COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2022 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2022 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union

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COMMISSION
Luxembourg, 13.7.2022
SWD(2022) 505 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
2022 Rule of Law Report
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany
Accompanying the document
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
2022 Rule of Law Report
The rule of law situation in the European Union
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ABSTRACT
The German justice system continues to experience a very high level of perceived judicial
independence and performs overall efficiently. The reinstatement of experience requirements
among the selection criteria for presiding judges at the Federal courts has been welcomed by
the judiciary. The Government intends to present a new reform to the powers of Ministers of
Justice to issue instructions to prosecutors in individual cases after a draft bill by the Federal
Ministry of Justice failed to advance in the last legislative period. An extension of the Pact
for the Rule of Law to provide further resources for the judiciary has been announced, and
the Länder have requested the Federal Government to start negotiations on this. However,
long-term challenges remain regarding recruitments and the level of salaries of judges.
Efforts to improve the digitalisation of the justice system continue and would also be
addressed in the new Pact for the Rule of Law.
Germany is still in the process of updating its strategic framework for the prevention of
corruption in the federal administration as well as its whistleblower protection rules.
However, a number of reforms are planned for the prevention of corruption, including to
further enhance transparency in decision making. Among the planned initiatives of the new
coalition agreement are the introduction of a legislative footprint on lobbying during the
legislative process, and the revision of political party financing rules. Shortcomings remain in
the regulation of asset disclosures for parliamentarians and government officials, especially
with regard to fragmented and inconsistent post-employment rules and cooling-off periods.
Following a significant rise in the detected financial damage caused by corruption in
Germany in 2020, with a stark rise of bribery targeting the public sector, Germany has
increased criminal sanctions for bribery of members of Parliament. Germany has a very solid
record of the prosecution of individuals who commit foreign bribery, but no legal provisions
for criminal liability of companies are in place.
Germany continues to enjoy a high level of media freedom and pluralism. There is a high
degree of independence of the media and relevant supervisory authorities. This includes a
strongly pluralistic framework of national and regional public service broadcasters as well as
a well-established Press Council. Transparency of media ownership is ensured. Journalist
representatives point to room for improvement regarding the framework for the access to
information by journalists, an issue which is also included in the coalition agreement. Länder
authorities, the Press Council and other media stakeholders are currently discussing an update
of the existing principles of conduct for the media and the police to address the safety of
journalists during protests.
As regards checks and balances, plans to improve the transparency and inclusiveness of law-
making have been announced, which could address challenges identified by stakeholders in
in this respect. Restrictive measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic have continued to be
subject to constitutional and judicial review as well as parliamentary scrutiny. The
appointment procedure for the head of the Anti-Discrimination Agency, who has remained in
functions ad interim for the past four years, has been reformed. Civil society continues to
experience challenges due to the uncertainty of rules related to their tax-exempt status. While
the Government has announced an intention to reform the legal framework related to the tax
exempt status, no concrete proposal has been tabled so far.
2
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended to Germany to:
 Continue efforts to provide adequate resources for the justice system as part of the new
pact of the rule of law, including on the level of salaries for judges, taking into account
European standards on resources and remuneration for the justice system.
 Proceed with plans to introduce a ‘legislative footprint’ to allow for the monitoring and
tracing of all interest representatives who seek to influence and contribute to specific
legislative texts.
 Strengthen the existing rules on revolving doors by increasing consistency of the different
applicable rules, the transparency of authorisations for future employment of high ranking
public officials, and the length of cooling-off periods for federal ministers and federal
parliamentary state secretaries.
 Take forward the plan to create a legal basis for a right to information of the press as
regards federal authorities, taking into account European standards on access to
documents.
 Take forward the plan to adapt the tax-exempt status for non-profit organisations with a
view to address the challenges which the currently applicable rules present for their
operation in practice, taking into account European standards on funding for civil society
organisations.
3
I. JUSTICE SYSTEM
The court system in Germany is structured in a federal manner. Jurisdiction is exercised by
federal courts and by the courts of the sixteen federal states (‘Länder’). The main share of
competence and workload regarding the administration of justice lies with the Länder1
. The
court structure is divided between the ordinary jurisdiction (civil and criminal) and
specialised courts (administrative, finance, labour and social courts). Appointment of judges
and prosecutors, except for the Federal Courts and the Prosecutor General at the Federal
Court of Justice, falls within the competence of the Länder. While appointment procedures
differ in details between the Länder, all share common core elements, in particular the
principle of merit2
and the judicial review of the process and decisions relating to
appointments. For the Federal Courts, a judges’ selection committee selects judges for
appointment by the executive and Councils of judges of the relevant courts have to be
consulted in this process3
. There are currently 638 local courts, 115 regional courts and 24
higher regional courts, as well as 51 administrative courts and 15 higher administrative courts
across the 16 Länder4
. There are five Federal Courts: the Federal Court of Justice, the Federal
Administrative Court, the Federal Finance Court, the Federal Labour Court and the Federal
Social Court. Germany has a Federal Constitutional Court and as well as constitutional courts
in each of the Länder. The prosecution services in Germany are part of the executive, at
federal level with the Prosecutor General at the Federal Court of Justice. At the level of the
Länder, each Land has its own public prosecution service. Germany participates in the
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). There are 27 regional Bars in Germany5
, which
are organised under the umbrella of the German Federal Bar.
Independence
The level of perceived judicial independence in Germany continues to be very high
among the general public and is now very high among companies. Overall, 76% of the
general population and 77% of companies perceive the level of independence of courts and
judges to be ‘fairly or very good’ in 20226
. According to data in the 2022 EU Justice
Scoreboard, the level remains consistently high for both the general public and companies
since 2016. The perceived judicial independence among the general public has decreased in
comparison with 2021 (80%), but it remains higher than in 2016 (69%). The perceived
1
As explained in the 2020 Rule of Law Report, the independence of the German justice systems is ensured by
multiple safeguards, which include judicial control over appointments, professional appraisals, promotions,
disciplinary sanctions and dismissals, and by a number of elements of judicial self-administration. 2020 Rule
of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 3.
2
The principle of merit is anchored in Article 33 para. 2 of the Basic Law; mainly on the basis of the grades in
the two legal state exams.
3
The judges’ selection committee is composed in equal parts of the responsible ministers of the federal states
and members selected by the Federal Parliament. See Law on Election of Judges and German Law on
Judges, Art. 54-55. Similar committees exist in certain Länder, though not all of them. Moreover, the
process and decision of appointment or non-appointment is fully subject to judicial control before the
administrative courts.
4
There are also 18 financial courts, 108 labour courts, 18 higher labour courts, 68 social courts and 14 higher
social courts. German Federal Ministry of Justice (2020), Courts at federal level and of the Länder.
5
There is also a special bar for the lawyers with rights of audience in civil matters at the Federal Court of
Justice.
6
Figures 50 and 52, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised
as follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very
good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%).
4
judicial independence among companies has increased in comparison with 2021 (68%) as
well as in comparison with 2016 (73%).
The reinstatement of experience requirements among the selection criteria for presiding
judges at the Federal Courts has been welcomed by the judiciary. As noted in the 2021
Rule of Law Report7
, the decision by the Minister of Justice in September 2020 to remove the
requirement of usually five years of experience at the respective Federal Court8
from the
selection criteria for presiding judges, without involving the Federal Courts and during an on-
going recruitment procedure, had been subject to criticism from the judiciary9
. In February
2022, the new Minister of Justice decided to return to the previous selection criteria,
including as regards the specific experience requirement10
, which has been welcomed by
stakeholders11
. This has allowed the Federal Courts to proceed with appointments for
presiding judges for a number of vacant posts, which had been frozen in the meantime12
. As
regards the vacancies at the Federal Finance Court that were noted in the 2021 Rule of Law
Report13
, a new president was appointed in January 202214
, following an unsuccessful appeal
by another applicant. Furthermore, in the appeal proceedings against the appointment of the
vice-president of the Finance Court, a second instance administrative court found that the
selection procedure had violated the requirements of Article 33 para 2 of the Basic Law
(principle of merit)15
, meaning that the procedure will have to be repeated16
. More generally,
the coalition agreement includes an announcement to reform the appointment and promotion
system for judges at the Federal Courts based on the criteria of quality, transparency and
diversity17
. However, no steps have yet been taken. Stakeholders consider that the current
system broadly functions well18
.
A new proposal to reform the power of Ministers of Justice to issue instructions to
Prosecutors in individual cases has been announced. During the last legislative period, ,
the reform proposed by the Federal Ministry of Justice to abolish the right to issue
instructions to prosecutors in individual cases only in the field of EU and international
7
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, pp. 3-4.
8
Exceptions from the criteria of having five years of experience were already possible.
9
German Judges’ Magazine (1/22), Interview with Supreme Court President Bettina Limperg; Contributions
from the German Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 10 and the 2021 Rule of Law
Report, p. 6.
10
To be noted that in principle under these criteria, exceptions from the five years of experience are possible.
11
Information received from the Association of Judges in the context of the country visit to Germany; Legal
Tribune Online (2022), Article on reinstatement of experience requirements at the Federal Courts (‘Wieder
fünf Jahre Erfahrung für Führung eines Bundesgerichts’).
12
German Judges’ Magazine (3/22), Progress with recruitments at the Federal Courts.
13
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, pp. 3-4.
14
German Federal Finance Court (2022), Dr. Hans-Josef Thesling new President of the Finance Court.
15
Judgment of the High Administrative Court of Bavaria of 1 February 2022, 6 CE 21.2708, which confirmed
the decision in first instance. The judgment cannot be appealed further.
16
The Court found that the comparison of the applicants' performance on the basis of the appraisals in the
service, which the Federal Government had carried out, was legally incorrect. Whether criteria for presiding
judges apply to court presidents and vice-presidents remains a point of debate that was not addressed in the
court ruling. Stakeholders consider that in particular vice-presidents have primarily judicial responsibilities
and should therefore fulfil the experience criteria. The Court states in its judgement of 1 February 2022, 6
CE 21.2708, para. 29 that it is not objectionable if the Ministry of Justice considers the administrative tasks
of the vice president to be of greater significance than the judicial tasks. . See also 2021 Rule of Law Report,
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, pp. 3-4.
17
Coalition Agreement 2021-2025, p. 106.
18
Information received from the German Judges Association in the context of the country visit to Germany;
German Judges’ Magazine (1/22), Interview with Supreme Court President Bettina Limperg.
5
judicial cooperation in criminal matters was not taken forward19
. The new coalition
agreement maintains the intention to adjust the ministerial right to issue individual
instructions in view of the requirements set out in the case law of the European Court of
Justice20
. At this stage no further details have been announced, but stakeholders and the
Länder remain split on the need for such a reform. A number of Länder as well as other
stakeholders consider that the possibility to issue instructions needs to be maintained to
comply with the constitutional principle of democratic legitimacy21
, while other stakeholders
argue for its abolition, in view of avoiding any appearance of political influence22
. The UN
Human Rights committee has also recommended to Germany in November 2021 to consider
legislative reforms to effectively ensure the independence of the prosecution service23
.
According to Council of Europe recommendations, where the Government has the power to
give instructions to prosecute a specific case, such instructions must carry with them adequate
guarantees that transparency and equity are respected in accordance with national law24
.
Measures and reflections to introduce regular security checks for judges before their
appointment are underway in certain Länder. In most Länder, the National Security
Agencies only perform security checks of the records of a specific candidate for judicial
appointment upon explicit request of the appointing authority25
. In Bavaria, since 2016, all
candidates are subject to a standard request to the security agency to check its records, but
only with the consent of the candidate26
and the applicant has the right to react to any
potential concerns raised in the context of this check. In May 2021, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern introduced a system of systematic security checks of all candidate judges by the
National Security Agency27
. Candidate judges have to be informed about the procedure28
and
have the right to request a review in front of an administrative court29
. In Bremen and
Niedersachsen, reflections are currently on-going to introduce a system of more systematic
security checks30
. The aim behind such reforms would be to identify whether candidate
19
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 3.
20
The coalition agreement further notes that issuing a European Arrest Warrant requires a decision by a judge.
Coalition Agreement 2021-2025, p. 106. To be noted that the relevant case law of the European Court of
Justice on concerns the definition of the term ‘judicial authority’ in the context of the application of the
European Arrest Warrant. Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 27 May 2019, OG
and PI, Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU and of 24 November 2020 – C-510/19,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:456.
21
Joint letter by Hessen, Bayern, Brandenburg, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saarland,
Niedersachsen and Schleswig-Holstein of 3 February 2021 and information received from the EU Affairs
Committee of the Justice Ministers Conference in the context of the country visit to Germany. See also
contribution from the German Bar Association for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 7.
22
Contribution from the German Association of Judges for the 2021 Rule of Law Report, p. 7; Position Paper
by the New Judges’ Association on the draft law on instructions to prosecutors from 2021.
23
Contribution from UN Human Rights Regional Office for Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law Report –
Germany; OCHCR (2021), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – Concluding observations
on the seventh periodic review of Germany, para. 41.
24
Recommendation Rec(2000)19 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, para. 13 (d-e). As
noted in the 2020 Rule of Law Report, the fact that this right is rarely used in practice, combined with the
legal safeguards in place, appears to mitigate the risk of misuse of the right of instruction; 2020 Rule of Law
Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 3.
25
Figure 56, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
26
Communication on the duty of constitutional loyalty in the public service of the Bavarian State Government.
27
Figure 56, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. State Judges Law Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, §3a.
28
State Civil Servant Law Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, §12a.
29
As part of the general possibility for judicial review of the entire appointment procedure; see also FN 3.
30
Information received from the EU Committee of the Conference of Justice Ministers in the context of the
country visit to Germany.
6
judges respect the principle of constitutional loyalty31
. According to European standards32
,
when security/integrity checks are not carried out by self-governing bodies of the judiciary
themselves but by an external body, utmost consideration must be given to respecting the
principles of separation of powers and checks and balances33
.
Quality
The Pact for the Rule of Law will be extended to provide further resources for the
judiciary, but long-term challenges regarding to recruitment and salaries of judges
remain. Following a request by the Länder reiterated in November 202134
and repeated
demands by stakeholders35
already noted in the 2021 Rule of Law Report36
, the new coalition
agreement of the Federal Government includes a commitment to continue the 2019 ‘Pact for
the Rule of Law’37
. On 2 June 2022, the Länder formally requested the Federal Government
to start negotiations for the new Pact for the Rule of Law38
, which were then started on 9 June
202239
. The implementation of the original pact has continued, with over 2700 posts for
judges and prosecutors having been created by June 202140
, already over-fulfilling the
commitment of creating 2000 new posts by the end of 2021. A final report from the Länder
on the implementation of the pact will be presented in 202241
. While recognising the progress
made so far, representatives of judicial associations consider that due to new tasks for the
judiciary, around 1500 to 2000 additional posts for judges and prosecutors would be
necessary42
and that additional investments are also needed for creating posts for court staff43
,
requesting a strong involvement of all judicial stakeholders, including also lawyers44
, in the
preparation of the new pact for the rule of law. In addition, longer-term challenges persist, in
31
According to §9 of the German Law on Judges, judges have to the guarantee that they will always stand up
for the free democratic basic order within the meaning of the Basic Law. Discussions about the return of a
politician who had expressed right-wing extremist views during his mandate to his former position of judge
have recently highlighted the question of constitutional loyalty. See the statement of the German Judges’
Association (2022): Make use of all legal options in case of Meier.
32
Venice Commission opinion (CDL-AD(2021)046), para. 16.
33
While there may be a legitimate interest, especially for certain specific judicial posts, to conduct a
verification of security, this should be done in full respect for judicial independence. Venice Commission
opinion (CDL(2022)005), para. 14.
34
Conference of the Justice Ministers (2021), Pact for the Rule of Law. As noted in the 2021 Rule of Law
Report, the Länder had already requested the continuation of the pact in June 2021; 2021 Rule of Law
Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 5.
35
Contributions from the German Association of Judges, the German Federal Bar and the German Bar
Association for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.
36
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, pp. 4-5.
37
Coalition Agreement 2021-2025, p. 105.
38
Conference of the Justice Ministers (2022), Pact for the Rule of Law – Pact for the Strengthening of Justice.
See also, Bavarian Ministry of Justice, Press statement of 2 June 2022 on the Conference of Justice
Ministers.
39
To be noted that the federal structure of the German judiciary allows funding of the courts operated under
the responsibility of the Länder only within narrow limits set by the Basic Law.
40
As of June 2021, around 2 500 of these posts had been filled. In addition, over 3800 posts for other judicial
staff had been created of which around 2 500 had been filled. Input from Germany for the 2022 Rule of Law
Report, p. 7.
41
Input from Germany for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 7.
42
Contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 15; Contribution
from the German Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 12.
43
Contribution from the German Federal Bar for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 13.
44
Contribution from the German Bar Association for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 12.
7
view of an upcoming ‘wave’ of retirements of judges45
. In this context, concerns continue to
be raised regarding the overall attractiveness of the profession, with stakeholders pointing
both to the overall level of salaries as well as regional disparities in this respect as a
challenge46
. A study of the German Association of Judges47
published in January 2022 shows
that such disparities can amount up to a 13% difference in salary for entry-level positions
between the Länder48
.
Efforts to improve the digitalisation of the justice system continue, and should also be
covered in the framework of the expanded Pact for the Rule of Law. The new Federal
Government coalition has announced that the existing ‘Pact for the Rule of Law’49
will be
expanded to encompass also a ‘Digital Pact for the Judiciary’50
. Comprehensive procedural
rules for the use of digital tools are in place in Germany for civil, criminal and administrative
proceedings51
. Electronic communication tools for courts and prosecution services are fully
implemented52
. Digital solutions to initiate and follow proceedings in civil and administrative
cases are overall very good53
. However, gaps still exist for criminal cases, for example on
defendants’ ability to communicate confidentially with their lawyer during remote hearings54
.
As noted in the 2020 and 2021 Rule of Law Reports, courts and public prosecutors will be
obliged to keep court and procedural files exclusively as electronic files by 1 January 202655
and three projects at Länder level are ongoing towards that transition56
. While the
stakeholders are broadly in favour of the digitalisation of the judiciary under the expanded
Pact for the Rule of Law, they pointed out that greater efforts are needed to ensure the
consistent, effective and practical use of digital tools across the country, which can vary
among individual courts and Länder57
. Building on the experiences of using the existing civil
45
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 5.
46
Contribution from the German Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 11.
47
German Association of Judges (2022), Gap in entry level salaries remains wide.
48
According to European standards, judges’ remuneration should be commensurate with their profession and
responsibilities, and be sufficient to shield them from inducements aimed at influencing their decisions.
Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member
states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, para. 54. See also Recommendation
CM/Rec(2010)12, para. 33.
49
2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany.
50
Coalition Agreement 2012-2025, p. 105.
51
Figure 42, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
52
Figures 43-44, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
53
Figures 46-47, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
54
Figures 46-47, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
55
2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 4 and 2021 Rule of
Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 5.
56
The Länder are engaging in three large-scale projects to implement the full digitalisation of court files
(namely, eAS (4 Länder), eIP (6 Länder) and e2A (6 Länder)), which has involved the progressive
introduction of the electronic filing in courts for pilot and regular use. As the sorting and filing of documents
in an electronic file is more time-consuming than with a paper file, particularly due to the need to capture
metadata, name or categorise documents, the SMART project was launched in the Rhineland-Palatinate,
which aims to automate these processes with the support of artificial intelligence; a pilot project in a court is
being prepared. Input from Germany for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 10 and information received. EU
Affairs Committee of the Justice Ministers Conference in the context of the country visit to Germany.
57
The German Federal Bar highlighted among other the need for better technical equipment and infrastructure,
the consistent implementation and further development of electronic legal transactions. Contribution from
the German Federal Bar for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 14. The German Association of Judges
considers further investment efforts will be needed to ensure a transition to a fully digitized justice system by
January 2026 (i.e. target date for the use of electronic file). Contribution by the German Association of
Judges to the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 12 and German Association of Judges (2021), After the Pact is
8
procedural rules for digital hearings58
, in November 2021 the Conference of Justice Ministers
asked the Federal Government to modernise the rules for hearings in the civil procedural
code59
. The Federal Ministry of Justice is presently working on a draft proposal60
.
Steps to provide for specialised court chambers for commercial matters with the
possibility to conduct proceedings in English are continuing. Following a legislative
proposal tabled by the Federal Council (Bundesrat) as noted in the 2021 Rule of Law
Report61
, the coalition agreement has taken up a commitment to provide for specialised
chambers for international commercial and economic disputes that may conduct proceedings
in English62
. The proposal had lapsed with the end of the legislative period, but has been
reintroduced by the Bundesrat to the Bundestag in March 202263
. In the meantime, in Berlin a
new chamber for international commercial and competition disputes has been created in
202164
. Other projects aimed at improving court specialisation related to large-scale
international proceedings include ‘Quality Law NRW’, which provides for the centralisation
of certain type of disputes at specific upper regional courts, for example cases related to
mergers and acquisitions above a value of EUR 500 000 at the upper regional court of
Düsseldorf65
. The aim is to centralise expertise in complex and fast-evolving areas of law and
thereby to ensure efficient and high-quality adjudication.
Efficiency
The justice system overall continued to perform efficiently, even if the ‘mass’ civil court
cases66 are posing a challenge. While the disposition time has increased for administrative
cases in 2020 (from 397 days in 2019 to 426 days in 2020), their high clearance rate has
remained relatively stable (at 109% in 2019 and at 110% in 2020) and confirmed the positive
trend on efficiency in administrative cases67
. The number of pending administrative cases has
slightly decreased in 2020, yet remains relatively high at 0.9 cases per 100 inhabitants68
. At
the same time, in 2021, a significant increase of cases in relation to challenges on restrictions
related to the COVID-19 pandemic was observed in the administrative courts compared to
2020, which may take time to process also throughout 202269
. The performance indicators on
before the Pact. The German Bar Association pointed out that as of January 2022 lawyers, public authorities
or legal persons under public law are obliged to submit briefs to the courts only electronically, whereas the
same obligation on electronic communication does not apply to the courts. Contribution by the German Bar
Association to the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 13.
58
Article 128a of the German Code of Civil Procedure.
59
Conference of the Justice Ministers (2021), Further development of video hearings in court proceedings.
60
Information received from the Federal Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit to Germany.
61
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 6.
62
Coalition Agreement 2021-2025, p. 106.
63
Bundesrat (2021), Draft Law on strengthening courts in economic disputes.
64
District Court Berlin (2021), International chambers in the District Court Berlin. Similar chambers already
exist in Baden-Württemberg, Hessen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Saarland and Hamburg.
65
In addition, cases related to information and media technology and to renewable energy above EUR 100 000
are centralised at the courts of Cologne and of Essen and Bielefeld, respectively. Decree on jurisdiction for
disputes from the areas corporate transactions (mergers & acquisitions), information technology and media
technology as well as renewable energies.
66
This normally relates to a very high number of individual civil claims that tend to have the same or very
similar factual characteristics.
67
Figures 5, 9 and 13, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
68
Figure 16, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
69
For example, in the North-Rhine Westphalian administrative courts, with a jurisdiction for about a quarter of
the national population, the challenges against the COVID-19 restrictions at first instance in 2021 amounted
9
civil and commercial litigious cases have remained stable (with the clearance slightly
decreasing from 98.8% in 2019 to 98.1% in 2020)70
. As highlighted by stakeholders71
, the
phenomenon of ‘mass’ civil court cases, such as cases related to the so-called Dieselgate
scandal72
present serious challenges for judges to ensure handling of cases within adequate
timeframes73
. This issue has also been recognised as urgent by the Conference of Justice
Ministers in November 2021 and June 2022, which have asked the Federal Government to
examine the possibility of legislative amendments to enable the efficient handling of mass
civil court proceedings74
.
II. ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK
Germany has several authorities responsible for the prevention of corruption at the federal
level, including the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community and the
Supreme Audit Institution. Competences for the policy coordination and corruption
prevention in the 16 Ministries of the Interior at the Länder level depend on the anti-
corruption frameworks in place. The Federal Court of Auditors75
and the Courts of Auditors
at the Länder level have a preventive role in monitoring the public spending, including
controls of corruption. As to the repression of corruption, Germany has a decentralised
approach. The sixteen Länder are in charge of the investigation and prosecution of corruption
offences across Germany. Some Länder have specialised police and prosecution offices on
corruption in place. The Federal Criminal Police Office plays a role in the information-
exchange between the international level and the local level as well as among police offices
at the Länder level.
The perception among experts and business executives is that the level of corruption in
the public sector remains low. In the 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency
International, Germany scores 80/100 and ranks 5th
in the European Union and 10th
globally76
. This perception has been relatively stable over the past five years77
. The 2022
to 10 442 cases (both main and interim measures cases) with 1 903 cases having been decided. By
comparison, in 2020, 1 473 cases were received. The proportion of these cases in all new disputes at the
North-Rhine Westphalian administrative courts thus increased from about 3% in 2020 to 20% in 2021.
Higher Administrative Court of North-Rhine Westphalia (2022), Annual Report, pp. 3 and 12.
70
Figure 12, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
71
German Judges’ Magazine (12/21), p. 438 and (03/22), p. 102, and information received from the German
Association of Judges in the context of the country visit to Germany.
72
According to the Judges Association, the number of cases related to the so-called Dieselgate scandal at
Higher Regional Courts in 2021 increased by 25% to about 37 500 cases. German Judges’ Magazine,
(03/22), p. 102.
73
Contribution from the European Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, pp. 21-22;
Contribution from the German Association of Judges for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 10.
74
The Conference of Justice Ministers suggested that the legislative amendments could touch upon on civil
law, civil procedural law, professional and legal services laws as well as on court fees and costs. Conference
of the Justice Ministers (2021), Urgent need for reform to deal with mass procedures.
75
There is also a role for the Federal Court of Auditors to assess the implementation of the Federal
Government Corruption Prevention Directive. It can provide recommendations for corruption risks and for
corruption prevention.
76
Transparency International (2022), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021. The level of perceived corruption is
categorised as follows: low (the perception among experts and business executives of public sector
corruption scores above 79); relatively low (scores between 79-60), relatively high (scores between 59-50),
high (scores below 50).
77
In 2017, the score was 81, while, in 2021, the score is 80. The score significantly increases/decreases when it
changes more than five points; improves/deteriorates (changes between 4-5 points), and is relatively stable
(changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years.
10
Special Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 53% of respondents consider corruption
widespread in their country (EU average 68%) and 8% of respondents feel personally
affected by corruption in their daily lives (EU average 24%)78
. As regards businesses, 44% of
companies consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 63%) and 17% consider that
that corruption is a problem when doing business (EU average 34%)79
. Furthermore, 34% of
respondents find that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from corrupt
practices (EU average 34%)80
, while 35% of companies believe that people and businesses
caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 29%)81
.
Germany’s strategic anti-corruption framework at the federal level continues to be
implemented and is under review82. The ‘Federal Government Directive Concerning the
Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration’ sets out key elements of the federal
administration’s corruption prevention strategy applying to all categories of federal
employees, authorities and offices, including the supreme federal authorities, the military and
state-owned enterprises83
. The revision of the directive led by the Ministry of Interior is
expected to be finalised by the end of 202284
. Germany has been encouraged during the
UNCAC review to seek, where appropriate, input from stakeholders outside the public
sector85
. Similarly, the currently ongoing revision of the 2004 rules on the prohibition to
accept favours and gifts, with an aim to assess whether more up-to-date and harmonised rules
and increased legal certainty would be required, takes longer than initially planned and is
expected to be finalised in 202386
. The delayed comprehensive 2020 compilation report on
integrity in the federal public administration planned for 2021, was finally published in spring
2022, including, among others, specific data on corruption cases and suspicion of corruption
in the federal public administration87
.
The Government envisages further strengthening the legal framework for corruption.
Corruption is already broadly criminalised in Germany88
. Following the introduction of
78
Special Eurobarometer 523 on Corruption (2022). The Eurobarometer data on citizens’ corruption
perception and experience is updated every second year. The previous data set is the Special Eurobarometer
502 (2020).
79
Flash Eurobarometer 507 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2022). The Eurobarometer
data on business attitudes towards corruption as is updated every second year. The previous data set is the
Flash Eurobarometer 482 (2019).
80
Special Eurobarometer 523 on Corruption (2022).
81
Flash Eurobarometer 507 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2022).
82
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 7.
83
UNCAC Review Report of Germany for the Review Cycle 2016-2021 (2020), pp. 29, 31-32. The strategy is
limited to the federal level and, thematically, to the prevention of corruption. In general, stakeholders
consider the system in place for the monitoring of the implementation of the directive to be comprehensive
and well-functioning, information received from LobbyControl in the context of the country visit to
Germany.
84
Information received from the Ministry of Interior in the context of the country visit to Germany. An inter-
ministerial working group, which includes contact persons for corruption prevention and experts from the
internal audit units prepares the revision, submitting it to all federal ministries for approval and to the
Federal Cabinet for adoption.
85
United Nations Convention against Corruption Country Review Report of Germany for the Review Cycle
2016-2021 (2020), p. 30.
86
Information received from the Ministry of Interior in the context of the country visit to Germany. See also
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 7.
87
Ministry of Interior (2021), Integrity in the public administration – Annual Report 2020.
88
Corruption is comprehensively criminalised in Germany, including active and passive bribery (see sections
331-337 of the Criminal Code). Private sector bribery is further criminalised in sections 299-300 of the
Criminal Code, while bribery of members of Parliament is specifically criminalised in section 108e of the
11
increased sanction levels that entered into force in October 2021, the new coalition agreement
includes, in addition, reform plans to make the criminal offence for bribery involving
members of the Parliament more effective89
. There is also a new initiative foreseen in the new
coalition agreement to revise current corporate sanctions, after the failure of the initiative
from the Ministry of Justice to introduce a Corporate Sanction Law90
in June 202191
. A
statute for corporate criminal liability92
could further facilitate Germany’s leading role among
OECD countries in criminal prosecutions of foreign bribery93
. A new law also came into
force amending the existing transparency register now requiring all legal entities to register
information on beneficial ownership in companies94
.
The financial damage caused by corruption has seen a significant rise in 202095. The
federal police publishes on an annual basis a robust analytical National Situation Report
illustrating Germany’s efforts to repress corruption. The report could be further improved by
including information broken down by Germany’s 16 Länder96
. The latest 2021 official
Federal Police Report details 5 510 police-registered corruption cases in 202097
. This
represents a minor increase in numbers of cases by 1.5% compared to 201998
. The Report
also indicates a decrease of 14.5% in the number of suspects. However, the number of bribery
Criminal Code. Germany has specific provisions for bribery of foreign officials in place (section 335a
Criminal Code; Article 1 (2) (4) Act on Combating International Bribery).
89
Section 108(e) of the Criminal Code. Active and passive bribery involving a member of the Parliament is
since October 2021 a crime carrying a minimum sanction of one year of imprisonment and a maximum
sentence of ten years of imprisonment (in minor cases, six month to five years). Due to the upgrading to a
crime, attempted bribery involving a member of the Parliament is now also punishable. As it stands, in
addition to imposing a sentence to imprisonment for taking or offering a bribe in one’s capacity as member
of Parliament, a court may deprive a person of their ability to acquire rights from public elections and the
right to be elected or vote in public matters.
90
Law on the sanctioning of association-related crimes.
91
After one ministerial draft submitted, one government bill and several debates about the planned provisions,
the legislative plan had been dropped after more than three years due to the lack of support by the
conservative coalition partner particularly regarding the planned handling of internal investigations. The
previous 2020 draft bill and the contributions to the related public consultation are publicly available on the
website of the Federal Ministry of Justice (2020), Business Integrity Strengthening Act.
92
Companies can be held liable for corruption offenses committed by their representatives under the more
generic Act on Regulatory Offences with a fine of up to EUR 10 Million and the possibility to confiscate
profits, which represents an administrative corporate liability regime. According to the OECD (2021),
Working Group on Bribery, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 - Two Year Follow-
Up Report Germany, p. 4, the lack of enforcement against legal persons has indeed demonstrated the limits
of Germany’s administrative liability regime.
93
OECD (2021), Working Group on Bribery, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 -
Two Year Follow-Up Report Germany, noting, however, that enforcement primarily targets natural persons
who commit economic offences, while Germany’s corporate liability regime remains critically low. See also
Correctiv (2022), Export champion Germany – the corruption file, indicating the defence sector as high-risk
corruption sector.
94
Previously, companies did not have to register in the transparency register if the information on the
beneficial owner was derived from other registers. Transparency Register and Financial Information Act. For
the implementation, there is a transition period until 1 December 2022.
95
German Federal Criminal Police Office (2021), Federal overview on corruption 2020.
96
The report is based on information supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office and its counterparts in the
federal states, the Federal Police and the Customs Criminological Office using a nationally standardised
questionnaire and published every January for the previous year.
97
German Federal Criminal Police Office (2021), Federal overview on corruption 2020.
98
As such, the number of police-registered corruption crimes is just slightly above the average of the past five
years.
12
cases have starkly increased99
. Cash payments are the most widely used form of corruption.
At the same time, the value of undue advantages obtained through bribery also significantly
increased100
. Overall, the detected financial damage caused by corruption has notably
increased compared to the previous year (2019) by 72.3% amounting to EUR 81.2 million in
2020. Of those who accepted a bribe, 71% have been public officials, which represents an
increase by 4%, compared to the previous year. The services sector is the most affected,
while the public administration represents the preferred target101
. Thus, compared to the
previous year, overall the detected financial damage caused by corruption has notably
increased in Germany in 2020102
, with a stark rise of bribery targeting the public sector.
The mandatory lobby register and a lobbying code of conduct entered into force and the
coalition agreement aims at further increasing lobbying transparency. Germany’s
mandatory lobby register103
, administered by the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) and
applicable to the Federal Parliament, the Federal Government and ministries, including heads
of directorates and above, came into force in January 2022104
. The new Government plans to
widen its scope to register a larger group of interest representatives105
and to also record
lower level meetings at technical levels in the ministries where legislative drafts originate
from106
. The register is accompanied by a lobbying code of conduct107
. An initial suggestion
from stakeholders to establish an independent oversight body was not implemented108
with
the result that the administration of the Federal Parliament will rely on third parties’
99
German Federal Criminal Police Office (2021), Federal overview on corruption 2020. This includes active
bribery (section 334 Criminal Code) and passive bribery (section 332 Criminal Code).
100
This is partly due to the fact that those who bribe often aim at obtaining advantages, for example large-scale
contracts, with a value that is several times higher than the cash bribe itself used to achieve this goal. See
German Federal Criminal Police Office (2021), Federal overview on corruption 2020.
101
German Federal Criminal Police Office (2021), Federal overview on corruption 2020.
102
This is below the five-year average of EUR 133 million.
103
Lobbyregister Law (16 April 2021). For more details, see also 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter
on the rule of Law situation in Germany, p. 9.
104
The need to enhance lobbying transparency has been a long-standing concern. See, for example, GRECO,
Fifth Round Evaluation – Evaluation Report Germany, para. 63, and UNODC, Review of implementation of
the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Executive summary - Germany. Only five of the 16
Länder have a lobby register in place. Information received from Transparency International in the context
of the country visit to Germany. For more details, see Lobbyranking of the Länder 2022,
https://lobbyranking.de/.
105
Amendments are planned in a differentiated manner that protect fundamental rights. According to
information received from LobbyControl in the context of the country visit to Germany, an amendment that
would address concerns regarding the large scope of exemptions of interest representatives would have to
include churches and religious communities, trade unions and employer associations to allow for their
mandatory registration in the lobby register representing the most important lobby actors in Germany and
that are so far not obliged to register. 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation
in Germany, p. 9.
106
Coalition Agreement 2021-2025, p. 10. This would apply to heads of divisions and officers, according to
information received by the Government in the context of the Member State consultation.
107
German Federal Parliament (2022), Handbook for interest representatives to register in the lobby register.
Breaches of the code will be registered for a period of 24 months with the exclusion of the respective
lobbyists from the register. The failure to register as a lobbyist will lead to sanctions, including a fine of a
maximum of EUR 50 000.
108
Lobbycontrol (2021), ‘The lobby register is coming – Our evaluation’, similarly, contribution from
Transparency International Germany for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 1. Instead, the administrative
authority shall be the Secretary-General of the Parliament, according to information received by the
Government.
13
compliance monitoring109
. The new Government plans the introduction of a ‘legislative
footprint’110
or a digital legislative portal to publish who sought to influence legislative
drafts.111
The collection and disclosure of comprehensive information on who influences
whom in the decision-making process would help to ensure a level playing field for all
interest representatives contributing to balanced legislative outcomes112
. It would also help to
ensure that risks of corruption, conflicts of interest and regulatory capture is reduced, while
the public interest is at the legislation’s core. The timeline for the introduction of the new
transparency tool is scheduled for the end of 2022113
.
Different post-employment rules remain a concern114. In case of concerns of interference
with the public interest, the Federal Government can prohibit, wholly or in part, the taking up
of new employment of high-ranking public officials115
. For federal ministers and federal
parliamentary state secretaries, the cooling-off periods are much shorter with a 12-18 months
period, compared to the period applicable to state secretaries and directors general of three to
five years, and thus could warrant a longer mandatory cooling-off period116
. Despite
international recommendations117
, the Federal Government does not currently plan to address
the persistent concerns as to the different application of Germany’s ‘revolving doors’ rules,
including varying cooling-off periods and the large discretion in the decision of superiors
regarding future employment of state secretaries and directors general.
The administration of the Federal Parliament is working on guidelines to interpret rules
on remunerated side jobs of members of Parliament. The amended Act on members of the
109
Concerns exist by stakeholders regarding the ceiling of fines at EUR 50 000, which is considered to be too
low particularly for larger and global enterprises, as well as the lack of public information on whether
breaches were fined, as reputational risk may have a greater effect than monetary fines. Contribution from
Transparency International Germany for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 1; information received from
LobbyControl in the context of the country visit to Germany. Notably, the Lobbying Register Act provides
some public information on significant breaches by special interest representatives of the code of conduct,
thus taking into account that reputational risks can have greater effects than monetary fines. According to the
Lobbying Register Act, the measures provided for must also be proportionate and no more restrictive than is
required.
110
A legislative footprint is a comprehensive public record of lobbyists’ influence on a piece of legislation.
111
Coalition Agreement 2021-2025, p. 10.
112
Especially the influence of large-scale enterprises and business associations, including from Germany’s
automobile industry, that use significant resources to influence Germany’s decision-making process have
been in focus, while several scandals, such as Wirecard and the mask affair, recently broke. See, for
instance, LobbyControl (2021), Lobbying undermines democracy – Ten theses.
113
Information received from Administration of the Parliament in the context of the country visit to Germany.
114
2021 Rule of Law Report, country chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 9.
115
The future employment is assumed to interfere with the public interest, if it is pursued in an area in which
the member of the Government or parliamentary state secretary was active during his/her term in office or
may otherwise undermine public trust in the integrity of the Federal Government. For more details on the
procedure, see GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, paras. 86 et seq., indicating several
cases where future employment was restricted, see footnote 89.
116
Stakeholders, including LobbyControl and Transparency International, call for a three-year cooling-off
period to better prevent and reduce risks of undue influence, see for instance LobbyControl, Lobbypedia –
Cooling-off Period.
117
GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, paras. 89 and 91. Political servants and Directors-
General are subject to cooling-off regulations stipulated in Civil Servants Act, section 105; and the 2021
Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 9. Restrictions on
‘revolving doors’ and accompanying disclosure requirements for current and former members of the Federal
Government and parliamentary state-secretaries are laid down in the Act Governing the Legal Status of
members of the Federal Government (section 6(a) and 6 (b), which apply mutatis mutandis to parliamentary
state secretaries) and the Act on the Legal Relationships of Parliamentary State Secretaries.
14
Federal Parliament118
adopted in June 2021 addresses integrity challenges with regard to
members of Parliament119
. The reform includes a prohibition for members of Parliament of
remunerated lobby activities as side jobs and of remunerated lectures that are in connection to
their parliamentary work. Supervision and enforcement may present obstacles in practice due
to the lack of a fully independent oversight body or ethics committee with a mandate to
investigate breaches120
. The amendment does not entail the disclosure of the actual time spent
on the side job121
. Similarly, ad hoc disclosures are not required when a conflict between
specific private interests of a member of Parliament emerges in relation to a matter under
discussion in Parliament122
. There were several cases of delays in the reporting of
parliamentarians’ side activities in 2021123
.
Germany finalised the 2021 internal review of its rules on asset declarations, with some
concerns remaining. The review did not result in addressing the lack of regulation for
members of the Federal Government to disclose assets and properties124
. For members of the
Federal Parliament, the categories of information to be disclosed in their financial
declarations was also not extended to liabilities and significant assets, such as shareholdings
in private enterprises below the current threshold125
. Similarly, Germany does not intend to
widen the scope of declarations to also include information on spouses and dependent family
members126
. The assets and financial interests of members of Parliament are subject to
notification, if the respective member is in charge of an issue in a parliamentary committee
and, at the same time, remunerated through a secondary activity127
.
118
Law amending the Act on Members of the Bundestag - Improvement of the transparency rules for members
of the German Bundestag.
119
UNODC, Review of implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, Executive
summary - Germany, Implementation Review Group (January 2020); and GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round
– Interim Compliance Report.
120
Information received from LobbyControl and Transparency International in the context of the country visit
to Germany. The Administration of the Parliament has a limited mandate to investigate and is staffed by
political parties. See also GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Interim Compliance Report, para. 36, p. 8.
121
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 10.
122
GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Interim Compliance Report, paras. 14-17, p. 4.
123
Transparency International Germany (2021), ‘More than 20.000 euros: Özdemir has also forgotten to report
special payments’; Transparency International Germany (2021), ‘Lauterbach reports fees belatedly’;
Transparency International Germany (2021), ‘Ancillary income: Hundreds of thousands of euros from MEPs
remained undiscovered for years’; Abgeordnetenwatch (2021), ‘Many representatives breached transparency
rules’.
124
GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, para. 95. See also 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country
Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 10, and 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on
the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 7. Information received from the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of
Interior, the Administration of the Parliament and Transparency International in the context of the country
visit.
125
Members of the Parliament are only obliged to disclose shareholdings in private corporations or partnerships
if they possess more than 25 per cent of the voting rights. GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Interim
Compliance Report, para. 37, p. 8. UNCAC Country Review Report of Germany, Review Cycle 2016-2021,
p. 5. See also 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 10,
where it was reported that the amendment to the Act on Members of the Federal Parliament included a
provision to disclose their financial holdings in unincorporated companies and companies with share capital
above 5% as well as the revenues of such holdings.
126
Information received from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit to Germany. See,
however, GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round – Interim Compliance Report, recommendation iii, paras 18-19.
127
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 10.
15
Germany plans to revise its political party financing rules to introduce more
transparency in decision-making. Party financing is regulated in the Law for Members of
the Parliament and the Law for Political Parties128
. The new coalition agreement includes
plans to regulate sponsoring and hidden campaign finance by third parties129
. In this context,
donations for parties above EUR 35 000 (instead of EUR 50 000, as is currently the case)
would have to be notified to the President of the Parliament and made public in the future. In
addition, the threshold for donations to be publicly disclosed by parties in their annual
accountability report130
would be lowered from EUR 10 000 to EUR 7 500. Furthermore, it is
planned to increase the human and financial resources of the Parliament’s administration to
strengthen its oversight and control functions in this regard131
. It is however not clear whether
it would have access to the tax information of donors for the monitoring of the regularity of
party finance, in order to be able to cross-check data during the verification process of
statements of accounts of political parties132
. Concerns remain regarding the significant time
lapse between the party income and its reporting133
.
New rules on whistleblower protection are still in preparation. The legislative initiative of
the Federal Ministry of Justice to introduce a comprehensive whistleblowing legislation
failed to receive the full support of the government coalition in 2021134
. A new draft law was
published in April 2022135
. Until adoption, the general protections against retaliation for
whistleblowers remain fragmented across several pieces of legislation.136
. In practice, also
several contact points for whistleblower disclosures are in place at the federal and state
level137
who facilitate the disclosure and investigation of corruption offences. The
fragmentation across institutions and administrative levels has been criticised, as potential
128
International reviewers have repeatedly pointed out the need for lower thresholds and strengthened record-
keeping, while sponsoring remains largely unregulated despite its potential to buy access to important
government officials. 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p.
11. See also UNCAC, Review of implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption,
Review Cycle 1 (Chapter III and IV), Executive Summary: Germany, Implementation Review Group (July
2020), and Review Cycle 2 (Chapter II and V), Executive Summary: Germany, Implementation Review
Group (January 2019).
129
Coalition Agreement 2021-2025, p. 10.
130
Political parties are obliged to submit annual financial reports to the President of the Federal Parliament
including on political party assets, liabilities, income and expenditure in both campaign and off-campaign
periods, according to the German Political Parties Act. 2021 Rule of Law report, Country Chapter on the
rule of law situation in Germany, pp. 10-11.
131
Coalition Agreement 2021-2025 p. 10.
132
Concerns in this regard are flagged in UNCAC Country Review Report of Germany, Review cycle 2016-
2021, p. 67.
133
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 10. Information
received from LobbyControl in the context of the country visit to Germany, emphasising that there is no
intention to shorten the lapse of time. Notably, the accountability reports of 2021 are expected to be
published in 2023.
134
Draft law on whistleblower protection. The draft law was intended to transpose EU Directive (EU)
2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (2019/1937) but failed at the end
of the legislature due to the lack of agreement between the coalition partners of the previous Government.
135
Press statement of the Ministry of Justice (2022), Better protection for whistleblowers
136
Protections exist in Germany’s Basic Law, the Criminal Code, the Civil Code, labour law and case law, see
UNCAC Country Review Report of Germany, Review Cycle 2016-2021, p. 5.
137
This includes the Anti-Corruption Appointees, the Specialised Ombudspersons, such as the Armed Forces
Ombudsman at the federal level, and the Citizen Ombudsmen and Confidence Lawyers at the state level. Cf.
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 10.
16
whistleblowers might have difficulties in identifying the appropriate disclosure channels138
.
The Federal Police indicates a trend in previous years of approximately three quarters of
corruption proceedings being initiated upon disclosures from such sources, including
whistleblowers139
.
Pandemic-related corruption risks continue to exist, with several cases under
investigation, while additional preventive measures were taken. Several procurements of
protective face masks that had been brokered by active and former members of Parliament
and their relatives, who had obtained commission payments for the facilitation of contracts,
were discovered and investigations were launched and continued in 2021140
. One case of
alleged passive bribery of members of the Parliament who have brokered facemask deals is
pending at the Federal Supreme Court141
. Since December 2021, Germany’s electronic
competition register in support of public procurement processes is operational, enhancing the
prevention of corruption during and in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic142
. Since
then, there is an obligation to report relevant crimes and misdemeanours to the register hosted
by the Federal Cartel Office. The register hosts and flags information for public contracting
authorities that is relevant for the exclusion of bidders from the procurement, including on
final convictions, penalty orders and fines for corruption, bribery, money laundering, tax
evasion, and other serious crimes143
. Public contracting authorities will be under the
obligation to consult the competition register in this regard as of 1 June 2022144
.
III. MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM
In Germany, the Basic Law and secondary legislation form a well-established legal
framework, guaranteeing media freedom and pluralism as well as the right of access to
information145
. The main legislative competence in the area lies with the Länder, which
conclude state treaties to establish a common media policy framework, including notably the
State Media Treaty146
. This is completed by national legislation and safeguarded by
constitutional guarantees and the relevant jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. The
federal structure results in a variety of legal frameworks, supervisory structures and public
service broadcasters providing an additional safeguard for media pluralism and media
freedom147
.
138
Transparency International Germany (2018), Comments and Recommendations to UNCAC Second Review
Cycle, p. 3.
139
Information received from the Federal Criminal Bureau of the police in the context of the country visit to
Germany.
140
See, for instance, Bayrischer Rundfunk (2021), 'Mask deals – Tax investigations against Andrea Tandler';
Tagesschau (2021), ‘Mask affair – kisses and commissions’.
141
Die Zeit (2021), ‘BGH must deal with mask affair’.
142
Input from Germany for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 20. See also section 123(1) and (4) of the Act
against Restraints of Competition. The Act to Introduce the Competition Register for Public Procurement
entered into force on 29 July 2017. The register is set up at the Federal Cartel Offices. UNCAC, Country
Review Report of Germany, Review Cycle 2016-2021, p. 32.
143
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 11.
144
Input from Germany for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 20.
145
2020 and 2021 Rule of Law Reports, Country Chapters on the rule of law situation in Germany.
146
The state treaties on media do not regulate the press (with the exception of the digital press). There are press
laws at the level of the Länder.
147
Germany ranks 16th in the 2022 Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index compared to 13th in
the previous year.
17
The independence of the 14 State Media Authorities148 functioning as regulatory
authorities for commercial broadcasters remains ensured149. There have been no major
changes in the legal framework concerning the State Media Authorities since the 2021 report.
Their financial independence remains guaranteed, with the budget ensured by a share of the
broadcasting fee for households150
. The media authorities have now adopted all of their
statutes required under the revised State Media Treaty and are fully applying the revised
framework, which entered into force in November 2020151
.
The self-regulation of the press remains effective, but the extension of the framework to
new online media outlets brings challenges152. The number of complaints received by the
self-regulatory Press Council, composed of journalists’ and publishers’ associations, in 2021
has decreased notably, but remains at a high level (2 556 complaints received in 2021,
compared to 4 085 in 2020 and 2 175 in 2019)153
. Overall, the Press Council issued 60 public
reprimands in 2021 of which 80% have been published. About a third of these reprimands
related to violations of the protection of privacy as defined in the Press Code154
. The last
revision of the State Media Treaty has introduced the possibility for certain online media with
journalistic content to comply with their obligation to adhere to recognised journalistic
principles by joining the Press Council and committing themselves to its Press Code155
.
Journalist representatives indicate that the Council still needs to gather further experience and
establish practices for how to best deal with these new type of media outlets156
. The 2022
Media Pluralism Monitor does not see a risk of commercial or political influence on editorial
decisions157
.
There are no issues signalled regarding the transparency of media ownership which is
well developed. The legal framework requires commercial broadcasters to report ownership
information and plans affecting the shareholders’ structure. It also sets out the requirements
for broadcasting licences. Additional provisions ensure transparency of ownership for online
news media and the press158
. Access to the information covering television, radio, press and
online media remains ensured via a public database of the Commission on Concentration in
the Media (KEK) of the state media authorities159
. The 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor
concludes that there is a low risk regarding the transparency of media ownership160
.
148
The 14 State Media Authorities are established at the level of the Länder, with Berlin and Brandenburg as
well as Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein having agreed on common State Media Authorities.
149
2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, pp. 10-11.
150
State Media Treaty, s. 112.
151
Information received from the Media Authorities in the context of the country visit to Germany.
152
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 12.
153
Press Council (2022), Annual Report 2021.
154
Press Council (2022), Annual Report 2021. A public reprimand, obliging the concerned media outlet to
publish a correction, is the most far reaching sanction of the German Press Council (to protect those affected,
the Council may also decide to pronounce a non-public reprimand, this was the case for one reprimand in
2021).
155
State Media Treaty, s. 19.
156
Information received from the German Federation of Journalists and the German Journalists Union in the
context of the country visit to Germany.
157
2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, pp. 13-14.
158
See 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 12.
159
KEK (2022), Media concentration.
160
2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 12.
18
The Länder have initiated the process to update the rules on media concentration. While
the state media laws contain provisions on media concentration across the press and
broadcasting sector, the State Media Treaty regulates ownership concentration in television,
under the regulatory supervision of the KEK161
. The 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor indicates
a medium risk on its news media concentration indicator. It states that the current media
concentration control system, which was created for a traditional media environment and
focuses on nationwide linear broadcasting, does not prevent a high degree of horizontal
ownership concentration and would need to be updated to take into account today’s digital
environment162
. The need to establish a future-proof media concentration framework was
already concluded in a protocol declaration of all Länder in the context of the conclusion of
the State Media Treaty in 2020163
. The relevant working group of the Länder has now started
to discuss a future revision of the current rules on concentration164
.
The legal framework safeguards the independence of the public service broadcasters
and guarantees a pluralistic offer. The system of public service broadcasters at regional and
national level, gathered in ARD and ZDF165
, ensures a pluralistic public service broadcasting
structure and programming. The legal framework for both regional and national public
service broadcaster ensures independent supervisory structures, in particular in the form of
broadcasting councils responsible for the supervision as regards the programming of the
broadcasters, and administrative councils, responsible for the supervision of the management
and financial affairs of the broadcasters166
. The supervisory bodies are intended to reflect
society with its members being nominated by relevant social groups, such as representatives
from employer and trade associations, employee organisations, churches, cultural or
educational institutions as well as representatives of the Länder and their parliaments167
. The
members of the supervisory councils are mandated to act independently. Following the
jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court, the number of political representatives in
such supervisory bodies is limited to one third of the members168
. The financing in the form
of a broadcasting fee secures the financial independence of the public service broadcasters.
Overall, there are strong safeguards for the independence of the public service
broadcasters169
, ensuring a pluralistic programming. The Länder launched in November 2021
a public consultation on the future mandate and structure of the public service broadcasters
with a view on a reform reflecting the digital transformation in the media sector170
. Based on
161
State Media Treaty, s. 60.
162
2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 13. The 2022 MPM concludes that in the area of market plurality there are
three areas showing a medium risk: news media concentration, online platforms concentration and
competition enforcement as well as media viability.
163
State Treaty for the Modernisation of the Media Regulation in Germany.
164
Information received from the Media Authorities in the context of the country visit to Germany.
165
Germany’s public service broadcasting consists of the ZDF, Deutschlandradio and the ARD, which is the
joint organisation of the country’s nine regional public service broadcasters.
166
Contributions from ARD, ZDF and Reporters without Borders for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.
167
Input from Germany for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 28.
168
German Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of the First Senate of 25 March 2014, 1 BvF 1/11, paras. 1-
135.
169
The 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor concludes there is a low risk regarding the independence of public
service media and its financing in Germany.
170
Rundfunkkommission der Länder (2021), Draft discussion paper on the order and structural optimisation of
the public service broadcaster.
19
the results of this consultation, the Länder agreed in June 2022 to a legislative proposal
amending the State Media Treaty, to be adopted in the following months171
.
There is a solid framework for the journalists’ access to information, but stakeholders
see further room for improvement. At national level, the Constitution and the Freedom of
Information Act provide for the access to information172
. However, as already noted in the
2021 Rule of Law Report173
, journalist representatives see certain gaps in the framework, in
particular as regards requests for access to information from federal authorities174
. GRECO
has also addressed a recommendation to Germany regarding the Freedom of Information
Act175
. A recent judgment of the Federal Administrative Court confirmed that journalists
have a right of access to information vis-à-vis federal authorities176
. In most Länder, there are
press laws in place guaranteeing the access to information by journalists. However, there are
noteworthy divergences in the legislation of the Länder177
. In its coalition treaty, the Federal
Government has announced that it will create a legal basis for a right to information of the
press as regards federal authorities178
.
While authorities at both federal and Länder level are making efforts to increase the
safety of journalists, particularly when covering protests, incidents relating to physical
aggression and online threats remain a serious concern179
. As in 2020, also in 2021
protests related to COVID-19 measures/vaccines were a particular hotspot for aggressions
against journalists180
. Preliminary police statistics for 2021 indicate a total of 276 registered
criminal offences in the broad target category ‘media’181
. These 276 cases included 49 cases
of threats and 30 cases of violent offences, of which 27 qualified as personal injuries182
. In
addition, verbal attacks and online hate speech and threats targeting journalists have been
reported to be common183
. Since the last report, the Council of Europe’s Platform to promote
the protection of journalism and safety of journalists has registered five alerts relating to
events in Germany184
. For the year 2021, the Mapping Media Freedom project recorded 119
171
State Government of Rheinland-Pfalz (2022), Amendments to the State Media Treaty adopted - brand of
public service broadcasting strengthened.
172
Basic Law, Art. 5(1).
173
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 13.
174
Reporters without Borders, Germany; Contribution from Reporters without Borders for the 2022 Rule of
Law Report, p. 18; Information received from the German Federation of Journalists and the German
Journalists Union in the context of the country visit to Germany.
175
GRECO has recommended that the Freedom of Information Act should be independently evaluated and
possible improvements should be considered on this basis, notably as regards exceptions allowing to decline
requests under the Act. See GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, para 57.
176
German Journalists’ Association, Right to information under press law from federal authorities; Federal
Administrative Court, Summary of Case law on access to information of the Federal Intelligence Service.
177
Open Knowledge Foundation (2021), Transparency Ranking.
178
Coalition Agreement 2021-2025, p. 124.
179
Information received in the context of the country visit to Germany from the German Federation of
Journalists and the German Journalists Union; Input from Germany for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, pp. 31-
32; Reporters without Borders, Germany.
180
Mapping Media Freedom – Monitoring Report 2021, p. 21.
181
Reply of the German Federal Government to Parliamentary Question on Attacks on media professionals in
the context of pandemic-related protests (Bundestag Drucksache 20/949). 39 cases registered in these
statistics are linked to Covid-19 in the context of protests.
182
Ibid.
183
Contribution from Reporters without Borders for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 17.
184
Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists, Germany.
20
alerts185
. The registered incidents relate to physical aggressions, verbal insults as well as
online threats against journalists. Overall, these concerns have a notable impact on the
professional environment for journalists and in particular their reporting of protests. Media
outlets often provide private security guards to protect journalists at protests186
. The Mapping
Media Freedom project and Reporters without Borders also refer to alleged cases of
aggressions or threats by police officers against journalists187
. However, it is not clear to
which extent or whether these allegations have been investigated or confirmed by official
authorities. The Conference of the Ministers of Interior of the Länder, the Press Council and
further media stakeholders currently discuss an update of the existing principles of conduct
for the media and the police188
. Police authorities in some regions have increased efforts to
protect journalists during protests, for example by establishing safe spaces for media
workers189
. The 2022 Media Pluralism Monitor concludes that the increasing violence against
journalists can be considered concerning190
.
Civil society and journalist associations point to some further developments of concern
regarding the professional environment for journalists. While the legal framework
remains generally effective at preventing strategic lawsuits against public participation
(SLAPP) targeting journalists191
, also in Germany there are some cases of abusive litigation
against journalists192
, as highlighted by a call of media organisations and civil society
organisations (CSOs) on the issue in 2021193
. CSOs and journalist associations continue to
see potential risks of journalists being subject to electronic surveillance measures by
intelligence services, in particular when interacting with potential informants, and have
announced a joint appeal against the recent legal reform adopted in June 2021, allowing
Germany’s intelligence services to use software tools to monitor communications194
.
185
Mapping Media Freedom – Monitoring Report 2021, p. 11. The annual Mapping Media Freedom Monitoring
Report for 2021 states that ‘While the high number of alerts can partly be explained by the strength of the
MFRR network in Germany, it clearly confirms a trend in the deterioration of press and media freedom,
especially when it comes to the coverage of demonstrations […]’.
186
Mapping Media Freedom Monitoring Report 2021, p. 21.
187
Mapping Media Freedom, country profile Germany; Reporters without Borders (2022), Close-up view
Germany.
188
Input from Germany for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 31; Press Council (2022), Annual Report 2021, p.
20.
189
Information received from the German Federation of Journalists and the German Journalists Union in the
context of the country visit to Germany; Input from Germany for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 31.
190
2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 10.
191
2022 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 10; Information received in the context of the country visit to Germany
from the German Federation of Journalists and the German Journalists Union. In many cases, pre-litigation
mechanisms lead to potential cases of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) being
dismissed before reaching court. According to German authorities, in May 2022 courts reported that they
have not received any SLAPP cases.
192
Reporters without Borders, Germany; Input from Reporters without Borders for the 2022 Rule of Law
Report, p. 19.
193
German Journalists’ Association (2021), Press release – SLAPPS: Against the abuse of claims
194
Reporters without Borders (2021), RSF and Journalists sue against ‘state trojans’; Contribution from Human
Rights Watch for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 17. Human Rights Watch (2021), Germany’s New
Surveillance Laws Raise Privacy Concerns.
21
IV. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES
Germany is a federal republic, with powers distributed between the federal and the sixteen
state Governments. The separation of powers is enshrined in the Basic Law195
and the
constitutions of the Länder. At the federal level, federal legislative power is vested in the
Federal Parliament (Bundestag) and the representative body of the Länder (Bundesrat)196
.
The Government, the Bundesrat or members of the Bundestag can submit legislative
proposals197
. Constitutional review is ensured by the Federal Constitutional Court and the
constitutional courts of the Länder. The German Human Rights Institute and the Federal
Anti-Discrimination Agency contribute to upholding fundamental rights.
The Government plans to improve the transparency and inclusiveness of law-making,
which could address challenges identified by stakeholders in the past. However, the
Government coalition agreement contains an overall commitment to improve quality of law
making, including early consultation of stakeholders and the creation of a digital portal on the
law-making process, where the state of play of a proposal will be presented and comments
can be submitted198
. While concrete details are yet to be announced, this could respond to
criticism raised by some stakeholders over short or very variable consultation periods,
especially but not only related to measures taken in the COVID-19 pandemic199
or overall
insufficiently transparent consultation procedures on draft legislation200
. Currently, the
Federal Government’s central platform on consultation procedures only brings together
information on the existing sites of Ministries and agencies201
.
Germany’s restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic have progressively eased
and been subject to constitutional review. As noted in the 2021 Rule of Law report, the
Infection Protection Law (IfSG) contained powers for the Federal Government and the
Länder to take measures under the IfSG202
, which could only be exercised as long as the
Bundestag has declared a “state of epidemic”203
. On 18 November 2021, Parliament passed
amendments to the IfSG, which allowed the Government to maintain certain restrictions and
obligations204
to combat the pandemic in place until 19 March 2022 and, at the same time, the
‘state of epidemic’ expired on 25 November 2021205
. As a result, Länder could adopt certain
195
Article 20 Basic Law.
196
Articles 70 et seq. Basic Law.
197
Proposals by the Bundestag can be submitted by (at least) 5% of its members. In practice, most proposals
emanate from the Government.
198
Coalition Agreement 2021-2025, pp. 9-10.
199
This can lead to the impression by civil society organisations that consultations are a mere formality.
Contribution from ENNHRI for the 2021 Rule of Law Report – Germany, p. 6. A specific example cited
relates to the legislation surrounding the expiration of the national epidemiological situation (see also below)
– contribution from the German Bar Association for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 18.
200
Stakeholders have e.g. criticised that draft legislation might only be shared via the press or to individual
contacts but not published in a timely manner for a consultation process. Contribution from the German
Federal Bar for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 23.
201
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 15.
202
2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 16.
203
First Law on the protection of the population in cases of epidemic situations of national relevance.
204
For example, the possibility to prescribe distancing, wearing of masks or presenting vaccination, recovery or
testing certificates. Federal Parliament (2021), Follow-up rules on the occasion of the lifting of the epidemic
situation.
205
Federal Ministry for Health (2021) Law amending the Infection Protection Law and other laws on the
occasion of the repeal of the determination of the epidemic situation of national importance. Federal
Parliament (2021) Follow-up rules on the occasion of the lifting of the epidemic situation.
22
restrictive measures206
to the extent that there was a concrete epidemic danger and subject to
the approval of the regional parliaments207
. In 2021, a considerable share of the constitutional
complaint proceedings concerned measures taken to combat the pandemic208
. In the period
between March 2021 and February 2022, the Federal Constitutional Court received 465 new
constitutional complaints against pandemic measures and decided on 318 such complaints209
.
The complaints against the restrictive measures adopted to combat the COVID-19 pandemic
also constituted an important share of cases at the administrative courts210
. On 19 November
2021, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled on a number of constitutional
complaints challenging the constitutionality and proportionality of the amendments adopted
in April 2021 (the so-called ‘emergency brake’)211
, and which had expired on 30 June
2021212
. Though the measures in the emergency brake constituted a strong interference with
fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court found that they were proportionate and
in accordance with the German Basic Law213
.
Following formal commitments by Germany clearly recognising the primacy of EU law,
the Commission has closed the infringement procedure concerning the judgment of the
German Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020214. As noted in the 2021 Rule of Law Report,
on 9 June 2021, the Commission had decided to send a letter of formal notice to Germany for
violation of the principles of autonomy, primacy, effectiveness and uniform application of
Union law, as well as the respect of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European
Union under Article 267 TFEU215
. On 2 December 2021, the Commission announced that it
had closed the infringement procedure, in light of the strong commitments provided by
Germany in the reply to the letter of formal notice. In particular, Germany formally declared
that it affirms and recognises the principles of autonomy, primacy, effectiveness and uniform
application of Union law. It explicitly recognised the authority of the Court of Justice of the
206
However, the Länder could not adopt curfews or a general preventative closure of schools and day-care
centres, of the gastronomic industry or of the retail sector. It was equally not possible to issue a general
prohibition of religious services and gatherings or sport activities, or to prohibit travel and overnight
accommodation. Federal Ministry for Health (2021), Law amending the Infection Protection Law and other
laws on the occasion of the repeal of the determination of the epidemic situation of national importance.
207
The German Bar Association welcomed the expiry of the state of epidemic. The association stressed that
after the expiry the Länder were still able to take executive decisions and called for a greater involvement of
the regional Parliaments. Contribution from the German Bar Association for the 2022 Rule of Law Report,
p. 19.
208
German Federal Constitutional Court (2022), 2021 Annual Report, p. 36.
209
Written contribution received from the German Federal Constitutional Court in the context of the country
visit, p. 2.
210
For example, in the North-Rhine Westphalian administrative courts, the challenges against the COVID-19
restrictions at first instance in 2021 amounted to 10 442 cases received (both main and urgent cases),
whereas in 2020, 1 473 cases were received. The proportion of these cases in all new disputes at the North-
Rhine Westphalian administrative courts thus increased from about 3% in 2020 to 20% in 2021. At the same
time, 664 cases (both main and urgent cases) were received by the Higher Administrative Court of North-
Rhine Westphalia in 2021, compared to 483 in 2020. Higher Administrative Court of North-Rhine
Westphalia (2022), Annual Report, pp. 12 and 20.
211
This involved the automatic introduction of certain restrictive measures by federal law if a specific threshold
of COVID-19 cases was reached over three days in a city or district See new §28b IfSG. Fourth Law on the
protection of the population in cases of epidemic situations of national relevance adopted on 21 April 2021.
212
Pursuant to Article 28b, paragraph 10, first sentence of the IfSG as applicable on 23 April 2021.
213
German Federal Constitutional Court (2021), Constitutional Complaints on the ‘Federal emergency break’
unsuccessful.
214
European Commission (2021), December infringement package: key decisions.
215
European Commission (2021), June infringement package – key decisions; 2021 Rule of Law Report,
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, pp. 16-17.
23
European Union, the fact that measures taken by EU institutions cannot be a direct object of
review in constitutional complaints and that courts of the Member States are required to refer
questions for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU, including a
second referral if necessary, as to whether an EU measure would exceed the EU
competences, or risks violating the national identity of a Member State in disregard of Article
4(2) TEU. The German Government committed to using all the means at its disposal to
ensure full recognition of the judicial powers assigned to the Court of Justice by the EU
Treaties, in particular its power to issue binding and definitive rulings on the interpretation of
EU law and the validity of EU measures.
On 1 January 2022, Germany had 13 leading judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights pending implementation216. At that time, Germany’s rate of leading
judgments from the past 10 years that remained pending was at 37% and the average time
that the judgments had been pending implementation was 3 years and 2 months217
. The oldest
leading judgment, pending implementation for 6 years, concerns the access to and the
efficient functioning of justice in public trial218
. On 1 July 2022, the number of leading
judgments pending implementation remains 13219
.
The appointment procedure for the director of the Anti-Discrimination Agency, who
had been in function ad interim for the past four years, has been reformed. As noted in
the 2021 Rule of Law Report, during the entire last legislative period, the position of the
director of the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency had remained vacant220
. Following an
announcement in the coalition agreement221
, Parliament adopted legislative amendments that
entered into effect on 28 May 2022 which provide that the head of the agency, who was
previously appointed by the Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth,
will now be elected by Parliament on proposal from the Federal Government and appointed
by the Federal President, for a period of five years, thereby decoupling the mandate from the
legislative period. The amendments also set out a number of qualification criteria and defines
the status of the head of the agency as the independent Federal Commissioner for
antidiscrimination222
. This amendment corresponds also to a previous proposal made by the
advisory council of the agency223
. The coalition agreement also commits to provide for
216
The adoption of necessary execution measures for a judgment by the European Court of Human Rights is
supervised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. It is the Committee’s practice to group
cases against a State requiring similar execution measures, particularly general measures, and examine them
jointly. The first case in the group is designated as the leading case as regards the supervision of the general
measures and repetitive cases within the group can be closed when it is assessed that all possible individual
measures needed to provide redress to the applicant have been taken. Germany notes that it has submitted
final Action Reports (and one Action Plan) in all of these cases.
217
All figures are calculated by the European Implementation Network and are based on the number of cases
that are considered pending at the annual cut-off date of 1 January 2022. See the Contribution from the
European Implementation Network for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 44.
218
Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 9 June 2016, Madaus v. Germany, 44164/14 pending
implementation since 2016.
219
Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC).
220
The outcome of the selection procedure for the new director had been annulled in court due to a lack of
compliance with the constitutional principle of merit. 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule
of law situation in Germany, p. 17.
221
Coalition Agreement 2021-2025, p. 121. The Coalition Agreement also commits to ensuring the institution’s
independence and adequate resources.
222
Law on the amendment of the general anti-discrimination law of 23 May 2022.
223
The opinion provides for an election of the director by the Bundestag, following a proposal by the
Government, for a period of five years (disconnecting it from the legislative mandate), with a possibility to
24
additional competencies and appropriate financial and human resources for the Federal Anti-
Discrimination Agency. As regards the German Institute for Human Rights, the coalition
agreement commits to increasing its financial and human resources, which corresponds to a
long-standing demand of the Institute, which currently often relies on project-based
funding224
. The re-accreditation of the Institute, which functions as the National Human
Rights Institution, was deferred by the Sub-Committee on accreditation (SCA) of the Global
Alliance of Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) for 18 months during the session in March
2022. In its deferral decision, the SCA in particular encouraged the German Institute for
Human Rights to advocate for amendments to its mandate that would strengthen its
protection mandate, including its capacity to monitor and have access to places of deprivation
of liberty225
. The Institute has proposed that the Federal Parliament change its rule of
procedures, to ensure that the Institute is invited ex officio to parliamentary hearings, instead
of relying on invitations by specific parliamentary groups, also to avoid any appearance of
politicisation226
.
Civil society continues to face practical challenges due to the uncertainty of their tax-
exempt status, while a reform of the rules has been announced. While civic space in
Germany continues to be considered as ‘open’227
, as noted in the 2020 and 2021 Rule of Law
Reports, the legal uncertainty related to the political activity of civil society organisations
(CSOs) with tax-exempt status continues to be a challenge in practice228
. While an
administrative decree adopted in January 2022 provides clarifications on the current situation
in line with the case law of the Federal Finance Court229
, stakeholders continue to raise
concerns over the limitations for CSOs to engage in ‘political activity’ while maintaining
their tax-exempt status230
. In particular, certain associations may be unable to carry out their
charitable purpose without use of political means231
. In this context, civil society continues to
report about cases of pressure on CSOs by political actors through legal action and threats
related to their tax-exempt status232
, which can lead them to refrain from taking any political
be renewed once. The opinion also asks for details of the selection procedure to be regulated in the law on
anti-discrimination, referring also to Commission Recommendation 2018/951 on Standards for Equality in
view of allowing for more independence of the Agency. German Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency,
Advisory Council – Recommendations for a Reform of the procedure for the appointment of the Director.
224
Contribution from ENNHRI for the 2022 Rule of Law Report – Germany, p. 4.
225
Report and Recommendations of the Virtual Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), 14-25
March 2022. In addition, the SCA notes a number of points related to the selection and appointment of the
head of the NHRI, the composition of the board of trustees, the term of office of the board of directors and
the adequate funding of the institute.
226
Contribution from ENNHRI for the 2022 Rule of Law Report – Germany, p. 4.
227
Rating given by Civicus, Germany. Ratings are on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed,
obstructed, repressed and closed.
228
2020 Rule of Law report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 12 and 2021 Rule of
Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Germany, p. 17.
229
Ministry of Finance (2022), Revision of the administrative decree on the Fiscal Code.
230
Contribution from Allianz für Rechtssicherheit für politische Willensbildung for the 2022 Rule of Law
Report, pp. 18-19. Contribution from ENNHRI for the 2022 Rule of Law Report, p. 5. Contribution from
Civil Liberties Union for Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law Report – Germany, pp. 8-9.
231
This would include means such as protests or petitions. In addition, not all charitable organisations can
identify a defined charitable purpose in the tax code that captures their activity. Franet (2022), Country
research - Legal environment and space of civil society organisations in supporting fundamental rights –
Germany, p. 4. See also Contribution from Allianz für Rechtssicherheit für politische Willensbildung for the
2022 Rule of Law Report, pp. 18-19 and Contribution from Civil Society Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law
Report, p. 9.
232
This can e.g. take the form of parliamentary questions asking to revoke the tax-exempt status of the
organisations working against right-wing extremism that have criticised individual political parties or their
25
positions or engaging in advocacy work, and have started to systematically document such
cases233
. The coalition agreement includes the commitment to present a legislative
amendment that would clarify that charitable organisations can, within their charitable
purpose, conduct political activity and can also occasionally take political positions on other
issues outside its main field of activity234
. Council of Europe recommendations underline that
any form of public support for NGOs should be governed by clear and objective criteria235
.
To support civil society, the new Government also intends to present a ‘democracy support
law’ in 2023, which responds to a demand from CSOs to create a more sustainable
framework for federal funding for democratic engagement236
, as well as to develop a new
national strategy for engagement in cooperation with civil society237
.
actions. Contributions from Allianz für Rechtssicherheit für politische Willensbildung and from Civil
Liberties Union for Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law Report – Germany.
233
An alliance of German civil society organisations has been formed to advocate for change in this area, which
collects examples of concrete cases of such pressure on CSOs (Allianz für Rechtssicherheit für politische
Willensbildung). See an anonymised list of examples of organisations affected by the loss of the tax-exempt
status or related threats here: https://www.zivilgesellschaft-ist-gemeinnuetzig.de/beispiele-fuer-
gemeinnuetzigkeitsprobleme/.
234
Coalition Agreement 2021-2025, p. 117.
235
Recommendation Rec(2007)14 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the legal status of
non-governmental organisations in Europe, para 58.
236
Contribution from ENNHRI for the 2022 Rule of Law report - Germany, p. 5. Position Paper by
Bundesnetzwerk Bürgerschaftliches Engagement (2021) for the 2021 elections.
237
Coalition Agreement 2021-2025, p. 117.
26
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order*
* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2022 Rule of Law report
can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2022-rule-law-report-targeted-stakeholder-
consultation_en.
Abgeordnetenwatch (2021), ‘Many representatives breached transparency rules’ (‘Zahlreiche
Abgeordnete verstießen gegen Transparenzvorschriften’)
https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/recherchen/nebentaetigkeiten/zahlreiche-abgeordnete-
verstiessen-gegen-transparenzvorschriften.
Allianz für Rechtssicherheit für politische Willensbildung (2022), Contribution from Allianz für
Rechtssicherheit für politische Willensbildung for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.
ARD (2022), Contribution from ARD for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.
Bavarian Ministry of Justice (2022), Press statement of 2 June 2022 on the Conference of Justice
Ministers https://www.justiz.bayern.de/presse-und-medien/pressemitteilungen/archiv/2022/99.php.
Bayrischer Rundfunk (2021), 'Mask deals – Tax investigations against Andrea Tandler' (Maskendeals
- Steuerermittlungen gegen Andrea Tandler) https://www.br.de/nachrichten/bayern/maskendeals-
steuerermittlungen-gegen-andrea-tandler,SrUydO1.
Bundesnetzwerk Bürgerschaftliches Engagement (2021), Position Paper by Bundesnetzwerk
Bürgerschaftliches Engagement for the 2021 elections (Engagementpolitische Empfehlungen des
Bundesnetzwerk Bürgerschaftliches Engagement (BBE) für ein Regierungsprogramm der 20.
Legislaturperiode (Langfassung)) https://www.b-b-
e.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/06_Service/02_Publikationen/2021/2021-bbe-reihe-positionen-003.pdf.
Bundesrat (2021), Draft Law on strengthening courts in economic disputes (Entwurf eines Gesetzes
zur Stärkung der Gerichte in Wirtschaftsstreitigkeiten)
https://www.bundesrat.de/SharedDocs/drucksachen/2022/0001-0100/79-
22(B).pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1.
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2022), Media pluralism monitor 2022.
Civicus, Monitor tracking civic space – Germany https://monitor.civicus.org/country/germany/.
Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2022), Contribution from Civil Liberties Union for Europe for the
2022 Rule of Law Report.
Civil Society Europe (2022), Contribution from Civil Society Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law
Report.
Commission for the determination of concentration in the media sector (KEK, Kommission zur
Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich) (2022), Media concentration https://www.kek-
online.de/medienkonzentration.
Conference of the Justice Ministers (2021), Further development of video hearings in court
proceedings (Weiterentwicklung der Videoverhandlung im Gerichtsverfahren)
https://www.justiz.nrw/JM/jumiko/beschluesse/2021/Herbstkonferenz_2021/TOP-I_-1---
Videoverhandlungen.pdf.
Conference of the Justice Ministers (2021), Pact for the Rule of Law – Pact for the strengthening of
justice (Pakt für den Rechtsstaat - Stärkungspakt Justiz)
https://www.justiz.nrw.de/JM/jumiko/beschluesse/2021/Herbstkonferenz_2021/TOP-I_-14---Pakt-
fuer-den-Rechtsstaat.pdf.
Conference of the Justice Ministers (2021), Urgent need for reform to deal with mass procedures
(Dringender Reformbedarf zur Bewältigung von Massenverfahren)
https://www.justiz.nrw.de/JM/jumiko/beschluesse/2021/Herbstkonferenz_2021/TOP-I_-11---
Dringender-Reformbedarf-zur-Bewaeltigung-von-Massenverfahren.pdf.
27
Conference of the Justice Ministers (2022), Pact for the Rule of Law – Pact for the Strengthening of
Justice (Pakt für den Rechtsstaat – Stärkungspakt Justiz)
https://www.justiz.bayern.de/media/pdf/top_i.14_-_pakt_f%C3%BCr_den_rechtsstaat.pdf.
Conference of the State Parties to the UN Convention against Corruption (2020), Implementation
Review Group, Executive Summary – Germany
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/E
xecutiveSummaries2/V2000216e.pdf.
Correctiv (2022), Export champion Germany – the corruption file (Exportmeister Deutschland: Die
Korruptions-Akte) https://correctiv.org/aktuelles/korruption/2022/03/10/exportmeister-deutschland-
die-korruptions-akte/.
Council of Europe, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists –
Germany. https://fom.coe.int/en/alerte?years=2022&typeData=1&time=1653914309287.
Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2000), Recommendation Rec(2000)19 of the Committee
of Ministers on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system.
Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2007), Recommendation Rec(2007)14 of the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the legal status of non-governmental organisations in
Europe.
Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers (2010), Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the
Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities.
Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2021), Republic of Moldova - Joint opinion of the Venice
Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of
Europe on some measures related to the selection of candidates for administrative positions in bodies
of self-administration of judges and prosecutors and the amendment of some normative acts (CDL-
AD(2021)046).
Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2022), Opinion no. 1073/2021 on the Introduction of the
procedure of renewal of security vetting through amendments to the Courts Act (CDL(2022)005).
Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 24 November 2020, AZ, C-510/19,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:953.
Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 27 May 2019, Minister for Justice and Equality
v OG and PI, Joines Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2019:456.
Die Zeit (2021), ‘BGH must deal with mask affair’ (‘BGH muss sich mit Maskenaffäre befassen’)
https://www.zeit.de/news/2021-11/18/bgh-muss-sich-mit-maskenaffaere-befassen.
Directorate-General for Communication (2019), Flash Eurobarometer 482: businesses’ attitudes
towards corruption in the EU.
Directorate-General for Communication (2020), Special Eurobarometer 502: corruption.
Directorate-General for Communication (2022), Flash Eurobarometer 507: businesses’ attitudes
towards corruption in the EU.
Directorate-General for Communication (2022), Special Eurobarometer 523: corruption.
District Court Berlin (2021), International chambers in the District Court Berlin (Internationale
Kammern beim Landgericht Berlin) https://www.berlin.de/gerichte/landgericht/das-
gericht/zustaendigkeiten/internationale-kammern/artikel.1034131.php.
European Association of Judges (2022), Contribution from the European Association of Judges for
the 2022 Rule of Law Report.
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2021), Mapping Media Freedom – Monitoring
Report 2021.
28
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Mapping Media Freedom – Country profile:
Germany.
European Commission (2020), 2020 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation
in Germany.
European Commission (2021), 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation
in Germany.
European Commission (2021), December infringement package: key decisions
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_21_6201?fbclid=IwAR1w6wbHhdcA5vxlq
XTohUjxcgF7mJbpSBxTXjxaNWXpMJ0MIzb9Zyuwv7I.
European Commission (2021), June infringement package: key decisions
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/INF_21_2743.
European Commission (2022), 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard.
European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 9 June 2016, Madaus v. Germany, 44164/14.
European Implementation Network (2022), Contribution from the European Implementation Network
for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.
European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI) (2021), Contribution from the
European Network of National Human Rights Institutions for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.
Franet, German Institute for Human Rights (2022), Country research - Legal environment and space
of civil society organisations in supporting fundamental rights – Germany, Vienna, EU Agency for
Fundamental Rights https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2022/civic-space-2022-update#country-
related.
German Association of Judges (2021), After the Pact is before the Pact (Nach dem Pakt ist vor dem
Pakt) https://www.drb.de/newsroom/presse-mediencenter/nachrichten-auf-einen-
blick/nachricht/news/nach-dem-pakt-ist-vor-dem-pakt.
German Association of Judges (2021), Contribution from the German Association of Judges for the
2021 Rule of Law Report.
German Association of Judges (2022), Contribution from the German Association of Judges for the
2022 Rule of Law Report.
German Association of Judges (2022), Gap in entry level salaries remains wide (Schere bei
Einstiegsbesoldung bleibt weit geöffnet) https://www.richterbesoldung.de/besoldung-
versorgung/besoldungsmeldungen/meldung/news/schere-bei-einstiegsbesoldung-bleibt-weit-
geoeffnet.
German Association of Judges (2022), Make use of all legal options in case of Meier (Alle rechtlichen
Möglichkeiten im Fall Maier ausschöpfen) https://www.drb.de/newsroom/presse-
mediencenter/nachrichten-auf-einen-blick/nachricht/news/alle-rechtlichen-moeglichkeiten-im-fall-
maier-ausschoepfen.
German Bar Association (2021), Contribution from the German Bar Association for the 2021 Rule of
Law Report.
German Bar Association (2022), Contribution from the German Bar Association for the 2022 Rule of
Law Report.
German Federal Administrative Court, Summary of Case law on access to information of the Federal
Intelligence Service https://www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen/pdf/080721U6A10.20.0.pdf.
German Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency, Advisory Council - Recommendations for a Reform of
the procedure for the appointment of the Director (Empfehlungen zur Änderung des Verfahrens zur
Besetzung der Leitung) https://www.antidiskriminierungsstelle.de/DE/ueber-
uns/beirat/beschluesse_des_beirats/beschluesse_des_beirats_node.html.
29
German Federal Bar (2022), Contribution from the German Federal Bar for the 2022 Rule of Law
Report.
German Federal Constitutional Court (2021), Constitutional Complaints on the ‘Federal emergency
break’ unsuccessful (Verfassungsbeschwerden betreffend Ausgangs- und Kontaktbeschränkungen im
Vierten Gesetz zum Schutz der Bevölkerung bei einer epidemischen Lage von nationaler Tragweite
(„Bundesnotbremse“) erfolglos)
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2021/bvg21-101.html.
German Federal Constitutional Court (2022), 2021 Annual Report
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Jahresbericht/jahresbericht_20
21.pdf;jsessionid=F5E6DF8DE85081613AE79D68540DC5BC.2_cid506?__blob=publicationFile&v
=8.
German Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of the First Senate of 25 March 2014, 1 BvF 1/11
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/e/fs20140325_1bvf000111en.html.
German Federal Constitutional Court, Written contribution from the German Federal Constitutional
Court in the context of the country visit.
German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) (2021), Federal overview on corruption
2020 (Bundeslagebild Korruption 2020)
https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/Korrupti
on/korruptionBundeslagebild2020.html;jsessionid=CAD4A2CA52733E972C2ED787931E94B3.live6
02?nn=28078.
German Federal Finance Court (2022), Dr. Hans-Josef Thesling new President of the Finance Court
(Dr. Hans-Josef Thesling neuer Präsident des Bundesfinanzhofs)
https://www.bundesfinanzhof.de/de/presse/pressemeldungen/detail/dr-hans-josef-thesling-neuer-
praesident-des-bundesfinanzhofs/.
German Federal Government (2022), Input from Germany for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.
German Federal Government, Reply to Parliamentary Question on Attacks on media professionals in
the context of pandemic-related protests (Angriffe auf Medienschaffende im Kontext von
pandemiebezogenen Protesten) (Bundestag Drucksache 20/949)
https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/009/2000949.pdf.
German Federal Ministry of Finance (2022), Revision of the administrative decree on the Fiscal Code
(Änderung des Anwendungserlasses zur Abgabenordnung)
https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Downloads/BMF_Schreiben/Weitere_Steuerth
emen/Abgabenordnung/AO-Anwendungserlass/2022-01-12-aenderung-des-anwendungserlasses-zur-
abgabenordnung-AEAO.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.
German Federal Ministry of Health (2021), Law amending the Infection Protection Law and other
laws on the occasion of the repeal of the determination of the epidemic situation of national
importance (Gesetz zur Änderung des Infektionsschutzgesetzes und weiterer Gesetze anlässlich der
Aufhebung der Feststellung der epidemischen Lage von nationaler Tragweite)
https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/ministerium/gesetze-und-verordnungen/guv-20-
lp/ifsg-aend.html.
German Federal Ministry of Interior (2021), Integrity in the public administration – annual Report
2020, (Integrität in der Bundesverwaltung – Jahresbericht 2020)
https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/themen/moderne-
verwaltung/integritaet-der-
verwaltung/integritaetsbericht2020.pdf;jsessionid=B6E3588608AF5FCBE802891194D5CCBB.1_cid
295?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
German Federal Ministry of Justice (2020), Business Integrity Strengthening Act (Gesetz zur
Stärkung der Integritär der
30
Wirtschaft)https://www.bmj.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/DE/Staerkung_Integritaet_Wirts
chaft.html.
German Federal Ministry of Justice (2020), Courts at federal level and of the Länder (Gerichte des
Bundes und der Länder)
https://www.bmj.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/PDF/Anzahl_der_Gerichte_des_Bundes_und_der_L
aender.pdf;jsessionid=2F6B80E7093D8B4F32366E2443C2259C.2_cid334?__blob=publicationFile&
v=3.
German Federal Ministry of Justice (31 April 2022), Better protection for whistleblowers (Besserer
Schutz für Hinweisgeber)
https://www.bmj.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2022/0413_Hinweisgeberschutz.html.
German Federal Parliament (2021), Follow-up rules on the occasion of the lifting of the epidemic
situation (Folgeregelungen an-lässlich der Auf-hebung der epi-de-mischen Lage beraten)
https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2021/kw45-de-infektionsschutzgesetz-867578.
German Federal Parliament (2022), Handbook for interest representatives to register in the lobby
register (Handbuch für Interessenvertreterinnen und Interessenvertreter zur Eintragung in das
Lobbyregister) https://www.lobbyregister.bundestag.de/informationen-und-hilfe/handbuch.
German Journalists’ Association (2021), Press release – SLAPPS: Against the abuse of claims
(SLAPPS: Gegen Klagemissbrauch) https://www.djv.de/startseite/profil/der-djv/pressebereich-
download/pressemitteilungen/detail/news-gegen-klagemissbrauch.
German Journalists’ Association, Right to information under press law from federal authorities
(Presserechtlicher Auskunftsanspruch bei Bundesbehörden)
https://www.djv.de/startseite/info/themen-wissen/presserechtlicher-auskunftsanspruch.
German Judges’ Magazine (12/21). Civil Justice at the beginning of a deep crisis (Ziviljustiz am
Beginn einer tiefen Krise).
German Judges’ Magazine (1/22), Interview with Supreme Court President Bettina Limperg.
German Judges’ Magazine (3/22), Progress with recruitments at the Federal Courts (Personeller
Aufbruch an den obersten Bundesgerichten).
Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (2021), Report and Recommendations of the
Virtual Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2021-
12/SCA-Report-October-2021_E.pdf.
GRECO (2020), Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report on Germany on preventing corruption
and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement
agencies.
GRECO (2021), Fourth Evaluation Round – Interim compliance report Germany on corruption
prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors.
Hessen, Bayern, Brandenburg, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saarland,
Niedersachen and Schleswig-Holstein (2021), Joint letter of 3 February 2021.
High Administrative Court of Bavaria, judgment of 1 February 2022, 6 CE 21.2708.
Higher Administrative Court of North-Rhine Westphalia (2022), Annual Report.
Human Rights Watch (2021), Germany’s New Surveillance Laws Raise Privacy Concerns
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/24/germanys-new-surveillance-laws-raise-privacy-concerns.
Human Rights Watch (2022), Contribution from the Human Rights Watch for the 2022 Rule of Law
Report.
Legal Tribune Online (2022), Once again five years’ experience for leading a Federal Court (Wieder
fünf Jahre Erfahrung für Führung eines Bundesgerichts)
31
https://www.lto.de/recht/justiz/j/bundesjustizminister-marco-buschmann-bundesgerichte-
bundesrichter-fuehrung-praesident-anforderung-erfahrung-korrigiert/.
Lobbycontrol (2021), ‘Lobbying undermines democracy – Ten theses’ (‘Lobbyismus höhlt die
Demokratie aus: Zehn Thesen’) https://www.lobbycontrol.de/lobbyismus-hoehlt-die-demokratie-aus-
zehn-thesen/.
Lobbycontrol (2021), ‘The lobby register is coming – Our evaluation’ (‘Das Lobbyregister kommt –
Unsere Auswertung’) https://www.lobbycontrol.de/2021/03/das-lobbyregister-kommt/.
LobbyControl, Lobbypedia – Cooling-off Period (Karenzzeit) https://lobbypedia.de/wiki/Karenzzeit.
Lobbyranking of the Länder 2022 (Lobbyranking der Bundesländer 2022) https://lobbyranking.de/.
New Judges’ Association (Neue Richtervereinigung), Position paper on the draft law on instructions
to prosecutors from 2021 https://www.neuerichter.de/fileadmin/user_upload/fg_strafrecht/2021-
01_FG_StrR_Stn_externe_Weisung_StA.pdf.
OECD (2021), Working Group on Bribery - Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase
4 - Two Year Follow-Up Report Germany https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/germany-phase-4-
follow-up-report.pdf.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2021), International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights – Concluding observations on the seventh periodic review of Germany
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/357/46/PDF/G2135746.pdf?OpenElement.
Open Knowledge Foundation (2021), Transparency Ranking
https://transparenzranking.de/static/files/ifg-ranking.pdf.
Press Council (2022), Annual report 2021 (Jahresbericht 2021)
https://www.presserat.de/files/presserat/bilder/Downloads%20Jahresberichte/Jahresbericht2021-
vero%CC%88ffentlicht.pdf.
Reporters without Borders (2022), Close-up view Germany (Nahaufnahme Deutschland),
https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/nahaufnahme/2022.
Reporters without Borders (2022), Contribution from Reporters without Borders for the 2022 Rule of
Law Report.
Reporters without Borders (28 October 2021), RSF and Journalists sue against ‘state trojans’ (RSF
und Journalisten klagen gegen Staatstrojaner),https://www.reporter-ohne-
grenzen.de/deutschland/alle-meldungen/meldung/journalisten-klagen-gegen-staatstrojaner.
Reporters without Borders – Germany, https://rsf.org/en/country/germany.
Rundfunkkommission der Länder (2021), Draft discussion paper on the order and structural
optimisation of the public service broadcaster (Diskussionsentwurf zu Auftrag und
Strukturoptimierung des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks) https://www.rlp.de/fileadmin/rlp-stk/pdf-
Dateien/Medienpolitik/Synopse_MAEStV_Reform_OERR_Nov2021.pdf.
SPD, The Greens and FDP (2021), Coalition Agreement 2021-2025 (Koalitionsvertrag 2021-2025)
https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/974430/1990812/04221173eef9a6720059cc353d759a
2b/2021-12-10-koav2021-data.pdf?download=1.
State Government of Rheinland-Pfalz (2022), Amendments to the State Media Treaty adopted - brand
of public service broadcasting strengthened (Änderungen des Medienstaatsvertrags angenommen -
Markenkern des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks gestärkt)
https://www.rlp.de/de/aktuelles/einzelansicht/news/News/detail/aenderungen-des-
medienstaatsvertrags-angenommen-markenkern-des-oeffentlich-rechtlichen-rundfunks-ges/.
Tagesschau (2021), ‘Mask affair – kisses and commissions’ (Maskenaffäre – Bussis und Provisionen)
https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr-wdr/emix-masken-provisionen-103.html
Transparency International (2022), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021.
32
Transparency International Germany (2018), Comments and Recommendations on UNCAC Second
Review Cycle (Chapters II and V) – Review of Germany
https://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Aktuelles/Stellungnahmen/2018/18-09-
10_Comments_and_Recommendations_UNCAC_Second_Review_Cycle.pdf.
Transparency International Germany (2021), ‘Ancillary income: Hundreds of thousands of euros from
MEPs remained undiscovered for years’ (‘Nebeneinkünfte: Hunderttausende Euro von Abgeordneten
blieben jahrelang unentdeckt’) https://www.transparency.de/aktuelles/detail/article/nebeneinkuenfte-
hunderttausende-euro-von-abgeordneten-blieben-jahrelang-unentdeckt/.
Transparency International Germany (2022), Contribution from Transparency International Germany
for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.
Transparency International Germany (21 May 2021), ‘More than 20.000 euros: Özdemir has also
forgotten to report special payments’ (Mehr als 20.000 Euro: Auch Özdemir hat vergessen,
Sonderzahlungen zu melden) https://www.transparency.de/aktuelles/detail/article/mehr-als-20000-
euro-auch-oezdemir-hat-vergessen-sonderzahlungen-zu-melden/.
Transparency International Germany (24 May 2021), ‘Lauterbach reports fees belatedly’ (‘Lauterbach
meldet Honorare nach’) https://www.transparency.de/aktuelles/detail/article/lauterbach-meldet-
honorare-nach/.
UN Human Rights Regional Office for Europe (OCHCR) (2022), Contribution from the UN Human
Rights Regional Office for Europe for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2016), Country Review Report of the Federal Republic of Germany -
Review by the Czech Republic and Denmark of the implementation by Germany of articles 15 - 42 of
Chapter III “Criminalization and law enforcement” and articles 44 - 50 of Chapter IV “International
cooperation” of the United Nations Convention against Corruption for the review cycle 2010 – 2015
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/CountryVisitFinalReports/2022_02_04_Germany
_Cycle_I_Country_Report_EN.pdf.
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2020), Review by Greece and Croatia of the implementation by
Germany of articles 5-14 and 51-59 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption for the
review cycle 2016-2021
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/CountryVisitFinalReports/2020_11_06_Germany
_Final_Country_Report.pdf.
ZDF (2022), Contribution from ZDF for the 2022 Rule of Law Report.
33
Annex II: Country visit to Germany
The Commission services held virtual meetings in March 2022 with:
 ARD
 Association of Judges
 Bundesnetzwerk Bürgerschaftliches Engagement (Network for Civil Engagement)
 EU Affairs Committee of the Justice Ministers’ Conference
 Federal Administrative Court
 Federal Bar
 Federal Constitutional Court
 Federal Criminal Police, Anti-corruption unit
 Federal Supreme Court
 German Association of Judges
 German Association of Journalists
 German Bar Association
 German Institute for Human Rights
 German Publishers’ Association
 German Union of Journalists
 Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte
 Joint Office of the Media Authorities
 Lobbycontrol DE
 Ministry of Justice
 Ministry of Interior
 Ministry of State for Culture and Media
 Prosecution Service
 Transparency International Germany
 ZDF
* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:
 Amnesty International
 Article 19
 Civil Liberties Union for Europe
 Civil Society Europe
 European Centre for Press and Media Freedom
 European Civic Forum
 European Federation of Journalists
 European Partnership for Democracy
 European Youth Forum
 Free Press Unlimited
 Human Rights Watch
 ILGA Europe
 International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
 International Press Institute
 Open Society European Policy Institute (OSEPI)
 Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa
 Philea
 Reporters Without Borders
 Transparency International Europe