2021, p. 6-8.
161
In 2021, the Ombudsman opened an own initiative investigation into the time taken by the Family Court to
deal with cases on supervised access after judgment and temporary custody. The Ombudsman has also
monitored the authorities' processing times for replying to access to documents requests from journalists and
other individuals. Parliamentary Ombudsman (2022), Annual report 2021, p. 6.
162
Information received from the Parliamentary Ombudsman during the country visit.
163
Contribution from the Danish Human Rights Institute via ENNHRI for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 2
and information received from the Danish Human Rights Institute in the context of the country visit.
164
Information received from the Danish Human Rights Institute in the context of the country visit.
165
The adoption of necessary execution measures for a judgment by the European Court of Human Rights is
supervised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. It is the Committee’s practice to group
cases against a State requiring similar execution measures, particularly general measures, and examine them
jointly. The first case in the group is designated as the leading case as regards the supervision of the general
measures and repetitive cases within the group can be closed when it is assessed that all possible individual
measures needed to provide redress to the applicant have been taken.
166
All figures are calculated by the European Implementation Network and are based on the number of cases
that are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2022. See the Contribution from the
European Implementation Network for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 38.
167
Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 15 September 2020, Aggerholm v. Denmark, 45439/18,
pending implementation since 2020, and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights of 9 July 2021,
M.A. v. Denmark, 6697/18 and of 7 December 2021 Savran v. Denmark 57467/15, both pending
implementation since 2021.
168
Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC).
169
Rating given by CIVICUS, ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed,
repressed and closed.
170
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 14.
19
sectors171
. The Danish Institute for Human Rights has raised concerns regarding the
prohibition of receiving donations from certain physical persons and legal entities172
and the
draft law on introducing the possibility of police imposing an assembly ban in a locality in
order to maintain public order173
. Though the assembly-ban contained in the ‘Security for all
Danes’ proposal was strongly opposed by civil society and ultimately rejected by Parliament
in June 2021, stakeholders consider that it demonstrated the need for an increased
involvement of civil society organisations in the preparation of legislative proposals,
especially related to security measures, that could negatively impact civic space174
.
171
The civil society strategy aims to support volunteer organisations by focusing on strengthened cooperation
with civil society on development of welfare solutions Nevertheless, the proposed financing model is
considered as uncertain by some civil society organisations. Previously, civil society organisations used to
apply for funding, whereas under the current system fixed amounts are distributed. Some organisations are
concerned whether they will be allocated sufficient funds. This funding has replaced the Governments
previous social investment fund (Satspuljen). Franet (2022), Country research - Legal environment and
space of civil society organisations in supporting fundamental rights – Denmark, p. 3.
172
In March 2021, legislation introduced a prohibition of receiving donations from certain physical persons and
legal entities, which raised some concerns by the Danish Human Rights Institute and stakeholders due to a
risk of arbitrariness in its application. In March 2022, a first individual was added to the list of prohibited
donors. 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Denmark, p. 14 and
information received from the Danish Institute for Human Rights during the country visit.
173
Contribution from the Danish Human Rights Institute via ENNHRI for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 3.
174
Franet (2022), Country research - Legal environment and space of civil society organisations in supporting
fundamental rights – Denmark, p. 5, contribution from the Danish Human Rights Institute via ENNHRI for
the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 3, contribution from the European Civic Forum for the 2022 Rule of Law
Report, p. 3, and written contribution from Nyt Europa in the context of the country visit.
20
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order*
* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2022 Rule of Law report
can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2022-rule-law-report-targeted-stakeholder-
consultation_en.
Agency for modernisation (2017), Code of conduct in the public sector
https://modst.dk/media/18742/code-of-conduct-in-the-public-sectorforside.pdf.
Altinget (2022), ‘Parties to negotiate on court finances: “It is not a law of nature that the agreement
must be administrative”’ (Partier vil forhandle om domstolenes økonomi: “Det er jo ingen naturlov,
at aftalen skal være administrativ”) https://www.altinget.dk/embedsvaerk/artikel/partier-vil-
forhandle-om-domstolenes-oekonomi-det-er-jo-ingen-naturlov-at-aftalen-skal-vaere-administrativ.
Altinget (2022), Hækkerup's exit reignits debate over conflict of interest: Here are the top politicians
who took the revolving door before him (Hækkerups exit genantænder debat om interessekonflikt:
Her er de toppolitikere, der tog svingdøren før ham)
https://www.altinget.dk/civilsamfund/artikel/haekkerups-exit-genantaender-debat-om-
interessekonflikt-her-er-de-toppolitikere-der-tog-svingdoeren-foer-ham.
Altinget (2022), Hækkerup's shift calls for democratic self-examination (Hækkerups skift kalder på
demokratisk selvransagelse) https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/haekkerups-skift-kalder-paa-demokratisk-
selvransagelse.
Blach-Ørsten, M., Burkal, R., Mayerhöffer, E., & Willig, I. (2021). Denmark: High media
independence and informal democratic traditions in the newsroom. In J. Trappel, & T. Tomaz (Eds.),
The Media for Democracy Monitor 2021: How leading news media survive digital transformation
(Vol. 2) p 167. Nordicom, University of Gothenburg https://doi.org/10.48335/9789188855428-4.
Berlingske Tidende (2022), Commentary: Long waiting times must not undermine confidence in the
justice system (Kommentar: Lange ventetider må ikke ødelægge tilliden til retssystemet)
https://www.berlingske.dk/kommentarer/lange-ventetider-oedelaegger-tilliden-til-retssystemet.
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2022), Media pluralism monitor 2022 – country
report on Denmark.
CEPEJ (2021), Study on the functioning of the judicial systems in the EU Member States.
Civicus, Monitor tracking civic space – Denmark https://rsf.org/en/denmark.
Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists –
Denmark https://fom.coe.int/en/alerte/detail/107636699.
Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2002), Recommendation CM/Rec(2002)2 of the
Committee of Ministers to member states on access to official documents.
Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2010), Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the
Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities.
Court of Impeachment (2021), The Court of Impeachment has ruled in the case against former
Minister Inger Støjberg (Rigsretten har afsagt dom i sagen mod fhv. minister Inger Støjberg)
https://rigsretten.dk/aktuelt/2021/12/rigsretten-har-afsagt-dom-i-sagen-mod-fhv-minister-inger-
stoejberg/.
Court of Impeachment, judgment of 13 December 2021.
Danish Association of Judges (2021), Response to public consultation on the draft law amending the
Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Road Traffic Act
https://www.dommerforeningen.dk/dommerforeningen/hoeringssvar/2021/bemaerkninger-til-
lovudkast-om-aendring-af-straffeloven-retsplejeloven-og-faerdselsloven-implementering-af-
initiativer-i-aftaler-om-politiets-og-anklagemyndighedens-oekonomi/.
21
Danish Association of Judges (2022), Response to the public consultation on the draft law amending
the Penal Code, the Code of Judicial Procedure and various other laws (Streamlining the criminal
case chain and the tribunal process, etc. in the Juvenile Delinquency Board, increased access to
disclosure and recording of photos, improving police opportunities for investigation, etc.)
https://www.dommerforeningen.dk/media/74901/justitsministeriet.pdf.
Danish Association of Judges (2022), Response to the public consultation on the draft law on police
activities https://www.dommerforeningen.dk/dommerforeningen/hoeringssvar/2022/hoeringssvar-til-
lovudkast-om-politiets-virksomhed-mv/.
Danish Association of Judges (2022), Written contribution from the Danish Association of Judges for
the 2022 Rule of Law Report in the context of the country visit.
Danish Bar and Law Society (2021), Response to public consultation on the draft law amending the
Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Road Traffic Act
https://www.advokatsamfundet.dk/om-advokatsamfundet/advokatradet/horingssvar-liste/2021/2021-
2747-strafferetsudvalget.
Danish Bar and Law Society (2022), Bar Council says: Lawyers must watch out for SLAPP cases
(Advokatrådet mener: Advokater skal passe på SLAPP-sager)
https://www.advokatsamfundet.dk/nyheder-medier/nyheder/2022/advokatradet-mener-advokater-skal-
passe-pa-slapp-sager/.
Danish Bar and Law Society (2022), Long waiting times must not undermine confidence in the justice
system (Kommentar: Lange ventetider må ikke ødelægge tilliden til retssystemet)
https://www.advokatsamfundet.dk/nyheder-medier/nyheder/2022/kommentar-lange-ventetider-ma-
ikke-odelaegge-tilliden-til-retssystemet/.
Danish Government (2020), Reflection Paper for an Agreement on the finances of the Police and
Prosecutor’s Office 2021-2024 Ministry of Justice
https://www.justitsministeriet.dk/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/trygheden_foerst_final-a.pdf.
Danish Government (2021), Input from Denmark for the 2021 Rule of Law Report.
Danish Government (2022), Input from Denmark for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.
Danish Institute for Human Rights (2021), Response to public consultation on the draft law amending
the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Road Traffic Act
https://menneskeret.dk/sites/menneskeret.dk/files/media/document/H%C3%B8ringssvar%20vedr.%20
forslag%20til%20lov%20om%20%C3%A6ndring%20af%20straffeloven%2C%20retsplejeloven%20
og%20f%C3%A6rdselsloven%20%28Implementering%20af%20initiativer%20i%20aftale%20om%2
0politiets%20anklagemyndighedens%20%C3%B8konomi%202021-2023%29.pdf.
Danish Institute for Human Rights (2022), Response to public consultation an Act amending the
Penal Code, the Code of Judicial Procedure and various other laws (Streamlining the criminal case
chain and the tribunal process, etc. in the Juvenile Delinquency Board, increased access to disclosure
and recording of photos, improving police opportunities for investigation, etc.)
https://menneskeret.dk/hoeringssvar/naevnsprocessen-mv-ungdomskriminalitetsnaevnet-politiets-
muligheder-efterforskning.
Danish Parliament (2021), Resolution on the convening of negotiations on the Danish Public Access
Act https://www.ft.dk/samling/20201/beslutningsforslag/B169/som_vedtaget.htm.
Danish Parliament (2022), Court of Impeachment (Rigsretten)
https://www.ft.dk/da/folkestyret/domstolene/rigsretten.
Danish Parliament (2022), Consultation summary and consultation response regarding the Ministry of
Health's statement on the application of the Epidemics Act, from the Minister of Health,
(Høringsresume og høringssvar vedr. Sundhedsministeriets redegørelse om anvendelse af
epidemiloven, fra sundhedsministeren)
https://www.ft.dk/samling/20211/almdel/epi/bilag/344/index.htm.
22
Danish Parliamentary Standing Orders Committee (2022), Written contribution from the Danish
Parliamentary Standing Orders Committee for the 2022 Rule of Law Report in the context of the
country visit.
Danish Police (2022), Written contribution from the Danish Police for the 2022 Rule of Law Report in
the context of the country visit.
Danish Radio and Television Board (2022), Written contribution from the Danish Radio and
Television Board for the 2022 Rule of Law Report in the context of the country visit.
Danmarks Radio (2022), Written contribution from Danmarks Radio for the 2022 Rule of Law Report
in the context of the country visit.
Danish Union of Journalists (2022), Action Plan on the Safety of Journalists (Dansk handlingsplan for
sikkerhed for journalister) https://journalistforbundet.dk/nyhed/ny-faelles-dansk-handlingsplan-
journalisters-sikkerhed.
Datatilsynet (2022), Whistle-blowing at half a year (Whistleblowerordning fylder et halvt år)
https://www.datatilsynet.dk/presse-og-nyheder/nyhedsarkiv/2022/jun/whistleblowerordning-fylder-et-
halvt-aar.
Directive (EU) 2018/1808 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of
audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market
realities.
Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the
protection of persons who report breaches of Union law.
Directorate-General for Communication (2019), Flash Eurobarometer 482: businesses’ attitudes
towards corruption in the EU.
Directorate-General for Communication (2020), Special Eurobarometer 502: corruption.
Directorate-General for Communication (2022), Flash Eurobarometer 507: businesses’ attitudes
towards corruption in the EU.
Directorate-General for Communication (2022), Special Eurobarometer 523: corruption.
DR (2022), Mette Frederiksen gets a nose for her role in the mink case (Mette Frederiksen får en
næse for sin rolle i minksagen) https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/politik/mette-frederiksen-faar-en-naese-
sin-rolle-i-minksagen.
Employee and Competence Agency (2022), Written contribution from the Employee and Competence
Agency in the context of the country visit.
ENNHRI (2022), Contribution from the Danish Human Rights Institute via ENNHRI for the 2022
Rule of Law Report.
European Civic Forum (2022), Contribution from the European Civic Forum for the 2022 Rule of
Law Report https://civicspacewatch.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Denmark.pdf.
European Commission (2020), 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation
in Denmark.
European Commission (2021), 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation
in Denmark.
European Commission (2022), 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
European Court of Human Rights, judgment of judgment of 15 September 2020, Aggerholm v.
Denmark, 45439/18.
European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 20 October 2015, Dvorski v. Croatia, 25703/11.
European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 9 July 2021, M.A. v. Denmark, 6697/18.
23
European Implementation Network (2022), Contribution from the European Implementation Network
for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.
Franet, Danish Institute for Human Rights (2022), Country research - Legal environment and space of
civil society organisations in supporting fundamental rights – Denmark, Vienna, EU Agency for
Fundamental Rights, https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2022/civic-space-2022-update#country-
related.
GRECO (2019), Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report on Denmark on preventing corruption
and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement
agencies.
GRECO (2021), Third Evaluation Round – Addendum to the second compliance report on Denmark.
GRECO (2021), Fifth Evaluation Round – Compliance Report on Denmark on preventing corruption
and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement
agencies.
Journalisten (2022), Government proposals have raised concerns - but in Sweden the state has no
power over the media ombudsman (Regeringens forslag har vakt bekymring – men i Sverige har
staten ingen magt over medieombudsmanden) https://journalisten.dk/regeringens-forslag-har-vakt-
bekymring-men-i-sverige-har-staten-ingen-magt-over-medieombudsmanden/.
Journalisten (2022), Plaintiffs dropped million-kroner case against Jonas (Sagsøgere droppede
millionsag mod Jonas, inden den gik i gang: ”Det viser andre, at det ikke har gang på jord)
https://journalisten.dk/sagsoegere-droppede-millionsag-mod-jonas-inden-den-gik-i-gang-det-viser-
andre-at-det-ikke-har-gang-paa-jord/.
Ministry of Culture (2012), Quadrennial periodic report on measures to protect and promote the
diversity of cultural expressions – Denmark
https://en.unesco.org/creativity/sites/creativity/files/periodic_reports/old/denmark_report_ownformat_
en_2012.pdf.
Ministry of Culture (2022), Media Agreement for 2022-2025 (Medieaftale for 2022-2025: Den
demokratiske samtale skal styrkes) https://kum.dk/aktuelt/nyheder/medieaftale-styrker-den-
demokratiske-samtale.
Ministry of Health (2021), Report to Parliament on the application of the Epidemics Act (Redegørelse
til Folketinget om anvendelse af epidemiloven)
https://prodstoragehoeringspo.blob.core.windows.net/4f1363f7-9a86-40a5-86a7-
e5f7a90a53a6/Redeg%C3%B8relse%20til%20Folketinget%20om%20anvendelse%20af%20epidemil
oven.pdf.
Ministry of Justice (2021), Whistleblowing https://www.justitsministeriet.dk/temaer/whistleblowing/.
Ministry of Justice (2022), Written contribution from the Ministry of Justice for the 2022 Rule of Law
Report in the context of the country visit.
National Courts Administration (2021), Digitisation of new criminal and probate system under way
(Digitaliseringen af nyt straffe- og skiftesystem sat i gang)
https://www.domstol.dk/aktuelt/2021/10/digitaliseringen-af-nyt-straffe-og-skiftesystem-sat-i-
gang/#straffe%20skifte.
National Courts Administration (2022), Annual report 2021 has been published (Årsberetning 2021 er
udkommet) https://domstol.dk/aktuelt/2022/3/aarsberetning-2021-er-udkommet/.
National Court Administration (2022), Even longer processing times in 2021 (Endnu længere
sagsbehandlingstider i 2021) https://domstol.dk/aktuelt/2022/3/endnu-laengere-sagsbehandlingstider-
i-2021/.
National Courts Administration (2022), Graph of average case processing time in selected criminal
cases in district courts 2012-2021 https://domstol.dk/media/ycrp14yf/1.png.
24
National Courts Administration (2022), Judgments database is open (Domsdatabasen er åben)
https://domsdatabasen.dk/nyheder/domsdatabasen-er-aben/.
National Courts Administration (2022), Key figures on case turnover and processing times (Nøgletal
om sagsflow og sagsbehandlingstider) https://www.domstol.dk/media/1qbewjdg/noegletal-2021.pdf.
Nyt Europa (2022), Written contribution from Nyt Europa for the 2022 Rule of Law Report in the
context of the country visit.
Parliamentary Ombudsman (2022), 2021 Annual Report
https://www.ombudsmanden.dk/findviden/fob/fob2021/.
Politiken (2021), Broad majority in parliament wants to tighten rules and ban Britt Bager-finten
(Bredt flertal i Folketinget vil stramme regler og forbyde Britt Bager-finten)
https://politiken.dk/indland/art8242082/Bredt-flertal-i-Folketinget-vil-stramme-regler-og-forbyde-
Britt-Bager-finten.
Politiken (2022), The Liberal Party kept recipients of party support secret: ‘If the rest of us filled out
forms from Tax or other authorities in the same way, we would not get away with it’, (Venstre holdt
modtagere af partistøtte hemmelige: »Hvis vi andre udfyldte formularer fra Skat eller andre
myndigheder på samme måde, så ville vi ikke slippe godt fra det«)
https://politiken.dk/indland/art8595893/%C2%BBHvis-vi-andre-udfyldte-formularer-fra-Skat-eller-
andre-myndigheder-p%C3%A5-samme-m%C3%A5de-s%C3%A5-ville-vi-ikke-slippe-godt-fra-
det%C2%AB.
Politiken (2022), 'It's completely, completely wrong what's going on': 2 billion taxpayer kroner worth
of rapid tests bought without a tender (»Det er helt, helt galt, hvad der foregår«: Kviktests for 2
milliarder skattekroner er købt uden udbud) https://politiken.dk/indland/art8563978/Kviktests-for-2-
milliarder-skattekroner-er-k%C3%B8bt-uden-udbud.
Reporters without Borders – Denmark https://rsf.org/en/denmark.
Standing Orders Committee (2021), Report concerning urgent consideration of government draft laws
(Betænkning og indstillingomændring af forretningsorden for Folketinget)
https://www.ft.dk/ripdf/samling/20201/beretningalmenart/20201_BER_15.pdf.
The Mink Commission (2021), Terms of reference (Kommissorium for en granskningskommission om
sagen om aflivning af mink) https://www.minkkommissionen.dk/da/kommissorium.
The Mink Commission (2022), Hearings (Afhøringer)
https://www.minkkommissionen.dk/da/afh%C3%B8ringer.
The Mink Commission (2022), The commission of scrutiny has delivered its report
(Granskningskommissionen har afleveret sin beretning)
https://www.minkkommissionen.dk/da/nyheder/2022/06/beretningen.
Transparency International (2022), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021.
TV 2 (2022), Mette Frederiksen officially gets a nose (Mette Frederiksen får officielt næse)
https://nyheder.tv2.dk/politik/2022-07-05-mette-frederiksen-faar-officielt-naese.
TV 2 (2022), That's why former ministers are so attractive to business (Derfor er tidligere ministre så
attraktive for erhvervslivet) https://nyheder.tv2.dk/business/2022-05-02-derfor-er-tidligere-ministre-
saa-attraktive-for-erhvervslivet.
25
Annex II: Country visit to Denmark
The Commission services held virtual meetings in April 2022 with:
• Danish Bar and Law Society
• Danish Media Association
• Danish Union of Journalists
• Danish Press Council
• Danish Institute for Human Rights
• Dansk Ungdoms Faellesraad
• Employee and Competence Agency
• Judges Association
• Ministry of Business
• Ministry of Culture
• Ministry of Justice
• National Audit Office
• National Court Administration
• Nyt Europa
• Parliamentary Ombudsman
• Standing Orders Committee of the Parliament
• Supreme Court
• Transparency International Denmark
* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:
• Amnesty International
• Article 19
• Civil Liberties Union for Europe
• Civil Society Europe
• European Centre for Press and Media Freedom
• European Civic Forum
• European Federation of Journalists
• European Partnership for Democracy
• European Youth Forum
• Free Press Unlimited
• Human Rights Watch
• ILGA Europe
• International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
• International Press Institute
• Open Society European Policy Institute ( OSEPI)
• Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa
• Philea
• Reporters Without Borders
• Transparency International Europe


Udenrigsministeriet
Asiatisk Plads 2
DK-1448 København K
Telefon +45 33 92 00 00
Telefax +45 32 54 05 33
E-mail: um@um.dk
http://www.um.dk
Girokonto 3 00 18 06
Medlemmerne af Folketingets Europaudvalg
Bilag Sagsnummer Kontor
3 2022-45 EKN 14. juli 2022
RETSSTATSRAPPORT
Kommissionens årlige rapport om retsstatssituationen i EU
Til underretning for Folketingets Europaudvalg vedlægges Kommissio-
nens meddelelse om retsstatssituationen i EU, landekapitlet om Dan-
mark og Kommissionens anbefalinger til medlemslandene. Samtlige do-
kumenter i retsstatsrapporten er offentliggjort på Kommissionens hjem-
meside på dette link: 2022 Rule of law report - Communication and
country chapters | European Commission (europa.eu)
Jeppe Kofod
Offentligt
KOM (2022) 0500 - Bilag 1
Europaudvalget 2022


EN EN
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Luxembourg, 13.7.2022
COM(2022) 500 final
ANNEX
ANNEX
to the
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2022 Rule of Law Report
The rule of law situation in the European Union
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1
ANNEX
Recommendations to the Member States
Belgium
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the national Recovery and Resilience
Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system, it is recommended to Belgium to:
• Continue measures to provide adequate human and financial resources for the justice
system as a whole, taking into account European standards on resources for the justice
system.
• Complete the legislative reform on lobbying, establishing a framework including a
transparency register and a legislative footprint, covering both members of Parliament and
Government.
• Strengthen the integrity framework, including by adopting a Code of Conduct covering all
members of ministerial private offices, rules on gifts and benefits for members of
Parliament and Government and rules on revolving doors for government and their private
offices.
• Strengthen the framework for access to official documents, in particular by improving
request and appeal processes and by limiting the grounds for rejection of disclosure
requests, taking into account European standards on access to official documents.
2
Bulgaria
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the national Recovery and Resilience
Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system and the anti-corruption framework and the
remaining commitments under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, it is
recommended to Bulgaria to:
• Ensure timely ordinary competitions for promotion to avoid long-term secondment of
judges to fill in vacant positions, taking into account European standards on secondment of
judges.
• Advance with the legislative amendments aiming at improving the functioning of the
Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council and avoiding the risk of political influence,
in particular by involving judicial bodies in the selection of its members.
• Take steps to adapt the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council, taking into account
European standards on Councils for the Judiciary.
• Continue the implementation of measures to improve the integrity of the specific sectors of
the public administration, including measures tailored to the police and the judiciary.
• Ensure that the institutional reforms of the Anti-Corruption Commission and the
specialised judicial authorities lead to an improved effectiveness of investigations and a
robust track-record of prosecution and final judgments in high-level corruption cases.
• Improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising, in particular with regard to state
advertising contracted through intermediaries, such as media agencies.
3
Czechia
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the national Recovery and Resilience
Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system and the anti-corruption framework, it is
recommended to Czechia to:
• Take forward the reform of the prosecution service retaining the original aim to introduce
safeguards for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General and other chief public prosecutors,
taking into account European standards on the independence and autonomy of the
prosecution.
• Take measures to reduce the length of proceedings to ensure a robust track record of
investigations, prosecutions and final judgments in high-level corruption cases.
• Strengthen the integrity framework for members of Parliament, in particular by ensuring
that Codes of Ethics are in place for both Houses of Parliament.
• Complete the revision of legislation on asset declarations and on conflict of interests,
including by clarifying the definition of beneficial ownership and progress with further
reforms relating to transparency of information on media ownership.
• Strengthen the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance of public
service media taking into account European standards on public service media.
• Take steps to establish a National Human Rights Institution taking into account the UN
Paris Principles.
4
Denmark
It is recommended to Denmark to:
• Ensure adequate human and financial resources for the justice system in the next
multiannual framework, taking into account European standards on resources for the justice
system.
• Adopt new legislation on political party financing that will address the issue of multiple
and anonymous donations and introduce sanctions for breaching the rules on the political
parties framework.
• Introduce rules on ‘revolving doors’ for ministers and on lobbying, and ensure adequate
control of asset declarations submitted by persons entrusted with top executive functions.
• Continue the process geared at reforming the Access to Public Administrative Documents
Act in order to strengthen the right to access documents, in particular by limiting the
grounds for rejection of disclosure requests, taking into account the European standards on
access to official documents.
5
Germany
It is recommended to Germany to:
• Continue efforts to provide adequate resources for the justice system as part of the new pact
of the rule of law, including on the level of salaries for judges, taking into account European
standards on resources and remuneration for the justice system.
• Proceed with plans to introduce a ‘legislative footprint’ to allow for the monitoring and
tracing of all interest representatives who seek to influence and contribute to specific
legislative texts.
• Strengthen the existing rules on revolving doors by increasing consistency of the different
applicable rules, the transparency of authorisations for future employment of high ranking
public officials, and the length of cooling-off periods for federal ministers and federal
parliamentary state secretaries.
• Take forward the plan to create a legal basis for a right to information of the press as regards
federal authorities, taking into account European standards on access to documents.
• Take forward the plan to adapt the tax-exempt status for non-profit organisations with a
view to address the challenges which the currently applicable rules present for their
operation in practice, taking into account European standards on funding for civil society
organisations.
6
Estonia
It is recommended to Estonia to:
• Ensure that the guidelines on the conflict of interests are subject to an effective verification,
monitoring and enforcement mechanism.
• Continue the efforts in effective implementation of the guidelines on lobbying.
• Ensure consistent and effective practical implementation of the right of access to
information taking into account European standards on access to official documents.
• Continue advancing with the digital platform to make the legislative process even more
visible and inclusive for public consultation.
7
Ireland
It is recommended to Ireland to:
• Ensure that the reform of the appointment and promotion of judges, as regards the
composition of the Judicial Appointment Commission, is taking into account European
standards on judicial appointments.
• Continue actions aimed at reducing litigation costs to ensure effective access to justice,
taking into account European standards on disproportionate costs of litigation and their
impact on access to courts.
• Strengthen the existing ethics framework, including on codes of conduct, asset declarations,
revolving doors and lobbying, and in particular as regards the monitoring and enforcement
capacity of the Standards in Public Office Commission.
• Continue the reform of the Defamation Act to improve the professional environment for
journalists taking into account European standards on the protection of journalists.
• Take measures to address legal obstacles related to access to funding for civil society
organisations.
8
Greece
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the national Recovery and Resilience
Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system and the anti-corruption framework, it is
recommended to Greece to:
• Address the need for involvement of the judiciary in the appointment of President and Vice-
President of the Council of State, the Supreme Court and the Court of Audit taking into
account European standards on judicial appointments.
• Ensure the effective and systematic verification of the accuracy of asset disclosures filed
by all types of public officials.
• Increase efforts to establish a robust track record of prosecutions and final judgments in
corruption cases.
• Establish legislative and other safeguards to improve the physical safety and working
environment of journalists, in line with the recently adopted Memorandum of
Understanding and taking into account European standards on the protection of journalists.
• Ensure that registration requirements for civil society organisations are proportionate in
view of maintaining an open framework for them to operate.
9
Spain
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the national Recovery and Resilience
Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system, it is recommended to Spain to:
• Strengthen the statute of the Prosecutor General, in particular regarding the separation of
the terms of office of the Prosecutor General from that of the Government, taking into
account European standards on independence and autonomy of the prosecution.
• Proceed with the renewal of the Council for the Judiciary as a matter of priority and initiate,
immediately after the renewal, a process in view of adapting the appointment of its judges-
members, taking into account European standards.
• Continue efforts to table legislation on lobbying, including the establishment of a
mandatory public register of lobbyists.
• Address the challenges related to the length of investigations and prosecutions to increase
the efficiency in handling high-level corruption cases.
• Ensure adequate resources for the national audiovisual media regulatory authority to
strengthen its operations, taking into account the European standards on the independence
of media regulators in particular as regards resource adequacy.
• Pursue work to strengthen access to information, in particular via revision of the Law on
Official Secrets.
10
France
It is recommended to France to:
• Continue efforts to complete ongoing projects aimed at full digitalisation of civil and
criminal court proceedings.
• Continue efforts to ensure adequate human resources for the justice system, including to
improve its efficiency, taking into account European standards on resources for the justice
system.
• Continue the effective investigation, prosecution and sanctioning of high-level corruption
offences.
• Ensure that rules on lobbying activities are consistently applied to all relevant actors,
including at top executive level.
• Enhance the transparency of media ownership, in particular regarding complex
shareholding structures, building on the existing legal safeguards.
11
Croatia
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the national Recovery and Resilience
Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system and the anti-corruption framework, it is
recommended to Croatia to:
• Reconsider the newly introduced periodic security checks conducted by the National
Security Agency on all judges and state attorneys by ensuring their integrity based on other
existing mechanisms, taking into account European standards on judicial independence and
autonomy of prosecutors and the opinion of the Venice Commission.
• Introduce comprehensive legislation in the area of lobbying, including on persons with top
executive positions, and set up a public register of lobbyists.
• Further strengthen the framework for a fair and transparent allocation of state advertising,
by establishing clear criteria, good practices and oversight measures to guarantee the
effective functioning of the new public tender procedure for local and regional media.
• Address the issue of strategic lawsuits against public participation targeted at journalists,
including by addressing the abuse of legal provisions on defamation and encouraging
awareness, taking into account European standards on the protection of journalists.
• Ensure a more systematic follow-up to recommendations and information requests of the
Ombudsperson.
12
Italy
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the national Recovery and Resilience
Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system and the anti-corruption framework, it is
recommended to Italy to:
• Continue the efforts to further improve the level of digitalisation of the justice system,
particularly for criminal courts and prosecutors’ offices.
• Continue effective operations of police and prosecution service against high-level
corruption, including by enhancing digitalisation and interconnection of registries.
• Adopt comprehensive conflict of interests rules and lobbying regulation to establish an
operational lobbying register, including a legislative footprint.
• Effectively address the practice of channelling donations through political foundations and
associations and introduce single electronic register for party and campaign finance
information.
• Introduce legislative and other safeguards to reform the regime on defamation, the
protection of professional secrecy and journalistic sources, taking into account the
European standards on the protection of journalists.
• Increase efforts to establish a National Human Rights Institution taking into account the
UN Paris Principles.
13
Cyprus
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the national Recovery and Resilience
Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system and the anti-corruption framework, it is
recommended to Cyprus to:
• Ensure that the reform on the appointment of the Supreme Constitutional Court and High
Court judges takes into account European standards on judicial appointments and the
opinion of the Venice Commission.
• Ensure that the reform on the composition of the Supreme Council of the Judicature takes
into account European standards regarding Councils for the Judiciary and the opinion of
the Venice Commission.
• Continue to improve the effective investigation and adjudication of high-level corruption
cases, including by strengthening the Office of the Attorney General and its budgetary
independence.
• Introduce rules on asset disclosure for elected officials to establish regular and
comprehensive filing, combined with effective, regular and full verifications.
• Strengthen the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance of public
service media taking into account European standards on public service media.
• Establish a framework for the effective and timely consultation of stakeholders in the
legislative process.
14
Latvia
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the national Recovery and Resilience
Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system, it is recommended to Latvia to:
• Initiate a process in view of ensuring adequate safeguards against undue political influence
in the appointment of Supreme Court judges, taking into account European standards on
judicial appointments.
• Continue efforts towards the swift adoption and effective implementation of the Action
Plan 2021-2024 to prevent corruption.
• Continue efforts towards adopting the draft legislation on lobbying, and following that,
ensure the setting-up of a special lobby register.
• Take measures to increase the participation of civil society in decision-making at local
level.
15
Lithuania
It is recommended to Lithuania to:
• Continue the reform of the legal aid system, including by ensuring adequate conditions for
the participation of legal aid providers, taking into account European standards on legal
aid.
• Proceed with the appointments to ensure the full composition of the Supreme Court and
with the appointment of the President of the Supreme Court.
• Initiate a process in view of adapting the system of appointments to judicial positions,
notably to the Supreme Court, including to improve transparency and taking into account
European standards on judicial appointments.
• Start implementing the anti-corruption agenda 2022-2033.
• Continue improving the practice of granting access to official documents, in particular by
making sure that the grounds for rejection of disclosure requests are not used to unduly
limit access, including by journalists, taking into account European standards on access to
official documents.
• Provide adequate human and financial resources for the functioning of the Office of the
Parliamentary Ombudspersons, taking into account European standards on resources for
Ombudsinstitutions and the UN Paris Principles.
16
Luxembourg
It is recommended to Luxembourg to:
• Continue with the process to adopt the reform on the powers of the future Council for the
Judiciary.
• Continue with the process to adopt the reform on making legal aid more accessible.
• Continue to implement and evaluate the new legislation on lobbying the Parliament,
including the transparency register.
• Ensure that there are adequate resources for the prosecution services dealing with economic
and financial crime.
• Reduce the time of processing of requests for disclosure of official documents, taking into
account European standards on access to official documents.
• Improve the legislative decision-making process by providing wider possibilities for
stakeholders to participate in public consultations.
17
Hungary
In addition to recalling the obligation to comply with the rule of law-related rulings of the ECJ
and the rule of law related infringement procedures referred to in the country chapter, the
concerns raised under the conditionality regulation, the relevant concerns raised in the Article
7 TEU procedure initiated by the European Parliament, and recalling the relevant country-
specific recommendations under the European Semester, it is recommended to Hungary to:
• Strengthen the role of the National Judicial Council, while safeguarding its independence,
to effectively counter-balance the powers of the President of the National Office for the
Judiciary.
• Adapt the rules related to the Kúria to remove judicial appointments outside the normal
procedure, to strengthen eligibility criteria for the Kúria President, and to strengthen control
by judicial bodies over the Kúria President, taking into account European standards, and to
remove the possibility of reviewing the necessity of preliminary references, in line with EU
law requirements.
• Adopt comprehensive reforms on lobbying and revolving doors, and strengthen the system
of asset declarations, providing for effective oversight and enforcement.
• Establish a robust track record of investigations, prosecutions and final judgments for high-
level corruption cases.
• Introduce mechanisms to enhance the functional independence of the media regulatory
authority taking into account European standards on the independence of media regulators.
• Strengthen the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance and editorial
independence of public service media taking into account European standards on public
service media.
• Adopt legislation to ensure fair and transparent distribution of advertising expenditure by
the state and state-owned companies.
• Remove obstacles affecting civil society organisations.
18
Malta
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the national Recovery and Resilience
Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system and the anti-corruption framework, it is
recommended to Malta to:
• Address the need for involvement of the judiciary in the procedure for appointment of the
Chief Justice, taking into account European standards on judicial appointments and the
opinion of the Venice Commission.
• Strengthen efforts to improve the efficiency of justice, particularly to reduce the length of
proceedings.
• Address challenges related to the length of investigations of high-level corruption cases,
including by establishing a robust track record of final judgments.
• Advance with the introduction of legislative and other safeguards to improve the working
environment of journalists, including on access to official documents, taking into account
European standards on the protection of journalists.
• Strengthen the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance and editorial
independence of public service media taking into account European standards on public
service media.
• Re-launch efforts to establish a National Human Rights Institution taking into account the
UN Paris Principles.
19
The Netherlands
It is recommended to the Netherlands to:
• Continue efforts to improve the level of digitalisation of the justice system, in particular as
regards publication of judgments and digital solutions for court proceedings.
• Complete the revision of rules on revolving doors involving former ministers and state
secretaries, including a two-year cooling-off period and restrictions on paid activities.
• Adopt a Code of Conduct for ministers and state secretaries including rules on gifts,
secondary activities and lobbying, as well as effective monitoring and sanctioning.
• Continue efforts to ensure a comprehensive follow-up to the childcare allowances affair to
address the potential structural issues, involving all relevant state authorities.
20
Austria
It is recommended to Austria to:
• Continue the reform to establish an independent Federal Prosecution Office, taking into
account European standards on the independence and autonomy of the prosecution,
including to ensure the independent operation of the specialised anti-corruption
prosecution.
• Address the need for involvement of the judiciary in the procedures for appointment of the
president and vice-president of the Supreme Court and for court presidents of
administrative courts, taking into account European standards on judicial appointments and
the selection of court presidents.
• Finalise the legislative revision of the political party financing rules including to empower
the Court of Audit to audit political party finances.
• Introduce effective rules on assets and interests’ declaration for Members of Parliament,
including effective monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms.
• Reform the framework for the allocation of state advertising by public authorities at all
levels, in particular to improve the fairness and transparency of its distribution.
• Advance with the reform on access to official information taking into account the European
standards on access to official documents.
21
Poland
In addition to recalling the need to address the serious concerns relating to judicial
independence, in particular those set out in the Article 7 TEU procedure initiated by the
Commission, as well as the obligation to comply with the rule of law related rulings of the ECJ
and the rule of law related infringement procedures referred to in the country chapter, the
commitments made under the National Recovery and Resilience Plan relating to certain aspects
of the justice system and the checks and balances, and recalling the relevant country-specific
recommendations under the European Semester, it is recommended to Poland to:
• Separate the function of the Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor-General and
ensure functional independence of the prosecution service from the Government.
• Strengthen the existing integrity rules by introducing lobbying rules and a standardised
online system for asset declarations of public officials and Members of Parliament.
• Ensure independent and effective investigations and prosecutions, address the broad scope
of immunities for top executives and abstain from introducing impunity clauses in
legislation in order to enable a robust track record of high-level corruption cases.
• Ensure that fair, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures are adhered to for the
granting of operating licences to media outlets.
• Strengthen the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance and editorial
independence of public service media taking into account European standards on public
service media.
• Ensure a more systematic follow-up to findings by the Supreme Audit Office and ensure a
swift appointment of the College Members of the Supreme Audit Office.
• Improve the framework in which civil society and the Ombudsperson operate, taking into
account European standards on civil society and Ombudsinstitutions.
22
Portugal
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the National Recovery and Resilience
Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system, it is recommended to Portugal to:
• Continue the efforts to ensure adequate human resources of the justice system and to
improve its efficiency, in particular of Administrative and Tax Courts, including by
finalising the legislative framework for the functioning of the High Council for
Administrative and Tax Courts.
• Continue the efforts to strengthen the transparency of allocation of cases.
• Ensure sufficient resources for preventing, investigating and prosecuting corruption
including by ensuring the swift operationalisation of the New Anti-Corruption Mechanism.
• Ensure the start of operations of the Transparency Entity in view of effective monitoring
and verification of asset declarations.
• Continue the reforms to improve the transparency of law-making, particularly on the
implementation of impact assessment tools.
23
Romania
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the National Recovery and Resilience
Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system, the anti-corruption framework and the
legislative process and the recommendations under the Cooperation and Verification
Mechanism, it is recommended to Romania to:
• Ensure that the revision of the Justice Laws reinforces safeguards for judicial independence,
including to reform the disciplinary regime for magistrates, and take measures to address
remaining concerns about the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences in the
judiciary, taking into account European standards and relevant Venice Commission
opinions.
• Introduce rules on lobbying for Members of Parliament.
• Address the operational challenges of the National Anti-Corruption Directorate, including
as regards recruitment of prosecutors, and closely monitor the impact of the new system on
investigating and prosecuting corruption offences in the judiciary.
• Strengthen the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance and editorial
independence of public service media taking into account the European standards on public
service media.
• Ensure effective public consultation before the adoption of draft legislation.
• Continue efforts to establish a National Human Rights Institution taking into account the
UN Paris Principles.
24
Slovenia
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the National Recovery and Resilience
Plan relating to certain aspects of the justice system, it is recommended to Slovenia to:
• Ensure that rules on parliamentary inquiries contain adequate safeguards for independence
of judges and state prosecutors, taking into account European standards on judicial
independence.
• Remove obstacles to the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including by
ensuring the operational autonomy of the National Bureau of Investigation, increasing the
resources of State Prosecution and revising the statute of limitation.
• Adopt and start implementing without further delay the anti-corruption strategy.
• Strengthen the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance and editorial
independence of public service media taking into account European standards on public
service media.
• Establish legislative and other safeguards to protect journalists, particularly online, taking
into account European standards on the protection of journalists.
• Ensure requisite safeguards for budgetary autonomy of the independent bodies.
25
Slovakia
In addition to recalling the commitments made under the National Recovery and Resilience
Plan, relating to certain aspects of the justice system, it is recommended to Slovakia to:
• Ensure that the members of the Judicial Council are subject to sufficient guarantees of
independence as regards their dismissal, taking into account European standards on
independence of Judicial Councils.
• Ensure that sufficient safeguards are in place and duly observed when subjecting judges to
criminal liability for the crime of “abuse of law” as regards their judicial decisions.
• Introduce proposals to regulate lobbying and to strengthen the legislation on conflicts of
interest and asset declarations.
• Improve the coordination among the different law enforcement entities and ensure the
objectivity of prosecutorial decisions, including by continuing to advance the legislative
amendments to restrict the power of the Prosecutor-General to annul prosecutorial
decisions with a view to promoting a robust track record of high -level corruption cases.
• Advance with the process to establish legislative and other safeguards to improve the
physical safety and working environment of journalists, including the reform of defamation
law, taking into account European standards on the protection of journalists.
• Strengthen the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance and editorial
independence of public service media taking into account the European standards on public
service media.
26
Finland
It is recommended to Finland to:
• Continue developing initiatives by the National Courts Administration to support the work
of courts.
• Continue to strengthen the criminal legal framework on corruption, in particular by the
adoption of legislation on trading in influence.
• Continue efforts to implement the new National Anti-corruption Strategy and Action Plan
2021-2023, including by starting the implementation of all planned measures.
• Continue the reform of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities to ensure
effective and wider access to documents taking into account the European standards on
access to official documents.
27
Sweden
It is recommended to Sweden to:
• Continue the work of the Committee of Inquiry on strengthening the protection of
democracy and the independence of the judiciary, taking into account European standards
on judicial independence.
• Evaluate the scope, impact and implementation of the rules relating to revolving doors that
cover top executive functions in the government.
• Strengthen the fight against foreign bribery, including through amending existing legal
definitions and improving on prosecution and final judgments of cases.
• Ensure that on-going reforms to the legal framework for the funding and operation of civil
society organisations do not unduly affect civil society engagement.