NATO Summit Madrid - Policy brief
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NATO Summit Madrid - Policy brief
https://www.ft.dk/samling/20211/almdel/npa/bilag/0/2605533.pdf
NATO MADRID SUMMIT 29-30 JUNE 2022 Policy Brief 136 SPE 22 E | Original: English | July 2022 This Policy Brief is presented for information only and does not represent the official view of the Assembly. Offentligt NPA Alm.del - Bilag 31 NATO's Parlamentariske Forsamling 2021-22 136 SPE 22 E 1 1. The recent NATO Summit in Madrid was a “transformative” event for the Alliance in the words of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. The Summit demonstrated Allied unity and resolve in meeting the key security challenges of today and tomorrow. It took place against the background of the greatest security threat to the Euro-Atlantic area since the Cold War and set the stage for a number of important decisions on the future trajectory of the Alliance: - the adoption of a new Strategic Concept for NATO; - inviting Sweden and Finland to join NATO; - a new concept for NATO deterrence and defence; - a recommitment to increase defence spending and an agreement to increase NATO common funding; - enhanced support for Ukraine; - deepened cooperation with key partners; - enhanced resilience - new initiatives in support of defence innovation; and - reaffirming NATO’s role in addressing the security impact of climate change. 2. The NATO PA President, Gerald E. Connolly, addressed Allied leaders on the final day of the Summit (Allies-only format), stressing the importance of recommitting NATO to its democratic foundations (read the full speech). 3. Ahead of the Madrid Summit, the Assembly adopted its own recommendations for NATO’s next Strategic Concept as well declarations on Standing with Ukraine and on Confronting Russia’s Threat which included further recommendations for how the Alliance should demonstrate its support for Ukraine and address the threat from Russia at the Madrid Summit. Many of the Summit’s decisions are well in line with the priorities identified by the Assembly. I. PROGRAMME 4. The two-day programme of the Summit covered three individual working sessions as well as a transatlantic working dinner for Heads of State and Government and separate dinners for Foreign and Defence Ministers. A roundtable discussion of Women Foreign and Defence Ministers from Allied Countries was held for the first time. 5. During the first session on 29 June, Allied leaders welcomed President Zelensky’s participation via VTC and received from him a sobering assessment of the current situation in Ukraine. Leaders firmly reiterated that NATO stands in full solidarity with the government and the people of Ukraine in the defence of their country. 6. During the second session, also on 29 June, Allied leaders welcomed for the first time Indo-Pacific partners Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand, along with Finland, Georgia and Sweden, and the Presidents of the European Council and European Commission. The meeting aimed to demonstrate the shared commitment by NATO and its partners to shared values and to the rules- based international order. NATO and the European Union have also responded in 136 SPE 22 E 2 unison to Russia’s war against Ukraine, thereby strengthening their strategic partnership. 7. Following the various working dinners the previous evening, the final session was held on 30 June, among Allied leaders, to address the issue of countering terrorism and addressing threats and challenges from the South. NATO PA President Gerald E. Connolly addressed leaders at the beginning of this session. II. KEY MESSAGES IN THE NATO PA PRESIDENT’S ADDRESS 8. In his address, the NATO PA President urged Allied leaders, as they implement the new Strategic Concept and the Summit’s important decisions, to reaffirm and operationalise NATO’s commitment to shared democratic values. 9. Welcoming the adoption of NATO’s new Strategic Concept – the Alliance’s top strategic guidance – President Connolly stated: “This Alliance will not allow authoritarianism to extinguish the flame of democracy. This Alliance will not allow President Putin to stamp out the embers of democratic ambition, wherever they burn”. 10. Russia’s war against Ukraine, he stressed, was a tragic illustration of the global contest of values: “People are dying in Ukraine as we speak for daring to embrace the democratic ideal. For daring to associate themselves with us – an Alliance that through solidarity, sense of purpose, and courage won the Cold War.” 11. To gird itself against “the march of authoritarianism”, NATO needed to “move beyond the rhetorical in our commitment to democratic institutions”, Mr Connolly argued. Specifically, the Assembly has recommended that NATO should establish a Democratic Resilience Centre at NATO Headquarters to serve as a resource and clearinghouse on democratic benchmarks – a proposal which currently has the backing of 29 out of 30 Allies. “To reject this proposal is to turn a blind eye to what Putin is doing in Ukraine and let a cancer that threatens our future continue to grow.” 12. President Connolly also welcomed the invitation extended by Allied leaders to Finland and Sweden to join NATO. As it has in the past, the Assembly will play its part in speeding up ratification in the Alliance’s 30 parliaments. 13. Mr Connolly further urged prompt and full implementation of NATO’s strengthened deterrence and defence posture, particularly in the East of the Alliance, and welcomed the new Strategic Concept’s recognition of the challenges posed by China’s ambitions and coercive policies. He also highlighted the need for the Alliance to address simultaneously other threats and challenges, including the persistent, direct threat of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, instability in the South and other neighbouring regions of the Alliance and the impact of climate change. 136 SPE 22 E 3 III. KEY OUTCOMES OF THE SUMMIT 14. The key decisions taken at the Summit are laid out in the Madrid declaration issued on 29 June 2022. a. A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT 15. NATO’s last Strategic Concept was dating back to 2010, when partnership cooperation with Russia still appeared possible. Now, peace in the Euro-Atlantic area has been shattered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In Madrid, NATO leaders therefore adopted a new Concept that provides a blueprint setting out how NATO will tackle the entire range of security threats it currently faces. 16. The new Strategic Concept is a public document. It makes clear that Allies consider Russia the most significant and direct threat to security at this point in time. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is the other, most direct asymmetric threat, as terrorist organisations threaten the security of Allied populations, forces and territory. The Strategic Concept also addresses China for the first time and the challenges that Beijing poses to the security, interests and values of the Alliance. 17. Beyond that, the Strategic Concept covers the evolving approach to a number of other threats and challenges, including energy security, cyber threats, climate change, technological innovation and hybrid warfare. 18. Importantly, as the Assembly has recommended, the new Strategic Concept places the Alliance’s shared democratic values at the heart of NATO’s response to today’s threats and challenges. The text of the new Concept includes references to these values throughout. 19. Paragraph 2 of the Strategic Concept affirms: “We are bound together by common values: individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law.” The second paragraph of the section on the threat environment highlights the growing threat of authoritarianism, stating: “Authoritarian actors challenge our interests, values and democratic way of life.” The Concept concludes with the following commitment: “As Allies, we will continue to stand together to defend our security, values, and democratic way of life”. 20. The Madrid Strategic Concept reiterates the three core tasks identified in the 2010 Concept – deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management and cooperative security. However, in light of Russia’s war, it puts significant emphasis on the need to strengthen collective defence. 21. See the full text of the Madrid Strategic Concept here and a factsheet here. 22. The Assembly was closely engaged throughout the consultation phase of the development of the new Strategic Concept. Its own recommendations for the new Concept – adopted in late February 2022 - are available here. 136 SPE 22 E 4 b. FINLAND AND SWEDEN 23. In an historic development, NATO leaders clearly reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment to the Open Door Policy, by deciding to invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO. Leaders welcomed the conclusion of the trilateral memorandum between Türkiye, Finland and Sweden that set the stage for this important phase of Alliance enlargement. Accession Protocols were signed at NATO HQ on 5 July. The membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO (and the NATO PA) will be completed once individual parliaments of NATO nations will ratify the Accession Protocols. Allied leaders stated that the security of Finland and Sweden is of direct importance to the Alliance, including during the accession process. c. DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE 24. In the face of the strategic shock of Russia’s aggression, leaders agreed a fundamental shift in NATO’s defence posture, labelled by NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg as the biggest overhaul of Allied collective defence since the Cold War. 25. First and foremost, NATO will strengthen the battlegroups already positioned in the eastern part of the Alliance up to brigade-level. 26. Beyond that, NATO’s force structure will be transformed to increase the number of high readiness forces up from 40,000 to well over 300,000. NATO will also boost its ability to reinforce during crisis and conflict by securing: • more pre-positioned equipment and stockpiles of military supplies; • more forward-deployed capabilities, like air defence; • strengthened command and control; and • upgraded defence plans, with forces pre-assigned to defend specific Allies. 27. These additional contributions will significantly enhance the ability of NATO forces to exercise together with home defence forces and to become familiar with local terrain, facilities and the new pre-positioned stocks. All of this will ensure NATO remains ready to protect and defend Allies against any threat, at any time. d. DEFENCE SPENDING AND NATO COMMON FUNDING 28. Another important Summit decision, linked to this enhanced defence posture, is a commitment to provide necessary resources to fund this new effort. 29. 2022 will be the eighth consecutive year of increases across European Allies and Canada. By the end of the year, these will have invested well over 350 billion US dollars since Allies agreed a Defence Investment Pledge at their Wales Summit in 2014. The US defence budget continues to be robust. 30. NATO leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the 2014 pledge and to build on it. They will decide next year on subsequent commitments beyond 2024. 31. This decision also includes a commitment to ensure that increased national defence expenditures and NATO common funding will be commensurate with the challenges of a more contested security order. 136 SPE 22 E 5 32. The agreement on common funding foresees an upward trajectory – “a considerable significant increase” in the words of Secretary General Stoltenberg – up to 2030. The Secretary General further explained: “The specific figures will be decided in the yearly or annual budgets. What I can say is that the agreement we have reached today [...] will enable us to invest more together in prepositioned equipment, in hardened shelters, in infrastructure, and to ensure that we can plug and play capabilities together in NATO. Also with more command and control and also to provide more support to our partners and also to have more exercises.” e. SUPPORT TO UKRAINE 33. The Madrid Summit’s fifth important decision was to upgrade a comprehensive support package for Ukraine. Allies already spend billions of Euros’ worth of military, financial and humanitarian assistance to support Ukraine. The strengthened Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine includes substantial deliveries of non-lethal support in areas like secure communications, anti-drone systems and fuel. In addition, over the longer term, NATO will help Ukraine transition from Soviet-era military equipment to modern NATO equipment, boost interoperability and further strengthen Ukrainian defence and security institutions. f. COOPERATION WITH PARTNERS 34. Leaders also agreed to deepen cooperation with partners. NATO will step up cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners including on cyber defence, new technologies, maritime security, climate change and countering disinformation. The Alliance will also continue to deepen the strategic partnership with the EU. 35. Defence capability-building measures were agreed to step up tailored political and practical support to partners, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. These measures will help those partners build their integrity and resilience, develop capabilities and uphold their political independence. Leaders also endorsed capacity-building support to partners from the South, Mauritania – for the first time – and Tunisia. g. ENHANCING RESILIENCE 36. The new Strategic Concept emphasises that ensuring national and collective resilience is critical to NATO’s three core tasks and underpins efforts to safeguard Allied nations, societies and shared values. In line with this guidance, leaders decided to further enhance Allied resilience across all domains, which is a national responsibility and a collective commitment. Nationally-developed goals and implementation plans, guided by objectives developed collectively, continue to play a key role. 37. Allies also endorsed a new chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence policy. Other resilience areas singled out by lLeaders in the Declaration are energy security and resilience against cyber and hybrid threats. Notably, they decided to build and exercise a virtual rapid response cyber capability to respond to significant malicious cyber activities. 136 SPE 22 E 6 h. BOOSTING DEFENCE INNOVATION 38. The Madrid Summit also launched the NATO Innovation Fund, which will invest 1 billion Euros over the next 15 years in start-ups developing dual-use emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence. Together with NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), the new fund will harness the best new technology for transatlantic security. Allies also endorsed a strategy to ensure the seamless delivery of the next generation Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) and related capabilities. i. ADDRESSING THE SECURITY IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 39. To help mitigate the impact of climate change on Allied security, NATO leaders agreed to cut greenhouse gas emissions by NATO bodies and commands by at least 45 per cent by 2030, down to net zero by 2050. They also agreed a new methodology to map military greenhouse gas emissions. The first High-Level Dialogue on Climate Change and Security was held on the margins of the NATO Summit and the Secretary General released his first Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment report. ********** 40. Taken together, these Madrid Summit decisions firmly set the direction for the Alliance’s continued adaptation to the new security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic area. Allies agreed to hold another Summit meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, in 2023. ______________ www.nato-pa.int